The combat portion of Operation DESERT line discussions between individuals at the so- STORM has been over for more than a cial events. Most of the equipment performed quarter of a year already, but ENDEX is not better than expected: some of it clearly yet within sight. It is evident now that the earned epithets. But the common thread, the shooting war may prove to have been the overwhelming opinion was that our soldiers easiest part of our deployment to the Persian performed magnificently. This will be the one Gulf region. The problems of keeping the great lesson learned, that well-led American peace, protecting regional inhabitants from soldiers, highly trained and given proper further atrocities, and redeployment are now equipment, can accomplish any mission removed from the front pages of newpapers. anywhere in the world. It seems to me that this is a lesson we already knew. Nevertheless, the war against Iraq may prove to generate more written words per I encourage all participants of Operation hour of combat than any other conflict in his- DESERT STORM to find some time to write tory. Until now, the media wrote most of for ARMOR, while your experiences are still those words, but now, accounts are starting fresh. We would like to see all points of view, to come forth from the participants them- from the HET driver to the cupola, from the selves. (See page 7 for the account of gunner's seat to the TOC, from sergeants to "Ghost Troop," and page 13 for the 1-4 Caval- the generals. We are interested in deploy- ry's story.) ment issues, organization, tactics, main- tenance, communications, equipment, first- The recent annual Armor Conference person accounts, unit narrations, and sparked record attendance, in large part, I analysis. Don't wait 10 years to write your think, because many of the senior com- book. Send us an article today. manders of DESERT STORM were here to tell their stories and to shed some light on - PJC what was great about the operation and what was not so great. The structured ~ presentations gave way to free-flow discus- If you want video tapes of the conference, send sion, which could have continued for days. blank tapes to: Soldiers redeploying to Fort Knox during the US Army Armor School conference reminded us that while we gather DOTD, Television Division lessons in a pseudo-academic state of mind, ATTN: ATSB-TDV the mission is not yet complete. Ft. Knox, Ky. 40121

Many things became clear during the struc- Call DSN 464-3725 or 502-624-3725. tured presentations and in the countless off- I

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official: CARL E. VUONO PATRICIA P. HICKERSON General, United States Army Colonel, United States Army Chief of Staff The Adjutant General ARMOR The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-1 7-91-3

Editor-in-Chief MAJOR PATRICK J. COONEY Features Ghost Troop's Battle at the 73 Easting Managing Editor 7 JON T. CLEMENS by Vince Crawley 13 Riders on the Storm Commandant by 1-4 CAV Operations Staff MG THOMAS C. FOLEY 21 Two Scouts Under Fire Helped Injured Buddies During Night Battle ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published by Captain Michael Gollaher, VI1 Corps PA0 bimonthly by the US. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121. 22 Lucky Scouts Dodge "Big Bullets"That Ripped Their Bradley Disclaimer: The information contained in ARMOR represents the professional opinions by Tony Wunderlich, VI1 Corps PA0 of the authors and does not necessarily reflect 23 "Shooting Blind Men in the Dark..." the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information by Bill Armstrong, VI1 Corps PA0 presented in other official Army publications. 24 Pumped Up... Ready to Roll Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored (DESERT STORM Photos) cavalry regiment headquarters, armor 26 Splattered! (Iraqi tank photos) battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head- quarters, reconnaissance 28 Armor and the Future Army squadron head- quarters, armored cavalry by General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff of the Army troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In 33 Light Cavalry in a Peacekeeping Role addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD by First Lieutenant Erick A. Reinstedt schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, 38 Future Heavy Forces: The Need For Better Air Deployability ground combat systems, organizations, and by Captain Cole Milstead the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by 45 SOUM: The Safety-of-Use Message Network sending a military letter to the editor-inchief. by The Directorate of Total Armor Force Readiness Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency Departments includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively 2 Letters in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted 2 Contacts soldiers; any miscellaneous items of 4 Commander's Hatch equipment which armor and armored cavalry 5 Driver's Seat organizations use exclusively; training for all 44 "Tanker!"(A poem by Chaplain Patrick A. Dolan) SC 12A, 126, and 12C officers and for all CMF-Isseries enlisted soldiers; and 49 The Bustle Rack information concerning the training, logistics, 51 Armor Branch Notes history, and leadership of armor and armored 52 Books cavalry units at the brigadelregiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated.

May-June 1991, Vol. C No. 3 A New Tradition received a red rose because he was an legion of Cavalrymen who have ridden Armor officer. General Armstrong was cor- the road to the fabled Wddler's Green, for rected by the undersigned during the 9th he commanded the largest light Cavalry Dear Sir: Division change of command when it was division in the history of our Army, the 9th explained that the rose had a great sym- Motorized Division (Light Cavalry). Its 8uc- The outgoing commander of the 9th bolism for the Cavalry; for "The red of the cessor is the 199th Motorized Brigade Motorized Division was presented with a rose stands for the glory, the spirit, the (Light Cavalry) that was organized as the single red rose and a spray of baby's grit and determination, the valor and the 100th Mechanized Cavalry troop, 100th breath during the division change of com- gallantry that one always associates with Division, during World War II. It's great to mand on March 1, 1991. This was the the Cavalry; and the soft, fragile, delicate welcome a historic Cavalry unit back into beginning of a new Cavalry tradition at blossoms of the spray of baby's breath our ranks. Fort Lewis, Washington. stand for the nobility of character, the loyalty, the dignity, the virtue, the courage THOMAS H. TAlT The commander, Major General Chuck and the sacrifice of the Cavalry trooper." MG, US. Army Armstrong, an erstwhile infantryman, com- Director, DESERT STORM mented during a retirement ceremony the General Armstrong earned the right to Special Studies Group previous day that a retiring soldier receive the rose and join the ranks of the Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.

~~ ~ (Note: Fort Knax Bhnsa Switch Notwork (DSN)prefix is 464. Commercial prefix is Area DIRECTORY - Points of Contact Code502424m.

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Editor-in-Chief Commandant (ATZK-CG) Major Patrick J. Cooney 2249 MG Thomas C. Foley 2121 Managing Editor Assistant Commandant (ATSB-AC) Jon T. Clemens 2249 BG James L. Noles 7555 Editorial Assistant Vivian Thompson 2610 Deputy Assistant Commandant (ATSB-DAC) Production Assistant COL Donald E. Appler 1050 Mary Hager 2610 Command Sergeant Major Contributing Artist CSM Jake Fryer 4952 SPC Jody Harmon 2610 Maintenance Dept. (ATSB-MA) MAILING ADDRESS ARMOR A'ITN: ATSBAM. Fort COL James R. Joy 8346 K~OXKY 40121-5210. Command and Staff Dept. (ATSB-CS) C 5855 ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS To impmve speed and ac- curacy in editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, V (ATSB-WP) either typed or printed out in near-letterquality printer mode. C 1055 Stories can also be accepted on 5-1/4" floppy disks in Microsoft GIT~CLUI-ULCUL BlaIuIug rnvelopments (ATSB-TD) WORD, MultiMate. Wordperfect, Wordstar, or Xerox Writer (please include a printout). Please tape captions to any illustrations LTC Craig S. Harju, Sr. 7250 submitted. Directorate of Combat Developments (ATSB-CD) COL Edward A. Bryla 5050 PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS: Report delivery problems or changes of addm to Ms. Connie Bright. circulation manager, NCO Academy/Drill Sergeant School (ATZK-NC) (502)942-8624. CSM John J. Beck 5150 Directorate of Reserve Component Spt (ATZK-RC) UNR DISTRIBUTION Report deliiry problems or chan- COL Eduard Yates ges of address to Ms. Mary Hager, DSN 464-2610 commercial: 1351 (502)624-2610. Requests to be added to the free subscription list Directorate of Total'Armor Force (ATZK-TF) should be in the form of a letter to the Editor-h-Chief. FAX -7585 7809 ARMOR HOTLINE - DSN &TANK (The Annor Hotline is a %-hour service to provide assistance with IXALJUC system manager questions concerning doctrine. training. organizations. and quip- for Armored Gun System (ATSB-TS ) ment of the Armor Fom.) COL Eugene D. Colgan 7955

2 ARMOR - May-June 1991 Refining CSS for Scouts Also, to put the 52 in the scout logistics complete. Both Troop A and Troop B of reporting chain doesn't work. When things the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry took part get hot and heavy, logistics for the scouts under their own guidons in the operation Dear Sir: is the last thing on the S2's mind. Per- as attachments to 1/7 Cav with the 1st haps a better solution is to keep a logis- Cavalry Division. Captain Timothy Flanagan's "Combat tics representative at the TOC (the bat- Service Support in the Task Force Scout talion senior supply sergeant is a strong Since 2/1 was on the inactivation block Platoon" (ARMOR, January-February 1991) possibility). This way, there is a desig- with the rest of the 2d Armored Division, was right on target. He brings up several nated link from the scouts (via the scout and 1i7's second ground troop was in the good points and cuts to the heart of what or O&I net) to the S4. The logistics rep Mississippi National Guard, 111 Corps at- bad logistics can do to the TF scout would simply monitor the reports and tached the two Blackhawk ground troops platoon. Having been responsible for relay to the S4 on the A/L net. To equip to the 1st Cavalry Division. As a result, 1/7 keeping the scouts in the fight over two the scouts with an OE-254/RG292 anten- deployed with three ground and two air NTC rotations (once as a support platoon na can be effective in allowing them to probably the heaviest division cavalry leader, once as a TF S4) I'd like to pass report on the AJL net. The scouts should squadron in the operation. on a few more comments. have a designated "window" of report times for them and them alone. Our ex- PETER D. WELLS The use of LOGPACS specifically for the perience was that the PJL net unclogs it- COL, Armor scouts is the only opti6n. The scouts need self between 2100 and 0300. During this Burke, Va. priority of resupply during the reconnais- window, traffic on the AJL net can be mini- sancelcounterreconnaissance phase of mized to allow the scouts access. This al- Tank Combat Award Overdue the battle, or the TF will have no eyes. But lows them some flexibility. To mandate I disagree with CPT Flanagan's use of the that the scouts submit reports along with Dear Sir: HHC first sergeant as the individual the rest of the battalion on an SOP responsible for scout resupply. Obviously, schedule does not work. Well, 50 years of armored combat and this is personality driven. But the the spearhead of the combined arms total firepower that the HHC first sergeant car- CPT flanagan's plan for medical sup force still doesn't have a combat award. In ries with that diamond he wears is not to port is also well stated. Another option for recognition of the dynamic mission ac- be underestimated. The HHC first ser- evacuation available to the S4/scout complishment that was done by our geant can perform a more vital service for platoon leader is to task the nearest line tankers in DESERT STORM, I think it's the task force by energizing line company company to provide medical evacuation about time. They broke the back of the supply sergeants, as well as his own as- for the scouts. The number of VINSON Republican Guards and the effort should sets, and ensuring that the myriad details devices available would determine who in be forever recognized. of logistics for the rest of the task force the tasked line company monitors the are worked out at the lowest level. Our scout net for an evac call. Either the line But, you know tankers are used to being solution was to leave the HHC first ser- company XO detailed to evac the scouts, "treated rough" and take it all in stride. So geant in the field trains and task the HHC or the medics themselves. The medical how about a tank gunnery qualification XO with resupply of both the scouts and platoon leader would then send an am- patch for Tank Table XX fired in the mortars. This way, the resupply of the bulance from the CTCP to replace the line Kuwaiti Theater of Operations? scouts was conducted on their terms - company ambulance that was dispatched. this is the way it has to be. The HHC XO Obviously, this requires tight coordination MSG JOHN BITTAY would resupply the mortars on his way to and rehearsal. In all cases, aeromedical Oakdale, Pa. or from the scouts. The S4 gets his situa- evacuation for the scouts should be tion report after the conduct of the resup- planned. If aeromedical support is limited, Another Call for Branch Badges ply, and the HHC XO is on his way back then priority should go to the scouts. to the field trains. This system also works Dear Sir: well if the battalion is employing an ad All loglstics for the scouts needs to be hoc counterreconnaissance force built planned in depth. The depth starts with The creation of a series of expert and around the scouts. making the scouts as self-sufficient as combat badges for combat arms soldiers time, training, and space allow. There are (in addition to 11-series infantry) is long To keep a scout "package" of Classes 111 limits to how far this can go. But if we fail overdue. Armor crewmen, artillerymen and V uploaded at the CTCP proved very even to address the impact of logistics, (air/field), aviators, green berets, combat successful in our experiences. Two fuel then we open ourselves up for failure. engineers, and scouts should be recog- HEMTTs and an ammunition truck kept nized. with the CTCP can refuel and rearm a MICHAEL P. GILROY scout platoon in five minutes or less. All CPT, QM I am an MlAl tank platoon leader in that's required is a grid for the HEMTTs to Office of the Quartermaster General DESERT STORM. Clearly, my main con- drive to. Simple. But the HHC XO can Fort Lee, Va. cern is not what should be pinned above also bring a TPU with the daily LOGPAC my breast pocket. My top priority is to keep the scouts moving. If the HHC XO They Also Served ... preparing for war; nevertheless, as my doesn't have a truck, then he needs a men and 1 await the order to roll north, I HMMWV with a trailer in order to carry Dear Sir: cannot ignore the fact that many soldiers everything the scouts would need. No- are being overlooked. where else in the task force is it more im- Your January-February 1991 chart of portant to have a "push" logistics system Armor-Cavalry units serving in Operation than it Is with the scouts. DESERT SHIELD was very helpful, but in- Continued on Page 47

ARMOR - MayJune 7997 3 MG Thomas C. Foley Commanding General US. Army Armor Center

Conference Capped a Triumphant Year

The 1991 Armor Conference We were extremely fortunate to keynote address. He reminded us provided us an excellent oppor- share the insights of DESERT that we have entered an era of fiscal tunity to review one of the most STORM commanders during a restraint, and that the downsizing of dramatic years in recent history, a series of presentations, which began the Armed Forces, the declining year in which we are celebrating the with a videotaped message from resources available to us to conduct victory of the forces of freedom LTG Franks, commander of VI1 essential training, and the presence both in Europe, where the end of Corps, in Southwest Asia, and an of forces capable of opposing the the Cold War was dramatically overview of VI1 Corps operations. vital interests of the United States demonstrated by the unification of MG Funk, MG Griffith, MG Tilelli, are realities. Our challenge is to con- Germany; and in the desert of BG Frazar, COL(P) Holder, and tinue to develop the doctrine, train- Southwest Asia, where the aggres- LTCs Goedkoop, Craddock, and ing strategies, devices, and simula- sion and oppression of Saddam Hus- Stewart detailed the operations of tions that will allow us to maintain sein ended in crushing defeat. It their units, providing us accounts of the training edge over our potential was fitting that, at the Home of the skill, determination, and adversaries in light of these realities. Armor, we reviewed the successes courage of the soldiers who of the recent past, discussed lessons demonstrated to the world the true As guest speaker for the Armor learned, and charted the path for meaning of firepower, maneuver, Association Banquet, GEN Crosbie the future of the Total Armor and shock effect. Clearly the past E. Saint, CINC USAREUR and Force. and present leadership of the Army Seventh Army, discussed the many developed the doctrine, training, or- key contributions of USAREUR sol- The highlight of the Armor Con- ganizations, leaders, and materiel re- diers to DESERT SHIELD and ference was the address, "Armor quired to achieve victory in the first DESERT STORM. Dr. Lewis Sor- and the Future Army The Challen- battle of DESERT STORM. The ley addressed our assembly during a ges of Change and Continuity," challenge for current and future stand-to breakfast. GEN Edwin H. presented by the Chief of Staff, Armor leaders is to continue the Burba, CINC Forces Command, General Carl E. Vuono, which is in- evolution of the Armor Force in a detailed the need for more lethality cluded in this edition of ARMOR. I changing world, as it prepares to in our light forces. He also spoke encourage you to review his win the first battle of the next war. out strongly for the integration of remarks and reconsider the "Six Im- reserve components in the total peratives" in light of our recent ex- GEN John W. FOSS,commander force. Reserve component units perience in Operations DESERT of the U.S. Army Training and must train to the same standard as SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Doctrine Command, delivered our active units; they will play a greater

4 ARMOR - May-June 1991 role in the Army as we downsize. review, clearly see the five challen- 1991 Armor Conferences. The MG Peter McVey briefed us on the ges facing the Armor Force: record attendance at the con- systems the Army is developing to 0 We must sustain a decisive tank ference, both of active and retired meet the challenges of the future and cavalry force. armor leaders and the repre- and enable us to execute AirLand .We must organize, equip, and sentation of the Marine Corps in operations. We engaged in excellent train a rapidly deployable light our retreat ceremony, honoring exchanges of information in a series armor force. DESERT STORM warriors demon- of meetings for brigade and 0 We must fully integrate the strates the vitality and, I believe, regimental commanders, master reserve components into the armor resurgence of the true spirit of gunners, and the Honorary Colonels force. mounted combat. I am sure we will of the Regiments. Participants in 0 We must modernize the total meet the five challenges of armor as the 1991 Armor Conference armor force to maintain the edge we have met all our past challenges. received copies of the coordinating over potential threats. The Armor Force has proved to the draft of the Armor 2000 study 0 We must maintain the quality of world a fact we have always known Branch Operation Concept for their our superb armor leaders and sol- to be true: All of the elements of review. The presentations of the diers. the DESERT STORM campaign directorates of the Armor Center were synchronized to defeat the and the equipment displays pro- This is an exciting time for Armor enemy. He suffered a punishing air vided our guests an opportunity to and the Army. In the next decade campaign, was cut off from his sup- review the progress we are making and the next century, Armor will be- ply and support, lost his morale, at Fort Knox to prepare the Armor come an even more diverse and was deserted by his leaders, but he Force to continue as the spearpoint challenging branch of our profes- did not surrender until Armor, of the combined arms team. sion. The Iraqi T72 tank recently Cavalry, and Mechanized Infantry added to the collection of the Pat- closed with him and threatened his The 1991 Armor Conference al- ton Museum stands as a physical destruction. lowed us to review our recent ex- reminder of the accomplishments of periences and, in light of this the period between the 1990 and Forge the Thunderbolt!

The Driver's Seat Command Sergeant Major Responsibilities and Duties

by CSM Jake Fryer, Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Armor Center

A capable command sergeant use this expertise and not relegate passage of lines and operate an ar- major's supporting and carrying out the CSM to solely routine rear area mored vehicle forward, are highly the commander's intent at the key "things" - duties. Stories abound, respected by troops. places in battle add credibility to and the most remembered and the operation; it also gives soldiers respected CSMs in the eyes of sol- What do we expect the CSM to a combat role model they can aspire diers were the ones that were for- do? With warfighting as the thrust to, because few, if any, will ever be ward with the operations. The war of our intent, the following are commissioned. They must have an in Asia is an example - many some activities the CSM should do: enlisted combat leader to look up to senior CSMs or retired CSMs are and follow. talked about today because they .Get on a tank with the TCE on were among the few that were out a moving range and be able to as- Many CSMs are lime soldiers with with the troops during the fighting sess the crew and the TCE's ability years of combat unit experience and operations. Today, the CSMs who to perform to the standard of FM ability to lead and influence small can help tank crews, TCE a tank, 17-12 and present methods to cor- unit actions. We should continue to run a calibration range, conduct a rect oroblems. ARMOR - May-June 7997 5 oInspect, check, and teach tank 0Run a program to develop en- to meet their mission. Be a part of defensive positions and fire plans. listed leaders in combat support of the OPORD brief to talk about low the task force. level actions and key actions that ~Coordmate, assist, detail, and 0 Influence and understand the bear on the operation from the en- oversee engineer work to prepare combat support of the task force. listed perspective. obstacles and fighting positions for 0 .Be track mounted and radio the defense. Influence, guide, advise, check, design, etc.; special combat-related equipped to operate independent of training and activities, such as the commander; move to critical 0 Observe, check, inspect, teach, points during the fight. and understand correct calibration EFMB, EIB, EIA, TCPC, individual exercises. weapons qualifications, crew served weapons firing, crewlsquadiplatood 0 Be the acknowledged combat ex- pert and a valuable member of the 0TCE a tank crew down tactical company/maneuvers and evalua- tions, and TCGST. staff. Be involved in all combat-re- tables, conduct the AAR, and lated activities. provide methods to correct the 0Be able to evaluate and assist crew‘s faults. training maneuver platoons and 0Be a platoon trainer and companies to ARTEP standards. evaluator during ARTEPs. 0 Know how to correct weapon 0 Be where troops are. malfunctions and know main- 0Be able to check, assist, teach, tenance of weapons. and coordinate on troop leading procedures before the battle. 0 Establish rapport with company commanders, platoon leaders, and .Help, advise, and assist tank other commanders to be able to in- unit breaching of obstacles and 0Know how to train and evaluate minefields. tank crews in firing, maintenance of fluence their actions; allow them to the turret and the vehicle, recovery, call upon the CSM’s expertise, and troubleshooting, camouflage, tacti- seek their guidance and counsel on 0 Conduct a passage of lines. cal movements, and fighting posi- fighting issues. 0 Know the threat. tions. 0 Keep current on soldier welfare 0Know the situation and be able 0Be able to move the task force to assist the commander. and soldier safety issues during bat- to a new area and set up to defend. tle operations.

