Who in South Korea Trust North Korea and Who Trust the United States?
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125 Who in South Korea Trust North Korea and Who Trust the United States? Chae-han Kim Abstract There have been many controversies in South Korea on how to deal with foreign governments. Indeed, position towards or preference for North Korea and the United States is one of the most controversial issues. Three factors seem to affect who in South Korea trusts or distrusts North Korea and who trusts or distrusts the United States. First are two socio-economic variables, age and region. The ten- dency to distrust the US government is more frequently found in the younger generations than among the elders. Similarly, the tendency to distrust the North Korean government is observed more easily in the older generation than in the younger. Also, Honam residents are more likely to trust Pyongyang than those in other regions, who tend more to distrust the North Korean government. Honam residents are more likely to distrust Washington than are residents of any other region. Second, attitudes toward foreign governments relate with the attitudes on the North Korea-US spectrum. A tendency to distrust the Japanese and Taiwanese governments seems to correlate with favoring the North Korean government over the United States. Finally, certain political activities are closely related to the Pyongyang-Washington spectrum. Those who trust the North Korean government but not the US are likely to read a progressive newspaper or support NGO leaders. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 2, Fall 2002 126 Who in South Korea Trust North Korea and Who Trust the United States? The relationship between the United Stated and North Korea is currently one of the most salient controversies in South Korea, including the presidential election. Any report on Pyongyang and Washington becomes the subject of a heated discussion between the rival political parties as well as general citizenry, and there have been many such controversies of late. Those controversies have been raised by several events, first, US President George W. Bush’s speech declaring North Korea as a part of an “axis of evil.” During the Clinton administration, North Korea and the United States had some dialogue and negotiations; for example the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework was signed, banning North Korea’s posses- sion of nuclear weapons in return for US assistance in setting up a light- water reactor in the North. US–North Korea relations deteriorated when Bush took office and ordered a review of policy towards North Korea. Relations deteriorated further when he described North Korea as a part of an evil axis with Iran and Iraq. Bush’s view of North Korea has become controversial in South Korea. The evil-axis remarks awoke anti-US sentiment in South Korea, and President Kim Dae-jung expressed some concern on Bush’s hard- line policy. On the other hand, those South Koreans who are critical of the Sunshine Policy have agreed with Bush on North Korea. They are in accordance with the US government’s concerns about the thousands of North Koreans who have crossed into China searching for food or work or who are fleeing persecution over what the North Korean leadership regards as a crime. Second, a statement made by South Korea’s top diplomat also has stirred up controversy. Foreign Minister Choi Sung-hong was quoted in an American newspaper as saying that sometimes carrying a big stick works in forcing North Korea to come forward.1 It implied that some within the South Korean government believe that a US hard-line policy toward North Korea may sometimes be necessary. The North Korean government seemed to be pressuring President Kim Dae-jung to dismiss the foreign minister. As the article embarrassed Work for this article was supported by research funding and data from the Hallym Academy of Sciences. 1 Washington Post, April 23, 2002. Chae-han Kim 127 the Kim Dae-jung government, South Korean officials claimed that the Post article was misleading. Fourth, the safety issue over Imnam Dam (Kumgangsan Dam) also has raised the controversy over the perception of South Koreans on North Korea. When it was reported that Imnam Dam is leaky and weak, there were various responses among South Koreans: bomb the dam before enlargement construction is complete at one extreme, and apologize to North Korea for misinformation at the other. Third, the bankruptcy of the Kumgang Mountains tourism project has raised controversy. The Kim Dae-jung administration wants to raise taxes to continue the project, even though it is reported that millions of US dollars of South Koreans’ touring money have been used to improve North Korea’s military strength. The Kim Dae-jung government and some Korean people judge that tension on the Korean peninsula has been reduced by Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy. Of course, many South Koreans do not want to pay taxes for the Kumgangsan tourism project since they think they are suffering from the Sunshine Policy. Fourth, South Korea’s F-X project has contributed to the controversy. When the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced that the government would buy forty F-15K fighter jets from Boeing, some NGOs criticized the decision saying a better deal had been offered elsewhere. Fifth, some issues on the United States Forces Korea (USFK) housing and welfare facilities are related to differing South Korean perceptions of the United States and North Korea. The USFK wants to build a high-rise apartment complex on its Yongsan compound and responses have varied. The Ministry of Defense reluctantly accepts it, but the city of Seoul does not favor the request. Environmental NGOs are also protesting the proposal since many South Koreans want Yongsan to be kept as open space for the future when the compound is eventually turned back to civilian use. A USFK plan to build a theater on the base has drawn particular ire. Such NGOs as “the Movement for Returning the Yongsan Military Base to the Korean People” said they would use force to block construction of the new theater and continue to campaign for the revision of the military agreement SOFA which many see as unequal in favor of the US. Sixth, the inter-Korean naval clash on June 29 has not only worsened NK-US relations, but it also has exposed some aspects of South Korean 128 Who in South Korea Trust North Korea and Who Trust the United States? perception along the North Korea–US axis. North Korea’s state-run media said that the inter-Korean battle in the Yellow Sea was orchestrated by the United States to drive a wedge between the North and the South. Some South Koreans pointed out that North Korea does not accept the Northern Limit Line (NLL) on the sea, and that South Korean fishing activity around the NLL has stimulated North Korea to defend its territory. After the incident Washington informed Pyongyang it would reverse its plan to send high-level envoys to the North for talks. Some South Koreans are demanding that the US stand firmer against North Korea. Just as the North Korean government seems to believe that some South Koreans agree with the North, the US government seems to believe that its hard-line decisions towards the North are supported by many South Koreans. Finally and most importantly, South Korean elections and the NK- US spectrum affect each other. The issues of Seoul’s relationship with Washington and with Pyongyang are likely to play a key role in group- ing Korean voters and determining the outcome of the December 19, 2002, Korean presidential election. Presidential candidates’ views on North Korea and on the United States have become a hot issue. South Koreans’ position on Pyongyang and Washington is one of the most difficult issues for the presidential hopefuls to balance, since they would like to represent as many voters as possible. In the early 1990s, the ruling Millennium Democratic Party presi- dential nominee Roh Moo-hyun was a vocal advocate of the withdrawal of the US troops from South Korea. Now he states that US troops should continue to be stationed on the Korean peninsula. Roh said that many people have told him to report to Washington once becoming a presidential candidate. He has termed this attitude toadyism, a remnant of the old sadaejueui of the ancient dynasties, which means the doctrine of automatic deference to the powerful. Roh said that he would not be swayed by talk that his camp should try to look good to the United States in order to win the presidential election. Roh called for a reciprocal South Korea–US relationship in which the South Korea–US alliance should be based on give and take, arguing that Seoul should be less reliant on Washington, or that South Korea should not be too concerned with how the US might view South Korea. He Chae-han Kim 129 demands that Seoul, not Washington, should set the tone for affairs with North Korea. Roh is aware that some of his opinions could bring dismay from Washington. He sent his foreign relations advisor Lee Chung-ryeol to Washington to explain his position, but Lee made a controversial remark urging the United States to stay out of Korea’s presidential election, which was reported in a Korean weekly newspaper. Roh sacked Lee one day after, stating that Lee’s views on the United States are completely different from his. When US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs James Kelly said the onset of the new Korean leadership would lead the US to redefine the relationship between the United States and South Korea, Kelly’s remark is argued to mean that the US harbors anxiety over the possible election of Roh Moo-hyun as the next head of state.