Who in South Korea Trust North Korea and Who Trust the United States?

125

Chae-han Kim

Abstract

There have been many controversies in South Korea on how to deal with foreign governments. Indeed, position towards or preference for North Korea and the United States is one of the most controversial issues. Three factors seem to affect who in South Korea trusts or distrusts North Korea and who trusts or distrusts the United States. First are two socio-economic variables, age and region. The tendency to distrust the US government is more frequently found in the younger generations than among the elders. Similarly, the tendency to distrust the North Korean government is observed more easily in the older generation than in the younger. Also, Honam residents are more likely to trust Pyongyang than those in other regions, who tend more to distrust the North Korean government. Honam residents are more likely to distrust Washington than are residents of any other region. Second, attitudes toward foreign governments relate with the attitudes on the North Korea-US spectrum. A tendency to distrust the Japanese and Taiwanese governments seems to correlate with favoring the North Korean government over the United States. Finally, certain political activities are closely related to the Pyongyang-Washington spectrum. Those who trust the North Korean government but not the US are likely to read a progressive newspaper or support NGO leaders.

The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 2, Fall 2002 126 Who in South Korea Trust North Korea and Who Trust the United States?

The relationship between the United Stated and North Korea is currently one of the most salient controversies in South Korea, including the presidential election. Any report on Pyongyang and Washington becomes the subject of a heated discussion between the rival political parties as well as general citizenry, and there have been many such controversies of late. Those controversies have been raised by several events, first, US President George W. Bush’s speech declaring North Korea as a part of an “axis of evil.” During the Clinton administration, North Korea and the United States had some dialogue and negotiations; for example the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework was signed, banning North Korea’s posses- sion of nuclear weapons in return for US assistance in setting up a light- water reactor in the North. US–North Korea relations deteriorated when Bush took office and ordered a review of policy towards North Korea. Relations deteriorated further when he described North Korea as a part of an evil axis with Iran and Iraq. Bush’s view of North Korea has become controversial in South Korea. The evil-axis remarks awoke anti-US sentiment in South Korea, and President Kim Dae-jung expressed some concern on Bush’s hard- line policy. On the other hand, those South Koreans who are critical of the Sunshine Policy have agreed with Bush on North Korea. They are in accordance with the US government’s concerns about the thousands of North Koreans who have crossed into China searching for food or work or who are fleeing persecution over what the North Korean leadership regards as a crime. Second, a statement made by South Korea’s top diplomat also has stirred up controversy. Foreign Minister Choi Sung-hong was quoted in an American newspaper as saying that sometimes carrying a big stick works in forcing North Korea to come forward.1 It implied that some within the South Korean government believe that a US hard-line policy toward North Korea may sometimes be necessary. The North Korean government seemed to be pressuring President Kim Dae-jung to dismiss the foreign minister. As the article embarrassed

