NATIONAL IDENTITIES 2018, VOL. 20, NO. 4, 379–399 https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2017.1279133 Bringing ‘Biafra’ back in: narrative, identity, and the politics of non-reconciliation in Nigeria Godwin Onuoha Department of Political Science, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, NJ, USA ABSTRACT KEYWORDS Drawing on Biafra as the most critical project in Igbo nationalism in Nigeria; Biafra; self- Nigeria, this article examines the interpretations and appropriations determination; ethnicity; of the Nigeria-Biafra War. It focuses on the meaning and significance identity politics of the war, and how contemporary neo-Biafran movements have appropriated and transformed the Biafran project into a basis for political action in their bid to resuscitate Igbo ambitions for self- determination. The article expatiates on the deployment of Biafra as a symbolic marker that captures the realization of an authentic Igbo national spirit, the ultimate act of Igbo self-determination and quest for nationhood in the Nigerian state. Introduction On 30 May 1967, the Igbo-dominated Eastern Region of Nigeria seceded from the main federation and declared its independence as the Republic of Biafra. The head of Nigeria’s Federal Military Government (FMG), General Yakubu Gowon, maintained that Nigeria was one and would remain so, and with guaranteed military superiority the FMG resorted to military action to bring Biafra back into the Nigeria. The war that ensued lasted for 30 months and led to defeat and surrender of Biafra on 12 January 1970. In a statement deliv- ered at Dodan Barracks, Lagos, on 15 January 1970, Major-General Phillip Effiong,1 Officer Administering the Republic of Biafra, declared that: We (Biafrans) affirm that we are loyal Nigerian citizens and accept the authority of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. That we accept the existing administrative and political struc- ture of the Federation of Nigeria. That any future constitutional arrangement will be worked out by representatives of the people of Nigeria. That the Republic of Biafra hereby ceases to exist. Effiong’s declaration marked the end of Biafra’s claim and challenge on the Nigerian state, and effectively halted its secessionist ambitions. Popularly regarded by the Igbo as a struggle for self-determination, the Nigeria-Biafra War (1967–1970) was one of the most protracted in post-colonial Africa and has severely impacted modern Nigerian society and history, and events surrounding Biafra’s campaign for self-determination and its after- math continue to shape political, social and economic developments in Nigeria in a CONTACT Godwin Onuoha [email protected] © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 380 G. ONUOHA profound manner. These have assumed more salience in a post-civil war context where issues of citizenship, ethnicity, territoriality, access to resource and power are hotly contested. Recently, a concatenation of prominent events ranging from the death of Chukwue- meka Ojukwu, the erstwhile Biafra leader in a London hospital in November 2011; the pub- lication of Chinua Achebe’s last book There was a country: A personal history of Biafra; and the death of Chinua Achebe in March 2013 have combined to bring Biafra back to the heart of Nigerian politics.2 The reactions to these events have revealed considerable tension between different regions, religions and ethnic groups in the country, and at the same time, poses a serious challenge to the possibilities of constructing a durable peace and building a viable nation-state project almost five decades after the war. The contested interpretations, constructions, appropriations, narratives, have ultimately, pro- vided the context for the entrenchment of the politics of non-reconciliation by pro- Biafran and anti-Biafran positions. What has emerged is a mutual de-legitimization of opposing narratives, as one party to the conflict tries to invalidate another’s description, narrative, and interpretation. This process of reciprocal de-legitimization has hardened and intensified positions, and as Salomon (2004, pp. 276–277) opines, it ‘bolsters a group’s self-identity and justifies its role in the conflict,’ as it invalidates the narrative and role of other groups: ‘if “we” are right, “they” are surely wrong, and if “we” are victims, “they” are obviously the perpetrators’. These tendencies gained additional momentum in the context of Nigeria’s troubled return to civilian rule in 1999 after decades of military rule as different ethnic constituencies and a host of hitherto sup- pressed forces were unleashed, producing centrifugal tendencies in the form of neo- Biafran separatist movements that threatened once again to break-up the country. Between 1970 when the civil war ended, and 1999 when the ghost of Biafra was pub- licly resuscitated, no Igbo socio-political group espoused radical or confrontational ten- dencies. However, on 13 September 1999, barely four months after the return to civilian rule, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) was established in Lagos to purportedly