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AL-QAEDA S.P.A Corso di Laurea magistrale (ordinamento ex D.M. 270/2004 ) in Relazioni Internazionali Comparate Tesi di Laurea AL-QAEDA s.p.a. IL FINANZIAMENTO DI UNA RETE TRANSNAZIONALE DALLE ORIGINI AD OGGI Relatore: Ch. Prof. Massimiliano Trentin Correlatore: Ch. Prof. Matteo Legrenzi Laureando: Marta Zancan Matricola 812408 Anno Accademico 2011/2012 AL-QAEDA s.p.a. IL FINANZIAMENTO DI UNA RETE TRANSNAZIONALE DALLE ORIGINI AD OGGI 1 2 SOMMARIO SINTESI INTRODUTTIVA 9 INTRODUZIONE 13 CAPITOLO PRIMO PERCHÉ AL-QAEDA s.p.a.? 15 1.1 L’ORGANIZZAZIONE E LA SUA IDEOLOGIA 1.2 LA RETE Ex JIHAD ISLAMICA EGIZIANA LASHKAR-E-TAYYBA HARAKAT-UL-MUJAHIDIN JAISH-E-MUHAMMAD JIHADISTI CECENI, EMIRATO DEL CAUCASO Ex MOVIMENTO ISLAMICO PER L’UZBEKISTAN, ora UNIONE ISLAMICA PER IL JIHAD Ex GRUPPO SALAFITA PER LA PREDICAZIONE ED IL COMBATTIMENTO e DHAMAT HOUMET DAAWA SALAFIA, ora AL-QAEDA NEL MAGHREB ISLAMICO AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ AL-QAEDA NELLA PENISOLA ARABICA JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 3 GRUPPO ABU SAYYAF CAPITOLO SECONDO FINANZIAMENTO DA ATTIVITÁ LEGALI 27 2.1 LA RETE COMMERCIALE E FINANZIARIA 2.2 LA RETE DELLE BANCHE 2.2.1 Al-Shamal Islamic Bank 2.2.2. Al-Taqwa Bank 2.2.3 Banca Commerciale Nazionale e Banca di Credito e Commercio Internazionale 2.2.4 Gruppo Finanziario e di Investimento Al-Rajhi ALLEGATO IL SISTEMA BANCARIO ISLAMICO ED AL-QAEDA: FOCUS SU AL-RAJHI BANK 2.3 I CANALI NON FINANZIARI DELLA ZAKAT 2.3.1 Muslim World League 2.3.2 International Islamic Relief Organization 2.3.3 RaBita Trust 2.3.4 Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation 2.3.5 World AssemBly of Muslim Youth 2.3.6 GloBal Relief Foundation e Benevolence International Foundation 2.3.7 Saudi Red Crescent 2.3.8 Qatar CharitaBle Society ALLEGATO ORGANIZZAZIONI UMANITARIE ISLAMICHE E AL QAEDA: FOCUS SU AL-HARAMAIN 4 2.4 COMMERCIO DEL MIELE 2.5 AUTO-FINANZIAMENTO CAPITOLO TERZO FINANZIAMENTO DA ATTIVITÁ ILLEGALI E CRIMINALI 63 3.1 TERRORISMO E CRIMINALITÁ ORGANIZZATA 3.2 NARCOTRAFFICO 3.3 TRAFFICO DI PREZIOSI 3.4 FRODE CON CARTA DI CREDITO 3.5 RICICLAGGIO DI DENARO CAPITOLO QUARTO ALTRE FONTI DI FINANZIAMENTO 77 4.1 SPONSORIZZAZIONE STATALE 4.1.1 AraBia Saudita 4.1.2 Iran 4.1.3 Pakistan 4.1.4 Emirati AraBi Uniti 4.1.5 Yemen 4.1.6 Kuwait 4.2 PARADISI FISCALI E FAILED STATES 4.3 LA “CATENA D’ORO” E DONAZIONI PRIVATE 5 CAPITOLO QUINTO I CANALI DI FINANZIAMENTO 97 5.1 HAWALA 5.2 CORRIERI 5.3 SISTEMA BANCARIO ISLAMICO ED INTERNAZIONALE 5.3.1 Al-Barakaat 5.3.2. Al-Taqwa/Nada Management Group 5.4 SISTEMA COMMERCIALE INTERNAZIONALE 5.5 ORGANIZZAZIONI DI CARITÁ CAPITOLO SESTO NEW YORK E WASHINGTON, 11 SETTEMBRE 2001 111 CAPITOLO SETTIMO GLOBALIZZAZIONE: AL-QAEDA E LA TECNOLOGIA/”CIBER-TERRORISMO” 119 INTERNET CAPITOLO OTTAVO IL FINANZIAMENTO DELLA RETE 127 LASHKAR-E-TAYYBA JAISH-E-MUHAMMAD STATO ISLAMICO DI IRAQ AL-QAEDA NEL MAGHREB ISLAMICO 6 AL-QAEDA NELLA PENISOLA ARABICA JIHADISTI CECENI, EMIRATO DEL CAUCASO UNIONE ISLAMICA PER IL JIHAD JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH ABU SAYYAF GROUP EUROPA CAPITOLO NONO AL-QAEDA OGGI 151 CONCLUSIONE 157 BIBLIOGRAFIA 163 ABSTRACT 175 7 8 SINTESI INTRODUTTIVA The financing of terrorism is a relevant issue nowadays and a challenge to the international community. This graduation thesis analyses the topic focusing on the sources and channels used by Al-Qaeda Ltd., a Middle-Eastern jihadist movement, to fund its terrorist activities with the aim of understanding its financial machine and its ripples through the current Middle-East. This choice is due to several factors and reasons. First of all, we have witnessed a privatization of terror during the last decade of the 20th century; with the end of the Cold War, states’ sponsorship of terror was outclassed by new actors, mainly charities, NGOs and wealthy individuals who collect donations from followers and financiers in the Arab World, but also from fellow-believers who live abroad. In this context, terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda have developed into a sort of enterprise where the managerial capacity of the leader is more important than his military career because of their financial needs for survival. Secondly, current jihadist terrorism influences the domestic and foreign policy of some Muslim governments because of its religious basis; in particular, several Gulf States politicians and businessmen have been accused of funding Al-Qaeda in order to preach their Islamic doctrine abroad, and since the beginning has been a matter of global significance because of the political, diplomatic and economic relations that link them to the international community. Even if some Muslim countries have officially supported Osama Bin Laden in the past, as in the case of Sudan and Afghanistan, it is important to highlight the recent role of influential individuals in the alleged sponsorship of terrorism, thing that safeguards their States against accusations and that allows them to continue with their policy. Thirdly, Al-Qaeda Ltd. has been able to develop and adapt to global changes as, for example, the new technologies introduced by the last wave of globalization and the civil insurgencies that are shaking the political establishment in many countries in the Middle-East and in North-Africa. These events issue new challenges to the international community, since it has to confront a now heterogeneous and fragmented movement (whereas in the first decade since its foundation Al- Qaeda was a single, hierarchical organization led by Osama Bin Laden) that is able to model and change its structure in order to survive and spread its jihadist cause. 