Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Public Disclosure Authorized Report No: ICR00004352
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (4724-TZ, 4991-TZ and 4724-TZ)
ON A
LOAN
Public Disclosure Authorized IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 214.3 MILLION
(US$ 329 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
FOR THE TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )
Public Disclosure Authorized January 16, 2017
Transport & ICT Global Practice Africa Region
Public Disclosure Authorized
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective {Dec 27, 2017})
Currency Unit = Tanzanian Shilling (TZS) TZS 2222 = US$1 US$ 1.42 = SDR 1
FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30
Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Bella Bird Senior Global Practice Director: Jose Luis Irigoyen Practice Manager: Aurelio Menendez Task Team Leader(s): Yonas Eliesikia Mchomvu ICR Main Contributor: Adam Stone Diehl
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AGL Airfield Ground Lighting CAS Country Assistance Strategy DVELA Driver and Vehicle Examination and Licensing Agency ERR Economic Rate of Return ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessments ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plans GDP Gross Domestic Product GoT Government of Tanzania GoZ Government of Zanzibar ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization IDA International Development Association Km Kilometer Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania (Growth and MKUKUTA Poverty Reduction Strategy for Mainland Tanzania) MoID Ministry of Infrastructure Development MoWTC Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication NRSA National Road Safety Agency NTP National Transport Policy RAIS Road Accident Information System TAA Tanzania Airports Authority TANROADS Tanzania National Roads Agency TSIP Transport Sector Investment Program TSSP Transport Sector Support Project US$ United States Dollars
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DATA SHEET ...... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ...... 6 A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL ...... 6 B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE) ...... 10 II. OUTCOME ...... 13 A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ...... 13 B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ...... 14 C. EFFICIENCY ...... 19 D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING ...... 20 E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) ...... 20 III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ...... 22 A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ...... 22 B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ...... 22 IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 24 A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ...... 24 B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ...... 26 C. BANK PERFORMANCE ...... 28 D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ...... 29 V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 30 ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ...... 33 ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ...... 44 ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ...... 46 ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ...... 47 ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ... 52 ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY) ...... 53
The World Bank TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )
DATA SHEET
BASIC INFORMATION
Product Information Project ID Project Name
P055120 TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )
Country Financing Instrument
Africa Specific Investment Loan
Original EA Category Revised EA Category
Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B)
Related Projects
Relationship Project Approval Product Line Additional Financing P126206-TANZANIA 30-Jun-2011 IBRD/IDA TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT - ADDITIONAL FINANCING
Organizations
Borrower Implementing Agency
MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND PLANNING TANROADS
Project Development Objective (PDO)
Original PDO The development objectives of the project are to improve the condition of the national paved road network, to lower transport cost on selected roads, and to expand the capacity of selected regional airports.
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FINANCING
Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$) World Bank Financing
270,000,000 270,000,000 266,203,902 IDA-47240
59,000,000 59,000,000 54,404,588 IDA-49910 Total 329,000,000 329,000,000 320,608,490
Non-World Bank Financing Borrower 11,700,000 11,700,000 4,508,806 Total 11,700,000 11,700,000 4,508,806 Total Project Cost 340,700,000 340,700,000 325,117,296
KEY DATES
Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing 27-May-2010 01-Dec-2010 05-May-2014 30-Jun-2015 20-Jun-2017
RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING
Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions 30-Jun-2011 43.74 Additional Financing Change in Project Development Objectives Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost 22-Apr-2015 255.68 Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Change in Financing Plan Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Change in Legal Covenants 29-Mar-2017 318.10 Change in Loan Closing Date(s)
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The World Bank TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )
KEY RATINGS
Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Modest
RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs
Actual No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Disbursements (US$M) 01 12-Dec-2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0
02 18-May-2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 43.74
03 27-Nov-2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 43.74
04 07-Jun-2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 49.91
05 08-Jan-2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 100.28
06 20-Jul-2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 125.44
07 03-Feb-2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 169.63
08 05-Aug-2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 210.72
09 30-Jan-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 251.03
10 03-Aug-2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 267.31
11 26-Feb-2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 303.81
12 12-Sep-2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 310.89
13 22-May-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 318.10
14 30-Jun-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 320.61
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The World Bank TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )
SECTORS AND THEMES
Sectors Major Sector/Sector (%)
Transportation 100 Public Administration - Transportation 7 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads 72 Aviation 21
Themes Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%)
Private Sector Development 19
Jobs 9
Job Creation 9
Public Private Partnerships 10
Public Sector Management 2
Public Administration 2
Transparency, Accountability and Good 2 Governance
Urban and Rural Development 90
Urban Development 9
Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 9
Rural Development 81
Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 81
ADM STAFF
Role At Approval At ICR
Regional Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Makhtar Diop
Country Director: John McIntire Bella Deborah Mary Bird
Senior Global Practice Director: Inger Andersen Jose Luis Irigoyen
Practice Manager: C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Aurelio Menendez
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The World Bank TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )
Task Team Leader(s): Dieter E. Schelling Yonas Eliesikia Mchomvu
ICR Contributing Author: Adam Stone Diehl
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The World Bank TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )
I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL
Context 1. Although Tanzania had experienced strong GDP growth (seven percent per year, on average) in the years leading up to the approval of the Transport Sector Support Project (TSSP), transport bottlenecks remained a key challenge for continued growth. Translating this growth into poverty reduction had remained a challenge. In the year before project approval, the global financial crisis had depressed GDP growth by 1.4 percentage points, impacting export sectors disproportionately. Many of the country’s key growth sectors, such as mining, manufacturing and tourism, were impacted.
2. The transport sector had been rapidly progressing. Tanzania had implemented a series of reforms in the sector, including delegation of regulatory and executive functions to autonomous authorities such as the Tanzania Airports Authority (TAA) and the Tanzania National Roads Agency (TANROADS), the creation of the Road Fund (an independent user financed funding mechanism for road maintenance), and the focusing of the ministry responsible for the transport sector on policy setting and sector development.1
3. The roads subsector had been fundamentally reformed in the years leading up to project approval. The road network included 88,472 km of classified roads, of which 29,847 km of trunk and regional roads were managed by TANROADS with the remainder managed by Local Government Authorities. Only five percent of the national network was in poor condition, thanks largely to the country’s well performing Road Fund. Yet, there was still a backlog of rehabilitation on paved trunk roads, with 1,200 km estimated to be in urgent need of rehabilitation. Local government roads still faced challenges, but were seeing improvements as well.
4. Despite significant increases in passenger traffic in the aviation sector, Tanzania’s air transport sector was facing significant infrastructure deficiencies which hindered further growth. 368 aerodromes served the country, 59 of which were owned, managed and operated by TAA. The Zanzibar International Airport (along with other infrastructure on Zanzibar and Pemba islands) was managed by the Government of Zanzibar (GoZ). Although demand was proven to exist, infrastructure bottlenecks had caused airlines to restrict and even cancel flights to some regional airports. Such restrictions were of particular concern for Tanzania’s tourism sector, a key source of revenue for the country2.
5. The project was aligned with Tanzania’s national development strategy and the World Bank’s assistance strategy. Tanzania’s transport was identified as a key bottleneck for development, highlighted explicitly in the “Growth Cluster” of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty 2005-2010 (known as MKUKUTA). MKUKUTA was developed to support the achievement of the country’s long term
1 At the time of appraisal, transport was the responsibility of the Ministry of Infrastructure Development (MoID). During implementation, the structure of the country’s Ministries was revised several times. At project closure, transport had been under the oversight of the Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication (MoWTC) since 2015. 2 Per the World Travel and Tourism Council, in 2016 tourism directly contributed 4.7% of GDP, and in total contributed 13.3% (including indirect contributions. 3.9% of jobs were in the tourism sector, while the total contribution (including indirect links) was 11.6% of jobs.
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The World Bank TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )
development strategy, the Tanzanian Development Vision 2025. This overarching development vision outlines key goals for reaching middle income status and highlights the need for infrastructure, with a focus on road transport in particular. The Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania FY07-FY10 was drafted to guide development partner support for MKUKUTA, including a clear focus on filling transport gaps. A National Transport Policy guided investment in the sector. Aligned with MKUKUTA, the objectives of Tanzania’s National Transport Policy were to (i) ensure optimal use of resources by investing in improved infrastructure in all modes of transport, promote modal efficiency and enhance competition; (ii) recover some of the cost from users and support the overall socio-economic development in a most cost effective manner; (iii) promote public-private partnership (PPP) in the development of transport infrastructure, where the private sector can easily invest alone; and (iv) attract private sector for investments in seaports, airports and railways.
6. To deliver on these objectives, the Transport Sector Investment Program (TSIP) was developed to guide investments over a ten-year period from 2007/08 to 2016/17. This program included investments by both the Government of Tanzania (GoT) and Development Partners such as the World Bank, African Development Bank, DANIDA, and others. Three year rolling plans were prepared and updated annually to align TSIP with the government’s Medium Term Expenditure Framework. TSSP was designed to support the first of these rolling plans, contributing to its overarching goals of improving the country’s roads, aviation, rail and port sectors.
7. TSSP built on the World Bank’s long standing partnership with Tanzania in the Transport sector. TSSP was preceded by a series of other transport projects, and many of the components of TSSP built on work prepared under these projects. Similarly, the engagement of the Sub-Saharan African Transport Policy Program (a Bank Executed Trust Fund) in Tanzania for the fifteen years leading up to TSSP helped lay the institutional groundwork for major transport reform and development programs.
Theory of Change (Results Chain) 8. The project was intended to support Tanzania’s economic growth and reduce poverty through improving transport sector performance, including improved and safer roads, expanded air transport service, and better operations in the rail and ports sectors. While the project primarily contributed to the roads and aviation subsectors, it also provided some support to the ports and rail subsectors as well. To achieve this objective, the project provided support for activities in road rehabilitation and maintenance, airport infrastructure improvement, road safety institution building, and PPP capacity building in various subsectors. These activities, in turn, supported the project’s three PDOs (described below), and the higher-level objective of growth and poverty reduction through improved transport sector performance.
9. The project’s additional financing built on the same theory of change. Further expanding on the contribution to the aviation sector, it added civil works strengthening the capacity of a fourth airport and a new component reconstructing a jetty linking a small island with the rest of the country. Aspects included through additional financing are included in italics in Figure 1 below.
10. As described in Section IV.A, the project’s results framework poorly captured the attribution of TSSP’s activities to the PDOs and longer term outcomes. While the project’s activities and outputs did contribute to its stated goals, many of the indicators included in the framework are only marginally impacted by the project (due to a host of confounding variables), do not measure the PDO directly, or both. As such,
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The World Bank TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )
while they are referenced in Figure 1 below, they are complemented by supplemental indicators of achievement in Section II.B.
Figure 1: Theory of Change
Project Development Objectives (PDOs) 11. The original PDO as stated in the PAD and financing agreement was: to improve the condition of the national paved road network, to lower transport cost on selected roads, and to expand the capacity of selected regional airports.
Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators 12. The project had three clear development objectives, each associated with one or more PDO indicators.
Table 1: TSSP PDOs and PDO Indicators
PDO Indicators
(i) To improve the condition of the • Roads in good and fair condition as a national paved road network share of total classified roads
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The World Bank TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )
(ii) To lower transport costs on • Average vehicle operating cost on selected roads Korogwe-Same road (US cents per km) • Average vehicle operating cost on Arusha-Minjingu road (US cents per km)
(iii) To expand the capacity of • Passenger volume at Bukoba selected regional airports • Passenger volume at Kigoma • Passenger volume at Tabora
Components 13. At approval, the project had five components, three focused primarily on civil works and two on capacity building and institutional strengthening. The total estimated project cost was US$281.7 million, of which $270 million was IDA and US$11.7 million was from GoT contribution to the airport component. The IDA Crisis Response Window accounted for US$15 million of the IDA contribution under Component E, the Emergency Road and Bridge Repair component.
Table 2: Project Components at Approval3
Components Description Amount Allocated
Component A: Rehabilitation of two sections of paved trunk roads IDA financing: Rehabilitation and (172km from Korogwe to Same, and 98km from US$186.5 million preparation of Arusha to Minjingu) and preparation of design and designs for the bidding documents for an additional 911 km of rehabilitation of additional paved trunk roads for future rehabilitation. paved trunk roads
Component B: Paving and rehabilitation of the runway at Kigoma IDA financing: Improvement of regional airport; rehabilitation of the runway at the US$57.5 million regional airports Tabora regional airport; and extension, rehabilitation GoT financing: and resurfacing of the runway and construction of a US$11.7 million new terminal, apron, and other facilities at the Bukoba regional airport.
Component C: Support for the establishment of a National Road IDA financing: Improvement of road Safety Agency (NRSA), Driver and Vehicle US$6.0 million safety Examination and Licensing Agency (DVELA), and Road Accident Information System (RAIS)
3 See Table 3 – Revised Components for actual expenditures
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Component D: Capacity building for the implementation of PPP IDA financing Promotion of Public- projects, feasibility studies of potential PPP projects US$5.0 million Private Partnerships (including a Civil Aviation Master Plan and PPP feasibility assessments for TAA airports, a Freight Centre feasibility study, a study for removal of bottlenecks on local government roads, assistance to prepare a bankable central rail project), and transaction advisors for any projects identified as feasible.
Component E: Emergency repair for just over 100 damaged sections IDA financing: Emergency Road and of roads and bridges throughout the country resulting US$15 million Bridge Repair from severe flooding at the time of appraisal. In line (from the IDA with the World Bank’s Rapid Response to Crisis and Crisis Response Emergencies Guidelines (OP 8.00), this included Window) retroactive financing of 40% of the component amount and accelerated, consolidated and simplified procurement and safeguards.
B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)
Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets 14. The PDO was revised slightly as part of an additional financing approved in June 2011 (just over a year after the original project’s approval). The revised PDO is to (i) improve the condition of the national paved road network, (ii) to lower transport cost on selected roads and to Songo Songo Island, and (iii) to expand the capacity of selected airports.4 The revisions included reference to the addition of a component to rehabilitate a jetty on Songo Songo Island, and expansion of PDO (iii) to include not only regional airports, but the airport on Zanzibar as well.
Revised PDO Indicators 15. A PDO indicator measuring passenger traffic volume at the Zanzibar airport included during the additional financing. No other changes to indicators or baselines were made.
Revised Components 16. The additional financing included two changes to the project’s components, a revision of Component B to include civil works at the Zanzibar International Airport (US$57.0 million) and addition of a new Component F to include rehabilitation of the Songo Songo Island Jetty (US$2.0 million). In line with the higher- level objectives of the original project, and PDO (iii) in particular, it was decided to use an additional financing to address some of the largest bottlenecks at the Zanzibar airport, where the extent and condition of the existing
4 Changes made through the additional financing marked in Bold.
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The World Bank TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )
taxiway and apron greatly limited the flow of aircraft through the airport. The new Component F was included as a social mitigation measure for the Bank’s closed Songo Songo Gas Extraction Project (P002797). This earlier project had taken over an existing jetty used by the local population, and had constructed a new jetty for their use. However, after the project closed, it was determined that the new jetty was not sufficient, submerging during high tides and becoming dangerously shallow during low tides. To address these challenges, it was agreed that rehabilitation and extension of the jetty would be included under TSSP.
Table 3: Revised Project Components5
Components Description of change Amount Allocated Actual Expenditure
Component A: Rehabilitation No change IDA financing: US$186.5 IDA financing: US$191.7 and preparation of designs million million for the rehabilitation of paved trunk roads
Component B: Improvement Expansion of initial Initial IDA financing: US$57.5 Total IDA financing: of selected airports component to include million US$101.7 million rehabilitation and GoT financing: US$11.7 million GoT financing: US$4.5 expansion of the million taxiway and apron at IDA Additional Financing: the Zanzibar airport US$57.0 million
Component C: Improvement No change IDA financing: US$6.0 million IDA financing: US$4.6 of road safety million
Component D: Promotion of No change IDA financing US$5.0 million IDA financing: US$3.4 Public-Private Partnerships million
Component E: Emergency No change IDA financing: US$15 million IDA financing: US$13.9 Road and Bridge Repair (from the IDA Crisis Response million Window)
Component F: Songo Songo New component, IDA Additional Financing: IDA financing: US$2.2 Island Jetty including rehabilitation US$2.0 million million and extension of the Songo Songo Island jetty
5 See Annex 3 for detailed project costs by component
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The World Bank TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )
Other Changes 17. In addition to the Additional Financing, the project was restructured twice. A level 2 restructuring was approved by the Country Director on April 22nd, 2015 to extend the closing date by 21 months (from June 30th, 2015 to March 31st, 2017) and allow for a reallocation of US$2.0 million between categories. The extension of the closing date was intended to allow for completion of one of the project’s road contracts, and finalize some additional works under road safety and Songo Songo jetty components. A second level 2 restructuring was approved by the Country Director on March 29th, 2017 to extend the closing date to June 20th, 2017. This extension allowed for works at the Tabora airport to be completed, including paving of the second runway and apron and installation of Airfield Ground Lighting (AGL), and completion and furnishing of the Tumaini Primary school in Bukoba (as explained under Component B below).
18. In addition to the formal changes described above, the project underwent a series of changes within its components. The most significant of which included:
19. Component A:
• During the liability period for the first lot of the Korogwe-Same road, it was determined that a failure in the pavement mix design had led to premature failure of the road surface in many areas. To address these issues, an independent consultant was hired to determine responsibility for remediation. After it was found that the contractor was responsible, repairs were agreed and implemented.
• On the Arusha-Minjingu road segment, it was determined that existing culverts in one location were insufficient and that the road required closure due to flooding during the heaviest rains. Using remaining project funds, the drainage structure was redesigned and reconstructed.
20. Component B:
• After the original project works were completed at the Tabora airport (including paving and extension of the runway), the project team and implementing agency partners determined that the existing second runway (serving as taxiway to the main runway) and apron facilities were insufficient for the larger aircraft which could now use the airport due to the improved runway. From existing project funds (the bids received under the subcomponent were much lower than expected in project design), it was agreed that the secondary runway (which is partly a taxiway for the main runway) and apron would be rehabilitated and paved under the project. In addition, AGL and Doppler Very-High-Frequency Omnidirectional Range (DVOR) were installed. Taking advantage of Tabora’s central location in the country, this equipment allows the airport to serve as a diversion location case of emergency, strengthening the safety of the air transport sector in Tanzania. Fencing was also added to the airport to protect the local community from entering the airport.
• In Bukoba, two major changes were made to the original plan. First, after runway extension, it was found that the rising water levels had destroyed a walkway on the lake side of the runway, causing local population to cross through the airport grounds instead, presenting a danger to themselves and air traffic. To address this concern, a walkway was built around the end of the airport to provide
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safe passage. In addition, it was determined that a primary school was too close to the end of the runway, and airport operations presented a threat to the students. To address this, an alternate school was constructed in a nearby safe location, and the original school demolished and land demarcated.
• In Zanzibar, in order to help the airport meet International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards, it was agreed that the project would support the purchase/rehabilitation of firefighting and maintenance equipment out of remaining project funds.
• Finally, although Component B had initially planned to receive US$11 million in co-financing from GoT, this was reduced during implementation to accelerate construction, with IDA providing the entirety of the support from that point on.
Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change 21. Approved just over a year after the original project, the additional financing took advantage of an unexpected opening in the IDA envelope to expand the project in line with its original goals. When a project scheduled for delivery in Eritrea was removed from the yearly approval plans, the TSSP project team was able to prepare and deliver an additional financing package within a very brief Fiscal Year window. This was possible because the Zanzibar airport component had already been planned and designed as part of an earlier project. The inclusion of the Zanzibar airport under Component B was very much in line with the theory of change, simply expanding the scope of the project’s impact in this area. As described above, the small Songo Songo jetty component also built off of an earlier project and contributed to the original long term objectives of TSSP, helping to improve transport services to an underserved population.
22. The two restructurings were approved to provide the necessary time to complete all works under the project, utilizing nearly all project funds to meet the project’s objectives. The implementation of the project was characterized by an iterative approach, identifying subsequent bottlenecks to meeting project goals after initially planned works were completed. As such, extensions were required to provide enough time to carry out these works. The major additions to the project (eg. remediation and additional works along the road lengths, additional runway/ taxiways and apron in Tabora, the relocation of Tumaini Primary School, safety and maintenance equipment in Zanzibar) were all in line with the theory of change outlined above, addressing major bottlenecks to fully capitalizing on the project’s investments.
II. OUTCOME
A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs
Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating 23. The project’s PDOs continue to be highly consistent with the country’s growth and poverty reduction strategy. The Tanzania Development Vision 2025 continues to be the country’s overarching strategy for growth and poverty eradication. As this Vision has been in place throughout the life of the project, it remains relevant. To support this vision, Tanzania has continued to develop five-year development plans, starting with MKUKUTA. The current plan, National Five Year Development Plan 2016/17 – 2020/21, continues to highlight the need for
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transport infrastructure, focusing on how it can support improvements in other sectors. It specifically highlights the need to leverage PPPs, to invest in local/regional airports, rehabilitate roads, and improve port infrastructure, all in line with the TSSP project’s three PDOs.
