Bringing 'Biafra' Back In: Narrative, Identity, and the Politics of Non

Home , Christianity in Niger, Dodan Barracks, Igbo nationalism

NATIONAL IDENTITIES 2018, VOL. 20, NO. 4, 379–399 https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2017.1279133

Bringing ‘Biafra’ back in: narrative, identity, and the politics of non-reconciliation in Nigeria Godwin Onuoha Department of Political Science, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, NJ, USA

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS Drawing on Biafra as the most critical project in Igbo nationalism in Nigeria; Biafra; self- Nigeria, this article examines the interpretations and appropriations determination; ethnicity; of the Nigeria-Biafra War. It focuses on the meaning and significance identity politics of the war, and how contemporary neo-Biafran movements have appropriated and transformed the Biafran project into a basis for political action in their bid to resuscitate Igbo ambitions for self- determination. The article expatiates on the deployment of Biafra as a symbolic marker that captures the realization of an authentic Igbo national spirit, the ultimate act of Igbo self-determination and quest for nationhood in the Nigerian state.

Introduction On 30 May 1967, the Igbo-dominated Eastern Region of Nigeria seceded from the main federation and declared its independence as the Republic of Biafra. The head of Nigeria’s Federal Military Government (FMG), General Yakubu Gowon, maintained that Nigeria was one and would remain so, and with guaranteed military superiority the FMG resorted to military action to bring Biafra back into the Nigeria. The war that ensued lasted for 30 months and led to defeat and surrender of Biafra on 12 January 1970. In a statement deliv- ered at Dodan Barracks, Lagos, on 15 January 1970, Major-General Phillip Effiong,1 Officer Administering the Republic of Biafra, declared that:

We (Biafrans) affirm that we are loyal Nigerian citizens and accept the authority of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. That we accept the existing administrative and political structure of the Federation of Nigeria. That any future constitutional arrangement will be worked out by representatives of the people of Nigeria. That the Republic of Biafra hereby ceases to exist. Efﬁong’s declaration marked the end of Biafra’s claim and challenge on the Nigerian state, and effectively halted its secessionist ambitions. Popularly regarded by the Igbo as a struggle for self-determination, the Nigeria-Biafra War (1967–1970) was one of the most protracted in post-colonial Africa and has severely impacted modern Nigerian society and history, and events surrounding Biafra’s campaign for self-determination and its aftermath continue to shape political, social and economic developments in Nigeria in a

CONTACT Godwin Onuoha [email protected] © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 380 G. ONUOHA profound manner. These have assumed more salience in a post-civil war context where issues of citizenship, ethnicity, territoriality, access to resource and power are hotly contested. Recently, a concatenation of prominent events ranging from the death of Chukwue- meka Ojukwu, the erstwhile Biafra leader in a London hospital in November 2011; the pub- lication of Chinua Achebe’s last book There was a country: A personal history of Biafra; and the death of Chinua Achebe in March 2013 have combined to bring Biafra back to the heart of Nigerian politics.2 The reactions to these events have revealed considerable tension between different regions, religions and ethnic groups in the country, and at the same time, poses a serious challenge to the possibilities of constructing a durable peace and building a viable nation-state project almost five decades after the war. The contested interpretations, constructions, appropriations, narratives, have ultimately, provided the context for the entrenchment of the politics of non-reconciliation by pro- Biafran and anti-Biafran positions. What has emerged is a mutual de-legitimization of opposing narratives, as one party to the conflict tries to invalidate another’s description, narrative, and interpretation. This process of reciprocal de-legitimization has hardened and intensified positions, and as Salomon (2004, pp. 276–277) opines, it ‘bolsters a group’s self-identity and justifies its role in the conflict,’ as it invalidates the narrative and role of other groups: ‘if “we” are right, “they” are surely wrong, and if “we” are victims, “they” are obviously the perpetrators’. These tendencies gained additional momentum in the context of Nigeria’s troubled return to civilian rule in 1999 after decades of military rule as different ethnic constituencies and a host of hitherto suppressed forces were unleashed, producing centrifugal tendencies in the form of neo- Biafran separatist movements that threatened once again to break-up the country. Between 1970 when the civil war ended, and 1999 when the ghost of Biafra was publicly resuscitated, no Igbo socio-political group espoused radical or confrontational tendencies. However, on 13 September 1999, barely four months after the return to civilian rule, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) was established in Lagos to purportedly promote the interests of Igbo-speaking Nigerians (or Biafrans) who constitute one of the three major ethnic groups in the country. The campaign was specifically aimed at the disengagement of the Igbo states from Nigeria into an alternative administrative and political arrangement known as the Republic of Biafra. Championed by MASSOB, the vision for a new ‘Biafra’ was framed as a political project of self-determination and sovereign statehood. Notably, since the ghost of Biafra was publicly resuscitated with the founding of MASSOB in 1999, several neo-Biafran groups like the Biafra Youth Congress (BYC), MASSOB International, Biafran Liberation Council (BLC), Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM), Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Coalition of Biafra Liberation Groups (COBLIG), and the Biafran Independent Movement (BIM) have emerged. These groups have also gained considerable momentum among a cross-section of the Igbo population in a context where separatist agitations are equally canvassed by youths of other non-Igbo ethnic groups across Nigeria.3 This article explores the dynamics and the interplay of forces that makes ‘Biafra’ central to the memory and politics of neo-Biafran groups in contemporary Nigeria. It is based on the analysis of primary and secondary materials, interviews and interactions with some of the actors who are actively involved in the present phase of the Biafran struggle. This article is divided into five parts. The introduction provides its background and overview NATIONAL IDENTITIES 381 of objectives, issues and arguments. The second part explores an often-contested aspect of Igbo Identity in the Nigerian state. This relates to conjuring a certain definition of ‘Igbon- ness’ and Igbo identity that transcends the Nigerian state by rejecting traditions of origins that link the Igbo to other ethnic groups in Nigeria, while emphasizing claims of oriental origin that depicts the Igbo as one of the ‘Ten Tribes of Israel’ lost in Africa. The third examines the transformation of Igbo Identity, with emphasis on how the process of becoming ‘Igbo’ developed and provided a militant and collective identity to a people, hitherto recognized as disunited, to such an extent that they were prepared to mobilize, fight and die for an independent state between 1967 and 1970. The fourth section deals with the question of ‘Igbo genocide’, and how this is weaved into the Jewish Holocaust in the articulation of contemporary Igbo nationalism. The adaptation of these events to contemporary political realities is not only meant to gain moral justification, but is also a new tool in the reinvention of Igbo identity and nationhood in the quest for territory and self-determination. The conclusion highlights what the legacies of Biafra portend for the future of the Nigerian state and its unpredictable search for nationhood.

