For a Suicide Bomber

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For a Suicide Bomber t "The fence for the Rio Grande Valleyy of Texas border will work!" Valle imupwilr Of ACLURM019527 FBI019318 b6 b7C ACLURM019528 FBI019319 ACLURM019529 FBI019320 CULTURE • WHAT IS CULTURE? • WHAT IS YOUR CULTURE? • WHAT INFLUENCES CULTURE? • WHAT INFLUENCES YOUR CULTURE? • WHO INFLUENCES CULTURE? • WHO INFLUENCES YOUR CULTURE? • HOW IS CULTURE INFLUENCED? • HOW IS YOUR CULTURE INFLUENCED? 6 ACLURM019530 FBI019321 ott DEFINED * CULTURE: THE ACT OF DEVELOPING THE SOCIAL, MORAL, AND INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES THROUGH EDUCATION. 7 ACLURM019531 FBI019322 IS THIS YOUR CULTURE? ACLURM019532 FBI019323 1 ACLURM019533 FBI019324 it IS THIS? ACLURM019534 FBI019325 ACLURM019535 FBI019326 ACLURM019536 FBI019327 • .j Slara t •CHANGEA .■ tA. ACLURM019537 FBI019328 AMERICAN CULTURE? ACLURM019538 FBI019329 ACLURM019539 FBI019330 : . 1 ;ate- . " • • :........4,4".1?1.4.:Iet'6.;;Xe • ■ •••••:' • • . 'f1:01.., - • - - " • e..4.1...• - • ' t.• - • 4 . • . '• L nAL •••• • oL. 1"? • ACLURM019540 FBI019331 ACLURM019541 FBI019332 ACLURM019542 FBI019333 ACLURM019543 FBI019334 ACLURM019544 FBI019335 When cultures clash! Response to Burger King The Council on American- Ad: "This is my jihad. I'm Islamic Relations pounded not going to rest until I find Nike into recalling 800,000 the person who is shoes because the English responsible. I'm going to word "Air" in its logo bring this country [Britain] allegedly resembled the down." Arabic lettering for "Allah." ACLURM019545 FBI019336 77, 14 AQ's Ideological Foundations Separation of Church 'And State ti Islam Is A Way of Life Not Just A Religion Sharia law is the blueprint for ideal Islamic society . Eradicate Those Opposed To Their Ideology kt . Jihad Is The Means To Bring About Global Islam 22 ACLURM019546 FBI019337 -7 °11.. stett7 Russia Russia Muslim Distribution 0 surd .11 Shia Norte Atlantic Ocean sPda ,- Abs China wetia, Yt,■fr,,,, nhiopla ar) il N,' -', % .1. ■ I 1 EVIAY .1‘t - l 1 L 1. Sante Afloat c Indian Ocean Ocean • - '320 Mom* ACLURM019547 FBI019338 The Case Against the West Arrogance, insensitivity toward other cultures Unbalanced foreign policies, favoritism toward Israel Resentment over economic success, political and military power, commercial exploitation 24 ACLURM019548 FBI019339 The Case Against the West Disgust over lax morals: alcohol consumption, suggestive dress of women, commercialization of sex Economic sanctions against Muslim countries Lengthy stationing of US troops in Saudi Arabia/Middle East Support of repressive, corrupt regimes due to Western greed (oil) 25 ACLURM019549 FBI019340 Seven-Step Plan: Al Qaeda dreams Definitive Victory"= Global Islamic Caliphate 1) Awakening (2001-2005) • 9/11 to Fall of Baghdad • Increase US presence in region • Cost Afghanistan and Saddam 2) Opening Eyes (2006) • Group turns into a movement • Massive Recruitment Drive (Iraq-Centric) 26 ACLURM019550 FBI019341 • • 3) Arising and Standing Up 4) 2010 to 2013 (2007-2010) • Collapse of Arab Gov'ts • Iraq as AI-Qaeda base to Focus on Syria/Africa create regional instability • Cadre already in place • U.S. Attacks Attacks on Israel & Turkey • Oil Infrastructure Increase