Work for this article was supported by research funding and data from the Hallym Academy of Sciences. 1 Washington Post, April 23, 2002. Chae-han Kim 127 the Kim Dae-jung government, South Korean officials claimed that the Post article was misleading. Fourth, the safety issue over Imnam Dam (Kumgangsan Dam) also has raised the controversy over the perception of South Koreans on North Korea. When it was reported that Imnam Dam is leaky and weak, there were various responses among South Koreans: bomb the dam before enlargement construction is complete at one extreme, and apologize to North Korea for misinformation at the other. Third, the bankruptcy of the Kumgang Mountains tourism project has raised controversy. The Kim Dae-jung administration wants to raise taxes to continue the project, even though it is reported that millions of US dollars of South Koreans’ touring money have been used to improve North Korea’s military strength. The Kim Dae-jung government and some Korean people judge that tension on the Korean peninsula has been reduced by Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy. Of course, many South Koreans do not want to pay taxes for the Kumgangsan tourism project since they think they are suffering from the Sunshine Policy. Fourth, South Korea’s F-X project has contributed to the controversy. When the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced that the government would buy forty F-15K fighter jets from Boeing, some NGOs criticized the decision saying a better deal had been offered elsewhere. Fifth, some issues on the United States Forces Korea (USFK) housing and welfare facilities are related to differing South Korean perceptions of the United States and North Korea. The USFK wants to build a high-rise apartment complex on its Yongsan compound and responses have varied. The Ministry of Defense reluctantly accepts it, but the city of Seoul does not favor the request. Environmental NGOs are also protesting the proposal since many South Koreans want Yongsan to be kept as open space for the future when the compound is eventually turned back to civilian use. A USFK plan to build a theater on the base has drawn particular ire. Such NGOs as “the Movement for Returning the Yongsan Military Base to the Korean People” said they would use force to block construction of the new theater and continue to campaign for the revision of the military agreement SOFA which many see as unequal in favor of the US. Sixth, the inter-Korean naval clash on June 29 has not only worsened NK-US relations, but it also has exposed some aspects of South Korean 128 Who in South Korea Trust North Korea and Who Trust the United States? perception along the North Korea–US axis. North Korea’s state-run media said that the inter-Korean battle in the Yellow Sea was orchestrated by the United States to drive a wedge between the North and the South. Some South Koreans pointed out that North Korea does not accept the Northern Limit Line (NLL) on the sea, and that South Korean fishing activity around the NLL has stimulated North Korea to defend its territory. After the incident Washington informed Pyongyang it would reverse its plan to send high-level envoys to the North for talks. Some South Koreans are demanding that the US stand firmer against North Korea. Just as the North Korean government seems to believe that some South Koreans agree with the North, the US government seems to believe that its hard-line decisions towards the North are supported by many South Koreans. Finally and most importantly, South Korean elections and the NK- US spectrum affect each other. The issues of Seoul’s relationship with Washington and with Pyongyang are likely to play a key role in group- ing Korean voters and determining the outcome of the December 19, 2002, Korean presidential election. Presidential candidates’ views on North Korea and on the United States have become a hot issue. South Koreans’ position on Pyongyang and Washington is one of the most difficult issues for the presidential hopefuls to balance, since they would like to represent as many voters as possible. In the early 1990s, the ruling Millennium Democratic Party presidential nominee Roh Moo-hyun was a vocal advocate of the withdrawal of the US troops from South Korea. Now he states that US troops should continue to be stationed on the Korean peninsula. Roh said that many people have told him to report to Washington once becoming a presidential candidate. He has termed this attitude toadyism, a remnant of the old sadaejueui of the ancient dynasties, which means the doctrine of automatic deference to the powerful. Roh said that he would not be swayed by talk that his camp should try to look good to the United States in order to win the presidential election. Roh called for a reciprocal South Korea–US relationship in which the South Korea–US alliance should be based on give and take, arguing that Seoul should be less reliant on Washington, or that South Korea should not be too concerned with how the US might view South Korea. He Chae-han Kim 129 demands that Seoul, not Washington, should set the tone for affairs with North Korea. Roh is aware that some of his opinions could bring dismay from Washington. He sent his foreign relations advisor Lee Chung-ryeol to Washington to explain his position, but Lee made a controversial remark urging the United States to stay out of Korea’s presidential election, which was reported in a Korean weekly newspaper. Roh sacked Lee one day after, stating that Lee’s views on the United States are completely different from his. When US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs James Kelly said the onset of the new Korean leadership would lead the US to redefine the relationship between the United States and South Korea, Kelly’s remark is argued to mean that the US harbors anxiety over the possible election of Roh Moo-hyun as the next head of state. The US Ambassador to South Korea, Thomas Hubbard, denies that the United States has a negative view of Roh, saying that Washington would support whoever becomes the next president. On the other hand, the main opposition Grand National Party presidential nominee, Lee Hoi-chang, has mentioned many times “increase of cooperation,” “recovery of traditional relations,” or “reestablishment of trust” between South Korea and the United States. In January, Lee was seen occupying one corner of the NK-US controversy when he was quoted by an American newspaper as having endorsed the Bush administration’s hard-line policy toward North Korea during a meeting with US senior officials.2 The report was the subject of a heated discussion between the rival parties for some time. When Lee Hoi-chang visited the United States in January, he met with Vice President Dick Cheney and other influential figures. Lee’s camp insists that he could have met one-on-one with Bush, but opted not to do so for fear of raising the ire of South Korean people over Bush’s “axis of evil” remark. Lee has shown his own pro-US views clearly by criticizing the Kim Dae-jung administration for moving away from what he calls the tradition of the ROK-US alliance. Delivering a speech at the National Assembly in February, Lee said North Korea should allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to