The identity–difference interface: towards an understanding of Igbo identity The politics of recognition is expressed in the form of unique cultural spaces and communities, emergent, retrieved, new or contested identities, and competing and conflicting ideologies and cultures. It has gained momentum with the resurgence of nationalist claims on a global scale. The ‘making’ and ‘remaking’ of representations of difference lies at the heart of identity and solidarity in contemporary societies. These tendencies underpin shifting political, social and economic contexts globally in a context where nationalist identities are constantly being re-created and re-defined as groups negotiate their identities and interests in the quest for self-determination and, or recognition.

The ‘pure tribe’ theory The Igbo regard themselves, and are still regarded by their neighbours, as a people with a common culture and shared history for centuries. Studies in Igbo history and culture con- sider the unity imposed on a diverse people as the Igbo as speculative, but maintain that this does not detract from the fact that the similarities now considered to be the funda- mentals of a shared Igbo culture never existed. Awareness of shared cultural similarities began to emerge among the Igbo when they started joining segmented groups and communities (van den Bersselaar, 1998, p. 10), and this process gave rise to the formation of an Igbo identity that claimed to incorporate all Igbo-speaking communities (Smock, 1971, p. 205). Igbo traditions of origin differ widely throughout the Igbo area and usually do not provide a reliable historical source of accessing the Igbo past. The first is the tradition of ‘oriental’ origin. This has two strands: one that asserts that the Igbo ethnic group is one of the lost ten tribes of Israel; another that traces Igbo source to ancient Egypt (Basden, 1925; Falola, 2005; Jeffreys, 1946, 1956). The claim to Hebrew origin is linked to the auto- biography of Olaudah Equiano (retrieved 26 July 2013), the former Igbo slave who wrote in 1789. The second tradition traces the origin of the Igbo to their neighbours, like the Edo Empire of Benin and the Igala Kingdom of Idah (Onwuejeogwu, 1972), while the third 382 G. ONUOHA tradition professes autochthony and ancestry in the present area of Igbo land, though not always in the exact location where the Igbo presently inhabit (Afigbo, 1981). As Afigbo (1983) argues elsewhere, the Igbo claim of oriental origins are ‘worthless’ in that archae- ological and linguistic evidence contradicts them. Nonetheless, the Igbo identity–difference interface continues to be interspersed and mediated by the ‘Jewish factor’. Igbo origins, ancestry, migrations, and the myth of a heroic Igbo age, decline and regeneration latch onto a Jewish link that makes it more ideological than genealogical. This kind of self- identification appears to be fictitious (Parfitt, 2000), but is of crucial importance in the discourse on ‘Igbo Jewishness’. The mobilization of Igbo-Jewish identity is framed to connect with Jews as neo-Biafran groups project an identity that pre-dates the existence of the Nigerian state, and simultaneously locates itself in time and in relation to a relevant global discourse. The notion of territory is central to the legitimacy of the state and its ability to satisfy the imperatives of statehood, including the assertion of its authority over its entire territory. But ethnic communities tend to see territory or location as part of something greater, which encompasses the concepts of homeland, culture, religion, spiritual sites, ancestors, sovereignty, and security. Space, location or territory becomes a necessary factor for framing self-identification. Smith (1999, p. 64) points out that ‘nationalists construct out of the sense of spatial origins and a given territory a “homeland”; this homeland will help to define the nation, by marking its boundaries and providing its “home”’. Thus, neo-Biafran movements claim to transcend the existence of the Nigerian state by framing Igbo traditions of origins in a manner that historically correspond to present day Igboland. Smith (1999, p. 64) further notes that the aim of this affiliation is symbolic and appears to be affirming ‘the principle of filiation as the key to historical development from a common source’. Igbo claims of emergence as a distinct people almost six thou- sand years ago (Afigbo, 1975, 1980) are in the short-term reflective of its quest for mobilization and integration, and in the long-term for meaning and validity.

Igbo identity in pre-colonial and colonial contexts The bulk of the literature in history and social anthropology describe most pre-colonial Igbo societies as ‘stateless’, ‘acephalous’, ‘segmentary’, and ‘individualistic’, comprising autonomous villages and village groups ruled by dispersed authority void of formalized, permanent or hereditary leadership positions (Green, 1947; Meek, 1937; Uchendu, 1965). The advent of colonial rule contributed remarkably to the development of Igbo identity by providing the context within which what became known as ‘Igbo identity’ developed and evolved (Anber, 1967). Different attempts at colonial conquest and efforts at colonial administration in the area gave rise to definitions of what the Igbo culture was and who the Igbo was, or was not. This meant that colonial authorities assigned topographical boundaries to the area, and certain cultural traits and forms of political arrangement were now classified as being typically Igbo (Talbot, 1969). The fragmen- ted nature of the society that emerged in the area as a result of British colonial enterprise later constituted a challenge for the establishment of colonial rule. British rule, therefore, was imposed on ‘Igboland’ in an incremental manner by a combination of treaties of surrender, trade or protection, which involved negotiation, diplomacy or force. Eventually, military conquest became the primary means through which British colonial rule was NATIONAL IDENTITIES 383 imposed on the territory through a series of military expeditions and conquest of various villages and communities in the territory that resisted British occupation openly or pas- sively (Afigbo, 1980). After the pacification of the diverse groups that comprised ‘Igboland’, these groups immediately responded to new opportunities and changes presented by colonial rule, a development that has been explained as a function of Igbo traditional way of life that thrives on competition and social mobility (Njoku, 1990, p. 1; Ottenberg, 1959), and the fact that Christian missionary education, which came ‘hand in glove’ with colonialism, provided the Igbo with necessary skills and knowledge of the English language that the north- erners lacked (Dike, 1957; van den Bersselaar, 1998).4 Igbo culture, Achebe (1983, pp. 46– 47) argues, is ‘receptive to change, individualistic and highly competitive’; Ezera (1964, p. 10) perceives it as a culture that encourages the spirit of open rivalry, aggressiveness and egalitarian belief; while Anber alludes to the mobility and receptivity of the Igbo culture as responsible for the unrivalled pace and nature of ‘Igbo modernization’ in a plural Nigerian society (1967, p. 168). These qualities, as Achebe (1983, pp. 46–47) argues, turned out to be advantageous for the Igbo and gave them unrivalled status in colonial Nigeria. The insertion of these qualities into internal challenges occasioned by land hunger, impoverished soil, population pressures in Igboland, and the worldwide depression of the 1930s (Isichei, 1976, p. 152), led to the massive migration of the Igbo to urban areas within their own region, and outside their region to the Northern and the Western parts of Nigeria in search of economic and educational advancement (Nnoli, 1980, p. 220). From the 1930s onwards, political developments began to take on an ethnic flavour as Igbo politics coalesced around the influential and charismatic figure of Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe. Popularly known as ‘Zik of Africa’, he emerged as ‘the most important and celebrated nationalist leader on the West Coast of Africa, if not in all tropical Africa’ (Coleman, 1958, p. 220). The major thrust in Igbo nationalism, as envisioned by Zik, was aimed at mobilizing the Igbo into a unified and cohesive political block. Zik did not perceive Igbo nationalism and Nigerian nationalism as conflicting pursuits, but as dual sources of inspi- ration in the struggle against colonialism as he aspired to assume the leadership role of not only a pan-Nigerian nationalist movement, but its pan-African version as well (Obi, 2002). Zik’s presidency of the Igbo State Union further compounded the issue as his expression of the ‘manifest destiny’ of the Igbo in his presidential address at the first Igbo State Union conference in 1949 was perceived by other groups in Nigeria in hegemonic terms (Azikiwe, 1961; Crowder, 1962).5 This represented an important moment in the promotion of Igbo identity in colonial Nigeria as it led to intense contestations along ethno-nationalist lines by dissipating a coherent platform for the nationalist struggle and laying the foundation for post-independence politics in Nigeria. Zik’s choice of narrative which describes the Igbo vision for the future as ‘the voice of destiny’, willed by the ‘God of Africa’, highlighted the fact that the Igbo have a choice in making their future, and carved a role for him as a political prophet and saviour of the Igbo (Coleman, 1958, p. 250; Obiechina, 1973, p. 91). This was compounded by the fact that the Igbo constituted a considerable minority group in every urban area in the country, constituted 45% the total non-indigenous metropolitan population of Lagos, and accounted for 45% of the manpower in the public services, all of which made the fear of Igbo domination real and present.6 It was precisely against this background that the Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups began to forge a link 384 G. ONUOHA between Igbo identity and the quest for domination in Nigeria.7 This lent the tri-polar ethnic power struggle (among the three mega ethnic groups of the Hausa-Fulani,8 Yoruba and Igbo) a much broader appeal by giving it the face of a zero-sum contest and brought into sharper focus the potential ethno-regional rivalries that engulfed Nigeria at independence (Osaghae, 2001, p. 1).9

