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Xenophobia in Post-Soviet Russia

Anna Sevortian1

The phenomenon of Post-Soviet xenopho- lifestyles, is becoming increasingly visible bia in its various manifestations has been around the world and Russia is no exception. consistently observed by independent think Most regions in Russia have observed a rise tanks, especially after 2000 when a report in the problem which manifests itself in a by the Moscow Helsinki Group first posed wide range of ways, from “soft” forms includ- this pressing problem to the Russian human ing hate speech and negative behavioural rights community. Russia has experienced patterns to violence. The deteriorating situ- considerable economic and political change ation could have been abated with a timely over the past decade. However, in terms of reaction from both the Russian authorities xenophobia, racism and nationalism the and citizens. In fact the first few years of this country has continued to experience trends “epidemic” were spent unwisely engaging in that were first identified ten years ago. This observations that merely attempted to voice academically ‘innocent’ phrase has in fact the problem. many disturbing consequences, including: growing violence, racial profiling, increasing In the early 2000s, xenophobia was largely nationalism and radicalisation, the major- overlooked and perceived as an understand- ity’s silent support of some very unpleasant able consequence of Russia’s economic and ideas, civic apathy and emasculation of many social transition. The slow but gradual in- democratic mechanisms. crease of xenophobic sentiments was per- ceived as a minor problem when compared These trends and manifestations are by no to other “state emergencies” such as the war means unique and could be compared with in Chechnya and the ongoing economic in- the situation in other countries, including stability. This attitude, together with the rare Russia’s closest neighbours Ukraine and public condemnation of ethnic violence, cre- Kazakhstan. A global outbreak of strong ated a favourable climate for the growth of feelings of national identity as well as geo- wider manifestations of hostility and hatred. political processes has also influenced the situation. Whatever the factors, Russia needs As scholars attempted to establish a correla- a better understanding of the complexities of tion between implicit and explicit xenopho- its xenophobia in order to establish effective bia – or how hate speech and latent xeno- 1.remedies. A Steady Rise phobia affect more violent manifestations of hatred – the number of attacks grew steadily. These attacks were most often targeted at “immigrants” who were visually different or, Xenophobia, which has been linked to eco- according to law enforcement agencies and nomic challenges, the intensification of the press, “non-Slavic” in appearance. While migration flows and new identities and many “non-Slavs” could have been Russian

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citizens due to the heterogeneous nature of The most conservative estimate of “extremist the Russian state, the message of xenophobia crime” during 2008 has been carried out by was clear and targeted “immigrants” from the SOVA Center, an independent think tank the Caucasus, Central Asia, and China. that has undertaken the most consistent re- search on this issue. This research suggests Several years of aggravated violence, coupled that in 2008 there have been no less than with internet-based and other activities by 525 victims of racist and xenophobic vio- overtly far-right groups, eventually raised lence, 97 of whom have died. It also reveals the status of this issue so that it could no lon- that the majority3 of the offences were being ger be ignored. After several murders of stu- committed in the Moscow and Saint Peters- dents with Asian features on Nevsky Pros- burg regions. pect, the main street in Saint Petersburg, and the unprecedented cruelty of the murder of The Russian NGO community, not surpris- Hursheda Sultanova, a 9-year old Tajik girl in ingly, prefer using other terminology: “hate February 2004, the first official statements crimes”. Their general analysis of this trend on this complex problem were made. Rashid is best summarised in the4 recent shadow re- Nurgaliyev, the acting Interior Minister at port to the UN Committee on the Elimination the time, admitted that “acute manifesta- of Racial Discrimination. Supported by 33 tions of extremism” existed towards visual inNGOs, Russia: this document marks out three main minorities in Russia. Nonetheless, it took facts regarding hate crime and hate speech another year for the government’s approach to change. Racist attacks were framed as “ex- tremist crimes” that constituted a threat to 1. The number of hate crimes has recently Russia’s security, and in 2005 the then Rus- been growing by 20% a year. Hate crimes sian President Vladimir Putin addressed the have become increasingly cruel and often in- issue during his internet-conference session volve weapons and explosives. As a rule, the 2.with Trends Russian and citizens. Statistics organisations instigating this discrimination and violence, act openly and with impunity.

