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Military Spending and Arms Sales in the Gulf

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Military Spending and Arms Sales in the Gulf burke chair in strategy Military Spending and Arms Sales in the Gulf How the Arab Gulf States Now Dominate the Changes in the Military Balance By Anthony H. Cordesman with the assistance of Michael Peacock April 28, 2015 Request for comments: This report is a draft that will be turned into an electronic book. Comments and suggested changes would be greatly appreciated. Please send any comments to Anthony H. Cordsman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, at [email protected]. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman, Peacock: Gulf National Security Balance 24.4.15 Rev 15:00 2 Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................................................................4 II. MILITARY EXPENDITURES ...........................................................................................................................................................................6 THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES (IISS) ESTIMATES ............................................................................................................................... 6 THE STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI) ESTIMATES .................................................................................................................. 6 MILITARY SPENDING AS A PERCENT OF GDP AND COMPARATIVE GDP ................................................................................................................................... 7 IRAN’S STRUCTURAL LIMITS IN SPENDING ON NATIONAL SECURITY ......................................................................................................................................... 8 US MILITARY SPENDING AND THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE ................................................................................................................................................. 8 Figure II.1: IISS Estimate of Gulf State Military Spending in Current $US Dollars, 1997-2014 ............................................................................................. 10 Figure II.2: IISS Estimate of Iranian vs. Arab Gulf State (GGC) Military Spending in Current $US Dollars, 1997-2014 ......................................................... 11 Figure II.3: SIPRI Estimates of Gulf State Military Spending in $US Current Millions, 1997-2014........................................................................................ 12 Figure II.2: SIPRI Estimate of Iranian vs. Arab Gulf State (GGC) Military Spending in Current $US Millions, 1997-2014 ..................................................... 13 Figure II.5: SIPRI Estimates of Gulf State Military Spending in Constant 2011 $US Millions, 1997-2014............................................................................. 14 Figure II.6: SIPRI Estimate of Iranian vs. Arab Gulf State (GGC) Military Spending in Constant 2011 $US Millions, 1997-2014 .......................................... 15 Figure II.7: Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP for the Gulf States .................................................................................................................... 16 Figure II.8: Gulf States’ Gross Domestic Product ................................................................................................................................................................. 17 Figure II.9: US Military Spending: 1950- 2020 in Constant $ US FY2016 Dollars.................................................................................................................. 18 Figure II.10: President’s FY2016 US Baseline Defense Budget Request in Billions of $US Current Dollars .......................................................................... 19 II. ARMS IMPORTS ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 20 A LACK OF RELIABLE OFFICIAL DATA ON TOTAL ARMS TRANSFER EXPENDITURES .................................................................................................................... 20 Commercial and Media Reporting ...................................................................................................................................................................... 21 NGO Reporting: the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ............................................................................................................. 21 ACTUAL WEAPONS AND MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS .............................................................................................................................................. 22 Congressional Research Service Data on Actual Transfers of Arms and Military Technology ............................................................................ 22 MIXED OFFICIAL DATA ON US ARMS TRANSFERS: DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY (DCSA) ...................................................................................... 26 NGO EFFORTS TO SUMMARIZE ALL MAJOR WEAPONS TRANSFERS ...................................................................................................................................... 27 Figure III.1 CRS: The Arms Delivery Gap: Iran vs. GCC 2004-2011 ....................................................................................................................................... 29 Figure III.2: CRS: The Arms Delivery Gap: Iran vs. GCC 2004-2011 ...................................................................................................................................... 30 Figure III.3: CRS: The New Arms Order Gap: Iran vs. GCC 2004-2011 .................................................................................................................................. 31 Figure III.4: CRS: The New Arms Order Gap: Iran vs. GCC 2004-2011 .................................................................................................................................. 32 Figure III.5: Gulf Arms Transfer Agreements in Millions of U.S. Dollars (SIPRI): 1997-2014 ................................................................................................ 33 Figure III.6: SIPRI Estimate of Arms Transfer Agreements: 2004-2008 in $US Millions ....................................................................................................... 34 Figure III.7: SIPRI Estimate of Arms Transfer Agreements 2009-2014 in $US Millions ........................................................................................................ 35 Figure III.8: CRS Estimate of Major US arms Transfers to Saudi Arabia: October 2010 to October 2014 ............................................................................ 36 Figure III.9: Defense Security Assistance Agency Report on Major Arms Sales to Arab Gulf States: 2000-2013 and Totals from 1950 to 2013 ................. 37 Cordesman, Peacock: Gulf National Security Balance 24.4.15 Rev 15:00 3 Figure III.10: Proposed Major US Arms Sales to the GCC States and Iraq: 2002-2013 By Weapon and Arms Transfer (Information Adapted from Releases from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency).................................................................................................................................................. 43 Figure III.11: IISS Estimate of Selected US and Non US Arms Sales in the Gulf .................................................................................................................... 92 Figure III.12: SIPRI Estimate of Arms Sales in the Gulf: 2000 to 4.2015 ............................................................................................................................. 101 Cordesman, Peacock: Gulf National Security Balance 24.4.15 Rev 15:00 4 I. Introduction The debate over the potential nuclear arms treaty between the P5+1 and Iran only addresses one aspect of the strategic competition between Iran, its neighbors, the US and key European powers like Britain and France. The Gulf region is also the scene of a major arms race in conventional forces, asymmetric forces, and conventionally armed ballistic missiles and artillery rockets. At the same time, Iran is using arms transfer to non-state actors like the Hezbollah in Lebanon, pro-Assad forces in Syria, Hamas and the PIJ in Gaza, and the Houthi in Yemen to expand its strategic influence while Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar are using arms transfer both the counter Iran and support various opponents of the Islamic State and Al Qaida. So far the trends in arms sales and the total national military expenditures that underpin them sharply favor the Arab Gulf states. Ever since the fall of the Shah, Iran has unable to compete in acquiring more arms because of sanctions, the politics of arms sales, and its lack of surplus capital. While it has strengthened its own military industrial sector, and often been both effective and creative in modernizing its weapons and keeping them operational over time, the end result has still been sharply limited. Iran lacks the resources, industrial base, and scale of effort to compete with Arab Gulf states that can generally buy the most advanced weapons available. This report compares both the relative scale of military spending in the Gulf region and the data available on regional arms transfers. As is noted in this report, these data
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