sign in sign up
<<
Home , 2011 Norway attacks, Central Operative Unit, Christopher John Lewis, Terrorism in New Zealand

COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

S OF AS AR P E I S Y T Y R T A

T

N E

E

G

Y W T

2 0 1 01 - 2 0 2 ABOUT ASPI The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non‑partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our Annual Report, online at http://www.aspi.org.au and in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements. It is incorporated as a company, and is governed by a Council with broad membership. ASPI’s core values are collegiality, originality and innovation, quality and excellence and independence.

ASPI’s publications—including this paper—are not intended in any way to express or reflect the views of the Australian Government. The opinions and recommendations in this paper are published by ASPI to promote public debate and understanding of strategic and defence issues. They reflect the personal views of the author(s) and should not be seen as representing the formal position of ASPI on any particular issue.

ABOUT THE COUNTER- POLICY CENTRE ASPI’s Counter-Terrorism Policy Centre (CTPC) was established in late 2015. The centre undertakes research across the spectrum of counterterrorism topics, facilitates dialogue and discussion amongst stakeholders, and provides advice to government, community and industry stakeholders, with a particular focus on what can be done to counter terrorism.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ASPI would like to thank the authors for their contributions, insights and recommendations, as without them the Counterterrorism yearbook 2021 could not have been compiled. Special thanks to the Hon Peter Dutton, MP, Minister for Home Affairs for providing the preface to this 5th edition of the yearbook. The editors would also like to thank Michael Shoebridge for his additional editorial recommendations; as well as Steve Clark, Emily French and James Dixon, the ASPI publication team, for their assistance with the production of this publication. Finally, thanks to everyone at ASPI for their ongoing support.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional person.

No specific sponsorship was received to fund production of this report COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Edited by Leanne Close and Daria Impiombato © The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2021 ASPI

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Level 2, Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, 40 Macquarie Street mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, Barton ACT 2600 stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Australia Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, Educational Institutions (including Schools, Independent Colleges, Universities, Tel + 61 2 6270 5100 and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for Fax + 61 2 6273 9566 educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge. [email protected] www.aspi.org.au First published March 2021 www.aspistrategist.org.au Facebook/ASPI.org Published in Australia by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute @ASPI_org ISSN 2209-2420 Contents

PREFACE 05 THE HON PETER DUTTON MP

INTRODUCTION 07 LEANNE CLOSE

THE CURRENT TERRORISM ENVIRONMENT GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2020: THE SHIFTING OF TERRORISM 11 THOMAS MORGAN, OLIVIA ADAMS AND DR DAVID HAMMOND

TERRORISM IN : HOW A DIFFERENT APPROACH MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED THE MOSQUE ATTACKS 15 DR JOHN BATTERSBY

LONE ACTOR TERRORISM IN 2019 AND 2020: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS 19 CHRISTOPHER WINTER AND RAMÓN SPAAIJ

EVOLVING TERRORISM THREATS AND COUNTERTERRORISM RESPONSES DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 23 JEREMY DOUGLAS AND NIKI ESSE DE LANG

THE IMPACT OF ONLINE PLATFORMS, AND TECHNOLOGY ON TERRORISM THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON 29 LEVI J WEST

BOOGALOO BOIS: THE BIRTH OF A ‘MOVEMENT’, FROM MEMES TO REAL-WORLD VIOLENCE 33 ELISE THOMAS

ASSESSING THE MAGNITUDE OF THE THREATS POSED BY HOAX DEVICES IN TERRORIST ATTACKS AND EFFECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES 39 DR JOSHUA SINAI

TERRORISM FINANCING, SUPPORT AND THE ORGANISED NEXUS TERRORIST FINANCING: GLOBAL POLICY CHALLENGES AND INITIATIVES IN 2020 43 DR GORDON HOOK

COUNTERING TERRORIST FINANCING: STRENGTHENING INDONESIA–AUSTRALIA COLLABORATION 49 SYLVIA LAKSMI

DEMYSTIFYING THE TERROR–CRIME NEXUS IN AUSTRALIA 55 DR JOHN COYNE

FIGHTING ORGANISED CRIME, PREVENTING TERRORISM: THE ITALIAN CASE 61 DARIA IMPIOMBATO

REVISITING THE TERROR–CRIME NEXUS IN LATIN AMERICA: MILITANT PROTO-STATE GOVERNANCE AND CHALLENGES TO STATE SECURITY 67 DR ALEXANDRA PHELAN 03 COUNTERING AND PREVENTING 71 AN EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM: THE INTERSECTION OF CYBERCRIME AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY 71 DR ANNE ALY MP

THE EVOLUTION OF RESILIENCE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM 77 PROFESSOR MICHELE GROSSMAN

OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM AND MANAGING THE RISK 83 COMMANDER SANDRA BOOTH AND ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR DR NATALIE DAVIS

UNDERSTANDING TRANSITIONS TO VIOLENCE AND THE ROLE OF PRACTITIONER–ACADEMIC PARTNERSHIPS 87 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER ROSS GUENTHER AND ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR DEBRA SMITH

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE NEW SOUTH WALES APPROACH 91 PIA VAN DE ZANDT, AFTAB MALIK AND MADELEINE COOREY

THE NEW FAR RIGHT: CONSTRUCTION OF HATRED AGAINST THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY IN MULTICULTURAL AUSTRALIA 97 ANGEL ADAMS

YOUNG PEOPLE AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE COVID-19 CONTEXT 101 PETA LOWE

THE IMPACT OF NATURAL DISASTERS ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM 107 LYDIA KHALIL

THE IMPORTANCE OF INTER-OFFICE COORDINATION IN COUNTERTERRORISM: THE ISRAELI CASE STUDY 113 PROFESSOR BOAZ GANOR

ABOUT THE AUTHORS 119 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 127 Preface THE HON PETER DUTTON MP Minister for Home Affairs