2. The prosecution of hate crimes is on the rise; however, it falls short of what is neces- “Extremist crime” was the term used to ex- sary in view of the scale of hate crimes and press the social concern over xenophobia-re- racist propaganda. lated violence in the national report submit- ted by Russia to the UN Universal Periodic 3. Some officials cooperate with racist organ- Review in 2009. The report officially recogn- isations and/or allow statements which are ises the increase of such crimes and provides overtly intolerant towards particular ethnic some statistics relating to the extent of the groups. For example, propaganda campaigns issue. It demonstrates a steady increase in against opponents on the international arena “extremist crime” in Russia and states that have led to hate speech against some ethnic/ the number of registered extremist acts national minority groups living in Russia. rose from 130 in 2004 to 152, 263 and 356 in 2005, 2006 and2 2007 respectively. In the In a sense, the lag between violent actions first half of 2008 alone, 250 extremist crimes and counter-measures is a result of the initial were registered. inertia in the response to the “xenophobic

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5 challenge”. A recent SOVA report explains The historical perspective is preferred as an that in 2008, across 19 regions of the coun- explanatory tool by some scholars;th and it may try, there had only been 33 successful pros- be true that the deep roots of modern xeno- ecutions for racist violent crimes where hate phobia can be found in 19 century village was recognised as an aggravating motive communal traditions or within the idea of of the offence. Any positive changes in the Soviet collectivism. It is reasonable to recall prosecution of cases of violence are however Soviet concepts such as “internationalism” immediately overshadowed by other facts. and “peoples’ friendship” as well as the sup- SOVA documented racist and neo-Nazi moti- pression of any manifestationglasnost of nationalism vated attacks in 44 regions of Russia. Aside when considering the roots of xenophobia in (fromDvizhenie organised protiv nationalist nelegalnoi groups, immigratsii, such as Russia. The tumultuous years and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration 1989 opened the floor for nationalist discus- sions and then led to the so called “parade of DPNI), the estimated number of active in- sovereignties” of the former USSR republics. formal skinhead movement members is between 10,000 and 20,000, mostly youths From this perspective, the 20 year period in painting racist graffiti and organising attacks which people have had the freedom to open- on minorities. ly express their thoughts for the first time (including nationalistic sentiments) may not These figures were first made public by have been sufficient for the development of Galina Kozhevnikova, SOVA Deputy Director new national identities. This is especially the in February 2009 at the Independent Press case in a country whose vast territory con- Centre in Moscow. It was exactly three weeks tains a great many national identities, such after another press gathering had been held there by the well-known Russian human as Tatar or Bashkir, alongside the Russian rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov. Follow- identity. ing the press conference, while on their way to the underground station, Markelov and To an extent it was predictable that some Novaya Gazeta reporter Anastasia Baburova form of ethnic based nationalism should have were brutally murdered. Ms. Kozhevnikova replaced the composite Soviet identity. The had also received an e-mail threat herself redefining of identity supposes distinguish- one3. Understanding day before her pressthe Roots conference. of ing oneself from “others” through simplistic Xenophobia “us” versus “them” judgements (which is typ- ical for emerging identities). Certainly, while Russia was in transition, the consequences of this process had no chance of being thor- It is not an easy task to single out the domi- oughly reflected upon and analysed. nating factors feeding xenophobia in Rus- sian society. Being a complex and subjective Another common argument in debates about notion, xenophobia is closely linked to the xenophobia in Russia rests on the exter- hardships of economic transition; national- nal challenges the country has faced at the ism in times when the meaning of “nation” economic, political and security levels. The is unclear; the challenges of globalisation in- list of factors which probably added to the cluding unprecedented human mobility; and spread of xenophobic sentiments usually in- history. cludes the economic difficulties of the 1990s

