DOCSLIB.ORG

Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle -- Enhanced Weapon System

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle -- Enhanced Weapon System Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1996-06 Case analysis of the U.S. Army Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program: Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle -- Enhanced weapon system Jones, Walter. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/39303 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS CASE ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. ARMY W ARFIGHTING RAPID ACQUISITION PROGRAM: BRADLEY STINGER FIGHTING VEHICLE -- ENHANCED WEAPON SYSTEM by Walter Jones June 1996 Principal Advisor: Orin E. Marvel Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. '• ' REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Fonn Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of infonnation is estimated to average I hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of infonnation. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of infonnation, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports. 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 222024302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washinl!:lon DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 1996 Master's Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE CASE ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. ARMY 5. FUNDING NUMBERS WARFIGHTING RAPID ACQUISITION PROGRAM: BRADLEY STINGER FIGHTING VEHICLE -- ENHANCED WEAPON SYSTEM 6. AUTHOR(S) Jones, Walter 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION Monterey CA 93943-5000 REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Aooroved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) With the Department of Defense's budget continuing to be reduced, Anny acquisition managers must acquire superior weapon systems within shorter time periods with less resources. One effective way to accomplish this with relatively small, µrgently needed acquisition programs is through the Anny's Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP). This thesis uses a case study of the Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle-Enhanced (BSFV-E) air defense system to determine the impact of the WRAP upon accelerated acquisition. WRAP transitions compelling US Anny Training and Doctrine Command Battle Lab successes into rapid acquisition successes. Lessons learned from the BSFV-E case are identified which might be used by other acquisition managers to effectively manage programs which emerge as Battle Lab experimentation successes and are approved for rapid acquisition through the WRAP process. One lesson learned is that BSFV-E's streamlined acquisition process permitted a significant reduction in the administrative and procedural requirements which typically burden systems development. Also, this case study identified that lack of funding for WRAP programs such as the BSFV-E can potentially transform a rapid acquisition effort into a business-as-usual program. This study concludes that the BSFV-E is an excellent acquisition streamlining role model. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program, WRAP, Acquisition 15. NUMBER OF Streamlining, Battle Labs, Advanced Warfighting Experiments, Bradley Stinger PAGES105 Fighting Vehicle-Enhanced, BSFV-E, Bradley Linebacker 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 18. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 20. LIMITATION OF CATION OF REPORT CATION OF THIS PAGE TION OF ABSTRACT ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 298-102 ., ' . ' .. ii .. ·,. ' .. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. CASE ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. ARMY WARFIGHTING RAPID ACQUISITION PROGRAM: BRADLEY STINGER FIGHTING VEHICLE -­ ENHANCED WEAPON SYSTEM Walter Jones Captain, United States Army B.S., University of California, Riverside 1986 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 1996 Author: Approved by: - ---------- Department of Systems Management 111 iv ABSTRACT With the Department of Defense's budget continuing to be reduced, Anny acquisition managers must acquire superior weapon systems within shorter time periods with less resources. One effective way to accomplish this with relatively small, urgently needed acquisition programs is through the Anny's Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP). This thesis uses a case study of the Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle-Enhanced (BSFV­ E) air defense system to determine the impact of the WRAP upon accelerated acquisition. WRAP transitions compelling US Anny Training and Doctrine Command Battle Lab successes into rapid acquisition successes. Lessons learned from the BSFV-E case are identified which might be used by other acquisition managers to effectively manage programs which emerge as Battle Lab experimentation successes and are approved for rapid acquisition through the WRAP process. One lesson learned is that BSFV-E's streamlined acquisition process permitted a significant reduction in the administrative and procedural requirements which typically burden systems development. Also, this case study identified that lack of funding for WRAP programs such as the BSFV-E can potentially transform a rapid acquisition effort into a business-as-usual program. This study concludes that the BSFV-E is an excellent acquisition streamlining role model. v vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION . 1 A BACKGROUND . 1 B. OBJECTIVE .............................................. 