Identity politics and the post-colonial state in Nigeria While competing explanations have been advanced for the rise of ethnic identity politics in post-independent Nigeria (Nnoli, 1980, 1988; Osaghae, 1995), Ekeh’s(1975) widely cited and influential work still provides one of the most original and profound analyses of the uniqueness of this phenomenon in African politics and its impacts on identity formation in a multi-ethnic Nigerian state. His concept of the ‘two publics’ bifurcates the African public sphere into the ‘primordial public’ identified with primordial groupings like ethnic, communal and hometown development associations; and the ‘civic public’ that is ‘historically associated with the colonial administration and is identified with popular politics in post-colonial Africa’. In Ekeh’s(1975, p. 91) view, the three elements of the theory: the impact of colonialism; the role of the state; and the distinctive nature of the African situation have led ‘to the emergence of a unique historical configuration in modern post-colonial Africa’. Ekeh’s theory provides the background for understanding the overarching and continu- ing struggles by dominant ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Igbo Yoruba) to capture and dom- inate state apparatuses; the phenomenon of ethnic minority groups challenging the dominance of the state over oil resources; the widespread revival of ethnic sentiments and the emergence of new and multiple violent actors in several sections of the country. The point to stress is that following decades of intense political contestations along ethno-regional lines, Nigeria’s nation-building project became severely fractured even before take-off, and the structure of its federal experiment collapsed irretrievably immediately after independence, ushering in a host of other crisis like the emergency rule in the Western region in 1962, the census controversies of 1962/1963, the election dis- putes of 1964/1965 and, finally, the intervention of the military in January 1966 and a counter-coup six months later.

The Nigeria-Biafra war and the transformation of Igbo identity Igbo identity or ‘Igboness’ was in some sense remarkably transformed as a result of the numerous pogroms against the Igbo in Northern towns at different times in 1945 (Jos), 1953 (Kano) and between May and October 1966. The trail of tears, actual death counts and loss of property associated with the event, and the idea that safety was only guaranteed in the Igbo heartland helped to construct Biafra more than any other factor. By 1967, a sense of Igbo identity had matured so strongly that the Igbo believed in, and mobilized for an independent state within Nigeria, and as events were to prove, they were prepared to fight and die to achieve it. On 30 May 1967, the Eastern region seceded from the main federation declaring its independence as the Republic of Biafra. The FMG maintained that the Eastern Region was still part of the federation and resolved to bring Biafra back into the federation. The ensuing conflict, which began in 6 July 1967, ended with the collapse of NATIONAL IDENTITIES 385

Biafra in January 1970. After seceding, Biafra was confronted with two key challenges. The first was the absence of any legal recognition of its right to self-determination at the national, continental and international levels.10 The second was the renewed political mobilization of different ethnic constituencies in the Nigerian state on the basis that a strong, prosperous, and united Nigeria held better hopes for both majority and minority ethnic groups (Nixon, 1972). The existence of unwilling minority ethnic groups in the Eastern region, which the Biafran secessionists took for granted, made the entire project to appear more as an Igbo ethnic rebellion rather than a war for the self-determination of the entire Eastern Region. Morally and ethically, the Nigerian state deconstructed the Biafran secessionist attempt as a rebellion, and in political and territorial terms, a total blockade by air, land, and sea was imposed on Biafra, which effectively sealed it off. This guaranteed its isolation, and strategically severed the ethnic minority groups on the Atlantic shoreline from the Biafran separatist project (Nixon, 1972, p. 480).11

Biafra and Igbo national liberation Biafran ingenuity and resilience was remarkably evident during the war. Despite the fact that by October 1967 Biafra had effectively lost its capital, Enugu, and most of its major cities, and was reduced to one-third of its original territorial size by October the following year, the secessionist republic sustained the struggle (Aneke, 2007; Cronje, 1972, p. 75; de St. Jorre, 1972, p. 272). While addressing a joint meeting of the consultative assembly and elders on 27 January 1968, Ojukwu used this fact to further Biafra’s claim for independence by stating that:

