Violent Extremism in the Sahel Countering Vulnerability to Radical Narratives: Towards a More Pragmatic Approach

Matteo Ilardo FOKUS | 1/2020 Violent extremism in the Sahel Countering vulnerability to radical narratives: towards a more pragmatic approach Executive Summary focus on addressing the above issues by all the other countries in the region have directly engaging with local actors to res- been shaken by an astonishing number Violent extremism is a constant threat tore the resilience of local communities, a of attacks. Nigeria and Mali rank fifth and in the Sahel.1 The sub-Saharan region basic condition for the eventual promotion tenth, respectively, among the countries traversing Africa from its west coast to the of effective counternarratives. with the deadliest violent Islamist activity center-east has been experiencing an alar- globally. In 2017, as a result of extremist ming rise in religiously motivated violence About this study violence and related counter measures, and jihadist attacks over the past ten ye- 3399 individuals were reported dead in ars.2 With the overall number of incidents Existing literature on violent extremism is Nigeria and 493 in Mali.7 At the same time, and fatalities in the Sahel countries rising divided, contested, and often politicized. extremist organizations harboring in Ni- respectively by eight and seven times For instance, there is no universally agreed geria and Mali used these two countries as as much since 2007, the region has only definition for violent extremism since dif- bases to forward attacks across the region’s recently seen a slight decline in jihadist ferent bodies, organizations and govern- porous borders claiming several other attacks due to the various regional and ments adopt specific terminologies to suit lives in Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso, with international security responses in place specific responses, policies, and purposes.4 the spillover of terrorist activity causing since 2015. Yet, violent extremism remains Nevertheless, the context to which the respectively 148, 62, and 53 victims in the a plague for local communities directly, concept is applied dictates some con- three countries.8 Most recently (spring with 2429 casualties and 1496 injured due ceptual biases. Therefore, for reasons of 2019), the situation has not improved. to terrorist attacks in 2017, and indirect- clarity and effectiveness, this study, albeit Especially in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad, ly, given that the responses of national without adopting a specific working de- jihadist militants have carried out even governments push back against jihadist finition, considers violent extremism as a more deadly attacks against both security activities are often disproportionally se- synonym for armed jihadism.5 This specific forces and civilians compared to other vere and end up fueling the ever-growing analysis does not intend to counter radical years, with Mali suffering, in March 2019, spiral of violence.3 Military interventions religious narratives itself, but rather aims at from the deadliest attack in the region alone have proven insufficient and, to understanding how societal vulnerabilities since 2013.9 some extent, counter-productive. In fact, lead to their violent expressions. Radicali- field research shows how violent extremist zation does not necessarily translate into The most active terrorist group in the ideologies are flourishing among the most terrorism and attempts to approach this region is Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb disrupted communities of the conflict- otherwise have already proven counter- (AQIM) with reportedly tens of thousands affected areas; hence, a more pragmatic productive.6 The scope here, instead of of jihadists moving from North Africa approach is needed. Recent Counter trying to propose a counternarrative, is to southward into the Sahel, followed by Violent Extremism (CVE) approaches have understand what makes radical religious Boko Haram, based in Northern Nige- mostly focused on promoting anti-Islamist narratives appealing in the first place, ria and in the Chad Lake basin. Other counternarratives but overlooked some of and thereby countering the root causes groups are notably Ansar ul Islam, the the root causes behind the issue. Various behind this appeal. With this in mind, this Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), jihadist groups have metastasized to local study aims to understand the main causes responsible for recent attacks in Niger, the communities by exploiting historical inter- behind rising radicalism-driven violence movement for the Unity and Jihad in West and intra-ethnic rivalries as well as those in the Sahel and consequently tries to Africa (MUJAO), and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam various conflict-induced vulnerabilities address them in an effort to draft some wal Muslimin (JNIM), a militant Islamist disrupting the increasingly fragile social guidelines for suitable, effective, sustaina- coalition especially active in Mali and fabric. Poor governance, socio-economic ble, and context-sensitive approaches to Burkina Faso that was formed in March marginalization, and rigid cultural struc- the issue. 2017 following the merger of AQIM figh- tures and gender relations are the most ters, the Fulani Macina Liberation Front, relevant among the many factors that The context: a spiral of violence Ansar al-Dine and Al-Mubrabitoun. In contribute to the increasing vulnerability response to intensifying terrorist activity, of a growing portion of the population With the only exception of Mauritania, regional and international forces have also towards violent radical narratives. Future which was not particularly affected by intensified their engagement in the Sahel. CVE approaches should therefore primarily Islamist terrorism in the last five years, With the deployment of UN peacekeepers, 1 Violent extremism in the Sahel FOKUS | 1/2020 a United States-backed counterterrorism and foreign forces operating in the border grievances have proven quite successful operation, two ongoing missions of the areas to counter smuggling and other recruitment strategies for different violent French special forces and the formation criminal activities, more isolated commu- extremist groups. In Nigeria, for instance, of the G5 Sahel Force, the region is going nities are further exposed to violence from Boko Haram established a microfinance through a new wave of militarization in a both jihadist groups and counter-terrorism system of loans to support small busi- constant escalation during the last seven forces, and to the abuse (real or perceived) ness ventures of new members, while in years that results in an increasing number from government authorities. Different Mali, groups like MUJAO and AQIM have of victims, law-enforcement (sometimes in studies show how violent extremism in managed to align their Islamist narrati- controversial extra-judicial processes) and the Sahel primarily occurs as a reaction ve to local social issues, for example, by border enforcement with patrolling and to local conflicts and in response to bad labelling custom duties, tolls, and tariffs checkpoints.10 governance as individuals almost comple- as being against the will of Allah.19 In tely lack trust in political leaders, police, particularly rigid societal hierarchies, as in Structural causes for violent extremism and military.14 On the other hand, religious the case of many communities across the leaders are held in relatively high regard in Sahel, playing on differences such as the Since the immediate aftermath of 9/11, their role of protectors of informal norms one between land owners and herders, violent extremism in the Sahel has ge- and institutions on the community level.15 or between the elders and the so-called nerally been linked to the rise of Islamic This combination, especially in fragile, ‘cadets sociaux’ (those subordinated to fundamentalism and to the idea of a conflict-affected communities, paves the age-based chieftancies, especially women “global jihad”.11 Yet, of the many possible way for possible short-circuits in spontane- and children) by promising alternative ‘root causes’ behind the phenomenon, ous local governance practices that might ways for a greater upward social mobility religion is one of the most controversial: completely abandon formal democratic has become one of the major strategies by unquestionably related to violent extre- structures and ease the acceptance of extremist groups to attract new mem- mism, but certainly not a threat in itself.12 violent extremist groups’ authority in pro- bers.20 In the Sahel, religious affiliation is merely viding for alternative sources of protection the frame for violent response to those and basic service.16 3. Cultural tightness and gender rela- structural issues affecting the region and tions: Norms, beliefs and values, as well simply works as a marker of identity for 2. Socio-economic marginalization: The- as gender relations, play a significant part group violence. In consequence, the root re is a wide consent over the idea of a cau- in both the attraction and, eventually, the causes to be addressed when countering sal relationship between socio-economic rejection of violent extremist ideologies.21 violent extremism in the Sahel, moving marginalization and violent extremism.17 Not surprisingly, in cases of particularly beyond the merely religious dimension, In the Sahel, this seems to find further rigid normative systems as in the case have to be identified locally as a combina- confirmation. In all the six countries con- of the Sahel, attraction seems to be the tion of context-specific, cultural, social, and sidered here,

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