Terrorism poses an enduring and evolving Over that time, the Australian Government threat requiring a coordinated and collaborative has invested an additional $2.3 billion to approach between governments, the private strengthen our national response and support sector and community. Addressing the threat the outstanding men and women of our security, requires sustained effort and responsive policies police and intelligence communities. It is thanks that are informed by a robust understanding of to their efforts that Australians can live safely, the changing risk environment and operational enjoying the freedoms we do. experience of law enforcement. As we learned from the horrific 2019 London As the Director-General of ASIO has observed, Bridge attack and 2020 Streatham attack in the the threat from Islamic extremism endures, with UK, convicted terrorists can pose a very real and groups including the Islamic State of Iraq and ongoing threat to public safety when they are the Levant and al-Qaeda continuing to inspire released back into the community after serving attacks globally and in Australia. However, this their sentences. In Australia, we have introduced does not mean our agencies are blind to other a presumption against parole for all convicted extremist threats. Unfortunately, there are groups terrorist offenders, as well as critical measures of individuals in Australia motivated by , providing for the continued detention of high-risk and other hateful . terrorist offenders after the conclusion of their We will not tolerate any form of extremism that custodial sentences, and control orders, where a resorts to intimidation or violence to spread a court finds that relevant thresholds are met. message of hate. With 15 high-risk terrorist offenders due for At the time of writing, the Australian Government release in the next five years, the government is in the process of listing Sonnenkrieg Division has sought to further strengthen these laws as a terrorist organisation under the Criminal by introducing a Bill to establish an extended Code. Sonnenkrieg Division’s encouragement, supervision order scheme. The scheme will promotion and glorification of terrorism has provide a robust alternative in circumstances inspired UK-based extremists, and has the where continued detention is not available, potential to similarly inspire Australia-based ensuring that high-risk terrorist offenders who are extremists. Listing ensures that Criminal released into the community are subject to close Code offences with penalties of up to 25 years supervision in proportion to the level of risk they imprisonment apply to this organisation. pose to community safety. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on The Australian Government continues to work in Intelligence and Security is also undertaking an partnership with our regional and international inquiry into extremist movements and radicalism allies to assess and counter the threat of in Australia. Once the inquiry is complete, terrorism. The government has put in place the government will carefully consider the measures to prevent the travel of Australians to committee’s recommendations in relation to support terrorism abroad and to manage the current legislative settings and other matters. return of foreign terrorist fighters. Since the national terrorism threat level was I thank ASPI for its continued leadership in raised to PROBABLE in August 2014, there counterterrorism research and I encourage have been 19 major terrorism disruptions continued analysis and thoughtful dialogue and 129 people charged with relevant to advance consideration of counterterrorism terrorism offences in Australia as a result strategies that strengthen the safety of of almost 60 counterterrorism operations. our communities.