9 This graduation thesis is supported by a selected bibliography and specific readings on the financing of terrorism, especially of Al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, there are some difficulties in exploring the issue: the first lies in the fact that we do not know the whole universe of the organization, which has been able to act behind the scenes thanks to a wide network of supporters and to the gaps of the international law against terrorism. Another difficulty is related to the fact that the bulk of bibliography has been written by United States experts, whose government began to be seriously engaged in counterterrorism policies only after the attacks against the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and especially following the 9/11 attacks; this means that we have to take an objective point of view on the issue and complete the array of information with international and Middle-Eastern sources. The following writing is organized in several chapters, each of which examines a specific aspect of the funding of Al-Qaeda Ltd. The starting point is an overall view of the terrorist organization founded in 1989; it is important to know its historic and ideological background in order to better understand its structural evolution until nowadays, which means a development from a unique and hierarchical organization located in a single country and devoted to the global jihad into a network of fragmented groups and cells spread all around the world and pursuing different projects. The core of this work is dedicated to the wide array of means used by Al-Qaeda to raise, hide and divert funds. The second chapter deals with the legal sources and activities focusing on Osama Bin Laden, whose wealth and business were used to fund the organization and to establish its financial structure; in this context the role of Islamic banking and charities in facilitating fund-raising have been fundamental since the beginning, because of their legal status and presence in every Muslim country around the world; these elements have allowed terrorists to act without raising suspects for a long period of time. In addition to the financial and humanitarian sector, terrorists were also involved in business and trade, such as the honey trade, which profits filled Al-Qaeda’s coffers. The third chapter analyses the illegal and criminal financing methods. There are several proof of Al-Qaeda’s involvement in drug dealing, due to the fact that under the Taliban regime Afghanistan, homeland of Al-Qaeda, became the most important heroin-producing and exporting country; credit card fraud, and precious stones smuggling constitute other illicit sources. An interesting aspect of these activities is the alliance of Al-Qaeda Ltd. with the organized crime, which opened safer routes to the illegal trafficking of the terrorist group. In order to make the 10 sources of these funds untraceable by the authorities, terrorists resort to money-laundering, therefore the funds seem to come from legal sectors. The fourth chapter focuses on state sponsorship and on the so-called “golden chain”. As far as the first one is concerned, Al-Qaeda Ltd. has always enjoyed a financial sustain by Muslim countries, especially the wealthy élite in power. Although an official state sponsorship does not exist, there are pieces of evidence that some middle-eastern Muslim leaders and businessmen have been involved in the funding of Bin Laden’s organization in order to preach their religious doctrine (for example, Saudi Arabia), or to combat a common enemy. Furthermore, safe heavens and failed states have facilitated terrorists’ fund-raising and money-laundering, offering unregulated places where to conduct their illicit activities and transactions. As far as the “golden chain” is concerned, it refers to an Al-Qaeda’s list discovered during a raid by Bosnian authorities in Sarajevo, quoting wealthy Muslim donors, many of whom filled political or management posts, who contributed to the financial machine of the terrorist organization. The fifth chapter examines the channels through which money travels from donors to the beneficiary; the main transactions use informal payments systems, such as the hawala (underground banking) or human couriers.
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