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Strategic Panorama 2003-2004

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Strategic Panorama 2003-2004 MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA 2003/2004 STRATEGIC PANORAMA INSTITUTO ESPAÑOL DE ESTUDIOS ESTRATÉGICOS REAL INSTITUTO ELCANO GENERAL SECRETARIAT Directorate General for OF DEFENCE POLICY Institutional Defence Relations Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Working Group no. 1/03 2003/2004 STRATEGIC PANORAMA The ideas contained herein are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the IEEE, which has sponsored this publication. LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR It was one year in ago in November that I was appointed Director of the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (IEEE). The Institute is attached to the Secretariat-General for Defence Policy which, owing to its functions and nature, stamps its personality on the organisations under its authority. Over the past fourteen months in my post at the IEEE I have endeavoured to promote a fresh approach to the various publications in our Strategy series, including the Panorama. No contributor has been ruled out on the grounds of degree of social or political prestige; indeed, when choosing our contributors priority is given solely and exclusively to their knowledge and specialisation in the particular subject. Accordingly, during 2003, as proposed, we have worked in conjunction with the Elcano Royal Institute of International and Strategic Studies to produce this edition of the Panorama, as well as with other institutes and research centres we believed could make an interesting contribution. We are now collaborating with institutions as important as the Instituto Universitario Gutiérrez Mellado, the National Intelligence Centre and the CESEDEN. We are already feeling the effects of the new life which these contributions are instilling into the IEEE and which will shortly be reflected in the publications that the Institute makes available to the various sectors of society interested in our area of strategic thought. We will carry on striving to improve the results of the Panorama and other publications in the Strategy series and the work of the Institute as a whole, convinced that in doing so we are helping to increase the dissemination of defence culture in Spain and, accordingly, to raise public awareness of defence, which is essential in any Western democracy. JAIME RODRÍGUEZ-TOUBES NÚÑEZ Director of the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies CONTENTS INTRODUCTIÓN By Javier Pardo de Santayana y Coloma Chapter I THE BUILDIN OF EUROPE By Javier Pardo de Santayana y Coloma Chapter II UNITED STATES. “PAX AMERICANA” By Rafael L. Bardají and Manuel Coma Chapter III RUSSIA By Félix Sanz Roldán Chapter IV THE MEDITERRANEAN By Carlos Echeverría Jesús Chapter V IBERO-AMÉRICA By Manuel Lorenzo García-Ormaechea Chapter VI BLACK AFRICA By Juan M. Riesgo Pérez-Dueño Chapter VII ASIA By Fernando Delage Carretero EPILOGUE COMPOSITION OF THE WORKING GROUP INDEX - 4 - INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION As pointed out in the introduction to last year’s Panorama, the year began with a number of causes for concern, such as the coalition forces closing in on Iraq and North Korea’s display of threatening gestures. In the first months of the year we witnessed with disconcertment the collapse of processes hitherto governed by the dialogue, consensus and cooperation that had become customary in our cultural environment and had been maintained and even grown stronger and more widespread following the events of 11 September. We are therefore particularly interested in monitoring the subsequent efforts to restore diminishing solidarity. The war waged in Iraq ended in a rapid victory for the Coalition, proving America’s military capability and the success of the “Revolution in Military Affairs”. It confirmed Washington’s determination to change the world map and put an end to the new threats with a very clearly defined view of its mission as a major world power faced with new security problems. Although the gloomy forecasts were mistaken in their predictions of a prolonged war of attrition, they were nonetheless right about the difficulties of the post-war period, which revealed gaping deficiencies in risk evaluation, in the political forecasts on reconstruction and in the American forces’ preparedness to address the security issues of the second phase. These difficulties were to open the United States’ eyes to the need to rely on others. The war took place in a context that the European countries found very uncomfortable, irked as they were by the radical nature of America’s “doctrine”, though aware of the need to preserve the transatlantic link as the key to security and to adopt a multilateral approach to combating the new threats. However, this discomfort soon gave way to disagreement, as France believed it was time to assume European leadership and exhibit its traditional misgivings about the United States. It accordingly took up the standard of confrontation with Washington and - 6 - attempted to distance Europe from US policy, even at