sudanHuman Security Baseline Assessment issue brief Small Arms Survey Number 16 April 2010 Symptoms and causes Insecurity and underdevelopment in Eastern Equatoria
astern Equatoria state (EES) is The survey was supplemented by qual- 24,789 (± 965) households in the one of the most volatile and itative interviews and focus group three counties contain at least one E conflict-prone states in South- discussions with key stakeholders in firearm. ern Sudan. An epicentre of the civil EES and Juba in January 2010. Respondents cited traditional lead- war (1983–2005), EES saw intense Key findings include: ers (clan elders and village chiefs) fighting between the Sudanese Armed as the primary security providers Across the entire sample, respond- Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s in their areas (90 per cent), followed ents ranked education and access Liberation Army (SPLA), as well by neighbours (48 per cent) and reli- to adequate health care as their numerous armed groups supported gious leaders (38 per cent). Police most pressing concerns, followed by both sides, leaving behind a legacy presence was only cited by 27 per by clean water. Food was also a top of landmines and unexploded ordnance, cent of respondents and the SPLA concern in Torit and Ikotos. Security high numbers of weapons in civilian by even fewer (6 per cent). ranked at or near the bottom of hands, and shattered social and com- Attitudes towards disarmament overall concerns in all counties. munity relations. were positive, with around 68 per When asked about their greatest EES has also experienced chronic cent of the total sample reporting a security concerns, respondents in food insecurity, a lack of basic services, willingness to give up their firearms, Torit and Ikotos cited cattle rustling, and few economic opportunities. Cattle and 63 per cent anticipating that natural threats (primarily drought), rustling, armed robbery, and banditry disarmament would significantly and instability arising from armed are endemic. With little or no official increase security in their area. groups. Magwi county residents security presence in many areas of the However, attitudes vary consider- expressed concern about disputes state, protracted cycles of revenge ably depending on local perceptions over natural resources, followed by attacks over natural resources, and of security. land in particular, are common. The natural threats. Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Killings—including spontaneous, which ended the civil war, did not intentional, and revenge killings— Context result in a tangible peace dividend for accounted for 40 per cent of all most EES communities; in fact, the crimes reported in the last 12 Located in the south-eastern corner of return of war-era refugees to ancestral months. Based on weighted data, Southern Sudan, EES shares borders villages and the recent arrival of inter- an estimated 5,587 households with Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda nally displaced persons (IDPs) from (± 470) in three counties experi- (see Map). Like the communities across other parts of Sudan have exacerbated enced one killing over the period. those borders, EES is populated pri- tensions over land and resources. The most frequently reported marily by agro-pastoralists who have To assess perceptions of develop- weapon used to commit a crime— long suffered from a range of devel- ment, governance, and security chal- including killings—was the AK-47 opment and governance problems, lenges in EES, the Small Arms Survey or other automatic rifle. However, including ‘a lack of basic services, and Danish Demining Group under- an equal percentage of crimes— unreliable water supplies, poor lead- took a household survey of almost including killings—were committed ership, depressed local economies, 2,400 households in Torit, Magwi, and with no weapon at all. insufficient responses to drought, Ikotos counties in November and Almost 40 per cent (38 per cent) of widespread poverty, and extremely December 2009.1 The survey gauged all surveyed households reported poor health and education’.3 Within respondent views on pressing security firearm ownership, with much the East and Horn of Africa region, and development issues, with a particu- higher rates in Ikotos (63 per cent) EES is noticeably prone to conflict, lar focus on armed violence; victims and Torit households (53 per cent) which is exacerbated by a culture of and perpetrators; motivations; weapons; than in Magwi (15 per cent). Based cattle rustling and widespread access disarmament; and security providers.2 on these responses, an estimated to and use of firearms.4 Governments
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 1 Eastern Equatoria State
E Bor T Khartoum JONGLEI H I SU DA N O
P W SUD AN h I i
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l e K a p o e t a N o r t h K a p o e t a L a f o n E a s t CENTRAL EAS T E R N EQ UA T ORI A EQUUAATTOORIA Lafon Kapoeta Juba Kapoeta South Ilemi Triangle (disputed territory) Narus To r i t B u d i A Surveyed counties Torit Y International boundary Chukudum N State boundary Magwi Palataka E County boundary Gilo Ikotos M a g w i Upper Main roads Talanga I k o t o s K Pageri Parajok State capital Loa A Main towns NimNimuleule D 0 km 50 Other towns U G A N
have periodically attempted to ‘pacify’ militarizing pastoralists and increas- was not possible to sample from every these marginalized communities using ing their reliance on weapons in inter- county; Magwi, Torit, and Ikotos coun- aggressive, militarized tactics—includ- communal conflicts. ties were considered representative of ing forcible disarmament—generally EES was also deeply affected by the south-western region of the state. without addressing underlying griev- the presence of the notorious Ugandan In this study, 2,392 households were ances or improving access to services. rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army surveyed, with one individual queried Livelihoods in EES consist of sub- (LRA). The LRA entered Sudan in per household. The sample included sistence agriculture (mainly sorghum 1991 and by 1994 was an organized 1,186 men and 1,201 women, achieving and millet) and livestock, and to a lesser proxy force on the government side intended gender parity between the extent fishing, natural resource exploi- against the SPLA and its allies. Its ages of 14 and 98. Respondents came tation, and mining and trade.5 Very few brutal operations isolated the region from the Latuka (30 per cent), Acholi alternative opportunities exist. The from humanitarian assistance; thou- (23 per cent), Madi (21 per cent), Lango region is beset by chronic insecurity, sands fled the force’s almost daily (20 per cent), and other clans (6 per a lack of tenure rights, a total lack of ambushes and abductions, often of cent). The survey methodology and infrastructure, and the absence of a children.8 For part of the latter phase sampling frame is outlined in Box 1. legal framework or institutions to en- of the civil war, the LRA effectively The survey reveals that sources of courage investment. Among the vast controlled Magwi county, among other insecurity and violent conflict in the majority of the population, chronic areas, and terrorized its communities.9 three counties are multi-faceted and poverty is the norm.6 The effect of the LRA’s domination complex. Respondents reported wide- The state is also home to a number differentiates Magwi from both Torit ly different causes, frequencies, and of IDPs and a large number of returnees and Ikotos. types of violent crimes. In particular, who had fled the violence and insecu- there were clear distinctions between rity of the civil war. It experienced Magwi’s security environment and regular aerial bombardments, attacks those of Torit and Ikotos. For this reason, by ground forces, and protracted fight- About the survey Magwi is considered separately. ing not only between the SAF and the In November and December 2009, SPLA, but also involving armed mili- the Small Arms Survey and Danish tia, such as the Equatorian Defence Demining Group undertook a house- Crime and violence in Torit Forces (EDF), EDF II, Boya Forces, hold survey to gauge community per- Didinga Forces, Lafon Forces, and spectives on pressing security and and Ikotos Toposa and Mundari militias.7 Arms development concerns.10 Due to EES’s Almost one-third of both Torit (28 per from both armies flowed to the region, large area, covering over 85,000 km2, it cent) and Ikotos (31 per cent) house-
