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NNoottee ddee ll’’IIffrrii ______________________________________________________________________ A Victorious Anti-insurrection Strategy? The Insurrections of 2010 in the Jonglei State of South Sudan __________________________________________________________________ Marc-André Lagrange March 2012 . Sub-Saharan Africa Program The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non- governmental and a non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Using an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. With offices in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European debate. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. The Sub-Saharan Africa Program is supported by: Translated by Kathy Judelson ISBN: 978-2-36567-007-4 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2012 Ifri Ifri-Bruxelles 27, rue de la Procession Rue Marie-Thérèse, 21 75740 Paris Cedex 15 – FRANCE 1000 – Bruxelles – BELGIQUE Tel: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 Tel: +32 (0)2 238 51 10 Fax: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Fax: +32 (0)2 238 51 15 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Website: Ifri.org Table of contents TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................... 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 2 THE ROOTS OF DISCONTENT ......................................................... 4 REBELLIONS IN JONGLEI ............................................................... 9 A MILITARY VICTORY? ............................................................... 13 A STABILIZING STRATEGY? ........................................................ 16 1 © Ifri Introduction On May 16 2010, a few weeks after its first elections, the government of the semi-autonomous province of South Sudan (GoSS) had to confront two rebellions in the Jonglei Province. General George Athor and David Yaw Yaw, who lost in that first democratic consultation, took up arms in the name of the people against the central government in Juba. The 2010 elections in the Sudan were more than just a simple formality for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its armed branch, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). For both bodies, these elections were going to test their ability to transform themselves into a political party and a national army and thus to create the foundations of an independent South Sudan. South Sudan may appear unified behind the banner of the SPLM/A, but in fact it is nothing of the kind. While a majority of the South Sudanese wishes to separate itself from the Khartoum regime, the Juba government is a long way from enjoying the support of all the diverse ethnic groups and the former rebel movements. The SPLA under John Garang is the signatory to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 20051. Its main feature is that they have assembled and brought into the ranks of the SPLA all the armed groups fighting against Khartoum. Thus both the population and the armed forces of the South Sudan constitute a constellation of ethnic groups and small groups of rebels, which have nothing in common Marc-André Lagrange is an expert in African conflicts. He has been working for over 10 years in conflict zones and has been in post in South Sudan for the United Nations. He has a degree in International development (ISTOM) and a Master’s Degree in Crisis Management. 1 The inclusive peace accords or Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which also goes by the name of “Naivasha Accords”, were signed in Kenya on January 9, 2005 by John Garang for the SPLM and Ali Osmane Taha, the Vice-President of Sudan for the National Congress Party. These accords anticipate the cessation of the fighting between the Khartoum regime and the SPLM/A as well as the autonomy of South Sudan during a 5-year transition period. The CPA also anticipates that democratic elections will be held within the whole of Sudan (North and South) one year before the end of the transition period, so that the South Sudanese can express their opinions on the independence of South Sudan. Finally these accords anticipate the integration of the rebel armed groups into the SPLA and also the setting up of Joint Integrated Units (SPLA/Sudanese Armed Forces) in South Sudan. 2 © Ifri M.-A. Lagrange / Insurrections in the Jonglei apart from their aversion to North Sudan. What further aggravates the situation is that most of the ethnic groups are rivals and caught up in perpetual conflict, while the political parties which have emerged from armed groups only have a very limited shared vision, if not rival ones, of an independent South Sudan. Less than four years after the signing of the CPA, South Sudan was on the very verge of imploding. Tribal wars and the proli- feration of small-calibre weapons (mainly AK47s) had generated a climate of virtual civil war in certain provinces like Jonglei. According to the United Nations in 2009, cattle raids had led to over 2,500 deaths in the space of a year, more than had resulted from the fighting in Darfur, the other war-torn province in the Sudan. The “cattle wars”, which are an integral part of the culture of most ethnic groups in South Sudan, constitute both social rituals and acts of banditry motivated by the economic stagnation, which the various populations have to confront in this unstable period of post-conflict and pre-independence. Furthermore, these inter-ethnic tensions have been aggravated by the composition and the management of security issues which have deliberately been lent an ethnic flavour by the SPLA both during and after the war. In a context like this, characterized by instability both political and social, the two rebellions in Jonglei are bound to have conse- quences and they represent a major threat for the recently elected government of a South Sudan currently ‘under construction’. In fact these troubles can irrevocably discredit an armed movement, which is having problems persuading its population to avail itself of the benefits of peace and to establish itself as a credible political player in the eyes of the international community. 3 © Ifri The Roots of Discontent While the 2010 elections were qualified as “fair by African standards” by the special envoy from Russia, the African Union and the League of Arab States2, that was far from the case for the international obser- vers from the Carter Center and the European Union, the special American envoy3 and the population of South Sudan. Indeed, while in the North the opposition parties were subject- ted to considerable pressure, the opposition parties and the independent candidates in the South were not spared by the SPLM/A either. While in the North the electoral commission based in Khartoum did nothing to facilitate the conduct of the elections, in the South the SPLA did everything it could to prevent non-SPLM candidates from participating in the elections. The members of the rival faction – Sudan People’s Liberation – Democratic Change (SPLM-DC) – were systematically stopped from campaigning and from registering as candidates. The argument put forward by the SPLM was that the SPLM-DC was a resistance movement, which disqualified it from being a political party and therefore from taking part in the elections4. The independent candidates, most of whom had come from the ranks of the SPLA, were confronted by similar problems5. Although the electoral law stipulates that candidates carrying out administrative and military functions have to resign from these during the campaign period and the elections as such, the President and candidate, Salva Kiir, refused initially to give up his post as head 2 «African and Arab organisations praise the conduct of Sudanese elections», <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article34808>; «Russia says Sudan elections fair by ‘African standards’», <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article34819>; consulted on April 20, 2010. 3 «US says Sudan elections not fair and free, shifts focus to 2011 referendum» <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article34817>: consulted on April 20, 2010. 4 «Should Dr. Lam be allowed to campaign in South Sudan?», <http://www.sudantribune.com/Should-Dr-Lam-be-allowed-to,33804>: consulted on January 17, 2010. 5 «SPLM warns against contesting as independent candidates» <http://www.sudantribune.com/SPLM-warns-against-contesting-as,33916>: consulted on January 28, 2010. 4 © Ifri M.-A. Lagrange / Insurrections in the Jonglei of the armed forces of the SPLA6. It was only after long negotiations and threats from the national electoral commission that the elections would have been rendered invalid that Salva Kiir agreed to give up his office7. In the provinces of South Sudan all the transitional governors or Caretakers appointed to those posts were active members of the SPLA. At Rumbek in Lake State – on advice from the Caretaker Governor – the five County Commissioners, two of whom were members of the “special security forces” (the SPLA’s intelligence service) were appointed by presidential decree8. There was a similar situation in numerous provinces such as Eastern Equatoria State, where the Caretaker Governor appointed an officer of the SPLA with special powers in Ikotos County9. In Jonglei State, future epicenter of General G. Athor’s insurrection, the deputy from Bor elected to the legislative assembly of South Sudan was declared the winner, as there was no opposing candidate10. It thus clearly emerges that, as far as the SPLM was concerned, the democratic and electoral game was only of interest if it enabled the SPLM to seize power legally. The vote granted to the people through elections was just a means of ratifying, in the South, the political victory granted through its status as CPA signatory, as opposed to the other armed liberation movements.

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