for three-quarters of a century now, Biafra has been ruled as a single political unit, so that the vast majority of the population have grown accustomed to the fact of the uniqueness of the political entity which we now know as Biafra. (Ojukwu, 1969, p. 240) Biafran territory had a population of about 15 million people and a considerable number of ethnic groups, with the Igbo making up about 65% of the total population. After seceding from Nigeria, Biafra knew its survival would depend largely on its ability to meet critical war challenges. One of the ﬁrst institutions to be created by the new state was the Bank of Biafra to ‘carry out all the central banking functions in the Republic, including the administration of foreign exchange and the management of the public debt of the Republic’ (Symes, 1997). In terms of its military preparedness, Biafra had only about 2000 troops at the beginning of the war, and former soldiers in the Nigerian army mostly of eastern Nigeria origin who were based in Enugu and other Nigerian military bases in the east. Biafra had no heavy military equipment, apart from the stocks left behind by the departing Nigerian army comprising some Saracen armoured cars and 105 millimetre howitzers (Clayton, 1999, p. 93). Igbo-Biafra heroics were reflected in the fact that almost half of Biafran arms were locally manufactured in Awka in the Eastern region, a situation which virtually became impossible and with the intensification of hostilities, the massive displacement of men and materials, and the sacking of its capital twice (first from Enugu to Umuahia and from Umuahia to Owerri). The massive supply of arms from Britain and the Soviet Union to the Nigerian Government ensured that Biafra was completely outgunned (Clayton, 1999, p. 93). Given this asymmetry in arms supply, Biafra resorted to whatever means 386 G. ONUOHA necessary to counter these shortfalls and keep its war efforts alive by inventing an anti-per- sonnel mine or metal container filled and charged with metal pieces called ‘Ogbunigwe’ (‘kill them plenty’), or nicknamed ‘Ojukwu’s bucket’, with a range of half a mile and clearing angle of 60 degrees (Achebe, 2012, p. 156; Gould, 2012, p. 121). This device was manufactured at the rate of 500 per day by the research and production group, an impressive undertaking performed by indigenous scientists and engineers without the prerequisites of standard technological development (Arene, 1997; Ogbudinkpa, 1985; Ukaegbu, 2005). Biafra therefore had to extend its technological capabilities to oil production and refining, and this became the critical task of the petroleum management board as it ensured the continued production, refining, and adequate supply of crude oil throughout the duration of the war (Onyegbula, 2005). Winston Churchill (Jr.) in an article in The Times (5 March 1969; cited in Gould, 2012, p. 122) captured an authoritative and first-hand account of Biafra’s innovation and improvisation. These feats later became very evident in Igbo society in the post-civil war as they struggled to survive in a Nigerian state they perceived to be structured against them.

The rise of a neo-Biafran movement in Nigeria Local and global intersections In the aftermath of the war, the FMG claimed that there was ‘no victor and no vanquish’, and subsequently launched a policy of ‘Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (3Rs)’ in order to achieve its aim of national unity (Ojeleke, 2010). These attempts appeared to have erased opposing memories of the war in the public realm, group memories of ‘hurt’, ‘injustice’ and ‘marginalization’ still flourishes in the private realm: kinship and family networks, town unions, and ethnic groups. MASSOB and other variegated neo- Biafran groups emerged as a direct response to the perceived failure of the Nigerian state and consecutive governments to address the ‘Igbo predicament’ since the end of the civil war in 1970. Post-war policies ranging from Indigenisation Decree of 1972,12 the ‘Twenty Pound Policy’ and the Banking Obligation (Eastern States) Decree of 1970,13 and recommendations of the Abandoned Properties Implementation Committee (APIC)14 ensured that the balance of power shifted in favour of the two other dominant ethnic nationalities in Nigeria (Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani), and thus, the Igbo became severely marginalised (Chukwumerije, 2010; Nwabueze, 1985). The perceived structural and institutional marginalisation of the Igbo in post-war settlements accounts for the constructive disengagement of the Igbo into the ‘informal sector’ which is characterised by Igbo informal manufacturing, long-distance trading networks and informal money changing to widen the sphere of Igbo economic operation (Albert, 1993; Meagher, 2006, 2010). Four decades after the war, these developments have further exacerbated and reinforced the challenges of Nigeria’s reconciliation with the Igbo (Albert, 2002), as most Igbo still believe that their ethnic group is yet to be fully re-integrated into the Niger- ian state (Duruji, 2009; Ikpeze, 2000; Ojukwu, 2009). The structural adjustment years made existing cleavages and ethno-nationalist identities more conflictive and competitive (Osaghae, 1995), and this led to a crystallization of ethnic divisions, intensification of political and economic marginalization, and a perpetuation of systematic Igbo exclusion from official and formal sectors of the economy.15 NATIONAL IDENTITIES 387

Apart from events on the domestic front, the emergence of neo-Biafran impulses was also linked to a series of events at the global levels. In the 1990s, the world witnessed the resurgence of hitherto suppressed currents of nationalism and self-determination on a global scale, in the context of the disintegration of large federations and multi-ethnic states, like the USSR and Yugoslavia. These developments impacted on Africa as it press- ured military regimes and one-party states in Africa to embark on a restructuring of gov- ernance and inclusive citizenship, leading to widespread constitutional reforms, the convening of sovereign national conferences, the restoration of multi-party politics and elections, and the advent of black majority rule in South Africa. Nigerians drew on these global and continental developments that were geared towards opening up a new political space in Africa to accommodate hitherto suppressed groups and forces (Olukoshi, 2005), to challenge years of military political adventurism, and make local claims and agitations for self-determination, a process that eventually led to a return to civilian rule in Nigeria in May 1999. Spurred by this specific reading of Nigeria’s political history, MASSOB was established in Lagos on 13 September 1999, barely four months after Nigeria’s return to civil rule, to promote the interest of Igbo-speaking Nigerians (or Biafrans) who constitute one of the three main ethnic groups in the country. The advent of MASSOB was a direct response to the perceived failure of the Nigerian state and successive governments to address the Igbo conditions of exclusion and marginalization since the end of the civil war in 1970. Between 1970 when the civil war ended, and 1999 when the ghost of Biafra was publicly resuscitated with the founding of MASSOB, Igbo socio-cultural platforms like Oha- naeze Ndi Igbo, Aka Ikenga, Mkpoko Igbo, Eastern Mandate Union (EMU), Odenigbo Forum, South East Movement (SEM), Igbo National Assembly (INA), Ndi Igbo Liberation Forum, Igbo Salvation Front (ISF), Igbo Redemption Council (IRC), Igbo Peoples’ Congress (IPC), and the Igbo Question Movement (IQM) existed, but none of these groups was radical or confrontational in its orientation.16 Led by Ralph Uwazuruike, an Indian- trained lawyer, MASSOB represented, at least in its early stages, a post-civil war second- generation nationalist movement that contested the marginalization of the Igbo after the civil war and was intent on resuscitating Igbo ambitions for self-determination. In several newspaper interviews and reports, Uwazuruike alluded to on an ethnic conspiracy reached between the Hausa and Yoruba after the civil war in 1970 to marginalize the Igbo, claiming that ‘the main issue that led to the formation of MASSOB is the marginalisation, discrimination, elimination, subjugation of Ndi Igbo in Nigeria’ (Daily Champion, 2007; The News, 2000). After MASSOB’s emergence in 1999, its struggle for self-determination initially drew a large following among Igbo youths, and its activities and programs immediately endeared it to a membership base drawn from a community of Igbo traders, artisans, unskilled workers, semi-literates, and Okada17 riders in different urban centres across the country. Declaring 25 stages in its struggle for the actualization of Biafra, the movement initially appeared to have widespread influence in its Igbo homeland in the southeast geopolitical zone of Nigeria, which it refers to as the 30 regions of Biafra. Adekson’s detailed study of the origin, character, and internal dynamics of ethnic militant organizations in southern Nigeria claims that in the early years of MASSOB’s activities, the movement had approxi- mately six million members, 80% of whom were based in Nigeria (Adekson, 2004, p. 90).18 The movement also has a substantial following among Igbo traders and Igbo communities 388 G. ONUOHA in different urban centres across the West African sub-region, and it has some support among different diaspora Igbo communities in Europe and North America.19 Since its emergence in 1999, the dynamics of MASSOB’s struggle for self-determination has assumed local salience in southeastern Nigeria. The movement adopts a political disposition that incorporates the contestation of state power on the one hand, and the construction of the legitimacy of Igbo nationhood on the other hand. In 2006, the movement mobilized the Igbo in the southeast to boycott the census exercise and the national identity card scheme in Igbo states across the southeast. The following year, during the 2007 general elections, MASSOB attempted to mobilize the Igbo of the southeast, Igbo political aspirants, and office-holders through the use of handbills, posters and newspapers to boycott the elections on the grounds that these states were not part of Nigeria but independent Biafran territory,20 and actually went ahead to intimidate those who participated in the process and called for the cancellation of the elections (ICG, 2007). While MASSOB and other neo-Biafran movement has steadily won a fanatical following among a new generation of Igbo (youths) born after the civil war, they define themselves in opposition to elite-led Igbo groups in Igboland. Personal communications (both for- mally and informally) with a cross-section of Igbo people above the age of 50 reveal that most are not favourably disposed to the idea of another war or a secessionist attempt.21 Shortly after the emergence of MASSOB in 1999, many prominent Igbo poli- ticians, legislators, governors from the southeast states, and apex Igbo organizations dis- tanced themselves from the movement and its activities, and were quick to remind Uwazuruike that the dream of Biafra died in 1970 (Akinyele, 2001). Even within the movement itself, there are differences in the aggregation of individual expectations that has led to conflicts and disagreements on the best strategy to adopt. One of MASSOB’s Area Administrators in Lagos, Emmanuel Onyeme stated that: ‘the realization of the Biafran dream may not be achieved immediately, but my present engagement with the struggle is meant to ensure that my children will enjoy the fruits of emancipation’.22 This view con- trasts sharply with that of Chuks, a younger member of the MASSOB in Lagos, who asserts that ‘all we want is Biafra and total independence now’.23 This has led to rifts and the emergence of breakaway factions and several splinter groups that all articulate the conditions that produced their emergence in a justificatory manner.