0 Know the tactical operation and .Serve as resident expert for the the commander’s intent, and be at commander to teach tactics, 0Muence feeding, fueling, and rearming the force. the critical point of execution to as- doctrine, battle techniques, sur- sist the commanders. vivability, chemical operations, night operations, etc. .Develop an NCO CSS support .Be able to influence the situa- line to resupply and support the tion and cause actions based on 0Demonstrate ability to fire and force. doctrine and the commander’s in- handle tank weapons and other task force weapons. 0Take actions and make tent. decisions to continue the operation .Serve as a role model for en- or react to the situation in the ab- 0Know how to maintain armored listed combat leaders. sence of the task force commander. vehicles in the field. 0Stay in the company areas and .Be able to demonstrate combat .Be an instructor, mentor, daddy, act as another set of eyes for the skills to soldiers. and point of expertise for company commander in preparation, move- officers in the field. ment, assessment, and possible ac- ohow doctrine for small armor tions that impact on the outcome of units from sections to task force. 0 Be involved in all areas that sup the battle. port the training for and conduct of 0Be present to assist the com- The possibilities are endless for battle. mander and staff; develop the com- the CSM to influence the course of 0Run a program to assist the mander’s intent - present the events in a battalion or task force. commander in developing junior of- OPORD, and be available to assist

ficers in combat skills. commanders in developing.- actions Forge- the Thunderbolt! 6 ARMOR - MayJune 1991 1

Ghost Troop's Battle at the 73 Easting By Vince Crawley

(Reprinted from Stars and Stripes)

Specialist Patrick Bledsoe heard The 150-man troop comes from ward. He was also carrying his lucky an explosion echoing through the Bamberg, Germany, and is part of cigarette lighter, the one he had distance, and he was afraid. This the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, with him when the Bradley shot was two days after the cease-fire, so whose job was to sneak into 1,000 at Grafenwoehr last year. probably the explosion was the southern Iraq and spearhead the sound of soldiers blowing up VI1 Corps in its search and destroy Ghost Troop had crept into Iraq another dead Iraqi tank somewhere mission against the Republican from Saudi Arabia more than 12 nearby. Still, Bledsoe went off to sit Guard. Upon finding them, the hours before the ground war official- in the desert by himself for awhile, cavalry regiment was supposed to ly began. The cavalry soldiers drove and when ,he came back, no one pull aside and let the heavy ar- due north for a couple of days, then asked him' why he'd gone. They mored divisions roll in and annihi- began swinging to the right. By that didn't have to. late the elite Iraqi forces. And that's Tuesday, they were driving due east. pretty much the way it happened, ex- "A certain part of you just dies," cept for the six hours that Ghost "We expect contact at any time," said 1LT Keith Garwick. "Some- Troop spent fighting the Guard's Kick told his mother in a slow body trying to kill you so desperate- Tawakalna Division on the 73 East- drawl, speaking into the recorder. It ly, for so many hours, and coming ing. was a little after 8 a.m. "77ic iirtifs so close. We just couldn't under- that were in Kuwait, that the Maiirtes stand it. I still don't understand it. "If the rest of their army had have driven out, are headed direct& Those guys were insane. They fought as hard as the Tawakalna our way. And reirifoxeitients, instead wouldn't stop," Garwick said of the fought, we would have been in of going back into Kuwait, are also Iraqi Army's Republican Guard, trouble," Garwick said. headed our way. So' iili, weye gortria which hurtled wave after wave of hit a lot of sliooting.' tanks at him. Ghost Troop's gun- PFC Jason E. Kick was driving a ners would blow up the oncoming Bradley fighting vehicle on Tuesday vehicles, only to watch the enemy morning, Feb. 26. The sky was still At around 8:30 a.m., the sun broke soldiers jump out and start firing dark from an overnight rain storm. out for a moment. Ghost Troop automatic rifles uselessly at the Kick, 18, from Pembroke, Ga., had scouts spotted an Iraqi vehicle in American armored vehicles. "They dropped out of high school and the distance. There were 20 enemy kept dying and dying and dying," joined the Army not long after turn- soldiers packed into the personnel said 25-year-old Garwick, a West ing 17. The "young buck of the carrier. They all got out as if to sur- Point graduate and cavalry platoon troop, he kept quiet and was render, but three suddenly ran back leader from Fresno, Calif. 'They making rank fast. He'd gotten his to the vehicle, and others fired never quit... they never quit." GED diploma in basic training and rifles. Ghost troopers said later that was talking about going to college. there might have been some overkill The Americans who fought there He carried a small tape recorder when they blew apart the vehicle, are calling it the Battle of the 73 and was narrating his impressions of but they wanted to make sure the Easting, a line on a map in a name- the war into it. He wanted to send three Iraqis couldn't get a chance to less part of Iraq. the tape home to his mom after- send any radio messages to their of- ARMOR - MayJune 7997 7 There was another explosion, showering sparks across the front of the Bradley. "lt was just like some- body hit us with a sledgehammer," Bledsoe said. ficers. They apparently didn't. Arabs call a wadi. Enemy vehicles "One just got one of our guys," There was a lot of blood. and infantrymen were all over the Kick shouted. place, dug in on the other side of "All I can say," Kick told his tape the wadi. SPC Patrick Bledsoe, 20, from Ox- recorder, "Is better them than me. nard, Calif., was driving Bradley G- That sounds cruel, but it's true." It "Wehprilled rip on line now,' Kick 16. All he saw was.shooting. "We had been Ghost Troop's first kill of said into his tape recorder. "We're were in a little wadi," he said, but the war. engaged in a pretty decent firefiglit the top of the vehicle looked out right now... we're shooting again. I over the valley. "We were kind of The debris turned out to be from can see where we're sltooting at, brit I skylined..." the Tawakalna Division, and intel- can't see a victor (a veliicle)... ntis is ligence people said that the regi- chaos Itere ... "Thisis total chaos." The Bradley's gunner was 23-year- ment would probably meet up with old SGT Nels A. Moller. The co- the front line of the Iraqi division Battle commands flooded the axial machine gun was jammed, and near the 73 grid line, about 13 miles radios, adding to the confusion. !'Ithe track commander, another ser- farther east. cart see smoke 011 the Aori:on," Kick geant, was trying to fix it when he said into his tape recorder. 'ntat looked up and saw Iraqi infan- By 1 p.m., the fog and clouds had riteairs we killed sontetlting. Wiat it trymen running toward them. He gone. Instead, a ferocious wind is, I don't know... Wiite One, lie's asked Moller, "You got troops to raged in from the south, creating a the platoon leader. You can hear it in the front?" blizzard of sand. Iraqi vehicles and Iris voice. He's all shook up. l?itte, infantry were scattered here and 4.54... this is coav firing. Ente is 5:lO Suddenly, there was an explosion. there. Ghost Troop killed several p.ni. We're still irt coiitact... Tltere's a From his seat at the gun sights, more personnel carriers and, at few PCs Itere mid there, itiost(v in- down inside the Bradley turret, around 3:30 p.m., three enemy famy. I just spotted tlie biggest dam Moller couldn't see the area right tanks. An hour later they reached qdosiori at about 12 o'clock. I don't outside the fighting vehicle. 'What the 73 Easting. know what tlie lie11 it was..." was that?" he asked, hearing the ex- plosion. Off on their right, Eagle, Iron, and Killer Troops already were fighting Garwick's platoon alone had al- According to Bledsoe, that was against dug-in Iraqi soldiers. "I had ready killed nine personnel carriers. the last thing Moller said. There a feeling," said Ghost Troop com- The enemy had started shooting was another explosion, showering mander, CPT Joseph Sartiano, 29, back at them at about 5 p.m. Artil- sparks across the front of the Brad- from San Francisco. "Everybody lery began falling around the Brad- ley. "It was just like somebody hit us else was making contact. So I leys. with a sledgehammer," Bledsoe said. kicked all my scouts back, and put my tanks up front." "A tremendous volume of small He jumped out and r an behind the arms fire and shrapnel hit the berm Bradley. Moller was dead. The A cavalry troop is half tanks and to my front," peppering his Bradley other sergeant was slightly wound- half Bradleys. Normally, the Brad- and another, Garwick said. Iraqi in- ed. Friendly tanks were shooting leys drive up front, and the tanks fantrymen ran forward and were over Bledsoe's head, and enemy fire hang back a little, ready to defend mowed down. The enemy gunfire in- was hitting the berm in front of him. them. Instead, Sartiano lined up the creased, and airburst artillery began He jumped down just as there was P-lnrlkn Aver their hparlc Turn vet annthpr pmlncinn PFC Jeff whole troop along the 73 Fnr*:-rr-aatui& vAp"""'Ej "I"&CII".I YVUUU. A .I" J-. -.,.-.I------. - - - I Bradleys in Garwick's platoon were Pike, 21, of Binghamton, N.Y., INaS

Garwick, the Bradleyf platoon positioned over his right shoulder. driving Sartiano's tank. It was never leader, was in position at 442 p.m. At 5:40 p.m., he saw three tank confirmed, but he be-lieves the 1last Most of the troop, he saild, was be- rounds hit the ridge in front of him, explosion was Sartiano's gun ner l--L ---L -L-& -1 ---_6- &Le D--Al-.,* .... 'F C< +hn tn..L +hn+ hind a small hill and ridge, overiuuK- caw1 SIIUL FIUSCI LO LllC YldulGyJ u11 auuuuu5 a I-JJ, tuk taun LuaL ,..led ing a wide, shallow valley that the his right. The last shot hit. Moller.

8 ARMOR - May-June 1991 ...e..

ARMOR - May-June 1991 9 Bledsoe tried to get away. "I low- sonnel carriers and run at Garwick's ing right on top, ricocheting around crawled up the the other track, and platoon, fving rifles. Getting killed. us. We were in a corner of hell. I knocked on the back door, but they don't know how we made it out of didn't hear me. I went up and All Kick could see was rounds there. I don't." knocked on the driver's hatch. The going downrange. driver opened it. I said, We got hit. Days later, in a quiet tent in free We got hit. I think Moller's dead'." It went on like this - total chaos Kuwait, an officer from the regi- His own track, G-16, "was just smok- - for nearly four iore hours. At ment tried to explain what had hap- ing." one point, SPC Chris Harvey pened to Ghost Troop. looked out from the back of his per- At 547, Kick spoke into his tape sonnel carrier. The Republican Guard's Tawakal- recorder. "It was one-sir that got hit." na Division had gotten tangled up A fav miitrites later, he continued "All I saw were things burning," with the 12th Iraqi Armored Divi- his voice steadier. V7te ginner of one- said the 24-year-old artillery ob- sion, and both enemy units were sir, SGT Moller, is dead. 77te TC server form Virginia Beach, Va. trying to retreat through the same and observer are on one-five right "For 360 degrees. Nothing but ac- narrow piece of terrain, said MAJ now. SGT Moller... SGT Moller was tion." Steven L. Campbell, 35, the regi- killed... time about 5:49." ment's intelligence officer. The Garwick called for the Air Force, Iraqi path of retreat, a shallow val- He paused a moment, then added, but the planes were diverted to ley between two ridgeliies, led "Can't let this... can't let this affect 11s another mission two minutes before straight into Ghost Troop. or get tis down at all. Or we're goitria they got to Ghost Troop. Instead, die. And he wouldn't want that. He he held back the tanks by calling in Campbell theorized that the Re- don't want that... But I'm scared. " artillery and rockets, pounding each publican Guard might have fought wave as it appeared on the far so fiercely because they were des- 1LT Garwick told his men to keep ridge. The Bamberg squadron's ex- perately trying to escape. fighting. Artillery, tanks, and ma- ecutive officer watched from a van- chine guns were firing all around tage point a short distance away. It Those guys wanted to get out of them on the hill. More were de- looked, he said, like Armageddon. there, and those guys are supposed stroyed. More fired. to be the best fighters. In my mind, One of Garwick's biggest prob- they weren't trying to break the "This is chaos," Kick reported at lems was that the radios were so defenses (the line Ghost Troop was 604 p.m. "Total chaos... got nine frantically busy that he couldn't call holding). The way the terrain was, dead victors to our front. Enemy tic- through. Several times, he had to they had to go through here to get tors. And got ntow contirig. " jump out of his Bradley and crawl by." over to the artillery observers to tell The sandstorm had worsened. Gar- them in person where he needed The soldiers in Ghost weren't the wick could see only about 50 yards. them to shoot. only ones fighting that night. At But the thermal sights cut through least half of the regiment's troops some of the murk. With those, he On one of these occasions, at and tank companies were on line at could see more than half a mile. about 8:30 p.m., he had crawled one point or another. But most of Two more enemy tanks were com- halfway to the artillery observer's them were fighting against dug-in ing. vehicle when a round of airburst soldiers. None of them faced the went off just on the other side of a wave-after-wave onslaught that was Kick watched them get shot three nearby Bradley. He and the artil- aimed at Ghost. minutes later. "Boont. Hit. Hit and leryman, Sgt. Larry C. Fultz, sought kill. He hit it. 77tat's revenge for SGT cover under Garwick's Bradley. More than once, artillery saved Moller. You sontifabitchirtg Iraqis. Ghost Troop. Helicopters helped God I hate tltent. SGT Moller was a Another wave of tanks was coming kill tanks. And, near the end, when good guy. We killed tltent. ntat's fotir in. the troop was desperately short on Iraqi PCs killed for this track alone." ammunition, a tank company, Garwick's scouts told him that 12 "We just sat there crying, just Hawk, came in to relieve them. In more tanks were coming. Possibly shaken, until we could get back out its 100 hours of combat, the regi- as many as 25. Iraqis down in the from underneath the Bradley," Gar- ment destroyed 100 tanks, about 50 valley would just leap from their per- wick said. "The air bursts were com- personnel carriers, and more than

10 ARMOR - May-June 1991 30 wheeled vehicles, plus some anti- Deskevich, 23, of Rockville, Md. take months or years before the aircraft artillery systems, Campbell "He didn't run, and he didn't die for people who write history books will said. nothing." decide whether Ghost Troop is worth a page or not. "At the time," He estimated that 85 to 90 percent He came from Paul, Idaho. Sar- said Garwick, the platoon leader, of those vehicles were killed in the tiano, the troop commander, deci- "none of us understood what was battle at the 73 Easting, but no one ded he will take leave and visit the happening." had yet counted the vehicles in dead sergeant's parents. Ghost's sector. All they knew was that they'd had The morning after the battle, Kick a tough night, one they found hard The equivalent of an Iraqi brigade and another soldier stood in front to describe in language that can be was destroyed that night, the first of their shrapnel-scarred Bradley printed in newspapers. It had snow- ground defeat of the Republican and talked about Moller. balled into chaos before anyone Guards, Campbell said. Within 36 really knew what was happening. hours, most of the others were gone. "He was about the only sergeant," Kick said, still with a bitterness in The chaos was relative, though, The morning after the battle, some- his voice, "who'd sit down and listen and all battles are chaotic to the one made a wooden cross and stuck to your problems and treat you like men fighting them. "All I did," Sar- it in the sand, and a chaplain came a human being, instead of a private." tiano said, "was manage the to say a few words about Moller. A violence." At his level on the bat- colonel spoke, too. That night, before the cease-fire tlefield, one rung up from Garwick, was called, the scouts took more two up from most of the others, he Everyone from Ghost Troop was prisoners and had to stay up guard- had felt in control. It had, after all, there, worn-out men with sunken ing them. Bledsoe, who'd been been a decisive victory. Captured eyes, their faces covered with dirt Moller's driver, said that he and the prisoners confirmed that the Tawa- and gunpowder. It was the first time others had stayed awake by talking kalna had been caught completely in two months that they had all about Moller. by surprise. And Sartiano, like the been together in one place, instead others, was proud of it. of spread out over the desert, in "We talked about it for three training, or combat formations. Sev- hours," Bledsoe said. 'We decided One morning Garwick gathered eral hugged each other, glad to see that when he went up on that hill, his men around to talk to them and their friends alive, then gathered in he wasn't worried about it. He said, admitted that he still wasn't sure a semi-circle, took off their helmets, 'If they get me, that's just another what had happened. "All I know is and listened to the chaplain and the bullet that was gonna hit somebody that a squadron's supposed to be colonel. else'." able to take a brigade. A troop's supposed to be able to take a bat- Then they were told to get ready In Bamberg, the cavalrymen live in talion. A fire team, a company. Our for the next battle. It never came. In- a place called Warner Barracks 2, fire team took out a brigade." stead, a Cease-fire was called, and and when they get back, they want the cavalrymen had time to sit to give it a new name - Moller Bar- He paused a moment, and the among themselves and try to under- racks - if the Army will let them. words seemed to be sinking into stand what had happened. No one, however, really knew what him as much as in the others. 'That to call the battle they had just lived really was above and beyond the They said SGT Nels Moller died through. The officers were all call- call of duty." with his hands on the trigger of the ing it the 73 Easting, because they Bradley gun, looking for enemy to were the ones looking at the maps. Garwick, it seemed, had been shoot. His TOW missile launcher, SSG Waylan Lundquist, a 29-year- changed the most. He'd been spoil- the Bradley's main antitank defense, old tanker from Aurora, Mich., sug- ing for a fight and got more than he wasn't working, and Moller knew it gested the Battle of the Tawakalna. expected. "That morning I was so ex- before he entered the battle. Another man thought it should be cited to have killed a Republican Reason enough to stay out, but he Moller Ridge. And none of them Guard: said the 25-year-old lieu- didn't. could judge how important it had tenant. "And at the end of the bat- been. They didn't know how hard tle, if I never saw another Re- "He died like a soldier," said one anyone else had fought in the 100- publican Guard in my life, I'd be of Ghost's artillery officers, 2LT Joe hour war. They still don't. It might happy." Or perhaps he's not so

ARMOR - MayJune 7997 77 MIA1, Bradley, Defied the Critics The following excerpts are from The Jayhawk, the VI1 Corps newspaper. The author Is Sergeant Major Martin L. Shupe of VI1 Corps PAO. changed. He still wants to get mar- ried as soon as he gets back - his Probably no armored vehicle has until it went up in flames. We saw fiancee is a former classmate from seen more controversy than the two more and fired 10 to 15 rounds West Point, now a military intel- Bradley... Skeptics claimed it at each and killed them," he said. ligence officer at Fort Polk, La. burned when hit, its weapons Later, they fired at a tank, thinking And he jokes about how his platoon wouldn't kill enemy armor, and it it was another BMP, and when the will fail its next gunnery at Grafen- couldn't swim. rounds obviously didn't do any woehr - the first target will pop damage, they then fired a TOW mis- up, and Ghost Troop will instantly Cavalry troopers from the 4th sile that blew up the tank. blast 40 rounds into it. Sqdn., 7th Cavalry, 3rd AD proved critics wrong on two of those char- The concensus was that the Brad- The night after the cease-fire, ges during Operation Desert Storm. ley was a great infantry fighting when his men rolled into free vehicle, but too large for scouting. Kuwait, he stood beside his Bradley During an intense battle that left Complaints also centered on the and watched the eastern sky. Ghost two of their comrades dead, two of coax machine guns: all 18 of A Troop was camped in a quarry that A Troop's platoons took on a bat- Troop's machine guns jammed. had been turned into a Republican talion of Iraqi Republican Guard Guard stronghold, a city-sized maze armor. After the battle, they praised MlAls Held Their Boresight of 20-foot ridges transforming the the vehicle and claimed it saved Over 200 Miles of Desert flat desert into a miniature moun- many of their lives. tain range. "The M1 has been great," said SFC When we took hits, damage was James Williams of C Co., 4th Bn., Orange flames from the burning compartmentalized," said 1LT 37th Armor, 1st ID. "With daily Kuwaiti oil fields glowed in the east Daniel J.W. King, whose platoon maintenance, cleaning air filters and - someone had counted 57 fires - took several tank main gun hits. fuel filters, it hasn't failed us yet." and a little to the south of that, a "The fire suppression systems SFC Williams' unit had just covered nearly full moon was rising. worked," he said of the Bradley's 200 miles of desert to engage the Halon extinguishers. "It's an awe- Republican Guards. 'We got on "I couldn't wait to see combat. some weapon when you have to go them so fast, they weren't expecting What a fool I was." The killing, he toe-to-toe with enemy armor." us. We caught them with their pants said, became almost too easy, and down," he said. that seemed also to make him un- "The Bradley is better than I comfortable. He questioned his fu- thought it was," said SFC Ivery SSG John Sawyer, master gunner ture, now that he's finished living Baker, platoon sergeant in A Troop of C Co., 3d Bn., 35th Armor, what he thinks might be the most and a 12-year cavalry veteran. He praised the tank's main gun. "All important night of his life. But what said he saw several take hits without the gunner has to do is keep his bothered him most was another catching fire or blowing up. "The sight on the target, and the cannon question that really doesn't have an personnel had flash burns and follows his line of sight. Look answer - he wanted to know why. shrapnel. One was totally unin- around you and you can see how ef- jured," he said. Baker's platoon lost fective our weapons are," he added, "Why did they fight?" he asked two of six Bradleys. Balancing that pointing to dozens of destroyed slowly, and repeated it. "Why did was the destruction his unit caused Iraqi vehicles. they fight?" the enemy. "Our main guns blew up every BMP they fired at, and our CPT Henry Kievenaar, CO of D He looked again at the sky. Some- TOW missiles destroyed every tank Co., 1st Bn., 35th Armor, said his Gmmc k- c&I hn cnkc Drnrrnrl tht= --'led over 200 miles in five uough all extremes of "The M1 hit deadly ac- for five days after we ~~~~u.e..ted.All of our 14 tanks another desert on another world, a still praised the machine. "We used made it ... I would take an MlAl quarter of a million miles away. HE from the 25-mm gun at a BMP over a T-72M1 any-. day." 12 ARMOR - May-June 1991 u Riders on the Storm A narrative history of the 1-4 Cav’s campaign in Iraq and Kuwait - 24 January - March 1991

by 1-4 CAV Operations Staff

G-Day, 24 Feb 91

For Operation DESERT STORM, the division’s mission was to destroy lead elements of the Iraqi 26th Inf Div, establish a breachhead, pass During refuel operations, CW3 at 1630, and began to collect several the 1st UK Armored Division, and Winters’ SWT flew over the Iraqi enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). on order continue the attack (Fig- positions to our front. This single The Iraqis surrendered as soon as ure 1). The division placed its caval- act caused several Iraqis to sur- we approached their positions. A ry squadron under the operational render. By 1030 hrs, B Troop had Troop received some indirect fire at control (OPCON) of 1st Brigade taken 21 prisoners. The B Troop the breach site, but continued to for the operation’s initial phase. first sergeant consolidated the pris- drive north. oners at the refuel site. The com- At 0420 hrs, we began our zone mand sergeant major, HHT com- During the squadron’s movement reconnaissance north of PL Ver- mander, and flight operations per- forward, we did not search all of the mont, which was the border be- sonnel assisted in the evacuation of bunkers, fearing booby traps. The tween Iraq and Saudi Arabia. First this group of prisoners, which in- squadron placed a higher priority Brigade arrayed 1-4 CAV on the cluded several officers. At the same on controlling the friendly forward left, TF 2-34 in the center, and TF 5- time, CPT Tovsen’s SWT, who re- line of troops and preventing frat- 16 on the right. On our left flank, lieved CW3 Winters’ SWT, engaged ricide between friendly flank units. 312 ACR assigned us a liaison of- and destroyed an AML scout car. ficer, CPT Delgado. The squadron The squadron was along PL collocated the field trains with the Due to the lack of any significant Colorado by 1730, then tied in with lOlst SPT Bn. resistance, MG Rhame ordered the 1-34 AR on the right. We could not division to continue the attack at tie in to any 1st Brigade unit on our We moved forward in zone and 1500 hrs. An intense artillery bar- left, due to the brigade com- remained tied in with TF 2-34. The rage began at 1430, TF 2-34 and 5- mander’s desire not to move TF 5- scout weapons team (SWTs) recon- 16 began breaching operations at 16 during darkness. TF 5-16 would noitered forward and maintained 1500 hrs. The squadron con- attack OBJ 12K the following morn- contact with our flank units. By solidated near Attack Position Dra- ing. 1000 hours, we sat along PL Plum goon, in preparation for our pas- with no enemy contact. At that sage through the breach. After dark, the A Troop CP cap- time, the Forward Area Support tured roughly 80 EPWs, numerous Team (FAST) began refuel opera- At 1530, 1st Brigade ordered the weapons, and assorted equipment. tions under the control of the com- squadron to follow 1-34 AR The squadron captured an addition- mand sergeant major and the HHT through the breach, clear OBJ 15K al 34 prisoners, and destroyed four commander. This operation took lit- and secure PL Colorado. A and B trucks, an AML, and three AT guns tle more than an hour. Troops passed through the breach (105mm). Total number of enemy

ARMOR - May-June 1991 13 Breaching the Iraqi Defenses

1. Zone Recon 2. Breach Iraqi Defenses EaA 3. Screen PL Colorado

killed is unknown. Total distance covered was 35 km. We rearmed/ refueled that night.