05 Introduction LEANNE CLOSE

This 5th edition of ASPIs Counterterrorism (CT) events in 2019, and an overview of Southeast yearbook provides a comprehensive picture of the Asian incidents, with a particular focus on the global terrorism landscape, as well as emerging Philippines and Indonesia. themes and recommended policy responses Christopher Winter and Ramón Spaaij provide for governments and communities. Our authors found Covid-19—a key theme in most chapters— an overview of lone-actor attacks and dispel to have had an impact on global terrorism. the notion ‘that lone actors are truly alone and However, pervasive online social media platforms operate in a social vacuum’. They find that lone have played a more significant role, increasing actors are usually active in online communities terrorists’ ability to radicalise and incite and signal their intent before carrying out 2 individuals to commit terrorist acts, as well as their attacks. encouraging financial support to terrorist groups. Social media and new technologies Terrorist now attracts larger, more 2021 themes diverse sections of our societies because propaganda and online rhetoric are increasingly Global overview sophisticated, making the rapid spread of misinformation and disinformation harder to The yearbook begins with an overview of current contain.3 Anne Aly outlines the intersection of trends and the terrorism landscape in 2020 cybercrime with online radicalisation into terrorist identified in the 8th Global Terrorism Index (GTI) activities and calls for a comprehensive approach produced by Australia’s Institute for Economics to CT incorporating online prevention and early and Peace. The GTI notes a 50% decrease in intervention strategies. terrorism-related deaths in the past five years, Conspiracy theorists abound on the internet, from more than 33,000 in 2014 to under 14,000 and many have used the Covid-19 pandemic, the in 2019. While the impact of radical jihadist installation of 5G cell towers and the Black Lives terrorism has subsided in the West, there’s been a Matter protests, or the US election process, as a rise in politically motivated terrorism, rising from catalyst for violent protest or terrorist actions in 13 deaths in 2014 to 90 deaths in 2019 (including 51 people in Christchurch in March 2019). There’s 2020 and into 2021. Elise Thomas examines this now a regional concentration of ISIL-supported in greater detail, assessing the rapid transition activities in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. of the ‘Boogaloo Bois’ from online memes into This corresponds, however, with a sharp increase in real-world extremist violence. far-right terrorism in the West, concurrent with the Online extremist and fringe groups are gaining rise of strong , civil unrest and political more prominence and credence in the real violence more generally. Between 2002 and 2014, world and are difficult to counter. While far-right violence accounted for 14% of total several global social media companies have attacks in the West; however, that grew to 40% in proactively attempted to reduce the exposure 2015 and to 46% in 2019 (49 far-right incidents out and reach of extremist narratives on their 1 of 108 attacks). Statistics in 2020 obviously don’t platforms, there are limitations. As the live include examples like the 6 January riot on the streaming of the Christchurch events in 2019 Capitol in Washington D.C., for example, so 2021 demonstrates, a recording can be disseminated seems set to continue the trend. so widely and rapidly that it’s impossible to The remaining chapters in Part 1 explore the eradicate. The online spread of propaganda trends identified in the GTI, with a focus on continues to encourage lone actors to commit several regions, including the New Zealand terrorist acts, which can be planned overseas and historical experience, leading to the Christchurch enacted locally.4 07 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Terrorists’ tactics and the impact of emerging terrorism-related deaths and attacks in the following technologies are explored in this edition of the two years.6 The researchers suggested that the turmoil yearbook, with a clear acknowledgement that terrorist caused by emergencies exacerbated vulnerabilities groups have always embraced new technologies not that terrorists then exploited. Khalil also points only to spread their propaganda but also to incite to recent research showing that the portrayal of violence. Levi West delves into the history of terrorists’ government responses to natural disasters affects exploitation of technologies, from powerful weapons subsequent terrorism activities because poor disaster and extreme tactics to ‘low capability tactics such as and emergency management, or the perception of it, stabbings and vehicle ramming’. can exacerbate existing grievances and manifest as terrorism or violent extremism.7 Government responses New technologies, such as unmanned aerial platforms, to Covid-19, therefore, have the potential to sharpen 3-D printing, artificial intelligence or deep fakes grievances about social and economic inequality in and—of extreme concern—biological agents, can coming years and to provoke further violent extremism. all be exploited by terrorists. The regulation and potential negative impact of new technologies must be constantly and quickly analysed by governments Terror financing and the organised to remain ahead of new developments. That hasn’t crime nexus traditionally been the case; legislation and capability investment to counter emerging terrorist threats has The 5th edition of the yearbook contains a new often lagged, causing gaps in efforts to prevent or theme focused on the global challenges of counter terrorist actions. countering and the nexus between terrorism and organised crime. The GTI The use of hoax devices by terrorists, outlined by estimated that the economic impact of terrorism Joshua Sinai, also raises serious concerns. Sinai was as high as US$104 billion in 2014, declining to provides a chronology of hoax events from the turn of US$26.4 billion in 2019. This is the fifth consecutive the century to recent events in 2020, noting that the year that it has declined, and the authors assert that impact of those hoaxes was as significant as impacts the improvement over the past four years has been from the use of real weapons. driven largely by the declining level of terrorism in Iraq, Levi West notes that the ‘exploitation of Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria.8 communications technology has been, and will Gordon Hook explores the UN requirements for and continue to be, an essential requirement for terrorism global efforts aimed at reducing terrorist financing to achieve effect’. While online environments have through the work of the Financial Action Task Force allowed for the acceleration and growth of extremist (FATF). Fundraising by terrorist groups has grown rhetoric and incitement to violence, Covid-19 has had to range from small remittances by supporters to a compounding effect. Peta Lowe finds this particularly large-scale sales of oil and gas, investment in real concerning for young people, who are digital natives estate and offshore tax havens, to counterfeit medical and have spent much time online during lockdowns. drugs during the pandemic. While a reduction in the estimated economic impact of terrorism financing is encouraging, the FATF reports that there are The Covid-19 pandemic fundamental gaps in legal frameworks and compliance Several authors highlight attempts by terrorist endeavours globally, leading to very few convictions for groups to use the Covid-19 pandemic to legitimise terrorist financing. their activities, spread their propaganda and gain Sylvia Laksmi assesses the opportunities for greater community support by providing charity to vulnerable global collaboration to diminish terrorist money groups. Jeremy Douglas and Niki Esse de Lang flows in her review of the counter-terrorism-financing show that the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah partnership between Indonesia and Australia. Her provided family support, health care and welfare to chapter highlights the abuse of funds donated to Indonesians following the 2004 Aceh tsunami and charities, the risks associated with new digital currency the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake. Recently, the group platforms and the requirement for appropriate installed 13,000 charity boxes at marketplaces across mechanisms to be implemented to verify the digital Indonesia and has used the pandemic to raise funds identities of customers. for its terrorist activities.5 Alexandra Phelan shows that terrorist groups in Brazil and Colombia have used John Coyne, Daria Impiombato and Alexandra Phelan analyse the role of organised crime activities, such as the Covid-19 crisis to enhance their own power and 9 legitimacy and provide local support where states have drug distribution, in funding terrorist actions. The 2018 edition of the GTI explored this issue, finding in a study failed to respond effectively. of 13 countries that more than 45% of terrorist recruits Lydia Khalil provides a thought-provoking chapter on had criminal backgrounds. The study with the largest the impact of natural disasters on violent extremism, sample was of ISIL foreign fighters from Germany; it highlighting a study of 167 countries over 30 years found that 66% of the 778 foreign fighters had prior from 1970, which found that an increase in deaths criminal convictions. The second largest study made from natural disasters resulted in an increase in a similar finding; 64% of 319 foreign fighters and ‘would be’ foreign fighters from the Netherlands focus on and enhancement of CT and P/CVE had criminal backgrounds.10 Analysis of their strategies. The importance of maintaining and motivation allows policymakers and investigators regularly reviewing Australia’s Counter-Terrorism an opportunity to consider other methods to Strategy and coordination framework, led by an target their activities. independent and properly supported national security adviser, is crucial for ensuring that In Australia, the facilitation of terrorism the focus is maintained and that coordination and organised crime funding, for example and capability development are continuously through real estate, offshore tax havens assessed and enhanced across state and and other money-laundering activities, territory boundaries. should be addressed through Australia’s long proposed anti-money-laundering and This coordination effort is increasing in counter-terrorism-financing (AML/CTF) legislation importance as terror risks in Australia expand. focused on real estate agents, lawyers and Multiple terrorism offenders are scheduled accountants.11 Recent amendments to Australia’s for release from over the next five AML/CTF legislation didn’t address this significant years, and right-wing extremists are becoming legislative gap.12 Phelan makes the case that increasingly organised and sophisticated.13 Our governments, which are responsible for economic authors agree that the key to effective P/CVE regulation and protection, should limit the ability strategy implementation is building trust and of individuals and terrorist groups to launder transparency in process and decision-making, money, legitimise their criminal financing as well as engaging individuals and various activities or move funds to special tax havens. community sectors in design and delivery.