2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 16 April 2010 Box 1 Survey methodology and analysis hold members reported incidents of crime and armed violence against one Sampling of their household members in the last Data from the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) and UN planning figures pro- 12 months. Killings—including spon- duced a population of 354,215 in the counties of Torit, Ikotos, and Magwi, composed of 64,520 households taneous, intentional, and revenge killings—were the most commonly with an average of 5.49 members. Magwi county contained an estimated 30,934 households (48 per cent of reported crime across all counties sur- the entire sample), Torit county 18,168 households (28 per cent), and Ikotos 15,418 households (24 per cent). veyed, accounting for 42 per cent of Using a confidence level of 95 per cent and a confidence interval of 2, two-staged sample size calculations all reported crimes in Torit and 47 per yielded a sample size of 2,315 households. cent in Ikotos (see Figure 1). Assault, Populations were grouped according to socio-economic status, experience of violent events, and ethnic beating, fighting, and shooting (com- membership. Ethnicity was defined according to tribal (clan) membership and language spoken. Each county bined into one category in the survey) was defined by its ethnicity. Because of the relative homogeneity of the three counties, however, it was came second, with 19 per cent of not meaningful to treat each as a separate, unique cluster. A two-stage random stratified sampling plan respondents in both Torit and Ikotos was applied; the first stratum was the county level, the second stratum was the boma (village) level. Using reporting such incidents. Automatic probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling, the chances of a boma being selected in a particular county rifles (AK-47) were used in 46 per cent reflected its population size. Rural and peri-urban sampling was calculated based on data from the South of killings in Torit, and 42 per cent of Sudan Human Rights Council that established the proportion of peri-urban to rural households at 30 per those in Ikotos. cent to 70 per cent (1:2.3). Torit and Ikotos are heavily affected Before arriving in the target boma, the programme manager and the enumeration superviser, who by cattle raiding and ensuing revenge oversaw a group of ten enumerators, personally contacted the boma chief to receive permission to survey attacks, and to a lesser extent by ‘ban- ditry’. Focus groups reported that raids the area. Once granted permission, the entire team of ten enumerators travelled to the boma to meet with commonly involve three to four per- the chief and to begin sampling. The enumeration team started in the putative boma centre, usually defined petrators operating at night. In Torit, by the presence of a central marketplace or concentrated market activity. The group then split into pairs cattle raids are perceived to occur on 11 12 and chose a direction randomly; every Nth household was designated to be selected. a weekly basis;14 estimates put the A number of limitations to the survey design and implementation should be noted. First, one side resulting death toll at 15–20 per month.15 effect of PPS sampling is that smaller villages had a lower chance of being selected, potentially introduc- Violence typically takes place only ing a bias. Second, a small number—no more than five—selected bomas had to be dropped because they after cattle are discovered to be miss- required days of hiking to reach. Third, non-response was difficult to quantify but probably constituted ing and attempts are made to recover 14 to 20 per cent. A number of households declined to participate before formal questioning even began. them—and during subsequent revenge In other cases, no female respondent was available. Finally, because the survey is drawn from one region attacks.16 Clashes thus erupt once the of the state, it is not representative of all of Eastern Equatoria. village youths (monyomiji) track down their assets in a neighbouring village. When recovery is not successful, sub- Data analysis sequent revenge and counter-attacks Prior to analysis, the data was validated and cleaned using stringent filtering criteria. Any cases present- follow. Retaliation may eventually be 13 ing more than five per cent error were to be identified as invalid and removed. Using this threshold, no directed at any member of the perpe- cases were removed. trators’ village and can escalate into Analysis of the data was conducted by strategic use of weighting, complemented by statistically deter- full-blown village warfare. In the mined confidence intervals. Two sets of weights were applied to the data. First, the sample was weighted heated atmosphere, violence can be to maintain county-level proportions of those provided by the census data. Second, in order to accurately triggered by rumours and proceed extrapolate findings to the total population of the three counties, the data was weighted for 1) selection even if traditional compensation is probability within the overall population, 2) non-response bias, and 3) post-stratification adjustments. paid.17 For example, in Ikotos county The combination of these three elements allowed inference, at the population level, of the impact and in November 2009, revenge attacks frequency of certain events or experiences. between the Logir and the Dongotono Finally, due to non-response and sampling biases the confidence intervals were increased from 2 to 4. escalated into serious clashes between This allowed the team to report findings within a greater margin of error, increasing the probability of these two Lango sub-clans, leading to two weeks of fighting and serious locating the true value or percentage within the reported interval. insecurity between villages, until the SPLA was brought in to stop the fight- Interpreting bar graphs ing.18 Quick action to recover stolen In each bar graph presented in this Issue Brief, the data includes an error margin, or confidence interval, cattle, based on reliable information of 95 per cent confidence. This means that the range within the error margin has a 95 per cent chance of and good collaboration with local including the true opinion of the sample. This is also important for judging whether different responses to communities—especially the youth— the same question are statistically significant. Depending on the number of responses, even a difference is thus key to preventing violence. of ten percentage points or more between two answers to a question may not reflect statistical significance. Notably, whereas conflict over cattle In this case, ranking responses is inappropriate. To determine whether different responses are significant, previously involved separate ethnic refer to the confidence interval lines included on each bar graph. groups and villages separated by great distances, in Torit and Ikotos they
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 3 increasingly involve neighbouring Figure 1 Types of reported crime by county villages. For example, in Hyala payam, Magwi Torit Ikotos Torit county, residents of the villages of Hyala Central, Ileu, Ilole, Lofi, and PER CENT REPORTED Lugurunj are now reportedly raiding 60% and killing each other, despite being from the same tribe (Latuka) and inter- 50% marrying.19 Many interviewed villagers