Legitimacy • Cyber-Terrorism of All nations bordering Iraq in Economy danger ACLURM019551 FBI019342 Seven-Step Plan 5) Declaration of Caliphate • 2013-2016 7) Definitive Victory • Weakened West • Approx 2020-2050 can't/won't resist • War of 2016 only lasts two years • Unrivaled Islamic State 6) Total Confrontation • 2016-2020 • Islamic Army will instigate fight world wide • "Believers v. non- believers" ACLURM019552 FBI019343 Seven-Step Plan • Western OptionE? • Blitz? Nukes? • Withdrawal? • Others? • What does defeat in IQ mean to al Qaeda? • Harm Credibility/ Mystique • Possession of Losing Ideology • Abandoned by God 29 ACLURM019553 FBI019344 AviFile 687 27:')Off ACLURM019554 FBI019345 "The Sword Verse" [9:5] And when the forbidden months have passed, slay the idolaters wherever you find them and take them captive, and beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they repent and observe Prayer and pay the Zakaat, then leave their way free. Surely, Allah is Most Forgiving, Merciful. 31 ACLURM019555 FBI019346 Suicide Bomber List/Locations 441.6 cft oti .1,00 4.1%.414 3 2 ACLURM019556 FBI019347 "President Saddam Hussein's Grant" for a suicide bomber i . 02-02.1114.0.04:1Sati ibev- 'I ii`1111 sai44 - - - Pdleseng In Donk TEL 7 0004000 egrr-Alldral 2-001:103s$ 110e4it t9 13441Ta i111411, 91 4,; %row eveskp . ir"11;1" II-ll' MAIN _____e_kmaitpaphila 14.6e .0-6 < AtA filitogNpri qwwwt =MSS WPSOMOM 77 2A p4ormsome 33 ACLURM019557 FBI019348 1:::)iagrow.. c-luolgv.A-eva lay 'Tke Righteous people will fly over It. Others will be cut by razor edges as punishment for evil. Some will be snagged and will fall in Hell. e7k6 )—idtekte For people who are too good to go to Hell but not ready fOr entry to Heaven. fixed term must be served zra Enter the gates and recite what you knodr Way of your Prophet's World Ended. Dead raised. revelation. You will Everyone will be sorted by move upward to one beliefs. Record is read. of seven levels and find Witnesses come. Recompense your home there. is given. Deeds are weighed. Rewards and Mercy is bestowed. The final pleasure 'are yours verdict is given. Drop into the pit and land In for eternity. one Of seven levels of punishment. Although some may be released, others will stay in the fire forever. ACLURM019558 FBI019349 Five Pillars of Islam • Shahada- confession that there is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet • Selah ritual prayer • Zekah alms for the poor • Sawm—fasting, especially during Ramadan (the month when Gabriel revealed the Koran) • Haj pilgrimage to Mecca I Q ACLURM019559 FBI019350 ACLURM019560 FBI019351 ACLURM019561 FBI019352 ACLURM019562 FBI019353 Strategic planning does not deal with future decisions. It deals with the futurity of present decisions. What we have to do today is to be ready for an uncertain tomorrow. Peter F. Drucker ACLURM019563 FBI019354 ACLURM019564 FBI019355 Female Suicide Bomber Note • "MY WORDS WILL NOT BE IN THE BEGINNING OR THE END, BUT IN-BETWEEN. MY LOVE FOR JIHAD, EVEN IF I WAS BETWEEN FLAMES OF WAR. I WILL DO A SUICIDE MISSION WITHOUT ANY DOUBT. 