2 Washington Post, February 10, 2002. 130 Who in South Korea Trust North Korea and Who Trust the United States? inspect its suspected nuclear facilities. Lee said that true peace on the Korean peninsula cannot be expected without the settlement of the problem of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with North Korea. He emphasized the need to strengthen bilateral trust and close coordination between South Korea and the United States in order to dispel fears about weapons of mass destruction. Pyongyang has several times attacked Lee verbally. Lee Hoi-chang’s election as president could yield a policy of less appeasement toward North Korea while Roh Moo-hyun’s election could keep Kim Dae-jung’s policies. Roh says he would maintain the Sunshine Policy while Lee proposes “reciprocity, national consensus and trans- parency.” Lee has expressed some apprehensions over Article 2 of the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration signed in June 2000, which states that there are common elements in the South’s proposal for a “confederation” and the North’s proposal for a “federation of lower stage,” saying it might be a clause aimed at bringing communism to South Korea. Roh and the Millennium Democratic Party have accused Lee of having a “Cold War mentality” and of trying to negate the progress in inter- Korean ties. Progressive groups argue that inter-Korean relations will become seriously strained if a conservative candidate such as Lee Hoi-chang is elected president. On the other hand, conservatives say that current inter-Korean relations are so unilateral that the policy does not yield any common interests or welfare. Many opinion leaders in Korea who have studied at American schools warn that significant security and economic troubles may occur if a new president forms a confrontational relationship with the United States. North Korea and the United States both have the capacity to affect South Korean elections. North Korea’s bombing of a Korean Air jetliner influenced the outcome of the 1987 presidential election, while its violation of the Armistice did so with the 1996 National Assembly election. It seems that either Pyongyang or Washington can pose difficulties for anyone judged to run counter to their own interests, even though neither nation can very well actually back a specific candidate. Such influence, however, is limited in achieving election results favorable to one side or the other. The most important factor in the Chae-han Kim 131 election outcome is the preferences of voters, and of course candidates would like to represent as many voters as possible over the NK-US spectrum. How the North Korean and US factors come into play depends on how the South Korean people think of North Korea and the United States. The survey data conducted by Gallup Korea is used here to show who trusts and distrusts the two countries. South Korean adults num- bering 1,002 and randomly sampled were interviewed face-to-face from June 22 through July 4, 2001.3 Limitations should be noted in using the survey data. First, a poll on how much people trust foreign countries is vulnerable to events that might occur just before the survey is taken,4 and pro-con ratios are found to be prone to vary abruptly. Thus, straightforward interpretation of survey results should not be taken. The causal relationships between pro and con and the background behind them, however, is found to be consistent. Since this paper does

Table 1. The Ranking of Trust in Foreign Governments by South Koreans, 2001

Ranking Government Question: Do you trust this government? 1 US 2 Taiwan 3 China 4 Russia 5 Japan 6 North Korea

3 The confidence interval or the range of error in a specific confidence level is not reported here since only the relationships among variables, not the frequency results of individual variables, are considered here. 4 One evaluator of the Gallup survey pointed out that it may be biased towards North Korea because the survey was conducted in the period that reminds them of the June 15 Summit Meeting between the two Koreas. Another said the survey result is outdated since the September 11 terrorist attacks has changed even the South Korean perception on the United States. It also may be argued that the controversy over a judge allegedly biased against a South Korean skater in the Winter Olympics has made the South Korean perception on the US more negative. 132 Who in South Korea Trust North Korea and Who Trust the United States? not intend to show the pro-con ratios but the background behind them, the survey data may be used with confidence. Even though Table 1 should not be considered to show the ratios or exact ranking of South Koreans pro and con toward foreign countries, the table is necessary for analyzing the backgrounds of North Korea– United States spectrum. As shown in Table 1, the North Korean government is least trusted among all other countries in or with much influence in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, more South Korean respondents answered that they trust the US government than they did any other surrounding foreign government, so it seems Washington continues to be considered most trustworthy.