COMMENTS: DPICM on the bat- tlefield posed severe problems for dismounts and wheeled vehicles. This made refuelbearm operations extremely hazardous, especially at night. The bomblets injured person- nel and destroyed tires. SWT teams I ta were invaluable for reconnaissance Figure 2. G + I25 Feb 9 operations and maintaining contact 1. Screen of Breachead on our flanks. The Global Position- 2. Move to Attack Position ing System greatly enhanced naviga- tion. 1 --:I

14 ARMOR - May-June 1991 G+1,25 Feb 91 - nificant enemy contact. In order to Cloudy/Overcast give the 1st UK maneuver room and prevent fratricide, the division’s First Brigade ordered the squad- zone was cut half of its width ron to move our screen line NE to (brigade-size zone). 3d AD was to screen the Corps Restrictive Fire our north, with 4-7 CAV as the Line (RFL) no later than O900 flank unit. (Figure 2). TF 5-16 seized OBJ 12K at 0800. We tied into 1-34 AR to The squadron departed from its at- our right and TF 5-16 to our left. tack positions at 0315 to occupy PL While the division passed the 1st Omaha before the division’s LD UK Armored Division and an artil- time of 0500. The squadron led the lery brigade forward, we maintained division’s movement in zone (Figure the screen and destroyed the enemy 3). We encountered no initial equipment abandoned in the area. enemy resistance, only scattered The B Troop engineers destroyed pockets of enemy, who gave them- several bunkers and ammunition selves up as we approached. The stockpiles on OBJ 15K. troops disarmed and passed several EPWs to the rear. A Troop en- At 1500, the division ordered the countered a series of enemy squadron to prepare for Contingen- bunkers and trench networks that cy Plan (COP) Jeremiah 11. 1-4 the Iraqis abandoned. Visibility was Division Movement to Contact CAV came under division control very limited (500-600m). G+2 26Feb91 1. Zone Recon and occupied attack positions A 2. Screen PL Abilene and B along PL New Jersey at 1900. By lo00 hours, we closed on the 3. Flank Screen At 2000 the squadron commander rear of 2 ACR along PL Abilene. briefed COP Jeremiah 11, which re- 2d ACR was conducting an attack quired the squadron to conduct a east of PL Abilene from north to division’s movement. All units com- zone recon forward of the division, south against what they believed pleted refueling within one hour. as it moved to contact. During that were elements of the Republican The squadron finished the day’s ac- evening, refuelhearm actions were Guards Tawakalna Division. During tion with full fuel tanks, prepared to reduced due to the extremely haz- the zone recon, A-25 encountered continue the advance forward. At ardous conditions posed by DPICM and destroyed an abandoned T-62 1700, CPT Morrison returned to and CBU bomblets. and a ZSU-23-4. field trains vic PT7709 to refuel the M978s. He began a hazardous night Total distance traveled was 10 km. At 1400, the squadron commander movement with 1SG Colangelo and The field trains remained with lOlst met with the CG, who gave the five M978s to link up with the com- SPT Bn - 25 to 30 kms distant. directive to contact 2d ACR and bat trains. Total distance: 60 km, The squadron XO, in conjunction coordinate the night forward pas- with an uncertain enemy situation. with the S-4 and HHT commander, sage of the division. MAJ Burdan, The division and 2d ACR dem- decided to continue the FAST con- the S-3, coordinated the passage. onstrated remarkable discipline dur- cept. This was a fortuitous decision, Additionally, we established and ing the forward passage of lines. given events to come. maintained contact with 4-7 CAV of Poor visibility kept the squadron the 3d AD. The passage began at from fully utilizing the air scouts. COMMENTS: 1:25O,OOO overlays 2130. The squadron’s mission was to We had rain and fog in the morning allow too much margin for error pass the division’s combat elements, and a dust storm in the afternoon. among units from different divi- then screen the division’s north sions. 1:25O,OOO maps must be ac- flank during the attack to OBJ Nor- G + 3, 27 Feb 91, companied by a list of points that folk. Total distance traveled was 120 Cloudy/Ground Fog define boundaries. 1:100,000 maps km. would be better. We started moving to the COMMENTS: CPT Morrison, division’s northern flank at 0130. G +2, 26 Feb 91, CloudyFiainy HHT commander, directed two The squadron positioned fuel for- critical refuel operations. He timed ward to top off the tanks before our During the night, the 1st UK Ar- these to minimize disruptions of the movement east to OBJ Norfolk. The mored Division to our south had sig- squadron’s momentum or the division stouued at OBJ Norfolk. ARMOR - MayJune 7997 75

- AAAAA The squadron set at the 70-85 north- - _-_.. south grid line.

The squadron commander in PAAA HQ66, the S-3 in HQ63, the FSO and ALO in HQ34 went forward at approximately 0400 to inspect the screen lie in preparation for con- tinued operations (See Figure 4). B Troop reported engaging and destroying a T-55 to its front.

As the command group ap proached the screen line, HQ63 spotted a T-72 at close range in tur- ret defrlade, with turret traversing. FAST. The area had not been attack, an Iraqi captain moved out Upon backing up, HQ63 acquired cleared by 2d ACR. of his bunker and surrendered his the T-72 and an additional tank, a T- men. First Platoon, A Troop dis- 55, as well as numerous dismounts. While in MOPP 4, 2LT Lowndes' armed the soldiers and moved them Keeping the tanks under observa- sections maneuvered and engaged south. Second and 3rd Platoons, A tion, the command group requested five tanks. SSG Robinson killed two Troop, continued the attack to the assistance from a B Troop tank. tanks with TOWs, and SGT Mar- east, destroying an apparent 2S1 bat- After maneuvering to the T-72's bach killed three tanks at point tery and several towed artillery right flank, the B Troop MlAl blank range with his tank's main pieces. B Troop encountered dug-in destroyed the tank. HQ63 destroyed gun. Upon completion of this en- tanks, BMPs, trucks, and numerous the T-55 with 25mm through the tur- gagement, B Troop's test for chemi- bunkers. ret and hull. Upon destroying the cal agents was negative. B Troop tanks, the numerous dismounts in commander gave the "all clear." By 0715, the squadron had the area took cover. The command reached its lit of advance, as A group displaced, as B Troop ac- At 0515, the squadron commander and B Troops continued to destroy quired additional T-72 tanks in the pulled the screed line back because enemy vehicles in the area. The same vicinity. B Troop commander of contact with the T-72s in command group went back into the sent 2LT Lowndes with two M3A2s prepared positions. The squadron area where the troops had en- and two MlAls to search out and commander and S-3 decided to at- countered the tanks earlier in the destroy the tanks. B Troop reported tack the positions once all the morning. Both the T-72 and the T- spotting a red and green star squadron's forces were set (Figure 55 were destroyed. HQ63 noticed cluster, followed five minutes later 5). At 0615, the squadron attacked another T-72 in hull defilade with by artillery fire on their positions. the enemy position, with A and B an Iraqi in the turret. When the The troop went to MOPP 4 and Troops on line. First Platoon, A enemy dropped down inside the tested for the presence of any Troop was the first with contact, tank, HQ66 destroyed the tank with chemical agents. Artillery also land- and destroyed two T-72 tanks with a TOW at 150m. ed near the combat trains and TOWs. As A Troop continued the The squadron commander called off the attack at 0830 hours after it appeared all enemy elements in the area were destroyed. For two hours -. the squadron had methodically AAAA moved and destroyed 11 tanks, artil- B TROOP SCREEN lery pieces, fuel, and cargo trucks. We refueled our tanks while waiting for the division to resume the at- tack. The brigade commanders and Figure 4. Command Group Contact CG discussed in detail their fuel status and expected rates of ad- G+3 0330-0430 27Feb91 vance before halting for resupply.

16 ARMOR - MayJune 1991 1

passed numerous fortified areas, captured three enemy tanks, and dis- armed 93 Iraqi soldiers.

Upon approaching our objective at 1630, the squadron commander directed B Troop to establish a screen line west, and A Troop east Figure 6. K Division Attack Eastward G +3 27 Feb 91 of the Basra-Kuwait City highway 1 and 2. Flank Screen; 3, Cut Road (Figure 7). A SWT under CPT Peters, scouted ahead of A Troop At 0930, the squadron resumed At 1330, the CG ordered the and reported personnel and the moving flank screen (Figure 6). division to continue the attack NE vehicles moving northward as well A Troop led the screen, followed by of PL Berlin to prevent the Iraqi as what appeared to be a bunker by B Troop. During the extremely fast- Army from retreating from Kuwait the road. As A Troop approached paced move, A Troop destroyed 23 City north to Iraq. The brigades’ ob- the road, it observed several vehi- tanks, 25 APCs, and numerous jectives were to the northeast .along cles and many personnel moving bunkers, many of which appeared the main Basra-Kuwait City high- north along the main road. The abandoned. Additionally, A Troop way. The squadron would continue squadron commander ordered A disarmed and pushed south more to screen the division’s north flank, Troop to secure the road lOkms than 100 EPWs. north of 2d Brigade. south of the Kuwait-Iraq border and cut the line of communications. The squadron arrived at PL Berlin The attack continued at 1430. Upon receipt of the order, CPT at 1230, where it conducted refuel SWTs reconnoitered forward and to Pope ordered 1st Platoon to lead, operations. HQ 66 then noted vehi- our flanks. Mr. Perkins’ SWT followed by 2d, 3rd, mortars, and cle movement on a ridgeline 500m engaged and destroyed several ar- trains. from the squadron. The S-3 ordered mored vehicles while supporting the B Troop to send a team to inves- squadron’s moving flank screen. At approximately 1700, 1st Pla- tigate. 2LT Karns led the scouts and The squadron passed a heavily for- toon reported contact with numer- tankers from B Troop and des- tified, but unoccupied, defensive ous enemy dismounts, tanks, and troyed one BMP, one BTR, and a position. The position had rein- APCs along the highway (Figure 8). rocket launcher that were attempt- forced (concrete) berms, trenches, The Iraqis appeared to have ing to flee the area. and bunkers. The squadron lost con- stopped before continuing north. tact with division, but relayed Unlike the previous vehicles, the At approximately 1300, the com- through 2d Bde our position and ob- enemy either manned or attempted bat trains passed through what ap- jective coordinates. At 1500 hrs, the to man their equipment. peared to be an unoccupied defen- TOC, led by the squadron executive sive position. Seven enemy soldiers officer, MAJ Wimbish, which was As the enemy spotted 1st Platoon, surrendered to CPT Harmon and moving with 2d Brigade, departed several vehicles attempted to move the combat trains. The EPWs indi- into hostile territory to link up with north. One T-55 attempted to cated that there were more Iraqi sol- A and B Troops. Enroute it by- traverse on A14, which immediately diers in the surrounding bunkers too injured to walk. CPT Stokes and the maintenance section used the AMV to clear the immediate vicinity, while LT Butler and Dr. Hanson, with escorts, proceeded to the wounded in the bunkers and treated their wounds. The combat \ trains stopped, passing ground am- bulances from 4-5 FA, which evacuated the wounded. The trains continued forward at 1430 to estab- Figure 7. Attack to Cut the Road to Basra 1600 27 Feb 91 lish contact with the squadron /!/ ground elements.

~ ~~ ARMOR - May-June 7997 77 Platoons to move north and estab- Enroute, CPT Morrison and CPL lish security northeast of the troop Hall captured eight Iraqi soldiers. area. In addition, CPL Hall later single- handedly captured 20 heavily armed As the scope of the task facing A Iraqi soldiers. Troop became too great, the squad- ron commander ordered B Troop With the combat trains in position, to abandon its screen line and move maintenance, support, and HQ per- to assist A Troop. The squadron sonnel began to secure the area and U proceeded to set up a hasty defen- take additional prisoners walking up sive position, preparing for either a the highway. The combat trains as- possible enemy counterattack from sumed control of the EPW site in the north or a large armored force order to allow A and B Troops the attempting to break out to the manpower to better secure the north. Both A and B Troop’s tem- squadron’s perimeter. porary EPW holding areas con- tinued to grow. The TOC informed The medical platoon immediately 2d Brigade of our position, situa- set up the aid station to treat the tion, and enemy assessment. wounded EPWs, and summoned the Jump Aid Station from the TOC. We were informed that the VI1 MAJ Hansen, CW3 Harston, and Corps commander halted the 2LT Butler worked diligently to Figure 8. division’s attack due to the presence treat more than 200 Iraqi casualties. m of the 1st UK Armored Division to Fortunately, an Iraqi and a Kuwaiti A Troop Cuts the south. Once the division halted, doctor provided much needed assis- Basra-Kuwait City Highway 1700 27 Feb 91 1-4 Cav was not only the sole con- tance. Working throughout the s troller of this key highway, but also night, this team of professionals ! the easternmost unit in VI1 Corps. saved many lives. Little water or destroyed the Iraqi tank. Farther food was available because of the ex- north, A15 destroyed the lead BMP, * I-- & I:.-- effectively blocking the road. With e the road now blocked, CPT Pope in- E structed 1st and 2d Platoons to 11 move northeast across the road, F destroying all enemy vehicles in C their path. e U As 1st and 26 Platoons continued t to engage vehicles, each platoon C began to gather a greater number of S EPWs. The A Troop commander or- a dered 2d Platoon to establish an 1 EPW collection point vicinity of his t M3A2. At approximately 1830 hrs, t elements of all platoons began to S deliver EPWs to the collection I point. During this time, all elements r were still engaging vehicles and 1 equipment. Eventually, A Troop col- lected about 450 EPWs. By this time, night arrived, and the situation became even more confusing. With the majority of enemy vehicles destroyed, the commander ordered a section from each of 1st and 2d

18 A alert all night. Discipline and mis- 0723. Second Brigade linked up on sion focus prevailed; we sustained the ground with A Troop at about no friendly deaths or injuries. 0900 hrs (Figure 9). One infantry Squadron engineers and soldiers company, 2-16, was to help guard from the combat trains and field POWs. Engineer ACES built a trains handled EPWs in an ex- POW berm. We pushed out the emplary manner. Squadron medical screen in accordance with the 2d personnel and the squadron Brigade plan and consolidated. chaplain treated EPWs as if they There were no squadron casualties. were their own. FLT OPS, FARP We hit three mines, placed enemy personnel and the support platoon KIAs in body bags, and continued worked all night, repositioning units to police up enemy weapons for for future operations. TOC person- destruction. Final count was 2,098 Figure 9 nel remained calm and in control, EPWs, 1,400 weapons, munitions, 360-Degree Defense while maintaining the vital com- and many destroyed vehicles. on Basra-Kuwait City Highway munications link to the division. Air G +4 28 Feb 91 troops worked all night preparing COMMENTS: Because of the the aircraft for an early morning large quantity of unexploded muni- launch. tions on the ground, no movement Kuwaiti border. The AH-64s were was allowed after sunset. in a holding area at the TOC, with It became obvious upon examining the company commander monitor- the EPWs that the Iraqis themselves G+5, 01 Mar 91 ing the squadron command net mistreated many of their own from within the squadron TOC it- countrymen. Some were old men of At 0240 the squadron commander self. The squadron commander 50 or 60; others, boys of 13 or 14 received an urgent call from the CG moved with B Troop, S-3 with A years of age, pulled from the streets to move into Iraq and secure the Troop. A SWT flew in front of each of Basra and pressed into the ser- Sahan Airfield (QU550370) for the troop under squadron control. They vice. They had been students, ar- upcoming cease-fire negotiations. provided the squadron with an ini- tists, writers, and teachers. Our mission was reconnaissance; we tial picture of enemy units. The were not to get decisively engaged squadron crossed the Line of The squadron was lucky that we (Figure 10). The squadron went to Departure at 0615 hrs, and within cut the road to Basra during a REDCON 1. We were instructed to one hour, had already bypassed or period of limited visibility. We were delay our LD until 0615 and crossed numerous vacated bunkers 30 kilometers in front of our received an Apache Company OP- and trenches. We observed and division, with an Iraqi division 12 CON. Our plan was to move two reported numerous T-72s, T-55~5, kilometers to the north. Hill 4.66 ground troops abreast, preceded by MTLBs, AMXs, and ZSU-23-4s in was a SCUD site (located beside air recce to the objective, which was the area surrounding the airfield the airfield), and enemy personnel 10 kilometers north of the Iraqi- and made face-to-face contact with found on the hill had a commanding view of the squadron’s positions.

G +4, 28 Feb 91

The division placed the squadron under the operational control of 2d Brigade at 0600. We captured about 1,400 EPWs and 700-900 weapons and demolitions. We air evacuated 15 injured Iraqis. We could not get additional rations, water, or blan- kets for the EPWs, but we gave Figurelo. G+5 iMar9 them what we could. It was an- The Capture of Safwan Airfield nounced that a cease-fire would go 1. Zone Recon, 2. Capture of Ai into effect at 0800, later changed to

~~ ARMOR - May-June 7997 79 Iraqi units in the area. The the area. The colonel finally are you in Iraq? Are you lost?" CPT squadron commander moved to the relented and ordered his unit to Bills replied that he was here to point of contact and approached leave the area secure the cease-fire negotiations their defensive position. The enemy site and that the Iraqis must leave had an armored brigade in In a separate incident, the S3, the area in order for the talks to prepared positions, with three bat- Mkl Burdan, was approached by begin. The Iraqi officer refused to talions abreast and one in depth an Iraqi captain and a major and leave without instructions from defending north of the objective. asked if he knew that the squadron higher. The enlisted soldiers were The squadron commander then or- was in Iraq. They seemed totally told to leave, leaving 15-20 officers dered B Troop to abandon its as- surprised 'at our sudden appear- surrounding CPT Bills. He started signed OPs and move to the line of ance. The S-3 smiled and replied to hand out MREs. One was of- contact. yes. He told them they needed to fered to the battalion commander leave the area and then asked them but he refused to accept it, saying Additionally, the squadron com- what unit they were from. The "Saddam feeds me well!" CPT Bills mander dismounted his M3 and con- major smiled this time and replied then returned to his screen line. A fronted several Iraqis. At ap- "Iraqi Army!" He refused to identify short time later, CPT Bills returned proximately 0900 hrs, an Iraqi col- his unit. The Iraqis then drove away to meet again with the Iraqi com- onel arrived in A Troop's sector. in a state of consternation. mander. This time, the battalion CPT Pope dismounted his vehicle commander was angry and asked and began to explain to the Iraqi Meanwhile, in the B Troop sector, 'Why are you Americans here?" colonel that he must move his unit CPT Bills put together a small con- The troop XO moved forward and out of the area. The colonel refused tingent of armored vehicles, three established contact with an Iraqi to move his force without instruc- Bradleys and two tanks, which armor battalion in their vicinity. As tions from his higher HQ. The Iraqi moved in an inverted "V" toward in the other sector, the Iraqis had to officer asked CPT Pope if he knew the Iraqi defense. 1LT Danussi, the be persuaded to leave their posi- that he was in Iraq. CPT Pope XO, led the contingent toward a tions and head north. The Iraqi of- replied that, yes, he knew that he gathering of Iraqi soldiers. Once the ficer said they would leave in 30 was in Iraq, and that his unit was formation came to a stop, CPT Bills minutes. CPT Bills was escorted there to secure the site for cease- dismounted and approached the back to his vehicle by the major and fire negotiations. The Iraqis had as- Iraqi officers and soldiers. The another soldier. He was dressed in sumed the talks were to be held in major then sent for his battalion a camouflage uniform, black leather Kuwait City. Additionally, the commander, a lieutenant colonel, jacket, scarf, beret, and AK-47. OII colonel seemed offended that the who spoke broken English. His first schedule, 30 minutes later, the Iraqi American soldiers were giving his comment to CPT Bills was "Why battalion began to pull out. By 1200 people food and responded by directing his men to prepare food and hot tea for A Troop. The A Squadron Battle Damage Assessment Troop soldiers drank the tea while the colonel departed to confer with -6 -C -D Total his superiors. Trucks 3 21 39 3 0 66 Bunkers 0 70 21 0 0 91 At approximately 1020, the colonel APC 6 40 10 3 7 66 0 7 65 returned and stated he still did not Tanks 5 35 18 Arty 0 11 2 0 2 15 have orders to leave the area. CPT AAA 0 5 0 2 0 15 Pope told the colonel that in order Radars 0 0 1 0 0 1 to prevent a confrontation, he must Rocket L 0 0 1 0 0 1 leave the area now. At roughly the POWS 3010 Numerous same time, a flight of A-10s flew KIA overhead, and CPT Pope told the Diesel fuel consumed from 22-28 Feb 91 = 25,900 gallons Iraqi that the aircraft would attack if he did not leave. Total combat flight hours: At this point, the squadron com- mander arrived and reiterated to 123.9 OH-58 75.4 AH-1 the Iraqi colonel that he must leave 14.6 UH-1 20 ARMOR - May-June 1991 Two Scouts Under Fire Helped Injured Buddies During Night Battle

by Captain Michael Gollaher, Vi1 Corps PA0

As night closed in on February 26, McMasters, in HQ-21, said he saw a rugged battle awaited a group of Stephens’ track taking fire from an scouts from the 4th Battalion, 32nd unseen position. The incoming Armor. rounds caused some of the Brad- ley’s ammunition to cook off. First Lieutenant James Barker’s DeMasters tried to raise Stephens Bradley, HQ-21, moved into posi- on the radio, but no one answered. tion on a screen line to the north front of the battalion. Joining HQ- PFC Frank “Ranger Bob Bradish 21 were HQ-24 and HQ-26, com- was in the open hatch of HQ-26, manded by SSG Christopher Ste- reloading TOWS, when the track phens. To their right rear flank took incoming rounds. The blasts were elements of Task Force 5-5 severely injured Bradish’s right The sign tells the story. Cav scouts. The night was overcast hand, Stephens suffered shrapnel and pitch black. wounds of his head and legs, and hrs, most of the Iraqis in the PFC Adrian Stokes, Bradish‘s fel- squadron sector were on the road The 4-32 scout platoon had been low observer on the track, suffered moving north toward Basra. After in position about five minutes when severe abdominal and groin injuries, the squadron had secured the air- a T-72 came into view on a nearby but was still alive. SGT Donald field, the CG ordered 2d Brigade to berm. With his night vision goggles, Goodwin was struck in the chest, move to the airfield and join in its 1LT Barker could see the Iraqi tank but was conscious. PFC John defense. The squadron was then and some dismounted infantrymen McClure was the only member of placed OPCON to 2d Brigade. Sec- as they headed toward Stephens’ the crew who did not have life- tors were adjusted and 2d Brigade track. The tank was part of the threatening wounds. assumed responsibility to prepare Republican Guards’ Tawakalna Di- the site for peace talks. CPT Mor- vision, and the Bradleys were no McClure and Bradish kept their rison worked all night to clear the match for its 125-mm main gun. heads, as if they were seasoned com- runway and assist corps in setting bat veterans. Bradish reported, up the negotiations site. We learned Stephens spotted the tank, report- saying he was OK, but Stokes was that night that the peace talks had ed it, and fired two TOW missiles. “hurt bad.” He tried to pull Stokes been delayed 24 hours. The first missed, but the second from the vehicle. Goodwin was able knocked off one of the T-72’s to climb out of the disabled track. COMMENTS: We continued to as- roadwheels. The gunners on HQ-21 McClure assessed the situation, sist the division and corps in and HQ-24 then opened fire on the pulled some flares from the ammo preparation for the cease-fire dismounts with their 25-mm, and box in the turret, and secured the negotiations. The squadron’s perfor- Barker fired a TOW, which radio. He passed these to Bradish, mance in accomplishing this dif- streaked toward the target and who also grabbed his M-16 with ficult mission was magnificent. popped the turret off in an ex- grenade launcher, and prepared to Aidground coordination was su- plosive fireball. The sky lit up as defend his friends. While McClure perb. Good order and discipline secondary explosions began to en- tended to the wounded, Bradish enabled us to move a Republican gulf the doomed T-72. called the lieutenant’s track, report- Guard armored brigade out of its ing they were hit and needed a prepared positions without blood- What happened next isn’t exactly medic. He cursed at the flares be- shed. clear. Platoon Sergeant Dennis cause he couldn’t open them with

