Rules of the Game

Daniel Sobelman New Rules of the Game Israel and Hizbollah after the Withdrawal from Lebanon Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies The purpose of the Jaffee Center is, first, to conduct basic research that meets the highest academic standards on matters related to Israel’s national security as well as Middle East regional and international security affairs. The Center also aims to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of issues that are, or should be, at the top of Israel’s national security agenda. The Jaffee Center seeks to address the strategic community in Israel and abroad, including policymakers, opinion-makers, and the general public. The Center publishes research that it deems worthy of public attention, while it maintains a strict policy of non-partisanship on issues of public policy. The opinions expressed in this publication are the author’s alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center, its trustees, boards, research staff, or the organizations and individuals that support its research. Daniel Sobelman New Rules of the Game Israel and Hizbollah after the Withdrawal from Lebanon Memorandum No. 69 January 2004 Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies דניאל סובלמן כללי משחק חדשים ישראל וחזבאללה לאחר הנסיגה מלבנון The study is an updated version of a study that was published in Hebrew in June 2003. English Editor: Judith Rosen Graphic Design: Michal Semo Production: Kedem Printing Ltd., Tel Aviv Cover Photo: from the Hizbollah internet site Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Tel Aviv University Ramat Aviv Tel Aviv 69978 Israel Tel. +972-3-640-9926 Fax. +972-3-642-2404 E-mail: [email protected] http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/ ISBN: 965-459-057-3 © 2004 All rights reserved. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Tel Aviv University Table of Contents Preface 7 Introduction 9 Chapter 1 Historical Background of Hizbollah, “The Party of God” 17 Chapter 2 The Withdrawal: Advance Assessments vs. Actual Developments 25 Reactions in Lebanon and Syria to a Possible Israeli Withdrawal 26 How Would Hizbollah Respond? 27 Israeli Assessments 30 Hizbollah’s Approach to the SLA 38 Would the Palestinians Join the Fray? 39 Chapter 3 Hizbollah Motives and Exigencies 43 The Lebanese Imperative 43 Israel: Threatening and Threatened 46 Syria: Ensuring its Interests via Proxy 46 Iran: Material and Ideological Source 48 Chapter 4 Four Major Junctures since the Withdrawal 51 Transition in Damascus 51 The Rise of Rafiq al-Hariri 56 The al-Aqsa Intifada 60 September 11, 2001 63 Chapter Five The Rules of the Game 67 Acknowledging the Blue Line 67 Shab’a Farms: Legitimate Theater 68 Anti-Aircraft Fire: “An Eye for an Eye” 70 Chapter Six Hizbollah’s Arsenal and Means of Deterrence 83 Arms Procurement 83 Covert Activity and Collaboration with Palestinian Groups 84 Chapter Seven Hizbollah in the Lebanese Domestic Arena 89 Domestic and Economic Intervention 90 Promoting “Resistance” as a Defense of Lebanon 97 Conclusion 99 Appendix 107 Endnotes 111 Bibliography 127 Preface Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000 presented the Lebanese Shiite organization Hizbollah with the most serious crisis since its founding in 1982. Concomitantly, the withdrawal signaled a new era in Israel’s security and political status, since it was no longer considered, either at home or abroad, an occupation force in South Lebanon. The idea of withdrawal from southern Lebanon generated deep reservations in Israel. Many Israeli situation assessments on the eve of the unilateral pullout from the security zone expressed the fear – and even predicted – that Israel’s border settlements would become targets for terrorist activity, which could lead to a major deterioration along the entire northern front. More than three and a half years after the withdrawal, it is clear that although Hizbollah has not ceased its activity against Israel, it is conducting itself in a manner completely different from these forecasts. In the months leading up to the American invasion of Iraq, some conjecture was voiced that Hizbollah would exploit the instability in order to operate against Israel in the north, even though Israeli military intelligence doubted, correctly, that the organization would take advantage of the campaign in Iraq to attack Israel. Indeed, Hizbollah was careful to maintain a low profile during the weeks of fighting in Iraq. Hizbollah leaders, who hid neither their opposition to the American campaign nor their hostility to Saddam Hussein’s regime, remained almost completely silent. They raised their voice only to announce that Hizbollah had not sent assistance to Iraq to repel the invader, and when it was reported from Baghdad that six Hizbollah fighters had been captured on the Syrian-Iraqi border, the organization was quick to issue an official denial. Thus, Hizbollah acted more cautiously and prudently than Syria, which permitted Syrian volunteer fighters to cross into Iraq, a move that brought Syrian-American relations to an unprecedented low point. The leadership in Damascus