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and the growing economic divide, disintegra- sulted in an increase of court cases concern- tion, tensions and geopolitical reconfigura- ing incitement to hatred and of suspensions tion on Post-Soviet territory, which included of radical newspapers for using hate speech. a wave of labour migration. In the absence of comprehensive policies, many of the conse- Russia’s new President Dmitry Medvedev, at quences of the rapidly changing life in Rus- the Meeting of the Council for Civil Society sia have been imbued with negative, xeno- Institutions and Human Rights on 15 April phobic interpretations. For example, labour 2009, commented on the campaign: migrants are blamed for “stealing” local jobs rather than being recognised for the value “The last problem brought up here is they contribute to society by taking unwant- that of extremism. I feel that we have made ed, unqualified work. Similarly, proponents advances on the subject, because just 10 of this argument have suggested that unprec- years ago, the law enforcement authorities edented terrorist acts in the North Caucasus, were reluctant to deal with it or even discuss Moscow and elsewhere, two wars in Chech- it. Now, they have begun addressing it, and nya and global counter-terrorism rhetoric they have been initiating some criminal7 cas- have made the growth of xenophobia almost es – perhaps not as often as they should, but inevitable. nevertheless, progress has been made.”

Other analysts have tended to emphasise the This progress is indeed important, though it influence of the years of Vladimir Putin’s gov- is controversial from the civic organisations’ ernance and have even charged the authori- perspective. Anti-extremism legislation, the ties with using xenophobia as a tool to unify Law on Combating Extremist Activity, was Russian society. Though such an explanation specially amended to deal with cases of ra- may be too mechanistic, two facts should be cial hatred and violence; however, it is often taken into account when exploring this issue regarded as a double-edged sword. It defines further – the comparatively late acknowl- “extremist activities” broadly and in some edgement of xenophobia as a social problem respects it goes further than the provisions 4.and Can the Xenophobia recent politicisation Be “Managed”? of xenophobia. of the Criminal Code. It permits selective ap- plication and at the same time establishes serious penalties for organisations and me- 6, dia engaging in extremist activities. Human The question we should pose here is wheth- rights monitors have repeatedly expressed er, along with “manageable democracy” their concerns about this legislation’s po- xenophobia in Russia was also considered tential to limit freedom of speech and other “manageable”, especially after ethnically human rights. Alexander Verkhovsky and motivated violence and incitement of racial Galina Kozhevnikova of SOVA believe that hatred has been condemned by top officials? the concept of “counter-extremism” activi- And if so, how has it been “managed” lately? ties has substantively altered the context of counteracting racism and xenophobia: The strategic solution for dealing with xeno- phobia and related xenophobic violence was “It is defined as ‘counteraction to ex- to “re-brand” it as an element of “extremist tremist activities’ and develops exclusively activities”. Governmental authorities initiat- as a fight against ‘extremism’, thus dragging ed a “counter-extremism” campaign that re- the issue into the political domain, leading

