Al View of the Psychological Role of Special Forces by Lieutenant General William P

September - October 2007 | Volume 20 | Issue 5

Articles 10 ARSOFLO Supports Unit-Level Language Training for Contingency Operations The SWCS Army Special Operations Forces Language Office offers a wide range of contingency language-training materials and services.

11 Foal Eagle Puts Green Berets’ Language Skills to the Test 1st Special Forces Group restructures language program to increase Soldiers’ proficiency. 12 12 A Historical Look at the Psychological Role of Special Forces A historical article written by Lieutenant General William Yarbor- ough, U.S. Army (ret.), looks at the psychological role of Special Forces, illustrating that while the battlefield changes, SF’s role remains the same.

15 SF and the Art of Influence Whether selling cars or conducting unconventional warfare, influencing others is an important skill.

20 Breaking the Afghan Insurgency The 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, implements its counterinsurgency strategy. 15 30 The Carrot and the Stick A historical study of a counterinsurgency strategy that could apply to today’s battlefield.

Departments ON THE COVER 4 From the Commandant A special-operations forces Soldier, assigned to the Combined Joint 5 Update Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan, fires on a Taliban fight- 36 Career Notes ing position during an afternoon battle. 38 Book Reviews Photo by Daniel K. Love Special Warfare Commander & Commandant Major General James W. Parker

Editor Jerry D. Steelman

Associate Editor Janice Burton

Graphics & Design Jennifer Martin

Webmaster Eva Herrera

20 SUBMISSIONS

Special Warfare is an authorized, official bimonthly Special Warfare welcomes sub- in a timely manner. Special Warfare publication of the United States Army John F. Kennedy missions of scholarly, independent reserves the right to edit all contribu- Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mission is to promote the professional development of research from members of the armed tions. Special Warfare will attempt to special-operations forces by providing a forum for the ex- forces, security policy-makers and afford authors an opportunity to review amination of established doctrine and new ideas. -shapers, defense analysts, aca- the final edited version; requests for Views expressed herein are those of the au- demic specialists and civilians from the changes must be received by the thors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. 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Published works may be reprinted, except where copy- Manuscripts should be submitted in considered to be in the public domain righted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and plain text, double-spaced, and in a digi- and is not protected by copyright un- the authors. tal file. End notes should accompany less it is accompanied by the author’s Official distribution is limited to active and reserve works in lieu of embedded footnotes. copyright notice. Published works may special-operations units. Individuals desiring private sub- scriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Please consult The Chicago Manual of be reprinted, except where copyright- Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing- Style, 15th Edition, for footnote style. ed, provided credit is given to Special ton, D.C. 20402. Special Warfare is also available on the Submit graphics, tables and charts Warfare and the authors. 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Commercial: (910) 432-5703 Secretary of the Army All submissions will be reviewed DSN 239-5703 0717003 Headquarters, Department of the Army Recently I had the opportunity of visiting some of our special-operations forces Soldiers in Afghanistan and meeting members of the Afghan Army whom they have trained. I was impressed by the skills of the Afghani soldiers and proud of the performance of our Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs forces working with them. Visiting the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan gave us a chance to view current operations and better evaluate the effectiveness of our training. The JFK Center and School is committed to ensuring that our training incorporates lessons learned from current operations. One of the things we learned is that some Soldiers and commanders are not fully aware of the assistance available to them for pre-deployment language training. As a result, in this issue of Special Warfare, we have included information on the resources available to units that need to conduct pre-deployment language training. It is hard to overemphasize the importance of language and cultural training to current operations. The successful tactics in Afghanistan discussed in Major Christopher Wells’ article in this issue depend heavily on an SF Soldier’s ability to communicate with the populace and earn the people’s trust. Working by, with and through indigenous forces and the people who inhabit our operational areas has always been the hallmark of Special Forces. In this issue, Major Patrick O’Hara points out that during the 1950s in the Philippines, Ramon Magsaysay helped to defeat the Huks by ensuring that the people saw Philippine military forces as protectors, not as aggressors. Lieutenant General Wil- liam Yarborough’s 1972 article on the psychological impact of Special Forces states that the greatest guarantee of cooperation from irregular forces comes from close personal rapport. Yarborough stresses, “The acceptability of Special Forces personnel in the country where they are to operate is of overriding importance.” Thirty-five years after General Yarborough wrote those words, the ability of our SF Soldiers to achieve rapport with partner-nation forces is still important, and its value will only increase in future operations.

Major General James W. Parker

Special Warfare U P D A T E Olson takes command of USSOCOM TAMPA, Fla. – Admiral Eric T. Olson became the first Navy SEAL to command the United States Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, during a July 9 ceremony at the Tampa Convention Center. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates presided as Olson assumed command from Army General Bryan “Doug” Brown. Brown had led the command since September 2003. Two of the more conspicuous accomplishments during that time were assuming new missions in the war on terror and assimilating Marine forces into the command. Gates said the command works seamlessly among the services, but that this was not always the case. The command grew phoenix-like from the ashes of a failed attempt in 1980 to rescue American hostages being Piping Aboard Admiral Eric T. Olson, flanked by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and held in Iran, he said. Eight airmen General Bryan “Doug” Brown, assumed command of the United States Special Operations and Marines were killed in the ill-fat- Command on July 9 during a ceremony at the Tampa Convention Center, Tampa, Fla. U.S. ed mission, and the lessons learned Army photo. from it led directly to the establish- and interagency partners for their The secretary encouraged Olson to ment of USSOCOM in 1987. help. “This is an international co- “continue your custom of giving honest “Joint capabilities would eventual- alition at its best, supporting each opinions and recommendations — with ly eclipse parochial service interests,” other,” he said. the bark off and straight from the shoul- Gates said. “And this year we cel- Gates also thanked Brown for the der,” he said. ebrate the 20th anniversary of the es- way he has worked with other nations For his part, Olson said he will build tablishment of a command that is at in the fight against terror. The general on the base that Brown has left him. the forefront of the fight to preserve has emphasized the need for Americans Olson, who served as the command’s our freedom and our way of life.” to develop language proficiency and cul- deputy commander, said he is in awe of Gates recognized Brown for his tural understanding to build trust and special-operations forces’ skill, intellect leadership of the command. “He came bonds with foreign militaries. “And his and courage. to this post four years ago deter- emphasis on indirect operations aimed “I intend to reinforce our enduring mined to improve the way special to prevent minor problems from growing priorities: to deter, disrupt and defeat operators fight,” Gates said. “He has into much bigger crises,” Gates said. terrorist threats; develop and support done just that.” Gates called Olson “a true warrior” our people and take care of their fami- Brown also improved the way the and a legend in the special operations lies; and modernize our force.” command works, the secretary said. community. In 1993, Olson — then a The admiral said he will work with He reorganized the command’s Center Navy commander — fought street by combatant commanders to meet their for Special Operations. The changes street through Mogadishu, Somalia, needs and will work with service chiefs allowed different special-operations leading a ground convoy to fellow special “in order to ensure that our respective specialties to build on each other operators surrounded by thousands of roles and missions are well-defined.” rather than compete. He praised the enemy combatants. Finally, the admiral vowed to en- intelligence community for working Olson is the first Navy SEAL to sure that U.S. special-operations forces side by side with special operators, wear three stars, and now four stars. remain the best-trained, best-equipped, “fusing their expertise and planning “There is no mistaking his combina- best-led, boldest, bravest, most aware, to greatly improve results.” tion of courage, experience and lead- innovative, responsive and spirited Brown thanked the coalition allies ership,” Gates said. force in the world.”

September-October 2007 U P D A T E Green Berets earn Silver Star A pair of Special Forces Soldiers received the Silver Star during a Fort Bragg ceremony July 2. Captain Kenneth M. Dwyer and Staff Sergeant Rodney Scalise, both of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, were recognized with the military’s third highest valor award for their gallantry under enemy fire during a battle on Aug. 19, 2006, in Afghanistan. “When we hear the words, ‘gallantry and valor,’ we see it in everything that they did that day. This does not happen frequently,” said Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. According to the award citations, Scalise and Dwyer were conducting a combined patrol with the Afghan National Army in the Oruzgan Province when they were ambushed by a numerically superior anticoali- tion militia force. With their patrol pinned down in a “U”-shaped ambush, Dwyer moved his vehicle though small-arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire to draw enemy fire and establish a support-by-fire position. He then charged from his position to draw the attention of enemy fire to free the pinned-down forces. He continued to engage the enemy forces until friendly forces were able to maneuver. He then assisted the commander of another SF detachment in coor- Heroic effort Captain Kenneth M. Dwyer and Staff Sergeant dinating indirect fires. He used various individual and vehicle-mounted Rodney Scalise, both of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces weapons systems to fire into the enemy’s positions until he was critically Group, were awarded the Silver Star Medal on July 2 in the Heri- injured by an air-burst rocket-propelled grenade. tage Auditorium, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. U.S. Army photo. Scalise, a Special Forces medic, also jumped into action upon contact and manned a 240B machine gun until he became aware of casualties. At bush back to the team’s base camp, he continued to care for his two charges. that time, he dismounted his armored vehicle, moved more than 100 me- Scalise acknowledged the significance of his Silver Star, but he said he ters through heavy enemy fire, and began triage of three casualties, one of feels that the award symbolizes the heroism of his team during its battle whom had already expired from his injuries. with enemy forces. “To me this is all not necessary. I wasn’t the only one To protect the remaining casualties, he supervised their movement to a there that was doing the right thing — I just happened to be the medic,” more secure location. Fighting his way through a three-kilometer rolling am- he said. — USASOC PAO

With valor Lieutenant Colonel Clayton M. Hutmacher, commander, 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regi- ment, attaches the Iraq campaign streamer to the unit’s colors, held by Command Sergeant Major David L. Leamon of the 1st Battalion. Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commander, U.S. Army Spe- cial Operations Command (second from left), presented the 1st Battalion with the Afghanistan and Iraq campaign streamers, as well as the Valorous Unit Award during a ceremony at Fort Campbell, Ky., May 22. In addition to the unit awards, eight Night Stalkers were presented with valorous combat awards, including four Distinguished Flying Crosses, the Bronze Star Medal for Valor and three Air Medals for Valor. Wagner praised the unit for its ongoing contributions to the Global War on Terrorism. “You have earned a place of honor in the history of the Night Stalkers,” he said. U.S. Army photo by Ruth Farwell, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

Special Warfare U P D A T E Lowe takes helm of Training Group The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School welcomed Colonel Mark S. Lowe as the new commander of the 1st Spe- cial Warfare Training Group in a ceremony held at Meadows Field June 28. Lowe is replacing Colonel Jack Zeigler, who has been named the SWCS chief of staff. Major General James W. Parker commended Zeigler for his achieve- ments while in command. “Jack has done a terrific job leading this organization. I can tell you, his challenges were significant,” Parker said. “Jack took command during a time of immense change. You could say that transformation and change have been the watchwords for the training group through the last two years.” These weren’t small changes to the organization, according to Parker. They were fundamental transformations in the way training is conducted to help meet the needs of a growing Special Forces community. “Two years ago, our training pipeline had just been redesigned, but it was not yet fully operational. We were essentially running two Special Forces training pipelines: an old one, which we referred to as the ‘legacy,’ and a new one. Some referred to it as running two trains on parallel tracks. We had to get them on one track,” Parker said. The Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations training was also going through transformation, as the Army created branches for CA and PSYOP career Soldiers, Parker added. In addition to all of this, Camp Mackall was going through its largest construction project since World War II. Parker said he brought Zeigler into his office and told him to fix the way things had been running. “That’s exactly what he did. Mission accom- plished, Jack.” Though Parker’s comments toward Zeigler’s time in command were kind and suggested the changes were complete, Zeigler himself in command Colonel Mark S. Lowe (second from left) takes the disagreed. guidon from Major General James W. Parker at a change of command “Well sir, I respectfully disagree on the mission accomplishment ceremony for the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, during a ceremony at statement. There’s still plenty of work that needs to be done, and I’d like Meadows Field, Fort Bragg, N.C., June 28. U.S. Army photo. to welcome Mark Lowe. I think he’s the right guy to continue this chal- lenge,” Zeigler said. mander to company commander. He also served as the aide-de-camp No stranger to the SWCS, Lowe expressed his great excitement for for the commanding general, U.S. Army Special Forces Command. the next two years of command. His other assignments include the United Nations Transitional Author- “Since I’ve been here, many people have asked me why I smile so ity in Cambodia; the Operations Group Alpha, Battle Command Training much,” Lowe said. “It’s because I knew my future. It’s been five years Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as the Special Forces plans and since I left the Special Warfare Training Group, but the Special Warfare operations officer; and commander of the Special Operations and Control Training Group has not left me.” Element at Camp Doha, Kuwait, where he participated in both Operations While preparing to take command, Lowe spent a week observing Southern Watch and Desert Thunder. At SWCS, Lowe has served as the training within the group. He praised the dedication and professionalism secretary to the general staff; as the executive officer for the 1st SWTG; of the instructors. He also thanked Zeigler for making it easy for him to and as commander of the 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG. Lowe served as the take command. executive officer for the commanding general, U.S. Army Special Opera- “I’d like to thank Jack Zeigler for making this transition an easy one,” tions Command, as well as the deputy chief of staff, Multi-National Lowe said. “You have truly set me up for success, and I wish you best of Force – Iraq in Baghdad, Iraq. luck in your new job as the chief of staff.” He later served as the C-3 director of maneuver, Multinational Force-I Lowe served as a rifle platoon leader and heavy weapons platoon during the conduct of the Iraqi national elections and the transition of the leader in the 6th Battalion, 327th Infantry, 172nd Light Infantry Bri- interim Iraqi government. Before assuming command, Lowe served as the gade at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, before attending the Special Forces chief of staff, Alaskan Command, at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. Officer Qualification Course in October 1985. Lowe has held numerous He is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College, the Army Command and positions in the 5th Special Forces Group, from detachment com- General Staff College, and the Infantry Officer basic and advanced courses.