pointed to a complete breakdown of 40% inter-village relations, their fear of being shot when walking to another village even during the daytime, and 30% mounting divorce cases as families made up of members from different 20% villages are unable to stay together in 20 a hostile environment. Similar evi- 10% dence was found in Ikotos Central village, where increased raiding and 0 attacks among neighbouring villages Killing Threat/ Assault/ Domestic Robbery/ was also reported as a new phenom- intimidation shooting violence theft enon that was putting significant strain TYPE OF CRIME on local social relations.21 In addition to violence associated the long-standing practice of cattle reportedly pushing youths to obtain with cattle raiding, villagers also re- raiding has many facets. It involves livelihoods through ‘parallel ways’.25 ported significant levels of killings acts of bravery and the initiation to Generational break. The breakdown due to banditry and armed robbery, manhood; it also serves to increase of old community relations and struc- committed by small criminal gangs, both individual and village wealth. tures has also had a significant effect occurring both inside and outside the Recently, however, the dynamics of on the younger generation’s ability to community. Attacks reportedly often cattle raiding, and the nature of the marry. For example, youths used to be involve looting of trucks for food and violence associated with it, have able to rely on fathers and uncles to cash, as well as attacks at gunpoint reportedly changed. help with the payment of cows as a against people travelling between Firearms. The widespread posses- dowry; since many male relatives died villages. In both Torit and Ikotos sion of firearms allows relatively small during the war, however, youths have banditry and armed robbery seem to and loosely organized groups to raid neither cattle nor family support have increased significantly over the large numbers of cattle. The absence structures. Complicating matters, the past year, with a peak of cases recorded of a state security presence, and the destruction of the traditional social towards the end of 2009.22 breakdown of traditional village fabric has made the gradual payment The proximity of the attackers and authority structures—exacerbated by of dowries much less accepted than the unpredictability of the attacks a crisis in the relationship between before, putting intense pressure on greatly enhance people’s feeling of younger and older generations—con- young people to acquire large numbers insecurity. Across the three counties, tribute to a culture of lawlessness and of cattle all at once. a surprisingly high percentage of crimes impunity. Food insecurity. Severe drought and reportedly take place during the day Sponsorship. Respondents believe food insecurity, affecting large parts (55 per cent) as well as in the home that relatives of villagers in high-level of EES since April 2009, was widely (28 per cent), with the exception of state and army positions are sponsor- reported as another key reason for Ikotos, where slightly more reported ing raiding for personal profit and to increasing levels of armed violence crimes took place in the streets than in generate a wider support base, thereby and insecurity. Violence peaked at the the home. These findings imply that fuelling local cycles of violence. These end of 2009, coinciding with the height attackers are often nearby and familiar sponsors reportedly provide weapons of the migratory period for cattle keep- with the environment. For example, and ammunition and guarantee pro- ers, who in the face of drought have women in Hyala Central village re- tection from prosecution for the per- to venture farther into unfamiliar or counted how attackers had shot two petrators.24 Chiefs and other village hostile territory in search of pasture men through a small window in a house authorities are said to be just as involved and water points. For example, in Isoke while their wives and babies were lying in acts of banditry as other members payam, Ikotos county, 40 out of 60 re- next to them. According to the women of the community. ported violent incidents from September interviewed, the attackers clearly knew Livelihoods. Lack of employment to December 2009 involved gunshot the place and their victim, yet escaped opportunities, idleness, and increasing injuries. Where one to two gunshot unidentified.23 desperation and impatience to see tan- wounds per month was the previous According to focus group discus- gible peace dividends and a more equal norm, by the end of 2009 the rate had sions and key informant interviews, distribution of available resources are increased to one to two per week.26
4 Sudan Issue Brief Number 16 April 2010 Box 2 Magwi county Victim profiles and gender
Causes and dynamics of insecurity in Magwi county are very different from those of Torit and Ikotos. Two dimensions historical facts help explain why: Magwi is the only county in EES that is populated primarily by farmers; it Youths are reportedly the primary also experienced widespread displacement during the war. Magwi was the site of heavy fighting during the victims of crime, with the mean age of civil war as well as after the signing of the CPA, when the LRA was headquartered in Owiny-Kibul until being victims across the three counties at 26.5 flushed out in 2007.27 Consequently, it became one of the most inaccessible and underserved areas in the years. Three-quarters of the victims state both during and after the war, while at the same time hosting a large influx of returnees and IDPs in are under 31; roughly 10 per cent are 28 the post-CPA period. under 16. Across all locations and Interviewed Magwi residents reported that disputes over natural resources, followed by natural threats, ages reported, more than two-thirds are the most prevalent security concerns in the county. Perceived levels of insecurity and in particular (67 per cent) are men, reflective of the armed violence are generally much lower than in Torit and Ikotos. In Magwi, 14 per cent of respondents fact that cattle raiding and predatory reported that a household member had been a victim of a crime in the last 12 months, compared to 28 per cent in Torit and 31 per cent in Ikotos. However, the potential for conflict, especially over land, as well as armed violence are typically committed conflict linked to the reintegration of large numbers of returnees, is very high. In Magwi, 22 per cent of by and against men. However, focus households experienced threats or intimidation, compared to 14 per cent in Torit and 5 per cent in Ikotos groups reported that in recent years (see Figure 1). But while respondents in Magwi, like Torit and Ikotos, reported killing as the most frequently women have been increasingly tar- occurring crime (30 per cent), the actual numbers were far lower than in the other two counties. Magwi geted, in particular during revenge households reported a higher percentage of spontaneous killings than Torit or Ikotos. attacks. Many people interviewed Focus group interviews in Magwi suggest that land has become a key source of conflict in the post-CPA agreed that this was a recent change period, largely since the influx of returnees and IDPs beginning in 200729 and exacerbated by the unequal that had significantly altered local distribution of services and the marginalization of particular communities. Political actors initiate and exploit conflict dynamics. Focus group par- these conflicts as a means of extending their constituencies into newly created administrative areas. The ticipants in Torit and Ikotos counties principle of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement that ‘the land belongs to the people’ has unleashed said that women and girls were shot a struggle for power and influence, fuelling splits along tribal lines as each group seeks to defend and at water points, in fields while culti- 30 demarcate its own ‘homeland’. The traditionally welcoming attitude towards ‘foreigners’ and the ease vating food, while collecting firewood, with which they used to settle has given way to widespread suspicion regarding possible land encroach- and when walking between villages.38 ment by rival communities. They are also increasingly forced to These conflicts in Magwi take diverse forms. Returnees may find their land occupied by earlier return- request armed youths to escort them.39 ees or members of the host community who have taken over the land. In Nimule, for example, mainly Dinka IDPs settled on Madi land during the latter’s absence. Tensions remain high despite some fruitful initiatives In Hyala Central village (Torit) women undertaken by the state and local governments to resolve the issue.31 In some areas, especially close to reported having to retreat into the 40 the Aswa river, Madi returnees are prevented from returning from Uganda because their land is occupied. house after dark for fear of attack. In Nimule town, permanent structures have sometimes been erected by the occupiers of the plots, or the Women also play an