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Heil to selective and discretionary application of boulevards in the city centre, some of them law and shifting the focus of preventing and chanting “ Hitler”, “Glory to Russia”, and eliminating discrimination from the pro- raising their hands in the Nazi salute. tection of individual8 rights and dignity to a fight against those whom the state deems its This unexpected first "legally authorised" opponents.” far-right mass event demonstrated the ugly side of modern nationalism in Russia. Foot- The issues of civic freedoms and xenopho- age of the march on TV and coverage in the bia “management” remain at the top of the press were a shocking revelation for many political agenda in connection with another people in Russia. Moscow city authorities resonant topic - non-violent gatherings and were also concerned. The “Russian march” 5.the Xenophobic right to hold Marchesrallies or demonstrations. was banned in 2006 and unauthorised gath- erings and radical actions were blocked by the police. Later marches have been ordered to be held away from the city centre and Since 2004 and until very recently, Russian popular routes and locations. The same tac- politics has been commonly characterised tics are employed by other big Russian cities by a discourse of the growing consolidation where such marches have been increasingly of power, the erosion of democratic institu- common. tions and Russia’s economic and geo-polit- ical resurgence. A general reduction of the Following the ban on the 2006 event in Mos- space for political discussion and criticism cow, the city mayor Yuri Luzhkov commented has been one of the obvious features of this to a TV channel: period. Many NGOs and political parties have been affected along with other institutions. “I made a decision to ban the so- 9 called Russian march. I appreciate that those The 2004 legislation on public meetings, ral- extremists may try and stage something of lies, demonstrations, marches and picketing the kind somewhere else in the city. Howev- introduced more restrictive regulations. In er, we shouldn’t allow this sort of activities to particular, the majority of activities of this do damage to the unity of our society.” kind now require official permission from the authorities complying with a special pro- This position, however, is controversial ac- cedure, and failure to obtain permission ren- cording to human rights organisations. Lud- ders them illegal. The legislation also places mila Alexeeva, Chair of the Moscow Helsinki restrictions on the type of venues in which Group, the oldest human rights institution pubic events can be organised. in the country, stated that banning a public rally is against the law, and the authorities This restrictive legislation, however, has not could only order the organisers to change helped prevent instances of open racism, the venue. She raised this issue at the recent the most notable of which was the “Russian meeting with President Dmitry Medvedev march”, which took place on 4 November who admitted that “naturally, the authorities 2005, the Day of National Unity (a new Rus- never want to allow these kinds of events sian public holiday which replaced the Oc- and their decisions10 are partially understand- tober Revolution Day). That day, over 3,000 able, but in any case, they are not based on people marched along the main Moscow the rule of law…”

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The dilemma faced by the authorities who discourse among political experts, as well as are acting to preserve “the unity of the soci- intellectual life in general, are characterized ety” through restricting freedom of expres- by the spread of an anti-Western consensus sion and assembly has been reinforced every often described as ‘Eurasian’, the essence of year since 2006 in connection with another which is the assertion11 that Russia is 'differ- type of march which is related to combating ent' from, or indeed, by its nature, the oppo- an associate of xenophobia – homophobia. site of the US.” Thus, Moscow authorities have famously been blocking any attempts to organise Gay The wording and manner in which these of- Pride parades in the city. The justifications ficial perceptions are delivered to the pub- put forward for blocking such parades have lic range from subtle and delicate to quite included the claim that the march will pro- straightforward, depending on the subject. voke action by skinheads and other far-right For instance, they can be delivered in a purely groups as has happened in some Eastern theatrical way, such as the purposeful pause European cities; that security can’t be fully which former President Vladimir Putin in- guaranteed; that much of the gay community cluded in his statement in 2006. When a re- opposes the Gay Pride parades; and that so- porter asked him who the next president of Russia would be Putin’s response was: “The 6.ciety Perilous is not ready Ambiguity for them yet. pause next president would be the one elected by the ‘ethnic’ Russians [ ] and other peo- ples of the Russian Federation.”

In addition to legislation and law-enforce- A different strategy was followed during the ment, governmental rhetoric is another im- so-called “anti-Georgian campaign” by the portant source upon which observations Russian media in 2006. After the Georgian about xenophobia in Russia can be based. Interior Ministry detained four Russian of- The most obvious conclusion to draw from ficers and later expelled them on charges observing governmental rhetoric is that the of espionage, Russia introduced tough eco- signals sent out by the Presidential Admin- nomic sanctions against Georgia. Research istration and the state-controlled or state-in- conducted by SOVA identified a significant fluenced media are ambiguous and – in many increase in anti-Georgian statements in the cases – controversial. press as part of the campaign against Geor- written, gia’s actions. Other human rights organisa- As the German scholar Andreas Umland has tions also noted the role of the media:

“Russian television stations actively “While primitive hatred of foreigners supported and justified the government’s and ethnic violence are officially stigmatised, singling out of Georgians through daily news the dissemination of national stereotypes programs as well as weekly analytic and po- and anti-Americanism, in particular, by gov- litical programming and special series. For ernment-directed information channels and example, one-sided news coverage in early political pundits continues unabated. On the October on the government-owned Channel one hand, the political leadership is promot- One exclusively presented the position of ing the integration of Russia into Western government officials and agencies12 and regu- organizations such as the G8 and the World larly connected Georgians to violations of the Trade Organization. On the other hand, the law, including organized crime.”