Table 2. Correlations between the Trust Levels of South Koreans toward Foreign Governments

Government North Korean US Japanese Chinese Russian Taiwan North 1.000 US .253 1.000 Japanese .333 .552 1.000 Chinese .387 .529 .503 1.000 Russian .443 .530 .513 .733 1.000 Taiwan .336 .516 .450 .694 .656 1.000 All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 2 shows bivariate correlations among how much Korean people trust the surrounding powers. The least positive correlation is found

Table 3. The Ratio of Respondents Who Trust/Distrust the North Korean and US Governments

Do you trust the US government? No Yes Do you trust the North No 4 3 Korean government? Yes 2 1 1, 2, 3 and 4 refer to relative frequencies only, neither exact number nor ratio. Chae-han Kim 133 in the relationship between trusting the North Korean government and trusting the US government. This supports the argument that the most salient spectrum of South Korean people is along the NK-US axis. In Table 3, among four cases, the biggest group is of those respondents who trust neither the North Korean government nor the US government. The second largest group (3) is of those respondents who said that they do not trust the North Korean government, but do the US government. This group is classified as the pro-US group here. Those who support the North Korean government over the US government is classified as the pro-NK group (2) in this paper. The other 80 percent (4+1) are classified as the neutral group over the spectrum of the NK-US. Table 4 shows the frequencies of pro-NKs, pro-USs, and neutrals. Now, let me show the distinguishing backgrounds of pro-USs and pro-NKs.

Table 4. Frequencies of Pro-NK and Pro-US in the Spectrum

Frequency Percentage Pro-US 152 15.2% Neutral 802 80.3% Pro-NK 45 4.5% Total 999 100.0%

Socio-economic Backgrounds of Pro-USs and Pro-NKs

Older South Koreans are likely to perceive the United States positively while the younger Koreans perceive it differently. The supporters

Table 5. Generation and Pro-NK/Pro-US NK-US Spectrum

Pro-US Neutral Pro-NK Total Age 18–29 7.9% (23, 2.3%) 87.2% (253, 25.3%) 4.8% (14, 1.4%) 100.0% (290, 29.0%) 30–39 11.9% (30, 3.0%) 82.5% (208, 20.8%) 5.6% (14, 1.4%) 100.0% (252, 25.2%) 40–49 19.5% (38, 3.8%) 76.9% (150, 15.0%) 3.6% ( 7, 0.7%) 100.0% (195, 19.5%) 50–59 23.4% (29, 2.9%) 72.6% (90, 9.0%) 4.0% ( 5, 0.5%) 100.0% (124, 12.4%) 60– 23.2% (32, 3.2%) 73.2% (101, 10.1%) 3.6% ( 5, 0.5%) 100.0% (138, 13.8%) Total (999, 100.0%) 134 Who in South Korea Trust North Korea and Who Trust the United States? of the United States tend to feel that the US defended South Korea during the 1950–53 Korean War and later helped South Korea develop into a democratic nation. The support ratio of the younger generations, however, is lower, as shown in Table 5. Some younger Koreans argue that the US is not helpful to Korea’s unification and democracy. The education factor as well as the age factor has been referred to in some controversies on South Korean attitude toward North Korea and the United States. Evidence, however, was not found supporting pro-NK or pro-US attitudes related to educational experience, in Table 6.

Table 6. Education Experience and the NK-US Spectrum

NK-US spectrum Pro-US Neutral Pro-NK Total Education No school 24.4% (10, 1.0%) 70.7% (29, 2.9%) 4.9% (2, 0.2%) 100.0% (41, 4.1%) Experience Primary/ 22.1% (15, 1.5%) 75.0% (51, 5.1%) 2.9% (2, 0.2%) 100.0% (68, 6.8%) elementary Middle school 20.7% (19, 1.9%) 78.3% (72, 7.2%) 1.1% (1, 0.1%) 100.0% (92, 9.2%) High school 14.4% (56, 5.6%) 79.4% (308, 30.8%) 6.2% (24, 2.4%) 100.0% (388, 38.8%) 2-years college 14.6% (22, 2.2%) 80.8% (122, 12.2%) 4.6% (7, 0.7%) 100.0% (151, 15.1%) 4-years college/ 11.0% (27, 2.7%) 85.3% (209, 20.9%) 3.7% (9, 0.9%) 100.0% (245, 24.5%) university Graduate 21.4% (3, 0.3%) 78.6% (11, 1.1%) 0.0% (0, 0.0%) 100.0% (14, 1.4%) school Total (999, 100.0%) * statistically insignificant