ARMOR - May-June 1991 21 his injured hand. He managed to Holding up his injured hand, Centurion on our left. SGT Jones, open them with his teeth instead, Bradish quipped, "They thought my 36 Bradley commander, called then sent them up to mark their they got me, but I fooled them ... I in contact with enemy infantry position. Bradish then told McClure shoot left-handed." troops and, right after that, with a that he was worried about his own BMP. hand wound, but urged him to con- Bradish received the Purple Heart tinue treating Stokes and Goodwin. and McClure was awarded the Sil- "SFC Ivery Baker, my platoon ser- As McClure treated his friends, ver Star for actions under fire. geant, reported troops to the front Bradish heard enemy forces ap- also, so I immediately reported to proaching. my commander that we had sighted Lucky Scouts Dodge one BMP. That quickly became two Meanwhile, 1LT Barker radioed when the Bravo section platoon ser- battalion to send some tanks and an "Big Bullets" That geant called in another. Then, Ser- ambulance track to their location. Ripped Their Bradley geant Jones called in a third. He saw an enemy infantry squad heading directly toward Bradish by Tony Wunderlich, "By the time I called in the first, and McClure, so he called in mor- VI1 Corps PA0 one was in flames because SGT tars on their position and watched Baker had given the fue command," as the rounds dispersed the attack- SABOT rounds rip armor and Vassalotti said. He added that ing enemy dismounts. He then destroy tanks and tank crews, unless before he could finish calling in headed for the stricken Bradley, the crew gets lucky. Some scouts of contact with the second and third where he linked up with Bradish. 3rd Plt., 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry enemy vehicle, all three had been Regiment, needed every ounce of destroyed. Within 20 minutes, SFC Craig Ken- luck they could muster on Feb. 26, dall's M1 platoon from Charlie when two of the deadly rounds Vassalotti said 36 had gone for- Company arrived with two am- ripped through a Bradley Fighting ward and taken up a firing position. bulance tracks. SGT Sergio Nino, a Vehicle during the ground war. 'We moved up with them on line HQ Company medic, assessed the and continued to engage the enemy. casualties. He went fast to As these scouts engaged the We moved south, out of the way of Stephens. "Is he gone?" asked Tawakalna Division of the Iraqi 2nd Platoon, which came through us DeMasters. Republican Guard, Bradley 36, com- to start firing and, in the process, manded by SGT Roland Jones, was we went blank on ammunition. We "I'm afraid so," SGT Nino replied. disabled by enemy fire, prompting a had to reload. rescue mission by the Bradley team Inside HQ-21, Stokes had gone in 31. After the 31 team, led by 2LT "Second Platoon took the heat off into shock. SGT Nino and medic Michael J. Vassalotti, retrieved the us while we pulled back and around Michael Gindra redressed Stokes' crew from 36, an Iraqi tank un- them to the right and began reload- wounds and tried to start an in- loaded two SABOTS on 31. Both ing," Vassalotti said. travenous infusion, but it was no rounds penetrated the Bradley's use; Stokes had lost too much blood. armor. But in a stroke of tremen- SGT Jones picked up the narra- dous luck, the rounds did not hit tive: "LT 'V' came over the net and Only after his friends were treated the scouts inside. A flash bum was said we had to move south about and ready to evacuate did Bradish the most serious injury. 800 meters. As we were shifting, my mention that he needed help. loader was reloading a TOW mis- "Ranger Bob" was injured much Recounting the event, Vassalotti sile. When we took up position, we worse than he'd let on. He had lost started at the beginning. "Our mis- engaged another BMP and a tank. portions of his right hand, suffered sion was to execute recon on 3d Ar- We were getting low on ammo, so I a painful groin injury, and had mored Division's right flank with a told my driver to pivot so we could taken a round through both upper one-kilometer sector between 3rd reload. 1 realized we were still up thighs. AD and the 2nd ACR," said the 23- front so we started backing up. It year-old 3rd Platoon leader. sounded like we lost a track, so I The medics wondered how he had told him to stop. As soon as we run around, popping flares, radioing "An additional mission was to stopped, we took a round in the for help, tending the wounded, and maintain contact between them, transmission. Later, we found out it trying to set up perimeter security. specifically between 4/34 Armor was from a 12.7-mm machine gun.

22 ARMOR - MayJune 1991 We lost all power. I called for tillery. It was constant bombard- TOWs, and AP on them." The bat- help and then evacuated the track. ment, continuous for minutes on tle proved to Rutherford and his end. There's no way the Iraqis men that a Bradley could kill both "When 31 arrived, my track took could've survived that. I knew it T-62 tanks and thinner-skinned ar- another round. We're not sure if it would go this fast." mored vehicles. was from an RPG round or a SAG- GER. My driver took some shrap- Not far from Rutherford's platoon, nel from that. We got evacuated CPT Charles Forshee engaged an into 31. On the way back to the "Shooting Blind Men Iraqi tank while backing up his own troop trains to get my driver to the In the Dark ...I1 Bradley. The Alpha Co. com- medics, we were engaged by a T-72 mander's crew then killed a T-62 tank and took two sabot rounds. by Bill Arrnstrong, VI1 Corps PA0 tank, in addition to two armored personnel carriers, by firing their "When the first round hit, I was A combination of better training, TOWs and 25-mm main gun. scared. When the second one hit, troop discipline, and an overwhelm- that terrified me. After the first ing technological advantage moved Forshee looks back on the battle round, I thought I could keep run- the soldiers of 3rd Armored as one of no contest. "We killed ning, but after the second round, I Division's Co. A, 4th Battalion, 18th stuff that was blind to us," he said. knew they had a bead on us. I was Infantry Regiment swiftly through "Shooting blind men in the dark." waiting for a third round, but it Iraqi trench lines in the allied never came. One of the tracks in ground offensive. And when the SPC Barker attributes the victory, 2nd Platoon - Lieutenant King's smoke cleared, the mechanized in- in part, to superior vision capa- track, I believe - took out the tank fantry soldiers of Alpha Co. dis- bilities. 'We had such an advantage that was firing at us. That saved my covered some shocking facts about over them with our thermal sights, it life and the lives of the other guys in their "elite Republican Guard op- seemed like they couldn't even see my crew." ponents. us," the 22-year-old gunner said.

SFC Baker, platoon sergeant for SFC Marvin Rutherford, a platoon And with first light came mass sur- 3rd Platoon, said the scouts stood sergeant with Alpha Co., was render. The Iraqi troops wanted no their ground despite the hairy situa- among the first in his company to misconception of their intent. "They tion. "Maintaining contact is what a encounter enemy forces. Two pairs carried large white sheets or sleep- scout's supposed to do," he said. of Bradley Fighting Vehicles ing mats or anything that was white, "With ground fire, rounds coming in bounded forward, protecting each and just walk en masse," said SFC all over, and vehicles getting hit, we other during the advance through Michael Jones, another Alpha Co. maintained contact with the enemy." Iraq, toward Kuwait, in the early platoon sergeant. As the enemy hours of the morning on Feb. 27. prisoners of war came closer to the One crew member had plenty to victors, the U.S. troops began to say, as well, about the sparks of fear "We saw a missile coming toward question some of the things they generated by the heavy-duty rounds. us, Rutherford said. "At first, we had heard about their "elite" op- thought it was a flare coming down, ponent. "They were scared, really "I was scared to death. I could see but it kept coming closer and scared," said SPC James Singleton, pretty much what was going on closer." an infantry soldier. "One group everywhere; it was scary," said PFC looked like they had been digging Richard Legendre, a 21-year-old The flare turned out to be an an- through garbage cans because they ammo loader. "I saw two of our titank missile. Rutherford's gunner, had pieces of our food here and three vehicles that got hit, and I was SPC Donald Barker, shot the mis- pieces of it there. The guys that we worried that my buddies weren't sile down 200 meters shy of its des- took looked like they had been plan- going to make it." tination. ning their escape for quite a while."

Legendre, though, maintained his For Rutherford and his men, the Starvation and a lack of adequate footing. He did his job. "I'm a fight was just beginning. "We didn't clothing were common among the loader, so I just started breaking know what we had gotten into. They captured Iraqis, according to PFC ammo apart, knowing we were had tanks in the trench lines and James Barnette. "Most of the EPWs going to need it." Finally, he felt the they were hard to see. Again, my we picked up didn't have shoes. burden of the battle lifting from his gunner got on them and we started They had blisters on their feet the shoulders. "I was relieved to hear ar- whipping-- - HE (high- explosive),,. size of their thumbs. One of them ARMOR - MayJune 7997 23 told our first sergeant it had been two or three days since he had food or water, and there's little to noth- ing of them there. It's like grabbing somebody who's been starved to death." h4AJ Robert Leonhard, who was in charge of the battalion's com- bat training, felt some pity toward the Iraqi soldiers, who had been im- mersed in combat with his men just a few hours before.

"We could see in their eyes Contract haulers on the Tapline Road carry ammo west in preparation for the assault despair. The immediate response was fear, either fear of the unknown or fear that they were going to be executed," Leonhard said. _PUMPED UPmmm "Our soldiers were very careful, ob- viously, but very compassionate at the same time." 1 Not one soldier of Alpha Co. was killed during the battle. The men in their Bradleys were able to kill three T-624 three PT-76 am- phibious light tanks, and nine ar- mored personnel carriers, despite r' several pockets of resistance. I 1 SSG Thomas Gregory, an Alpha Co. squad leader, admits that Iraqi troops may have had the advantage I of being combat veterans going into the fight. But he points out, "They have never met a force with such L technology that rolls them up like I that." I I

Gregory adds that tough training gave his squad the edge in battle. "We found them with their pants down. All of their equipment was stocked, but it wasn't loaded. 'I

On March 4, as the soldiers of Alpha Co. stood in formation on a barren, sandy plain in central Kuwait, MG Paul E. Funk pinned the Bronze Star for valor on the chest of Forshee, the company com- mander.

Tank and Bradley crews in the last days before But he made it clear to the forma- the attack make final adjustments to their tion that every soldier standing weapons, check commo, and prepare to saddle up there could be considered a hero. fnr.-. thn.,." rltmh,-.""., .rirlo ,..- ,nnrth.". .,..

24 I - May-June 1991 Armor in its element - The 3d Armored Division masses in the desert prior to its assault into Iraq. READYTO ROLL

MlAl tanks of the 3d AD begin to roll across the desert in the 100-hour war. Photo SFC Gail Thueson

What They Faced...

These Iraqi obstacles were typical of those along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. The "dragons' teeth" on either side of the wide antitank ditch protected a crossing point used by the Iraqis. An access road runs parallel to the ditch, and be- hind that, several lines of wire obstacles stretch across the desert at the top of the photo, probably straddling a minefield. ARMOR - May-June 1991 25 SPLATTERED!

After the 1 a graveya mored ve dotted thi revealed tanks wit1 Page 13), -after ragi

At hundreds of locations in the featureless desert, the tions were little more than halfdug graves for fighting and crews that had been abandoned by their leaders vehicles were almost new: the T-72 track at far right hi spots of the track - the road wheels were barely worr several hundred kilometers of use. The illumination dc some T-72 turrets, was intended to spoof antitank mis

26 ARMOR - May-June 7997 L

!d air and ground assault, the desert was parts (above right). On-scene observers talked about of black hulks. Dug-in Iraqi tanks and ar- sabot shots that penetrated sand berms to kill, or les, some charred beyond identification, passed through both sides of a turret, or plowed at, brilliant landscape. A helicopter tour through the tank, driving the powerpacks out the rear rned-out hulls, tanks without turrets, of the hull. In some cases, killing shots set off im- heir turrets upside down in place (see mediate secondary explosions; in other cases, gun- d others that had settled on their bellies ners who had scored direct turret hits didn't know it - heat softened their steel suspension they followed sabot shots with HEAT to make sure.

tarve and die. Many of the Year only on the high Id odometers showed only e at lower right, found on S, such as the TOW.

ARMOR - May-June 7997 27 The Challenges of Change and Continuity by General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff of the Army

Today America’s Armored Forces want to spend a few minutes discuss- devote to national defense. - along with the rest of the Army ing the challenges the Army and Together, these factors define the - stand triumphant. The shattered our Armor Force will face in shap evolving nature of the international remains of Iraqi tank divisions sent ing the Army for the future. I want system in the post-Cold War era. a clear message to both our friends to stress the parallel themes of and our foes - our systems work, change and continuity - change in August 2, 1990, was a pivotal mo- they survive, and they are lethal. We the environment, in our strategy, ment in our history, defining the demonstrated to a watching world and in our forces, but continuity of end of one era and the dawn of what we have known for a long time purpose, responsibility, and another. It was on that day that the - our soldiers and equipment are capability as we move forward in a legions of Saddam Hussein the best in the world - our Army is quest for a new world order. I want launched their brutal aggression trained and ready, and America’s to begin by looking at DESERT against Kuwait, threatening the very armor stands at the cutting edge of STORM in the context of our chang- fabric of the international system. It our nation’s defenses. - .& ing national military strategy - a was also on that same day, on the change that will significantly affect other side of the world, that Presi- As we celebrate this great success, how we must shape the Army for dent Bush announced a new nation- let us not forget that every soldier, the challenges of tomorrow. every civilian, and every family shares in DESERT STORM. This was a Total Army victory - Active, Changes Reserve, and National Guard. DESERT STORM could only have The strategy has its roots in three been fought and won by an Army fundamental factors. The fvst of that is trained and ready to respond these - and the most important - anywhere in the world. Remember is the unambiguous success of our also that this same Army has trium- strategy of containment and the col- The new military strategy rests on phed in three wars in the past 18 lapse of the Soviet empire. The the time-honored principles of months alone - the Cold War, second is the challenge of a world deterrence and colle&ve -security which we won without firing a shot, in a state of revolutionary change - At the same time, in recognition of Operation JUST CAUSE, and now, a world alive with unprecedented the changing environment, tht

~ -1 _-_- ---l---:- -- DESERT STORM. opportunities but also rife with in- sira~egy-.--.-- piaceb ncw---- c;rnpnasis on stability and violence fueled by the three additional concepts - each of But even in the midst of this un- accelerating spread of sophisticated which is of central importance to precedented victory, we must now weapons. The final factor is, of the armor community and must be turn again to the task of shaping the course, the precipitous decline in understood by all Army leaders if Army for the future. Therefore, I resources our nation is willing to we are to maintain a trained and

28 ARMOR - MayJune 1991 I ready Army in a time of great not fully manned or must be mobi- global uncertainty. lized from scratch as we did during World War 11. In this regard, we First, as an element of our nation’s are examining the concept of cadre forward presence, the Army will divisions as one means of quickly maintain powerful forces - includ- fielding more forces. do well to remember the images of ing armored divisions - stationed the fourth largest tank army in the in Europe and the Pacific to anchor That is the essence of our new world crushed and burning in the stability and to provide a credible strategy - a strategy in which the wake of the most overwhelming capability to influence events in United States Army and its Armor onslaught of military power in the those critical regions. Commen- Forces will be at the very center. It history of our nation. The 100 hours surate with the declining Soviet is a strategy that recognizes that of the ground offensive clearly threat, however, we can and will most potential adversaries have in- demonstrated what power projec- reduce our forces in Europe to a vested their resources primarily in tions is all about. level appropriate to the challenges their land forces - forces that we confront. alone can seize or defend territory. DESERT STORM was a triumph Only powerful land forces - includ- for our strategy and for the Total The heart of our new military ing modernized, trained and ready Army - a winning team of Active, strategy lies in the second element Armored Forces - can deter, dis- Reserve, and National Guard. It - the projection of power - swift- suade or defeat these enemy armies was a victory for the American sol- ly and massively - to trouble spots should the need arise. dier - men and women who are around the world. To meet this courageous in war, compassionate power projection requirement, we Desert Storm in peace, and committed to the must have a force of five fully-struc- defense of our nation. It was a vic- tured active divisions - including Seldom has a national strategy tory for the armor leaders - from armor, mechanized infantry, light, been more quickly tested by fire. the platoon leader to the corps level airborne, air assault, and special For, even as the President was an- - who honed their units into the operations units - that are coiled nouncing the strategy, the Iraqi polished, razor-sharp formations in readiness to deploy immediately Army stood victorious in Kuwait that slashed through the vaunted and to fight and win. From this and was poised like a dagger at the Iraqi Army. Finally, it was a tri- powerful grouping, we will tailor the throat of the entire world. With vir- umph for the Army throughout the package that is appropriate to the tually no American forces forward world - soldiers, units, and leaders threat that we confront. deployed in the region, the United manning the ramparts of freedom States faced the monumental chal- from the DMZ in Korea to the Powerful projection also requires lenge of projecting credible, Panama Canal to the North Ger- that the Army have the capacity to capable combat power from the man Plain. Every soldier, every reinforce our committed forces. A United States and Europe. civilian, and every family of critical element of this capability America’s Army share in this vlc- will be our Active Component Beginning with the arrival of the tory. divisions rounded-out by maneuver first Abrams tanks in those early, un- brigades from the National Guard. certain days of the crisis, the United For more protracted or larger-scale States and our coalition partners Challenges conflicts in Europe or elsewhere, methodically built a mighty force the Army will rely on its remaining that could withstand the power of We cannot afford to rest on our reinforcement units - our National the Iraqi Army. This same force - laurels, however, as we look ahead Guard combat divisions. which included over 60 percent of to a future we can only dimly see. our armor battalions and cavalry We face many challenges that we The final aspect of the strategy is squadrons - would ultimately drive must attack with the same resolu- the requirement to reconstitute the Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. tion we displayed during DESERT force. Reconstitution - put simply STORM. The Army must continue - means the generation of addition- Those who would contemplate our disciplined evolution into the al forces from units that are either challenging the United States would force the nation will need to fulfill

