Iranian Relations (1907•fi1953): Colonial
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The Formative Years of Anglo-Iranian Relations (1907-1953): Colonial Scramble for Iran and Its Political Legacy Behravesh, Maysam Published in: Digest of Middle East Studies DOI: 10.1111/j.1949-3606.2012.00157.x 2012 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Behravesh, M. (2012). The Formative Years of Anglo-Iranian Relations (1907-1953): Colonial Scramble for Iran and Its Political Legacy. Digest of Middle East Studies, 21(2), 386-400. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1949- 3606.2012.00157.x Total number of authors: 1 General rights Unless other specific re-use rights are stated the following general rights apply: Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Read more about Creative commons licenses: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. LUND UNIVERSITY PO Box 117 221 00 Lund +46 46-222 00 00 bs_bs_banner The Formative Years of Anglo-Iranian Relations (1907–1953): Colonial Scramble for Iran and Its Political Legacydome_157 386..400 Maysam Behravesh Lund University Lund, Sweden Abstract As the title largely illustrates, this study seeks to investigate, from a diplomatic- history and geostrategic perspective, the key developments in Anglo-Iranian relations during what may best be dubbed their “formative years,” ranging from 1907 to 1953. Having thus provided a glimpse into pre-twentieth-century Persian–British relations, it moves to analyze the division of Persia into two spheres of influence between Great Britain and Tsarist Russia in 1907, the Anglo-Iranian agreement of 1919, the English control of Iranian oil during the first half of the twentieth century and the nationalist struggle against it, and finally the 1953 coup d’état orchestrated by the United Kingdom and the United States against the democratic government of Mohammad Mosaddeq, which managed to topple him and bring Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to power. While the article focuses mainly on the complex history of Anglo-Iranian relationship, it strives to shed light on the implications of such a history for future bilateral relations, its impact on the contemporary Iranian perception of the British, and finally the cultural-political legacy it has left behind in Iran. The study follows a chronological order and draws on a range of English and Persian sources in trying to fulfill its task. hen on November 29, 2011, a crowd of Iranian protesters stormed the WBritish embassy and residential compound in Tehran, tore up the Union flag, and damaged London-owned property, there came many enunciations from within Iran’s political establishment that the action, although politically incorrect and diplomatically unconventional, served Britain right. It “was a symbol of the atmo- sphere [prevailing] in the public opinion of Iranian nation,” said Ali Larijani, the Speaker of Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis), following the takeover (Radio Farda, 2011). Although this was largely a misleading exaggeration of the facts on the ground pronounced mostly for domestic consumption, one could hardly dismiss it as entirely false propaganda. While the attack was widely perceived as a premeditated action sponsored by the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) leadership, and more accu- rately,as part of a struggle for a greater share of power between dominant conservative factions in the Islamic Republic, it also reflected some powerful sentiments of Digest of Middle East Studies—Volume 21, Number 2—Pages 386–400 © 2012 Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Fall 2012 Anglophobia still running deep in parts of the Iranian society, and more so in the securitized mentalities of those in power. The embassy seizure and the earlier parliamentary decision to downgrade the bilateral ties marked the third time political relations between the IRI and Great Britain experienced a systematic rupture since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The first fissure had occurred in 1980, when Britain under the then Tory Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher closed its embassy in Tehran following a number of unsavory incidents, including the American hostage crisis of November 1979 in Tehran and the Iranian embassy siege of April to May, 1980, in London. Along parallel lines, the second diplomatic cleft came after the late Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a religious decree (fatwa) in February 1989 against Salman Rushdie—a British author born to a Muslim family in India—for the authorship of The Satanic Verses (1988), a novel that was construed by many Islamic authorities, not least Iranian revolutionary leaders, as a grave affront to the holy Qur‘an, Prophet Mohammad, and Islam on the whole, hence blasphemous and deserving capital punishment.1 Significantly, perhaps Iran’s post-revolutionary relations with no nation in the world have been so complex and tumultuous as those with Britain; this is also the case with its popular and elite perception of the British. While political considerations of the day at each juncture, conflicting interests, and ideological differences have all influenced the development of bilateral ties, the history of engagement and interac- tion, represented quintessentially by Iranians’ collective memory of their victimiza- tion at foreign, not least British, hands, has played an undeniable role in plaguing the relationship, particularly at the governmental level. Given this, it might be compelling to argue that the first half of the twentieth century constitutes the most seminal and decisive part of such a history, due primarily to a number of epoch-making episodes characterizing it. Exploring these developments from a diplomatic-history and geo- strategic perspective and in the light of their perceptual/subjective implications for future Anglo-Iranian ties is the principal task this article seeks to carry out. A Glimpse of Pre-Twentieth-Century Anglo-Iranian Relations Diplomatic contacts between Persia and Britain can be traced back to as early as the late thirteenth century when Edward I of England (1272–1307) dispatched Geoffrey de Langley, an English knight and envoy, to the Mongol court in Tabriz to enter into alliance with Ilkhanid rulers reigning over Persia at the time (Clawson & Rubin, 2005; Phillips, 1998). The relations between the two empires, however, started mostly in the form of informal trade and military cooperation against the Ottomans in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, but could be expected to take on a unique political flavor after a while as the critical geostrategic position of Persia in the Near East constituted a useful bridge to the British Empire and its trading arm in the region and beyond, the British East India Company (Yapp, 1980). Behravesh 387 Digest of Middle East Studies Later on during the era of high British colonialism in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Persia and its expansive territory came to be seen by Britain as a largely reliable buffer and barrier against French and Russian colonial invasions of India. Protection of British interests in the Indian Subcontinent at this time appears to have been a key and constant consideration in the Kingdom’s alliances with or against Iran (Pelletiere, 1992; Sadoughi, 2005). To this end, at one time, it strength- ened its ties with France against the ambitious expansionism of Russian monarchy, and then, it found itself in alliance with Tsarist Russia to contain the colonial moves of Napoleonic France, with all of this affecting, in one way or another, the Persian interests and territorial integrity. In 1813, in the wake of Russia’s war with Iran and the French assault on Russia as part of the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), Britain halted its support for Persian rulers, and Sir Gore Ouseley, the then British envoy in Iran, helped to conclude the Treaty of Gulistan (1813) and make peace between Iran and Russia—whereby the former lost large swathes of Caucasian territory to the latter—to better secure British interests in the Near East and Europe (Hairi, 1993). In 1825–1826, however, when disputes over the territorial provisions of this treaty between Persia and Russia ran high and the latter refused to withdraw from occupied Iranian lands, the British preferred to keep clear and declined to mediate, leaving an enfeebled Iran alone in a conflict with a militarily superior Russia, which culminated in another substantial territorial concession on the part of Tehran under the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828. Iran was on the way to turn into a rather convenient political instrument of considerable weight in the dynamics of colonial rivalry between Great Britain and Russia. In the words of Saikal (1991), “while Russia regarded Iran as vital to its security and as a gateway to the wealth of India, Britain found it increasingly important to the defence of its colonial interests” (p. 427). Iran’s Division into Spheres of Influence in 1907 Gradually, as Russia expanded its territory in Central Asia and strived to access the sea routes and warm waters of the Persian Gulf, the British government perceived it as the most formidable potential adversary in the East, a factor that played a key role in shaping its interventionist policies toward Persia (Marlowe, 1962). Thus, from the mid-nineteenth century, the British scramble for economic concessions in Iran was practically brought into force and increasingly gathered momentum until a century afterwards.