Table 7. Marriage Status and the NK-US Spectrum

NK-US spectrum Pro-US Neutral Pro-NK Total Marriage Married status (including 17.5% (129, 12.9%) 78.6% (580, 58.1%) 3.9% (29, 2.9%) 100.0% (738, 73.9%) divorced) Not married 8.8% (23, 2.3%) 85.1% (222, 22.2%) 6.1% (16, 1.6%) 100.0% (261, 26.1%) Total (999, 100.0%) Chae-han Kim 135

According to Table 7, South Koreans who have a marriage experience are more likely to trust the US government than are South Koreans with no marriage experience. This argument, however, is not strong statistically as confirmed by multiple regression analysis. The regional factor is very influential in Korean politics. After relationships were sought between region and the NK-US spectrum, no region but one was significantly correlated to the NK-US spectrum, Honam (the city of Gwangju and Jeolla Provinces in the southwest part of the peninsula) was found to be significantly related to the attitude toward North Korea and the United States. As shown in Table 8, most Honam residents and most of non- Honam residents are biased neither for the North Korean government nor for the US government. The ratio of neutral Honam respondents is almost the same as that of neutral non-Honam respondents, but more of them (9.3%) said they were more likely to trust the North Korean government than were residents outside the Honam area (3.9%). Among Honam residents, the percentage of pro-NKs is not so different from that of pro-USs. In contrast, the ratio of pro-NKs among non-Honam residents is only a quarter of that of pro-USs.

Table 8. Region and the NK-US Spectrum

NK-US spectrum Pro-US Neutral Pro-NK Total Region Not reside 15.8% (139, 13.9%) 80.4% (708, 70.9%) 3.9% (34, 3.4%) 100.0% (881, 88.2%) in Honam Reside 11.0% (13, 1.3%) 79.7% (94, 9.4%) 9.3% (11, 1.1%) 100.0% (118, 11.8%) in Honam Total (999, 100.0%)

Some Honam residents suspect that the US government interfered with the Gwangju Democratization Movement in 1980. Also, Honam residents and President Kim Dae-jung exert influence on each other in ideological trend. 136 Who in South Korea Trust North Korea and Who Trust the United States?

Perceptions of Pro-NKs and Pro-USs towards Governments

According to Table 9, half of those South Koreans who trust the Japanese government are pro-US while the other half are just neutral over the NK-US spectrum. On the other hand, most of those South Koreans who distrust the Japanese government are neutral over the spectrum, so trusting the Japanese government is positively correlated to trusting the US government in South Korean perceptions. Table 9 also shows how related the level of trust toward the Chinese government is to pro-USs or pro-NKs. Similar to trusting/distrusting the Japanese government, those South Koreans who trust the Chinese government are more likely to be pro-US than are those who distrust the Chinese government. With respect to the Taiwanese government and the Russian government, the same conclusion could be made. Thus, those South Koreans who trust such surrounding governments as Japanese, Chinese, Taiwanese, and