instrumental entire plot may have been sold to foreign businessmen, making the peaceful settlement of land disputes role in motivating and encouraging extremely complicated. In one instance in 2009, serious fighting erupted and one person was killed when young men to go out on cattle raids. a Madi landowner found that his land had been sold by an SPLA commander to a Somali businessman who They compose songs to shame those planned to construct a petrol station.32 Frequent armed threats are reported when people try to resolve who have not yet gone raiding or who the issues peacefully, in particular when confronting IDPs from SPLA members’ families. Locals perceive have come back empty-handed. This the relatives of soldiers to be privileged, close to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), and protected behaviour increases the pressure on by SPLA commanders. Complicating matters, IDPs often reject the authority of the Magwi county adminis- young men to secure the necessary heads tration, relying instead on their own chiefs and court system, as well as a special GoSS police force not of cattle for a dowry.41 Respondents drawn from the EES state police and paid directly by Juba. said that educating girls to reject raided Border disputes over new or pending administrative boundaries are also a source of conflict, whether cows as part of their dowries, and to at the boma, payam, county, or state level. Politicians jockeying for power mobilize along tribal and iden- delay their marriages, would prevent tity lines, even though the underlying grievance is almost always a lack of development and the unequal distribution of services among all groups. For example, the Ijire people, currently under the administration violence by reducing the pressure on of Obbo boma, want to create their own boma and move it under the Torit county administration; the con- young boys to find large numbers of 42 flict is reportedly primarily about the lack of development and facilities in Obbo.33 cows. While most communities associate the creation of a new payam or changes to county boundaries with Rape and sexual assault are seldom an increase in service delivery as well as additional administrative positions, politicians are often more reported (3 per cent across all counties), interested in widening their political constituencies and exploiting natural resources. Indeed, in many cases, but anecdotal evidence suggests that powerful individuals issue contracts to companies without the knowledge of the communities involved.34 they occur frequently. In Ikotos, focus Several ongoing local border disputes have the potential to seriously escalate due to the number of par- groups reported at least several ties involved as well as the interests at stake. monthly incidents of women being Recent reports also point to an increase in mob justice cases, many involving accusations of poison- raped and their food stolen when ing, in the Madi corridor of Magwi county.35 Allegations of poisoning are often based on little more than coming to the market from outside hearsay; youths reportedly mobilize quickly to kill the accused and burn down their homes. For example, villages.43 Investigation and prosecu- on 17 October 2009, a mob burned down 10 tukuls (huts) in Iriya village (Loa boma, Pageri payam) based tion is rare, even when the attacker is on rumours that individuals were practising witchcraft. A woman was thrown into her burning tukul, and known, for fear of revenge. The SPLA another couple died in the fire.36 In some areas, whole villages have refused to settle on their traditional reportedly also harass and sexually land because of the presence of a person suspected of poisoning. This complex phenomenon may be an abuse women in areas where they are indication of the growing dissatisfaction with the current lack of law enforcement and the absent legal system, with local youths increasingly taking matters into their own hands.37 stationed, such as Nimule, where the army barracks are situated within the
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 5 settlements of the general population. hold misunderstandings into violence. lating for the entire population, this In Nimule prison, where men and In Magwi, the dynamics of resettlement study estimates that approximately women are held together in one room, and reintegration of large numbers of 7,000 households possess them.49 Even there are reported cases of women people returning from different regions though reports of ERW usage in vio- prisoners ‘disappearing’ for the night and countries with diverse experiences lent incidents are infrequent, private and being brought back the next morn- are also aggravating misunderstand- ownership and unsafe storage of these ing by the police officer in charge.44 ings and conflicts between and within devices is a risk factor for accidents. Early pregnancy (‘defilement’) cases families.47 Focus groups highlighted several are common in Magwi, according to accidents involving official stockpiles focus groups, ranking among the top of unexploded ordnance (UXO)50 col- three issues causing disputes in the Instruments: small arms and lected by demining groups and await- county, and often inspiring revenge ing destruction by the SPLA in Magwi crimes against the accused or his explosive remnants of war county. UXOs are often kept for months family.45 Because early pregnancy is Civilian small arms possession is an or longer in official stockpiling areas, shameful for the family concerned, important facet of local security dynam- unguarded and unprotected. Besides disputes are often settled at the family ics in EES. Because official state secu- being easily accessible to anyone in level or with the help of a chief, unlike rity providers are largely absent, or the community, they are also suscepti- in Torit and Ikotos, where perpetra- perceived as being inefficient, partial, ble to fires and explosions. For example, tors can expect serious punishment. and corrupt, many communities rely in Lobone payam, Magwi county, a fire Another consequence is female school on small arms for protection and secu- broke out and spread to an UXO stock- dropouts, which are reportedly very rity—as well as for crime and violence. pile in September 2009, causing an high in Magwi.46 At the same time, the survey findings explosion that killed one person.51 In Domestic violence was reported suggest that high levels of firearm Obbo boma, Magwi county, a ‘mentally across all counties, particularly in ownership coincide with perceptions disturbed’ community member took a Magwi, where it accounted for 18 per of low security and increased levels of UXO from a stockpile in October 2009 cent of all reported crimes, compared armed crime and violence. and placed it in a fire where children to 9 per cent in Torit and 6 per cent in Almost 40 per cent (38 per cent) of were roasting sweet potatoes; the ex- Ikotos. Focus groups reported that the total sample reported firearm own- plosion killed one of the children and alcohol consumption by both men ership within their household. This seriously injured another.52 Prompt and women is a factor, turning house- means that approximately 24,789 (±965) removal and destruction of UXO stock- households in the three counties con- piles by SPLA and partner organiza- Figure 2 Firearm possession by county tain at least one firearm. Reported tions, and increased sensitization of