Parallels of belonging? Biafra, Jewish Holocaust and the ‘question of genocide’ The term ‘genocide’ entered the war in its early stages, and was linked to earlier massacres of the Igbo population in northern Nigeria, arising from the fractious relationship and enmity that had developed between migrant Igbo populations who served as railway men, teachers, traders, shop-keepers, clerks, skilled workers and domestic employees in the north and the indigenous populations in the region (Ekwe-Ekwe, 2007). In the view of most Igbo, the final phase in these series of Igbo genocides was enacted after the outbreak of the war on 6 July 1967 till the end of the war in January 1970, when over three million Igbo died (Ekwe-Ekwe, 2001, pp. 126–132). The actual death toll ranges from three million (Jacobs, 1987), to two million (Smith, Sandberg, Baev, Hauge, & Kidron, 1997), and almost two million (Kohn, 1986; Taylor & Jodice, 1986) and is currently still being contested. Biafra’s claim of genocide against the Nigerian government was a watershed NATIONAL IDENTITIES 389 moment in that it stimulated external interest in the war and became the most enduring controversy of the Nigeria-Biafra war till date. Biafra consistently charged the Nigerian government with a genocidal campaign aimed at exterminating the entire Igbo population, and the claim of genocide remained the focus of an immense global outcry, which Biafra explored to its advantage. Implicit in Biafra’s claim of genocide were controversial statements credited to Nigerian field commanders (Economist, 1968), officials (Jacobs, 1987), and even, the British prime minister (quoted in Morris, 1977, p. 122). The Nigerian government in turn pointed to massive exaggerations of the Igbo killings of 1945, 1953 and 1966, and throughout the war up to 1970. Weighed against the utterances emanating from the FMG and British official sources, Biafra’s claim of genocide against the Nigerian state appeared to have some basis. However, the debate over the existence or non-existence of genocide in the Nigeria-Biafra war remains contested and the factual evidence available remains largely divergent. Depending on which source was favoured, reports from Biafra created wholesale misconceptions and misinterpretations, which worked to the advantage or disadvantage of either side. Despite their internal contradictions and weaknesses, the leaders of MASSOB and other neo-Biafran groups have taken a leaf from the first Biafran attempt at secession: they have realized that taking the Biafran quest beyond the borders of Nigeria in a globalised era would require a range of strategies, tactics, and networking that also includes a religious appeal. The framing of the Nigeria-Biafra War (1967–1970) by Biafran authorities as a Biafra-Christian versus Hausa-Fulani-Muslim war fomented a religious discourse, and this discourse became critical in projecting the Igbo quest for secession from the Nigerian project. Omenka (2010) identifies two events that Biafra leveraged in casting the war as a religious war: the first was the pogrom of 1966, and the second was the perceived threat of Sardau- na’s pre-1966 proselytization campaigns against Christians. Omenka further argues that the religious interpretation of the war makes little sense or collapses completely unless seen in the context of the 1966 pogrom against the Igbo in northern Nigeria. The 1966 pogrom, in many ways, expanded the frontiers of the religious war discourse because according to Walls ‘self-conscious Christian profession was part of the self-identity of Biafra’ (Walls, 1978), and the eastern region could lay claim to a Christian identity in a way no other region in the federation could (Omenka, 2010, p. 369). Biafran leaders mobilized on this basis to garner support for its separatist project abroad. Prominent in this regard was the statement credited to Francis Akanu Ibiam, a respected Igbo statesman, in a paper presented in a workshop on human rights on 21 January 1968 in Bonn, where he stated that ‘if the world, especially the churches, do not help us, we shall all die and Christianity in Niger- ian shall die with us’.24 The overarching lesson in this regard is that religion cannot be sep- arated from politics, and this was brought to bear on the role of the Catholic Church, humanitarian organizations and other global actors in the conflict (Walls, 1978). The foregoing provides the context for the emergence of neo-Biafran movements, not just as separatist groups, but groups that are heavily steeped in Judeo-Christian traditions and history. MASSOB invokes biblical stories of the deliverance of the ‘Children of Israel’ from Egyptian bondage, ‘David and the Goliath’ and ‘Samson and the Philistines’, and equate these with their struggle for self-determination from an oppressive Nigerian state.25 The mobilization of Christian virtues, calls for prayer and fasting sessions urging all churches (particularly in the east) to conduct special prayers for Biafra at various times are some of the core strategies of the movement (Ujumadu, 2013). The movement 390 G. ONUOHA engages in lectures to emphasize and identify with the pro-Gandhian and non-violence philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, and embarks on peaceful demonstrations and civil dis- obedience reminiscent of the peaceful resistance movement of the African-American civil rights leader, Martin Luther King, Jr. Perhaps the most striking and exploited aspect of the neo-Biafran struggle for self-determination is their identification with Jews who they perceive to have suffered the same fate as the Igbo nation in the face of genocide. Though the neo-Biafran movement emphasize narratives that link the Igbo to oriental traditions of Jewish origin, the literature suggest that the Igbo are not the only group in Nigeria, or indeed, in Africa to lay claim to this tradition of origin (Bruder, 2008; Lis, 2014). Igbo narratives stem from Nri, popularly described as the cradle of Igbo culture and home to the famous kingdom of Nri. The myth of Eri describes him as the founding father of the Igbo civilization, the fifth son of the Gad, one of the original 12 sons of Jacob and lost tribe of Israel (Alaezi, 1999, p. 94). Based on this myth, it is commonplace to assume that Jews and Igbo are linked by virtue of their historical experiences and cultural practices like purity taboos, circumcision, and animal sacrifices. While claims of Igbo Jewishness remain fictitious, their importance in the discourse of Igbo nationalism lies in the reference to real world-historic case of a people who have been victims of persecution, marginalization, and deprivation in the Nigerian state.26 The most striking and exploited part of the neo-Biafran struggle is the weaving of Igbo identity and memory into Jewish identity, and a perception of the Igbo as the ‘Jews of Africa’. The neo-Biafran movements mobilize Igbo-Jewish identity as a means of establish- ing itself as the ‘other’ ethnic group in Nigeria and rejecting a subordinate place in society (Miles, 2012; Parfitt, 2013). This link is critical not just for casting a veil of authenticity or genuineness on Igbo nationalism, but as a force for identity transformation within the context of the Nigerian state. The articulation of individual and collective Igbo experiences to forces outside the Nigerian state has thus become a critical ‘selling point’ in neo-Biafran nationalism. Smith (1999, p. 65) argues that ‘the satisfaction of the drive for meaning and security afforded by these myths is even more important than their short-run uses as instruments of immediate mobilization and integration’. The dramatic rise of the Igbo constituted a formidable threat to other ethnic groups in colonial Nigeria. As railway men, teachers, traders, and civil servants, the Igbo dominated the colonial economy and massively populated urban centres across northern and southern Nigeria even after independence (Paden, 1971). Neo-Biafran groups view their current predicament of the Igbo as similar to that of Jews, a people who dwell in the midst of enemies and are hated by their neighbours. Ogbukagu (2001, p. 75) is of the view that the global Jewish extraction of which the Igbo ethnic group is a part of has been destined to attract hostility whether in ancient or modern Israel – and indeed, in Nigeria. Alaezi (1999, p. 47) argues that the Igbo is part of the world Jewry and, as one of the seeds of Jacob and a branch of the Hebrews, they have produced eminent person- alities in Nigeria. While these groups appropriate the experience of Jews who were scattered all over the world where they suffered persecution but later established the state of Israel, they also equate the Igbo and the Jewish experience by campaigning for the creation of sovereign state of Biafra, an Igbo homeland for all Igbo in diaspora. This tendency to integrate diverse perceptions and experiences of the Igbo and Jews, and the ‘special’ Igbo-Jewish relationship is captured in the statements of Ralph Uwazuruike (MASSOB) and Ben Onwuka of the Biafran Zionist Movement (BZM) (Obi, 2013). NATIONAL IDENTITIES 391