Preventing and countering violent extremism Conclusion The final section of the CT yearbook focuses Each author in the 2021 CT yearbook on strategies being applied in preventing and provides governments and CT practitioners countering violent extremism (P/CVE). Community with contemporary analysis of current and resilience is a key topic discussed in those emerging challenges and offers key policy chapters. The impact of the devastating bushfires recommendations. Emerging technologies need in Australia and the global Covid-19 pandemic to be monitored for the potential for their use provided strong examples of community by terrorists. Technologies and methods for the resilience and lessons for CT practitioners funding of terrorist groups also need constant throughout 2020. monitoring and agile regulatory responses. Michele Grossman finds that resilience to terrorism The findings of the New Zealand Royal is evolving as communities experience and Commission of Inquiry into the Attack on recover from various crises and disasters. She Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019,14 stresses that resilience is a social process involving released in December 2020, also provide a strong health, education, cultural, legal, economic and framework for governments throughout the world environmental strategies, complemented by to consider when developing CT strategies. While interventions focused on an individual or group. the commission recommended some tactical Likewise, current CT practitioners in NSW, Victoria legislative changes, for example in firearms and and the Australian Federal Police highlight the hate regulation, it emphasised a strong importance of well-coordinated P/CVE strategies focus on leadership and building community as well as alliances between social science cohesion, as well as embracing diversity. researchers, non-government organisations, Covid-19 has resulted in significant funding for governments and law enforcement and important health and economic responses. While intelligence agencies to inform evidence-based that funding may concurrently support P/CVE decision-making on the intent, motivation and strategies, addressing broader radicalisation factors ideological drivers to violent extremism (see the such as socio-economic inequality must remain contributions from Pia van de Zandt et al.; a focus. P/CVE work must be further supported Aftab Malik and Madeleine Coorey; Ross Guenther to develop it into a whole-of-systems approach and Debra Smith; Peta Lowe; and Natalie Davis and encompassing all actors involved in the prevention Sandra Booth). of terrorism, including governments, communities Boaz Ganor examines lessons from ’s focus and businesses. Effective state governance and on CT over many decades and the strength of the credible institutions, maintaining the rule of law role of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. The and building or sustaining trust in government and coordinator oversights the country’s CT activities, its systems are crucial for combating the activities reporting directly to the Prime Minister and of terrorists and delegitimising their actions in the providing an effective mechanism for a constant eyes of the community. 09 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Notes 1 Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), Global Terrorism Index 2020: measuring the impact of terrorism, November 2020, online. 2 M Hamm, R Spaaij, The age of terrorism, Columbia University Press, 2017, 91, online. 3 Katja Theodorakis, Leanne Close, The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on extremism dynamics: towards national resilience, ASPI/KAS, Canberra, 8 December 2020, online. 4 Theodorakis & Close, The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on extremism dynamics. 5 Anugrah Kumar, ‘Indonesia: Al-Qaeda linked terrorists use thousands of fake charity boxes to raise funds’, The Christian Post, 14 December 2020, online. 6 Claude Berrebi, Jordan Ostwald, Earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorism: do natural disasters incite terror?, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2011, online. 7 Daren Fisher, Laura Dugan, ‘The importance of governments’ response to natural disasters to reduce terrorist risk’, Justice Quarterly, 2019, doi: 10.1080/07418825.2019.1685120. 8 IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2020. 9 ‘Italian police seize 14 tonnes of amphetamines allegedly produced by Islamic State’, ABC News, 2 July 2020, online. 10 IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2018, online. 11 ‘Greens additional comments: Um, tranche 2?’, Senate Standing Committees on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Australian Parliament, 2019, online. 12 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2019, Australian Parliament, online. 13 Mike Burgess, statement to Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Budget Estimates, 20 October 2020,online . 14 Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attack on Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019, Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019, 8 December 2020, online. THE CURRENT TERRORISM ENVIRONMENT

The current terrorism environment

Global Terrorism Index 2020: the shifting landscape of terrorism

THOMAS MORGAN Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Economics and Peace Sydney, Australia

OLIVIA ADAMS Research Fellow, Institute for Economics and Peace Sydney, Australia

DR DAVID HAMMOND Director of Research, Institute for Economics and Peace Sydney, Australia