Magwi Torit Ikotos ownership was highest in Ikotos, communities to the risks associated where 65 per cent of all households with these weapons, could reduce the PERCENTAGE said they had a gun, compared to 53 frequency of these incidents. 100% per cent in Torit and 15 per cent in Some local residents acquired their Magwi (see Figure 2). Actual owner- firearms in the post-CPA period, but 90% ship rates are probably much higher; most did so during the war.53 In addi- interviews suggested that at least every tion to active arming by the SPLA and 80% male community member over 20 years the SAF, small arms, ammunition and of age owns a gun in Ikotos, with some ERW fell into civilian hands when households having as many as eight garrison towns such as Torit or Pajok 70% to nine guns.48 There was a significant changed sides54 and residents accessed correlation between the level of arms abandoned supplies. Across the three 60% ownership and crimes committed counties, about 50 per cent of respond- with a gun. In Ikotos, 33 per cent of ents reported that the supply of arms 50% all crimes were reportedly carried out has decreased in the last 12 months, with an AK-47 or similar automatic while 39 per cent said it has remained 40% rifle, compared to 28 per cent in Torit the same, with little significant varia- and 11 per cent in Magwi. In Ikotos, 42 tion in the counties. The reported ease per cent of all killings were committed of acquiring a weapon varied, how- 30% with an AK-47 or similar weapons; in ever: 40 per cent of respondents in Torit the figure was 46 per cent and in Ikotos reported difficulty in acquiring 20% Magwi 18 per cent. firearms, compared to 49 per cent of Across all three counties, 10 per respondents in Torit and 73 per cent 10% cent of households surveyed reported in Magwi. possessing explosive remnants of war Purchasing was the most commonly
0 (ERW). The figures were higher in Torit reported method of acquiring small Yes No (15 per cent) and Ikotos (18 per cent) arms (35 per cent over all areas), in DOES YOUR HOUSEHOLD OWN A FIREARM? than in Magwi (4 per cent). Extrapo- particular in Ikotos (44 per cent) and
6 Sudan Issue Brief Number 16 April 2010 Figure 3 Firearm acquisition by county campaigns,62 significantly reducing the legitimacy of such exercises in the Magwi Torit Ikotos eyes of local communities. Focus PERCENTAGE groups also singled out the continuous 70% flow of ammunition from the SPLA as a key factor fuelling local cycles of 60% violence. Poor controls and irregular salary payments for soldiers were 50% seen as major reasons influencing SPLA members to sell their ammuni- tion at local markets. 40%
30% Impact and perceptions of
20% small arms and light weapons As noted, while small arms feature in
10% violence in all three counties, they are by no means the only tool—or neces- sarily the dominant one—used to 0 Was purchased Was given by Was given by Was given by a Found it threaten or commit violence. In Magwi, a friend/family the SPLA militia group lying around member the survey found that killings were 44 MEANS OF ACQUISITION times more likely to involve a stick than an automatic rifle when compared to Torit, and 20 times more when compared Torit (31 per cent), though less so in which can occur repeatedly. Many to Ikotos. The majority of Magwi’s Magwi (24 per cent) (see Figure 3). soldiers have reportedly stockpiled population fled to Uganda during the During the war, informal commerce weapons in this way, anticipating war; the county had access to educa- in small arms was common in Eastern payouts for weapons as part of CPA- tion and avoided involvement in armed Equatoria, with Agoro market (Ikotos mandated disarmament, demobiliza- conflict, and residents generally do not county) on the Ugandan border acting tion, and reintegration (DDR) efforts,58 approve of arms carrying in public as a centre for the trading of black- which have already begun in EES.59 places. Even in Torit, where a strong market arms and ammunition.55 While The survey found that the SPLA was tradition of armed violence exists, this market was officially closed in2003 , the second-most commonly reported more crimes were committed without cross-border arms and ammunition source of firearms (29 per cent) after a weapon (32 per cent) than with an trade is reported to continue, though purchasing (35 per cent);60 however, automatic rifle 28( per cent). The impli- its scale is difficult to establish.56 Focus Magwi residents were significantly cation is that the availability of weapons groups in Ikotos county suggested more likely to report having received should not be considered the primary that weapons are still acquired from their firearms from the SPLA (55 per cause of violence, but rather a risk and Uganda in exchange for cows. Until cent) than both Torit (30 per cent) and recently, Uganda People’s Defence Ikotos residents (16 per cent) (see enabling factor. In the context of poten- Force (UPDF) troops stationed in Figure 3). This may be due to the arm- tial community security programmes, Magwi county to pursue the LRA ing of local communities in Magwi to it also points to the necessity to focus on were also reported to sell arms and counter the LRA in the absence of a comprehensive programming that ad- ammunitions to the local population. robust police and army presence. dresses the root causes of local violence. In addition, arms are being traded Survey respondents said the SPLA Among households reporting fire- along traditional pastoralist cattle was also the primary source of ERW arm ownership, the primary reason routes, in particular on the Ethiopian (42 per cent) in Magwi (49 per cent), given was village protection (77 per and Kenyan borders. The Buya sea- Torit (49 per cent), and Ikotos (34 per cent). Personal protection from gangs sonal movement north to Jonglei state, cent). In addition, Ikotos and Torit and criminals was the second most com- where they come in close contact with residents identified militia groups as mon response (40 per cent), followed the Murle, is also believed to facilitate significant sources of ERW and small by personal protection from wildlife arms and ammunition flows allegedly arms (17 per cent and 9 per cent, (33 per cent). Variations in this response from Khartoum to local militias.57 respectively). reflect differing levels of insecurity. Since the end of the civil war, de- Focus groups reported that politi- In Torit and Ikotos, where both threats mobilized or relocated fighters have cal patronage was a factor influencing to household members and criminal returned to EES with their personal arms flows from SLPA stocks to local victimization were reported more fre- service weapons; sometimes they also communities.61 Arms provided are said quently than in Magwi, ‘protection of receive new weapons as they join local to be typically recycled from stockpiles the village’ was also a more frequent police, prison, or wildlife services, collected during civilian disarmament reason given for gun possession.
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 7 Institutions: formal and Figure 4 Ranking police and traditional leaders’ approach to crime informal security providers Police Traditional leaders Most respondents (85 per cent) reported MEAN RATING that some kind of security institution 4.0 is present in their area. The vast major- 3.5 ity of these (90 per cent) said that tra-
ditional leaders and boma chiefs are 3.0 their primary security providers, fol- lowed by neighbours (48 per cent) and 2.5 religious leaders (38 per cent). Official security providers were at the bottom 2.0 of the list: only 27 per cent said the 1.5 police and 8 per cent said the SPLA
were present in their area. 1.0 Recognition of certain security groups varied across the three counties: 0.5 Magwi county respondents reported a stronger police presence (32 per cent) 0 Trust Efficiency Accessibility Familiarity Transparency than both Ikotos (18 per cent) and Torit (28 per cent). Conversely, in Ikotos and CHARACTERISTIC Torit, ‘neighbours’ were more often reported (52 per cent and 56 per cent, obstacle to modernization and democ- Exacerbating matters, the formal respectively) than in Magwi (41 per ratization of the state, and that the court system, especially at the county cent). These differences were statisti- government should involve the youth and state level, is not sufficiently 63 cally significant. more. In fact, some villages have re- developed, so the most serious cases Given the negligible presence of cently elected relatively young chiefs, are often delayed considerably. This official state security providers, the but their authority and legitimacy re- invites revenge killings as impatient 64 majority of crimes and disputes con- mains questionable to some villagers. victims take justice into their own tinue to be reported to traditional Widespread gun ownership and hands. The increasing numbers of authorities. Indeed, 59 per cent of all use among local youths has also con- mob justice cases over allegations of respondents said they would report a tributed to the erosion of traditional witchcraft, poisoning, and other crimes crime to traditional authorities first; authority. There are reports of chiefs in Magwi county (see Box 2) is, accord- 16 per cent