Chukwudiegwu (2004, p. 16) appropriates perceived similarities between Igbo and Jewish experiences of Holocaust and genocide in a series of prophetic utterances that emphasize the religious dimension to the Igbo-Biafra-Jewish struggle in Nigeria:

All these happenings are in sequence to what Jehovah has planned to do before the end of 40 years wilderness expiration of the Igbo in Nigeria. 40 years of suffering and persecution in the hand of gentile Nigeria the enemy of the Jews and of the Israelites of which the Igbo represents. Chukwudiegwu (2004, pp. 16–17) further states that:

The 1966 killing of General Aguiyi Ironsi and other Igbo in the North was the beginning of the sorrow of wilderness journey of the Igbo … . The name ‘Nigeria’ is not a ‘nation’, but a power- ful evil spirit of wickedness and slavery, scourge and pains of sorrow (in no distant time you will see that Nigeria is not a nation). At 40 years Jehovah will bring the captivity of His people to an end. The scripture has many things to say of the Israelites concerning 400 years, 40 years, 40 days, and 4 day. At the outbreak of the Nigeria-Biafra War, Ojukwu articulated the Biafran resistance against the Nigerian state as a war between the biblical David and Goliath, and assured the Biafrans of victory through the ability of the Almighty God (Walls, 1978, p. 207). Coin- cidentally, Biafra and Israel were in a similar situation in 1967, with the former confronted by the superiority of the Nigerian army in troops and equipment, and the latter faced by a combined might of Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian forces. After the declaration of Biafran independence on 29 May 1967, the Six Day Arab-Israeli War broke out a week later and lasted from 5 to 10 June 1967, ending with a decisive victory for Israel. Israel’s victory led to the takeover of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. Buoyed by this seeming victory over the combined force of Arab armies, beleaguered Biafra (David) was encouraged to believe that it could win against the Nigerian state (Goliath) when hostilities eventually begin. While the state of Israeli was fighting for its own survival and was in no position to help secessionist Biafra, Jewish community relations’ councils participated in the various capacities in delivering relief materials (food and medical supplies) to Biafra. The American Jewish Congress, in a memorandum written by its Director of Com- missions on International Affairs, Phil Baum, called global attention to the crises in Biafra, and argued for the need to understand the nature and scope of the war. With reference to the debate on genocide, the memorandum pointed to the fact that ‘certain kinds of “legitimate” military strategy, though not to be equated with genocide intentionally perpetuated by a government on a particular people, can result in the extermination of large numbers of a particular group’. But, ‘that there has or will be deliberate genocide in the sense of the Federal Government attempting to wipe out the Igbo people, is debatable’ (American Jewish Congress, 1968).