September-October 2007 U P D A T E

Boyd takes command of 4th psychological Operations Group Colonel Curtis S. Boyd assumed command Boyd is no stranger to the 4th POG, having of the 4th Psychological Operations Group July served there as a detachment commander, 13 at Meadows Memorial Field, Fort Bragg, N.C. group operations officer and battalion executive The 4th POG is the only active-duty PSYOP officer. He expressed his pride in the unit and unit in the U.S. Army. Boyd is replacing Colonel his opportunity to command it. Kenneth A. Turner. Boyd was commissioned from Norwich Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, University as an Infantry officer in 1984. commanding general of the U.S. Army Special From 1985 to 1992, he held numerous Operations Command, praised the work of the assignments in Germany with the 36th 4th POG, as well as Turner’s leadership. Infantry and at Fort Bragg with the 325th “We talk about forces that are high-demand Airborne Infantry Regiment. In 1992, Boyd and low-density,” said Wagner. “Your services left the 82nd Airborne Division to begin a two- are in such high demand, we can’t create more year Psychological Operations officer training of you fast enough.” program at the JFK Special Warfare Center On average, more than 500 Soldiers from and School. Following language school at the unit are deployed at any given time, with the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, missions in more than 20 countries. Wagner Calif., he began a series of assignments in said the unit had a critical role in that it the 4th POG. From 1999 to 2002, Boyd was “removes a combatant’s will to fight.” assigned as an information-operations officer “You bring nation-building from the national to the Joint Special Operations Command. level down to the local level,” said Wagner. He then returned to the JFK Special Warfare Turner, who will move to the U.S. Army Center and School, where he commanded a Special Operations Command staff, had high training battalion from 2002 to 2004. After that praise for the men and women of the unit. command, Boyd was assigned as the deputy “Commanders come and go, but the unit goes director for Special Operations Proponency. commanding moment Colonel Curtis on,” he said. “The unit is what this is all about. Boyd’s most recent assignment was the S. Boyd (second from left) takes the guidon from Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner It is the only group like it in the world. I am assistant chief of staff, G3, at the U.S. Army at the 4th PSYOP Group’s change-of-com- proud to have served with these Soldiers … Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations mand ceremony at Meadows Field, Fort When done right, words conquer.” Command. Bragg, N.C., July 13. U.S. Army photo. Cambria takes helm at special Operations Command-Pacific Brigadier General (Promotable) Salvatore As SOCPAC commander, Cambria exercises F. Cambria assumed command of Special operational control of special-operations forces Operations Command-Pacific, or SOCPAC, July 5 within the Pacific region. SOCPAC forces play during a ceremony at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. the dominant role in U.S. Pacific Command’s Cambria, a Special Forces officer, replaced war on terror operations. Major General (Promotable) David P. Fridovich. SOCPAC troops are the core of Operation Fridovich commanded SOCPAC for two and a Enduring Freedom-Philippines. Through their half years. advice and assistance to the Armed Forces Cambria said he’s looking forward to joining of the Philippines, or AFP, the AFP have SOCPAC’s talented team of quiet professionals. improved its ability to coordinate and sustain “I am deeply aware of SOCPAC’s proud history counterterrorism operations. and the many significant accomplishments under SOCPAC forces are also involved in General Fridovich’s leadership,” said Cambria. “I humanitarian-assistance projects in the look forward to joining this very talented team of southern Philippines, such as medical, dental quiet professionals.” and veterinarian clinics; and in engineering Cambria added that it was an honor and projects, such as water, road and classroom privilege to follow Fridovich, and that he looks improvements. CAMBRIA forward to continuing the great work Fridovich Cambria is a 31-year Army veteran who has has started in the command. served in multiple special-operations assignments. Special Operations Command-South, Homestead “God bless this beautiful area of the world In addition to SOCPAC, he has held command Air Reserve Base, Fla. Cambria’s most recent and all the cultural and national diversity,” positions as commander, 7th Special Forces assignment was as director of operations, U.S. Cambria said. Group, Fort Bragg, N.C.; and commander, Southern Command, Miami, Fla.

Special Warfare U P D A T E

Gamble Takes SOF Community mourns the loss Command of Brigade Colonel Duane A. Gamble assumed com- of the ‘father of modern rangers’ mand of the Special Operations Sustainment Brigade from Colonel Edward F. Dorman during a Fort Bragg, N.C., ceremony July 20. Gamble, a 1985 graduate of the ROTC program at Western Maryland College, was commissioned as an Ordnance officer, with a bachelor’s in economics and business. He later earned a master’s degree in logistics from the Florida Institute of Technology and a master’s in national resource strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Gamble has held a variety of logistics positions within the 82nd Airborne Division. His most recent assignment was as the corps logistics officer for the NATO Rapid Deploy- able Corps-Turkey. He has earned numerous military awards, including two Bronze Star Medals. Gamble expressed his confidence in assuming the challenges of command as he 21-gun salute Soldiers of the 75th Ranger Regiment bid farewell to General Wayne Down- vowed to focus first on USASOC units and ing during funeral services held in Downing’s hometown of Peoria, Ill. Downing was known as Soldiers. “I’ll always keep my mission of the ‘Father of Modern Rangers.’ U.S. Army photo. supporting USASOC units and Soldiers first, Special-operations warriors paid tribute to to the next assignment, said Lieutenant General and I’ll always accomplish the mission,” said a leader of the special-operations community Francis H. Kearney, deputy commander, U.S. Gamble. during a memorial service, July 21 in Peoria, Ill. Special Operations Command. Dorman’s next assignment is with the Retired U.S. Army General Wayne Allan Downing “He was, and is, and always will be, a XVIII Airborne Corps on Fort Bragg. died of a sudden illness in his hometown July 18. personal and professional compass for leaders, “I think each generation is given only a Soldiers and units, pointing the right way to go,” handful of extraordinary people,” said the said Wagner. “Legends will be told of Wayne commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Downing, but future generations will have a Command, Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, hard time of truly sensing the full depth of the during the closing eulogy. “From the White person we know, love, honor and respect. No House to Congress, the State Department to the one personified the word “Ranger” or the Ranger media, in homes across the nation and globe, creed better than Wayne A. Downing, father of with moments of tears in our eyes in disbelief the modern-day Rangers. His life (was) filled and sadness, we are here today to honor and with incredible accomplishments.” salute a uniquely special and extraordinary man “We worked together on many, many of our generation.” projects; we traveled together extensively,” Downing served as the commander of both said Jim Kimsey, founding chief executive the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and officer of AOL and a founding AOL CEO and the U.S. Special Operations Command. Downing’s West Point classmate. “We went to “Again, again and again during Vietnam, he places like China, Iraq and, just a few weeks was exactly what a military leader should be,” ago, we were in Israel together. And, on all of said long-time friend H. Ross Perot. “He would these trips, Wayne dispensed his advice to our never leave his men behind; he would personally various constituencies in a way I’ve heard no go out and rescue the wounded. And he was one else do. And I will say, to sum it all up … Accepting Responsibility Colonel always held in the highest regard by those who He was a true anomaly. Here was a man who Duane A. Gamble (left) takes the guidon served with him.” was commander-in-chief of the most lethal from Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner at the Special Operations Sustainment Throughout his career, Downing maintained fighting force on Earth; yet, he is one of the most Brigade change-of-command ceremony at a close relationship to his subordinates and compassionate, giving, caring, loving persons Meadows Field, Fort Bragg, N.C., July 20. continued to mentor them, even after moving on I’ve ever met.” U.S. Army photo.

September-October 2007 Speaking the ARSOFLO supports unit-level language training for contingency operations When Army special-operations forces units need to vocabulary flash cards and non-language-specific graphic cards. conduct or obtain contingency foreign-language training or ARSOFLO works with ARSOF units to identify their lan- training for emergent language requirements, they may not be guage needs in advance and to provide access to resources aware of the full range of available assistance. necessary to facilitate just-in-time language training. ARSOFLO Units at the group level or its equivalent have a full-time also coordinates with other training organizations to provide command language-program manager who provides language ARSOF Soldiers with the most up-to-date language materials support to the unit. These units include the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, available. Those organizations include DLIFLC’s Field Support 10th, 19th and 20th SF groups, the 1st Special Warfare Train- Office and Emerging Languages School; the U.S. Special Op- ing Group, the 4th Psychological Operations Group, the 95th erations Command Special Operations Forces Language Office; Civil Affairs Brigade, the 75th Ranger Regiment and the 160th sister-service language-training components; and leading lan- Special Operations Aviation Regiment. guage-training universities, such as Brigham Young University In addition to the command language-program manager, and Indiana University. however, there is another language-training resource: the Army ARSOFLO also hosts semiannual working groups that Special Operations Forces Language Office, or ARSOFLO, bring together ARSOF unit and command language-program which is the functional proponent for language training in the managers, ARSOF subject-matter experts, resource managers United States Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC. and other USASOC personnel who are concerned with initial, One of ARSOFLO’s primary missions is to assist the language sustainment and contingency foreign-language training. ARSO- program managers of USASOC units in acquiring and provid- FLO provides outreach assistance to USASOC units to ensure ing quality contingency language training. that units are able to identify, resource, train and manage their ARSOFLO can provide units a variety of contingency lan- foreign-language training and funding requirements. guage-training materials in more than 45 languages. Materials The ARSOFLO contingency program manager visits units available for pre-deployment training include language survival periodically to assess the state of foreign-language training; to kits created by the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language determine whether they need additional funding, materials or Center, or DLIFLC; 200-hour language-familiarization courses assistance; and to discuss contingency-operations and identify developed by the I Corps Language Center at Fort Lewis, Wash.; contingency-language-training needs. and commercial training products, such as Transparent Lan- If units need support for language sustainment or con- guage’s Critical Languages-150 Technology Matrix. tingency training, the first stop should be the battalion-level During the past year, the ARSOFLO has provided ARSOF manager of the unit command language program. For more units with a variety of language materials to support combat information, contact the ARSOFLO sustainment program man- operations, including training in more than 15 languages using ager, Terry Schnurr, at DSN 239-6699, commercial (910) 432- the Critical Languages-150 Technology Matrix; DLIFLC language 6699, e-mail: [email protected]; or the ARSOFLO contingency survival kits in Iraqi, Dari, Pashto, Uzbeki and Tadjik; the July program manager, Rusty Restituyo, at (910) 907-2941, e-mail: 2007 version of DLIFLC Iraqi Headstart; and aids such as Iraqi [email protected].

U.S. Army Special Operations Forces Language Office ‘Open for Business’ On Aug. 8, 2006, the United States Army ties, resource programming and assistance. cordance with the standards of the Interagency Special Operations Command, or USASOC, A SWCS unit, Company C, 3rd Battalion, 1st Language Roundtable. The curriculum content designated the JFK Special Warfare Center Special Warfare Training Group, is responsible for covers five areas: military and security; politics and School’s Army Special Operations Forces conducting initial-acquisition training in 10 core and economics; geography; science and tech- Language Office, or ARSOFLO, as the functional languages: Arabic (modern standard), Korean, nology; and socio-cultural factors. The critical- proponent for ARSOF language. Chinese-Mandarin, Thai, Russian, Persian-Farsi, task list is reviewed periodically and modified As the proponent, ARSOFLO has respon- Tagalog, Indonesian, French and Spanish. Initial- as needed to maintain relevance for ARSOF. sibilities not only in initial-acquisition foreign- acquisition training in Tagalog and Chinese-Man- It is imperative to ensure that SOF person- language training for personnel in the Special darin is conducted at the I Corps language-train- nel receive the best training to meet the foreign- Forces and Civil Affairs/Psychological Opera- ing facility at Fort Lewis, Wash. language requirements of ARSOF’s global oper- tions pipelines but also in language sustainment Initial-acquisition language training at ations. ARSOFLO coordinates with the Defense and contingency training for all USASOC direct- SWCS is designed to ensure that students mas- Language Institute Foreign Language Center, or reporting units, or DRUs. ARSOFLO serves as ter 33 critical tasks and develop cultural and DLIFLC, the U.S. Special Operations Command, the central point of contact for the USASOC socio-linguistic competency at the 1/1/1 level or USSOCOM, and other training institutions to DRUs for policy questions, language-training (reading, listening, speaking) as scored by the update training content and identify essential technology, the validation of required capabili- Defense Language Proficiency Test and in ac- resources.