would inform the nearest hesitating to expose criminals to the ing to several key informants, a result family member; and only 11 per cent authorities or even actively cooperat- of growing dissatisfaction with the would report a crime to the police. ing with them for fear of retaliation.65 prevailing justice system and a lack of 68 The differences in these responses Some chiefs have even been attacked law enforcement in the state. across counties were small. In places and shot, something that was unthink- where both police and traditional able in years past. Key informants high- The police and the SPLA authorities were present, 43 per cent lighted the need to protect chiefs and When asked to rank the police on a would still report a crime to the tradi- establish collective decision-making scale of 0 to 4 in terms of trust, effi- 66 tional authorities, compared to 32 per and local conflict resolution processes. ciency, accessibility, familiarity, and cent who would go to the police. There is also considerable confu- transparency regarding their approach sion today over the applicability of to crimes and disputes, respondents Traditional authorities traditional and modern authority and ranked them far below traditional Focus group interviews revealed that justice systems; while traditional authorities in areas where both are despite their continued presence, tra- authorities have faded, state authority present (see Figure 4). Similarly, focus ditional authorities have been severely has not effectively filled their place. groups cited a lack of impartiality, weakened by the civil war, the prolif- Whereas chiefs used to be able to judge corruption, and criminal involvement eration of small arms in civilian hands, on all cases during the war, whether as some of the reasons for their low the breakdown of traditional commu- civilian or criminal, they now rule opinion of both the police and the SPLA. nity relations, and the transition from only on local disputes, investigating For example, when police are trucked traditional to modern state authority. criminal cases in conjunction with in to respond to a specific security Indeed, some chiefs in power today police, and referring the most serious threat, respondents suggested that are not traditional leaders but appoint- cases to the formal county or state certain villages receive preferential ees installed by the SPLA (or the courts. Cooperation between chiefs coverage and others none, depending Government of Sudan during the and police is often fraught with prob- on local connections to high-level com- war) to control and extract resources, lems, as police officers are perceived manders or politicians. In other cases, and they lack legitimacy in the eyes of to be incompetent or corrupt, even residents claimed that unjustified local communities. At the same time, setting suspects free in exchange for force and punishments are applied.69 some youths believe that chiefs are an small bribes.67 Focus group interviewees also said
8 Sudan Issue Brief Number 16 April 2010 that the police are often too weak or In the absence of any official secu- unprotected and fell victim to attacks easily overpowered by local armed rity provider in many areas, youths by neighbouring tribes, resulting in them communities. In Torit county, police currently take over the task of protect- losing their livestock, and turning them allegedly fear confronting cattle raiders, ing local villages and enforcing the further against the state authorities.79 for example, and thus do not investigate law. While traditional structures such Moreover, even government officials cases thoroughly, unless backed up by as the monyomiji used to have clear rules acknowledge that the previous cam- the SPLA.70 While the official security of engagement, as well as responsibili- paign yielded only limited results, forces are sometimes successful in re- ties for protecting villages, it is perhaps with most people handing over old, covering stolen cattle, known culprits not surprising that in the current secu- non-functioning guns while hiding are often left alone, exacerbating what rity vacuum, traditional structures are serviceable ones in their homes or interviewees characterized as endemic also being used for criminal purposes.78 remote areas.80 lawlessness, lack of follow-up and This situation points to the urgent Nevertheless, survey findings 71 commitment, and weak governance. need to find interim security solutions suggest a favourable attitude towards Like elsewhere in Southern Sudan, that focus on communities’ security disarmament, with around 68 per cent local police in the three counties are needs, while integrating both tradi- of the total sample reporting a willing- primarily former SPLA soldiers who tional and modern systems and focus- ness to give up firearms and a majority demobilized following the signing of ing on mutual trust and a division of of 63 per cent anticipating that future the CPA. Five years later, they still lack responsibilities. disarmament would very much increase transport, communications equipment, household security. Magwi respond- arms, and ammunition, as well as ents (71 per cent) were significantly trained manpower, and thus remain Disarmament more likely to say they would comply ill-equipped to face the security chal- While the SPLA and the GoSS remain with disarmament than both Torit (63 72 lenges in the state. The Torit police committed to civilian disarmament, in per cent) and Ikotos respondents (66 commissioner estimates that there the current security vacuum the issue per cent) and much less likely to hide should be 2,000 police officers per state, is particularly sensitive. Without a some or all of their firearms 8( per cent, with around 120 officers deployed in guarantee of security after guns are as against 26 per cent and 25 per cent 73 every county. In practice, police offic- collected, disarmed communities are for Torit and Ikotos). Ikotos (56 per ers tend to stay close to urban centres, vulnerable to attacks from neighbour- cent) and Torit (59 per cent) respond- however, mainly because rural areas ing and cross-border communities. ents were significantly less optimistic lack accommodation, food, and trans- 68 74 Uneven disarmament of competing than people in Magwi ( per cent) port. In Ikotos county, for example, communities also incentivizes rearma- about a potential significant increase in there is a total of 100 police officers, of ment. In Torit and Ikotos, communities household security after a disarmament 50 whom are based in Ikotos Central. disarmed in 2009 were reportedly left campaign in their area (see Figure 5). Despite the current poor reputation of the police, interviewees revealed Figure 5 Anticipated effect of disarmament by county that they would welcome better equipped, trained, and more easily Magwi Torit Ikotos accessible and strategically located PERCENTAGE 75 police as their security provider. 80% Interviewees said that they fear the SPLA, which currently provides security in some areas. Grievances 70% against the army include the rape and sexual harassment of local women 60% and the extortion of communities’ natural resources (such as timber). In 50% a recent incident in Khor Engliz on the Juba–Torit road, a civilian chal- lenged an SPLA soldier cutting down 40% trees, who apprehended the challenger. The arrest sparked the mobilization 30% of the entire village, heavily armed, against the nearby SPLA barracks. 20% A violent clash was avoided only by calling in the local authorities, who 10% prevented the army from attacking.76 The SPLA reportedly also reminds people of the civil war, and thus has 0 Would very Would some- Would not make Would some- Would very a limited capacity to resolve disputes much decrease what decrease a difference what increase much increase or deal with criminal incidents in an security security security security impartial manner.77 RESPONSE