ARMOR - May-June 7997 29 our strategy in the 1990s and more easily deployed, and we must continuity of purpose, continuity of beyond. train for deployment. We cannot be commitment, and continuity of content with rotations to the combat capability that will preserve the fun- In the years ahead, we will shape training centers or an occasional damentals of the force as we move an Army of 20 divisions - Active "Reforger"-type exercise. Deploy- into a future we can only dimly see. and Reserve - that will be the smal- ability must become a mindset in lest since the eve of World War 11. the entire force. These vital threads of continuity However, this is the force that we have their clearest expression in the must shape to preserve training, It will be an Army that is expan- vision of the Army of the future - readiness, and, above all, quality - sible - able to grow rapidly to a vision that each of us as leaders the essence of the force that fought meet a resurgence of Soviet adven- must share. It is a vision of a trained and won in DESERT STORM. turism or the rise of violence and ready Army, today and tomor- wherever it threatens our interests row, that can fulfill its strategic man- By the mid-l990s, we will have a around the globe. This requirement date anytime, anywhere. We can force that is perilously small for a means that you must ensure that the achieve such a force, and we will un- nation with the global interests of Active and Reserve forces are dergird continuity, if we are unyield- the United States - a force that is trained to common standards so ing in our adherence to the Army's at an irreducible minimum. Yet, I that integration during mobilization six fundamental imperatives - prin- believe that if we are imaginative, can be effected quickly. The ciples that are now fdy em- determined, and responsible, the Reserve components have been es- bedded in the Army at all levels. result will be an Army that has the sential to our readiness in the past characteristics necessary to fulfill and will continue to be a key ele- They are of singular importance to our strategic responsibilities. ment in the future. the Army and to our soldiers. As I discuss each of them, I ask that you It will be an Army that is versatile Finally, it will be an Army that is consider the impact of these impera- in its ability to satisfy the wide lethal and can fight and win on any tives on your units and how you can range of requirements in multiple battlefield at any time. The violence implement them as the foundation theaters with force packages ap unleashed during DESERT of the Armor Force we will need in propriate to the threats our nation STORM only foreshadows our fu- the future. will face. For the Armor Force, this ture capabilities. But you must means that your weapons and recognize that lethality is not simply The first imperative - fvst listed doctrine and your thinking must be bigger, faster, or more modem and fvst in importance - reminds applicable to diverse environments weapons. Lethality also comes from us that we must maintain the quality and threats, and you must be able the ability to generate combat of the force throughout the total to fight in a variety of force pack- power - the combination of leader- Army. We have achieved levels of ages. Versatility also means that you ship, protection, maneuver, and quality unprecedented in our na- must retain the ability displayed fvepower - in synchronization, so tion's history. The soldiers, ser- during DESERT STORM that that the effect is devastating. geants, and officers are the best caused an Iraqi general to label America has to offer. The quality of American soldiers as heroes - the Versatile, deployable, expansible, the Armor Force had benefitted ability to shift from being destroyers and lethal - that is the Army the from the matchup of these quality to being deliverers when called nation needs and the Army that we personnel with quality equipment upon to render humanitarian relief. must build. Your challenge is to and doctrine. This must remain the forge the armored component of standard for the future. It will be an Army that is deploy- such an Army - an Army trained able in its ability to project power and ready to meet the military Your challenge is to ensure that rapidly and massively throughout strategy of our nation. our soldiers continue to have a train- the world. This presents a particular ing environment that is unsurpassed challenge to the Armor Force. You Continuity in its ability to teach and motivate. must find ways to improve your You are key to bringing out the ability to deploy rapidly. More In the midst of these massive chan- quality inherent in our young sol- sealift and airlift and prepositioning ges in the environment, in our diers. We also must recognize that are only partial answers. We need strategy, and in our forces, we must the entire quality of life is important to design our weapons so they are retain steel threads of continuity - to the readiness of the force. We

30 ARMOR - May-June 1991 cannot forget that the family is part mechanized, light, and special of that environment. We are a mar- operations - within our active and ried Army today - far different reserve components - that provide from the Army I entered as a us the necessary versatility in im- lieutenant over 30 years ago. Per- plementing our national strategy. haps at no time in our recent past Our experience in the last 18 has the role of the family been more months vividly demonstrates the units, and leaders - this is the important to the Army's success - vital importance of combined arms. highest priority of the army in the whether it be in routine garrison ac- field. tivities, rotations to the combat I liken this imperative to a kit bag training centers, or mobilization for from which we can draw out the Fifth, we must continue to modern- war. Our goal must be to provide right forces we need for the job - ize both our Active and Reserve our soldiers, civilians, and family whether it is a minor regional con- component forces. In the sands of members with a quality of life equal tingency such as JUST CAUSE, the Arabian Desert, we vividly wit- to that of the citizens they defend. which was predominantly light for- nessed the life and death difference ces support by elements of Mech that modernization makes. Thanks Second, we must maintain an effec- and Armor, or major regional con- to American industry, new equip- tive warfighting doctrine. At no tingency such as DESERT STORM ment was fielded rapidly, and older time in our history has doctrine that required the largest commit- equipment modified quickly and ex- demonstrated its importance so ment of U.S. Armored Forces since pertly. And it did wonders for the decisively. AirLand Battle is now World War 11. We must have forces confidence of our soldiers. During part of the lore of America. It was whose capabilities range across the Christmas, I visited with a unit of manifest in the images of armored entire spectrum of conflict while we the 1st Cavalry Division that had cavalrymen spearheading the assault retain also the ability to tailor forces been upgraded with the MlA1. The deep into Iraq; of tens of thousands that can operate competently in soldiers could not say enough about of Iraqi prisoners plodding south joint and combined operations. how much better it was than the past the burned-out remnants of a older version - whether it be once-proud army; and of Abrams Fourth, we must continue to train firepower, accuracy, or chemical tanks and Bradleys racing north to to tough, realistic standards - protection. seal the fate of the Iraqi Army. standards that are uncompromising in application and uniform across As dramatic as the performance of We must now ensure that our the entire force. The payoff for our the Abrams was, however, we can- doctrine continues to evolve so that investment in training was manifest not afford to become complacent. AirLand Battle-Future will be as ef- in the destruction of a powerful We must ensure that we stay on the fective on the battlefields of tomor- army and in the low casualties our cutting edge of technology. We row as AirLand Battle was today. forces suffered. Indeed, it is no exag- must maintain the same battlefield We must look to the special geration to say that the fate of the advantage into the next century that demands that our new strategy Iraqi Army was decided years ago let our tanks see and kill targets at places on the capability of our for- in our combat training centers. over 3OOO meters; the edge that put ces. Our doctrine must now include sabot rounds through the defensive not only the classical principles for One young armor captain under- berm, through the front glacis, and combat, but also encompass the en- scored the value of such training through the engine block of a T72 tire range of military operations when he stated emphatically that, "It before exiting the rear of the tank. from peacetime engagement to was hard sometimes to remember major war. While you can take we were really at war, because the The experience of one Iraqi tank pride in Operation DESERT drills and maneuvers were exactly battalion commander summed up STORM, your challenge for the fu- the same as we had used at the the importance of technology when ture is to develop the tactics, techni- NTC." We cannot afford to aban- he described the impact such an ad- ques, and procedures that will bring don this key to the confidence and vantage has on morale. He said that AirLand Battle-Future to life for success of America's soldiers. You his first knowledge that the soldiers in the Armored Force. must concentrate on the fundamen- Americans were nearby came when tal skills - such as gunnery, main- the turret blew off the tank next to Third, we must maintain the right tenance, and individual proficiency. his - in a sandstorm with only 150 mix of forces - armored, We must continue to train soldiers, meters of visibility. By the time a ARMOR - May-June 1991 31 second tank beside him blew up, he ranks. I want to stress that our ex- and ill-equipped - abandoned by a decided it was time for his battalion perience in the Gulf underscores nation that had lost its vision of a to abandon its tanks and surrender. the importance of sending our trained and ready Army. As a So he gathered his men together, leaders to school. Combat ex- result, thousands of Americans raised a white flag, and waited. perience should reinforce - not died, and our forces were nearly replace - leader education. defeated by the Army of a back- Today, the Armored Systems ward and impoverished nation. Modernization Program is key to These are the imperatives. For the developing the Armored Force for Armor community, these impera- In chapter two, our story now the Army of the 21st century that is tives must be far more than catchy leaps ahead more than 40 years and second to none on the battlefield. It phrases pasted on a bulletin board. half a world away. The soldiers of is vital to our future capabilities. They are the essence of your profes- America's Army were again walking This program symbolized the for- sional purpose. Your challenge now point in an international coalition. ward-looking approach that takes is to apply these imperatives This time, they were trained to a the changing environment into ac- without compromise and without razor's edge, led by sergeants and count. A common platform for our equivocation. For they are the road officers of unparalleled ability, and armored vehicles will enhance our map for shaping the Army that the equipped with the finest weapons effectiveness in every area, from nation will require in the tumul- our nation could produce. Eight maintenance to maneuver. tuous times ahead. American Army divisions - spear- headed by cavalry and armor units We must aggressively explore new It falls to you to ensure that the - slashed deep into enemy ttr- technologies in the areas of com- Armored Force remains at the peak ritory, and waded into the heart of posite and other types of armor, of readiness during the critical years the Republican Guards. They countermeasures, and firepower. as the Army becomes smaller. We destroyed division after enemy Additionally, we must continue to cannot assume that we will ac- division and thousands of Iraqi pursue the Armored Gun System in complish the reshaping of the Army tanks, until no organized resistance the near term, so that we can quietly, without crises that will was left. All of this was ac- provide our contingency forces with demand the use of force in some complished at the cost of fewer than air-droppable armored firepower. manner. Nor can we assume that 100 soldiers. We must never be guilty of sending threats will come with any warning. our quality soldiers - entrusted to Chapter three remains to be writ- us by the American people - into Conclusion ten, and you are the authors. You battle with outdated and over- will determine what the Army of the matched technology. We should There is a story that illustrates the future and the Armor Force will be never have to say that a single life importance of the imperatives and like. You have a sacred obligation was lost because our soldiers were goes to the heart of the meaning of to the nation and the soldiers of the ill-trained or ill-equipped - either "Trained and Ready." past - to all the Task Force Smiths now or in the future. that have gone before, and to all the Chapter one begins in June, 1950, soldiers who have laid down their Finally, we must continue to with elements of the U.S. Army serv- lives. You bear the heritage of develop leaders - officers and ser- ing on occupation duty in Japan. the cavalrymen who guarded the geants - who are competent in the Nobody expected a war - and western frontier and the tankers art of war, responsible for their sol- nobody wanted one. Nonetheless, who were the hope of the Western diers, and committed to the defense on 25 June, the armies of Kim I1 Front. Your lineage is steeped in of the nation. Sung invaded South Korea. battles from Normandy Beachhead to the Bdlge; from Korea to Viet- Our leader development program As the spearhead of the United nam. You must never permit our must continue to meet the demands Nations' response to North Korea's Army and its Armored Forces to be of our new strategy, and we must naked act of aggression, Task Force anything but trained and ready, or remember that the leaders we Smith was scraped together from our soldiers to be lead by anyone develop today will be our most en- our occupation forces and dis- but dedicated professionals who are during legacy to future generations patched to stem the onslaught. The competent, responsible, and com- of Americans - especially to those task force had courageous men, but mitted. It is a task which you cannot who will serve the nation in our it was ill-prepared, udermanned, and will not fail. 32 ARMOR - May-June 1991 Light Cavalry in a Peacekeeping Role by First Lieutenant Erick A. Reinstedt

'2s airrent(.. demonstrated in SWA, the erid of fighting niay signal the start of very toiigli niissioris. This platoon's qperieitce in the peacekeep- ing role following JUST CilUSE high- lights importarit Iessoiis." - Ed. then fill in the gaps with their own The lesson learned is don't expect I am a platoon leader in A Troop, training. Certainly, as Armor branch to go in country with all of your as- 2-9 Cavalry, the only ground cavalry restructures itself to keep pace with sets. External restrictions, especially troop in the 7th Infantry Division the changing world situation and in a high visibility and politically (Light). On a two-month deploy- changing Army, this type of mission volatile situation, such as an inter- ment in Panama, we caught the last will become more and more com- vention, may dictate you enter a days of Operation JUST CAUSE, mon for its members. zone already severely reduced in but we spent most of our time in combat effectiveness. Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY. DeploymenVDutiesin Country PROMOTE LIBERTY was the fol- Once in country, we were attached low-on to Operation JUST CAUSE At the time of our deployment, to different infantry battalions and and focused on stabilization of the our troop at Fort Ord was struc- brigades. For the most part, they country and aid to the new govern- tured with three platoons and a made maximum use of our mobility. ment. During PROMOTE LIBER- headquarters section. Each platoon With our self-sustainability, ability TY, we had a significant peacekeep- had six HMMWVs with a SO to iiiove ourselves quickly to remote ing (PK) role. cal./TOW mix. We deployed as a areas, and our ability to cover large troop, separated from the aviation operational zones, commanders Our experiences in Panama taught and headquarters troops, which quickly realized what an excellent us many lessons that we, as a make up the rest of the squadron. economy of force unit a light caval- platoon, feel would be generic to Airlift restrictions (lack of ry troop can be in this type of mis- light cavalry in a PK role. This ar- airplanes) limited us to taking only sion. ticle is about lessons learned, impor- three vehicles per platoon and a tant skills needed, and significant small headquarters slice. We left Throughout the deployment, the leadership challenges we faced. our SOs and TOWS at Fort Ord, threat consisted primarily of Hopefully, these lessons should taking only our M60s because we criminal activity in the villages and provide thought points for other didn't want to appear overly aggres- towns, and suspected guerilla ac- junior leaders, officers, and NCOs. sive. tivity in the interior. While there Should some of these points hit was always that threat of a guerilla home, then units need to determine Panama was cooling down, and ap- strike, policing criminals and deal- which of these areas their people, parently headquarters felt that the ing with everyday problems of the especially junior leaders, have al- introduction of such weapons sys- people was by far the largest reality. ready been schooledltrained in, and tems might send the wrong signal. We always had guerrillas in the

ARMOR - MayJune 1991 33 back of our minds, but they rarely this, we were tasked with reconning "Our possible encounters al- surfaced when military forces were the entire province. As with the first most always included innocent present. At all times we talked to two weeks, each platoon worked in- civilian presence on the bat- the people - who were very friend- dependently, conducting three-vehi- tlefield. Any threat would be ly and receptive - trying to glean cle patrols. Often out of commo wearing civilian clothes and be information. Our work was made range, the platoons were basically difficult to distinguish from the difficult by the fact that we worked autonomous. We worked as a troop general populace." in conjunction with the Panamanian only when more strength was neces- Police. The people do not trust sary to conduct a raid on a them, and when they were in our suspected weapons cache, or to pur- might be. In Panama, the conduct vehicles, the people would not give sue information regarding armed of operations was affected by strict us any information. men. Our missions in Cocle took us Rules of Engagement (ROE) on long patrols over poor roads and placed on the occupying American Our types of missions covered a rough terrain. Here, the SO cal. force. Our possible encounters al- wide spectrum, as did the type of would have been best, along with most always included innocent terrain in which we found ourselves the TOW day and night sights (we civilian presence on the battlefield. working. One day, we would be con- did take the TOW night sight from Any threat would be wearing ducting mounted and dismounted Ord, and used it hand-held). civilian clothes and be difficult to patrols through city streets, the next distinguish from the general day mounted and dismounted pa- We often worked deep in the inte- populace. We had to designate trols through countryside, moun- rior, where there were only Indian marksmen on each vehicle to ensure tainous terrain, or double- and natives. Just as often, we worked controlled fire. triple-canopy jungle. in the various villages and towns closer to the Interamerican High- When on a patrol or roadblock, The first two weeks focused on way, which crossed the province the senior person was required to security missions north of Panama near the coast. In these villages and decide when the lock-and-load. City, patrolling suburbs and barrios towns lived the more wealthy Pana- warning-shot, and fire-to-kill cri- to control the criminal element that manians, and often there were some teria were met as laid out in the had gained strength and weapons in who spoke English. ROE. Often, this would be a ser- the absence of authority following geant vehicle commander or patrol the invasion. We also spent time Any Spanish-speaking capability leader. Without positive control looking for and raiding weapons we had was invaluable, as were any over the element, it would be easy caches, questioning the people for medical personnel we had with us for a tense situation to escalate information on Noriega's men or who could help the people in the in- beyond control. drugs, enforcing curfew, and pursu- terior where doctors were non-exis- ing leads. While these first two tent. When the word went out there Due to the number of civilians, the weeks mainly found us in the city was a medic present, it was not un- heavy use of suppressive fire was im- and the barrios, at one point our common to see lines of women with possible, and recon by fire was not platoon of three vehicles found it- children waiting hours to be seen. an option. Selective and highly ac- self on a mountain road, with jungle curate fire was the only choice. too thick to turn around, looking for In summary, we spent the seven Also, because of the number of 30-40 guys spotted earlier with AK- weeks of field time performing a civilians and because of the distance 47s. The troop was spread very thin. wide scope of missions. Each per- we were working from our parent For the close quarters (village and son and vehicle performed ap- elements, artillery support was non- jungle) in which we found ourselves proximately 3,500 miles of patrols, existent. At times, we had close air during the first two weeks, the M60 throughout savannah, mountain, support on a one-and-a-half-hour was probably the best weapon. swamp, jungle, plain, and urban ter- string, but even then, total loss of rain. commo when deep in the interior The last five weeks took us out of made that a non-entity. Only once the city and into the interior. We Lessons Learned and Areas did we actually have an AC-130 on were working out of Rio Hato, once Deserving Special Emphasis: station above us, and a general had the home of Noriega's elite, the to approve its use. 1 --* . . Macho de Monte. Our basic troop A rK mission will not be a free- mission was security of Cocle fire, multiple-target environment as In field problems, movement is Province (60x90 km), and as part of a European heavy threat scenario rarely restricted, and platoons can

34 ARMOR - MayJune 7997 maneuver abreast almost at will. In Due to the num- Panama, movement was restricted ber of civilians to the roads. Almost all of the walking or driving property bordering the roads is on the roads, we fenced, and because we were there had to conduct to "win their hearts and minds," we most of our patrols wouldn't go maneuvering through in service drive, their farms. Once engaged, this making it easier to restriction would go out the win- hide from us or am- dow, but up to that point, it is one bush us. worth noting. It is known that one of the essentials in low-intensity con- Skills flict is domination of key roads and cities. That knowledge, coupled As cavalry, we with being restricted to tight roads were often the first due to consideration for private into an area, and property, led to predictable routes many times the only unit to ever be leaders need to receive a lot of ex- and limited maneuverability on our in the area. This meant that we posure to dismounted patrolling. part - prime ambush situations. were expected to have and to per- Against small groups of dismounted Training in action drills, fighting form all types of skills to adequately guerrillas or criminals who know from the march, hasty target desig- clear and gather intelligence on an the area, it is impossible not to dis- nation, and dismounting fire teams area, to pursue suspected or known mount and still execute your mis- would be helpful here. enemy or criminals, and to follow sion effectively. Should you be able up leads on weapons caches, drugs, to get your hands on squad radios In Panama, recon ops were slow etc. (PRC-l26s), they could be very use- and thorough. Always on our own, ful. Also, work on SOPS for quick there was never the need to move We constantly used MOUT skills dismounting. You may have to leave quickly to clear an area for units be- in Panama. Units iizzist receive a vehicle and chase someone hind us. The missions were usually MOUT training. Contrary to the through streets without having had to move to a previously unpatrolled "MOUT School" training we had ex- time to discuss it. You need to area and to see what was there, posure to at Fort Ord (which, in a know where your buddy and what the people's attitudes were nutshell, says, clear every room with vehicles will be. like, etc. Against the small elements a frag grenade and blow holes in that were suspected to be in the roofs and walls for entry), the A side note along the lines of dis- area, a very slow and detailed recon MOW training we receive needs to mounting is vehicular crewing. Our was essential. Often, this would in- be taught from a peacekeeping TOSrE only gives us three-man clude driving up every little dirt perspective. There needs to be crews. In Panama, four-man crews road, dismounting along river beds civilian decoys in some of the proved a must! You have got to be to look for signs of camps, and stop- rooms, and entry and room clearing able to leave a gunner and driver ping and talking to many people, etc. techniques need to be tailored to with the vehicles as they follow the minimize damage and innocent route of the dismounted patrol. This An example of this detail was a casualties. Nine out of ten times, means to have a dismounted patrol mission near La Chorrera. There, you'll be chasing ghosts, and the of more than one man, there needs we, along with a battalion-sized mix house or building will be filled with to be at least two people from each of light and mech infantry, spent women and children and no vehicle available. For the present, three days searching a 15-by-20-km weapons or drugs. stacking crews might be the answer. area for six men with AK-47s who For the future, the TO&E needs to had fired on an infantry patrol. The Dismounted patrolling skills also be revised. enemy wore civilian clothes, and we proved critical. To properly clear an suspected that they often used the area, look for caches, or pursue Each crew should be capable of riverbeds when they moved. It took suspects required dismounted pa- performing maintenance well above constant mounted and dismounted trols for many kilometers into a operator level, and of improvising patrolling, to include screening, to jungle, up a riverbed, or through temporary solutions to problems. At cover our portion of the area. city streets, slums, or villages. Junior times, being able to do so enabled

ARMOR - May-June 7997 35 ES TU DEBER RECOYPENSA HASTA $5,000

OI .om m.*10. c (1. .01 MIIOL. p ns - E-.- *,I- - UnOlllED ".mu r6 - COOPERAR CON NOSOTROS HOY Posters played a part in winning hearts and minds. us to return to base when otherwise Creativity was always useful, and when you intimidate them by rolling we would have been stuck out over- often necessary to improvise and into their town with full cam0 paint, night in a possibly hostile area, overcome the lack of resources kevlar, flak vest, and weapons awaiting a mechanic's arrival. We available. For example, we found leveled. The signal it sent was that were also able to assist the that the mine detectors not only we were afraid of the people and mechanic who was trying to support served to help locate weapons didn't trust them. What they needed a whole troop's vehicles with limited caches, but also served to show the was to forget about the militant ter- resources. In peacetime, drivers people that we were serious and ror image they had been haunted should have maximum exposure to that it was better to just tell us with for so long, and begin rebuild- their vehicles while maintenance is where the weapons were buried. ing.their nation. As a leader, finding being performed on them at all the medium ground between safety levels. Also, for the missions we per- of your men and developing a low- formed across Cocle Province, basic key, working, trusting relationship Also, due to the extensive distance skills are still very important. The with the people was always a chal- we operated from our troop and its ability to quickly recon and classify lenge. medic, a strong grasp of first aid by a route was at times essential due to every man was imperative. Medics the length of some routes. Lack of a The third major leadership chal- were hours away, and MEDEVAC close parent/support unit meant lenge, and by far the most difficult, unit need to be schooled in low-in- get to know the people, and Lo real- 0Operations will often be very tensity conflict and PK scenarios, ize what super people they are. We slow, and very detailed. problems, and skills. Units must really got to like and respect them, 0 Interaction with the populace then take articles- such as this one, and we would have felt very bad will be a must. from people who were there, and had any of them been killed by lack 0 Tactical maneuver may be fill in the gaps. The ultimate respon- of discipline or preparedness on our sacrificed for safety. sibility is with the unit, though part. On the other hand, to lose one 0The extensive presence of in- branch schools need to stay on top of our men due to inaction or nocent civilians will cause most of of the latest experiences and ensure restrictions would not be easy to your operations and actions to be their teaching covers the lessons live with. It is a fine line you will carefully planned, executed with learned. These types of missions tread in this type of mission. tight command and control, and will only become more common. often performed at more risk to Junior leaders must receive early Overall, the best advice we can your life than normal. these points and potential problems give you is to be flexible. If you are 0 MOUT is a must, with civilian to ponder, so they have plenty of employed the way we were, you will decoys. time to prepare themselves and not be expected to perform strictly 0 Four-man crews are a must. their units for this type of deploy- "cavalry" missions. Your firepower, 0Every soldier must be fluent in ment. mobility, and self-sustainability will combat first aid! have your parent unit using you in Drivers/crews should be able to Leaders have got to be put into many varied economy of force mis- perform maintenance above oper- highly stressful training environ- sions. The PK mission we took part ator level, and to improvise. ments. Work with restrictive ROE in as a light cavalry troop/platoon 0 Every NCO/junior officer and deal with the command and epitomized the fact that a 29D must should be able to communicate controi problems that result. be the jack of all trades. quickly and effectively with air as- Operate with no indirect fire sup- sets. port, limited mobility, and less than This article is the product of oCommo, and commo improvis- ideal tactical conditions. Leaders platoon AARs covering the entire ing/fhg, must be second nature. need to be forewarned that, due to deployment, and, hopefully, it will 0The basic cavalry skills, with an the number of civilians and sub- provide some junior leaders, NCOs, emphasis on reconnaissance and en- sequent number of your own people and officers, some points of thought gineer skills, are still essential. hovering around for fear of an inci- and some possible options to 0 Be aware that significant leader- dent, they will be micromanaged prepare for this type of role. ship challenges will face you. from the highest levels. primarily the. need for tight dis- To prepare for a PK role, NCOs cipline, the balancing of safety of Units need to train with MILES and junior officers in armor/cavalry men versus appearance to the laser systems and civilian decoys; need to have exposure to the follow- populace, and the need to keep the train for highly restricted, -precision ing ideas, and should be offered level of alertness up among the men. marksmanship; train alternatives to training options in preparing for the indirect fire. Train to fight from the mission. march, and to conduct detailed recon where the objective is only a .Extensive ROE will restrict a First Lieutenant Erick A. one- or two-man OPFOR. Train unit's ability to perform. Reinstedt graduated from those skills that will be predominant 0The threat will be few, far be- West Point in 1988. He has emphasized in a PK role, to include tween, and will probably look the attended the Air Force SERE MOUT, and dismounted patrolling. same as the general populace. program in Colorado; So much of the heart of preparing .Heavy fire, and indirect fire, Jungle Operations Training and training for this type of mission may be either nonexistent or heavily School at Ft. Sherman, lies in the creativity of the unit. restricted. Panama; and AOBC and the 0You may have to deploy with Scout Platoon Leaders One final point worth noting. few of your ma.jor combat assets. Course, both at Ft. Knox, Your men may resent the ROE. 0 Often politics will outweigh your Ky. He is currently a platoon The ROE in Panama was restric- ability to fight your platoon. leader in A Troop, 2-9 Caval- tive, but it served to make us aware 0 Maneuver will be severely ry Squadron (Recon), Ft. of the danger to innocent civilians. restricted, and predictable to the Ord, Calif. After a week in country, we came to enemy.