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The media very rarely talked about attacks clivities for xenophobia, the world economic on ethnic Georgians or the other kind of inci- downturn of late 2008 – 2009 has made it dents that were provoked by this campaign. more visible. Nor did they cover the views and actions of the critics of this fanning of xenophobic senti- With an increase in unemployment, social ments. At the same time topics such as “Geor- distress and anxiety are easily and naturally gian criminality”, “Georgian terrorism” and channelled into anti-migrant sentiments. “Georgia parasitizing on Russia’s economy” Labour migrants, if they lose their jobs, are (referring to people of Georgian origin trans- believed to stay in Russia and turn to crime ferring money from Russia to support their by many in Russian society. There is also a families in Georgia) were abundant in the wide-spread belief that “they steal limitchikithe jobs”. media. As SOVA’s research has ascertained, In some ways such beliefs are also a relic of even expressly political rhetoric is often in- former Soviet prejudices against terpreted as relating to ethnicity. The media (local “guest workers” – small-town dwellers coverage was immersed in anti-Georgian the state had moved to central big cities as political sentiment that rendered the over- cheap and low-qualified workforce in indus- all situation close to a “public hysteria”. The try). most shameful episodes of “witch-hunting” 14 during this campaign included orders from According to a 2005 survey by Mikhail Alex- at least two Moscow police districts for pub- eev on the xenophobic proclivities among lic schools to produce lists of children with the Russian youth, around 36% of respon- Georgian names, birth dates, addresses and dents who were 18 – 25 years old and 43% information on their parents’ employment. of those 40 or over completely or partially supported the statement “all 15migrants, legal Nonetheless, at least in terms of the “man- or illegal, and their children should be sent agement of xenophobia”, the lessons from back to their places of origin.” this episode seem to have been remembered. Instigated by political rhetoric, xenophobic In recent years labour migrants, especially sentiments can quickly run wild and slip visible minorities, have not been fully wel- out of control. When reporting on the war comed in the main Russian regions. Having in South Ossetia in August and September one’s papers in order is often not a sufficient 2008, therefore, the Russian press kept their guarantee against discrimination by law en- coverage exclusively political (not ethnic) forcement agencies. In 2006 the Open Soci- and the 13 number of xenophobic remarks by ety Justice Initiative conducted a study on government representatives was markedly “Ethnic Profiling in the Moscow Metro”. It ex- 7.reduced. Xenophobia’s Disguises amined whether and to what extent the Mos- cow Metro police disproportionately stopped individuals based on their appearance as “Slavs” or “non-Slavs”. The results were un- If we were to name the current “campaign” expectedly high: non-Slavic16 appearing pas- in which the xenophobic banner resides it sengers were over 20 times more likely to be would probably be “anti-migrant”. In fact, stopped for an ID check. By comparison, in general xenophobia in the public discourse the US and the UK, it was four to five times fairly easily transforms from one type to an- more likely for a person who is a visible mi- other. Taking into account the general pro- nority to be stopped.