2 C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS . 2 D. SCOPE ................................................... 2 E. LITERATURE REVIEWS AND l\1ETHODOLOGY ............... 2 F. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS . 3 G. ORGANIZATION ............. : . 4 II. WRAP: TRANSITIONING BATTLE LAB SUCCESSES INTO STREAMLINED ACQUISITION ..................................... 5 A. INTRODUCTION . 5 B. CHANGING THREAT ENVIRONMENT . 6 C. FORCE XXI . 8 1. Doctrine . 10 2. Modernization and Digital Technologies ..................... 11 3. Simulations ............................................. 12 D. JOINT VENTURE . 14 E. BATTLE LABS . 15 F. ADVANCED W ARFJGHTING EXPERI1\1ENTS . 21 1. Operation Desert Hammer ................................. 23 2. Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment ............. 25 G. W ARFIGHTING RAPID ACQIBSITION PROGRAM POLICY . 26 1. Tiger Team -- Rapid Acquisition Initiative Background .......... 26 2. Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program Purpose ............... 27 3. Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program Process ................ 28 4. Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program Documentation ......... 29 H. SUMMARY .................................................. 31 ID. BRADLEY STINGER FIGHTING VEHICLE -- ENHANCED . 33 A. BSFV-E SYSTEM DESCRIPTION . 33 B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ............... , . 35 1. Budget Impacts Upon FAAD ............................... 3 7 2. Continued Need For Heavy Division Air Defense ............... 38 3. Changing Air Defense Threat ............................... 38 C. AIR DEFENSE BATTLE LAB INITIATIVE . 40 1. Use of Virtual Prototyping ................................. 42 2. Testing ............................................. 43 D. BSFV-E PROGRAM ACQUISITION STRATEGY ............... 44 1. Contracting Milestones .................................... 46 2. Competition ............................................ 47 3. Source Selection Process & Pricing Analysis ................... 49 4. Effects of Acquisition Reform .............................. 51 Vil E. SUMMARY ............................................... 52 IV. CASE ANALYSIS OF THE BSFV-E PROGRAM . 55 A INTRODUCTION . 55 B. LESSONS LEARNED ...................................... 55 C. SUMMARY ............................................... 72 V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . 73 A GENERAL CONCLUSIONS . 73 B. SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED . 73 C. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................... 75 D. AREASFORFURTHERRESEARCH ......................... 75 APPENDIX A [LIST OF ACRONYMS] . 77 APPENDIX B [BSFV-E PROGRAM CHRONOLOGY] . 83 APPENDIX C [REPRESENTATIVE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS] . 85 LIST OF REFERENCES . 87 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 93 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . 95 viii I. INTRODUCTION A. BACKGROUND Just as the document "From the Sea" has shaped the way the United States Navy will fight in the future, the Army's "Force XXI Campaign" provides that Service's current overarching vision. Force XXI is the Army framework which balances today's operational challenges with an understanding of what capabilities are needed to meet future challenges. In light of the rapidly increasing rate of change in both technological advancements and the strategic global environment, the Army must enter the business of "changing the way it changes." [Ref 1] In May 1992, the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Battle Laboratories (Battle Labs) were founded to help identify the components needed by the Army to stay at the forefront of this wave
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Projected Acquisition Costs for the Army's Ground Combat Vehicles
    Projected Acquisition Costs for the Army’s Ground Combat Vehicles © MDart10/Shutterstock.com APRIL | 2021 At a Glance The Army operates a fleet of ground combat vehicles—vehicles intended to conduct combat opera- tions against enemy forces—and plans to continue to do so. Expanding on the Army’s stated plans, the Congressional Budget Office has projected the cost of acquiring such vehicles through 2050. Those projections include costs for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and for procurement but not the costs of operating and maintaining the vehicles. CBO’s key findings are as follows: • Total acquisition costs for the Army’s ground combat vehicles are projected to average about $5 billion per year (in 2020 dollars) through 2050—$4.5 billion for procurement and $0.5 billion for RDT&E. • The projected procurement costs are greater (in constant dollars) than the average annual cost for such vehicles from 2010 to 2019 but approximately equal to the average annual cost from 2000 to 2019 (when spending was boosted because of operations in Iraq). • More than 40 percent of the projected acquisition costs of Army ground combat vehicles are for Abrams tanks. • Most of the projected acquisition costs are for remanufactured and upgraded versions of current vehicles, though the Army also plans to acquire an Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle, which will replace the Bradley armored personnel carrier; an Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, which will replace the M113 armored personnel carrier; and a new Mobile Protected Firepower tank, which will be lighter than an Abrams tank. • The Army is also considering developing an unmanned Decisive Lethality Platform that might eventually replace Abrams tanks.