ARMOR - May-June 7997 37 Future Heavy Forces: * The Need For Better Air Deployability by Captain Cole Milstead

The Army must re-evaluate plans Sheridan in scenarios requiring deploy using 400 C-17 sorties. That for future heavy fighting systems. forced entry airdrop capability. We is only two-thirds of the sorties re- The best way to assure fielding of should not be lulled, though, into quired to deploy the 82nd Airborne. Armored System Modernization thinking AGS makes light divisions Program (ASMP) weapons is to competitive with enemy armor. Admittedly, those 400 sorties ex- reduce their size to fit into the con- With a 105-mm gun, AGS does not clude some battalion equipment tingency business. A "leapahead in penetrate modern enemy tanks. and other support assets of a heavy heavy force air deployability will With light armor, AGS will not sur- division. But if the contingency is in give future planners a broader vive long on a higher intensity bat- the Persian Gulf, we can preposi- range of strategic, operational, and tlefield. tion this other equipment in a host tactical options. Air-deployable country or on prepositioned ships. heavy battalions will permit rapid To defeat heavier forces, light The resultant force will provide a force projection to reinforce light divisions would need many AGS bat- more credible defense against Army divisions and Marine ele- talions to compensate for low sys- enemy armor until other heavy ments. Even in light-intensity con- tem survivability and limited combat divisions can deploy by sea. POM- flict, deploying heavy forces will effectiveness. This would require ex- CUS stocks in NATO provide addi- dramatically shift the balance of tensive new force structure per light tional justification for improving combat power, as illustrated recent- division or contingency corps. In- heavy weapon deployability. Con- ly in Panama. stead, picture a future balanced task gress may want to reduce future force that can deploy using the C-17 POMCUS stocks to save additional Some believe Operation JUST sorties required to move two AGS funds. CAUSE showed that a light tank is battalions. Given this capability, all sufficient to augment light forces. ten ground maneuver battalions and More deployable heavy weapons Certainly, we need an Armored three field artillery battalions of the may allow us to preposition trucks Gun System (AGS) to replace the 24th Infantry-. (Mech) could air- and other less costly division equip- 38 ARMOR - May-June 1991 Comparison of C-17 Sorties Required to Deploy A Notional Current and ASMP Balanced Task Force

Current:

Number & TvDe of Svstems Svstem Weiaht G17 Sorties Reauired ment. POMCUS stores of expensive tanks and other fighting systems can 1 Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV) 57.5 tons 1 be substantially reduced if heavy 28 MlAl or M1A2 Tanks 65-70 tons 28 26 M2A1 or M2A2 lWs 25-33 tons %-13 weapons are more air-deployable. 8 M109A6 SP Howitzers 30 tons 4 4 FA Ammo Spt Vehicles Loaded 29 tons 2 Weapons that do remain in POM- 12 M901A1 ITV 13 tons **0 CUS can serve as a source of for- 6 M3A1 or M3A2 CWs 25-33 tons *2-3 ward-deployed equipment for other 6 Pedestal-Mtd Stinger HMMWVs 4.5 tons 9 contingencies. The shorter distance 46-51 Sorties between Europe and the Middle *Smaller figure is for A1 models East will reduce sortie turnaround **Assumes that all are deployed on same G17s carrying tanks time, making it easier to air deploy multiple heavy brigades with lightened armored systems. Some Armored System Modernization Program: argue that at some point, instead of Number & TvDe of Svstems Svstem Weiaht G17 Sorties Reauired decreasing the sue of threat-driven weapons, we must increase the num- 1 Combat Mobility Vehicle (CMV) 50 tons 1 ber of air-deployment assets. We 28 Block 111 Tanks 55 tons 28 should. But a C-17 costs more than 26 FlWs 50 tons 26 8 AFAS 50 tons 8 an entire battalion of MlAls. In the 4 FARV-A 40-50 tons 2-4 current budget atmosphere, we are 6 LOSAT 30 tons 3 unlikely to convince anyone to buy 10 FSV 7.5 tons *o more aircraft just because we 6 Pedestal-Mtd Stinger HMWs 4.5 tons 32 decide to build larger armor sys- 68-70 Sorties** tems. *Assumes that all are deployed on same G17s carrying tanks **A 3352 % increase over sorties needed for current task force. The threat dictates the armor re- quired to stop a given "bullet." It does not dictate that we buy bigger Table 1 weapons with more area to be ar- mored. Nor does it require that The primary counter-argument heavy weapons. A few weapon dif- every weapon withstand a tank's against sealifting all heavy forces is ferences in a contingency heavy main gun round, an ATGM, or top- response time. If Iraq had con- division may be acceptable. But we attack munitions. For years, we have tinued its attack into Saudi Arabia, cannot revisit the proliferation of used tactics to evade such threats. light forces, AGS, and airpower weapons and force structure rever- We also need to get smart and use could not have held for three weeks sal with the elimination of the technology to build smaller weapons until heavy forces arrived on fast motorized division. that survive by being harder to sealift assets. We need the detect and hit. capability to rapidly move substan- Once heavy forces arrive in tial heavy armor to suddenly erupt- theater by air or sea, the potential A second argument often heard is ing contingencies. for intratheater transport will al- that only a fraction of the heavy ways exist, given the capabilities of force will ever air deploy. Sea Therefore, to maintain force com- the C-17 and the needs of the deployment will move the bulk of monality, all heavy forces must be theater commander to rapidly shift heavy forces to a contingency area. designed to the most demanding combat power. Making the entire Therefore, why not build huge deployment option. Otherwise, we heavy force smaller enhances this howitzers and future infantry fight- need another specialized division re- capability. If it makes sense to air ing vehicles with tank-like armor quiring extensive development costs deploy heavy battalions to augment protection as the ASMP proposes? for limited procurement of unique light forces, then what weapons ARMOR - May-June 1991 Example of Non-Contingency Combined Arms Battalion Task Force

Number & TvDe of Svstems Svstem Weight C17 Sorties Reauired should shrink to make this an 1 CMV 50 tons 1 28 Block 111 Tanks 55 tons 28 achievable option? Tanks are a 26 FIFV 25 tons *O natural choice for weight reduction 8 AFAS 25 tons 3 because they have the most avail- 4 FARV-A 25 tons **1 able to lose. The ASMP proposes a 6 LOSAT 25 tons 2 ***I 55-ton Block 3 tank, reversing the 10 FSV 7.5 tons 6 Pedestal-Mtd Stinger HMMWVs 4.5 tons 0*** “bigger is better” trend. This re- 36 C-17 Sorties stores the combat capability to deploy two tanks on a C-5. One *Each FIFV is loaded on a G17 carrying a single tank tank can also be carried aboard a C- **One of the four FARV-As and two AFAS are loaded on one C-17 17 with weight left over for other ***All HMMWVs and two FSVs are loaded on 2 C-17s each carrying a single tank. heavy or light forces. Table 2 Because tanks have always been the biggest air deployment chal- lenge, it is curious to see that and a 25-ton medium family of same C-17 carrying a tank and a ASMP proposes a whole new weapons. This force alternative is medium armored vehicle. The con- generation of deployment problems. the best one for the bulk of our tingency tank will be a stripped If the future infantry fighting vehicle heavy divisions. It provides a high down variation of the 55-ton main (FIFV) and armored field artillery degree of combat capability with battle tank. Frontal modular armor, system (AFAS) grow to tank-like greatly improved potential for in- and side-skirt armor can sea deploy proportions, the advantage in tratheater transport, or transport or be prepositioned to minimize air making tanks smaller and procuring from an adjacent theater. deployment sorties. Lighter weight the (2-17 airlifter will be totally reactive armor can be used frontally eliminated. A future balanced task CONUS-based battalions in a con- and on top to defeat ATGMs and force with supporting artillery will tingency corps heavy division or top-attack munitions until modular require nearly 50 percent more C- separate brigade need to pare down heavier armor arrives and is in- 17 sorties if ASMP is implemented! even further to make it realistic to stalled. (See Table 1.) air deploy multiple battalions. Be- cause cavalry and scout organiza- The combined use of a lighter To improve heavy force deploy- tions need a new, smaller, future variant lank and a smaller FSV- ability, the FIFV, MAS, LOSAT scout vehicle (FSV) anyway, the based FIFV reduces the C-17 sor- (Line of Sight Antitank Vehicle), same chassis, with more armor and ties to deploy a contingency task and FARV-A (Future Ammo firepower, can serve as a contingen- force to just 29! The savings of Resupply Vehicle) must grow cy-oriented FIFV carrying a fire seven C-17s over the proposed base smaller, rather than larger. If cur- team instead of a squad. A Soviet TOE may not sound significant. It rent systems weigh about 30 tons, BMD weighs about S tons using con- quickly adds up, though, if the con- composite technology and smaller ventional armor, and it is designed tingency requires air deployment of modern drivetrains will make 25-ton to carry seven soldiers. A similarly- numerous heavy battalions. The weapons feasible while still upgrad- sized wheeled or tracked composite saved sorties become the primary ing ammunition payload and armor U.S. FIFV carrying only five troops billpayer, allowing other battalion protection. This weight permits could weigh 10 tons, providing sub- equipment to air deploy. three vehicles to load aboard a C- stantially more armor protection, 17. It also allows both the 55-ton defeating perhaps 30-mm Ap Up to 11 more C-17 sorties can Block I11 tank and a 25-ton medium rounds frontally. transport battalion or brigade FSB weapon to fit aboard the same C-17. support equipment without surpass- Then, we reduce the weight of our ing 40 total sorties for each task Table 2 shows the air deployment 55-ton-tank by 7.5 tons, to-transport force. The contingency heavy bat- gains achieved with a 55-ton tank the lighter FIFV or FSV on the talion’s tanks and FIFVs will be 40 ARMOR - May-June 7997 silhouette is the biggest survivability Proposed Contingency Combined Arms Battalion Task benefit. If vehicles are hit and armor is overmatched, only half the Force Versus Two Armored Gun System Battalions squad is injured. Available mounted firepower doubles with two vehicles Number & TVDe of Svstems WemWeiaht C17 Sorties Reauired per squad instead of one. Individual 1 CMV 50 tons 1 squads gain a mounted overwatch 28 Block 111 Tanks 47.5 tons 28 capability. Maneuverability and con- 44 FINS 10 tons *O cealment in confining terrain and 8 AFAS 25 tons *O built-up areas is also enhanced. 4 FARV-A 25 tons *O 6 LOSAT 25 tons *O 6 Pedestal-Mtd Stinger HMMWs 4.5 tons *O Admittedly, command and control 10 Future Scout Vehicles 7.5 tons 9 of the squad is more complicated. 29 C-17 Sorties Modem low-power communications equipment should solve that *All vehicles carried on 29 G17s carrying either a tank or CMV. See Table 4 for load plan. problem. On the positive side, fire team leaders will gain additional Two Armored Gun System Battalions (58 AGS each): leadership and maneuver ex- 116 Armored Gun System 19 tons 29 G17 Sorties perience due to the additional responsibility of commanding a Table 3a FIFV. Each platoon will have six FIFVs for the three squads, and one FIFV for the platoon head- quarters. Large numbers of contin- Austere Battalion Task Force Suppart Package gency FIFVs, based on equally numerous FSVs, reduce develop- Number and Twe of Vehicles Vehicle Weiaht # Of G17S ment and procurement costs and better justify unit PLL lines. A 11 HEMTT PLS w/ PLS trailer partially loaded 40 tons 11 11 M577 Cmd APCs/M113 Ambulances 12 tons *O move to combined arms battalions 11 Five-ton trucks w/trailer partially loaded 17 tons *O may better distribute the main- 22 HMMWVs loaded 3.54.5 tons 32 tenance of vehicles over a contingen- 11 Sorties cy division's ten battalions. Such a *One APC, Ston truck, and two HMMV Is are loaded on each G17 w/one HEMTT notional battalion is shown in Table PLS truck 3a and 3b.

Table 3b With a better idea of how a contin- gency task force appears and deploys, let us examine how it fights only marginally less combat effec- The Block I11 tank may be fielded as part of a heavy-light mix. En- tive than the weapons in the before technology is able to achieve vision a scenario in which U.S. for- proposed base TOE given the defen- a 55-ton tank. There is also a ces deploy to the Persian Gulf to sive, "buy-time" nature of the initial chance that the Block I11 tank will combat a large invading armored mission. be based on an Abrams chassis. In force. Army Rangers, an airborne In the defense, use of hull-down either case, developers should strive brigade, and V-22 Osprey-mounted positions can exploit the Block I11 to field as light a tank as possible. Marines arrive first to augment the tank's overhead gun design, reduc- Modular armor will let us reduce invaded nation's division-sized force ing the impact of lighter frontal tanks to 55 tons when lighter ad- defending a portlairhead. A heavy- armor. Flanks will be less frequently vanced armor or other technologies light brigade with two battalions of exposed, precluding the immediate become available. airborne infantry and one heavy need for side skirts. The tank's 140- combined arms battalion task force mm main gun will defeat any enemy The contingency FIFV can be air lands, using 50 C-17 sorties armor. The reduced tank weight fielded with current technology. A (Table 4). will enhance fuel consumption, small fire-team FIFV is more making it easier initially to sustain analogous to the dismounted infan- The combined force assumes the the battalion. tryman. The substantially reduced mission of securing and expanding ARMOR - May-June 1991 41 Eighteen C-17s

82.5 tons without infantry, 86 tons with 28 light inf.

Eight C-17s y\ 82 tons without infantry, 86 tons with 32 light inf

One C-17

82.5 tons without infantry, 86 tons with 28 light inf.

One C-17

77.5 tons without Infantry, 81.5 tons with 32 light inf.

One C-17

80 tons without infantry 84 tons with 32 light inf. \ :

Eleven C-17s 77 tons without infantry T\ 81 tons with 32 light inf. 40 tons w/trallrr

NOTE: Vehicle crewmembers are also included in weights. Ught LU~Uriaria iur uepioyrrierit battalion support vehicles and other personnel are deployed on Of a Heavy/Light Brigade Task Force 10other C-17sorties. See Table 3b for description of heavy sup- port package shown above.