Conclusion Referred to as ‘Africa’s first televised excursion into an African genocidal attack’ (Bakare- Yusuf, 2012, p. 243), and in many respects the first black-on-black genocide in post- colonial Africa (Korieh, 2012; Nwauwa & Korieh, 2011), the Nigeria-Biafra war attracted enormous public attention. At the core of the conflict is the question of genocide, 392 G. ONUOHA which has perpetuated, fomented and fermented the war in various ways, and continues to elicit contrasting views in post-civil war Nigeria. The diverse positions on the question of genocide appears to be of real value and very potent in shaping and inflaming debate in the academia and in public discourses. Given the centrality of the concept to the war, there is need for the literature on the Nigeria-Biafra War, or what has now been referred to as ‘Biafran studies’ to move beyond sectional narratives into critical analysis. Post-war Nigeria as presently configured aptly describes a space where there is an active effort to forget the war, but if, and when remembered, the state controls memory production as a tool for political power. In the post-civil war Nigerian public space, the pursuit of ‘sectional’, ‘regional’ or ‘ethnic’ justice had to be abandoned in the interest of nation-building and there were no statements on who has suffered, what has been suffered or who to punish or compensate. For this reason, the Biafran story has remained an incomplete one, and a source of widespread disagreement. If anything, Biafra has been detrimental to the collective effort at nation-building, one that often vacillates between inertia, amnesia, and sometimes, enforced forgetting. While the war is being carried on by other means, questions and stories requiring scrutiny, investigations and answers continue to emerge. The official position of ‘silence’ broke immediately after Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999 following decades of military rule as neo-Biafran movements emerged among the Igbo for whom the war is still an incomplete and unfinished business. It appears the war was not only against Igbo secession but also against memory and historiography. The narratives of the war is shaped not by the personal experiences and recollections of the subaltern and the ordinary survivors of the war, but framed by the state’s official history, memories and narratives that suit its own vision, interest, and politics. Neo- Biafran groups contest these official views as the sole legitimate framework for remember- ing and interpreting the war, and still connects to the war as a war of Igbo national liberation. For all its activism, the neo-Biafran project is currently floundering under the repressive tendencies of the Nigerian state. Even in the execution of the project, there is a lack of clarity, and it is sometimes imbued with contradictory tendencies. The neo-Biafran approach raises critical issues on different fronts. First, its intolerance to opposing views, philosophies, programmes, and strategies leaves no room for constructive criticisms and engagements. Second, the rhetoric of allegations of conspiracy, subjugation and domination by other ethnic groups also exacerbates the structural friction and antagonism between the Igbo on the one hand; and the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and other minority ethnic groups on the other hand. Since 1999, Nigeria continues to witness the proliferation self-determination movements from different sections of the country in the Nigerian political space, some seeking autonomy and other seeking outright secession from the Nigerian state on the Biafran model. Irrespective of ethnic and ideological positions, the war continues to inspire agitations for recollection and reflection. The existence of self-determination movements across the broad spectrum of society strengthens the neo-Biafran claim to exit the federation into an alternative administrative and political project. Neo-Biafran groups continue to mobilize and deploy memory repertoires (flags, anthems, uniforms, and curren- cies) and practices like commemoration (of the annual anniversary of the declaration of the Republic of Biafra on 30 May 1967) in a manner that support their claims and interests NATIONAL IDENTITIES 393 to the detriment of the national narrative. This tendency throws up contending historical narratives that are closely linked to Igbo identity and interests, and is critical for fostering and shoring up group interests, Igbo national identity and the vision of a ‘glorious’ past which projects into the future.

Notes 1. Major-General Phillip Effiong was an Ibibio (one of the minority ethnic groups in Biafra) and Ojukwu’s second-in-command. After the fall of Owerri, Ojukwu fled and handed over power to him as the Officer Administering the Republic of Biafra. 2. During the Nigeria-Biafra war, Chinua Achebe was a Biafran envoy and was particularly close to the power structures in Biafra. Many non-Igbo believe his views on the war are biased and edges towards a sense of Igbo triumphalism in Nigeria. 3. Neo-Biafran separatist groups were partly inspired by the partial successes of other ethno- nationalist projects in the Niger Delta (Obi, 1997, 2001; Osaghae, 1995, 2001; Ukeje, 2001), and of the Yoruba ethnic extraction (Adebanwi, 2005; Ukeje & Adebanwi, 2008). 4. Christian missionary education was introduced into the Southern Protectorates of colonial Nigeria in the 1840s. It began in Lagos and Calabar, and spread to other coastal cities like Onitsha in the mid-nineteenth century. The schools were set up and operated by Christian Missionaries. In the Northern protectorates of Nigeria, which was predominantly Muslim, Christian missionary-style education was prohibited, as religious leaders did not want the missionaries interfering with Islam. 5. The Igbo state Union was launched in 1949 as a successor organization to the Igbo Federal Union formed in 1944. Its aim was to organise the Igbo linguistic group into a political unit and it inherited all the structures of the former organization. Azikiwe’s leadership and his declaration of the ‘Manifest Destiny’ of the Igbo was highly political, and this initiated suspi- cions from other ethnic groups in Nigeria. 6. See The Nigerian Situation: Facts and Background (1966, p. 25) and Government Statistician (1953–1954) (both cited in Anber, 1967, Modernization and political disintegration: Nigeria and the Ibos). 7. These developments formed the superstructure upon institutional and structural foundations laid by British colonial policy. Shortly after the introduction of the Clifford Constitution in 1922, the British adopted a policy of ‘separate development’ the following year, which split the entire territory of Nigeria into two different administrative systems for the next twenty-five years. This enabled the British to cultivate Hausa-Fulani/Islamist identity in the North and regionalize virtually everything in order to promote mutually exclusive identities (See Diamond, 1988, p. 28). With the introduction of the Richards Constitution in 1946 and the creation of a new Legislative Council, both Northern and Southern Nigeria were brought together for the first time since 1923. But the three regions that emerged as the administrative and political units of Nigeria were to coincide with the spatial locations of the three major ethnic- nationalities in Nigeria (the Hausa-Fulani in the North; the Yoruba in the West; and the Igbo in the East), a policy which in practice set the stage for the regionalization of the nationalist movement into three mutually antagonistic groups, and ultimately, set the tone for the enduring structure of Nigerian politics. 8. The Hausa and the Fulani are two ethnic groups predominantly situated in the Northern part of Nigeria. Though the groups originated in different parts of West Africa, but a common religion, intermarriage and the adoption of the Hausa language by the Fulani have unified the groups over time. In contemporary Nigerian society and in the literature, they are often referred to collectively as Hausa-Fulani. 9. Apart from the conflicts among the majority ethnic groups, there are conflicts between majority and minority groups as the latter showed no confidence in the ability of the Nigerian state as presently constituted to serve and protect their interests in terms of ensuring a just and equitable access to power and resources. This was particularly witnessed in the 394 G. ONUOHA