promote the interests of Igbo-speaking Nigerians (or Biafrans) who constitute one of the three major ethnic groups in the country. The cam- paign was specifically aimed at the disengagement of the Igbo states from Nigeria into an alternative administrative and political arrangement known as the Republic of Biafra. Championed by MASSOB, the vision for a new ‘Biafra’ was framed as a political project of self-determination and sovereign statehood. Notably, since the ghost of Biafra was pub- licly resuscitated with the founding of MASSOB in 1999, several neo-Biafran groups like the Biafra Youth Congress (BYC), MASSOB International, Biafran Liberation Council (BLC), Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM), Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Coalition of Biafra Liberation Groups (COBLIG), and the Biafran Independent Movement (BIM) have emerged. These groups have also gained considerable momentum among a cross-section of the Igbo population in a context where separatist agitations are equally canvassed by youths of other non-Igbo ethnic groups across Nigeria.3 This article explores the dynamics and the interplay of forces that makes ‘Biafra’ central to the memory and politics of neo-Biafran groups in contemporary Nigeria. It is based on the analysis of primary and secondary materials, interviews and interactions with some of the actors who are actively involved in the present phase of the Biafran struggle. This article is divided into five parts. The introduction provides its background and overview NATIONAL IDENTITIES 381 of objectives, issues and arguments. The second part explores an often-contested aspect of Igbo Identity in the Nigerian state. This relates to conjuring a certain definition of ‘Igbon- ness’ and Igbo identity that transcends the Nigerian state by rejecting traditions of origins that link the Igbo to other ethnic groups in Nigeria, while emphasizing claims of oriental origin that depicts the Igbo as one of the ‘Ten Tribes of Israel’ lost in Africa. The third exam- ines the transformation of Igbo Identity, with emphasis on how the process of becoming ‘Igbo’ developed and provided a militant and collective identity to a people, hitherto recognized as disunited, to such an extent that they were prepared to mobilize, fight and die for an independent state between 1967 and 1970. The fourth section deals with the question of ‘Igbo genocide’, and how this is weaved into the Jewish Holocaust in the articulation of contemporary Igbo nationalism. The adaptation of these events to contemporary political realities is not only meant to gain moral justification, but is also a new tool in the reinvention of Igbo identity and nationhood in the quest for territory and self-determination. The conclusion highlights what the legacies of Biafra portend for the future of the Nigerian state and its unpredictable search for nationhood. The identity–difference interface: towards an understanding of Igbo identity The politics of recognition is expressed in the form of unique cultural spaces and commu- nities, emergent, retrieved, new or contested identities, and competing and conflicting ideologies and cultures. It has gained momentum with the resurgence of nationalist claims on a global scale. The ‘making’ and ‘remaking’ of representations of difference lies at the heart of identity and solidarity in contemporary societies. These tendencies underpin shifting political, social and economic contexts globally in a context where nationalist identities are constantly being re-created and re-defined as groups negotiate their identities and interests in the quest for self-determination and, or recognition. The ‘pure tribe’ theory The Igbo regard themselves, and are still regarded by their neighbours, as a people with a common culture and shared history for centuries. Studies in Igbo history and culture con- sider the unity imposed on a diverse people as the Igbo as speculative, but maintain that this does not detract from the fact that the similarities now considered to be the funda- mentals of a shared Igbo culture never existed. Awareness of shared cultural similarities began to emerge among the Igbo when they started joining segmented groups and com- munities (van den Bersselaar, 1998, p. 10), and this process gave rise to the formation of an Igbo identity that claimed to incorporate all Igbo-speaking communities (Smock, 1971, p. 205). Igbo traditions of origin differ widely throughout the Igbo area and usually do not provide a reliable historical source of accessing the Igbo past. The first is the tradition of ‘oriental’ origin. This has two strands: one that asserts that the Igbo ethnic group is one of the lost ten tribes of Israel; another that traces Igbo source to ancient Egypt (Basden, 1925; Falola, 2005; Jeffreys, 1946, 1956). The claim to Hebrew origin is linked to the auto- biography of Olaudah Equiano (retrieved 26 July 2013), the former Igbo slave who wrote in 1789. The second tradition traces the origin of the Igbo to their neighbours, like the Edo Empire of Benin and the Igala Kingdom of Idah (Onwuejeogwu, 1972), while the third 382 G.