10 Special Warfare Language-training Language program changes result in greater Soldier proficiency

The 1st Special Forces Group language Foal Eagle puts Green Berets’ lab offers language sustainment and en- hancement training to help its Soldiers language skills to the test maintain a basic understanding of lan- The 1st Special Forces Group recently used as interpreters between SF teams. They were guage and communicate effectively. the annual Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise Foal literally forced to use their language skills During the summer of 2006, the 1st Eagle as an opportunity to further educate and rather than perform their regular duties. Even Group developed a plan for creating a 160- evaluate its Soldiers in practical language and though the scope of their job changed, the hour training course in language and cul- cultural skills. goals remained the same: build rapport, collect tural education for SF Soldiers assigned to Foal Eagle is one of three training exercises intelligence and complete the mission. the 1st Group. The language lab provides conducted annually in Korea by the Republic Amis said it’s important to remember training in 10 languages, including Korean, of Korea-United States Combined Forces that when Soldiers enter a village, they aren’t Chinese Mandarin, Tagalog, Thai and Indo- Command, or CFC. Focused on the ability dressed as the local populace but rather as nesian. Training consists of small teams of of the ROK to defend itself assisted by U.S. warriors. Their appearance can be frightening, about five to 10 Soldiers in a class with an forces, Foal Eagle trains all aspects of the CFC’s and it is important that Soldiers immediately instructor. Soldiers are also encouraged to mission: rear-battle-area protection; reception, express their intent to villagers and break down make use of the fully functional computer staging, onward movement and integration; communication barriers through language skills lab to supplement classroom instruction conventional multiservice force-on-force; and and cultural understanding. with the use of interactive software to im- special operations. On one team, a Chinese Mandarin prove their vocabulary and with interactive Training exercises like Foal Eagle test speaker, Sergeant First Class Matt Carey, classes online. The language lab also gives an aspect of language skills that written and used his language skills to build rapport by listening tests cannot: effective intercultural explaining medical procedures to villagers them access to self-study materials and a communication. “The commanders and during a medical civic-action program. His small reference library. language-program administrators receive the ability to communicate, form relationships To date, 230 Soldiers have been true measure of their Soldiers’ abilities through and impart knowledge earned the trust of trained, according to Sergeant First Class Todd Amis, coordinator for the 1st Group language program. The training has result- ed in the Soldiers receiving higher scores on the Defense Language Proficiency Test, or DLPT, which measures scores in listening, reading and speaking. Of the 230 Soldiers trained, 67 percent improved to these exercises. And the Soldiers’ confidence is the villagers, who reciprocated by providing pass the standard of 1/1 (listening/read- bolstered through their abilities to communicate intelligence on enemy whereabouts, manpower ing) on the DLPT, while 23 percent scored and improve on their speaking skills,” said and weapons. the 2/2 needed to qualify for language pro- Sergeant First Class Todd Amis, coordinator of Through the exercise, the Soldiers ficiency pay. Nearly all of the Soldiers who the 1st SF Group language program. enhanced their abilities to communicate and have taken part in the training achieved a During the exercise, SF Soldiers were sent impart knowledge in realistic situations. They 33-percent increase in their measured lan- into villages in which volunteer or contract reaffirmed their strengths, improved on their guage capability. linguists played roles as Korean and Chinese weaknesses and learned what actions or Soldiers training in Chinese Mandarin speakers. The “villagers” spoke only in their language might be offensive or misunderstood and Tagalog also participate in a week- assigned language, without breaking character in their target country. long, language-immersion isolation. The by using English. The SF Soldiers were unaware Exercises like Foal Eagle not only test the most recent graduates of the Chinese of the extent to which their foreign-language capabilities of SF Soldiers but also emphasize language program showed enormous skills would be tested, and the complete the importance of language and cultural language immersion came as a surprise to interaction to modern warfare. improvement, Amis said. Out of 18 gradu- many of the younger SF Soldiers. “Rapport speeds success,” said ates, all achieved the 1/1 standard. Fifty In some instances, Soldiers used voice- Colonel Eric P. Wendt, commander of the percent achieved a 2/2 or better and now response translators to convert English to 1st Special Forces Group. “The rapport we receive language pay. Twenty-two percent Korean or Chinese; however, technology develop with language capability and cultural of the Chinese-language students have cannot substitute for a person on the ground, understanding helps us as we enhance the achieved at least a 3 (general professional speaking the language and understanding legitimacy of the host government with proficiency level) in either listening or cultural complexities. Soldiers who were most the local populace. Language and cultural reading. In speaking, their scores ranged proficient in Korean and Chinese were used capabilities are vital tools.” from 1+ to 2+.

March-April 2007 11 A historical view of the psychological role of Special Forces By Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough

port structure. The latter is rooted in the civilian population and usually numbers many times the strength of the guerrilla units it serves. The underground which makes guerrilla operations feasible does not develop automati- cally nor spontaneously. A great deal of careful, sophis- ticated, patient and time-consuming work on the part of highly motivated resistance architects goes into its Special Forces are often in a position to observe de- design. velopments that may have important ramifications on the Members of a resistance underground live and work attitudes of target areas, as well as the actual audience surrounded by great danger to themselves and to their attitudes. families. It is evident, therefore, that the stakes for which The Special Forces of the United States Army were de- they are willing to risk everything must be high. These are signed for employment in several types of environments, usually political. Sacrifice in serving in an underground each having pronounced psychological overtones. In their organization that is hounded by special police and by primary role, that of unconventional warfare, Special counterintelligence agents can be justified in the mind s Forces will be in contact with friendly guerrilla forces and of those who feel most deeply that their future and the will provide a positive link between the irregulars and the future of their country can be made better through their conventional commands. The nature of the unconvention- efforts. Guerrilla forces which grow from the underground al-warfare structure, which produces the guerrillas with recruiting processes must have the same convictions which Special Forces work, must be understood in order — many with a firm political base. The mechanics of to appreciate the importance of the psychological compo- keeping guerrilla and underground forces’ zeal at the re- nent of the Green Beret’s makeup. quired level must involve inspirational approaches which Guerrillas are an action element of the total uncon- are simple, powerful, consistent and persistent. ventional-warfare system, but they do not comprise it It is necessary for the outside forces who work with entirely. Moreover, guerrillas will not appear as the first guerrillas to understand the vital part that belief in the manifestation of a well-conceived and -organized resis- cause plays in the making of an irregular soldier. Grant- tance movement. ed, there are classical pressures which are used to force A guerrilla-warfare capability of any significance is an individual into guerrilla ranks against his will. Fre- normally based on a broad clandestine and covert sup- quently a combination of inspiration and terror is used

Editor’s note: This article was written in 1972 and was published in DA Pamphlet 525-7-2, The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application Volume 2 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1976), 587- 90. Yarborough, who died in December of 2005, is credited as being one of the founders of Special Forces. This historical look at SF’s role shows the timelessness of the SF mission and skills.

12 Special Warfare Vietnam

A historical view of the psychological role of Special Forces

to move a “volunteer” from his village to a guerrilla camp ing World War II, point up the extraordinary impact that in the jungle. In any case, both the guerrilla and the vast human emotions can have on official negotiations.1 infrastructure which supports him are dependent upon U.S. Special Forces introduced into a conflict arena psychological considerations more than any other. to work with guerrillas could find themselves enmeshed The history of resistance movements shows conclu- in several kinds of situations, none of them simple. The sively that guerrilla leadership must be indigenous — not guerrillas may be fighting for their own government under imported from outside. This being the case, U.S. Special siege by an invading enemy. In this case, the motivational Forces would be ill-advised to seek command of guer- propaganda which sustains them would come from that rilla forces with which they have been placed in contact. government. The latter would of necessity be compatible Nevertheless, the interests of the United States, which in enough with U.S. aims to have warranted introduction of the first place led to the introduction of the Special Forces U.S. Special Forces in its support. teams, must be appropriately served. It follows that the In such an environment, U.S. Special Forces would Special Forces Soldier must have a clear understanding be expected to do nothing which would interfere with the of what his country’s interests are, and he must seek, mental conditioning of the indigenous resistance mecha- with judgment, finesse, firmness and diplomacy, to serve nism. Here the requirement for intensive indoctrination them in dealing with the guerrilla leaders. He can, of and meticulous selection of the Americans is apparent. course, attempt to guide the indigenous guerrilla leader In recognition of the difficulties surrounding psycho- toward desired tactical objectives by regulating the flow of logical operations carried out by resistance forces, U.S. supplies and resources from U.S. stockpiles. This kind of Special Forces should provide appropriate assistance, persuasion, powerful as it is, may not always work. beginning with materiel and instruction in its use. Guer- The greatest guarantee of cooperation from irregular rilla forces should be taught field expedients for leaflet forces can come from the close personal rapport which production and distribution. The value of simple slogans a mature, carefully selected and trained Special Forces painted on walls and of face-to-face persuasion should be team leader can develop with the guerrilla leader. Even stressed. Finished intelligence, received through the U.S. when the relationship is close and there is a mutual link with the Special Forces operations base and which respect and confidence, the nature of the guerrilla’s com- can assist in psychological targeting, can be provided by mitment to his political cause and future may preclude the Special Forces to the guerrilla leaders. his acceding in every respect to the United States’ re- Generally, the propaganda content of guerrilla psycho- quirements voiced through the Special Forces command- logical-operations activities should not come from U.S. er. The latter must be the type of individual who can un- Special Forces. Rather it should come from the guerrillas’ derstand the nuances and intangibles that make his role own government through the established communications in the irregular-warfare scheme so different from that of a system of the friendly underground. Thus the Special liaison officer with foreign conventional forces. Historical Forces contribution would consist largely of advice in accounts of problems stemming from personality clashes planning, training in simple techniques, and provision of between Draza Mihailovic and Colonel Bailey, the British certain supplies and equipment from U.S. resources. liaison officer to the Yugoslav partisan headquarters dur- Another type of unconventional-warfare situation

September-October 2007 13 in which Special Forces might be used could be that in which guerrilla forces supported by an underground States’ own psychological campaign against the enemy resistance movement were challenging a government that government could be reflected through Special Forces to for various reasons was unacceptable to the people of the friendly guerrillas and their supporting infrastructure. the country. In such a case, the introduction of Special Intelligence is the lifeblood of effective psychological Forces would be preceded by the most exhaustive analy- operations. Special Forces deployed in contact with guer- sis of the situation to determine whether U.S. interests rilla forces are in a position to gather the kind of intel- actually demanded involvement in what might seem to be ligence that bears most intimately upon the attitudes of another country’s internal affairs. the people at the grass-roots level. Propaganda programs Lessons of current history seem to place this kind of which are shaped in the absence of extensive knowledge projection of Special Forces’ use fairly low on the prob- of feelings and persuasions of human target groups are ability scale. In the event, however, that Special Forces likely to succeed only through rare luck and in defiance of were used, their psychological role would probably not the laws of probability. be limited to the provision of training and materials to In his classic work, Psychological Warfare, Paul M.A. the forces of the resistance. Certain aspects of the United Linebarger points out that some of the worst blunders of history have arisen from miscalculations of the enemy state of mind. He indicates that psychologists can WE WANT TO HEAR FROM YOU... set up techniques for determining how people really feel about certain conditions and situations. Special Forces, The Special Warfare staff needs your help to make this the in carrying out the psychological aspects of their uncon- best publication it can be. Drop us a line and let us know ventional-warfare missions, need to be trained in or at your ideas and opinions about the new concept and design least familiar with such techniques so that the products of the magazine. of their intelligence-collection can be usable for something other than order-of-battle refinement. What do you like or dislike? The opportunities for intelligence-collection concerning Do you have any comments about the articles? popular attitudes are widely available to Special Forces assigned to missions bearing upon internal defense and What would you like to see in future issues? stability of an ailing foreign country. The activity, which was once termed “counterinsurgency” by the U.S. Army Do you like the magazine redesign? and which involves everything from civic action to coun- terguerrilla warfare, is still carried as a valid type of em- Are there any issues you want to discuss that may not ployment for Green Berets. require a magazine article? Students of counterinsurgency will recognize immediately the pitfalls inherent in the application of the accept- Just tell us what’s on your mind. ed doctrine which has developed during the last decade. Nonetheless, certain aspects of what is held as valid and Send Letters To: E-mail: is taught in internal-defense-and-stability instruction [email protected] are being implemented quietly and with success. In every Editor, Special Warfare; case, the acceptability of the Special Forces personnel Include your full name, rank, address Attn: AOJK-DTD-MP; and phone number with all submissions. in the country where they are to operate is of overriding JFK Special Warfare Articles dealing with a specific operation importance. Center and School should be reviewed for security through Fort Bragg, NC 28310 the author’s chain of command. Notes: 1 C.N.M. Blair, Guerrilla Warfare (London: Ministry of Defense, 1957).

14 Special Warfare SF and the Art of Influence By Captain David P. Coughran Jr.

Special Forces soldiers are highly by social psychologist Dr. Robert B. that she’ll have to empty it.” In other regarded for their ability to interact Cialdini, the leading expert in a field situations we’re the lock, and we feel with people of different cultures and of study that many have named influ- the pressures from outside locksmiths: backgrounds. To date, they are the ence psychology. The term influence “This car dealer is trying to make me only branch of the modern military refers to a type of response whereby believe this piece of junk is a bargain.” whose explicit purpose is to achieve one person or a group of people will Influence techniques are used in daily U.S. objectives by operating through acquiesce to the requests of another. social interactions with our friends, and with indigenous forces. Through- Cialdini and other researchers have professional colleagues and families. out their missions, there is a recurrent identified certain deep-seated charac- Television and radio advertisements theme of Green Berets influencing teristics in human nature that directly bombard us with them. With the ex- the people around them. FM 3-05.20, affect our ability to say “yes” or “no.” ception of marketers and salesmen, not Special Forces Operations, puts it suc- These characteristics, in turn, have everyone has the benefit of reviewing cinctly: “SF soldiers use their interper- led to techniques that others can an actual list of specified techniques. sonal skills to get the desired action utilize to shape our behavior. A good Even fewer have considered why those from a foreign counterpart.”1 metaphor is to imagine our brain and techniques can be so effective. With so much emphasis on this personalities as a lock; a competent The remainder of this article will be ability to influence others, it is worth locksmith can approach us with his devoted to describing the most widely the time to consider the factors that tools, position the tumblers in just the used influence techniques identified increase or decrease the power of appropriate way and open us up to by Cialdini.2 To begin with, it is neces- this influence. How can I approach a comply the way he wants. sary to analyze the deep-seated char- person, shape his perceived environ- In some way, all of us have been acteristics of human nature that lend ment, and direct the conversation to locksmiths before. Anyone in a mar- themselves to influence. Then, after increase the likelihood that he will riage can relate to attempting to describing the technique, we must re- behave in the manner I want? influence their spouse: “I’ll remind my view the variables and strategies that This is exactly the question posed wife how I loaded the dishwasher so can make them more persuasive.

September-October 2007 15 the Art of influence

Nation-Building By applying the principle of scarcity, villagers can be won over to a certain viewpoint by offering certain perks, such as schools and wells. If the village decides not to cooperate, then the construction projects will be moved to another village where cooperation is ensured. U.S. Army photo.

