Chapter 2 Iranian Cultural and Media Policy: from Constitutional To

Chapter 2 Iranian Cultural and Media Policy: From Constitutional to Islamic Revolution Constitutional Revolution and Redefinition of Cultural Identity It was one of many interesting coincidences in Iranian contemporary history that Mozaffar al-Din Shah (1853-1907), the fifth king of the Qajar dynasty (1796-1925), was the man who introduced two modern phenomena, one in the field of culture and the other in the field of politics, to Iranian society: the art of cinema that he passionately brought with him after his travel to Europe (1900), and the constitutional monarchy that he reluctantly accepted after the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1906). Although the first should have waited for next decades to be turned into a significant constituent of Iranian cultural identity, the latter instantly required and implied a wide range of radical transformations in political and social life of masses, and thus gradually changed their forms of life and their cultural identities. In the second half of 19*'^ century, following military encounters with Russia, and the consequent defeats and humiliating peace pacts for Iranian side, including partition of big parts of Mamaiek e Mahrouse ('well-preserved territories', a prestigious title for Iran as the Qajar establishment used to call it), there was a growing understanding of technical underdevelopment and necessity of economic progress and industrial improvement - the necessity that had become more visible especially after the arrival of new commercial companies and agents of European colonialist countries (mainly Britain and France) and their rivalry for exploiting the new-found sources in Iran. Moreover, in 47 their travels to Europe, several of the Qajar kings and their high officials had witnessed welfare and happiness of affluent western citizens and civilizations as well as efficient and organized political systems, had realized the plight and poverty of their own country; thus, they started to reform some parts of their administrations, and to initiate and facilitate a process of modernization by establishing a new educational system -for instance, Darolfonun (polytechnic college), the first modern institution of higher learning, had been established by Amir Kabir (1807-52), the reformist chief minister of the fourth Qajar King, Naser al-Din Shah (1831-96), in 1851. Meanwhile, the most decisive role was played by a range of Iranian intellectuals and students who visited Europe and - becoming familiar with modern societies, and being impressed with their foundation and formation - raised their 'comparative consciousness': returning to their homeland, this 'enlightened' Iranian elite tirelessly struggled to introduce new ideas of modern statecraft and, more or less, 'civil society' to the Iranian people (not surprisingly, in 1892, Naser al-Din Shah provisionally banned travel abroad except for diplomatic missions, as he grew more conservative and suspicious of modern development in the European style that, he truly believed, would lead to destruction of his authority). (1) After all, these rather coordinated efforts, with support of some parts of traditional communities and several religious authorities (Ulama), culminated in a revolutionary movement on the eve of 20^^ century in Iran. By relying on their conception of modern nation-state, the revolutionaries struggled for reawakening of Iranian masses by way of a radical change in Iranian political system, requested for ending the existing despotic regime and transforming the old patrimonial monarchy into a new constitutional monarchy and replacing arbitrary rule by rule of law, or autocracy by democracy. Eventually, following many violent clashes and conflicts between progressive pro- constitution forces and their regressive reactionary opponents, the attempts resulted in formation of the first national assembly (Majles) and the first Iranian constitution as the 'Fundamental Laws' of 1906. (2) Historically, especially after the Arab invasion and the conquest of the Persian Empire in the middle of 7*^ century, religion had functioned as a 48 highly significant element in Iranian identity, had played a major role in Iranian forms of life. However, traditionally, institution of politics (government) had mostly remained independent of institution of religion (Islam); kings and princes had their own rights to do whatever they wanted by way of their administration, religious leaders did not have many things to do with political structure of the society - they, at their best, were supportive of the other's authority. As a turning point, this autonomy or independence was modified since 16* century when the monarchs of the Safavid dynasty (1501-1722) established 'Shia Islam' as official religion of their kingdom, claimed to be 'God's shadow on earth', commanders of Muslims, protectors of Shia beliefs, keepers of the Koran, and legitimate descendants and lieutenants of the twelve Holy Imams of Shiism. Since then, religious authorities appeared as an increasingly powerful force that legitimized the political body of the society and the king at as its head. Still, they were not included in the political body itself, did not claim any administrative role for themselves; thus, the 'double patriarchy' was to be continued as they did support the king as the legitimate monarch who should be obeyed by all of Muslim subjects under his rule while the monarch officially and financially supported them in return. The process continued till the constitutionalists tried to transform this relationship and thus to destroy the institution of religiously-confirmed monarchy in Iran, to make a modern 'State' out of the traditional government, in order to facilitate a process of tajaddod (modernity) which was considered as contemporary counterpart of tamaddon (civilization). To make an alternative for legitimacy source of political power, they proposed a concept of 'Nation' which was supposed to provoke a sense of 'national identity' among the people who did not have a considerable concern about their own 'nationality' - interestingly, as one of their neologisms, the constitutionalists highlighted the word Mellat as a translation of 'Nation' while Mellat had been used as signifying 'Religion' in Persian literature for centuries. However, from Mirza Fath-Ali Akhundzade (1812-78), Mirza Malkam Khan (1833-1908), and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani (1853-96) to 49 Mirza Abd al-Rahim Talebof (1834-1910) and Ali Akbar Dehkhoda (1876-1956), the secular-nationalist activists and vanguards of constitutionalism (the idealist-humanist intellectuals, at home or in exile, who had a vision of an Iranian Utopia) were more or less aware of the decisive roles which were played by religious authorities in Iranian society as well as the important role of religion in typical Iranian life styles. Faithfully or not, they tried to translate vocabulary of liberal democracy into Islamic tradition, to be able to achieve support of Islamic authorities and religious people (i.e. the vast majority of the society) as well. At any rate, it worked and, after several decades of intellectual and social struggles, the constitutional revolution gained victory by establishment of parliament and approval of constitution in December 1906. First Constitution: Genealogy of an Unannounced Cultural Civil War In the 1900s, although Iranian cinema may be said to have already begun with the filming of Mozaffar al-Din Shah's trip to Ostend, Belgium, as recorded on a newly purchased camera by his court photographer, there was no visual mass media in Iran as elsewhere in the world: cinema was at its beginning and television had to wait for decades to be born. Then, the main mass media were newspapers that had not yet found a massive audience in Iran: according to the Iranian constitutionalists, there was no necessity to elaborate on the limits and the liberties of mass media in the form of a fundamental law. That is the reason why we do not find any articulation of media policy in the first Iranian constitution. However, if we accept that constitutions, especially those that appeared after revolutions, have been expression of power relations rather than creation of them, 'Fundamental Laws' of 1906 and, more importantly, its 'Supplement' of 1907, have many things to say about the power structure in Iran, but much less about the ideal structure in liberal constitutionalist's minds: the very contradiction was a dominant struggle for defining the Iranian identity, destined to be a crucial element in forthcoming Iranian cultural and media policies in the coming decades. 50 Since Europe was exposed to the eyes of Iranian constitutionalists as the magnificent model of progress and prosperity, the main patterns for the first Iranian constitution were, admittedly, the European constitutions of Belgium, France, and Bulgaria (historical experience of the three countries had certain similarities with actual and ideal power structure in Iran); but they witnessed a huge alteration in the process of adaptation, especially in the form of the 'Supplement' of 1907. The 'Fundamental Law' of 1906 had crucially confined itself to the institution of parliament, to articulate its legal position and its members' responsibilities, had avoided the statement of constitutional principles as such (the only important exception came about as an indirect indication to freedom of media speech, where it indicated in Article 13 that 'all newspapers, provided that their contents be not injurious to any one of the fundamental principles of the Government

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