    [Show full text]
  • FEBRUARY/MARCH 2017. Issue 01
    FEBRUARY/MARCH 2017. Issue 01. READY FOR WHEREVER YOUR MISSION TAKES YOU ELAMS TOC: The ELAMS TOC Primary mission is to provide effective, reliable space for execution of battlefield C4I. MECC® Shower/Latrine: The AAR MECC® is a fully customizable ISO that allows you to mobilize your mission. SPACEMAX® The SPACEMAX® shelter provides lightweight, durable solutions for rapidly deployable space that reduces costs and risk. 2 armadainternational.com - february/march 2017 MADE IN armadainternational.com - february/march 2017 3 www.AARMobilitySystems.com THE USA FEBRUARY/MARCH 2017 www.armadainternational.com 08 AIR POWER COST VERSUS CREDIBILITY Andrew Drwiega examines maritime patrol aircraft procurement, and the options available for air forces and navies on a budget. 14 20 26 LAND Warfare TURING STIRLING CLASS WAR CATCH-22 VEHICLES FOR CHANGE Stephen W. Miller examines how the designs of Thomas Withington examines the Link-22 tactical Andrew White uncovers some of the latest light armoured vehicles are changing around data link, its workings and what it heralds for advances in vehicle technology to help the world. tomorrow’s naval operations. commandos reach their objectives. 32 38 FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES SEA POWER 44 THE MAN WHO FELL TO EARTH WHAT LIES BENEATH LAND Warfare Parachute technology is over a century old and is Warship definitions are becoming increasingly PREVENTION IS BETTER THAN CURE being continually refined, thanks to advances in blurred due to technological advances. Are we Claire Apthorp explores some of the innovative design and manufacturing, Peter Donaldson moving towards the multipurpose combatant, asks methods being adopted for military vehicle finds out. Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • The Army's M-1 Abrams, M-2/M-3 Bradley, and M-1126 Stryker: Background and Issues for Congress
    The Army’s M-1 Abrams, M-2/M-3 Bradley, and M-1126 Stryker: Background and Issues for Congress (name redacted) Specialist in Military Ground Forces April 5, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R44229 The Army’s M-1 Abrams, M-2/M-3 Bradley, and M-1126 Stryker Summary The M-1 Abrams Tank, the M-2/M-3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), and the M-1126 Stryker Combat Vehicle are the centerpieces of the Army’s Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs) and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs). In addition to the military effectiveness of these vehicles, Congress is also concerned with the economic aspect of Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker recapitalization and modernization. Due to force structure cuts and lack of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) opportunities, Congress has expressed a great deal of concern with the health of the domestic armored combat vehicle industrial base. ABCTs and SBCTs constitute the Army’s “heavy” ground forces; they provide varying degrees of armored protection and mobility that the Army’s light, airborne (parachute), and air assault (helicopter transported) infantry units that constitute Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) do not possess. These three combat vehicles have a long history of service in the Army. The first M-1 Abrams Tank entered service with the Army in 1980; the M-2/M-3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle in 1981; and the Stryker Combat Vehicle in 2001. Under current Army modernization plans, the Army envisions all three vehicles in service with Active and National Guard forces beyond FY2028. There are several different versions of these vehicles in service.