41 ACLURM019565 FBI019356 Continued *IF THERE IS ANYONE WHO WOULD REFUSE MY JIHAD, AND DISCOURAGE ME FROM DOING IT, NOT FOR ME ONLY BUT FOR ANY WOMAN WHO WANTS TO DO A SUICIDE MISSION -A HUSBAND OR BROTHER-THIS IS A SIN." *1 LOVE FREEDOM 42 ACLURM019566 FBI019357 AI-Qaeda note on computer Q • $1000 car • $5000 — M01/ release from detention. • $2000 — to watch Mohamad so he does not get captured • $5800 — KIA automobile • $1300 — 50 cal. Machine gun • $6000 — PKC's and sniper rifle • $1000 — release money 43 ACLURM019567 FBI019358 AQ note continued.... • $200 — for wife's birth • $5000 — to electronics guy for a generator • $8000 — for IED's and explosives • $2000 — for loan • $2500 — from group as loan • S5000 — 2 PKC's • $1200 — to Al-Hari Tribe for release • $400 — for gasoline 44 ACLURM019568 FBI019359 ACLURM019569 FBI019360 7,500 miles of US Border 500 million people enter US each year 330 million non-US citizens 11.2 million trucks 2.2million rail cars enter each year 7,500 foreign ships make 51,000 US port calls each year. ACLURM019570 FBI019361 McAllen Sector ACLURM019571 FBI019362 Border Issues with Mexico ACLURM019572 FBI019363 ACLURM019573 FBI019364 : ,.. Tug,POUND Pal/ • LorWrOGromi•olan '- ' 1-4T POIP4D P jgg EAT !r•rr a:Lr.-.7 Mr • pn 4'4. Lor • - I , IPIPORMIRRINLIMIN - . .. - I AGENC1A SEGL'NDA DEL MIN1STERIO PLIBLKD PEDERAL 1 41,*- ACLURM019574 FBI019365 ACLURM019575 FBI019366 ACLURM019576 FBI019367 Special Interest Aliens (SIAs) * FBI Border Strategy and Response ACLURM019577 FBI019368 ACLURM019578 FBI019369 ACLURM019579 FBI019370 ACLURM019580 FBI019371 ACLURM019581 FBI019372 I tr.) 1154, tv ACLURM019582 FBI019373 ACLURM019583 FBI019374 Iraq: Sunni Islamist Groups • Jama'at aI-Tawhid-Wa'aI-Jihad (2003) Aka: JTJ, TWJ, Monotheism and Jihad Group, al-Zarqawi Network, precursor to AQ in Iraq . 60 ACLURM019584 FBI019375 AQ in the Land of 2 Rivers * AQIZ/ Al-Zarqawi Network * Led by Abu Ayyub al-Masri * Sunni Wahhabi-Salafist militants • Goals: 7th Century caliphate * Area of Operation: Central/Northern Iraq (Ramadi, Fallujah, Baghdad, Baqouba, and Mosul. • Established: December 2004 61 ACLURM019585 FBI019376 Ansar al-Sunnah * Aka: Ansar al-Islam, Helpers of Islam, Kurdish Taliban * Group of Iraqi Kurds and Arabs who have vowed to establish an independent Islamic state in Iraq. Works closely with AQIZ. * Area of Operation: Northen/Central IZ * Established: December 2001 62 ACLURM019586 FBI019377 Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) • Coalition of 8 Salafist Sunni militant groups organized by AQ in Iraq to enforce Islamic Law and protect Sunnis. The state's "Emir of Believers," Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, has declared Iraq a "University of Terrorism," and claims his group is now building its own "Quds 1" missile. 63 ACLURM019587 FBI019378 Is I • The organization finds itself in a growing state of war with Sunni Nationalist insurgent groups and former allies who say they are fed up with the slaughter of Iraqi civilians and "strange laws and verdicts," such as requirement that all women wear veils. • Funding through extortion, etc. • Established: October 15, 2006 64 ACLURM019588 FBI019379 11 FUNDING THROUGH KIDNAPINGS • 4.0"Asia 42' 1". i 41.41.1". 401111 V 11411. .III‘ ACLURM019589 FBI019380 Mujahedeen Shura Council • Umbrella of 7 Sunni Islamist militant groups including AQ to "manage
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