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This is just one example of discriminatory pressing issues, discuss and advocate for practices considered normal and natural their community interests. Even in cases of both by society and law-enforcement agen- escalating racist and neo-Nazi violence, Rus- cies. Consequently such practices are very sian society largely ignores discussions about rarely questioned or studied as a source of what is permissible and socially acceptable xenophobia. What is more disturbing in the and what is normal and abnormal. Such a di- light of the financial crisis, however, is the alogue only happens within small audiences trend of linking migration to criminality as such as at universities, NGOs or – as was the such. Apart from contributing to the general case many years ago – in peoples’ kitchens. growth of xenophobia, this logic is the basis for the police to justify the lack of effective During one such occasion – at the conference responses by casuistic arguments such as17 on the impact of hate speech on politics and the one that “migrants have committed more society in Moscow, Alexander Auzan, Profes- crimes than were committed against them.” sor of Political Economy, compared Russian It also strengthens the state’s overall ap- nationalism to a fever. This metaphor was 8.proach Infantile to regulating Disease? migration. used in a positive sense, as a symptom of an infantile disease. According to Auzan, this “fever of nationalism” could be perceived as an indicator of the current state of the “or- So if the question is whether the state is try- ganism” – a specific moment in the transition ing to politicise xenophobia, the answer is 9.from Conclusion an “ethnic” to a “civic” nation. definitively yes. At the same time if one asks whether the state is trying to counter-act xenophobia, the answer is again yes. This controversy obviously makes combating dis- Concerns that xenophobic sentiments might crimination quite complicated. be politically exploited are getting stronger - recently the issue has been treated as a threat What is perhaps most problematic, however, to national security. Despite the recent posi- is the controversial state of Russian society tive changes in the level of prosecution, state itself. On the one hand, there is what has rhetoric reveals an ambiguity in regard to been called by President Dmitry Medvedev different manifestations of radical national- “deep-rooted public distrust toward institu- ism and discrimination. As this phenomenon tions of power” and a fairly reserved attitude has not yet been adequately explored and towards their actions. On the other, there’s a understood, xenophobia in Russia cannot be clear lack of public interest in the issues of considered fully “manageable” – neither is nisms.discrimination and xenophobia and a lack of it, in this sense, politically controlled or ef- demand for enforcing existing legal mecha- fectively restrained. Much depends on sensi- ble and consistent governmental strategies. However, the issue is unlikely to be resolved Civil society institutions have been weakened without non-state actors’ participation, edu- in the recent past and the Russian social fab- cational efforts, civilian oversight and intro- ric has been fractured. Growing individual- ducing good international practices. ism has brought many positive changes, but it has also affected people’s ability to raise

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1

2 Anna Sevortian is Deputy Director of the Centre for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights, Moscow. Russia’s National Report for 2008 under the new Universal Process Review procedures. Materials Prepared by Russian NGOs for the Universal Periodic Review of Russia in the United Nations Human Rights Council. 04.02.2009, available3 at: http://xeno.sova-center.ru/6BA2468/6BB4254/B87D16B.

Kozhevnikova. G, “Radical Nationalism in Russia in 2008, and Efforts to Counteract It”, edited by A. Verkhovsky, available4 Compliance at: http://xeno.sova-center.ru/6BA2468/6BB4208/CCD6D21. of the Russian Federation with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: Russian NGOs’ Alternative Report

5 . 2008, available at: http://xeno.sova-center.ru/6BA2468/6BB4254/B8954EB.

6 See http://xeno.sova-center.ru/6BA2468/6BB4208/.

I use the term “manageable democracy” in the sense of a Russian model of governance. The term was coined by Vladislav7 Surkov, one of the Presidential Administration spokesmen, in a public speech in 2004.

“The Meeting of the Council for Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights under the President of the Russian Federation - An official transcript”, 15 April 2009, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/ speeches/2009/04/15/1932_type82913_215131.shtml.8

9 See above, note 3.

Federalny zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii o sobraniah, mitingah, demonstratsiah, shestviah i piketirovaniah, N 54-FЗ (1910 June 2004).

11 See above, note 7. Opednews,

Umland, A., “’Neo-Eurasianism’, the Issue of Russian Fascism, and Post-Soviet Political Discourse”, 11 June 2008, available at: http://www.opednews.com/articles/-Neo-Eurasianism---the-Iss-by-Andreas-Umland- 080610-4.html.12 Singled Out: Russia’s Detention and Expulsion of Georgians

Human Rights Watch, , October 2007, pp. 34 – 35, available13 at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/russia1007/russia1007web.pdf.

14 See above, note 3. PONARS

15 Alexeev, M. A., “Xenophobia in Russia. Are the Young Driving It?” Policy Memo No. 367, December 2005.

Additionaly, approximately 60% of respondents in the age group 18-25 and 57% of respondents 40 and above expressed16 complete or partial supportEthnic for Profiling the slogan in the “Russia Moscow for Metro the Russians”.

Open Society Justice Initiative, , New York, 2006, available at: http://www. justiceinitiative.org/activities/ec/ec_russia/metro.17

See above, note 2.

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