the cost of disrupting the processes under way within the Union, the Atlantic Alliance and the United Nations. Germany, which had shied away from any kind of leadership from the outset, followed in France’s footsteps and the two countries have strengthened their ties to such an extent that many European countries now fear the possible return of a sort of “entente” between the powerful nations. For their part, Russia and China took the opportunity to distance themselves from Washington without drawing too much attention to themselves. In contrast, the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, headed by Poland, showed the importance they attach to the transatlantic link. In response to this position-taking, the Bush administration, to quote Condoleezza Rice, decided to “punish France, isolate Germany and forgive Russia”. Accordingly, the US president endeavoured to chill relations with Paris while striving to develop his excellent personal relationship with Mr Putin, although on some occasions he made gestures of “putting the past behind” him and re-establishing a minimum understanding with Paris at the G-8 summit in Evian. At that meeting a serious of agreements were reached on signing specific commitments on combating terrorism and putting pressure on North Korea and Iran to prevent these countries developing nuclear weapons. As regards the United Nations, consensus began to be restored concerning a resolution for the post-war period. The resolution in question, which was approved by the Security Council, lifted the sanctions on Iraq and attempted to give the United Nations a role of some sort. The resolution marked the “legalisation” in practice of the presence of the liberation forces, as both France and Germany supported it with their votes. Later, consensus was also reached on a new resolution giving definitive legitimacy to American authority over Iraq, thereby confirming that the United States would continue to exercise political control and command of the multinational force. France and the countries that followed in its footsteps merely made their disagreement known by refusing to contribute funds or troops at the so-called “Donors’ Conference” in Madrid. This decision placed them in a very awkward situation as it contrasted with that of several Arab countries which proved considerably more willing to cooperate. NATO’s support for Poland, which had irked the French government by sending forces to Iraq, constituted indirectly a de facto involvement of the Alliance in reconstructing that country and helped re-establish relations between Europeans and between Europeans and Americans. The atmosphere of solidarity within NATO was restored in particular at the meeting of foreign - 7 - ministers held in Madrid in early June and was subsequently consolidated by a fresh consensus on the reform and simplification of the command structure as a means of boosting the efficiency of the organisation’s counter-terrorism efforts. A development that was given little media coverage but marked a turning point was NATO’s direct involvement in Afghanistan, which proved that the doctrine established at Prague was not limited to theory. NATO’s presence in Central Asia represented the Alliance’s definitive shift from its original status of European defence instrument to its new role in the field of world security. It should be pointed out that the “naturalness” with which this qualitative leap took place is difficult to explain bearing in mind the misgivings that certain powers are showing about US proposals in general. Equally noteworthy is the speed with which the initial stage of the NATO Response Force got off the ground. The inauguration ceremony took place in mid-October at the Regional Headquarters Allied Forces North Europe in Brunssum with 9,000 of the 30,000 men of the envisaged total of 30,000. Spain contributed the largest contingent (2,200). The European Union is another area in which efforts were made to improve the atmosphere resulting from the dissent. The first, very modest European military mission (to relieve the NATO forces in Macedonia) was followed by an unexpected mission in the Congo, which was begun in June to support the United Nations and largely sponsored by France. The Union also expressed its willingness to take over SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina in mid-2004. Therefore, contradicting Europe’s declared military weakness, the CSDP embarked on a new stage that revealed the Union’s wish to play a more lucid role on the international scene. The effort to restore European solidarity received impetus in June when the proposals of the Convention were presented in an atmosphere of considerable euphoria. However, the differences of opinion that emerged from the outset created a tense climate for the negotiations of the Intergovernmental Conference. Also worthy of comment, as it showed a certain rapprochement between Europeans and Americans regarding security and defence matters, was the priority given by the so-called “Solana Document” to counter-terrorism, and its recognition of the need to use all available means, including force and preventive action.
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