    [Show full text]
  • The Bradley Fighting Vehicle-The Troops Love It Just Like Its Partner-In
    The Bradley Fighting Vehicle-The Troops Love It Just like its partner-in-combat the Ml Abrams tank, the Army's new M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle is rolling off the assembly line in grow­ ing numbers and finding an enthusias­ tic welcome in the units where it is be­ ing assigned. From the battalion com­ manders down to the squad leaders who fight from the Bradley there is high praise for its speed, agility, fire­ power and protection from artillery fragments and small caliber weapons. Also, just like the Abrams tank, the Bradley has been subject to a great deal of uninformed and polemical crit­ icism leading to its current less-than­ optimal press image. In truth, the Bradley, now fielded in 17 battalions, is a very successful piece of equip­ ment. It does what it was intended to do and does it very well. It deserves more objective treatment by the press and other critics who do not under­ stand its function. The Bradley exists to provide infan­ trymen and cavalry scouts a protected fighting platform on the battlefield where they function as partners of a combined-arms team, closely integrat­ ed with tanks, artillery, aviation and air defense weapons. For the first time our infantry soldiers can move into a new dimension-aboard a protective vehicle from which they can fight the enemy, with the firepower, agility and speed which assures continuous effec­ tiveness on a modern battlefield. This is not just a matter of getting the infantry to the battle. It is the de­ mand that infantry and tanks fight to­ gether, that both be there offering their strengths and protecting the oth­ er's weaknesses.
    [Show full text]
  • Army Transformation and Modernization: Overview and Issues for Congress
    Order Code RS20787 Updated March 11, 2004 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Army Transformation and Modernization: Overview and Issues for Congress nae redacted Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary The U.S. Army continues an ambitious program intended to transform itself into a strategically responsive force dominant in all types of ground operations. As planned, its Future Force will eventually meld all ongoing initiatives into a force based on a high- tech Future Combat System (FCS). Its Current Force is beginning to provide a new combat capability, based on current-technology armored vehicles, for the mid-intensity combat operations that seem prevalent in today’s world. Its current “legacy force” of existing systems is being modernized and maintained to ensure effective light and heavy force capabilities until the Future Force is realized. This short report briefly describes the program and discusses issues of feasibility, viability, and affordability of potential interest to Congress. It will be updated as events warrant. Background Modernization is not a new issue or objective for U.S. military forces, but it has taken on new urgency because of: the post-Cold War downsizing and procurement reductions, the new global environment and unexpected requirements, and the promise of a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) suggested by rapid developments in computers, communications, and guidance systems. The last notable surge in modernization culminated during the “Reagan build-up” of the 1980's. Weapons and doctrines developed and fielded in that era made fundamental contributions to United States successes in the Cold War, the Gulf War, and Kosovo.
    [Show full text]
  • NSIAD-90-172 Bradley Vehicle: Status of the Army's Survivability Enhancement Program
    United States General Accounting Office Report to theI - Honorable GAO Barbara Boxer, House of Representatives May 1990 BRADLEYVEHICLE Status of the Army’s Survivability Enhancement Progrm -- GAO,‘NSlAD9O-172 United States General Accounting Office GAO Washington, D.C. 20648 National Security and International Affairs Division B-221733 May 21,199O The Honorable Barbara Boxer House of Representatives Bear Ms. Boxer: This report responds to your request that we provide you with informa- tion on the current status of the Army’s modification program for enhancing the survivability of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. We briefed your staff on the results of our work on March 5, 1990. As a result of live-fire testing conducted between March 1985 and Results in Brief May 1987, the Army is incorporating a number of survivability enhance- ments into a new Bradley high-survivability configuration referred to as the “A2 model.” This model will be produced in two versions: the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) and the Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (WV). Enhancements will include (1) the addition of armor to provide protec- tion against 30-mm projectiles, (2) the addition of liners inside the turret to protect the crew from high-velocity debris (spall) resulting from rounds’ penetrating the crew compartment, (3) the addition of armor to protect against antitank chemical energy weapons (this armor is to be provided to field troops when it is developed), (4) changes in the way fuel and ammunition are internally stored, and (5) changes to the vehi- cle’s automatic fire extinguishing system. Because of the weight increases associated with these changes, the Army is upgrading the Bradley power train with a 600-horsepower engine and a modified transmission.