Reciprocation in an effort to hurry on with his busi- gotiations, the importance of flexibility Reciprocation is the most eas- ness, does the Krishna member ask for cannot be understated. A successful ily recognized influence technique. a small donation in return. More often bargainer is patient and always willing In simplest terms, it’s the familiar than not, the traveler pays up. to adjust his terms. concept of tit-for-tat: I give to you, so The concept this example empha- The door-in-the-face technique, now you must give to me. In general, sizes is that a crafty trader can capital- or DITF, is the most basic version of people always seek to repay favors ize on another’s innate desire to repay the reciprocating technique. While that have been provided to them. This debts, even if the initial “gift” is uninvit- the name may be unfamiliar, virtu- driving force stems from our social ed. Mankind adapted this principle into ally every person has used it. The evolution into networked societies. his behavior so that anyone could initi- strategy involves making two separate The hunter who ate from the pot with- ate a reciprocating relationship without requests. The first request is large out having contributed that day did the fear of loss. This helped connect and demanding. The second request so fully understanding that he would the less productive contributors of is smaller by comparison and is the share his future kill. Before currency, early society to the social network and actual goal of the influencer. this allowed early man to give some- increased their chance of survival. So When the first request is rejected thing away without really losing it, givers or receivers beware, because on by the subject, it induces psychologi- and it remains wired into our brains a subconscious level, “no strings at- cal guilt. The subject senses that he today. No one wants to be labeled a tached” isn’t entirely accurate.3 or she is responsible for some form freeloader or a mooch. This mental Second, just as goods and services of damage or disadvantage to the predisposition to want to pay our are reciprocated, so are concessions. influencer. The influencer now offers a debts lends reciprocation its influenc- Humans have a psychological urge not concession in the form of a more mea- ing power in many ways. only to repay another’s favors but also ger request. For reasons discussed First of all, reciprocation can be their compromises, too. This phenom- earlier, the target reciprocates the invoked from an unwanted object. The enon is observed in virtually every concession by accepting the offer. Hare Krishna society uses a unique culture of the world: Our psychologi- Social psychologists have identified tactic that some of us have experienced cal urge to agree to a request greatly three critical variables that affect the in airports. The Krishna solicitors first increases if the person with whom we outcome of DITF. First, time interval give away a free book or flower. Only af- are bargaining is willing to cooperate effects guilt. Guilt is a self-induced ter the traveler accepts the gift, usually and compromise. Therefore, in all ne- emotion, and it will dissipate over

16 Special Warfare time. Therefore, the influencer should conflicted with their private feelings. responsive to an authority-influence display his disappointment when Some would wring their hands, bite technique than an ordinary civilian the first request is rejected but not their lip or beg through their own would be. wait too long before offering the next, tears for the researcher to stop, all SF soldiers are trained to identify smaller, request. while continuing to give the shocks. the host-nation individuals who have Second, the guilt is associated External influence, in the form of the greatest authority on the local with the identity of the influencer. an authority figure, can easily twist population. These people may derive The second request will have the someone into a decision they would their power along tribal, political or greatest statistical chance of success not choose on their own. religious lines. By focusing efforts on a if the same person makes both the The origin of this human quality is key few, a small detachment can have large and small request. Finally, pro- easy to surmise. As mankind started to a much wider impact than it could social requests are more likely to suc- cooperate in social groups, he was also achieve by itself.8 ceed than for-profit requests. In other learning the benefit of having one mem- words, the influencer’s request that ber of the group in charge. This brought Commitment, consistency is a benefit to everyone has a better order, organization and synchronization There are few examples of indoctri- chance of acceptance than a request to their efforts when everyone complied. nation that match the scope of the Chi- that benefits only the influencer.4 The trend continues today when we nese communist re-education camps of teach our children to obey the teacher the 1950s and 1960s. Loosely outlined Obedience to authority or to listen to the crosswalk guard. in party manuals, these programs were In 1963, Dr. Stanley Milgram pub- Professions each mark their own area used against criminals, civil dissidents lished the findings of an experiment of authority in society, from courtroom and even American POWs during the that is still one of the most controver- law to waging wars. Korean War.9 The camps went beyond sial in modern psychology. His goal These authorities make many of mere behavior influence; the goal was was to better understand atrocities our decisions for us when we’re faced for the subject to completely espouse such as the death camps at Auschwitz with unfamiliar or excessive amounts the ideology of the communist regime. and Dachau. Was it an individual’s of information. For example, in the The camps took a very subtle tack: In inherent personality or social forces midst of a traffic accident, you’ll follow the beginning, they might ask the sub- that could lead to such depraved acts? the hand signals of the police officer ject only to sign a politically charged

“In all negotiations, the importance of flexibility cannot be understated. A successful bargainer is patient and always willing to adjust his terms.”

The experiment was simple: The test without questioning. document — a seemingly harmless subject was misinformed to make him Authority is easily adapted as an contrivance — for a bowl of rice. More believe that the researcher was study- influence technique during a negotia- involved writing assignments would ing the effects of punishment on learn- tion. The probability that a request will then follow, lulling the subject into a ing. In actuality, the real experiment be accepted increases greatly if either: sense of routine. “Recopy this party focused on how much electricity the (a) the requester bears some sort of au- manifesto for us.” “Memorize this.” subject was willing to administer to an thority regarding the subject matter; or “Recite this in front of the other prison- imaginary learner when he answered (b) the requester is making his request ers.” Slowly, and over time, the con- questions wrong. A speaker would play at the recommendation or behest of an stant pressure could twist a subject’s sounds of screaming and anguished authority figure.6 Authority can be car- self-image until he was actually protests as the voltmeter increased ried by someone with a title or special cooperating. The results are shocking. and the imaginary learner continued to job position. In other cases, simply American POWs who were repatriated make mistakes. In 65 percent of more having privileged information can lend in 1953 recounted the intelligence and than 100 separate experiments, the the influencer authority. propaganda opportunities they had test subject followed the orders of the Research further suggests that inadvertently provided enemy forces. researcher and administered shocks certain people are more prone to obey This prompted the military to adopt past the lethal level of 400 volts.5 authority than others. A 2002 study the Code of Conduct and conduct more These results have been repro- conducted among four major univer- training in resisting interrogation.10 duced in virtually every similar ex- sity psychology departments reported: The commitment and consistency periment to date. The presence of the “Career interests and world view ... technique is based on personal and researcher, attired in his professional moderate estimates of self and other interpersonal pressure to behave in lab coat and politely urging the shocks obedience.”7 A government official or accordance with our previous deci- to continue, was the key variable of military figure, long indoctrinated on sions. Every culture in the world compliance. Test subjects obeyed the the importance of following orders and appreciates a man or woman who is lab coat even when the experiment a chain of command, is therefore more steadfast in their beliefs and follows

September-October 2007 17 The art of influence

through with their word. Examples of The majority of the earth’s popula- now, the deal won’t be available in the this surround us. Business employ- tion is satisfied with its sense of self; morning,” or “Well, if you won’t agree, ers seek this quality when they hire. humans tend to like themselves and the other tribe I was in contact with Matchmaking consumers rate “de- their personal qualities. Others who earlier was interested.” Sometimes pendability” as one of the top three share the same qualities are liked, too. a touch of scarcity can produce the characteristics of a potential partner. The association principle in psychol- small lean you need to complete the Many analysts believe presiden- ogy stipulates that if a person sees a negotiation. Use this technique gently, tial candidate John Kerry committed similarity between two things, he as- as the subject may not appreciate the political suicide with the statement, sumes that the two are alike in other pressure and may simply walk away. “I actually voted for the [bill] before I ways.13 Therefore, if the influencer and voted against it.”11 On a psychological the subject share even a few charac- Planning level, human beings need consistency teristics, the subject will tend to be- As stated before, none of these com- to conserve their mental energy. After lieve that they are alike in other ways. pliance techniques are new or revolu- a person makes a decision, even as This feedback builds on itself and can tionary. The fact that a well-liked per- simple as “I dislike broccoli,” it is eas- help lead the subject to look positively son has a better chance of influencing ier to behave in accordance with that on the influencer. other people is not shocking. However, decision than to constantly re-evalu- So as the influencer and subject sit the benefit of discussing these tech- ate the information every time one is down and converse in their first face- niques, naming them and compiling faced with the same choice. to-face meeting, it serves the influencer them into a list makes it substantially To bring the full force of commitment and consis- well to direct the conversation into easier to plan with them.14 No military tency to bear in a negotiation, start small and build. topics that will reveal the similarities operation in the U.S. Army is per- The influencer gets the subject to commit toA , then between the two. Easy places to start formed without some level of planning. to A + B. It’s then a small jump to A + B + C = D, are families: wives, children, brothers, Why should interactions with people which is the influencer’s real goal. Then the influencer sisters, etc. One layer deeper would encountered during a mission be any will make every effort to publicize that agreement as lie the similarities of their goals. What different? It is surprising to learn that widely as possible. By sharing the subject’s decision was the common ground that brought in the intelligence industry, introverts with his peers or colleagues, it brings that interper- everyone together? What does everyone sometimes make the best operatives.15 sonal pressure on him to comply, because he wants to gain from a successful negotiation? While extroverts are adept at carrying appear to be consistent with his decision. That is why These conversations, coupled with pa- on conversations and are comfortable diet and health counselors encourage clients to share tience, cultural respect and a smile, go around people, the introvert seeks their goals with their friends and families. If only the far toward reaching an agreement with design and order in everything he does. influencer and the subject know of the commitment, it which everyone will be pleased. Conversations and negotiations can be is much easier for the subject to change his mind.12 anticipated and modeled. True litiga- Scarcity tors spend hours contemplating the Likeability There’s an adage with a thousand logic their opponent will use and find An influencer’s likeability with the different translations: “You always methods for refuting it. subject greatly affects the probability want what you can’t have.” Making The final compliance technique of compliance. It should not surprise something scarce is the easiest and involves approaching negotiations in anyone that sales associates in virtu- most complete technique for increas- the same manner as in intelligence ally every business are trained to be ing its desirability. Where there is a preparation of the battlefield: Identify as affable, polite and pleasant as pos- limited supply, there is a breadth of the subject of your influence. Consid- sible. The best performers in this field demand. If something is in high de- er his environment and what he may have a customer believing that the mand, then it must have great value, seek in an interaction. Use informa- sales rep is their new best friend, and and if it’s valuable, we want it. tion regarding his culture, religion, he will leave the store grateful that he Psychological reactance is the term tribe, past experiences and previous could buy the item from such a nice behavior professionals use to explain occupations to glean an indication of person. When a girl scout is selling this phenomenon. Along with every the best way to approach him. Finally, her cookies, the first places she’ll living species’ evolutionary drive to develop a course of action. What will go are to the houses of her parents’ compete for limited resources, human you talk about first, second and third? friends and neighbors. beings exhibit a tendency to preserve If he mentions a sensitive subject, Psychologists have identified many their prerogatives. The ability to make how will you return the conversation variables of how much a person is a choice is a freedom. Take away that to your agenda? How can you lever- “liked.” Physical attractiveness is a choice, as when someone else takes age or resource some of his requests? large contributor in the first moments the last of anything, and an individual What conditions do you set before the after the introduction. The amount loses personal control of his environ- conversation is over? When will you of influencer-subject contact and the ment. The need to retain this control meet again?16 influencer’s professional background can lead us to desire a scarce object. are factors, too. While these variables As an influence technique, scarcity Notes: are difficult to control, there is a tre- is used when you put a time limit on 1 Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Opera- mendous potential in one likeability an offer or explain how other people tions, 1-7. variable if the influencer can only ap- seek the asset you are bartering: 2 Robert B. Cialdini, Compliance: The Psychol- proach it properly: similarity. “Please, sir, if you can’t agree to this ogy of Persuasion Revised Edition (Quill, 1984), 1-19.

18 Special Warfare RECIPROCATION The principle of reciprocation shows that people are naturally inclined to repay services and favors provided to them. In ex- change for the construction of a new building, for example, villagers might be more willing to provide information regarding suspicious activities in the area. U.S. Army photo.

Cialdini’s research provided the base of reference of this ian support and other control mechanisms ensured that counterindustrial espionage. article. After understanding the basic concepts, it was the leaders continued to facilitate cooperation and did 16 Nolan, 25. possible to review other research articles and seek in- not renege on their commitments. formation from other sources. Cialdini also recognizes 9 Larry Zellers, In Enemy Hands: A Prisoner other compliance techniques that are not specified in in North Korea (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of this essay. Kentucky, 1991), 43, 168. Zellers was a civilian prisoner 3 John Mariotti, “Understanding Influence and Per- during the Korean War. A portion of his book traces suasion,” Industry Week, 5 April 1999, Vol. 248; 126. interrogation techniques that originated in China and 4 Daniel J. O’Keefe and Marianne Figge, “A Guilt spread as far as Vietnam in the 1970s. He discusses Based Explanation of Door in the Face Strategy,” Human specific measures and procedures that his captors used Captain David P. Coughran Jr. Communication Research, September 1997, Vol. 24; against him. is a student in the Special Forces 64,18. 10 Don Oldenburg, “Tending to the Psychic Qualification Course. He graduat- 5 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New Wounds of POWs; Military ‘Decompression’ Eases ed from the U.S. Military Academy York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1974), 155. Transition,” The Washington Post, 15 April 2003, C 01. in 2002 with a degree in mechani- 6 Cialdini, 230-33. 11 Damian Cave, “Flip Flopper,” The New York cal engineering and was com- 7 Glen Heber, Kathleen P. Bauman, Sara Elizabeth Times, 26 December 2004, 4. missioned as an Engineer officer. Kay Hubbard and Jared Richard Legate, “Self and Other 12 Master Sergeant Martin, interview with author, His assignments include platoon Obedience Estimates: Biases and Moderators,” The Fort Bragg, N.C., 3 March 2007. leader, 73rd Engineer Company; Journal of Social Psychology, December 2002, Vol. 13 Cialdini, 194. and task force engineer, 1st Bat- 142; 688. 14 Lieutenant Colonel Mark Baggett, interview with talion, 24th Infantry Regiment 8 Lieutenant Colonel Paul Burton, interview with the author, Fort Bragg, N.C., 14 March 2007. Baggett’s (Stryker Brigade Combat Team). author, Fort A.P. Hill, Va., 30 January 2007; and Fort suggestions greatly contributed to this portion of the He has served in Operation Iraqi Bragg, N.C., 12 March 2007. Burton frequently used article. Freedom III with the 1st Brigade, this approach during operations in Africa, the Middle 15 John Nolan, Confidential Business Secrets 25th Infantry Division (SBCT); with East, Latin America and Afghanistan. He reports that Getting Theirs, Keeping Yours (Yardly Chambers, the 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group; as a commander of a special-operations task force 1999), 23. Nolan had a 20-year career as a govern- and as a liaison officer to the 2nd in Afghanistan, his greatest success in influencing ment intelligence official. He worked with the CIA, the Infantry Battalion, Iraqi National the population to cooperate with coalition forces was military and other government agencies. He is known Guard. convincing their key leadership. Leveraging humanitar- in the mainstream business industry for his seminars in