24. The PDOs are also consistent with the World Bank’s support strategy for Tanzania. At project closure, the World Bank was in the process of developing a new Country Partnership Strategy for Tanzania. The most recently approved Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) had been approved for the period of FY12-FY15, and then extended for an additional year by its Progress Report6. The CAS identifies the need to “Build Infrastructure and Deliver Services” as one of its for strategic objectives, and “increased access to and quality of transport services” as one of its eleven targeted outcomes. This focus was strengthened by the progress report, with a stated focus on two strategic clusters. Under the first cluster, “Productive Investments for Growth of Labor-Intensive Industries and Job Creation”, transport investment was identified, including objectives of reducing transport costs and crowding in private investment through PPPs. These objectives are in line with those of TSSP, with reduction of transport costs a PDO, and improving the environment for PPPs addressed through a project component.
25. Tanzania’s current Systematic Country Diagnostic (approved in February 2017) also highlighted the continued need for transport investments. Although the World Bank’s new Country Partnership Strategy was still under development at the time of project closure, a Systematic Country Diagnostic had been prepared to guide its development. This Diagnostic identified nine specific priority areas, one of which was to “Strengthen rural-urban connectivity through enhanced rural transport and market linkages between villages and secondary cities”. All three of TSSP’s PDOs and its various component contribute directly to this priority area.
26. Rating: High. As outlined above, the PDOs continued to be strongly aligned with the Bank and borrower’s strategy.
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)
Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome 27. There are three separate PDOs, each measured by a series of indicators and supported by various project components. They are assessed individually below:
Revised PDO (i): to improve the condition of the national paved road network
28. TSSP contributed to the quality of the national road network through various activities. The works under Component A included 268 km out of the more than 6400 km of national paved roads in the country. Including the 641 km of road, 212 culverts and 2 bridges in 19 of the 31 Regions across Tanzania receiving emergency maintenance under Component E, TSSP performed rehabilitation or maintenance on 909 km, or approximately 14% of the total national paved road network. Repairing these locations and bringing them back
6 See Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the United Republic of Tanzania for the Period of FY12-FY15. p9.
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to good condition was necessary to make portions of the road network functional post flooding, and contribute to the PDO.
29. The project’s capacity building components also contribute to the overall management and condition of the road network. Component C on road safety should contribute to the safe operation of the road network, providing a governance structure for improving road safety outcomes, a system for ensuring vehicle fleet condition and proper driver behavior, and the RAIS system to identify blackspots to be addressed by road planners. While some progress may be made in this area going forward, by project closure, only the RAIS system had been implemented (see further discussion of Component C in Section III.B below). Based on feedback from various stakeholders, the RAIS system is focused on the most serious cases. Component D contributed to this as well, through a study on identifying and removing on local government managed roads, such as drainage or pavement failures, which impede access of the population to the wider transport network. In addition, Component D has supported the feasibility study and design for a potential 140km toll road which had just reached the bidding stage at project closure.
30. TSSP was part of TSIP, a larger initiative aimed at achieving this objective. As outlined in section I.A., the activities included in TSSP were identified as part of a larger series of engagements between GoT and various development partners, with no one single organization able to deliver on the scale required to meet the country’s road rehabilitation needs. As such, while it is impossible to solely attribute achievement of the PDO to the project, it was designed to play a part in the broader set of engagements which were able to meet this objective.
31. This PDO was tracked during implementation through Figure 2: Share of Classified Road Network in the PDO Indicator “Roads in good and fair condition as a share Good or Fair Condition (as reported in ISRs) of total classified roads”. As described in Section IV.A, the definition of this indicator was changed informally during 100 80 supervision and the results are not reliable. However, as the Target PDO identifies a much narrower subset of roads it is possible to 60 identify an alternate data set to track the achievement of the 40 PDO. More directly measuring the wording of the PDO, an 20
assessment of only the national paved roads shows that the 0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 condition of the network increased slightly (from 75% listed as in 2010 good condition at approval to 76% at project closure), in line with project outputs. In addition, the road lengths included in the project are some of the most important in the country. The Korogwe-Same road forms part of the North- East Corridor, the major road link between Dar es Salaam, the economic activity and tourist destinations in the North, and on to Nairobi. The Arusha-Minjingu road makes up part of the great African North-South axis, from Cairo to Cape Town, while also being vital to the tourism industry linking the Serengeti and other national parks with Arusha and the Kilimanjaro International Airport.
Revised PDO (ii): to lower transport costs on selected roads and to Songo Songo Island
32. This PDO is assessed through two PDO indicators, “Average vehicle operating costs on Korogwe-Same road” and “Average vehicle operating cost of Arusha-Minjingu road”. Although transport costs can be
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impacted by a range of factors, vehicle operating costs (VOC) are a strong proxy, other factors being the same. Following project closure the road lengths were reassessed to calculate VOC, with new data collected on traffic volumes (and types) and road roughness. Based on this data, an HDM-4 analysis was conducted on both road lengths, with VOC calculated for each in line with World Bank supported methodologies. The reduction in VOC along the Korogwe-Same road length was in line with pre-project expectations, falling from US$ 0.34 to US$0.22 per km and achieving the indicator target of US$ 0.23 per km. The Arusha-Minjingu road has seen a similar decrease in VOC, from US$ 0.45 per km at appraisal to US$ 0.27 per km and in line with the targeted value of US$ 0.25 per km. In addition to the dramatic decrease in VOC, the road rehabilitation has contributed to traffic volumes more than doubling along the route, with the largest increases in public transport options.
33. While no specific data is available on Songo Songo island transport costs, the rehabilitated jetty can be reasonably assumed to have lowered transport costs by enabling continuous transport service to the island. The jetty rehabilitation was necessitated by the existing jetty’s inoperability during high and low tide. During these periods, alternate means of transport were necessary which were less efficient and more costly. These issues have been rectified through TSSP activities, and uninterrupted service is now available for the residents of the island.
Revised PDO (iii): to expand the capacity of the selected airports
34. The project used the annual number of passengers passing through each airport as a proxy for airport capacity. In aggregate, the annual passenger traffic target was achieved (1.26 million versus a target of 764 thousand passengers per year). At the sub-indicator level, the target was only reached in 1 of the 4 airports (Zanzibar) at the time of completion, with the Bukoba airport very likely to reach its target once final 2017 data is available. As Zanzibar is a much larger and economically important airport than the other three, with more than six times the passenger volume of the other three airports combined at appraisal, achieving the PDO target there was the most important in meeting the PDO.
35. Despite uneven increases in passenger traffic, the capacity of each airport to handle additional and higher quality service was expanded.7 Airport capacity (as referred to in the PDO) has many facets, but is generally defined as the hourly throughput that an airport’s runways can sustain during high demand. While the number of passengers per year can be a proxy of capacity, it is heavily dependent on other factors outside of the airport’s control, such as passenger demand, airline operations, and economic growth. Therefore, in addition to the project’s PDO indicator (number of annual passengers), capacity at the four airports is assessed below through a variety of additional factors.
7 Monthly passenger data received from TAA through the end of September, 2017 and annualized based on a linear projection of the remaining 3 months.
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36. The Zanzibar International Airport has seen increasingly higher traffic volumes and has greatly surpassed its indicator target. By far the largest and most important of the airports included in the project, this is the main gateway to one of Tanzania’s most important tourist destinations, Zanzibar and its Stone Town (a UNESCO World Heritage Site). From a baseline of 500,000 passengers, the airport has seen steadily Figure 3: Zanzibar Airport Annual Passenger Traffic increased passenger volumes, reaching 946,905 in 2016 1000000 and expected to surpass 1.6 million by 2020. The 800000 Zanzibar airport works included expansion and rehabilitation of the taxiway and apron. While the 600000 Target indicator target had already been met by the time 400000 works began, the airport was severely constrained and 200000 Project Works would have struggled to meet further demand. The 0 project’s works addressed some of the most pressing 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 bottlenecks restricting continued traffic growth and allowed the airport to continue to meet the rapidly growing demand for additional passenger traffic. The extended taxiway enables planes to enter or exit the runway at the end without having to taxi along the actual runway to reach the terminal. This extension greatly reduced the time each airplane occupies the runway, and thus significantly increases the throughput of the airport. The previous apron was insufficient to handle the increased international traffic, with larger aircraft overwhelming the apron space and blocking portions of the taxiway, rendering it unusable at times of high traffic. The expansion has relieved some of the pressure, although further expansion may be necessary in the future. In addition, the purchase of additional fire tenders allowed the project to meet emergency firefighting standards and prevented a need to reduce service.
37. The Bukoba airport saw substantially increased traffic with the PDO indicator target likely to be fully achieved. Of the three regional airports included in the project, Bukoba accounted for the largest share of expenditures (37%) and works - including extension of the runway; paving of the runway, taxiway and apron; construction of a new terminal building; and construction of access roads and parking among other more minor works. During preparation, the indicator target was set at 34,000 passengers per year, up from a baseline of 26,628. As of the latest available data during the ICR review 33,379 passengers had already used the airport Figure 4: Bukoba Airport Annual Passenger Traffic in 2017 (end September), nearly meeting the target. 50,000 Projecting a similar level of traffic through the end of 40,000 the year, the airport is expected to serve more than 30,000 Target 44,000 passengers, with continued growth projected 20,000 into the future. Tanzania’s Civil Aviation Master Plan, 10,000 Project Works developed under Component D of the project, - estimates demand at the airport to continue increasing at 4.2% per year, reaching 60,000 passengers per annum by 2033.8 In addition to numbers of passengers, the capacity of the airport has expanded in other ways.
8 Tanzania’s Civil Aviation Master Plan, Final Report Volume I, Air Transport Sector & Air Traffic Demand Forecasts
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The extended and paved runway has allowed for larger aircraft and additional airlines to serve the airport. After the project, the airport was assess as having an Aerodrome Reference Code of 2C, able to accommodate the ATR-42 being commonly used for commercial service in Tanzania. Both Precision Air and Air Tanzania have begun service at the rehabilitated airport, and the average number of passengers per plane increased from 8.6 in 2009 to 18.6 in 2017. In addition, as the old terminal had been damaged in an earthquake and been condemned, the newly constructed airport was necessary for any continued commercial airport operation.
38. The Tabora airport has not yet met its PDO indicator targets as the extended duration of works has restricted operations, however airport capacity has expanded. As discussed in Section III, after completion of the initially planned works, it was decided that remaining funds under the subcomponent would be used to pave the additional runway and taxiway. Completion of these works required project extension and were only finished just before project closure, with full testing and operationalization to be completed by the end of 2017. The extensive works required severe restrictions on operations during construction, depressing traffic significantly. Although data was only available for several months of operations following completion of phase 2, there are clear signs that traffic will rebound. From an average of 1,022 passengers per month during the first half of 2017, passenger traffic nearly doubled following completion of phase 2, averaging 1,950 passengers per month since June. Looking forward, traffic is expected to grow by an estimated 4% per year (although estimates started from a 2015 baseline, depressing future projections).9 Furthermore, despite this lower than projected traffic by project closure, the capacity of the airport can be assumed to have greatly increased. Paving the runways has allowed the number of passengers per flight to increase slightly, from 10.1 in 2009 to 11.1 in 2017. In addition, due to Tabora’s central location in Tanzania it is important to the overall safety of the Tanzanian aviation sector, serving as a potential diversion airport Figure 5: Tabora Airport Annual Passenger Traffic for flights crossing the country. By paving the airport’s two runways, the project improved its condition and 35,000 30,000 Target reliability, and the addition of AGL and DVOR will enable 25,000 night-time operations. It also provides services such as 20,000 refueling unavailable at many other Tanzanian airports. 15,000 10,000 The airport’s capacity will be further expanded in the 5,000 Phase 1 Phase 2 future, as agreement has already been reached with - European Investment Bank to construct a new terminal, leveraging the improved runway, taxiway and apron facilities developed under TSSP.