    [Show full text]
  • Military Spending and Arms Sales in the Gulf
    burke chair in strategy Military Spending and Arms Sales in the Gulf How the Arab Gulf States Now Dominate the Changes in the Military Balance By Anthony H. Cordesman with the assistance of Michael Peacock April 28, 2015 Request for comments: This report is a draft that will be turned into an electronic book. Comments and suggested changes would be greatly appreciated. Please send any comments to Anthony H. Cordsman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, at [email protected]. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman, Peacock: Gulf National Security Balance 24.4.15 Rev 15:00 2 Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................................................................4 II. MILITARY EXPENDITURES ...........................................................................................................................................................................6 THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES (IISS) ESTIMATES ............................................................................................................................... 6 THE STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI) ESTIMATES .................................................................................................................. 6 MILITARY SPENDING AS A PERCENT OF GDP AND COMPARATIVE GDP ..................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Bradley Fighting Vehicle
    TOW anti-tank missiles for great distance and firing accura- The Bradley cy (up to 4km), in addition to ammunition for each piece of artillery. Bradleys can travel up to 40mph on ground, and 2.5mph in water via attached inflatable barrier. It takes up Fighting Vehicle to thirty minutes to be deployed as an amphibious vehicle. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), commonly known as the “Bradley,” is a tracked armored vehicle for transporting A Success in Today’s Battlefield/ troops to critical battlefield points, providing fire coverage A Failure in Efficient Research and for dismounting troops, and delivering offensive attack ca- Development pability at enemy armored vehicles and troops. There are two models of the Bradley used for army ground opera- Although the Bradley destroyed many enemy tanks and tions: the M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), designed for experienced fairly low rates of casualty in the First Gulf troop transport, and the M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (CFV), War and the Iraq War, the vehicle’s recent battlefield per- deployed for reconnaissance missions and tank combat. Of formance was not acquired through efficient planning and the Bradleys that have been built through the mid-1990s, project management. The origins of the modern Bradley 4,671 are IFVs and 2,083 are CFVs. span decades of troubled development; the involvement of many stakeholders; inflexible and questionable require- Both models of the Bradley (M2/M3) carry an identical ments; a failure of contractors to make design tradeoffs three-man crew, comprised of a gunner and commander in for fear of losing capability; billions of dollars in R&D costs; the turret, and a driver seated under a hatch, in the front and numerous Congressional interventions, including hull.
    [Show full text]
  • (AVF0005) 1 Written Evidence Submitted by Brigadier
    (AVF0005) Written evidence submitted by Brigadier (Retired) BW Barry OBE Senior Fellow Land Warfare International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) INQUIRY INTO BRITISH ARMOURED VEHICLE CAPABILITY HCDC is conducting an inquiry that “will focus on the procurement and use of Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) and ask whether more must be done to ensure the Army’s ability to deploy an armoured division.”i This submission provides analysis to assist in answering this question and subordinate questions including: - “Whether the Army is currently on track to be able to field the Strike Brigades and armoured division in line with the recommendations of the 2015 SDSR”. - “Whether the Army will be able to match the potential threat posed by peer adversaries by 2025” - The 13 more detailed questions listed at the Call for evidence.ii It is based on IISS analysis of global armoured warfare capabilities published in the annual IISS Military Balance and data held in the Military Balance+ database, as well as a strong body of analysis of recent, current, and future wars and the roles of AFVs in conflict. It does not look beyond 2030. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Armoured warfare is a capability of great relevance, both currently and in the future. Based on data held by the Military Balance+ database, some 250,000 AFVs are in service globally. Most current British Army AFVs are either obsolete or approaching obsolescence. Together with the introduction of the Ajax and Boxer AFVs, the Army’s plans to upgrade Challenger and Warrior have the potential for a transformational enhancement to British armoured warfare capabilities.