42 ARMOR - May-June 7997 the portlairhead to keep it outside fantry companies from live heavy seven task forces equipped with cur- artillery range. The contingency battalions supporting an air assault rent weapons. Finally, just five corps’ aviation brigade and division 200 kilometers away, are ASMP heavy battalion task forces ATACMS assets also air deploy sling-loaded by CH-47 to help rein- could deploy with the same 400 sor- and begin attacking enemy armor at force the oil fields. ties. a distance, aided by carrier-based BAI support. Another heavy-light Blackhawks lift light hunter-killer If prepositioning is not possible in brigade, and a pure heavy brigade teams into the dunes around the oil the Middle East, or if the contingen- airland just as three enemy divisions fields to engage enemy armor using cy is elsewhere, the best option may at about 60 percent strength ap MWS-M. Other UH-60sY over- be to attach heavy battalions to a proach the portlairhead. watched by heavy battalions, dis- light division until other heavy pense Volcano minefields along the division organizations deploy by sea. Our forces and allies in the fight enemy’s axis of advance. Air Force Light division aviation, air defense, defend during the day and conduct BAI, Longbow Apaches, and military intelligence, signal, chemi- limited counterattacks at night ATACMS fires reduce the divisions cal, and military police forces against the larger armor force. Air to 50 percent strength before the should be able to temporarily sup- deployment of supplies, supporting first ground maneuver element port a heavy-light division mix. COSCOM, and CS forces continues engages the enemy. Some heavy division engineer aug- unabated, thanks to adequate com- mentation will be essential. Air bat power on the ground. Heavy bat- A tank-heavy battalion with sup deployment of one Combat Mobility talion palletized load system (PLS) porting artillery deploys from Vehicle (CMV) or several Armored trucks use the airhead as the supply Europe loaded on 45 (2-17s. It lands Combat Earthmovers per heavy bat- point for class I11 and V needs. Pre- on a remote austere airfield well talion may be sufficient initially to rigged PLS pallets with combat-con- beyond the five enemy divisions. support the force. figured loads, slide off MAC Navy and Air Force fighters provide aircraft ready for front-lime units. supporting air cover. The battalion Light division CSS organizations decimates the enemy’s supply trains can temporarily support heavy force The rest of the Marine Expedition- as it maneuvers back to rejoin its needs if they receive COSCOM or ary Brigade and some heavy own supply lines and put the weak heavy forward support battalion division support equipment arrive remnants of the attacking enemy (FSB) augmentation. To minimize aboard prepositioning ships. This divisions in a.vise grip back at the heavy FSB sorties, only medical, provides the logistical base, support portlairhead. fuel, and ammunition resupply or- structure, and adequate additional ganizations are immediately essen- heavy forces to maintain the Fast sealift ships begin to arrive tial. Lighter weapons reduce aug- defense of the portlairhead, while and offload additional heavy forces. mentation requirements. For in- concurrently beginning more offen- After sufficient forces are combat stance, ASMP tank-sized FIFVs sive operations. With our allies and ready, a major armor spearhead is and AFASs would require twice as Army light forces, Marines assume launched to destroy enemy forces many supporting fuel trucks. the defensive mission against the and drive them back into their own enemy attackers, now at less than 50 country. percent strength. Highly accurate future heavy All ten ground maneuver bat- weapons, coupled with smart muni- Heavy Army elements (five bat- talions, three artillery battalions, tions, will decrease initial ammuni- talions) from the heavy-light force and austere support forces from the tion consumption. This particularly break out of the encircled port/air- proposed contingency heavy divi- applies to the field artillery, which head and move to block two fresh sion could deploy using 400 (2-17 historically consumes the most am- enemy divisions approaching nearby sorties. In contrast, the same num- munition on the battlefield. The con- oilfields. Three FIFV-equipped in- ber of sorties would transport only centrated use of smart munitions

~~~ ~ ARMOR - May-June 7997 43 Captain Cole Milstead en- listed as a combat en- gineer, attended the by initially deployed artillery forces Up until now, we have yet to ex- USMA Preparatory will be highly effective in a target- plore fully the "air" in AirLand Bat- School, and graduated rich environment. This allows expen- tle (ALB) doctrine. The ALB-Fu- from West Point in 1980. diture of fewer rounds to achieve ture Concept places even greater He was commissioned in the same effect. Forces will transi- emphasis on a non-linear bat- Infantry, graduated from tion to more conventional rounds tlefield, stressing maneuver force flight school as a UH-1H when the logistical infrastructure is agility and long range fires. We pilot in 1981, and joined intact. must be capable of deploying heavy Aviation Branch in 1983. maneuver and fire support forces by He served with 3d AD as These ideas are open to debate. air to a non-linear theater, and HHC XO and aviation bat- What is clear, is that the Armored around that theater once there. The talion support platoon Systems Modernization Program is combined capabilities of the C-17 leader. Afterward, at the on the wrong track. It is a force that and a more agile heavy force offer Aviation Center, he served fails to get te future wars 'Yirstest that possibility. as a combat developer with the mostest." and commanded an ATC Members of other combat arms company. He sub- We must revise the ASMP and often express dismay that Army sequently served in the make heavy battalions more air Aviation's priority continues to in- Sinai with the Multinational deployable to build support for the crease. The reason for that em- Force and Observers. Cur- already reduced C-17 program. phasis is planners count on Army rently, he is acting chief, The decision to buy 90 fewer C-17s aircraft being with the first to fight Concepts Branch, Direc- is indefensible. If we do not buy in conflicts ranging from high to low torate of Combat Develop- enough C-l7s, the aging C-141 fleet intensity. They task Aviation for ments, Ft. Rucker, Ala. may need a service life extension to such contingencies, not simply be- support light force deployment. cause aircraft are highly combat ef- Congress will show more inclination fective, but because they can either to fund necessary airlit capability if self-deploy or .fit aboard airlifters ground. It, too, can become a it sees we are not just paying lip-ser- using fewer sorties. deployable combat forcc, ready to vice to the need to deploy heavy for- The heavy force has an oppor- support national interests anytime, ces by air. tunity to make up some of its lost anywhere.

TANKER! Tanker, watching in the night Never do you tread alone: Ready to begin the fight Human soul with flesh and bone With your flaming fists of steel That break and bleed make up the light Pushing forward, set to kill kl

Let the tyrant shrink and cower L Seeing your most noble power w Rush into his land of fear. L

'Sabot" fill the way is clear. b "HEAT'the ridgeline, spray the hollow. Punch the way that others follow.

Track where otbers would not dare! Boldly rumble anywhere! I 44 ARMOR - MayJune 7997 SOUM: The Safety-of-Use Message Network of 1990. Personnel from the Direc- Attacking Problems in a Flawed System torate of Total Armor Force Readi- ness at Fort Knox surveyed armor by the Directorate of Total Armor Force Readiness battalions worldwide and dis- covered that only 17 percent of the Picture this scenario: You are the him to lose his eye. The doctors surveyed battalion maintenance maintenance officer for the 1st Bat- aren’t sure yet what the outcome leaders had received the message talion, 10th Armor, 23d Armored will be, or if there’s any disability in- five weeks after it was released. Division. You observe one of your volved. The bottom line is that you Several surveys combined revealed maintenance teams as it lifts the are responsible for two seriously in- that it takes approximately si.. powerpack from a C Company jured two soldiers and will be weeks before 50 percent of armor MlAl Abrams. As the M88A1 responsible for repaying a lot of battalions get SOUM to the user Recovery Vehicle begins to back medical bills and equipment level. Clearly this is unacceptable, the powerpack away from the tank, damage.” and is a major accident waiting to the sling holding the engine sudden- happen. ly fails. The powerpack drops like a Your only feeble response is, boulder, glancing off of the rear of “Why me?“ Several problems exist with the the tank as it crashes to the ground, SOUM system today. Those breaking into dozens of pieces. As After a few minutes of explana- problems exist from the top all the the dust begins to settle, you first tion, it all became terribly clear. way to the bottom. Fortunately, notice the smashed engine lying on Approximately three months earlier, Army Materiel Command (AMC), the ground near a crushed grille an urgent safety-of-use message the Army Safety Center and many door and the badly scarred back (SOUM) had been issued, forbid- other commands recognize that end of the tank. Then beyond, you ding the use of a type of engine there are SOUM weaknesses. A notice the C Team Chief grimacing sling. As you virtually never emptied comprehensive solution may not be as he clasps his hands over his eye. your distribution box at battalion immediately forthcoming. An under- Beside him, the hull mechanic, SGT headquarters, the message that your standing of the problem will hope- Jones, is standing hunched over, logistics representative put there fully help users see some of the sub- holding his arm. All you can think had apparently collected dust for tleties of the situation, so that they is, what a mess! several weeks, along with everything may better attack the problem in else. Consequently, this vital safety the interim. Several days later, the investigating information never reached the men officer appears at your office. He who needed it, your mechanics. At its simplest level, there are begins, “Captain, I’ve got some bad And it was your fault. three fundamental problems with news for you. My preliminary find- the SOUM network: format, dis- ings indicate that the equipment Not a very pretty picture, is it? semination, and tracking. Each of loss will amount to approximately With the way that some individuals these three areas further contain $320,000 worth of damage to govern- and units track SOUMs though, this several contributing factors. ment equipment. The engine was a is certainly not an improbable complete loss, and the back of the scenario. Fortunately, nothing as The area that will require tank and grille doors were pretty serious as this example has oc- regulatory change over time is for- badly damaged. curred yet. mat. To see through the fog created by poor format can be an initial ”I haven’t been able to determine Many people in the safety com- hurdle in solving the problem. Un- the medical costs yet, though. For- munity acknowledge that the fortunately, the format problem tunately, SGT Jones just broke his SOUM network has major prob- starts at the very beginning of the collar bone from that pipe that lems. A real example of the mag- SOUM. Each of the subordinate broke off, so his medical expenses nitude of this problem was exag- commands of AMC numbers its won’t be that bad. SFC Wilson, gerated in the earlier scenario. SOUM differently. For example: however, is a different story. That TACOM issued an urgent SOUM TACOM 90-40, AMCCOM 40-90, sheared bolt that hit him may cause on the M1 engine sling in October and CECOM 40-90, could be in

ARMOR - May-June 7997 45 reference respectively to: M1 tanks, The first component of this The bottom line though, is that 120-mm tank rounds, and VRC-89 problem lies with SOUM addresses. commanders must get SOUM so SINCGARS radios. Therefore, it is In many instances, the only way that that: they know about the very important to include the AMC some SOUM will reach an installa- problem; they can place extra em- subordinate command abbreviation tion is through an AIG at Logistics phasis, or specific guidance; they and SOUM subject matter when- Assistance Offices (LAO) or Safety can suspense Compliance; and, ever discussing or transmitting infor- Offices. If this is the case, you need they can ensure that the mission mation about a SOUM (e.g. to do one or both of two steps. is accomplished. TACOM 90-40, M1 Series Exhaust First, hound your LAO and safety Duct Seal). This way, there is no representatives relentlessly to keep confusion about which SOUM you updated with the latest SOUM. are referring to, or its subject. Second, send a message or of the identified equipment to memorandum to the headquarters respond within 15 calendar days The next format problem will controlling the AIG, and ask to regarding projected compliance strike the reader in the very first have your unit included as a specific with SOUM. There is, however, no paragraph. SOUM are worded so addressee in the AIG. The thing to procedure to ensure compliance as to be kind, in that they say the remember with this portion of the within a unit. reader "should" retransmit the mes- problem is that communications cen- sage, and they "are requested" to ac- ter personnel will only give a The solution for the tracking knowledge receipt. The fact is, SOUM to agencies that are on the problem has a two-pronged ap- there ought to be no flexibility on address list. Therefore, the solution proach. The first prong includes the dissemination of SOUM. For is to become an addressee, or go to what was discussed under dissemina- practical application purposes, the the addressees. tion, the command channels issue. SOUM reader should substitute the SOW must get into command kind words with the word, "will." The second component of the dis- channels. It does not matter semination problem may occur at whether this is done by direct ad- any number of unit levels. The dress, or through information The last area that I classify as a problem is that many recipients of copies distributed by reviewers or format problem is created by a peri- SOUM may not know to whom to action officers. The bottom line odic lack of required coordination give them for action. The safest though, is that commanders must at the SOUM author level and countermeasure to this problem is get SOUM so that: they know about above. Whenever a SOUM is to officially designate one individual the problem; they can place extra generated, all systems that could or office to clear all SOUM that emphasis, or specific guidance; they possibly be affected are supposed to come into the brigade or battalion, can suspense compliance; and, they be evaluated to see if they should or whatever echelon in question. can ensure that the mission is ac- also be included in the SOUM. For Whoever clears the SOUM must be complished. example, a SOUM applying to the familiar with a wide variety of sys- M1 tank may well also apply to the tems to ensure that the SOUM are The second part of the tracking M60A3. Sometimes coordination routed properly (e.g. the reviewer solution pertains to unit level fails, and a system that should have should not be dumbfounded when records keeping. File copies of the been included falls through the reading a SOUM for the M231 SOUM should be maintained at the cracks and does not get included in 5.56mm Submachine Gun, but reviewer level (to account for all in- the SOUM. For this reason, it is im- should realize the SOUM addresses coming SOUM), and the action of- portant for the user to carefully the M2 Bradley's firing port ficer level (to account for SOUM look at each SOUM and see if a sys- weapon). The reviewer must still specific to his equipment). Keep tem that the user has may have guarantee that the commander these records in case a future ques- been inadvertently omitted from the receives a copy of the SOUM, in ad- tion arises about the SOUM, or a SOUM. dition to the action officer, so that new piece of equipment arrives, the commander may track the issue which the SOUM covered. The next major problem area is and place any added emDhasis that dissemination. This problem is fre- he wishes. Additionally, the unit should estab- quently nothing more than a com- lish some sort of standard proce- mon sense problem by the in- The last major prooiem area wm dure to indicate that the steps of a dividuals or agencies passing the SOUM is tracking. Current SOUM SOUM have been applied to each SOUM. regulatory guidance requires users and every vehicle or item of equip-

46 ARMOR - MayJune 7997 I I ment in question. Record proce- I Letters I dural SOUM on a by-name roster. Continued from Page 3 hard working tankers and cav scouts in A couple of possibilities for equip- our Army today. I especially feel strongly ment records include: 1) maintain a Badges for other branches would not about the timing of this endorsement im- file folder on each piece of equip- dilute the worth of the infantry award; on mediately following the Perisan Gulf War, the contrary, they would reinforce the truly an Armordominated ground conflict. ment and simply place a note or Army's age-old concept of combined Let me state for the record that although memo in the folder; 2) make a small arms. The awards would surely boost there were thousands of hard working in- pencil annotation in the remarks morale. fantrymen who helped win the war, (a) block of the DD Form 314 (Preven- they couldn't have done it by themselves, tive Maintenance Schedule and Each branch could dictate requirements and (b) they already have the CIB and EIB for the award of the badges. For instance, as an award. Record). Include the AMC com- tracked vehicle crewmen (scouts and mand issuing the SOUM and its tankers) could be required to demonstrate On that note, let me say that the Infantry number (i.e. TACOM 90-40). This expert gunnery, tactical, and individual has been awarding ElBs and ClBs for way, when your new motor sergeant skills. Soldiers would have an incentive to decades now to infantrymen who success- shows up nine months later and excel. fully accomplish all tasks needed to fulfill combat or combat-related tasks. What asks if you performed the steps in The design of these badges could be should also be known is that tankers and SOUM 90-40, you can pull the modeled after the EIBICIB. The badge's scouts perform many of those tasks just record and show him. Additionally, field could vary with each branch. as successfully, i.e., land navigation, first your SOUM file will allow you to aid, radio/telephone procedures, emplac- cross reference to the exact SOUM Perhaps the role of the various direct ing Claymore mines, etc., not to mention the many gunneries, NTC rotations (truly for further details from your annota- and indirect fire branches has been secon- dary to that of the infantry in previous con- an armordominated training event), and tion on the DD 314. flicts (a debatable point), yet it is clear REFORGERs participated in. In the after- that no one branch is superior (despite math of the recent war, making particular The SOUM system, as with any our Cavalry claims to the contrary) to any note of the huge, "miraculous" success of bureaucratic network, has its pit- other. The infantry is only one part of the the ground conflict, it should be even equation for victory. Branch politics and more apparent that Armor needs its own falls. Responsible agencies are re- traditions of the service are not easy to qualification badges as symbols of the searching the problems to try and comprehend from my place in the sand - hard work, dedication, and effective ser- work out lasting solutions. In the in- alongside the infantry. vice of its members, and also as an en- terim, it is up to commanders, hancement to esprit de corps. I do believe leaders, and NCOs in the field to en- 2LT RICARDO 0. MORALES these are some of the major reasons In- fantry has its own qualification badges. sure that every soldier who needs to 3d ACR Saudi Arabia have SOUM information gets it. As a scout platoon leader in the 1st Cav Anything less is a disservice to our Division's cavalry squadron, I have been soldiers and an accident waiting to Tankers and Scouts Due an eyewitness to the professionalism, happen. Some of the ideas Equal Recognition devotion, and hard work of today's caval- ry scouts, my unit being merely a repre- presented here hopefully will help Dear Sir: sentative of the whole. Also, as a former you work through any problems that tank platoon leader, I can attest to the you may have in getting and track- I am writing this letter for publication in quality of today's tankers; but do not take ing SOW. The bottom line is to hopes of gathering support for a proposal my word for any of this, just review the get the SOUM expeditiously, get I am making as a concerned officer and war record of the ground units involved. member of the Cavalry/Armor community. the word to your soldiers, and get Knowing the widespread influence your One thing I noticed in my unit, and the SOUM by whatever means you publication has, I have high expectations specifically in my platoon, that prompted can until a foolproof system is that circulation of my recommendation me to write this letter was the fact that I emplaced. will perhaps sway influential people to have five 11M infantrymen in my platoon agree with me and my associates on assigned as observers and drivers. It is whose behalf I am writing. the same for the other two platoons. The Directorateof Total Armor Force These men served valiantly and deserve Readiness surveys Active and What I am strongly endorsing is an Ex- their Combat Infantry Badges, but the rest Reserve component Armor/Cavalry pert/Combat Armor Badge in two classes: of my platoon served just as heroically units worldwide, to ensure that they those awarded to tankers and those and are not eligible for any such award be- receive urgent SOUM. If you are awarded to scouts. cause they are 19D cavalry scouts. Also. having any problems receiving any the mortar section assigned to my troop SOUM, or have suggestions for solv- I realize that this is no new issue in the will receive ClBs for each member, and, al- ing the problem, call DSN 464-TANK Army and that Armor has been pushing though they are deserving, it should be (24 hour recording), or DSN 464- for such an award for over a decade. I noted that they supported us from a 7752/4047 (COM: 502-624-7752/ hope to list my own experiences as viable doctrinally induced central position be- 4847). reasons for creating the award for all the hind a screen line of cavalry scouts who ARMOR - May-June 1991 47 protected their flanks. These cav scouts in the field to replace the aging M60 fleet. 4. I'd like to see the COAX stowage are, today, not eligible for a Combat The Abrams has done this so well that reduced on company commander's tanks Armor Badge, therefore, the inequities are we've had to rethink our warfighting and above so that a second radio mount blatantly obvious. doctrine in order to accommodate the in- could be installed under the first one. This creased capabilities of the system. We've would definitely help C2 at company and Now, let me also say that the estab- gone from "active defense" to "Airland battalion level. lishment of this award should be such Battle," which emphasizes offensive shock that armored crewmen who served in war action using combined arms. We couldn't 5. Since we've gone to a HEAT/SABOT are eligible for a CAB, and the Armor do this with the M60, or maybe we could mix only, I'd like to see some sort of inter- Center will obviously have to establish have, but not very well. mediate weapon between the COAX and criteria for the testing of future armor men the MAIN gun that the crew could use and the awarding of EABs in peacetime. Mr. Goldfarb also makes some asser- when it had a target too small for the As a further note, 1 have discussed this tions about the tremendous cost overruns main gun, but too big for the .50 or the issue with my fellow officers, scouts, and and mechanical unreliability of the Ml COAX. If the range was great enough, the tankers, and not only are they in full agree- with which I also take issue. I don't deny crew could also use the weapon to mark ment, but we have also discussed the that the Abrams is expensive, but then targets for aircraft with smoke rounds. badges' designs. We are not being preco- again what state-of-the-art tank in the cious, just possessing a belief that the world isn't these days? The Ml's cost 6. I'd like to see a final drive odometer, men who would wear the badge should compares very favorably with every other similar to what semis use, to help keep have a hand in creating it. What we frontline Western tank deployed today, track of usage. DIPS get changed out a propose is the Tanker Badge as the from the Leopard 11 to the Challenger. Ad- lot, and sometimes the mileage isn't car- Armor insignia on a yellow enamel back- ditionally, calling the M1 a mechanical ried over, which makes it difficult to ground similar to the blue one of the In- "dog" is totally without merit and irrespon- properly record usage. A final drive fantry. For cav scouts it would be a single sible. Perhaps if Mr. Goldfarb had stayed odometer will always stay with the tank, saber on a red enamel background. As in the Army long enough to learn how to and if we can develop a clear road wheel with the CIB, awards earned in combat keep the vehicle operational, he'd have a hub, I know we can do this. would have a wreath around them. different opinion. I've been a platoon leader, executive officer, and commander 7. I think we need a MILES system that As it should be, the Army will have the of M1 units, and I've never seen the "dog" allows you to boresight the tank normally. final word on this proposal, but as a loyal, face of the M1 surface. Quite to the con- dedicated officer who cares about the fu- trary, the vehicle is very easy to work on, 8. I think we need an external phone. I ture of the Army, Armor, and my soldiers and in my experience is extremely reli- know this is in the works. and comrades, I felt it necessary to push able. The only time I witnessed excessive for this award. On behalf of all members down time with the system was at the 9. I think we need to put the azimuth in- of the Armor community, I feel that this NTC, and the way those tanks get used dicator back in the gunner's station. would be a positive award and that the out there, it isn't surprising. But even hywould be doing the right thing by its then, the down time only involved one or 10. Kind of off the subject, but I think we implementation. two vehicles in the fleet and not a sys- need new coveralls. We missed the point temic problem across the board. The when we developed tanker's NOMEX, be- JAMES M. BURTON measure of a vehicle's OR rate has more cause NOMEX loses its protective 1LT, Armor to do with the maintenance procedures en- qualities when it gets greasy, oily, etc. We Trp 6, 1-7 Cav forced by the owning unit than anything should take a look at what race car drivers 1st Cavalry Division else. are using right now, because I think it's in the right direction. Oevelop the flame retar- Now, having said all that, I still feel the dant suit as an undergarment to a M1 Attack "Unwarranted" M1 could be an even better system than it coverall system that can get dirty without is now. However, I make these recommen- degrading the system. If we do this, can Dear Sir: dations with my head held high because 1 we sew a pistol holster inside? It would believe in this tank. A lot of what I'd like to sure makes things easier inside the tank! Jeffrey S. Goldfarb's letter in the Sep see on the M1 is already programmed to tember-October 1990 issue (T-64 no *su- be added, some of it isn't and may never Oops, I got carried away there. Let's pertank") still disturbs me, even after read- be, but that doesn't change the con- hope everyone didn't fall asleep. Anyway, ing the excellent rebuttals in the Novem- fidence I have in this outstanding vehicle. Mr. Goldfarb posed a question in his letter ber-December 1990 issue. What bothers that he should not have asked. In me is Mr. Goldfarb's unwarranted and vi- 1. I'd like to see an AP grenade launcher response, all you have to do is take a look cious attack on the M1 tank. on the vehicle for close-in defense, or at history. The T-34 did as much to win maybe an AP grenade that can be Wll as any other vehicle. By the way, I Mr. Goldfarb seems to infer in his letter launched from the M250 smoke launchers. didn't notice Israel as a world leader in that the only reason we built the Abrams tape recorders, computers, and cars, but was to counter the T-72/64, which just 2. I'd like to see a gun tube position they've fielded the MERKAVA, haven't isn't true. Yes, I heard all the same stories locator in the driver's compartment, so they? he did from the instructors at Ft. Knox the driver always knows where the gun about why it was so important to field the tube is relative to the front slope. CPT THOMAS C. HOUSTON 11 M1 to counter these vehicles, but the bot- 5th Signal Command tom line is that we needed a new system 3. Underarmor APU! FRG

48 ARMOR - May-June 7997 The Bustle Rack#I

Anniston Army Depot Maintenance Repair Hotline