9 Ibid.
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39. The Kigoma airport has not yet met its PDO indicator targets, despite expansion of airport capacity. The Kigoma airport accounts for the smallest share of the three regional airports in terms of expenditure and works (23% of expenditures). Primary works included the paving of the main runway, dramatically Figure 6: Kigoma Airport Annual Passenger Traffic improving its condition. Traffic through Kigoma has 50,000 been largely driven by refugee operations near the 40,000 Target town. In addition, at project approval, it was being 30,000 used to supply UN forces stationed in the Democratic 20,000 Republic of Congo. After 2009 these supply runs were 10,000 Project Works moved to the Entebbe airport in Uganda. In addition, - as with other airports, improvement of other transport modes, especially roads, has provided additional options for travelers. While the total number of passengers has plateaued after returning to pre-project levels, future projections indicate a return to growth, returning to an average of 7.1% growth and upwards of 100,000 passengers per year by 203310. In addition, some other indicators of capacity have improved. Reflecting the capacity to handle larger flights, the number of passengers per flight has risen from 14.7 in 2009 to 23.9 in 2017. Furthermore, additional airlines have begun operation, with Air Tanzania having recently relaunched service. The airport has been assessed as having an ICAO Aerodrome Reference Code of 3C.
Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating 40. The overall efficacy is rated as Substantial. As described above, the project largely met its objectives, with some minor shortcomings. Although PDO (i) shows some challenges with attribution, the project contributed its share to the larger TSIP program and addressed failures in important road lengths. PDO (ii) was achieved, with VOC targets met and 24-hour access to Songo Songo Island established. PDO (iii) was also achieved, with airport capacity greatly expanding at all 4 airports. Although passenger targets had only been met at 2 of the 4 airports by project closure, this is only weakly associated with airport capacity and in Tabora, is due to the recent re-establishment of full operations at the airport.
C. EFFICIENCY
Assessment of Efficiency and Rating 41. An ex post economic analysis was conducted on the project, replicating the analysis done during preparation to the extent possible. An assessment of the road rehabilitation component finds that both road sections are economically viable, with similar Economic Rates of Return (ERR) as calculated at appraisal. For the Korogwe-Same road length, the ERR was assessed as 19 and 19.9 percent (for the two lots) while it was found to be 17.1 percent during the ex post assessment. Although the cost of the road works was within the envelope of Component A, construction costs were significantly more than used in the economic analysis during appraisal, reducing the calculated rate of return. The Arusha-Minjingu length was projected to have an ERR of 15.2
10 Ibid.
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percent at appraisal, but reached 16.3 percent by closure. Although construction costs were also higher than predicted during appraisal, the dramatic increase in traffic along the route led to the higher than expected ERR. For the airports component, lower than expected traffic volumes have reduced the ex post ERRs for 2 of the 3 assessed airports. In Bukoba, where traffic has seen strong growth and costs were somewhat lower than expected, the ERR was calculated at 18.3 percent, up from the expected ERR of 15 percent at appraisal. In Kigoma, while traffic has not met expectations, significantly lower costs resulted in an ERR of 8.5 percent. Although this meets the World Bank’s new norm of 6 percent, it is well below the appraised value of 23 percent. In Tabora, the ERR was calculated ex post as -9.6 percent. As explained in section II.V above, the airport had just reopened for full operation at project closure. As such, the ERR value for this airport is very preliminary, with the uncertainty of traffic growth leading to uncertain results. A detailed efficiency analysis is included in annex 4.
42. The project had several aspects in its design and implementation which impacted its efficiency. The project was extended twice to allow for project activities to be completed, leading to additional supervision costs. Although economically justified based on its ERR, within the road component delays and additional costs arose from procurement, design errors, disagreement over responsibility for remedial works, etc. See section III for more information on these factors. While the road costs were higher than expected in the economic analysis conducted during appraisal, they were in line with other roads in the region constructed during the project period. The airport components were constructed at significantly less cost than estimated during appraisal, with the remaining funds used to expand the planned works (in Tabora especially). While the project delays led to some additional costs, the additional time allowed for TSSP to expand its outputs in the aviation component greatly.
43. The Efficiency Rating is Modest. While the project was able to achieve most of its planned outputs, the above factors highlight that the efficiency was mixed, with delays and other factors bringing down the ERR and increasing some costs of various components.
D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING 44. The overall outcome is rated Moderately Satisfactory. As described above, the project’s relevance is rated as high, its efficacy is substantial, and the efficiency is moderate. Although the PDO was changed with the project’s additional financing, no ‘split rating’ was deemed necessary as the scope of the PDO was simply expanded to include the additional works.
E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)
Gender 45. The project did not explicitly incorporate a gender dimension into its design or implementation, and thus did not include any actions or indicators to specifically target the mobility needs of women. See section IV.B for more information on the project’s social impacts.
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Institutional Strengthening 46. As discussed above, Components C was intended to develop capacity within the GoT for road safety. The most significant achievement was the development and launch of a RAIS system, allowing the police to enter road crash information into a national database for use by transport planners, TANROADS, police speed enforcement, and other aspects. At project closure, Tanzania was under discussions on how to build on this system, including training of additional police or integration of mobile data entry to improve information capture. The other two major aspects under this component (establishing a NRSA and DVELA) had not been achieved as of project closure. Their creation required the passage of a Road Safety Act in Parliament. As this act did not pass, they could not be created as envisioned. While these agencies would not have contributed directly to the project’s PDOs, they are important for the long-term road sector in Tanzania. As of the ICR, discussions were still ongoing within the GoT, with World Bank support, for moving forward on this agenda,
47. Under Component D, the project provided for PPP capacity building within the GoT. Approximately 140 representatives of relevant agencies were trained in PPP aspects and a working manual was developed. See below for more information on these activities.
48. In addition, the project contributed to the institutional capacity of TANROADS. It supported the hiring of additional procurement staff and a contract management specialist, all of whom have remained with the agency beyond the end of the project.
Mobilizing Private Sector Financing 49. Component D was intended to help jumpstart the introduction of PPPs into the transport sector, providing for training of government officials, studies in a variety of transport modes, feasibility studies for potential projects, and support through the bidding stage of any identified projects. Tanzania’s previous experience with PPPs has been mixed, with failures due at least partially to weak capacity on the part of the public sector to design, negotiate and manage PPP arrangements. The project was intended to build on this capacity. While some success was achieved and, as of project closure, one transaction had reached bidding (a toll road), there was a general mismatch between the level of resources provided to this component and its goals. Namely, conducting the subsector wide research, establishing the enabling environment for PPPs, developing government capacity for their management, and supporting specific transactions would require much more than the US$ 5 million allocated by the project. However, the outputs which were achieved may lay the ground work for future successes.
Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity 50. While the project was not explicitly designed to have a distributional impact on the poor, the investments made under the project support the county’s poverty reduction strategy. As described in section II.A, the project supports Tanzania’s vision for the future and poverty reduction strategies. By enabling improved access to services, opportunities, and employment in some of the more remote areas of the country, TSSP should be expected to drive both growth, and poverty reduction. This said, no data was collected by the project to validate such an impact.
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III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME
A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION
51. Scope of the Project – TSSP was initially envisioned as more widely scoped engagement, with additional components in other transport subsectors (including rail and ports). Following the project’s Concept Note stage, it was decided to streamline the project’s scope, simplifying the design and focusing on subsectors ready for investment. While the initial design reflected the interlocking nature of the national transport system and the broad objectives of the TSIP guiding overall investments, such a wide- ranging project would have proved infeasible to implement. Reflecting TSIPs overarching goals, many of the considered components have been included in subsequent World Bank projects, such as in the Tanzania - Intermodal & Rail Development Project (P127241) and the Dar es Salaam Maritime Gateway Project (P150496).
52. Use of Emergency Response Window – The works under Component E (emergency road and bridge repairs) were financed through Crisis Response Window funds, taking advantage of availability for retroactive finance and accelerated, consolidated, and simplified procedures for streamlined procurement and safeguards. The use of this tool enabled the project to rapidly meet wide spread failures in the road network, and reestablish reliable connectivity throughout the country. These works were largely completed during the first year of implementation.
53. Preparation Time – While the project built on previous engagements, it was prepared in less than a year, a relatively short time period for such a complex infrastructure program. Due to abbreviated preparation time, some of the project components struggled through implementation due to poor or incomplete designs, necessitating a series of changes within nearly every component – for instance the relocation of the Tumaini Primary School in Bukoba, pavement issues which arose in Tabora, incorrect volumes of materials specified for the Korogwe-Same road. While many of these issues are addressed in Section III.B below in more detail, they share a common root related to poor or rushed preparation. The additional financing was also prepared and approved in a very short time to take advantage of available IDA funds.
54. Results Framework Design – The results framework was not designed in such a way as to inform or improve implementation. PDO indicators such as condition of the road network and airport passenger data are largely driven by forces outside of the project, while vehicle operating costs were only intended to be assessed at project design and ICR. Intermediate indicators are largely of the “yes or no” variety, tracking whether subcomponents are completed.
B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION
55. TSSP underwent a long series of changes during implementation, with nearly all components seeing at least minor changes. The key factors impacting the project included:
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Factors Subject to Government and/or Implementing Agency Control
56. The Parliament was unable to pass the Road Safety Act, which prevented the creation of the NRSA and DVELA. Without the passage of this Act and accompanying political will behind the creation of these agencies, much of the work under Component C was stalled, never having the momentum to progress beyond the discussion stage. While there are multiple reasons why the Act was never passed, a significant challenge was due to a lack of coordination among relevant agencies and potential disagreement on responsibility for road safety among various Ministries and agencies. Never the less, as described under section II.B the RAIS system was implemented and is operating across the country. The WB and GoT continue to work together to deliver on this agenda.
57. The project relied on a wide range of implementing agencies. Although TANROADS was identified as the principal implementing agency for the project, many other GoT and GoZ agencies had responsibility for implementing various components (TAA for Component B-regional airports, GoZ for Component B-Zanzibar airport, two separate Divisions within the MoWTC for Components C and D, etc.). TANROADS was responsible for overall coordination of the project, reporting, financial management, and procurement.