11 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

In the West, terrorist attacks and deaths from terrorism Measuring the impact peaked slightly after the global peak of incidents in 2015, when 340 attacks were recorded, and deaths of terrorism peaked in 2016 when 233 people died in terrorist attacks. Although the impact of radical jihadist Measuring the impact of a phenomenon as complex terrorism has subsided in the West, there’s been a as terrorism is challenging. However, without the rise in the level of politically motivated terrorism. ability to gauge levels and trends, it’s difficult to have The number of deaths from politically motivated an informed discussion of the shifting of terrorism in the West has increased significantly over terrorism. The 2020 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), now in the past five years, rising from 13 deaths in 2014 to its eighth year, was designed to provide just that kind 90 deaths in 2019. of base measure. This article provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in The impact of terrorism lessened in seven of IEP’s nine terrorism and places a special emphasis on trends global regions in 2019. This matches the trend for the since 2014, which corresponds with the start of the fall world as a whole, which has recorded a consistent of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). decline in terror-related deaths and incidents. The largest improvement occurred in the Middle East and The GTI is produced by the Institute for Economics North Africa (MENA) for the second consecutive year. & Peace (IEP) using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and other sources. Data for the GTD South Asia had the largest deterioration, followed by is collected and collated by the National Consortium Central America and the Caribbean. The deterioration for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism in South Asia was predominantly caused by the (START) at the University of Maryland. The GTD contains large increase in deaths in Sri Lanka as a result of the more than 170,000 terrorist incidents for the period Easter Sunday bombings, which killed more than from 1970 to 2019. 266 people and injured at least 500. The GTI ranks 163 countries based on four indicators Although the MENA region has recorded the highest weighted over five years. A country’s annual GTI score number of deaths from terrorism since 2002 (more is based on a unique scoring system to account for the than 96,000 deaths in total), the region has recorded relative impact of terrorist incidents in the year. Four a substantial decline in the past three years. Deaths factors are counted in each country’s yearly score: in MENA have fallen by 87% since peaking at 13,800 in 2016, reaching the lowest level since 2003. More • the total number of terrorist incidents recently, terrorist activity has been concentrated in • the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, both of which • the total number of injuries caused by terrorism recorded more terrorism deaths than MENA in 2018 and • the approximate level of total property damage from 2019. Collectively, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa terrorist incidents. accounted for over 80% of all terrorism deaths in 2019 (6,583 and 4,635 deaths, respectively). Each of the factors is weighted differently, and a five-year weighted average is applied to reflect the lingering psychological and cultural impact of terrorist acts over time. By generating and synthesising new information on evolving trends in terrorism at the Terrorism in 2019 national and global levels, IEP hopes to inform a The total number of deaths from terrorism declined positive, practical debate about the future of terrorism for the fifth consecutive year in 2019, falling by 15% and the required policy responses. compared to 2018, to 13,826 deaths. The fall in terrorism deaths wasn’t restricted to a single region: the MENA, Russia and Eurasia, South America and South Asia regions all recorded falls in deaths from Global trends terrorism of at least 20% from 2018 to 2019. The past five years have seen a large decrease in Deaths from terrorism fell in 46 countries, and terrorism across the globe. Deaths from terrorism Afghanistan recorded the largest year-on-year declined steadily, from more than 33,000 in 2014 to just reduction. Since the peak of violence in 2018, deaths under 14,000 in 2019—a 59% reduction. The largest from terrorism in Afghanistan have fallen by 1,654, decreases occurred in Iraq and Syria, while deaths in or over 22% in a year. This was driven by a decline Nigeria fluctuated over time. The winding down of in terrorism deaths attributed to the Taliban and the the Syrian civil war, the territorial defeat of ISIL and Khorasan Chapter of Islamic State; 1,111 and 494 fewer increased counterterrorism coordination at both deaths were attributed to each group, respectively. state and international levels have all played a role in The Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State has faced reducing the impact of terrorism around the world. significant territorial losses in Kunar and Nangarhar provinces following attacks by coalition and Taliban the current terrorism environment forces. Despite the fall in terrorism deaths, 2019 Since their first emergence in 2013, ISIL-related was the second deadliest year on record after groups and individuals have mounted more than 2018, and Afghanistan remains the country 3,000 attacks in 48 countries, other than Iraq most affected by terrorism, as measured by the and Syria, and caused over 12,000 fatalities. The 2020 GTI. number of countries experiencing ISIL-related attacks each year has steadily increased from two Countering the overall fall in terrorism deaths, in 2013 to 27 in 2019, including Mozambique and several sub-Saharan African countries recorded Sri Lanka, which recorded ISIL-related attacks for significant rises in terrorism deaths in 2019. the first time. Countries such as Burkina Faso, the Burkina Faso recorded the largest increase; the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique number of people killed in terror attacks rose and Niger have all recorded sharp rises in terrorist from 86 in 2018 to 593 in 2019. Mozambique, the attacks with the emergence of several new Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali all ISIL provinces and affiliates (the Central Africa recorded an additional 100 terrorism deaths from Province of the Islamic State and the Islamic 2018. Much of the increase in terrorist activity State in the Greater Sahara), and the expansion can be attributed to the proliferation of jihadist of existing groups, namely the Islamic State groups throughout the region, including newly West Africa Province (ISWAP), into neighbouring established ISIL provinces and affiliates as well countries. as groups aligned with al-Qaeda. In particular, Burkina Faso and Mali have seen a sharp increase The emergence of new ISIL provinces and in terrorism deaths attributed to Jamaat Nusrat affiliates and the problems of the ISIL core have al- wal Muslimin, which is an affiliate of led to a regional shift in which ISIL-related terrorist Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and the Islamic activity is now concentrated in South Asia and State in the Greater Sahara, along with other sub-Saharan Africa. By 2019, ISIL-related terrorism extremist groups and militias that appear to be in sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 41% of the gaining influence in the Sahel region by exploiting total, or 982 deaths, while South Asia accounted existing ethnic tensions.1 for 25% of the total, with 596 fatalities. In sub-Saharan Africa, ISIL-related terrorism has predominantly been driven by ISWAP, which has been the deadliest ISIL province since it emerged The global in 2015. Formally a part of Boko Haram, the group pledged allegiance to ISIL and was accepted expansion of ISIL as a regional province in March 2015, when it subsequently renamed itself ISWAP.2 In 2016, a While ISIL has been severely weakened, it hasn’t dispute over the leadership of ISWAP resulted in been eliminated. Instead, the group’s global the emergence of two factions of the group; while provinces and affiliates have become increasingly one faction continued to operate as ISWAP, the deadly in some countries, indicating the strength other faction reverted to the use of Boko Haram’s of ISIL’s global brand of terrorism beyond Iraq and formal name, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Syria—and that’s been in parallel with a collapse Wal-Jihad.3 in the number of deaths attributable to the ISIL core in Iraq and Syria as a result of the group’s In South Asia, the increasing trend of ISIL-related territorial defeat (from a peak of more than deaths was driven by the Khorasan Chapter of 8,907 in 2016 to some 611 in 2019). the Islamic State. The group was responsible for 3,134 terrorism deaths between 2015 and 2019, Deaths attributed to ISIL provinces and affiliates or 89% of the region’s ISIL-related deaths. Of peaked in 2015 at 3,769 and have since fallen to the 596 ISIL-related terrorism deaths in South 1,784 in 2019—a fall of more than 2,000 deaths Asia in 2019, more than half were attributed in four years. Although ISIL-related terrorism as to the Khorasan Chapter in Afghanistan, India a whole has begun to decrease in the past few and Pakistan. The remaining deaths were the years, ISIL-related deaths are still 36% higher result of the deadliest terror attack of the year than in 2013, when the group first emerged. With when eight coordinated suicide bombings the proliferation of ISIL provinces and affiliates were conducted across Sri Lanka on Easter around the world, and the concurrent demise Sunday. The bombings, which killed more of ISIL in Iraq and Syria, provinces and affiliates than 266 people, were allegedly carried out by now record more terrorism deaths a year. In 2019, National Thowheeth Jama’ath, a previously ISIL provinces and affiliates accounted for 74% of unknown group that pledged allegiance to former 2,396 ISIL-related terrorism deaths. ISIL-leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.4