Table 9. Perception on the Surrounding Governments and the NK-US Spectrum

NK-US Spectrum Pro-US Neutral Pro-NK Total For the Japanese Distrust 11.9% (107, 10.7%) 83.9% (753, 75.4%) 4.2% (38, 3.8%) 100.0% (898, 89.9%) government Trust 44.6% (45, 4.5%) 48.5% (49, 4.9%) 6.9% (7, 0.7%) 100.0% (101, 10.1%) Total (999, 100.0%) For the Chinese Distrust 11.2% (94, 9.4%) 85.2% (713, 71.6%) 3.6% (30, 3.0%) 100.0% (837, 84.0%) government Trust 35.8% (57, 5.7%) 54.7% (87, 8.7%) 9.4% (15, 1.5%) 100.0% (159, 16.0%) Total (996, 100.0%) For the Taiwanese Distrust 10.8% (87, 8.7%) 85.0% (683, 68.6%) 4.2% (34, 3.4%) 100.0% (804, 80.8%) government Trust 33.5% (64, 6.4%) 60.7% (116, 11.7%) 5.8% (11, 1.1%) 100.0% (191, 19.2%) Total (995, 100.0%) For the Russian Distrust 12.1% (106, 10.7%) 84.1% (738, 74.2%) 3.9% (34, 3.4%) 100.0% (878, 88.2%) government Trust 38.5% (45, 4.5%) 52.1% (61, 6.1%) 9.4% (11, 1.1%) 100.0% (117, 11.8%) Total (995, 100.0%) For the South Distrust 11.6% (73, 7.3%) 85.2% (536, 53.7%) 3.2% (20, 2.0%) 100.0% (629, 63.0%) Korean Trust 21.4% (79, 7.9%) 71.9% (266, 26.6%) 6.8% (25, 2.5%) 100.0% (370, 37.0%) Government Total (999, 100.0%) Chae-han Kim 137

Russian are likely to be more or less pro-US while most of those who distrust these surrounding governments are likely to be neutral. Similarly, most of those South Koreans who distrust their own government tend to be unbiased towards the NK-US spectrum. Higher ratios of neutral people over the NK-US spectrum are found among those who distrust several governments than among those who trust them.

Political Activities of Pro-USs and Pro-NKs

In Table 10, pro-government respondents appear more pro-US than do anti-government respondents. This implies that the supporters of the North Korean government are not satisfied with the current order.

Table 10. Attitude toward Government and the NK-US Spectrum

NK-US spectrum Pro-US Neutral Pro-NK Total Anti-government 12.0% (70, 7.1%) 84.4% (491, 49.8%) 3.6% (21, 2.1%) 100.0% (582, 59.0%) Pro-government 20.0% (81, 8.2%) 74.3% (300, 30.4%) 5.7% (23, 2.3%) 100.0% (404, 41.0%) Total (986, 100.0%)

The NK-US spectrum is significantly correlated to respondents’ perception on social institutions and leaders. Supporters of the North Korean government are more likely to distrust such institutions as local governments, political parties, the military, police, prosecution, the courts, industry and corporations, banks, the press, hospitals, church and temple. They are also likely to distrust such social leaders as national or local assemblymen, governors, mayors, political party leaders, high-level officials, military generals, high-level policemen, prosecutor, judges, lawyers, CEOs, union leaders, bankers, teachers, professors, press reporters, entertainers, medical doctors, monks and priests. Unlike other institutions and leaders, the Blue House with the president and NGOs with NGO leaders do not show any significant correlative relationship with the NK-US spectrum. Pro-US South Koreans are less likely to regard with hostility the Korean president or 138 Who in South Korea Trust North Korea and Who Trust the United States?

Table 11. Supporting the NGOs and the NK-US Spectrum

NK-US Spectrum Pro-US Neutral Pro-NK Total Anti-NGO 18.1% (87, 8.7%) 78.0% (375, 37.7%) 4.0% (19, 1.9%) 100.0% (481. 48.3%) Pro-NGO 12.5% (64, 6.4%) 82.5% (424, 42.6%) 5.1% (26, 2.6%) 100.0% (514, 51.7%) Total (995, 100.0%)

NGO leaders than they are to the other leaders. In Table 11, those South Koreans who favor the US government are likely to criticize NGOs. On the other hand, those who favor the North Korean government are likely to support NGOs. With respect to the NGO leaders, the same conclusion may be made. Those who trust the North Korean government instead of the US government are likely to rely on NGO leaders. On the other hand, those who trust Washington but not Pyongyang are likely to have negative views on the NGO leaders.