58. Pavement design and construction proved an issue under several sub-components. The pavement mixture in Lot 1 of the Korogwe-Same road showed significant failure along its length, necessitating significant remediation. Soon after completion of the works along the segment, major deformations began to appear. As the implementing agency and contractor could not agree on responsibility for correcting areas of failure, a third-party consultant was hired to evaluate the pavement, with both sides agreeing to abide by the findings. The review determined that the pavement mix was at the root of the failures. As the mix was contractually the responsibility of the contractor, the contractor performed the necessary remediation. While the mix failure was not due to the original design, the experience has led to a change in how TANROADS designs pavement (switching to the SuperPave mix design system). Along the Arusha-Minjingu road, issues with pavement core testing led to delays in starting works, as the specified test was not possible with the locally available materials used in the road. In Tabora, the original pavement design was based on an assumption that the airport would be fully closed during construction. As it was only partially closed, issues arose in the pavement used for the first half of the runway, with aircraft causing some damage to the freshly laid pavement. To rectify this, the pavement design was changed halfway along the runway, with lessons learned applied in Bukoba as well.
59. Lower than expected bids under Components B provided significant space for financing additional works. The largest of these included the phase 2 of works in Tabora. After completion of phase 1, it was recognized that the apron and secondary runway, which also serves as the main taxiway, would need to be paved and expanded to leverage the investments already made. As the cost of the runway paving and expansion was much lower than expected, these works could be readily financed through the project. The addition of AGL and the DVOR further capitalized on the gains already made under the project. Similarly, the need to include emergency and maintenance equipment in Zanzibar was facilitated by unused project funds. In Bukoba, the relocation of the school, addition of fencing around the airport, and construction of a walking path to enable passage of pedestrians around the end of the runway was financed through similar modalities.
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60. The co-financing from the GoT for the airports component (US$11 million) was reduced, with IDA financing supporting the entire project cost from that point forward. During implementation, slow disbursement of these funds led to potential delays under Component B. As the bids received for airport works were significantly below their allocation during design, it was determined that the entire remaining works, including the additional works under the phase 2 in Tabora, could be financed through the IDA allocation.
Factors subject to World Bank control
61. The World Bank project team remained heavily engaged throughout the project life. As the project TTLs were based in the Dar es Salaam office throughout preparation and supervision, the World Bank could provide effective support to the project. Being closely located to the project enabled the Bank team to stay engaged with the implementing agencies on a regular basis, helping to mitigate any potential issues with lack of coordination or cooperation and providing ready support as needs arose. In addition, although the project had 3 Task Team Leaders (TTL) over its lifespan, all TTLs were involved in the project team from approval, smoothing handovers.
62. To encourage a wider variety of bids, the World Bank removed requirements for pre- qualification and developed more standardized bidding documents. These steps enabled the project to receive bids substantially lower than expected, freeing up project funds for additional works, such as the Tabora phase 2 or the culvert added to the Arusha-Minjingu road. The project used an International Competitive Bidding process. Before the project, the Tanzania context section of the bidding documents was not standardized, so one aspect was to ensure consistency on that side. In addition, the team worked with the implementing agency/consultants working on the various components to identify best practices and areas where we could align the documents (for instance on assumptions, inclusion of certain clauses, etc.).
Factors outside of the control of government and/or implementing agencies
63. During implementation, the domestic airline industry in Tanzania went through a difficult period, with the National carrier (Air Tanzania) drastically reducing or eliminating flights, including to the project’s airports. This made it increasingly difficult to meet PDO (ii) targets. In addition, the shifting of demand from Kigoma to Entebbe reduced demand on that airport. Finally, the expansion of other modes of transport (roads in particular) has reduced the demand for air transport to some extent.
IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME
A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)
M&E Design 64. Although PDO indicators were established to track progress against each of the PDOs, and all components were associated with at least one intermediate indicator, the project’s M&E design was generally insufficient to monitor and assess the project. PDO indicators suffered from either poor attribution to
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the project or an inability to be assessed during implementation, eliminating their use as a feedback mechanism to implementation.
65. Indicators with poor attribution included the “share of classified road network in good or fair condition” and the “passenger traffic at selected airports”, both of which rely only modestly on the project to be achieved. In the case of the road network, the length of the classified road network included in the PDO (more than 80,000 km) was highly mismatched with the PDO itself (assessing the approximately 6,400 km of paved national roads) and the actual works of the project 268 km under Component A and 641 km under Component E). Achievement of project outputs was unlikely to noticeably impact the PDO indicator. It should be noted that this indicator was a Core Sector Indicator at the time, and was included in nearly all World Bank roads projects. To a lesser extent, passenger traffic at the selected airports may also be driven by factors exogenous to the project
66. Vehicle operating costs, included as PDO indicators to assess progress against PDO (ii), were only calculated at project design and during ICR preparation. As such, while they may give some sense of achievement of outcomes, they were unavailable to inform the project during development. In addition, this indicator also relies as much or more on factors outside of the project (such as fuel costs, fleet makeup and age, tire wear, etc.) as it does road condition.
67. Intermediate indicators primarily served as a checklist for project implementation. Most intermediate indicators were structured as “yes or no” questions, or as a simple tally of road kilometers completed. In the case of the PPP component, the associated intermediate indicator was poorly matched to the scope of the works. Due to Tanzania’s nascent PPP market and the relatively small size of the component, establishing the indicator of number of transactions to reach bidding stage was overly ambitious, and provided some incentive to try to bypass the very necessary steps of capacity building to move on to transaction identification and bidding.
M&E Implementation 68. TANROADS was responsible for collecting and aggregating Results Framework data for the project. It provided biannual updates through the implementation of the project, reporting on project works and indicator status. This arrangement worked well, with data collected from TAA, MoWTC, and GoZ and provided in aggregate to the World Bank team.
69. As described in Section II.B, the “share of classified road network in good or fair condition” indicator was not monitored consistently throughout implementation. Initially conceived as the share of the total classified road network in good or fair condition (over 80 thousand km), baselines and targets reflected this definition. However, early in implementation the definition was informally changed, with reported condition data reflecting only the national and regional roads (approximately 30 thousand km). While the change was made throughout the TSIP program, to address a challenge with unreliable data for local roads, it was never officially changed in TSSP reporting. This change in the definition is solely responsible for the rapid increase in reported data, and invalidates indicator results.
70. Other indicators suffered from minor shortcomings. For instance, the additional PDO indicator on Zanzibar airport traffic was not fully incorporated into project reporting until most works had already been completed, with the baseline data repeated as the current value from additional financing approval in 2011
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through 2016 when updated data was included. In addition, the airport traffic indicators were depressed due to construction (especially in Tabora), which makes it difficult to realistically assess future traffic numbers at the time of the ICR.
71. The M&E was not adjusted during the life of the project, despite an additional financing and several restructurings. Although the additional financing was approved early in the project’s life, and so may have been too early to identify and address failures in the M&E framework, the Mid Term Review and two restructurings all provided potential openings to strengthen the results framework.
M&E Utilization 72. The project’s results framework was used as a checklist during implementation, allowing the project team and implementing agency a way to formally track progress of outputs. The project’s M&E was otherwise not used to inform or course-correct its implementation. Furthermore, the project’s M&E relied on data already incorporated into TANROADS and TAA’s regular reporting, and had no impact on either of these institutions M&E systems going forward.
Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E 73. The project’s M&E is rated as modest. Although data was collected on a regular basis, and provided some use in tracking the project’s progress and as a source of information for preparation of the ICR, it had severe shortcomings, including design (mismatched indicators, PDOs, and components), implementation (unreliably monitored road condition), and utilization. Overall, while it did provide a measure of outputs, the M&E did not provide a clear metric to assess the project’s outcomes and achievements.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE
74. The project’s environmental management was satisfactory. The project was rated with an Environmental Assessment category of B. All sub-projects under Components A and B (those including major civil works) were subjected to Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs), which concluded that all potential impacts could be mitigated through implementation of Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs), which were generally adhered to during project implementation. Deficiencies detected during implementation were addressed. TAA developed and adopted in November 2015 an “Environmental Management Manual” that provides guidelines on how to comply with international environmental management and occupational health and safety standards. This manual gives clear instructions on implementation of best practices on environmental management aspects and has helped TAA to assume its responsibility under the ESMPs. At project closure, the only environmental measure still to be completed was verification that all asbestos has been removed from the site of the former Tumaini primary school. While all visible materials had been removed, final verification through soil testing had not yet been completed.
75. The project’s social safeguard management was satisfactory. As described above, relevant major civil works were subjected to ESIA and addressed through ESMP. The implementing agencies substantially addressed social safeguards issues under the project. Some key factors included:
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• The project required resettlement under Component B. Under the airport component, RAPs were prepared for all airports, although no resettlement was required at Tabora and Kigoma. In Bukoba, five resettlement cases remained pending at project closure. Four of the cases were pending court deliberations, with the fifth resolved through the project’s Grievances Redress Mechanism with payment of the entitlement agreed and pending from TAA. TAA agreed to continue submitting project progress reports to the Bank until the remaining cases are resolved. Resettlement was also required at the Zanzibar airport, and successfully completed.
• Under component A, the road lengths were completed within existing alignments and no resettlement determined to be required. As resettlement would have been required for the short segment of the Arusha-Minjingo road within Arusha town (approx. 7 km), during project preparation it was decided to exclude these kilometers from civil works, although detailed designs were completed for future rehabilitation. During implementation, a request for relocation was received from several families living near an existing quarry utilized by the Arusha-Minjingo contractor. Their request was fulfilled and they successfully relocated.
• Construction of a new primary school was required at the Bukoba airport. During implementation, it was determined that the Tumaini Primary School was located within the flight path of the extended runway. A public primary school, Tumaini serves students from the area around the airport, including Figure 7: TSSP Project Team, TAA representatives, hosting a unit serving more than 50 and School Officials at the new Tumaini Primary School disabled children. When the risk was identified, the airport was put under a flight restrictions, with operations only allowed in the opposite direction of the school. To address this concern it was determined that the school would have to be relocated. Empty land was contributed by the local government and a new school buildings were constructed. Both students of the former school and new students began attending classes in the new location. Although there were some students whose commute was made more challenging, the move was largely successful. TAA and the Bukoba airport management have committed to continue supporting the school going forward.
• HIV/AIDS prevention measures were put in place in project areas. With the influx of people during civil works, there is always a risk of HIV/AIDS infections. To prevent such issues, construction companies were required (and successfully implemented) education and sensitization plans, including voluntary testing, in collaboration with district health officers.
• During preparation, it was determined that the project triggered the cultural property safeguards policy (OP 4.11). To address this concern, the project was expected to secure the services of an archeologist to assess any chance finds. While no archeologist was secured, as
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very little undisturbed land was utilized, no chance finds were identified during construction. At the Zanzibar airport expansion of the taxiway necessitated relocation of a cemetery. This was satisfactorily achieved.