believed that its conduct was in line with Syria’s national interests and ideology. In this same period, however, Hizbollah turned inward to Lebanese domestic affairs in order to strengthen its position. On April 8, 2003, Hizbollah Deputy Secretary-General Na’im Qasim met with Lebanon’s Maronite patriarch, Nasrallah Butrus Sfeir, for the first time in four years. Qasim told the clergyman, “We are all in the same boat.” As a way of grappling with the ramifications of the Iraq War, Hizbollah leaders met with representatives of 8 Daniel Sobelman most of the Lebanese political parties and earned their public support. This effort at public political integration has continued for many months. This study traces the path taken by Hizbollah since the May 2000 watershed – a path that in many respects determined its conduct during the Iraq War. Predicated on a brief comparison of the turn of events with the scenarios that Israel had forecast, the study includes a detailed description of the developments and stratagems that have shaped the rules of the game on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border. These new rules of the game have allowed the border to enjoy greater stability and quiet than it has experienced in many years, despite the Hizbollah threat that overshadows the lives of Israelis residing in the north. The bulk of my research is based on publicly accessible material from the Lebanese media, as well as Israeli and international sources. I hope to have surveyed the majority of statements, at least the most important ones, made by senior Hizbollah figures in recent years. In addition, I received excellent assistance from academic institutions and researchers, Israeli and foreign diplomats, and officials from Israel’s security establishment, to understand the factors that influenced Israel’s assessment of possible developments on the northern border following its withdrawal. Most of the sources have been footnoted in detail and compiled in the bibliography at the end of this memorandum. I wish to extend my thanks to all of these people for their help, as well as to certain individuals whose names I am not at liberty to divulge. In a few cases I was unable to provide source details because of censorship. The study that follows is based on a monograph that was first published in Hebrew in June 2003. The text that follows has been modified slightly and updated to reflect some recent developments. It is my pleasure to thank Dr. Shai Feldman, Head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, for the opportunity to conduct this research and publish it, both in English and Hebrew. Special thanks go to Anat Kurz from the Jaffee Center for her comments and insight. Additional gratitude is extended to Emily Landau and the staff at the Jaffee Center, particularly Moshe Grundman and English Editor Judith Rosen, who provided extensive help in editing the research and crystallizing the ideas it presents. Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents, Nina and George Sobelman, as well as my wife, Lilach, for their steady and warm support. Daniel Sobelman Tel Aviv, December 2003 New Rules of the Game 9 Introduction Israel withdrew from South Lebanon on May 24, 2000 after an extended presence of nearly two decades that began with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. Military involvement between Israel and Lebanese factions had begun several years earlier and the Litani Campaign occurred in 1978, but the invasion of 1982 launched the war that was designed to protect the northern settlements from Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) attacks. The IDF invasion and entry into Beirut attained the primary goal of the military operation, the expulsion of the PLO and its leader, Yasir Arafat, from Lebanon. This accomplishment notwithstanding, Israel became embroiled much longer and more deeply, both militarily and politically, than it had originally anticipated. Two and a half years after the invasion, on January 14, 1985, the Israeli government voted 16-6 in favor of a withdrawal within a few months, but even then the decision aroused a political storm. A few days earlier, Yitzhak Shamir, vice premier in the national unity government, had declared the IDF would not withdraw from Lebanon without security guarantees, even should those arrangements take years.1 Shamir dismissed the Israeli security establishment’s plan to withdraw from Lebanon as “surrender.” Prime Minister Shimon Peres, however, announced “this would be the IDF’s final winter in Lebanon, and I hope for peace in the Galilee.”2 The government’s decision, with its reference to “establishing an area in southern Lebanon where local IDF-backed forces could operate,” included what later became clear was an opening for a renewed or sustained military presence in Lebanon. Moreover, political differences eventually gave way to a military-oriented conception, according to which a unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon was virtually a guarantee for intensive terrorist activity against Israel from within Lebanon.

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