Table 12. Supporting the NGO Leaders and the NK-US Spectrum

NK-US Spectrum Pro-US Neutral Pro-NK Total Anti-NGOL 19.3% (93, 9.4%) 77.0% (371, 37.4%) 3.7% (18, 1.8%) 100.0% (482, 48.5%) Pro-NGOL 11.4% (58, 5.8%) 83.4% (426, 42.9%) 5.3% (27, 2.7%) 100.0% (511, 51.5%) Total (993, 100.0%)

It is said that Korean newspapers have variously opposing views on the North Korean government and the US government. The Chosun Ilbo seems to represent some conservative views while the Hankyoreh Sinmun publishes some progressive views. Which newspapers pro-US or pro- NK respondents read are analyzed. Among major newspapers and broadcasts, only the Hankyoreh Sinmun was statistically related to pro- NK/pro-US. The other newspapers and broadcasts were not significantly correlated. Among those who do not read the Hankyoreh Sinmun, as shown in Table 13, the ratio of pro-US is higher than is that of pro-NK, while more Chae-han Kim 139

Table 13. Reading Hankyoreh Sinmun Newspaper and the NK-US Spectrum

NK-US Spectrum Pro-US Neutral Pro-NK Total Do not read 15.8% (145, 14.5%) 80.4% (739, 74.0%) 3.8% (35, 3.5%) 100.0% (919, 92.0%) Hankyoreh Daily Read 8.8% (7, 0.7%) 78.8% (63, 6.3%) 12.5% (10, 1.0%) 100.0% (80, 8.0%) Hankyoreh Daily Total (993, 100.0%)

Hankyoreh readers trust Pyongyang but not Washington than who trust the US government over that of North Korea.

Table 14. Perception on Unity and the NK-US Spectrum

NK-US Spectrum Pro-US Neutral Pro-NK Total Strong unity is Disagree 8.5% (10, 1.0%) 83.9% (99, 9.9%) 7.6% (9, 0.9%) 100.0% (118, 11.8%) a virtue Agree 16.1% (142, 14.2%) 79.8% (702, 70.3%) 4.1% (36, 3.6%) 100.0% (880, 88.2%) Total (998, 100.0%)

Table 15. Perception on Freedom and the NK-US Spectrum

NK-US Spectrum Pro-US Neutral Pro-NK Total Freedom is Disagree 12.5% (49, 4.9%) 81.9% (321, 32.1%) 5.6% (22, 2.2%) 100.0% (392, 39.2%) guaranteed in Agree 17.0% (103, 10.3%) 79.2% (481, 48.1%) 3.8% (23, 2.3%) 100.0% (607, 60.8%) our society Total (999, 100.0%)

In Table 14, most of pro-USs agree that being closely banded together or being strongly united is a sort of social virtue. In pro-NKs, however, the ratio of agreement is much lower. Similarly, most of those who trust the US government instead of the North Korean government agree that basic freedoms necessary for life are guaranteed sufficiently in South Korean society. Only a half of pro- NKs, however, agree with that. Many of those who favor Pyongyang are 140 Who in South Korea Trust North Korea and Who Trust the United States? dissatisfied with the current freedom level and order in South Korea. Even though this paper distinguishes between those who trust North Korea and those who trust the US, it should be emphasized that only a few South Korean people trust the North Korean regime while most distrust. Similarly, even though the US government is perceived more trustworthy by the South Korean people than is any other surrounding government, the majority of South Korean people seem to be neutral on the spectrum of NK-US.

Conclusions

Many factors that explain the Washington-Pyongyang spectrum have been described above. Of course, explanatory powers of some variables depend on model specification. As technical analyses are omitted here, the verbal confirmation is following. Three variables explain the spectrum. First, two socio-economic variables explain who tend to trust the North Korean government and who trust the US government: age and region. The tendency to distrust the US government is more frequently found in the younger generation than in the older, while distrust of the North Korean government is observed more easily in the older generation. On the other hand, non-Honam residents are relatively unlikely to trust Pyongyang and more likely to trust Washington; in Honam that is reversed. Second, attitude toward foreign governments could help explain the North Korea–US spectrum. Tendency among South Koreans to distrust the Japanese and Taiwanese governments seems to play a positive role in favoring the North Korean government along the North Korea–US spectrum. Third, some political activities are closely related to the spectrum of Pyongyang and Washington. Those who trust the US government over North Korea are likely neither to read a progressive newspaper nor support NGO leaders. In sum, age, region, NGO, newspaper, and Japan are among explanatory variables of the spectrum that is being perceived most salient by the South Korean people over South Korea’s foreign relations.