76. The project’s financial management was satisfactory. During preparation, TANROADS was identified as the agency best placed to handle all fiduciary responsibilities for the project. A World Bank financial management specialist based in the Tanzania country office supported the project through implementation. Reporting was provided on a timely basis and all audits were unqualified.
77. The project’s procurement performance was satisfactory. As institutional capacity was identified during preparation as a potential risk to implementation, the project required the hiring of three additional procurement staff within TANROADS. In addition, as the roads sector in Tanzania had been plagued with higher than expected bids, the team developed standardized bidding documents and waived requirements for pre-qualification, expanding the pool of potential contractors and leading to bids significantly lower than expected in many cases.
C. BANK PERFORMANCE
Quality at Entry 78. TSSP was prepared as part of the much larger TSIP, necessitating a wide view of the country’s transport needs and engagement of many stakeholders. As part of this larger program, TSSP was strategically aligned with the country’s development strategy. In addition, the inclusion of studies and capacity building for all transport modes under Component D (such as the rail study, civil aviation master plan, dry port feasibility study, toll-road development, etc.) provided for the success of the wider program.
79. As described under Section III.A, the project leveraged various agencies and Ministries from across the GoT. This necessitated effective engagement and trust development with a variety of stakeholders during preparation, establishing a strong implementation framework for the project.
80. The project suffered from a number of technical oversights during preparation. As described in Section III.A, these led to delays in implementation and additional costs in some components. In addition, the poor quality of the M&E framework created a challenge for the project throughout its life (and made the preparation of an ICR more difficult and costly).
Quality of Supervision 81. The project team should be commended for great flexibility in its supervision, allowing the project to overcome some challenges inherited from preparation and adapt to the changing reality. Very few aspects of the project occurred as initially planned, with additional subcomponents included throughout as needs and resources were identified. Design and construction of the school in Bukoba highlights the flexible and careful approach to supervision. As described in Section III.A, the Bank team being based in Dar es Salaam allowed a close working relationship with the implementing agency, and rapid response to evolving challenges. In addition, reflecting the flexible approach, during the project’s grace period after closure the World Bank
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lowered the minimum disbursement amount, from US$ 200,000 to US$ 40,000 to enable direct payments to various service providers.
82. Project documentation was filed appropriately, with ISRs and a Mid-Term Review completed as expected. Issues identified in the Mid-Term Review appear to be those most relevant to successfully achieving the project. ISR ratings appear to well reflect project status over time, and risks to development outcomes were identified and addressed.
83. The M&E remained poor throughout the life of the project. As outlined in the M&E section above, the M&E could have potentially been improved at several stages of implementation, including the additional financing, two restructurings or the Mid-Term Review.
84. The World Bank’s transport team in Tanzania has established a broad engagement in the sector, effectively leveraging ongoing projects to lay the groundwork for future, related, engagements. This was exemplified by the decision to overlap the TSSP ICR mission with the project identification mission for a potential follow-on effort, incorporating lessons from TSSP directly. Furthermore, TSSP was based around designs prepared under other earlier projects, and it in turn has laid the foundation for its successors. This approach to design and implementation has created a robust, holistic, and integrated sectoral engagement.
Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance 85. The overall Bank performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. Although there were significant issues with preparation of the project, the team’s flexible implementation approach enabled such challenges to be overcome during supervision.
D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME
86. There remain some risks to the project’s outcomes. As the project is integrated into the broader TSIP program, is in line with GoT investment plans going forward, and is supported by a well- coordinated group of development partners, there a high likelihood of continued expansion on the goals of the project.
87. Continued achievement of PDOs (i) and (ii) are ensured by Tanzania’s Road Fund. Established by Parliament, the Road Fund provides stable revenue, collected from fuel levies and other road user fees, to ensure sustainable maintenance of the road network. With revenues increasing year over year for a 2016/2017 fiscal year total of nearly US$350 million11, the Fund is well placed to maintain the country’s growing paved road network. This is reflective of a general approach which has been adopted, of maintaining those roads already improved before continuing expansion of the network. Although
11 Tanzania Roads Fund, Roads Tolls Collections for the Period July 2016 - June 2017
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priorities may change in the future, the GoT has shown sustained commitment to ensuring its roads are maintained.
88. Risk to the capacity of the supported airports is driven by a lack of clarity in responsibility and resources for maintenance. All four airports supported by the project are expected to see increasing demand going forward. The Civil Aviation Master Plan’s outlook on growth suggests that the Tanzanian aviation sector will continue to expand, as improvements in infrastructure unlock tourist traffic and economic growth and rising incomes enable an increasing share of the population to afford air travel. Both factors are reinforced by the country’s competitive and growing low cost carrier industry. The key risk to continued success is a lack of clarity on responsibility and resources for maintenance. At project closure, a decision had been made to move responsibility for construction of mainland airports from TAA to TANROADS. The agencies were in the process of determining which would have the responsibility for future maintenance, but no final decision had been made at the time of the ICR. Furthermore, maintenance budgets are not guaranteed, and proper resources may not be available to maintain the infrastructure. Although aviation generally generates revenue, Tanzania does not have a set percentage to be retained by the airports for operations and maintenance, with airport budgets allocated from a central account based on annual requests. In Zanzibar, a percentage is retained for maintenance, but it is insufficient to meet maintenance needs. Without such a dedicated maintenance structure (like the Road Fund in the road sector) maintenance needs may not be met, threatening the airports’ capacity over the long term.
V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
89. The following lessons learned and recommendations from the project are intended in inform future World Bank Group operations:
90. Institution Building:
• Ensuring implementing agencies have strong contract management capacity can help prevent minor issues from arising, or more rapidly address them once they appear. At the Bank’s suggestion, TANROADS hired a contract management specialist to monitor the project’s contractors. Prior to bringing the specialist on, several minor issues had led to delays and additional costs within Component A. Implementation proceeded much more smoothly afterwards. Building this capacity has transferred to other projects as well.
• Establishing standardized bidding processes and removing requirements for pre- qualification can create a more competitive bidding process and result in lower costs. Earlier World Bank transport projects in Tanzania had suffered from increasingly high bids for civil works, to the extent of the Bank canceling bidding processes. By streamlining the bidding documents and standardizing relevant sections, as well as opening up bidding from pre- qualification, the number of bidders was greatly increased, with bids received from contractors from a wide range of countries. The increased competition drives down the costs
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of received bids. The project could address a much wider range of challenges due to the funds made available by the lower bids.
91. Project Design:
• Airport projects should be built on a well-designed airport master plan to ensure all components are well integrated. The decision to initiate phase 2 of the Tabora airport was recognition that the initial investment could not be fully leveraged without additional works. In Zanzibar, while the TSSP works addressed severe bottlenecks, poor integration with a separate project being financed by the China Exim Bank may prevent the best possible outcome for both investments in the future. In Bukoba, better planning could have identified the need to relocate the primary school. In addition, security fencing was not included in the original designs of the regional airport, but during implementation it was determined that residents of the local areas were crossing through the airport area, risking harm. Fencing was included as part of the revisions.
• Road safety should be fully integrated into road projects to avoid treating it as an afterthought. During the remediation activities along Lot 1 of the Korogwe-Same road (see section III.B for more information) the road safety measures were removed from this part of the project’s road works. As safety was not identified as a key objective of the project, and the safety of the road lengths was not monitored under the project, there was little incentive for the contractor to retain these measures. Furthermore, identification of safety as a priority during road design and identifying pedestrians as road users equal to those in vehicles may have encouraged road designs to incorporate footpaths or wider shoulders in areas with settlement. As these sorts of road safety works have been more frequently included in recent World Bank road projects, additional attention should be given to older, legacy projects under supervision. Political will was also lagging to pass the necessary legislation for creation of a NRSA and DVELA.
• Consultations with those living in the area around an intervention can be vital, both during preparation and supervision. The Arusha-Minjingu road runs through an area frequently used by nomadic Maasai herdsmen. As the road had the potential to impact their animal’s ability to move between grazing areas, the contractor did significant consultations and provided signage and earthworks in identified areas to improve the safety and ease of herds crossing the road. In Bukoba and Tabora, the airport works blocked walking paths traditionally used by local residents. To ease their travel, and prevent the safety risk of their incursion into the airports, the impacted residents were involved in planning an alternate path to be constructed by the project. In both cases, users expressed appreciation for the new routes.
• Monitoring and evaluation design should be directly linked to the project’s theory of change. Although the project’s theory of change logically flows from activities to outputs to outcomes, its indicators did not measure aspects strongly tied to project achievement. For instance, in the aviation sector, if improved airport capacity is the targeted outcome PDO indicators should be selected which measure capacity (such as ICAO Aerodrome Reference
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Codes where available, or maximum throughput of the airport). Projects should select indicators which are “SMART”, meaning they are Specific, Measurable, Attributable, Realistic, and Time-Bound. The TSSP project, for instance, would have benefited from indicators which were more specific (specifically measuring the PDOs), attributable (measuring something the project could actually impact), and timebound (with data available during implementation to guide supervision and results fully available by project closure, in the case of the airport traffic).12
92. Strategic Engagement:
• Including preparatory works for future projects can help build a strong and lasting engagement in a sector. TSSP was based on design works largely done under earlier projects. Furthermore, the Zanzibar additional financing component was only feasibly developed and approved under such a tight timetable because nearly all of the preparation had already been done for an earlier engagement. Looking forward, TSSP has continued this strategy, with designs for 918 km of additional roads prepared under Component A, and studies done for prioritization of future airport investments under Component B. Finally, the Tanzania transport team used the ICR mission to also begin discussions of follow-on projects, using the lessons of TSSP to inform the next engagements. This sustained engagement not only helps engender additional projects, but contributes to sustaining capacity development endeavors and the success of subsequent operations’ implementation.
. .
12 For more information, see World Bank, OPCS, Results Framework and M&E Guidance Note.
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ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS
A. RESULTS INDICATORS
A.1 PDO Indicators
Objective/Outcome: To improve the condition of the national paved road network Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Roads in good and fair Percentage 66.00 70.00 86.00 condition as a share of total classified roads 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 02-Jan-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Unclear. Inconsistency in how the indicator was measured makes it difficult to assess actual achievement of the indicator.
Objective/Outcome: To lower transport cost on selected roads and to Songo Songo Island Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Average vehicle operating Amount(USD) 0.45 0.25 0.27 costs on (b) Arusha - Minjingu Roads 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 01-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. VOC were recalculated using updated road and traffic information at project closure. The result was in line with the original target and represents a dramatic reduction from the baseline.
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Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Average vehicle operating Amount(USD) 0.34 0.23 0.22 costs on (a) Korogwe-Same 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 01-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. VOC were recalculated using updated road and traffic information at project closure. The result was in line with the original target and represents a dramatic reduction from the baseline.