September-October 2007 19 Breaking the Afghan Insurgency By Major Christopher B. Wells

Breaking the afghan insurgency

n a cloudless, still morning, dawn breaks on a small village in the Oruzgan province of Afghanistan. As the sun rises, it casts shadows along the crumbling dirt walls of the dozen or so dwellings that make up the village. Despite the still- O ness of the coming day, an ominous dust storm appears to grow from the valley floor to the south of the village. The inhabitants of the village stare in confusion at the mysterious storm forming in the valley. The Taliban mixed among the residents look not in confusion but in horror, as they recognize not only the cause of the storm but the power behind it. Above the din of the dusty tempest, aircraft fly, and within its whirlwind, a virtual armada of coalition and Afghan National Security Force vehicles and men bear down on the village. The noise of some 300-plus soldiers, amplified by the benefits of modern technology, are the harbingers of destruction to the vastly outnumbered and relatively surprised Taliban who have taken over the village. They immediately launch into a well-practiced drill of escape, evasion and concealment among the villagers. Within hours, the Taliban has been routed from the village, either through successful escape or through unsuccessful confronta- tion with the massive coalition force, and relative order and security have been re-established for the villagers who have suffered under the tyranny of their “guests” for the last few weeks. In the days that follow the engagement, the ability of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to maintain order and provide a safe way of life is demonstrated to the populace. Vehicle checkpoints are established on the few roads leading into the village. A shura meeting is held to discuss civic improvements and to assuage the fears of the village elders of possible Taliban reprisal if they cooperate with the government forces. Promises are made for better wells, more food, improved roads and relief from tribal conflict. Within 72 hours of the initial assault that drove the Taliban from the village, the coalition forces, unable to maintain a presence because of a similar situation that requires their attention elsewhere, depart the small village. Despite every intention to the contrary, they leave the village much the same way they found it three days earlier. On another cloudless, still morning, dawn breaks on the same small village in the Oruzgan province of Afghanistan. As the sun rises, it reflects off the clean white turbans of the first group of Taliban to return to the village. In the dawn of the fifth day since they were driven from this oasis of possibility in the remote province, they return with a simple, insidious purpose. The sounds of the violence they bring back to the village quickly drown out the memory of the awful noise of the coalition force a mere 96 hours ago.

Time and again, this scenario plays and political entities can properly government and the populace. It is out throughout Afghanistan. Short- execute those types of operations. imperative to understand the effective- sighted combat operations, conducted Understanding the environment ness and efficiency of the host-na- simply for the sake of clearing out and the organization of the insurgent tion military, the level of corruption, pockets of enemy forces, do little to force is the key to fighting effectively economic growth and infrastructure establish the kind of long-term secu- and efficiently in a counterinsurgency, development, state of the insurgency, rity required to create a stable envi- or COIN, environment. Developing a and the support to the insurgency. ronment safe enough to allow for the flexible COIN strategy that is adopted Finally, it is imperative to organize improvement of Afghan society. by all forces and determining the the COIN force to conduct lethal and Only operations that incorporate command-and-control relationships nonlethal intelligence-driven, decen- aspects of clearance, security and between the civil government, military tralized, full-spectrum operations that development within the context of a and police are key in implementing a establish and maintain the security, comprehensive counterinsurgency successful counterinsurgency strategy. stability and safety needed to control framework will have the lasting effect Another priority is the development the insurgency and provide develop- required to save Afghanistan. Only of a task-force structure that inte- ment and support to the populace. truly integrated task forces that pos- grates the capability and capacity of Understanding the insurgency is sess elements of military, diplomatic the police, military, interagency, civil key in developing an effective COIN

22 Special Warfare strategy — how it is organized, how coalition efforts to establish enduring weapons caches are and begin report- it sustains itself and how it conducts security forces, economic stability, ing on Taliban activity throughout operations. This knowledge is critical government institutions and a func- the area. Whereas before, they would to the eventual defeat of the insurgent tional justice system. report on our movements to the Tal- movement. Special Forces Soldiers, The Soldiers of the 1st Battalion, iban,” said Major Chris Hensley, the from their early stages of training, 3rd Special Force Group, or Task TF-31 operations officer. are taught how to establish guer- Force-31, have deployed to Afghani- TF-31’s strategy follows four basic rilla forces composed of indigenous stan on five combat tours in support lines of thought: search, assist, at- personnel to fight, subvert, discredit of Operation Enduring Freedom, or tack and train. The Desert Eagles and eventually unseat an established OEF. The Desert Eagles, as they are search for the enemy and for ways to government. Nowhere has that been called, have been honing their coun- help the populace or the government. demonstrated better than in Afghani- terinsurgency strategy to address They assist the populace through stan, where just a few SF teams en- issues that historically plague coun- security development, humanitarian tered the country, and through their terinsurgency forces. assistance, or HA, and civil-military ability to organize and employ the TF-31’s strategy recognizes that operations, or CMO. They attack indigenous personnel, defeated the the civilian population is the center the insurgency, both lethally and Taliban regime. of gravity and that the fight needs to nonlethally, to separate the enemy However, six years later, U.S. be focused on winning the support of from the primary population centers. Special Forces, the Afghan National the passive/neutral populace, since Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Bolduc, Army and the multinational coali- a passive populace generally favors the former TF-31 commander, ex- tion are running into problems with the enemy. plains, “This is a political, diplomatic a resurgence of the Taliban. The in- “We have found that the enemy and military process. These elements surgency is pushing hard to reclaim can easily intimidate locals into pro- must be integrated, coordinated, large portions of territory from which viding them support, a help-us-or-else synchronized and deconflicted. One it was driven. While the SF Soldiers kind of attitude. The fence-sitters are of the problems we face is that units have been lauded as experts in un- usually just trying to survive. It isn’t that deploy to Afghanistan conduct conventional warfare and masters until we can prove to the people that operations based on rotational cycles of employing indigenous forces to an enduring security situation exists, vs. operations based on a unified overthrow lawless governments, they that we can expect to see a shift in the counterinsurgency-campaign plan. have encountered difficulty dealing populace’s psyche — from passive to Additionally, many of the national with the insurgent forces in Afghani- actively supporting us. After that, they task forces get sidetracked by focus- stan. Those forces attempt to thwart start telling us where the IEDs and ing on their respective provinces and

SOTF-31 STRATEGY NESTED WITH ISAF/NATO & RC-SOUTH ADZ

1. Security 2. Good Governance & Justice 3. Infrastructure & Economic Growth

SEARCH ASSIST ATTACK TRAIN • HUMINT INTEL • Village - Province • HUMINT Network • Individual Tasks • ANA/ANP/NDS INTEL • Promote Nationalism Over Tribalism • ANP INTEL Network • Collective Tasks • Interagency INTEL • MEDCAP/VETCAP • Cordon & Search • Shoot, Move, C2 • PRT/DOS INTEL • CAT-A (CERP/Cash for Work) • Sweep and Clear • TLPs to CO Leadership • Develop NAIs • Shura Meetings • Deliberate Ops & CRP - Chance • Govt. and Institution Development • Build Afghan and Coalition Relations • IO-Peace Papers Contact: Pressure, Pursue, Punish • MDMP for ANA Staff • Nested Strategy • Flyers, etc. • Movement to Contact: Air & Ground • Unit COIN Training • Redevelop AOR Familiarization • Radios/Stations • QRF to Other Units • Doctrine-Driven SOF - UW/COIN • Combat RECON Patrols (CRP) • HA Supplies • IO Targeting • Train the Trainer • IO Campaign • A-Camp Clinics • Eagle Attack/Nest • ANA Green-Amber-Red Cycle • Interaction With Populace • Civil-Military Ops • IO Training for ANA • Eagle Search • USAID/NGO Ops • Decentralized FID Training • Eagle Sweep • Mobile Mullah

AFGHAN FACE, AFGHAN LED

September-October 2007 23 breaking the afghan insurgency

then follow their own agendas rather than an integrated strategy. Our mantra (pressure, pursue, punish) loosely mirrors the four tenets of our strategy, and I believe it provides … the proper default needed to work through problems encountered in this complex environment.” The U.S. Special Forces must train the Afghan National Security Forces, or ANSF, and officials of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, or IRoA, to further build up government infrastructure and capabilities, all of which set conditions for bringing in developmental organizations. They conduct sustainment training with the Afghan National Army, or ANA, conduct basic counterinsurgency training with the Afghan National Po- lice, or ANP, and they mentor government officials from the village to the provincial level in order to establish systems that promote good governance and justice. Ouch A Special Forces medic, assigned to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task The Desert Eagles’ strategy is Force- Afghanistan, provides medical treatment to a Soldier who received shrapnel wounds facilitated through several operations from an RPG explosion while battling Taliban fighters in the Sangin District area of the Helmand Province. U.S. Army photo. that are revised prior to every TF-31 deployment to Afghanistan. These operations are designed to provide Counterinsurgency consolida- COIN operations. Historically, there the operational detachments and tion operations are one of the pillars are 18 pitfalls that disrupt efforts staff with a common vision to guide of Eagle Strategy and are critical to in dealing with an active insurgent tactical missions. winning the counterinsurgency fight. group. The battalion determined that, The operations are: Eagle Search, Bolduc puts it best, “COIN is gradu- collectively, from the individual-unit designed for incoming detachments ate-level warfare, a thinking man’s level to the coalition-command level, to regain operational awareness of game. It simply isn’t enough to strike nine of the 18 mistakes were being their respective areas of responsibil- the enemy or focus on insurgent made, three of which will be covered ity and to conduct extended recon- leadership. We must affect all levels in detail in this article. naissance patrols to identify enemy of the insurgent infrastructure. This The most relevant mistake being locations for future lethal operations; is a cyclic process that requires intel- made is that the coalition is operating Eagle Sweep, designed to target and ligence-driven, decentralized, full- under “multiple divergent lines of com- clear enemy forces from key popula- spectrum operations that must focus mand and control, all following sepa- tion centers identified during Eagle on establishing security, stability and rate agendas.” The Desert Eagles must Search; Eagle Attack, designed to safety for the Afghan people.” (See coordinate all their efforts through the target enemy forces that have been graphic on Page 25.) Combined Joint Special Operations made to operate in their safe haven During the battalion’s most re- Task Force-Afghanistan, or CJSOTF-A, and contested areas identified during cent deployment, the battalion staff which in turn answers to Combined Eagle Search and Eagle Sweep; and conducted a review of SF doctrine Joint Task Force-76, or CJTF-76. Eagle Nest, an enduring operation in order to conduct an internal as- Additionally, the battalion falls designed to seamlessly continue in- sessment and identify any breaks or within the battlespace of Regional frastructure development, further de- flaws in TF-31’s strategy. The review Command-South, or RC-South, velop IRoA government capacity and revealed some noteworthy results which is composed of several national to provide oversight regarding the — many validated the strategy, while commands under the International establishment of enduring security others exposed areas that required Security Assistance Force, or ISAF. in key population centers and on pri- further focus or revision. RC-South is separated into smaller mary lines of communication through The review began with an examina- task forces that are given control over COIN consolidation operations. tion of the common mistakes made in specific political provinces. While TF-

24 Special Warfare The Counterinsurgency Strategy Pyramid

Tier 1 SOF (Insurgent Leader Focused) Weigh the effects vs. the Lethal operations are (OCF/OGA/UK SAS/CANSOF/ETC...) EMPOWERED cost to the populace. How greatly reduced as POPULACE effective will the strike security is established Strike operation be without the in key population Operations proper foundation? centers. Limited Lethal Ops Tier 2 SOF and Conventional Forces Against Insurgent (Population Focused) Infrastructure/Leadership (USSF with ANA & ANP Facilitated through & nested with conventional forces & PGAs/NGPs

SUPPORTED Transform a passive population Focused Information Civil Military POPULACE More support from the into a pro-government one, thus Intelligence Operations Operations population equates to reducing support to the insurgency Collection (IO) To Win the Infrastructure more reliable intelligence. and further denying the insurgents Populace Development freedom of movement.

SECURED Employment of Civil POPULACE Population security Defense Forces creates a is the most Counterinsurgency Basic Security/Consolidation Operations important aspect of early warning net. Protect the Populace/Search & Attack Insurgents Assist/Train Host-Nation counterinsurgency Forces/Populace Develop Irregular Forces - Civil Defense Forces/Aux Police consolidation Employ Population Control Measures (PCM) operations. Establish CPs/Martial Law (As Required)/Travel Permits & IDs /Security Patrols/Curfews (As Required)

Each layer enables the next layer of operations, but all can occur concurrently. The populace is the key — a passive or neutral populace generally favors the insurgency.