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 9 In Ikotos, where the perception of level) are failing to do this, or are part on community–police relations and security is lowest, 42 per cent said of the problem—as when local power- ultimately on the effectiveness of local security had worsened in the county brokers get involved in land disputes policing. The inclusion of parallel over the past year compared to 26 per for personal gain. conflict management and local peace cent in Torit and only 15 per cent in Moreover, local government insti- and reconciliation initiatives could Magwi. Further, 67 per cent of Ikotos tutions are seriously understaffed and also help ensure that ‘community respondents said they were concerned underfunded, without the infrastruc- security’ does not become a synonym about their household members’ safety, ture, transport, equipment, or manpower for vigilantism. significantly more than in both Torit to deliver even the most elementary As has been documented in other (54 per cent) and Magwi (48 per cent). services. Investment and capacity areas of Southern Sudan, the commu- This indicates the degree to which building in local institutions that can nities in the three counties viewed the communities rely on guns, especially respond to communities’ needs is rule of the gun as one forced upon in the more insecure areas of the state; therefore desperately needed and should them by necessity. In most cases they it also highlights the need for a com- be an essential part of any effort to tackle expressed a great willingness to give prehensive strategy for alternative insecurity and underdevelopment. up their weapons if the army and the security provision in these communi- Ultimately, reducing violence and state government provided security. ties, before disarmament takes place. insecurity—both real and perceived— But even recently, and despite the In focus groups, interviewees said requires eliminating the culture of wider intention of both the army and that disarmament should proceed by impunity with which crimes are com- the GoSS to disarm Southern civilians, sensitizing local communities in parallel mitted. It is difficult to see how that the SPLA was arming EES communities with simultaneous, voluntary arms col- shift can take place without a more against external threats, an implicit lections, and that this should be followed visible and capable law enforcement admission of its inability to protect them. by forceful disarmament if necessary. presence. Deployment is currently Selective civilian disarmament This would avoid the current problem limited to towns, while rural areas are will soon restart in EES. To avoid the of neighbouring villagers raiding and devoid of police. Police posts along bloodshed and community predation attacking disarmed areas.81 As disarma- major cattle and trading routes, and that disarmament has caused elsewhere, ment is set to restart in EES, there is on well-known escape routes, are also it should be simultaneous, include a small window of opportunity for lacking. A joint initiative for a ‘rapid meaningful security guarantees, and community engagement to ensure it reaction force’ by the Torit county draw on local community initiatives is peaceful and well-organized. commissioner, the SSRRC, and the and civil society networks. Without police is an innovative starting point.82 the latter, the SPLA—which will con- The periodic rotation of security forces duct the disarmament—will not have Reflections would also help prevent the formation an adequate understanding of local Respondents provided a wealth of of long-term patronage networks and security dynamics and potential con- specific, well-considered recommen- limit corruption, bias, and profiteering. flicts. Initiatives such as the Eastern dations for mitigating particular Building up the capacity of the Equatoria Action Network on Small sources of violence and insecurity. police to anticipate and prevent crime Arms, engaged in building a civil These include educating girls to reject and enforce the law is an even greater society network for sensitization and dowries of stolen cattle; moving swiftly challenge than their increased deploy- awareness on small arms, are impor- to locate and restore stolen cattle before ment. The police force urgently needs tant.83 Initial reports from ongoing revenge attacks take place; expediting not only adequate equipment, transport, disarmament exercises in Jonglei seem the removal and destruction of ERW; and communication facilities, but also to suggest that similar organizations reorienting traditional clan structures training in global standards in law play a pivotal role in community sen- such as the monyomiji back to their enforcement, conflict prevention, weap- sitization and awareness raising both original community functions; and ons use, and respect for human rights. before and during campaigns. preventing the recirculation of guns Support is also needed for the court Perhaps the most striking and after disarmament efforts. These are systems, both official and customary, worrisome finding of this survey was all worth pursuing. But without better which are currently incapable of provid- the constantly repeated view that com- governance and more development, ing justice and compensation to victims munities had been abandoned by their violence is likely to continue despite or holding perpetrators to account. state, their police, and the Juba govern- these steps. Remedies must therefore These are long-term challenges. ment. After decades of war, the CPA address both the symptoms and the In the meantime, the responsibility for has not addressed the profound sense causes of insecurity. village and household security remains of marginalization among these commu- As respondents ranked insecurity in the hands of community members. nities. With the approach of national far below natural resource and devel- Supporting communities to exchange elections and the close of the interim opment concerns—and given the information, identify and attempt to period in 2011, Eastern Equatorians linkages between violence, cattle, and preempt conflicts, and liaise more continue to face chronic underdevel- land issues—it is clear that redressing closely with the police would help to opment, natural resource competition, the marginalization of these commu- provide an important stopgap until and pervasive insecurity—indicators nities would reduce the incentives and state services improve. In fact, support- of some of the deep internal challenges motivations for violence. Currently, ing ‘ground-up’ community security a newly independent Southern Sudan GoSS institutions (at the Juba and state efforts could have a positive impact may face in the future.
10 Sudan Issue Brief Number 16 April 2010 22 Interviews with INGO and UN represen- cause of girls not graduating from school Notes tatives, Torit and Ikotos counties, 15–25 in EES, where marital life often starts as This Issue Brief was produced by Irina January 2010. early as age 14 (IRC, 2010, p. 2). Mosel and Ryan Murray, based on the 2009 23 Interviews with women, Hyala payam, 47 Interview with chairlady of St. Monica Torit county, 16 January 2010. Women’s Association, Magwi county, Small Arms Survey–Danish Demining 24 Focus group discussions across Torit and 19 January 2010. Group Eastern Equatoria Security Percep- Ikotos counties, 15–25 January 2010. 48 Interview with a youth, Ikotos county, tions Survey. 25 Interviews with women and youths, Ikotos 23 January 2010. county, 20–24 January 2010. 49 The precise survey findings indicate that 26 Interview with INGO official, Isokepayam , 6,909 (±1,340) households may harbour 1 Households in each of the payams (admin- 23 2010 ERW. istrative districts) of the three counties Ikotos county, January . 27 50 UXOs typically include ERW as well as were surveyed, with the exception of The LRA assembled in Owiny-Kibul in late 2006 Himodonge payam in Torit county. as a Juba-sponsored peace process other forms of ordnance—such as bullets— 2 This Issue Brief presents the survey results got under way. After LRA leader Joseph found in conflict zones. 51 using the ‘armed violence lens’ of the Kony failed to sign a Final Peace Agree- Interview with paramount chief, Magwi Organisation for Economic Co-operation ment several times, the peace process fell county, 19 January 2010. and Development’s Development Assis- apart. See Schomerus (2007, pp. 34–39). 52 The accused was subsequently jailed for tance Committee. See OECD (2009). 28 The Office of the United Nations High the incident. Interview with Magwi county 3 Munyes (2007, p. 7). See also Mc Evoy and Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) commissioner, Magwi, 22 January 2010. Murray (2008, pp. 12–21). documented almost 53,000 officially 53 Interviews with government officials, Torit 4 Mc Evoy and Murray (2008, p. 12). assisted returnees to the area by March county, 15 January 2010; see also, Schomerus 5 EES (2007, p. 14). 