Objective/Outcome: To expand the capacity of selected airports Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Passenger Volume at airports Number 78399.00 104000.00 764000.00 1026329.00
30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 06-Jun-2011 02-Jan-2017
- Bukoba Airport Number 26628.00 34000.00 33138.00
30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 02-Jan-2017
- Kigoma Airport Number 28859.00 40000.00 29781.00
30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 02-Jan-2017
- Tabora Airport Number 22912.00 30000.00 16505.00
30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 02-Jan-2017
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Annual passenger volume at Number 500000.00 660000.00 946905.00 Zanzibar airport 01-May-2011 06-Jun-2011 02-Jan-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. Although only the Zanzibar airport surpassed the targeted passenger volume, in aggregate the airport component achieved its goals. Although annual data is only available for 2016, preliminary 2017 data indicates that Bukoba will also well exceed passenger targets.
Unlinked Indicators Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Direct project beneficiaries Number 0.00 5150000.00 5700000.00 6000000.00
31-Mar-2009 31-Mar-2009 06-Jun-2011 28-Feb-2017
Female beneficiaries Percentage 0.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
31-Mar-2009 31-Mar-2009 06-Jun-2011 28-Feb-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. The number of beneficiaries was assumed based on the estimated number of users of the transport facilities. Its achievement is assumed based on the completion of all civil works.
A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators
Component: Component A: Rehabilitation of paved trunk roads
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion
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Design and bidding Kilometers 0.00 911.00 918.00 documents for rehabilitation prepared 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015
Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. All designs and bidding documents were developed as planned.
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Roads rehabilitated, Non- Kilometers 0.00 270.00 268.40 rural 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 29-Jan-2016
Korogwe-Same Road Kilometers 0.00 172.00 172.00
30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 02-Jan-2017
Arusha-Minjingu Road Kilometers 0.00 98.00 96.40
30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 02-Jan-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. All roads were completed as intended.
Component: Component B: Improvement of airports
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion
Three Regional airport Yes/No N Y Y
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Runways paved and Zanzibar 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2014 airport taxiways and apron improved
Bukoba Runway paved, Yes/No N Y Y terminal building, access road and car parking 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015 constructed
Kigoma Runway paved Yes/No N Y Y
30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2014
Tabora Runway paved Yes/No N Y Y
30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2014
Zanzibar taxiways and Yes/No N Y Y apron rehabilitated and extended 01-May-2011 11-May-2011 14-Dec-2014
Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. All planned works were completed within the project, as well as additional works determined necessary during the project's implementation.
Component: Component C: Improvement of road safety
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion
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Road Accident Information Yes/No N Y Y System established and operational 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 31-Dec-2014
Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. the RAIS was established, police were trained in its use, and was operating at the time of project closure.
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Driver and Vehicle Yes/No N Y N Examination and Licencing Agency (DVELA) established 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 20-Jun-2017 and operational
Comments (achievements against targets): Not Achieved. The DVELA was not established due to the lack of passage of the requisite Road Safety Act by Parliament.
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion National Road Saftey Agency Yes/No N Y N (NRSA) established and operational 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2016
Comments (achievements against targets): Not Achieved. The NRSA was not established due to the lack of passage of the requisite Road Safety Act by Parliament.
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Component: Component D: Promotion of public-private partnerships
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Transport Sector PPP Number 0.00 2.00 1.00 transactions which have reaqched bidding stage 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 20-Jun-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Partially achieved. As of project closure, one transaction had reached bidding, the Dar es Salaam to Chalinze Toll-Road. While other transactions have had preliminary work done, they have not yet reached bidding.
Component: Component E: Emergency road and bridge repair
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion National Road/Bridge Number 0.00 100.00 109.00 sections improved 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015
Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. These emergency works were completed within the first year of the project.
Component: Component F: Songo Songo Island jetty
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Songosongo jetty Yes/No N Y Y
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rehabilitated 01-May-2011 01-May-2011 30-Jun-2016
Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. The jetty was rehabilitated as planned and is providing service to the residents of the island.
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B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT
Objective/Outcome 1: To improve the condition of the national paved road network 1. Roads in good and fair condition as a share of total classified roads Outcome Indicators (%) 1. Design and bidding documents for rehabilitation prepared (#) 2. Roads rehabilitated (km) 3. National Road/Bridge Sections Improved (#) 4. Road Accident Information System established and operational (Y/N) Intermediate Results Indicators 5. Driver and Vehicle Examination and Licensing Agency (DVELA) established and operational (Y/N) 6. National Road Safety Agency (NRSA) established and operational (Y/N) 7. Transport Sector PPP transactions which have reached bidding stage (#) 1. Component A. Rehabilitation and Preparation of Designs for Rehabilitation of Paved Trunk Roads. -Rehabilitation/upgrade of the Korogwe-Same Road (172 km) -Rehabilitation of the Arusha-Minjingu Raod (98 km) -Preparation of Detailed Design and Bidding Documents for the Rehabilitation of about 911 km of Paved Trunk Roads Key Outputs by Component 2. Component E. Emergency Road and Bridge Repair (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1) -repair of roads and bridges at more than 100 locations 3. Component D. Promotion of Public Private Partnerships -Dar es Salaam Chalinze Toll Road feasibility study and bidding 4. Component C. Improvement of Road Safety -Establishment of NRSA -Establishment of DVELA
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-Creation and operationalization of RAIS
Objective/Outcome 2: To lower transport cost on selected roads and to Songo Songo Island
1. Average vehicle operating costs on (b) Arusha - Minjingu Roads Outcome Indicators 2. Average vehicle operating costs on (a) Korogwe-Same 1. Roads rehabilitated (km) Intermediate Results Indicators 2. National Road/Bridge Sections Improved (#) 3. Songo Songo Island rehabilitated (Y/N) 1. Component A. Rehabilitation and Preparation of Designs for Rehabilitation of Paved Trunk Roads. Key Outputs by Component -Rehabilitation/upgrade of the Korogwe-Same Road (172 km) (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2) -Rehabilitation of the Arusha-Minjingu Raod (98 km) 2. Component F. Songo Songo Island Jetty
Objective/Outcome 3: To expand the capacity of selected airports
1. Passenger volume at airports -Bukoba Airport Outcome Indicators -Kigoma Airport -Tabora Airport -Zanzibar International Airport 1. Three Regional Airport Runways paved and Zanzibar airport Intermediate Results Indicators taxiways and apron improved (Y/N) 1. Component B: Improvement of Airports Key Outputs by Component -Bukoba: paving and extension of runway, taxiway, and apron; (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2) construction of a new terminal building -Tabora: Paving and extension of main and secondary runway and
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apron; installation of AGL and DVOR -Kigoma: Paving of runway -Zanzibar: Paving of taxiways and apron, purchase of fire tenders and maintenance tractors
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ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION
A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS
Name Role Preparation Dieter Schelling Task Team Leader Gisbert Joseph Kinyero Procurement Specialist Naima Hasci, Godfrey Kamukala, Helen Shahriari Social Safeguards Specialists Theonestina Kaiza-Boshe Environmental Safeguards Specialist Bella Diallo, Luis Schwarz Financial Management Specialists Philip Beauregard Councel Felly Kaboyo Team Member Fang Xu Team Member Yonas Eliesikia Mchomvu Team Member Grace Mayala Team Member Nina Jones Team Member
Supervision/ICR Yonas Eliesikia Mchomvu Task Team Leader Negede Lewi Task Team Leader Gisbert Joseph Kinyero, Wangwe Magige Mwita Procurement Specialists Michael Eriu Okuny, Mercy Mataro Sabai Financial Management Specialist Mary C.K. Bitekerezo Social Safeguards Specialist Shri Vasantt Kumar Jogoo Environmental Safeguards Specialist Jane A. N. Kibbassa Social Safeguards Specialist Faith-Lucy Matumbo Team Member Julie Rieger, Philip Beauregard Counsel Judith Elimhoo Mziray Team Member Allen David Natai Team Member
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Grace Mayala Team Member Alexander Birikorang Team Member Adam Stone Diehl ICR Author
B. STAFF TIME AND COST
Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs) Preparation FY05 36.170 303,354.59 FY06 30.563 204,342.05 FY07 23.117 113,263.65 FY08 36.341 202,717.35 FY09 47.837 264,359.78 FY10 42.734 233,932.75 FY11 0 0.00
Total 216.76 1,321,970.17
Supervision/ICR FY10 0 8,780.69 FY11 28.725 119,497.76 FY12 29.605 118,293.65 FY13 26.330 115,764.03 FY14 22.425 124,193.03 FY15 23.525 98,474.91 FY16 19.290 83,517.14 FY17 18.544 101,982.55 FY18 6.400 52,773.05 Total 174.84 823,276.81
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ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT
Amount at Approval Actual at Project Percentage of Approval Components (US$M) Closing (US$M) (US$M) A - Rehabilitation and Preparation of Designs for 186.5 191.7 103% Rehabilitation of Paved Trunk Roads B - Improvement of Regional 69.2 56.5 82% Airports C - Improvement of Road 6.0 4.6 77% Safety Management D - Promotion of Public 5.0 3.4 68% Private Partnerships E - Emergency Road and 15.0 13.9 93% Bridge Repair F - Rehabilitation of the Songo Songo Island jetty. 2.0 2.2 110% (New component added) - Addtional financing B2: Rehabilitation and extension of Zanzibar airport taxiways and apron. (Scale up 57.0 50.7 89% of the airport component) - Addtional financing Total 340.7 325.0 95%
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ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
Background
1. To improve the condition of the national paved road network and to expand the capacity of selected regional airports, the project included two types of large investment components: (i) Rehabilitation of two trunk roads (172 km from Korogwe to Same, and 98 km from Arusha to Minjingu), and (ii) Rehabilitation of three regional airports at Bukoba, Kigoma and Tabora, and one international airport at Zanzibar. The rehabilitation and expansion of Zanzibar Airport was added by the additional financing approved in 2011.
2. The current ex post analysis is focused on the road rehabilitation component and the three regional airport rehabilitation works, for which necessary data that are needed for evaluation are available. These road and airport investments amounted to about US$292 million and accounted for 73 percent of the actual total project expenditure.
Road rehabilitation component
3. For the road component, HDM4 was used at appraisal. The model computes the expected road user cost savings because of road improvement by the investment. With investment costs, traffic data and vehicle operating costs updated, the model was rerun separately for Korogwe– Mkumbara–Same and Arusha–Minjingu Road.
4. Investment costs. Based on the HDM analysis comparing different investment options, the Project adopted a road standard of 50 millimeter AC surfacing for 6.5 meter carriageway with 1.5 meter DBST shoulders. For Arusha–Minjingu Road, reprocessing of the existing base course and strengthening by new crushed stone base were also included. The works costs were initially estimated at US$81 million for Korogwe–Same and US$47 million for Arusha– Minjingu Road. The actual costs turned out higher than estimated: US$119 million and US$58 million, 47 percent and 22 percent cost overruns, respectively.