31 doesn’t officially fall into the RC- Additionally, all ANA and ANP fall bazaars, posted on the Internet or South command structure, it must under the Combined Security Train- released to the mainstream media. coordinate all its efforts through every ing Command-Afghanistan, or CSTC- Many insurgent commanders regu- level of command. The battalion does A, and the Afghan Ministry of Inte- larly speak directly to reporters or are not seek approval but it does attempt rior. While CSTC-A efforts are focused regularly contacted by representa- to gain support in order to avoid coali- on solving problems that hamper the tives of the media who are undoubt- tion infighting. ANSF, they make decisions that are edly granted exclusive direct access Concurrently, TF-31 is required to often at odds with those of maneuver to those leaders. coordinate and seek approval through commanders and with tactical ground In most cases, media interactions its formal chain of command. At the truth. CSTC-A’s centralized control are not coordinated; they are ac- RC-South level, each represented doesn’t afford the commander the tions taken by motivated individuals NATO nation generally tries to sup- visibility to make informed decisions unhampered by approval processes. port the designated RC-South com- that effect the tactical level. Overall, the assessment indicates mander, a position that rotates from The second mistake commonly that the Taliban is well ahead of each represented nation every four to made during COIN operations is coalition efforts in that arena. The six months. “Failure to establish an effective current national and international Each task force is under the strategic, operational and tactical public opinion of U.S. efforts in deal- operational control of the RC-South information operations (IO) campaign ing with the insurgency indicates that commander; however, the command- to counter insurgent IO efforts.” Time the insurgency has been successful er’s position is weakened by contrib- and again, the Taliban and other at peddling its messages to what ap- uting country’s national caveats that insurgent forces have released mes- pears to apparently liberal media only limit the commander’s ability to exert sages with video that were broadcast too happy to broadcast the messages his command authority. This problem on major media outlets around the under the guise of legitimate news. is commonly referred to as “NOCON,” world before coalition forces had time At the tactical level, the battalion since most operations are agreed to determine what happened. has made significant strides in its upon and negotiated to gain desired Additionally, the enemy has be- efforts to counter the enemy’s propa- effects. Generally the effect is limited come adept at developing low-budget ganda machine. Two years ago, the at best. propaganda videos that are sold in battalion began fielding its “radio in

September-October 2007 25 breaking the afghan insurgency

a box” concept, placing small broad- is “Conducting combat operations support the insurgency. Bolduc, the cast radio systems next to most of for the sake of conducting combat TF-31 commander, stated, “The key its firebases. These radio systems operations; Conducting large sweep- is an organization driven by a COIN have greatly enhanced SF’s ability to and-clear operations for short-term strategy that is flexible, adaptable reach the populace with news, music, effects, instead of conducting sweep, and focuses on achieving effects open-mike interviews with local lead- clear, hold, secure and develop against the enemy and gaining the ers and time-sensitive information operations for long-term effects on support of the people.” broadcast across a province. the enemy and the populace.” This There have been several examples However, the centralized approval is probably the most recurrent and of conventional units that proved to process for broadcast messages is harmful type of operation that oc- be successful at realigning their forc- retained at higher levels. Many mes- curs. Usually, conventional forces es in order to deal with COIN issues sages are not approved for release lapse into this type of operational and reorganized their forces to better until well after the time when they tempo, but on occasion, some Special avoid common pitfalls. Ideally, a con- have relevance to unfolding events. A Forces units make this mistake as ventional force should decentralize its possible solution to this problem is to well, usually when they concentrate forces, partner with host-nation forc- first have a strategic IO plan that del- only on conducting direct-action es, conduct security for the provincial egates authority to tactical command- missions and focus on targeting the reconstruction teams, disrupt enemy ers to broadcast messages relevant to insurgent leadership. safe havens and protect population their level of operations. Secondly, a Conventional forces, on the other centers and key facilities. One unit system of approved criteria should be hand, suffer from organizational ar- deployed its subordinate units across developed that would provide lower- chitectures that restrict their ability the volatile Zabul Province in small, level commanders guidelines and give to operate in a COIN environment. decentralized elements that were suc- them freedom to release time-sensi- Conventional forces are simply not cessful in gaining effects against the tive messages that would counter Tal- agile enough to adapt to the ever- insurgency.

“The key is an organization driven by a COIN strategy that is flexible, adaptable and focuses on achieving effects against the enemy and gaining the support of the people.” iban information operations. changing insurgent template. Their The commander nested his opera- TF-31 developed a comprehensive centralized command-and-control tions with the capabilities and capac- IO campaign plan designed to influ- structure is not suited to COIN op- ities of Task Force-31 and adopted a ence the insurgents and populace erations. This fact breeds frustration COIN strategy that was tailored for through lethal and nonlethal means. that drives commanders to conduct his infantrymen. They began aggres- The strategy spans the tactical, large sweep-and-clear operations to sively patrolling their area of respon- operational and strategic levels by co- “defeat the insurgency once and for sibilities in small groups that were ordinating print, radio, Internet and all.” able to interact effectively with the television messaging. Each week, the The large conventional footprint populace, disrupt Taliban freedom of staff holds its IO working group meet- usually telegraphs units’ intentions movement and facilitate reconstruc- ing to discuss CMO projects, success- to the enemy, and the insurgent force tion efforts. The commander empow- es against enemy forces, ANA/SF/co- simply departs the area until the op- ered his subordinates to become as alition cooperative efforts and ways eration has concluded. Again, these agile as the enemy and entrusted of countering radical Islamic propa- large operations usually produce few them with the freedom to make timely ganda. The battalion also executes or no measurable effects, further tactical decisions, thereby greatly an IO battle drill order to publish or frustrating commanders. Addition- enhancing his battalion’s COIN capa- broadcast time-sensitive messages ally, these operations are generally bility. He also maintained a stand- that will counter enemy messag- repeated, and over time, the popu- ing quick-reaction force, or QRF, ing and defuse crisis situations that lace becomes weary of the constant that could move to support infantry could harm U.S. or IRoA political and disruption and regular invasions into troops and Special Forces teams military objectives. Again, this is all their homes during mass searches. that required additional assistance. closely nested with the RC-South’s IO Units that operate in this fashion Furthermore, the QRF element not efforts to identify gaps and realign IO find that the populace begins to view “on-call” would directly support the assets as required. coalition forces as unwelcome guests provincial reconstruction team as it The last mistake to be reviewed and in some cases, begins to actively moved through the districts work-

26 Special Warfare built between the two commands has helped to fill SF’s inherent shortcomings. Bolduc said, “The infantry bring mass and assets I just don’t have. Yes, we have mass in the ANA, but at times they have faltered or have reached the end of their skill sets. In those instances, we, SF, need to be able to rely on a force that can move quickly to exploit success.” These balanced lethal and nonlethal approaches are effective tem- plates that conventional commanders should consider adopting when operating in the Afghan theater of operations. Normally, conventional and special-operations forces clash in their approaches dealing with the Af- ghan insurgency, but when egos are set aside and commanders focus on a common goal or vision, great strides can occur in defeating the insurgent movement. Task Force-31’s strategy continues to evolve as the ISAF begins to take on more responsibility in southern Afghanistan. With that comes a myriad of challenges that define coalition warfare. The Desert Eagles have resolved many of those issues by nesting their operations with the RC-South headquarters. Through this parallel coordination, both commands have been able to sustain complementary effects across the region. Additionally, TF-31 recognized the need for close cooperation with sister Up in smoke Special Forces Soldiers and members of the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry Regi- coalition SOF under ISAF control. ment, search for enemy fighters after Air Force munitions strike a target in the Sangin District of TF-31 began by incorporating SOF Afghanistan. U.S. Army photo. liaison officers into its headquarters staff and by offering each element ing on development projects. trum COIN operations. Furthermore, its own working space. Currently, In January 2007, the 1st Bat- he wanted to expand his capabil- there are representatives from Dutch, talion, 508th Parachute Infantry ity to collect human intelligence, or Canadian, Polish and Romanian SOF; Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, HUMINT, and position his leaders Australian Special Air Service; and deployed to RC-South in support of to better interact with the populace, the British Special Boat Squadron. ISAF’s mission under the command thereby increasing his ability to influ- All have signed on as members of the of Lieutenant Colonel Brian Mennes. ence the enemy. combined special-operations cell, a Mennes, realizing the need to become While the unit has just begun its coordination and deconfliction work- as agile as the enemy, decided to deployment, its commander’s actions ing group that was conceived of by partner with TF-31 to glean tactics, demonstrate that he understands and TF-31 during its latest OEF rotation. techniques and procedures from the is willing to address capability issues The resulting level of cooperation Desert Eagles. He wanted to em- in order to adapt to a counterinsur- has proven to be critical to unity of power his subordinate commanders gency environment — an environment effort and to creating focused op- to conduct decentralized small-unit that is inherently unconventionally erations in RC-South. Initially, the missions that focused on broad-spec- based. Furthermore, the cooperation Desert Eagles encountered resistance

September-October 2007 27 breaking the afghan insurgency

Talking points Assadullah Khalid, the governor of Kandahar, and Major General Ton Van Loon, the RC-South commander, meet with local elders in Panjawayi at a shura arranged by Special Forces Soldiers. U.S. Army photo. from many of their European part- dahar. Task Force 31 pushed just probably thought they could achieve ners. Many coalition members simply four SF A-teams with their partnered a strategic victory against the un- didn’t understand the capacity and ANA and a B-team into Panjwayi to proven ISAF/ NATO forces.” capabilities of SF. Through focused dislodge the enemy force. Later, to After the area had been cleared, and deliberate leader engagements, exploit success, an infantry company TF-31 recommended to the RC- the battalion commander set out to from the 10th Mountain Division was South commander that in order to inform his counterparts about the placed under SF command to assist prevent the Taliban from returning, full capabilities of Green Berets. He with detailed clearing operations. a series of checkpoints needed to be did that by proving the validity of After a month of heavy fighting, the established to properly consolidate the strategy as it was applied in the Desert Eagles emerged victorious. this key population center. This was Oruzgan Province, the birthplace of The Taliban sustained losses not seen never done, and the Taliban returned the Taliban. since the early stages of the war, with and began rebuilding their num- The strategy was further validated 562 confirmed enemy dead, validated bers. Recognizing the resurgence of through the battalion’s participation through AC-130 Specter/UAV Preda- new fighters in Panjwayi, RC-South, in two of the largest NATO combat tor footage and firsthand accounts. now under the command of Dutch operations in history, Medusa and Bolduc reflected on the similari- Major General Ton Van Loon, asked Baaz Tsuka. Medusa drove an en- ties between this battle and ones he the Desert Eagles to participate in trenched Taliban force of 1,400 from endured during the initial invasion of a second clearing operation in the the contested district of Panjwayi, Afghanistan. “On Sept. 11, 2006, as I contested area. TF-31 agreed, under the foothold the Taliban required to assessed the battlefield, I wondered, the condition that SF be given a free seize Kandahar City. It is the same ‘Why are we fighting the enemy in the hand to build the required perma- area that the Russians could not take same manner as we did in November nent security apparatuses through from the Mujahideen in the 1980s, 2001?’ Then I thought, well, the en- the construction of nearly 20 police and the Soviets eventually lost Kan- emy has a vote, too, and the Taliban checkpoints.

28 Special Warfare Joint Patrol Special Forces Soldiers on patrol with British soldiers in the Helmand Province stop to regroup before continuing on their patrol. U.S. Army photo.

The commander agreed, and Op- conjunction with U.S. Civil Affairs, Desert Eagles as the consummate eration Baaz Tsuka was born. Similar began cash-for-work projects to facili- experts of counterinsurgency and to Operation Medusa, Baaz Tsuka tate reconstruction of battle-damaged unconventional warfare. He made the proved to be yet another defeat for property. Furthermore, the Kandahar following statement at a NATO awards the Taliban, but now, with the newly governor, with an entourage of inter- ceremony: “I need more units like TF- constructed checkpoints, the insur- national media, came to Panjwayi to 31: They are my most effective task gent fighters were denied freedom tout the success of Baaz Tsuka and force in Southern Afghanistan.” of movement. With the return of the to conduct a series of shura meetings local families, who could see that the with the district leadership and vil- Major Christopher B. Wells has new security system was working, lage elders. The meetings focused on conducted four combat tours as a Spe- Afghanis began to report locations of coordination of reconstruction efforts cial Forces detachment commander, IEDs, caches and remnant groups of and the recruitment of young men to commanding ODAs 321 and 324 and Taliban fighters, as predicted. In fact, join the new Afghan National Auxil- serving as the Task Force-31 future there were instances in which locals iary Police. Concurrently, IO efforts operations officer. In that capacity, he were emboldened to kill Taliban fight- were employed to exploit the success led the planning effort in support of ers who were attempting to emplace in Panjwayi. operations Medusa and Baaz Tsuka. IEDs intended for coalition forces. As a result of TF-31’s shared suc- He has been awarded the Silver Star SF, Canadian engineers, British cess, many of the coalition partners Medal and four Bronze Star Med- SOF and Dutch infantry all assisted began to accept the strategy as a als for his contributions to Operation the Afghan National Army with the proven method that should be repli- Enduring Freedom. Wells has also nonlethal activities that followed the cated in other units and adopted at received the Valorous Unit Award operation. Humanitarian supplies higher levels. Van Loon, who once and the Army Superior Unit Award were rushed in, and the U.S. Agency viewed Special Forces methods with for service in Afghanistan with Task for International Development, in skepticism, now publicly touts the Force-31.