13 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Far-right terrorism and Conclusion political violence Terrorism and violent extremism co-evolve with political, technological and social changes. The GTI There’s also been a sharp increase in far-right terrorism provides a comparable metric to conduct analysis in the West, concurrent with the rise of , and observe trends. Understanding these shifting civil unrest and political violence more generally. landscapes allows PVE, CVE and CT policymakers to: This increase has been the focus of intense political • focus attention on what’s increasing and media scrutiny, particularly after a number of high-profile attacks in 2019. In March 2019, a lone • investigate how recruitment strategies are evolving gunman attacked two mosques in Christchurch, • discuss areas of actions. New Zealand, killing 51 people and injuring a further 49. Five months later in El Paso, Texas, another lone gunman shot and killed 23 people and injured 23. In total, 89 of the 108 deaths from terrorism in the West in Notes 2019 were inflicted by far-right extremists. 1 Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country reports on terrorism 2019, Far-right terrorism has also been growing as a proportion Department of State, US Government, 2020, online. of total terrorism in the West. Between 2002 and 2014, 2 Australian Government, ‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, far-right incidents never accounted for more than 14% Australian National Security, no date, online. of total attacks in the West, or no more than 16 attacks 3 Australian Government, ‘Islamic State West Africa Province’. in a year. However, that number grew to 40% in 2015, to 55 attacks out of 139, and had risen to 46% by 2019 to 4 Thomas Joscelyn, ‘Terrorists in Sri Lanka swore allegiance to 49 far-right incidents recorded out of 108 attacks. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’, FDD’s Long War Journal, 23 April 2019, online. The US recorded the highest number of deaths from far-right terrorism, or 113 deaths since 2002. had the second highest number of deaths at 78, of which 77 occurred in a single day when carried out the . New Zealand had the third highest number of deaths with 51, all of which occurred during the Christchurch mosque shootings in 2019. The US is the only country in the West to have experienced multiple attacks resulting in more than 10 deaths; three such attacks have occurred since 2002. Much of the discourse about far-right terrorism, and extremism more generally, has focused on the threat that far-right groups pose to civil society. However, most far-right terrorist attacks are carried out by ‘lone-wolf’ actors who aren’t affiliated with a specific terrorist group or far-right organisation, even if they may have had contact with other far-right individuals or been inspired by other far-right attacks. This shift from affiliated to unaffiliated terrorism and online rather than in person radicalisation has also been seen across most other forms of ideologically driven terrorism in the West. The prevalence of unaffiliated far-right terrorism is even higher when looking at terrorist attacks that result in at least one death. From 2002 to 2019, there were 52 far-right attacks that resulted in at least one fatality. Of those, only seven were attributed to a specific group, while all the attacks that occurred in the past decade were classified as unaffiliated. This doesn’t mean that far-right terrorists have no contact with extremist organisations, or that the radicalisation of far-right individuals occurs entirely in isolation. Contact with like-minded individuals can be a significant factor in the radicalisation process and has traditionally been a strong predictor of whether a person will engage in violence. THE CURRENT TERRORISM ENVIRONMENT

Terrorism in New Zealand: how a different approach might have prevented the Christchurch mosque attacks

DR JOHN BATTERSBY Teaching Fellow, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University , New Zealand