5. Traffic. The actual traffic is consistent with or greater than expected. The annual average daily traffic on Korogwe–Same increased by 37 percent, from 1,332 in 2009 to 1,826 in 2017. The Arusha–Minjingu experienced a much more significant increase in traffic, 1,300 to 3,261 vehicles per day.
Table 1. Traffic along the project roads: Before and after the project Korogwe - Same Arusha - Minjingu 2009 2017 2008 2017 Cars 182 263 88 413 Pickups 270 390 588 1049 Minibus 158 74 178 832 Large bus 61 106 71 199
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Small truck 166 89 66 138 Medium truck 65 105 135 120 Heavy truck 211 73 55 80 Truck trailer 219 215 89 108 Subtotal 1,332 1,315 1,270 2,939 Motorcycle 0 511 30 322 Total 1,332 1,826 1,300 3,261
6. Vehicle operating cost parameters. In addition to the traffic data, the underlying fleet characteristics and vehicle operating unit costs were also updated. The underlying data are slightly different but practically the same between the two road sections.
Table 2. Fleet characteristics: Korogwe–Same Large Small Medium Heavy Truck Cars Pickups Minibus bus truck truck truck trailer Passenger car space equivalent 1 1 1.2 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.8 No. of wheels 4 4 4 6 4 6 10 18 No. of axles 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 Annual operating length (km) 25000 50000 30000 120000 60000 100000 120000 120000 Working hours 590 1600 1050 2720 1800 3260 3660 3660 Average life (years) 13 15 15 15 12 15 15 15 Private use (%) 50 50 10 0 50 0 0 0 No. of passengers 4 4 15 50 1 1 1 1 Work related trip (%) 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Table 3. Economic unit costs: Korogwe – Same Large Small Medium Heavy Truck Cars Pickups Minibus bus truck truck truck trailer New vehicle 18360 17200 24000 114660 15900 55900 84900 121390 Replacement tire 68 125 125 316 154 250 316 359 Fuel (per liter) 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.74 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 Lubricating oil (per liter) 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 Maintenance labor (per hour) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Crew wages (per hour) 0.5 0.5 0.95 1.6 0.95 0.95 1.1 1.6 Annual overhead cost 450 470 580 2840 520 1720 2780 3260 Annual interest (%) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 Time value (per hour): Passenger 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 Non-working passenger 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 Cargo 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
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7. Results. The HDM4 was rerun separately for the two road sections, based on the above data, while keeping the other assumptions the same as the appraisal. Both road investments are found to be economically viable, given the actual costs and current traffic trend. The rate of return for the Korogwe–Same section is estimated at 17.1 percent, slightly lower than the IRR at appraisal. While the traffic is generally consistent with the projection, the rehabilitation work costs increased by nearly 50 percent, which reduced efficiency in investment. For Arusha – Minjingu Road, the IRR is estimated at 16.3, higher than the estimate at appraisal. The rehabilitation costs increased by 22 percent, but the traffic also increased substantially along this road. Assuming that the traffic would continue increasing steadily, the investment is economically justifiable.
Table 4. Summary of economic analysis: Road component Length Traffic 1/ Investment ($ mil) IRR (%) NPV ($ mil) (km) 2009 2017 Appraisal Ex post Appraisal Ex post Appraisal Ex post Korogwe - Same Korogwe - Mkumbara 76 37.8 61.7 19.0 19.5 1,332 1,826 17.1 27.98 Mkumbara - Same 96 43.0 57.6 19.9 27.7 Arusha - Minjingu 98 1,300 3,261 47.2 57.7 15.2 16.3 21.5 12.80 1/ Traffic varies from section to section. The AADT on Korogwe-Same Road was 920 to 1,756 vehicles before the project. For Arusha Minjingu, it varied from 700 to over 14,000 vehicles.
Airport rehabilitation component
8. For the regional airports, the economic analysis at the appraisal stage was focused on economic values that additional passenger and cargo traffic could bring in. While the details are unclear in PAD, it seems to have assumed that the airports could not have handled any more passengers or cargo without the project. Thus, the project’s benefits primarily stem from the expected growth in airport passengers and cargo. The economic analysis at appraisal took into account the following benefits: (i) spending by additional tourists and business persons, (ii) value added to additional freight cargo, (iii) growth impacts, including new jobs and agricultural production; and (iv) airport service revenue.
9. The current ex post assessment follows the similar approach but ignore one of the above- mentioned factors, i.e., growth impacts, since the underlying assumptions are not clear in PAD. Therefore, technically speaking, the following results are not perfectly comparable to the appraisal assessment but should be considered to be more conservative.
10. Airport traffic. Before the projects, the three airports had experienced 10 to 20 percent traffic growth in air passengers. The appraisal assessment assumed significant and steady growth in both passengers and cargo. For Bukoba Airport, for instance, it was assumed that passengers would increase by 9 percent per annum, tapered off to 4 percent over time. For Kigoma, it was assumed that passengers would initially grow by 40 percent because of the project. The actual traffic growth has been much modest in reality. In addition, the prolonged works on runways and taxiways restricted airport services, which was not taken into account in the economic evaluation
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The World Bank TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )
at the appraisal stage. Particularly for Tabora Airport, this has been significantly impacting passenger and freight traffic.
11. The current ex post assessment reflects the actual passenger and cargo traffic up to 2016. For the remaining period, on the other hand, the traffic growth rates assumed at appraisal are used as they are. Therefore, passenger and cargo traffic is assumed to growth at 3 to 5 percent and 2 percent, respectively. For Tabora, an initial passenger growth of 30 percent is also assumed in 2017, because the rehabilitation work has just been completed. This is consistent with the recent traffic: The traffic at Tabora Airport has been picking up since 2015. The number of passengers increased from 10,100 in 2015 to 16,500 in 2016 and 17,200 (est.) in 2017.
Figure 1. Airport passenger traffic: Actual and forecast at appraisal
12. Economic benefits. To assess the benefits from spending by additional tourists and business persons, the same assumptions are used as the appraisal assessment. Ideally, the passenger composition and the amount of expenditure per person should be updated after the project. Unfortunately, however, such data are not available. In addition, the same benefit from increased cargo traffic is also assumed (i.e., US$18 per ton). For Bukoba Airport, an additional airport revenue of US$12.5 per passenger is assumed. As mentioned above, the growth impacts, including new jobs and additional agricultural production, are not taken into account because of the lack of data.
Table 5. Traveler composition and spending per person Spending (US$ per Traveler category (share) person) Bukoba Kigoma Tabora Bukoba Kigoma Tabora Business 0.40 0.35 0.35 258 258 258 Tourist 0.30 0.35 0.35 707 707 707 Visiting relatives 0.03 0.01 0.02 430 430 430 Government 0.22 0.29 0.22 0 0 0 Other 0.05 0.00 0.06 0 0 0
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The World Bank TRANSPORT SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT ( P055120 )
13. Results. The summary of the results is shown in the table. At appraisal, the IRR were estimated at 15 percent for Bukoba, 23 percent for Kigoma and 15 percent for Tabora Airport, respectively. Given the current traffic and actual project costs, the ex post IRR for Bukoba is estimated higher at 18.3 percent. This is because of its relatively strong growth of traffic and slightly lower costs. Assuming that the future traffic would continue growing, the investment is considered to be economically justifiable.
14. For Kigoma, the ex post IRR is estimated at 8.5 percent. This is largely because the actual costs turned out substantially lower than expected, despite the fact that the current traffic remains modest. It is below the traditional 12 percent threshold but exceeds the Bank’s new norm, i.e., 6 percent. For Tabora, the IRR is estimated to be negative. It is too early to assess its project viability: The rehabilitation work has just been completed. However, the current traffic is significantly lower than expected. Note that in the current assessment, it is assumed that the traffic would increase by 30 percent, as assumed at appraisal. In addition, the actual costs were lower than planned. Economic viability of the investment in Tabora Airport is crucially dependent on the future growth of airport traffic in the next couple of years.
Table 6. Summary of economic analysis: Regional airports Passenger traffic Investment cost ($ mil) IRR (%) NPV ($ mil) Ex 2008 2016 Appraisal Ex post Appraisal Ex post Appraisal post Bukoba 23,673 33,138 20.4 19.3 15 18.3 20.6 6.7 Kigoma 28,859 29,781 26.7 11.8 23 8.5 42.1 -4.2 Tabora 22,912 16,505 19.1 16.6 15 -9.6 22.2 -24.9
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ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS
Borrower Comments:
1. The flexibility with which the Bank exercised in the implementation of TSSP has made it possible to disburse all the funds allocated. For instant, it was possible, during the grace period of closure of the project, to change the minimum withdraw application from US$ 200,000.00 to US$ 40,000. this enabled direct payments to various services providers whom could not be possible to make payment to them of the approach was not adopted.
2. The decision by WB to extend the closure of the project to June 20, 2017 is commendable because this has enable to spend, the money that otherwise would not have spent. construction of Kisongo Box culvert and rehabilitation of second runway are example of the activities that benefited from the Bank's decision.
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ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY)
10 Year Transport Sector Investment Programme (TSIP), Phase I 2007/08 – 2011/12. United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Infrastructure Development.
Aide Memoires, Implementation Status reports (ISRs), and project documents for the Tanzania Transport Sector Support Project (P055120), World Bank.
The Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 14. International Civil Aviation Organization.
Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the United Republic of Tanzania for the Period of FY12-FY15, World Bank.
Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) for Investment Project Financing (IPF) Operations, World Bank Guidance, Catalogue Number OPS5.03-GUID.140. Issued July 5, 2017.
Key Implementation Challenges for the World Bank Financed Projects. Tanzania National Roads Agency. September 2016
Mid-Term Review, Tanzania Transport Sector Support Project (P055120), World Bank.
National Five Year Development Plan 2016/17 – 2020/21. United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Finance and Planning.
National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MUKUKUTA), United Republic of Tanzania Vice President’s Office, June 2005
National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty II, United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, July 2010.
Project Appraisal Document, Tanzania Transport Sector Support Project (P055120), Report No: 53152. World Bank.
Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Credit, Tanzania Transport Sector Support Project (P055120), World Bank. Report No: 60183-TZ
Restructuring Paper, Tanzania Transport Sector Support Project (P055120), World Bank. Report No: RES15765. April 18, 2015
Results Framework and M&E Guidance Note, World Bank. OPSPQ. 2014
Roads Tolls Collections for the Period July 2016 - June 2017, Tanzania Roads Fund.
Tanzania Development Vision 2025, United Republic of Tanzania Planning Commission
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Transport Sector Support Project Civil Aviation Master Plan, United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Transport, April 2015
United Republic of Tanzania Systematic Country Diagnostic. World Bank. February 23, 2017.
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