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Anti-Bribery and Corruption – Introduction to Country Guides

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Anti-Bribery and Corruption – Introduction to Country Guides Introduction to Country Guides A summary of bribery and corruption risks in Austrade jurisdictions 23 September 2020 Table of Contents Argentina ............................................................................................................................... 4 Australia ................................................................................................................................ 8 Bangladesh ...........................................................................................................................12 Brazil .................................................................................................................................... 15 Brunei ................................................................................................................................... 19 Canada ................................................................................................................................. 22 Chile ..................................................................................................................................... 25 China .................................................................................................................................... 29 Colombia .............................................................................................................................. 34 Czech Republic .................................................................................................................... 38 Fiji ......................................................................................................................................... 42 France .................................................................................................................................. 44 Germany ............................................................................................................................... 48 Ghana ................................................................................................................................... 52 Hong Kong ............................................................................................................................55 India ...................................................................................................................................... 59 Indonesia .............................................................................................................................. 62 Iran ....................................................................................................................................... 65 Israel ..................................................................................................................................... 68 Italy ....................................................................................................................................... 71 Japan .................................................................................................................................... 74 Kenya ................................................................................................................................... 78 Korea, Rep (South Korea) ....................................................................................................82 Kuwait ................................................................................................................................... 86 Malaysia ............................................................................................................................... 89 Mexico .................................................................................................................................. 92 Mongolia ............................................................................................................................... 95 Morocco ................................................................................................................................ 99 Myanmar (aka. Burma) .......................................................................................................103 New Zealand ...................................................................................................................... 106 Pakistan .............................................................................................................................. 108 Papua New Guinea .............................................................................................................111 Peru .................................................................................................................................... 114 Philippines .......................................................................................................................... 117 Poland ................................................................................................................................ 121 Russia ................................................................................................................................ 124 Saudi Arabia ....................................................................................................................... 128 Singapore ........................................................................................................................... 131 page 2 South Africa ........................................................................................................................ 134 Spain .................................................................................................................................. 137 Sri Lanka ............................................................................................................................ 140 Sweden .............................................................................................................................. 143 Switzerland ......................................................................................................................... 146 Taiwan ................................................................................................................................ 149 Thailand .............................................................................................................................. 153 Turkey ................................................................................................................................ 157 United Arab Emirates ..........................................................................................................161 United Kingdom .................................................................................................................. 165 United States of America ....................................................................................................168 Vietnam .............................................................................................................................. 171 page 3 Argentina 1.1 Corruption rating Argentina was ranked 85 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, receiving a score of 40 out of 100 (with 0 being highly corrupt and 100 being very clean).1 This is a slight improvement from Argentina’s previous score of 39 in the 2017 Index. Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer 2017 for Latin America and the Caribbean was conducted via face-to-face surveys in 2017. The barometer identified that 13% of Argentinians surveyed had paid a bribe to at least one public service in the 12 months preceding the survey.2 The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators identified that in 2017, Argentina ranked 48th in the world in relation to the control of corruption. A score of 0 corresponds to the lowest rank (lowest control) and 100 corresponds to the highest rank (highest control).3 1.2 Efforts to improve Argentina has made the following efforts to improve its approach to combatting bribery and corruption: In March 2018, introducing Law 27.401 regarding corporate criminal liability for corruption; In 2016, issuing Decree 1246/2016 which expressly prohibits the tax deductibility of bribes;4 Adopting an online search system to improve detection of cases reported in the media in regard to foreign bribery;5 Creating the Agency for Access to Public Information.6 1.3 Applicable Laws and regulatory bodies The laws that apply to corruption and bribery offences in Argentina are as follows: . The Argentina Penal Code applies to public sector corruption and criminalises domestic and foreign bribery involving public sector officials.7 . Law 27.401 on corporate criminal liability for corruption includes foreign bribery in the offences covered and provides for an ‘effective collaboration agreement’ 1 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2018, available at https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018. 2 Transparency International, People and Corruption: Latin America and the Caribbean Global Corruption Barometer, October 2017, 31. 3 World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators 2017, available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports. 4 OECD, Phase 3bis Report on implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Argentina, March 2017, available at http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/Argentina-Phase-3bis-Report-ENG.pdf. 5 Transparency International, Exporting Corruption: Progress Report 2018: assessing enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
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