September-October 2007 29 The Carrot and the Stick: Can it still work? By Major Patrick M. O’Hara

The United States is conducting major counter- organization.4 Fighting between the Huks and the insurgency, or COIN, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, landlords’ private armies continued. In April of that year, but the success of these ongoing operations has been Roxas died, and his vice-president, Elpidio Quirino, was limited at best. The current U.S. strategy seems to focus on named his successor. In 1949, Quirino was formally combatting the insurgents conventionally, with only limited elected president, but that election was seen as corrupt. resources dedicated to addressing the issues that initially Huk activities and recruitment increased, as did the ignited and continue to fuel the insurgencies. human- and civil-rights violations by government forces.5 The U.S. Army must learn from historical successes In the summer of 1950, Roberto Kangleon, the and attempt to adapt and adjust the strategies used in Philippine secretary of national defense, resigned over a the past into viable courses of action for today. One of dispute with Quirino over the reorganization of the military. the most successful COIN operations conducted during Quirino asked Ramon Magsaysay, the chairman of the the last 50 years has been the defeat of the Hukbalahap house of representatives’ committee on national defense, to insurrection by President Ramon Magsaysay and the fill the post. Magsaysay said he would, but on the condition Filipino government in the early 1950s. Combined with that he be given a free hand. Quirino reluctantly agreed.6 reform in the government and the military, Magsaysay’s use of “the carrot and the stick” defeated the insurgents on Causes of the insurrection the battlefield and also in the heartlands. The causes of the insurgency at first centered on landlord-tenant disputes and corruption in the national The Huk insurrection government. The tenants who worked the land felt that Following the occupation of the Philippines by Japan they had little representation in the government, while in 1941 and the decimation of the Philippine army, bands their oppressive landlords had much. When the tenants of Filipino guerrillas organized in rural areas to fight a did gain seats in the government, as in 1946, their elected protracted campaign against the Japanese. These guerrillas candidates were not allowed to be installed.7 Additionally, were called “Hukbalahap” (Huks for short), which meant the Huks felt betrayed and minimized when they were “people’s anti-Japanese army.”1 forced to demobilize and were later declared illegal. Following the liberation of the Philippines from As the government and landlords tried to suppress the the Japanese in 1945, many Huks were reluctant to insurgency under the Roxas “iron-fist policy,” violence and demobilize. When General Douglas MacArthur jailed Huk injustices committed by the government forces against leaders Luis Taruc and Castro Alejandro, the Huks fled the tenant peasants increased.8 This caused the peasants to the mountains but continued to support the National and Huks to become more aggressive, which pushed the Peasant Union, or NPU, from hiding. In 1946, Manuel government forces to be even more violent. The iron- Roxas was elected the Philippine president in what was fist policy only caused the insurgency to grow and gain considered a corrupt election.2 Landlord-vs.-peasant support. The Huk insurgency reached its peak during violence increased, and after the murder of NPU leader the period 1949 though 1951. During that time, Filipino Juan Feleo, the Huks rebelled in central Luzon.3 intelligence estimated that the Huk forces numbered By 1948, military attempts to quell the Huks had between 11,000 and 15,000,9 with some 250,000 failed. President Roxas pardoned Japanese collaborators supporters.10 The Huks also controlled the central Luzon and declared the Huks to be an illegal and subversive region and had committees established in the southern

30 Special Warfare Eagle Eye Colonel Abudul Majeed, commander, 1st Kandak, 209th Afghan National Army Corps (left), combat-advised by a U.S. Army Special Forces company commander, assigned to the Combined Joint Special Forces Task Force-Afghanistan, assesses a location for a new governor’s headquarters in the Sangin District of Afghanistan. Building government offices to better serve the people is one example of a carrot that can be offered. U.S. Army photo. Tagalog region, the northern Luzon region, the Visayan during the 1951 elections to ensure safety and honesty in Islands and Mindanao. the election.12 In 1953, Magsaysay became president of the Philip- The carrot and the stick pines. In that capacity, he reformed the government to ad- After becoming secretary of national defense, Magsay- dress several of the issues that had ignited the insurgency. say implemented radical changes in the way the military He reduced corruption in the government, implemented conducted its COIN operations. His intent was to fight land reform, passed education legislation and took other the Huks in their own territory, combining the use of actions to improve the lives of the people.13 small-unit tactics with psychological warfare to maintain Magsaysay also developed a “carrot and the stick” constant pressure on the insurgents. Magsaysay wanted COIN strategy toward the Huks. This strategy was meant to create dissension within the Huks and influence the to hamper the Huks’ recruitment efforts, reduce insur- people to give their support to the government.11 gent support among the population and efficiently defeat Magsaysay improved the image of the military and the ongoing insurgent operations. The carrot consisted of three government. He insisted on high levels of professional- main features: (1) Magsaysay opened virgin tracks of land ism and was quick to punish soldiers who committed for cultivation; (2) he offered amnesty, land, cash, hous- injustices upon the people. He also deployed the military ing, work animals and training to all Huks who came in (it

September-October 2007 31 The Carrot and the Stick

was never called surrender); and (3) he reintegrated former rebels into society and the government.14 Magsaysay’s stick was his insistence that the Huks ENDOGENY EXOGENY were not rebels but mere felons wanted for rape, murder, etc. He offered rewards for Huk leaders, sometimes offering higher rewards for lower-ranking leaders to further create dissension.15 He used tactics designed specifically to trans- 16 fer popular support from the Huks to the government. INPUTS Because of Magsaysay’s philosophy and reforms, the U.S. (People, food, material, information, etc.) began providing more economic and military aid. By addressing the core grievances that initiated the insurgency (land reform, government corruption, and legal elections) and transforming the military from an oppres- sor into a protector of the people, Magsaysay was able to CONVERSION MECHANISM effectively defeat the Huk insurgency. By 1954, more than 9,000 insurgents had come in, and the Huks numbered (Production functions for training, fewer than 2,000 active guerrillas.17 By 1955, the popu- logistics, operations, etc.) lar-support base of the Huks, which had been as high as 250,000 in 1949, was reduced to fewer than 30,000.18 The Huks were no longer a serious threat. Insurgency as a system OUTPUTS (Activities) In their analytical essay on insurgencies, Rebellion and Authority, Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr. propose that insurgencies can be modeled as a system that has three components: inputs, conversion mechanisms and outputs.19 Their model illustrates not only the effects of AUTHORITY Magsaysay’s COIN strategy on the Huks but also its potential for use in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Leites and Wolf Insurgency Model According to the Leites and Wolf model, inputs are both internal (endogenous) and external (exogenous). Internal inputs include recruits, intelligence, food and shelter. Ex- gents’ outputs become more numerous and successful, ternal inputs include financing, equipment, training cadre inputs, particularly internal ones, increase. After process- and publicity.20 These inputs are the raw materials of the ing through the conversion mechanisms of the insurgent insurgency. system, these increased inputs produce more outputs, Conversion mechanisms are those functions through further feeding inputs, and so on. which inputs become outputs. These functions include training, equipping, supplying and leading the rebellion. Magsaysay’s COIN strategy The degree of organization within the rebellion often dic- Magsaysay’s carrot-and-stick COIN strategy can be tates the efficiency levels of these functions.21 The conver- integrated into the Leites and Wolf model of insurgencies. sion mechanisms turn the insurgency’s raw materials into Magsaysay’s carrot (social reforms that directly addressed operations against the government. the grievances of the people who supported the rebel ac- Outputs are the actual insurgents and their activities. tions) effectively removed the Filipino populace as a source Insurgent activities can be both combative and noncomba- of internal inputs. Because the Huks had no significant tive. Combative activities include sabotage, assassination, sources of external input, their insurgent system suffered terrorism and military attacks (usually starting with guer- from a lack of raw materials when they lost their support rilla fighting and leading to more conventional operations). among the populace. Noncombative activities include aid projects, education and Magsaysay’s stick (focusing military action on small- nonmilitary training to the people.22 These outputs are the unit tactics, ending large-scale operations and their inevi- more visible signs of an insurgency, but they are only a table large-scale collateral damage) defeated the conversion part of the entire insurgent system. mechanisms and the outputs of the Huk insurgent system. This insurgent system is cyclical, with the success of With most of the fighting occurring in the rebels’ own back- insurgent outputs affecting future inputs. As the insur- yard, the smaller-unit operations kept the fight focused on

32 Special Warfare Carrying a big stick A Special Forces Soldier engages insurgents attempting to disrupt a medical civic-action program. To effectively imple- ment a carrot-and-stick COIN strategy, military action must become focused on small-unit tactics, with an end to large-scale operations and their inevitable large-scale collateral damage. U.S. Army photo. the rebels (and the rebels only) as much as possible. The beyond the scope of this article, this section will focus on COIN operations were successful in improving local secu- the tactical applications of Magsaysay’s COIN approach. rity and government control. As a result, the Huks con- In order for a company-grade tactical commander ducted increasingly fewer effective insurgent operations, (detachment commander, company commander or platoon interrupting the cyclical nature of the insurgent system. leader) to understand which issues are most important to The focused, small-unit COIN operations also limited col- the local population — the basis for the carrot — within his lateral damage and its tendency to spur popular support particular area of operation, or AO, that commander must for the insurgents, further limiting the Huks’ sources of incorporate rapport-building into every operation his unit internal inputs. conducts. Through rapport, the tactical commander can With the carrot limiting inputs and the stick reducing determine what the population needs. By addressing those outputs, the Huk rebellion was defeated on two fronts. The needs, the tactical commander can reduce and eventually defeat led to the surrender of the Huk leader, Luis Taruc, eradicate any local support for the insurgents in the tacti- on May 17, 1954, and a severe reduction of the Huks’ re- cal AO. Local support for the government can be passive sistance against the government. (apathetic citizens begin to support the government) or active (citizens who once supported the insurgents switch Current applications their allegiances to the government). Although the Magsaysay carrot-and-the-stick” strategy The tactical commander will typically build rapport with worked in the Philippines of the early 1950s, could it work local leaders while the rest of the unit establishes rapport today in Afghanistan and Iraq? The answer is “yes.” with the various subsets of the populace. Rapport-build- Magsaysay’s carrot and stick have applications at the ing operations can be stand-alone missions (attendance at strategic, operational and tactical levels of modern COIN a local council meeting) or part of a larger operation (while strategy. Because strategic and operational strategies are conducting a patrol, the unit makes note of needed area-

September-October 2007 33 The carrot and the stick

Making a Point A Special Forces Soldier speaks with a village elder in Afghanistan about improvements to the village. By bringing improvements to the village, such as better schools and medical care, Soldiers can win the loyalty of the villagers from the Taliban. U.S. Army photo. improvement projects). Once established, rapport must can improve his mission success on combat operations continually be reinforced in order to build on past suc- — his “stick.” The answer is that it can lead to improved cesses and to expand the tactical commander’s influence sources of indigenous intelligence. Typically, the govern- throughout his AO. ment and the U.S. suffer from a lack of local intelligence While rapport-building operations can use positive assets, while the insurgents enjoy a huge advantage in that reinforcements (incentives), negative reinforcement (sanc- area. By building rapport and gaining support, the tactical tions) or a combination of both, the use of positive rein- commander gains access to those local assets, giving him forcements — meeting the basic needs of the people (food, and his unit a better intelligence picture for future combat water, shelter, security, etc.) — is usually the most effec- operations. As his “sight” into the local situation improves, tive course of action. Other than security, these needs the insurgents become blinder, and his success turns the might seem to lie outside the capability of a company- tables in the battle for local intelligence. grade tactical unit, but they do not. Additional foodstuffs While working on his carrot, the tactical commander for the populace can be brought in during scheduled re- must simultaneously work on his stick — direct combat supply operations. Detachment or company engineers can operations against the insurgents — to maintain pressure assist in rebuilding projects. Medical personnel can help on the insurgents and secure the populace. The tactics out in the local hospital. These are only a few examples used by the commander and his unit need to be designed of what the tactical unit can do to help the local populace for the smallest possible element that can still ensure the within their AO (outside of combatting insurgents and success of the mission and the safety of the Soldiers. As providing a secure environment). The tactical commander much as possible, operations need to be conducted on can forward any local need that is beyond his unit’s capa- insurgent ground. That can be extremely difficult, because bility to his higher command for action. in Afghanistan and Iraq, the insurgents are either in re- A tactical commander might ask how rapport-building mote locations or intermingled within the population. This

34 Special Warfare is where the intelligence gained through rapport-building direct combat with the insurgents. Tactical commanders greatly aids the unit in finding exactly where the insur- play a key role in this through their development of rap- gents are located. port with the local population and their conduct of combat Multiple small-unit operations at various locations (vs. operations against local insurgents within their tactical AO. one massive attack) will allow the tactical unit to secure These tactical COIN efforts will become the building blocks the populace and maintain constant pressure on the insur- of the COIN strategies of higher-level commanders. gents but will also lessen the amount of collateral damage. The people are the roots of the insurgent weed. If one The reduction of collateral damage will minimize the effects can take the roots away, the weed will wither, die, and not of COIN operations on the people and increase popular grow back. support for those actions. These tactical carrot-and-stick operations can form the Notes: base of the operational- and strategic-level COIN strategies 1 L. Grant Bridgewater, “Philippine Information Operations During The Hukbala- (the “big picture”) developed for the region, country or the- hap Counterinsurgency Campaign.” IO Sphere, Spring 2006 [journal online]; avail- ater. Leaders at those higher levels can build on the tactical able from http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_spring06_bridgewater. successes of ground units and gain valuable insights into pdf; Internet; accessed 28 July 2006, 37. local situations in order to accomplish COIN on a national 2 Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion (Berkeley: University of California and international level. They can begin large-scale rebuild- Press), 1977, 150. ing operations (i.e., power grids, irrigation systems and oil 3 Kerkvliet, 154. pipelines), target insurgent strongholds, start the flow of 4 Kerkvliet, 199. international aid, and begin transferring responsibility for 5 Kerkvliet, 210. national security to indigenous governmental forces. 6 Lawrence M. Greenberg, The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955 [book online] Summary (Washington, D.C.: Analysis Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987); Ramon Magsaysay recognized the need to attack the available from http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/coldwar/huk/huk-fm.html; Huk rebellion in a different way. He understood that who- Internet; cited 28 July 2006, 82. ever had the support of the Filipino people would eventu- 7 Kerkvliet, 150. ally win. Magsaysay developed a carrot-and-stick ap- 8 Kerkvliet, 188. proach to COIN that would reprioritize government efforts 9 Kerkvliet, 210. (focusing on building popular support for the government 10 Bridgewater, 38. over the insurgents) in order to defeat the Huk insurgent 11 Greenberg, 116. system at multiple levels. The Magsaysay carrot reduced 12 Greenberg., 132. the Huks’ inputs by addressing the needs of the popu- 13 Kerkvliet, 237. lace. The Magsaysay stick reduced the Huks’ outputs 14 Kerkvliet, 239. by attacking their conversion mechanisms and defeat- 15 Greenberg, 121. ing their outputs with small-unit operations focused on 16 Bridgewater, 39. the rebels themselves. Magsaysay’s approach effectively 17 Greenberg, 140. removed the Huks as a threat to the Filipino government 18 Greenberg, 141. within four years. 19 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority (Chicago: Modern COIN strategists can learn from Magsaysay. Markham Publishing Company, 1970), 32. At all levels of command, COIN strategists need to refocus 20 Leites and Wolf, 32-33. their efforts and dedicate as much, if not more, of COIN 21 Leites and Wolf, 33. resources to addressing the problems of the people as to 22 Leites and Wolf, 34.