Anniston Army Depot has a Maintenance Battle Staff Noncommissioned Correspondence Course Program. After Repair Telephone Hotline for the M48, Officer Course completing the required number of les- M60 and M1-series combat vehicles; the sons, prospective students will receive a engine, transmission, and power train for certificate, which they will present to an A new course, for staff NCOs began in academy faculty advisor when they report these vehicles; for AVLBs, M88s, and January 1991 at the Army Sergeants US. to Fort Bliss for the resident phase of the M551s/M551Als; as well as for land com- Major Academy, Ft. Bliss, Texas. The first bat missile systems (to include the course. pilot has ended. The reaction from the LANCE launcher/loader transporter). The first graduating class was overwhelmingly hotline can also be used for problems All the resident training will be perfor- in favor of the new course. relating to small arms, mortars, and recoil- mance oriented, based on the ARTEPs for heavy battalion, heavy brigade, and light less rifles. This hotline can provide assis- The Battle Staff NCO Course was tance to field units that are having difficul- infantry battalion. The underlying prin- designed at the academy, and will in- ciples of the course are synchronization ty in resolving equipment problems and is tegrate the current Operations and Intel- an additional source of information for the and "train as you fight." ligence and Personnel and Logistics cour- soldier, the field maintenance technician, ses. But, according to its developers, the The following is a schedule of class and the logistics assistance officer. So, if course will be more than a simple mesh- you have a problem with any of the above dates for the remainder of the PI: ing of the two existing courses: it is a com- identified items, try your supporting units, pletely new course, designed 'Yo train bat- the AMC Logistics Assistance office, or Class # Start Date End Date talion and brigade staff NCOs to serve as give us a call, and we'll do our best to integral members of the battle staff and to help you solve it! Our hotline number is: 3-90 20 May 28 Jun manage the day-today operations of bat- (205) 235-6582 or DSN 571-6582. 4-90 8 Jul 16 Aug talion command posts." 5-90 26 Aug 4 Oct

NCOs were already learning their The Battle Staff NCO Course is geared Saber Award Winners specific duties in the existing course. to handle 160 students per class. If you What wasn't happening, according to have any questions on how to apply, you LTG Dave Palmer, Superintendent of the SGM Phillip Cantrell, was an effort to train may call Armor Branch, commercial United States Military Academy and the battle staff NCOs to function and fight as (202)325-9080 or DSN 221-9080. Academy's senior Armor officer, will an effective team. SGM Cantrell helped present the Armor Association Cavalry develop the Battle Staff NCO Course. sabers to West Point's top academic and Letterkenny Employees military Armor graduates during gradua- Training will actually begin before the Support Desert Storm tion week exercises May 27-31. NCO arrives at the school, according to SGM Cantrell. "We are planning a six- Letterkenny Army Depot employees suc- Cadet Blake K. Puckett of Annapolis, week course which is far shorter than the cessfully tackled another special short- Maryland, will be honored for achieving ten-week Operations and Intelligence turnaround project in support of Desert the highest cumulative grade point Course and two weeks longer than the Storm. average of the 116 cadets branched into Personnel and Logistics Course. With an Armor this year. He entered his final overall reduction in course length, some Depot employees assembled and semester with a 3.895 average. of the material NCOs need to know will prepared for shipment more than 800 re- have to be completed by correspondence placement tracks for the MlAl Abrams Cadet Matthew D. Morton attained the before their arrival." tank. The track, which was stored at New highest cadet military rank, serving as a SGM Cantrell said the proposed solution Cumberland Army Depot, Pa., is usually cadet battalion commander. The Bethel, is to select students a minimum of four to sent to Anniston Army Depot, Ala., for as- Ohio, resident also had served as a bat- eight months before course attendance sembly. Anniston overhauls and repairs talion command sergeant major. and enroll them immediately in the Army the MlA1. However, in the interest of

ARMOR - May-June 1991 49 Armor Center Hotline time, the track was brought to Letterkenny armored cavalry regiments, or US. Army Have you ever had a question in Chambersburg, Pa. Reserve Readiness Regions are eligible you needed to ask someone at for consideration for the award. Air cavalry the Armor Center, but didn't Employees worked around the clock for troops and attack helicopter companies or- know who to call? Well, here's two weeks just before the ground war ganic to armored and cavalry ground your answer, the Armor Center broke out to get the track out on time. Let- units are also eligible. The program is Hotline. Operated by the Direc- terkenny normally assembles tracks for open to US. Army, Army Reserve, and Na- torate of Total Armor Force Readi- howitzers and other tracked vehicles; tional Guard units. ness (DTAFR), the Hotline is a 24- however, normal production is about ten hour service that can get you an tracks per month. The Draper Award program also recog- answer. When you call the Hot- nizes individuals for their demonstrated line, you will be asked to leave The Draper Combat leadership in courses at Fort Knox, recog- your name, unit, a telephone Leadership Award nizing the outstanding leadership number, and of course, your graduates in both ANCOC and AOBC for question or request. DTAFR will their contributions and efforts while stu- get back to you with a response The annual Draper Combat Leadership dents. within 72 hours and often it will Award recognizes the outstanding armor be less than 24 hours. If the ques- or cavalry company or troop in each The point of contact for any questions tion isn't answerable within 72 division, separate brigade, and armored regarding the Draper Award Program is hours, DTAFR will contact you cavalry regiment in the U.S. Army, to in- Leadership Branch, USAARMC, Fort Knox, with a status, then track the ac- clude Army Reserve and National Guard Ky. 40121, phone: DSN 464494815450 or tion to ensure you get a final units. It is not a new award. The history of commercial (502) 624494815450. answer. this prestigious program is the legacy of LTC Wickliffe P. Draper. In 1924, LTC Recently, the use of the Hotline Draper developed a plan to test and has been declining, with most re- recognize combat leadership in small Elimination of MOS 19E quests from Reserve Component cavalry units. The first tests were held at units or recruiting offices asking Fort Riley, Kan., then the Cavalry School. Effective 1 October 1991, MOS 19E will for publications or publicity-type no longer be a valid active component items. While DTAFR is happy to Since that start nearly 70 years ago, the MOS. Commanders need to make every help fill these requests, the Hot- award tias evolved. In 1928, LTC Draper effort to ensure that all 19Es transition to line is also meant as your entry created a trust fund to ensure the per- 19K before this date. There are two into the Armor Center for manence of the award, and the competi- primary options available to accomplish doctrinal, training, equipment, tion expanded from Fort Riley to posts this transition. and safety issues. DTAFR will do throughout the United States. in 1939, everything it can to get your ques- cavalry regiments that had been (1) M1 Tank Commander Certification tion answered, even if it means mechanized began to compete for the Course (lc",at Fort Knox. If an MOS 19E going to agencies outside the award, thus ensuring its continued soldier is scheduled to PCS, ensure that Armor Center. So, if you've got a relevance in a modernized Army. he contacts his career advisor in question relating to Armor, call PERSCOM (DSN 221-9080) and gets DSN 464-TANK or commercial During World War II, the competition scheduled for the course enroute to his (502)624-TANK and give the Hot- was suspended, but was resumed in 1946 new duty station. The course can also be line a try. under the title of the Armored Cavalry taken in a TDY-and-return status, depend- Leadership Award to reflect the new ing on the unit's available funds. reality of the force. Since then, the com- petition has continued to evolve. (2) Supervised on-the-job training need to do everything possible to protect (SOJT). SOJT packages are available our quality soldiers. Today the Draper Combat Leadership from your installation learning center or Award, represented by the "Goodrich from the M1 NETT Team (Commander, Questions on 19K transition, to include Riding Trophy," is awarded not on the USAARMC, ATTN: ATZK-DPT-NET, Fort the administrative requirements, should results of a test, but on the overall perfor- Knox, Ky. 40121 or DSN 464-1661/5504). be referred to Mr. Henley or SGM Gray at mance of a unit. This was done for both Directorate of Total Armor Force Readi- practical and economical reasons. Many soldiers may have transitioned, ness (Commander, USAARMC, ATTN: Economically, it is no longer necessary to but stili require the appropriate administra- ATZK-TFP, Fort Knox, Ky. 40121-5000 or allocate funds for a "Draper Test:" the tive actions to be completed. A review at DSN 464-318815155). results of all of a unit's field exercises are Fort Knox found a large number of 19Es considered during the competition. Ex- who had been awarded MOS 19K, but the amining the functioning of a unit appropriate papework had not been sub- Seeks Oral Histories throughout the year gives a better evalua- mitted to PERSCOM. for D-Day Collection tion of the true performance of a unit and its leaders than a one-time test. Failure to convert soldiers to 19K before The director of the Eisenhower Center is 1 October 1991 could have an adverse im- calling on all veterans of the Normandy in- All company-sized armor cavalry units pact on their careers. During this era of vasion, in whatever capacity, to contribute assigned to divisions, separate brigades, force structure cuts, SERB, and OMP, we their own taped oral history to the D-Day

50 ARMOR - May-June 1997 ow personnel files will be marked to Armor Branch reflect Desert Storm experience and no one will be allowed to request officers and Notes NCOs just because they have Desert Storm experience. collection at the Center, where they are at- tempting to preserve the record of the The TC's Hatch The CSA will ensure that his com- common soldier, sailor, or airman. For the manders understand his guidance. DA 50th Anniversary, they plan to publish a by COL Stephen E. Wilson Selection Board members will receive ap- book, "Voices of D-Day," based on the propriate instructions wheh stress that oral histories. Chief, Armor Branch, OPMD what counts is the total performance and demonstrated potential over one's entire For detalls, write Stephen E. Ambrose, Operation Desert Storm - a campaign career, regardless of SWA service. For ex- which will be forever synonymous with Director, The Eisenhower Center, Univer- ample, if the Army resorts to RlFs to success and total victory is, for all in- sity of New Orleans, New Orleans, La. - reduce the active force, Desert Storm ex- tents and purposes, over. The Army's con- 70148. perience/nonexperience will NOT be a tribution to this victory was made possible criterion for retentionkeparation. through the selfless and dedicated efforts Keep Your CMlF of all of its soldiers, both active duty and In sum, our leadership is committed to Up To Date reserve, and its civilians. Those who did ensuring that personnel decisions are not deploy, the majority of the Army, also based on fair, equitable assessments of The Career Management Information performed magnificently and contributed the whole person - one's performance Rle (CMIF) is a tool used by career substantially to the overall success of the and demonstrated potential over one's branches of the U.S. Total Army Person- campaign, From training RC units at the total career, The unsung heroes of Desert nel Command for making assignments NTC and Fort Hood to training RT-12 sol- Storm - those who didn't deploy to SWA, and professional development decisions diers, IMAs, and IRRs at Fort Knox; from but who were and are responsible for our on staff sergeants, sergeants first class, those sent TDY to SWA from every post Army's high state of readiness - will also and master sergeants. The file contains a and MACOM, CONUS, and OCONUS, to be among our future battalionbrigade copy of the Official Military Personnel File those who were in professional develop- commanders and command sergeants (OMPF), microfiche, Efficiency Reports, ment courses such as OAC, CGSC, AWC, major. and DA Forms 2A and 2-1. The informa- etc.; from those who worked incredible tion in the CMlF is forwarded after being hours in identifying and fixing shortcom- Desert Storm was a total team effort. processed at the Enlisted Records and ings in both equipment and logistics to Our success is a result of hard work and Evaluation Center at Fort Benjamin Har- those who quickly formed NETTs to transi- dedication which resulted in a stunningly rison, with the exception of the OMPF, tion units to the M1A1 Abrams tank - swift and total victory. American soldiers whioh Is sent upon request. The Enlisted everyone played a crucial role in making - especially tankers and cavalrymen, Preference Statement (DA 2635), pre- our eventual victory possible. regardless of where they serve - con- viously kept in the CMIF, has been res- tributed to this victory. YOU ARE ALL WIN- cinded. As our units redeploy from SWA, the NERS! Army must shift its attention to confront DA Forms 2A and 2-1, which are re- less violent challenges, such as the quired attachments for many personnel programmed reduction of the Army to Reunions actions, are used when making decisions 535,000 active duty soldiers by the mid- about your assignments and schooling. 1990s. A challenge which all of us must The 11th Armored Cavalry's Veterans When this information is not current, the face head-on is a perception voiced by of Vietnam and Cambodia will host its difficulty in making the right decision at both officers and noncommissioned of- sixth reunion 2-4 August 1991 in Philadel- the right time increases. PSCs are re- ficers that those without Desert Storm ex- phia, Pa. For more information, contact quired by AR 640-2-1, Para 3-3, to send perience will be disadvantaged when they Pete Walter, 8 Tallowood Drive, Mt. Holly, copies whenever the forms are being compete with their Desert Storm peers for N.J. 08060, telephone (609) 261-5629. remade or upon completion of a full audit. schools, promotions, assignments, and retention. On 13 March 1991, MG Robert The 1lth Armored Division reunion will The assignment information on file Is ac- L. Ord, 111, CG, PERSCOM, met with GEN be held 14-18 August 1991 in San Antonio, cumulated from assignments made by Carl E. Vuono, CSA, to discuss this per- Texas. For more information, contact TAPC, applications and requests received, ception of "1st team, 2d team." GEN Alfred Pfeiffer, 2328 Admiral St., Aliquippa. letters written to or prepared within the Vuono gave the following guidance. Pa. 15001. branch, and general correspondence that has had an impact on your assignment 0Future wars are likely to continue to 0 Blackhorse troopers who served with status. be "come as you are" conflicts in which the 11th ACR and its detachments in the participation is a function of where one is Republic of Vietnam, between August It must be emphasized that the CMlF is assigned at the time of deployment. 1966 and August 1967 ONLY. interested in not used in any way by DA centralized Those not deployed will not be penalized attending a reunion to mark the 25th an- selection boards for promotions, schools. for somethina over which thev have no niversary of the Blackhorse Regiment's or QMP. control. deployment to Vietnam should contact (CPT) Gil Perrey, (415) 477-9211; (1SG) Direct questions about the CMlF to MSG 0 Officers and NCOs will receive fair, im- Jim Embrey (502) 737-8671; or (CPT) Bill Galloway, Armor Branch, EPMD, TAPC, partial treatment in personnel actions Abbey, (919) 766-5857 (evenings). This ini- DSN 221-9080 or commercial (703) 325- based on all of their past performance tial reunion is planned for 24-26 August 9080. and demonstrated potential. 1991 in Alexandrla, Va.

ARMOR - MayJune 7997 57 Light Forces and the Future of tended operations only if supported by ex- Wars for territorial expansion are over." U.S. Military Strategy by Michael J. tensive corps-level assets. It is able to Clearly, the book was published before Mazarr. Brassey's, New York, 1990. 180 delay in a mid-intensity conflict only if on the Gulf War. easily defended terrain. And its ability to pages. $32. operate even in a RACO mission in a high- Creveld's real subject is not the transfor- intensity conflict against a Soviet-style mation of society. His vision of the future Before August 2, 1990, the future of the force is at best minimal. Mazarr makes all is centered on the decline of the nation U.S. Army seemed to lie in "contingency these points and goes on to compare the state and the rise of what is best operations." As early as 1979, General non-American experience and the capabil- described as tribalism. Even more disturb- "Shy" Meyer, then Chief of Staff, proposed ities of the motorized division against this ing is that by rejecting the Clausewitzian the creation of a new type of motorized standard. dictum that wars are fought for reason- light division. The goal was to create a able ends, we are left with a human lust deployable, very lethal, and tactically Perhaps the best argument for reading for violence. We make war for war's sake. mobile division. The 9th Infantry Division and absorbing Mazarr's book was in Creveld's view of the future is one we (Motorized) and the High Technology Test General Schwarzkopf's final briefing. should commit ourselves to avoid. Bed organization at Fort Lewis, Washing- While the forces of Central Command ton, were to be the means of developing were still attempting to reach Saudi With the decline of Communist ideology this force. Arabia, and the light divisions were and the apparent rise of nationalism, employed on forest fire watch, the best there is no reason to assume that the Then, in the mid-l980s, the new Chief of defense for our allies and our initial forces European model of the nation state will Staff, General Wickham, launched a new was the over-inflated reporting of the not continue to monopolize the most im- initiative, the tight Infantry Division. The press. Will that be sufficient in the future? portant forms of warfare. I cannot recom- new force was to be austere and deploy- mend this book for everyone. The serious able in a way no other American division SFC JOHN T. BROOM students of Clausewitz will find it thought was. Sacrificing tactical mobility and anti- US Army Armor School provoking; the rest of us will find it simply armor lethality, the new LID was to be Ft. Knox, Ky. depressing. lifted by not more than 500 (3-141 sorties. The Transformation of War, by MICHAEL MATHENY While today only a single motorized LTC, Armor Martin Van Creveld. The Free Press, New brigade remains of General Meyer's bold Harker Heights, Texas new experiment, four active duty divisions York. 1991.254 pages. and one National Guard division are or- The Forgotten Victor: General ganized under General Wickham's design. Martin Van Creveld, as both historian Sir Richard O'Connor, by John Don't be fooled by the title of Mr. Mazarr's and analyst, has contributed a great deal book; his future does not lie with the LID to the study of war. His earlier works on Baynes. Brassey's, 1990. 281 pages. of General Wickham. supply, command, and technology are $24.95. classics of penetrating historical analysis. Relying on open sources and interviews, Unfortunately, his latest study, The Trans- OConnor was the soldier's soldier. At Michael J. Mazarr follows the evolution of formation of War, misses the mark. his memorial service in 1981, Lieutenant the light division concept from the tactical- Creveld's thesis is simply that "contem- General Sir George Collingwood spoke of ly mobile and well-armed motorized porary strategic thought is fundamentally him thus: "The chief facets of his charac- division to the strategically deployable, flawed." It is flawed because current ter were, I think, great courage and deter- but tactically immobile and inadequately strategic thought is dominated by the in- mination, an impelling sense of duty, armed, tight Infantry Division. fluence of the German military loyalty, extreme personal modesty, kind- philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz. .Clause- ness and generosity, and a delightful In addition to the historical evolution, witz' Qn War was based upon his ex- sense of humor. I think the jokes he liked Mazarr devotes four chapters to an perience and study of the Napoleonic best were those against himself." analysis of the possible contingencies and Wars. Creveld maintains that Clausewitz' the low-, mid-, and high-in!ensity conflict interpretation of war between nation John Baynes has written a very readable spectrum. He illustrates point by point the states is no longer adequate to explain account of the life of this undoubtedly weaknesses inherent in the structure and prn2t msn Uic nsrhr fnrmstivn \marc in. modern warfare. ,.vu. ...-I.. ,.I- "L..', .-. 111...1.- ,v..,- ..I equipment of the tight Infantry Division. :lude his almost incredible luck in surviv-

The weaknesses of the tioht~ lnfantrv Th-I ..v author begins by attempting to ng four years in the trenches during the Divisions extend across the spectrum of demoinstrate the failure of conventional ar- eirst World War, a period that earned him conflict and across all the capabilities mies since 1945. He then organizes his 3. DSO and bar, and an MC. During the necessary to a combat formation. analysis around fundamental questions of ost-WWI years, he served in India and for \n/hat purpose, by whom, and how alestine as the youngest major general The Light Infantry Division. while ad- wars are really fought. Clausewitz' dictum f his day. Then, in WWII, he commanded rnivshh, riaitsrl 4-v r-nirl rlsnln.,man+ lrrbr AL-A I !mmnnawty OUILTU IW napw UT~IV~II~GU~L,tabna rriar 'war is a continuation of politics" is 111 Corps in the Western Desert, the tactical mobility, adequate anti-armor discarded as Creveld stresses growing eriod of his career upon which his fame weaponry, medium-range indirect fire sup- religious and ethnic reasons for war. He )rever rested. port, and even the minimum logistical sup- emphasizes the dominance of low-inten- port necessary for sustained combat. The sity warfare and claims that war between It was here that OConnor's greatest tight Infantry Division is capable of ex- nation states is obsolete. He offers that ualities shone throuah. He drove the 52 ARMOR - MayJune 7997 Italian 10th Army from Cyrenaica, destroy- range nuclear force treaty in 1987. This matter and has written another book, Re- ing it utterly, and he would have carried work gives good insight into the use of actionary Modernism, which also revolves on to the gates of Tripoli had not Chur- military coercion and deterrence being in- around Germany. However, this book is chill and Wavell (then OConnor's com- terjected into the domestic political bat- not for everyone. It is not easy to read or mander-in-chief) deemed intervention in tlefield of West Germany. The strategy easy to comprehend. It is very dry and Greece more important, a decision that evolved around using the indirect ap- reads like a doctoral dissertation (its bibli- military historians still argue over today. proach to attack at what Clausewitz sepa- ography and footnotes comprise more And then came tragedy, O'Connor's rately described as one of the strategic than 100 pages). The salient points of this chance capture by the Germans after centers, which is neutralizing allies of your work could be made in 30 pages. The sub- some poor map reading. The book covers opponent. ject of the book is very interesting for a his imprisonment in Italy and includes a professional military man, but this book fascinating chapter about his successive The author describes how the Soviets may not be the vehicle to educate or even escape attempts and the life and mental deployed the SS-20s (a mobile missile keep the average reader awake. outlook of senior officers enduring cap- with three nuclear warheads) with no tivity (there cannot have been a more ready response by NATO. The ploy was to GEORGE F. MILBURN troublesome batch of 50+-year-olds in develop a strategic nuclear arsenal that CPT, USMC Europe!). would only threaten the NATO alliance, Fort Knox, Ky. and not the United States, thus forcing His eventual escape is followed by com- NATO to respond. This in turn would mand of a corps in the crucial stages of touch off a political maelstrom that would the battle for Normandy. Captivity has result in West Germany being severed taken its toll, though, and there is the and slowly "Finlandizing" the country Passage of Lines taste of a lost edge. He falls out with under Soviet hegemony. Montgomery (over an American divisional Colonel Harrison H. D. commander under his command - The book concentrates on the West Ger- Montgomery wants the general sacked, mans trying to muster the political Heiberg, a cavalryman since but O'Connor, ever loyal to his subor- courage to deploy the nuclear-tipped Per- 1919, and a tanker since 1940, dinates, fights the issue). Inevitably, shing II and cruise missiles. It goes into ex- died April 20, 1991, at the age Montgomery wins, and O'Connor sees the cruciating detail about the intelligence of 90. Graduated from the war out in India. Postwar, a rather sad framing the arguments both for and period as adjutant general to the ever-tri- against the deployment of the weapons. USMA in 1919 and commis- umphant Montgomery, results in another This work shows how seemingly unrelated sioned a second lieutenant of clash and retirement. By then, this brilliant events in domestic policy, world events, cavalry, Heiberg served with soldier was weary, and the effects of near- and the history of Nazism that still haunts the lst, 6th, and 10th Cavalry ly 30 years of very active service have the German mindset had influence on the Regiments and instructed taken their toll. decision. It also relates how different in- stitutions, such as the political parties, the Cavalry at VMI and USMA. John Baynes does well to bring out the church, and universities interact to form a extraordinary phases in OConnor's life. national consensus. Mr. Herf does a good He was with the Detachment He also poses the great questions: What job in showing how the Soviets tried to in- for Mechanized Cavalry Regi- if O'Connor had taken Tripoli? What if he fluence the arguments and hide the fact ment at Fort Knox from 1932 hadn't been captured? Baynes' liking for that the SS-20 deployment of over 352 the man is obvious throughout the book. systems with 1.053 warheads was "no to 1936 and was an Aide de And why not? O'Connor's immense in- threat to Europe," while the much less Camp to BG Adna R. Chaffee tegrity shines through in his every action. capable AmericanlNATO response would in 1939. He later organized This is what generals should be like, and overturn the balance. the 7th Reconnaissance and those aspiring to such heights would do well to read this book. The rest of us mere The battle shows how resilient Support Squadron. mortals can but read and wonder. democracy can be (even in the wake of 500,000 people demonstrating against the He served as G-3, I11 Ar- J.M.W. MOODY missile deployment). The NATO systems mored Corps; and as G-3 Lt. Col. were deployed, and in 1987, Presidents Plans Chief, 1st U.S. Army British Liaison Officer Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF Fort Knox, Ky. Treaty, eliminating a whole class of Group during WWII. From weapon systems. The book shows that, al- 1948-1951, he served as presi- War By Other Means by Jeffrey though this cold war battle may not have dent, Army Field Forces been the decisive factor, it did have a Herf, The Free Press, New York, 1991. 357 Board No. 2 at Fort Knox. direct influence on the Soviet Union pages. $27.95. loosening its grip on Eastern Europe. If Colonel Heiberg was the fea- the West Germans had left the NATO al- War Bv Other Means is a very detailed liance and come under the Soviets' will, tured speaker at the 50th account of the last cold war battle, which would they have taken the route they did? Armor Force anniversary ob- was the deployment of intermediate servance at Fort Knox on July range missiles by the superpowers in The author, Jeffrey Herf, who teaches in- 10, 1990. Europe during the late 1970s that cul- ternational relations and European politics minated in the signing of the intermediate at Emory University, knows his subject ARMOR - May-June 7997 53 24th ID GivesT-72 81BMP to Patton Museum

WOIOSb, blbJ Patrick J. Cooney The 24th Infantry Division formally presented an Iraqi T-72 tank and BMP-1 to the Patton Museum and Fort Knox during the annual Armor Conference on May 8. The division captured the two vehicles in the Euphrates River valley during the Gulf War. In top photo, the tank is lifted off a rail- road car at the Boatwright maintenance facility. Lower photos are of the presenta- tion ceremony in front of the museum. PIN: 056041-oOO U.S. Government Printing Office 1991 748450191-3