relationship between the dominant Igbo ethnic group and minority ethnic groups in the Eastern Region before and after the Nigeria-Biafra War. See Osaghae (2001). 10. It is pertinent to note that at the national level, the FMG was successful in deconstructing Biafra’s secession politically and territorially, and morally and ethically as a rebellion. The situation in Africa was not radically different. By 1969 a year to the end of hostilities, four states (Gabon, Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Zambia) had recognized Biafra. But the overwhelming con- sensus at the official levels of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was that Article III of the organization’s charter guaranteeing the sanctity of territorial borders inherited at independence should be held sacrosanct. The provisions of the charter were implicitly and explicitly invoked by the OAU as a clear rejection of post-independence self-determination claims, the kind of which Biafra represented. At the international level, despite the fact that the conflict had metamorphosed into an international affair, the attention of the international community was much more focused on events in the Middle East (the Six-Day War), the United States preoccupation in Vietnam, and Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia. Britain, France and Portugal ended up supporting different sides in the conflict, but remarkably, the conflict became the only Cold War conflict where the two major super powers ended up supporting the same side. This ruled out any serious reflection on the conflict, let alone any action at the United Nations. 11. Based on the 1963 Population Census of Nigeria, the Eastern Region (which later became the Republic of Biafra) had a population of 12–15 million, out of which the Igbo majority comprised 64%, Efik and Ibibio 17%, Annang 5.5%, Ijaw and Ogoni 7.5%, Ekoi, Yalla and Ukelle 3.4%, and others 2.5%. Some of these minority ethnic groups were critical to the survival of Biafra because of the incipient oil discoveries located in their region and their location on the Atlantic shoreline of Nigeria. Hence, without these minority ethnic groups joining the secession, Biafra’s access to oil in the Niger Delta would be impossible and Biafra would be landlocked. See Nixon (1972, p. 480). Even before independence in 1960, the relationship between the Igbo and the minority ethnic groups in the Eastern Region has been strained. This can be traced back to the immediate aftermath of the Western House of Assembly inci- dent in 1952 where Nnamdi Azikiwe was reduced to the Leader of Opposition. Zik promptly returned to the Eastern House of Assembly and displaced Eyo Ita, an Efik, as the Leader of Gov- ernment in the Eastern Region. Eyo Ita later formed the National Independence Party that led the clamour for the creation of Cross River, Ogoja and Rivers State (COR) out of the Eastern Region. These developments formed the basis for the troubled relationship between the dominant Igbo ethnic group and the minority ethnic groups in the Eastern Region prior to independence and the war (for a more detailed story see Olusanya (1980). 12. The Indigenization Decree of 1972 reviewed the ownership structure and control of Nigerian enterprises, and compelled foreign companies to sell part of their shares to Nigerians at a time when the Igbo had barely recovered from the effects of the war and were still perceived to be economically emasculated. 13. ‘Twenty Pound Scandal’ and the Banking Obligation (Eastern States) Decree of 1970 did not recognize any deposits made into bank accounts within the former Eastern Region from 30 May 1967 up until 12 January 1970. After the war, the FMG changed its currency and all depositors were given the equivalent of 20 pounds no matter the amount of money they had in the bank. 14. The committee presided over the sale of Igbo properties outside Igboland, and in parts of the former Eastern Region (Port-Harcourt), at ridiculously low prices to indigenes of those states that claimed to have captured them during the war. 15. Structural adjustment was introduced in Nigeria from 1986 to 1993 by the Ibrahim Babangida Military Government to address the country’s economic crisis. Though the adjustment programme was essentially economic in outlook, its breadth and implementation impacted fundamentally on every area of social and political relations, and ultimately, exacerbated ethno-nationalist consciousness. This is because the diminishing resources and opportunities attendant to the adjustment programme intensified competition for jobs, contracts and other benefits, and ethnic connections became the hallmark of negotiations of the period (For a NATIONAL IDENTITIES 395

comprehensive discussion, see Osaghae (1995)). Aware of the growing concerns about marginalization, injustice and underdevelopment in the South East, and the dominance of the hegemonic group(s) that controlled federal power and oil resources, there was a push at the Igbo elite level to address the ‘Igbo Question’ and its share of the national patrimony. 16. Some of these groups emerged in the early and mid-1990s and have either ceased to exist (or are dormant) or still remain active. Their existence and activities are gleaned from Nigerian newspapers, author’s fieldwork and interviews. 17. This is a popular form of transportation in many Nigerian cities and urban centres where pas- sengers are conveyed by motorbikes. 18. A significant number of MASSOB sympathizers form part of diaspora Igbo populations in the United States, Europe and in some African countries as shown in the following websites: www. biafraland.com; www.biafranet.com; http://magazine.biafranigeriaworld.com; www. umuigbousa.org; www.kwenu.com; http://ekwenche.org; http://biafraforum.biafranet.com; http://www.bianu.net; http://igboforum.igbonet.com; http://wazobia.biafranigeria.com. 19. Private communication with Rev. Columba Nnorom of the Igbo Coalition in the Americas and Ekwe Nche Organization on 9 April 2010, Howard University, Washington, DC. 20. See the Report on the Election Boycott, available at: http://www.biafra.cwis.org/pdf/REPORT% 20ON%20ELECTION.pdf. Retrieved February 27, 2009. 21. Chief Goddy Uwazuruike (Vice-President of Aka Ikenga) maintained in an interview that the idea of succession resonates with younger generation of Igbo because they did not witness the war (Personal communication, Lagos, 15 January 2009). 22. Personal communication, Lagos, 26 January 2009. 23. Personal communication, Lagos, 19 January 2009. 24. See Omenka (2010, p.369). 25. Depictions of the Igbo as the ‘Jews of Africa’ are amplified by a school of Hamitic historiography that claims the Igbo are descendants of a migrant Israeli tribe. 26. This line of thought has been vigorously pursued by Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe who trace Igbo marginalization, persecution and deprivation in Nigeria to the colonial period, covering several pogroms and massacres from 1945, 1953, 1966, and to contemporary attacks on Igbo migrants in different parts of northern Nigeria.

Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding This work was supported by Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.

Notes on contributor Godwin Onuoha serves as an adjunct instructor in the Department of Political Science at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, where he teaches courses in politics and culture, and Sub- Saharan Africa politics. He was previously the African Humanities Post-Doctoral Research Associate at Princeton University, and an African Research Fellow and Senior Research Specialist at the Human Sciences Research Council, South Africa. He is a political anthropologist with interdisciplinary research interests that intersects political science, history, social theory and anthropology. He is the author of Challenging the State in Africa: MASSOB and the Crisis of Self-Determination in Nigeria (Munster: LIT Verlag, 2011), and his articles have appeared in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, African Studies, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Review of African Political Economy, and Current Sociology. He is on the editorial board of Democratic Theory: An Interdisciplinary Journal. 396 G. ONUOHA

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