15 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

‘Terrorism’ is an abstract noun applied collectively Internationalised terrorism surfaced in New Zealand because of the common characteristics of terrorist in 1975 when a few followers of New Zealand’s small organisations, groups, cells and individuals. But chapter of the Ananda Marga sect were caught in a plot its collective nature is also problematic, because to bomb the Indian High Commission.3 Ten years later, those same terrorist organisations, groups, cells and the French Directorate-General for External Security individuals are the product of specific historical, social bombed the flagship in and political contexts. They present in different and Harbour.4 A cabinet paper in 1985 declared nuanced ways depending on the circumstances in that the Rainbow Warrior incident showed New Zealand which they have emerged. wasn’t immune from terrorism, as if the events of the has similarities but also distinct differences from 1970s had never happened. In March 2019, multiple Australia’s and other terrorist actions further afield. commentators and media sources again declared that This paper outlines that nuanced terrorism experience New Zealand’s immunity from terrorism had come and considers why New Zealand has struggled to to an end, even though no such ‘immunity’ had ever take terrorism seriously for half a century, leaving a really existed. historical legacy of dragging the chain when it comes to Terrorism in New Zealand has often occurred as countering terrorism. For the future, the country must dispersed single events. One event fades from memory break this habit to more effectively combat terrorism. by the time a subsequent event occurs, leading to the recurring belief (illusory though it is) that some form of immunity from terrorism exists. The severity of the 15 March 2019 attack, when 28-year-old Australian International terrorist Brenton Tarrant brutally murdered 51 people at influences on terrorism two mosques in Christchurch, has broken that illusion. in New Zealand Over the past 50 years, terrorism in New Zealand New Zealand’s has tended to follow some international trends. The movements against the Vietnam War, nuclear nuanced terrorism concerns and apartheid all emerged overseas as New Zealand has always shown a propensity to popular protest movements associated with violent generate its own unique causes for political violence, activity. New Zealand emulated those trends, although in unusual or unexpected circumstances and with very terrorism tended to be less frequent with less severe nuanced targets. The institution of 6 o’clock closing of consequences than in other countries. public houses after World War I prompted bombings in In 1970, more than a dozen bombings were carried out 1919, and again in 1932 in Greymouth.5 Mining strikes in New Zealand by anti-war activists targeting military involved the bombing of a railway line in Denniston and government buildings, and the attacks continued in 1913 and a railway bridge in Huntly in 1951.6 In at a lower frequency in following years.1 Much like 1976, two followers of the Hare Krishna movement in Australia in the early 1970s, those terrorist acts planned to bomb a meatworks, but accidently killed caused no deaths and the perpetrators weren’t readily themselves when their bomb detonated prematurely in labelled as ‘terrorists’.2 However, the link between Auckland.7 In 1981, a troubled youth with a penchant civil or popular unrest and terrorists on the fringes of for criminal acts connected with political messaging those movements was already a noticeable theme deliberately located himself along Queen Elizabeth when it occurred again during the South African Rugby II’s route during her visit to Dunedin and fired a shot Union Team’s tour to New Zealand in 1981. Along with with a stolen .22 rifle.8 The following year, a punk-rock widespread protests came several bombings, as well as anarchist bombed the Police National Computer bomb and death threats against players, Rugby Union Centre in Wanganui, deliberately killing himself as officials and police. he did so.9 The 1981 shooter and the 1982 bomber had both previously been involved in Springbok tour Overall, the terrorists were usually, although not anti-apartheid protests. Both leaked their intentions exclusively, on the far left of , and their acts to associates, but no one reported them, and their and intentions were almost tacitly accepted as an defining acts were discovered only after the fact. extension of protest. The lack of any counterterrorism In 1984, an unknown perpetrator left a bomb in legislation suggested an inability or unwillingness by Wellington’s Trades Hall; the bomb detonated and New Zealanders to clearly understand what terrorism killed the building’s caretaker. The political nature of was, and governments certainly appeared to have the target strongly suggests a political motive, but the no obvious desire to do anything about it, given case has never been solved.10 that public sentiment. The convoluted in New Zealand’s Terrorism Suppression Act New Zealand didn’t have any terrorist legislation 2002 (TSA), which remains largely unchanged since its until after theRainbow Warrior bombing, so calling enactment, suggests a continuing lack of clarity in New any of those events ‘terrorism’ has been intermittent. Zealand about what terrorism is considered to be. Commentators sympathetic to the bombers have avoided the term altogether, preferring to the current terrorism environment idolise them more often as heroic actions for Legislative and noble, protest-related, causes. The desire for a pejorative label for the actions of the Rainbow systemic shortfalls Warrior bombers, however, saw them widely labelled as terrorists. The same is true of the 2019 In the 12-year time lapse between 2007 and Christchurch killings perpetrator: New Zealanders 2019, successive New Zealand governments have readily used the term to distance themselves failed to review and repair the TSA. Despite the from him, rather than understanding how the international evolution of terrorism towards New Zealand legal definition of terrorism applied actions by individualistic and impulsive to his actions. cyber-activated adherents of extreme ideologies who are geographically dispersed and In 2007, terminated a disconnected, no updates were made to the TSA surveillance operation (Operation Eight) that to address the possibility that this new brand of targeted activists for a range of causes.11 terrorism might occur in New Zealand. Foreign Police cited the TSA as their key legal instrument terrorist fighter (FTF) legislation lagged behind the for proceeding. The affidavit supporting the phenomenon and initially neglected any concern application for search warrants for Operation that New Zealand FTFs might return home.16 Eight clearly evidenced multiple references in New Zealand had very few of them, and the fear electronic intercepts of those under surveillance of their return in most countries was far greater to starting a ‘race war’, proposing assassinations than the reality of the risk they posed when they and bombings, discussions about the acquisition did, but nowadays lone actors are highly effective of semi-automatic weapons and ammunition, and dangerous. Historically, with the exceptions and camps where ‘training’ with those weapons of the Vietnam War and Springbok tour periods, occurred, including the preparation of Molotov terrorism in New Zealand generally only involved cocktails and other ‘tactical training’.12 one or a few individuals in single, non-sequential Despite multiple arrests, the Solicitor-General and unconnected acts of violence. didn’t authorise charges under the TSA, stating The Operation Eight experience produced that the wording of the Act was too complicated an opportunity to address what were clear for the evidence collected to meet the legal deficiencies in New Zealand’s firearms regulations criteria required. It wasn’t for any lack of evidence that had so easily allowed those suspects to that charges weren’t laid: the Solicitor-General acquire arms and ammunition. If this wasn’t publicly stated that it was the tautology of the enough, there were further warning signs. Act that led to his decision not to charge: A man with a cache of firearms, including The fundamental problem is that the semi-automatic weapons, shot three police legislation focuses upon an entity that carries officers and a civilian (killing one officer and out a terrorist act, and if individuals are then himself) in Napier in 2009. The subsequent actually developing towards … carrying out coronial inquiry called for a review of the Arms Act and careful reconsideration of the 1996 a terrorist act, they aren’t yet an entity that is 17 carrying out a terrorist act, and so there is a Thorp Inquiry report. Thorp recommended a tautology in the legislation which is extremely firearms licensing and registration regime similar difficult to unravel.13 to Australia’s in the wake of the Port Arthur massacre. The recommendations were deemed The media interpreted the Solicitor-General’s too expensive to implement in 1996 and, despite decision as a failure on the part of the New the subsequent coronial recommendation, Zealand Police to substantiate their suspicions.14 weren’t implemented. A firearms register may Political leaders distanced themselves from both have alerted police to Tarrant’s rapid acquisition the police investigation and the decision not to of semi-automatic weapons and thousands of prosecute. Supporters of those arrested usurped rounds of ammunition. A more restrictive regime the public narrative, depicting the suspected might have prevented him acquiring those items. perpetrators as the victims of a heavy-handed New Zealand’s firearms licensing regime had police over-reaction. Academic and independent long been under-resourced, and former officers commentary failed to balance the ‘debate’.15 have recently come out critical of New Zealand The fact that a successful detection and Police’s own lack of commitment in properly surveillance operation had potentially disrupted administering it.18 a dangerous evolving threat was overlooked, and addressing the shortfalls of the TSA was quietly In 2015, reporter Heather Du Plessis-Allan side-lined. That experience set the context for demonstrated how easy it was to obtain a firearm counterterrorism in New Zealand leading up to without a licence, publicly reporting her own New Zealand’s worst terrorist attack 12 years later, illegal internet purchase of a .22 rifle from a in 2019. Gun City store. Ironically, the police subsequently executed a search warrant on her home and 17 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