2010. Email correspondence with UNHCR (2008, p. 49) and Mc Evoy and Murray 6 EES (2007, pp. 12–13). official, Nimule,27 March 2010. The actual (2008, p. 19). 7 McEvoy and Murray (2008, p. 17). number is likely to be much higher. 54 For example, places such as Palotaka in 8 Schomerus (2007, pp. 10, 18). 29 Interview with Magwi county commis- Magwi county have been used as SAF, 9 Schomerus (2007, p. 21). sioner, Magwi, 22 January 2010. SPLA, and UPDF as well as LRA head- 10 Previously, in 2008, the Small Arms Survey 30 Locally, members of other communities quarters over the past decade, leaving a had conducted a household survey of are seen as ‘foreigners’. legacy of arms and ammunitions in the selected communities in Eastern Equatoria 31 The ‘Nimule Resolution’ of January 2009, hands of the civilians in the area. and Turkana North district in northern the outcome statement of a conference 55 Schomerus (2008, p. 50). Kenya. See McEvoy and Murray (2008). organized by both EES and Jonglei state 56 See also, Lewis (2009, p. 54). 11 Because households were usually situated governments, stipulates that the return 57 Interview with UN Mission in Sudan along a main artery or in a concentrated of IDPs should be facilitated from Jonglei official, Torit, 18 January 2010. block, random selection was limited to back to their home communities with their 58 Interview with government officials, Torit prevent enumerators from travelling down cattle; those preferring to stay in EES are and Magwi counties, 15–21 January 2010. roads with no households. expected to agree to integrate into the local 59 The DDR caseload for EES is expected to 12 Every Nth household was determined by community, lose their cattle, and abide by be 2,300. Interview with EES DDR bureau dividing the total population size of the the regulations of the local administration. officials, 18 January 2010. boma by the number of questionnaires 32 Vuni (2009). 60 Note that some of the weapons declared needed in the specific boma. The former 33 Interviews with state officials, youth as ‘purchased’ may also have been sourced figure was calculated from SSRRC popu- groups, and civil society leaders, Magwi from the SPLA. lation data, and the latter from the popu- county, 21–22 January 2010. 61 Some of the arms come from successful lation data and the total sample size. 34 Interview with INGO staff, Juba, 14 Janu- cattle raids. Interviews with traditional 13 Error was defined as the presence of a ary 2010. leaders and youths in Torit and Ikotos missing or invalid response (that is, a 35 Interview with state officials, youth groups, counties, 15–25 January 2010. response that was illegible, incoherent, and civil society leaders, Magwi county, 62 For details on recent civilian disarma- or did not adhere to the response option 21 January 2010; interview with church ment campaigns in Southern Sudan, see limitations of the particular question). official, Diocese of Torit, Torit, 25 January O’Brien (2009). 14 Interview with police major, Torit county 2010. 63 Interview with key informants among police station, 18 January 2010. 36 See Eastern Equatoria Today (2010). local youths and civil society, Magwi town, 15 Interview with United Nations Mission 37 Interview with church official, Diocese of 21 January 2010. in Sudan official, Torit, 18 January 2010. Torit, Torit, 25 January 2010. 64 Field observation by Irina Mosel, January 16 Interview with Torit county commissioner, 38 Focus group discussions with women 2010. Torit, 15 January 2010. across Torit and Ikotos counties, 16–25 65 Interviews with county and state govern- 17 Interview with church official, Diocese of January 2010. ment officials, Torit and Ikotos counties, Torit, Isoke payam, Ikotos county, 23 Jan- 39 Interview with INGO representative, January 2010. uary 2010; see also Eaton (2008) for the Isoke payam, Ikotos county, 23 January 66 Interview with Torit county commissioner, importance of the dynamics surrounding 2010. Torit, 15 January 2010. revenge attacks. 40 Focus group discussions with women in 67 In Magwi, two formally appointed county 18 Interviews with international non-govern- Hyala Central, Torit county, 16 January 2010. judges reportedly left their posts after two mental organization (INGO) and church 41 See Ochan (2007, p. 14) for examples in months because of a lack of cases. Local officials, Isoke payam, Ikotos county, Ikotos. police allegedly preferred to solve cases 23 January 2010. 42 Interview with SSRRC state director, Torit themselves through bribery. Interview 19 Traditionally, the Buya and the Didinga county, on 18 January 2010. with key informants in Magwi town, used to raid villages in Hyala payam, but 43 Interview with boma chief, Ikotos Central, 21 January 2010. attacks between neighbouring villages 24 January 2010. 68 Interviews with church official, Torit town, within the payam were less common. See 44 Interview with key informant, Magwi and key informants, Magwi county, Ochan (2007). county, 21 January 2010. 21 January 2010. 20 Focus group discussions with women 45 Interview with paramount chief, Magwi 69 Interviews with youths and authorities and youths in Hyala payam, Torit county, county, 19 January 2010. in Ikotos county, 14–25 January 2010. 16 January 2010. 46 Interview with Pajok payam administrator, 70 Interview with a police major, Torit county 21 Focus group discussion with women Peace 20 January 2010. A recent International police station, 18 January 2010. Committee members, Ikotos Central, Ikotos, Rescue Committee protection report finds 71 Interview with the governor of Eastern 24 January 2010. that early pregnancies are the primary Equatoria state, 18 January 2010.
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 11 72 Interviews with government and police have been equipped with mobile satellite Monyomiji. n.d. ‘Engaging Monyomiji.’ officials, Torit, Magwi, and Ikotos counties, telephones and are linked with a ‘quick
HSBA project summary Credits The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment Series editor: Emile LeBrun (HSBA) is a multi-year project administered by Copy editor: Tania Inowlocki the Small Arms Survey. It has been developed Design and layout: Richard Jones ([email protected]) in cooperation with the Canadian government, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the United Nations Contact details Development Programme (UNDP), and a wide array of international and Sudanese NGO partners. Through the For more information or to provide feedback, active generation and dissemination of timely empirical contact Claire Mc Evoy, HSBA Project Manager, at research the project supports violence reduction initiatives, [email protected], or Klaus Ljoerring including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration Pedersen, Danish Demining Group Horn of Africa & programmes; incentive schemes for civilian arms collection; Armed Violence Reduction, at [email protected]. and security sector reform and arms control interventions Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment across Sudan. The HSBA also offers policy-relevant advice Small Arms Survey, 47 Avenue Blanc on redressing insecurity. 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Sudan Issue Briefs are designed to provide periodic snapshots of baseline information in a timely and reader- t +41 22 908 5777 f +41 22 732 2738 friendly format. The HSBA also generates a series of longer Danish Demining Group and more detailed Working Papers in English and Arabic, Borgergade 10, 3rd floor available at www.smallarmssurveysudan.org. 1300 Copenhagen, Denmark The HSBA receives direct financial support from the UK Government Global Conflict Prevention Pool, the Norwe- t +45 3373 5000 gian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Netherlands Min- w www.danishdeminingroup.dk istry of Foreign Affairs. The project has previously received direct support from the Global Peace and Security Fund at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and the Danish International Development Agency (Danida).
12 Sudan IssueIssue Brief Brief Number Number 6 16 April April 2007 2010