Major Patrick M. O’Hara is a candidate for a master’s of science in defense analysis (irregular warfare) at the Naval Postgradu- ate School. Major O’Hara enlisted in the Army as an Infantry rifleman in 1992. In 1995, he completed Officer Candidate School and was commissioned into the Infantry. He served as a rifle platoon leader, company executive officer and battalion air-operations officer in the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y. His SF assignments include commander, SF detachments 586 and 584 (military free-fall) and assistant battalion operations officer, 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group. He commanded a detachment in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and on his second tour in Iraq, he was on the battalion staff. Major O’Hara was also the Headquarters and Headquarters Company commander for the Support Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Major O’Hara holds a bachelor of science degree in finance from Auburn University, a master’s in business administration from the University of Ala- bama at Birmingham, and an associate in arts in Russian from the DLIFLC, Monterey, Calif.

September-October 2007 35 Enlisted

E8 promotion board slated ARSOF accession board to ment: two sergeant-first-class All SF sergeants first class convene in 2008 positions at each of three posts who are in the zone for consider- The Special Operations Recruit- — Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Carson, ation for the 2008 Master Ser- ing Battalion is accepting applica- Colo.; and Fort Richardson, Alaska. geant Promotion-Selection Board tion packets for the next accession Interested Soldiers should contact should ensure that their records board, which is scheduled for the Master Sergeant Butler at HRC, are current. The board will con- second quarter of FY 2008. Inter- DSN 221-8399 or (703) 325-8399. vene Oct. 3-26. For additional ested Soldiers should contact SFC information, refer to MILPER Mes- Herring or SFC Pease at (910) 907- CMF 18 poised for growth sage #07-155. 9697. The CA accessions board CMF 18 is experiencing un- looks for Soldiers who are best- precedented growth, and through 2008 enlisted board schedule cAREER nOTES cAREER qualified and meet all the prereq- efforts at all levels, the force is The 2008 schedule for Army uisites listed in DA PAM 611-21, well-manned to meet the growth enlisted promotion and school Military Occupational Classification requirements. The force stands boards is listed below: and Structure, which can be ac- at 110 percent overall, and it has cessed at: https://perscomnd04. recently experienced all-time highs Board Convene date army.mil/MOSMARTBK.nsf/ for manning in occupational specialties that have been tradition- Sergeant First Class 29 January 2008 Bonus approved for CA NCOs ally understrength: 18D strength Command Sergeant CA Soldiers in the rank of is 101 percent, 18F is 103 percent, Major, Sergeant Major 3 June 2008 sergeant are eligible for a selective and 18E is 116 percent. and Sergeants Major re-enlistment bonus of as much The strength increases are Course as $15,000; staff sergeants are eli- the result of focused efforts by Master Sergeant 02 October 2008 gible for as much as $10,000. The SWCS and by the force as a whole critical-skills-retention bonus for to maintain some of the highest Soldiers should work with sergeants first class and master re-enlistment rates in the Army. their career manager at the Army sergeants is pending approval by Recruiting is on track in both Human Resources Command to the Office of Secretary of Defense. quantity and quality of recruits. ensure that their records and The increased exposure of other microfiche are up-to-date and they CA E7 positions available Army units to SF NCOs deployed have a DA photo on file that is less The following CA positions are in theater has been a key part of than a year old. available for immediate assign- SF’s ability to attract recruits.

Warrant Officer

SWCS transfers SF WO PME cer education and one more step ATLDP’s recommendation of responsibility toward meeting the recommenda- developing and implementing an On June 27, the JFK Spe- tions of the warrant-officer study integrated education system for all cial Warfare Center and School done by the Army Chief of Staff’s Army officers that will teach com- transferred the responsibility for Army Training and Leader Devel- mon leader skills and actions re- SF warrant-officer professional opment Panel, or ATLDP. In the quired by the Army vision and will military education within the 1st past, SWCS has supported and prepare officers for full-spectrum Special Warfare Training Group completed the ATLDP’s recom- operations in the contemporary from Company A, 2nd Battalion, to mendations, including integrating operational environment. The SF Company A, 4th Battalion, which warrant officers into the Army warrant-officer education system is responsible for the training of SF officer corps and incorporating the meets the Army’s training and officers. The transfer will provide requirements of warrant-officer ca- leader-development requirements warrant-officer education within an reer and professional development for officers by branch, grade, posi- officer-centric organization. into DA PAM 600-3, Commissioned tion, specialty, functional area and The transfer of command Officer Development and Career assignment, and it ensures their and control is part of the SWCS Management. technical competence throughout transformation of warrant-offi- The transfer also meets the their career.

36 Special Warfare

Notes Officer Career Army releases FY 2008 officer Board Convene Date board schedule Listed below is the fiscal year LTC command (maneuvers, fires and effects [MFE]) 18 Sep 07

2008 schedule of Army boards COL command (MFE) 8 Jan 08 for command, promotions and schools: CWO 3/4/5 promotion 29 Jan 08 In light of the high operational LTC Army/MAJ selective continuation 26 Feb 08 tempo, all officers should work Senior Service College 1 Apr 08 proactively with the Army Human Resources Command, Special MAJ Army/CPT SELCON 8 Apr 08 Operations Division, to ensure COL Army/LTC SELCON 15 Jul 08 that their records and microfiche are up-to-date and that their file ROTC (Professor of Military Science) 18 Aug 08 contains a DA photo that is less LTC command (MFE) 23 Sep 08 than a year old.

SWCS, HRC work to expand ILE cer position in the 5th Group’s S3 available captains. Lower priority opportunities section, the growth will add 31 SF positions will remain vacant until In an effort to provide officers officer authorizations, as shown a sufficient number of officers is in Army special-operations forces below: available to man those billets. with broader experience in their For lieutenant colonels: one The commanding general of intermediate level education, or authorization for a battalion com- the U.S. Army Special Operations ILE, experience and to increase mander was included in the new Command has approved upgrad- the number of officers attend- authorization. ing commanders of SF head- ing ILE, the JFK Special Warfare For majors, five authorizations quarters-support companies and Center and School is working were approved: one for battalion headquarters-and-headquarters with the Army Human Resources executive officer, one for the bat- companies from captain to major. Command to increase the num- talion S3 and three for company The action is now being processed ber of ARSOF allocations for commanders. for approval at the Army G1. If study at the Naval Postgraduate For captains, 25 authorizations approved, the action will create 30 School, the Western Hemisphere were approved: 18 for SF ODA additional majors’ positions during Institute for Security Coopera- commanders; three for company the growth timeline of PDM III. tion, foreign and sister-service XOs; one for the headquarters- The new positions will offer greater schools and Army scholar and support-company commander; opportunities for filling field-grade fellowship programs. These ILE one for the battalion S3 plans of- billets in SF operational units. opportunities should begin to ficer; and one for the SF Group S3 expand during FY 2008. plans officer. CA force structure growing The 25 new captain positions The Civil Affairs force struc- PDM growth will expand SF will cause a temporary drop in the ture continues to grow. The 95th officer authorizations overall strength of the FY 2008 Civil Affairs Brigade is scheduled Fiscal year 2008 will see the captain population. Subsequent to stand up the 98th CA Battalion addition of a fourth battalion to years will see the captain inven- in March 2008. In May, the Army the 5th Special Forces Group as tory increase as larger year groups released the results of the latest part of the growth authorized un- are accessed into Special Forces. ARSOF selection board: 59 officers der Program Decision Memoran- According to the guidance of the were selected to branch-transfer to dum III. The 5th Group is sched- commander, U.S. Special Opera- CA. One of the main reasons these uled to activate the 4th Battalion tions Command, on the priorities officers gave for their desire to Aug. 16, 2008. The new battalion for filling SF officer vacancies, become part of the CA branch was will add 30 officers to the force. vacant SF operational slots will their observation of CA officers Combined with an additional offi- continue to receive the majority of and NCOs in the field.

September-October 2007 37 Contra cross: Insurgency and Tyranny in Central America, 1979-1989

While the United States and defeat the communist Farabundo Soviet Union were engaged in a Marti National Liberation Front, or Cold War between capitalism and FMLN, in El Salvador and the Nica- communism, the same ideologi- raguan insurgency that he worked cal struggle played out in violent to keep alive. fashion in a series of “hot wars” in Meara’s unusual vantage points Central America during the 1980s. allowed him to draw several con- Contra Cross, by William R. Meara, clusions that run contrary to con- is a ground-level account of the ventional wisdom. First, language, author’s experiences in the con- regional expertise and experience are flicts in Central America from 1979 critical to effectiveness in a foreign to 1989. land, and insurgencies are serious Details Written as a personal memoir, business — amateurs should not be By William R. Meara the events detailed by Meara reveal allowed to dabble in them. Second, Annapolis, Md.: that this was truly a bloody and there are institutional biases and Naval Institute Press, 2006. tumultuous front, as well as one shortcomings that make it difficult ISBN: 1-59114-518-X. of the final stands between Soviet- for us to deal with foreign insurgen- 168 pages. $26.95. sponsored communism and Western cies, particularly our conventionally Reviewed by: democracy. The difficulties faced oriented military machine (i.e., using Major Kirk Windmueller by our diplomatic corps and our big bucks and a high-tech approach JFK Special Warfare Center and School conventionally focused military in as- to support). Also, the Army’s idea sisting insurgencies and counterin- that “any good officer” can work on surgencies in this region offer many insurgency is ill-conceived. or without our assistance. Accord- parallels to today’s challenges abroad Finally, when we decide to get ing to Meara, this fact was lost on in the Global War on Terrorism. involved in foreign insurgencies, we many in Washington who were on Because of the diverse range should remember to conduct our- the wrong side of the Cold War and of capacities in which he served, selves in a manner consistent with used the war for their own political Meara offers unique insights into our national values. We were once agendas. this era. He first went to the re- helped by foreigners when we were Contra Cross is well-delivered gion as a volunteer English teacher farmers fighting for our indepen- in a pragmatic and modest style. working at a Catholic school in Gua- dence, so we should not be careless Meara exposes the reader to the dif- temala. As an Army Special Forces in our dealings with the lives of oth- ficulties of dealing with insurgencies officer, Meara served in Honduras, ers who are struggling abroad. on foreign land and shows the direct Panama and El Salvador as one of Another of Meara’s points worth impact and implications of U.S. the “55” U.S. military advisers. He mentioning is that the insurgency policy on the ground. also served as a U.S. Foreign Service against the communists was not This book is recommended to officer who worked as a liaison to simply a “proxy war” that was some- anyone who is looking for a military the Nicaraguan Contras in their how manufactured for the benefit of or political perspective on the events struggle against the Sandinistas. the U.S. in the fight against Soviet in the region during the 1980s, or to Perhaps most noteworthy is the domination. The Contras were a anyone seeking information on serv- rare perspective that Meara gained genuine, homegrown resistance that ing in an advisory or training role in as an insider working on both sides stood against a communist ideology, a foreign-internal-defense or uncon- of an insurgency: the COIN effort to and they would have done so with ventional-warfare mission.

38 Special Warfare Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction Winning the Peace is a compila- conflict reconstruction. tion of essays contributed by seven To further develop the policy pre- authors who have expertise in the scriptions, the authors contributed varied areas of post-conflict recon- four additional essays to provide struction. Seven of these essays specifics on improving U.S. capabili- were written by the editor, Robert C. ties for deployment and conducting Orr, either alone or in conjunction post-conflict reconstruction. These with other authors. essays focus on interagency strate- The compilation is a continuation gies and coordination, training and of a joint project by the Association education, civilian rapid response of the United States Army and the and funding. Center for Strategic and Interna- Finally, the book is balanced by tional Studies to study strategies for the inclusion of six case studies. Details post-conflict reconstruction. In par- These describe various post-conflict ticular, the book builds upon a brief reconstruction cases, ranging from Edited by Robert C. Orr joint publication created in 2002 and post-World War II Japan to con- Washington, D.C.: dubbed the “Post-Conflict Recon- temporary Iraq, that involved U.S. Center for Strategic & International Studies, struction Task Framework.” All the support. Orr argues that the United 2004. book’s essays emphasize at least one States has participated in five nation- ISBN: 0-89206-444-7. of the four “pillars of reconstruction”: building eras. From that analysis, he 360 pages. $24.95. security; justice and reconciliation; focuses on interventions that he calls Reviewed by: social and economic well-being; and nonterritorial — those not undertak- Major Jeremy S. Mushtare governance and participation. en primarily to obtain Cold War geo- 5th Psychological Operations Battalion The book’s relevance is conveyed graphical-positioning advantages and by Orr’s emphasis that the United that followed in the wake of a war. States has a vested, yet internation- Orr terms his resultant catego- ally disproportionate, interest in ries “generations of post-conflict therefore a “one-size-fits-all” ap- promoting international stability and reconstruction.” First-generation proach cannot be entertained. in reconstructing weak states that efforts include the post-World War II This book is an essential read for may provide safe havens to terrorist occupations of Germany and Japan; PSYOP officers and NCOs deploying networks. Furthermore, the authors second-generation post-conflict as part of military information sup- emphasize, “There is a lack of a co- reconstruction involves post-Cold port teams. The book’s true appli- herent, overarching strategy among War humanitarian interventions; cability, from a PSYOP perspective, U.S. policy-makers on how to pro- and third-generation operations are is that it allows PSYOP planners to mote economic and social well-being those ushered in by the aftermath analyze a post-conflict or democra- in post-conflict countries.” of 9/11, as well as global interven- tizing country based upon the task The book is formed around tions predicated upon countering framework and then systematically a core of four essays previously both international terrorism and develop programs that bolster insti- published in the Washington Quar- the proliferation of weapons of mass tution-building and address the root terly (Autumn 2002) and that also destruction. causes of insurgency and terrorism. corresponded to the four pillars of Winning the Peace clearly high- While every country is differ- reconstruction. These essays have lights the importance of addressing, ent, Winning the Peace provides a been updated to include references in a synchronized manner, the myr- comprehensive baseline from which to Iraq and Afghanistan. Their main iad of tasks necessary in stabilizing conclusions may be drawn regard- arguments remain the same, howev- a post-conflict society or region. ing institutional shortfalls and er, as do the authors’ recommended Furthermore, the authors make it those areas that military support to policy prescriptions for enhancing clear that each attempt at post-con- public diplomacy may target with U.S. capabilities to conduct post- flict reconstruction is unique, and best effects.

September-October 2007 39 U.S. Army photo

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