    [Show full text]
  • Steel Beasts Recognition Guide
    Steel Beasts Recognition Guide By James Sterrett Andrew Romaniuk Ssnake Tankboy Vasiliy Fofanov PDF Formatting by Burner Table of Contents U.S. Vehicles Page M1A1 Abrams MBT 3 M2A2 Bradley IFV 5 M113 APC 7 M113 Medivac 9 M901 ITV 11 M981 FIST-V 13 HMMWV (Hummer) 15 German Vehicles Leopard 2A4 MBT 19 Marder 1A3 IFV 21 M113 Artillery Spotter 23 Truck 25 Jaguar 2 ATGM Veh 27 Soviet Vehicles T80U MBT 30 T72BV MBT 32 BMP-1 IFV 34 BMP-2 IFV 36 BMD-2 IFV 38 BTR-80 APC 40 BRDM-2 ATGM Veh 42 BRDM-2 Recce 44 MT-LB 46 2 U.S. Vehicles 3 FRONT SIDE TOP M1A1HA MBT Crew: 4 Armament: 120mm cannon, 7.62mm coax MG, 12.7mm AA MG, 7.62mm A MG Ammunition: 40 x 120mm; 1,000 x 12.7mm; 11,400 x 7.62mm Armour Protection: max approx. 1300mm vs HEAT, approx. 650mm vs KE Armour Type: Chobham and steel Length: 9.845 meters Width: 3.657 meters Height: 2.375 meters Combat Weight: 62.6 tons Engine: Textron Lycoming AGT 1500 gas turbine Max Road Speed: 67 km/h Max Water Speed: sinks [can ford 1.219m, or 1.98 with preparation] Max Cruising Range: 498 km One of the stars of our show! Like the Leopard 2, the M1 was undertaken after the MBT-70 project collapsed in disarray. Also like the Leopard 2, the used a combination of advances in armor and powerplants to deliver a notably advanced vehicle, once teething troubles were ironed out.
    [Show full text]
  • Manifestations of the Egyptian Army's Actions in the US Army's 1976
    Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 19, ISSUE 1 Studies Manifestations of the Egyptian Army’s Actions in the US Army’s 1976 Edition of FM 100-5 Operations Dr. Tal Tovy During the years in which the United States has been entangled in the land war in South-East Asia, the Soviet Union has significantly increased its conventional forces, as well as acquired new weapon systems in the air and on the ground. Against these processes, the United States needed a new doctrine for warfighting against the Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. The existing doctrine stipulated that the NATO forces would stop the Warsaw Pact armoured mass and then launch a counterattack. However, if the conventional containment failed, the NATO forces would have to resort to tactical nuclear weapons. It was clear that the use of nuclear weapons would bring about the total destruction of Western Germany, as well as an escalation of the war and massive mutual destruction. Thus, the American strategists, together with the strategic planners of other NATO countries, have looked for ways to contest the conventional ©Centre of Military and Strategic Studies, 2018 ISSN : 1488-559X JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES soviet military power, both quantitatively and qualitatively, while avoiding the use of nuclear weapons. 1 Following the American involvement in Vietnam Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton Abrahams, led dramatic reforms in the US Army. The mighty task to make reforms in the Army was allocated to the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), a new command formed in 1973. This was the year that a new war broke out in the Middle East – the Yom Kippur War, 6-24 October, 1973.
    [Show full text]
  • GAO-21-361, Military Vehicles: Army and Marine Corps Should Take
    United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters July 2021 MILITARY VEHICLES Army and Marine Corps Should Take Additional Actions to Mitigate and Prevent Training Accidents GAO-21-361 July 2021 MILITARY VEHICLES Army and Marine Corps Should Take Additional Actions to Mitigate and Prevent Training Accidents Highlights of GAO-21-361, a report to congressional requesters Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found Tactical vehicles are used to train The number of serious accidents involving Army and Marine Corps tactical military personnel and to achieve a vehicles, such as tanks and trucks, and the number of resulting deaths, variety of missions. Both the Army and fluctuated from fiscal years 2010 through 2019 (see figure). Driver Marine Corps have experienced inattentiveness, lapses in supervision, and lack of training were among the most tactical vehicle accidents that resulted common causes of these accidents, according to GAO analysis of Army and in deaths of military personnel during Marine Corps data. non-combat scenarios. GAO was asked to review issues Number of Army and Marine Corps Class A and B Tactical Vehicle Accidents and Resulting Military Deaths, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2019 related to the Army’s and Marine Corps’ use of tactical vehicles. Among other things, this report examines (1) trends from fiscal years 2010 through 2019 in reported Army and Marine Corps tactical vehicle accidents, deaths, and reported causes; and evaluates the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have (2) taken steps to mitigate and prevent accidents during tactical vehicle operations; and (3) provided personnel with training to build the skills and experience needed to drive tactical vehicles.
    [Show full text]