investigated her illegal action, while the store owner she purchased the gun from labelled her a ‘terrorist’!19 Notes The irony deepened when it came to light that it 1 John Battersby, ‘The ghost of New Zealand’s terrorism: past was a Gun City store, operating within the laws and and present’, National Security Journal, 2019, 1(1):35–48. regulations in force, that had sold Tarrant four of his 2 Sean Brawley, ‘“Days of rage” downunder: considering firearms as well as ammunition prior to the 15 March American influences on “home-grown” terrorism and ASIO’s 20 2019 attacks. In the absence of political leadership, response in 1970s Australia’, Australian Historical Studies, 2016, loopholes in legislation and an administrative malaise 47(2). meant natural resistance points that might have 3 John Battersby, ‘Can old lessons inform current directions: upset Tarrant’s preparations were diluted. Multiple Australia, New Zealand, and Ananda Marga’s trans-Tasman opportunities to take steps to prevent the development “terrorism” 1975–1978’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2019. of modern modes of terrorism in New Zealand were 4 James Veitch, ‘A sordid act: the Rainbow Warrior incident’, simply never taken. It is hoped that may now change. New Zealand International Review, 2010, 35(4):6–9. 5 ‘Dastardly act: Explosion at Denniston’, Evening Post, 11 November 1913, National Library of New Zealand (NLNZ); ‘Beer bombings: files released’, Otago Daily Times, 4 Hope for the future November 2017, online. 6 ‘Attempt to blow up bridge’, The Dominion, 1 May 1951, NLNZ. The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the attack on 7 ‘Death blast linked to bomb plot’, New Zealand Herald, 15 May Christchurch Mosques was set up with an ambitious 1976, NLNZ. completion date in December 2019, which it was unable 8 Christopher John Lewis, Last words, The Moon Productions, to meet. The report was made public in December Auckland, 1997, 72–79. 2020 and provides comprehensive recommendations, 9 Battersby, ‘The ghost of New Zealand terrorism’, 38. including establishment of a new National Security and Intelligence agency focused on coordinating 10 Thomas Manch, ‘Trades Hall bombing evidence points to a key suspect, retired marine engineer Edgar Kidman’, . counterterrorism efforts. While the Royal Commission’s co.nz, 16 July 2019, online. terms of reference were quite narrow, it has delved into commentary focusing political, resourcing or legislative 11 ‘The terrorism files’, The Dominion Post, 14 November 2007. This report and others associated with it were removed decisions that ultimately influenced the actions of the from this media sources website after it was prosecuted for specific agencies under review. Those agencies were publishing material from the leaked affidavit. I sourced from criticised variously, but importantly no intelligence hard copy held at NLNZ. failure or act or omission was found that would have 12 ‘Affidavit of Detective Sergeant Aaron Pascoe’, NZ Police, prevented the 2019 attacks. 10 October 2007, obtained under Official Information Act The Royal Commission of Inquiry Report is detailed and request, 2018. needs to be properly considered before an informed 13 ‘Act too complex to use, says Collins’, Dominion Post, 31 assessment can be made. Certainly, whether additional January 2009. bureaucracy is actually required is questionable but, 14 John Battersby, ‘Security sector practitioner perceptions of for the future, the recommendations recognise broader the terror threat environment before the Christchurch attacks’, strategic concerns must be dealt with. The Royal Kotuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online, 2020, Commission has called for deficiencies in legislation, 15(2):299. coordination of effort and agency resources to be 15 Danny Keenan (ed.), Terror in our midst: searching for terror in addressed and it would be remiss of the New Zealand Aotearoa New Zealand, Huia, Wellington, 2008. government not to do so. New Zealand’s recently 16 Battersby, ‘Security sector practitioner perceptions’, 300. launched counterterrorism strategy was a positive step, 17 ‘Call for Arms Act review after Napier siege’, Dominion Post, but a tentative one. The strategy document is thin on 3 September 2010. detail and more substance is required for it to set out a 18 ‘Police bosses accused of neglecting firearms control for genuinely useful path for the future.21 The findings and years, as Government plans new arms authority’, Stuff.co.nz, recommendations of the Royal Commission provide 22 June 2020, online. the opportunity for the New Zealand government, 19 Shabnam Dastgheib, ‘Reporter’s gun purchase “like a terrorist collaborating with the community, to set out on activity”’, Stuff.co.nz, 22 October 2015, online. this pathway. 20 ‘Gun City sold Brenton Tarrant four guns and ammunition’, Otago Daily Times, 18 March 2019, online. 21 Countering terrorism and violent extremism national strategy, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, February 2020, online; see John Battersby, Rhys Ball, Nick Nelson, ‘New Zealand’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy: a critical assessment’, National Security Journal, 2020, 2(1):79–96. THE CURRENT TERRORISM ENVIRONMENT

Lone actor terrorism in 2019 and 2020: trends and implications

CHRISTOPHER WINTER PhD Candidate, Victoria University Melbourne, Australia

RAMÓN SPAAIJ Sociologist, Victoria University and University of Amsterdam Melbourne, Australia

19 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Terrorist attacks by lone individuals aren’t a new rise of the self-titled Islamic State. At the same feature of the contemporary security environment, and time, the relative sophistication and complexity of the decade leading up to 2019 saw the widespread attacks decreased, as many perpetrators eschewed adoption of the tactic. However, the threat posed by sophisticated attack plans or long periods of terrorism is never a static one, as would-be terrorists preparation to instead opt for low-effort, quickly shift their tactics, targets and messaging in the context actioned attacks. Often, the weapons used were of wider security, political and cultural environments. little more than kitchen knives. Dozens of attacks were performed in this manner, mostly in Europe The years 2019 and 2020 involved a continuation of and particularly in France. Both al-Qaeda and ISIS many of the trends witnessed over the past decade. recognised the utility of low-tech attacks. Indeed, in a Europe continued to experience the threat of low-tech, 2016 issue of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s Inspire low-effort, close-combat attacks against seemingly magazine, an article titled ‘O Knife Revolution, head random targets, such as in the 2019 London Bridge towards America’ called for a series of knife attacks stabbing attack. However, a significant number of against various targets, including Jewish people.4 attacks were by heavily armed perpetrators who Australia also experienced several such incidents: the displayed relatively sophisticated targeting and 2014 Endeavour Hills stabbing, the 2016 Minto stabbing, operational capabilities. Further dispelling the notion the 2018 Mill Park stabbing and the 2018 Bourke Street that lone actors are truly alone and operate in a social stabbing. One analysis has found that internationally vacuum, those terrorists were often active in online (excluding the US), close-combat weapons were the communities, sometimes signalling their intent before preferred weapon of lone-actor terrorists, being used carrying out their attacks, and also wanting online in 56% of all attacks. Although those attacks killed validation from extremist ‘fellow travellers’ after the relatively few people, the short planning period and 1 act. Moreover, attacks by non-political, idiosyncratic the unpredictability of target selection meant that or poorly articulated perpetrators have continued to security forces were responding to attacks in progress, be a threat. rather than disrupting them during the planning or In this chapter, we discuss recent international preparation stages. That unpredictability was a key developments in lone-actor terrorism, with a focus on element in a shift towards the promotion of concepts how lone-actor terrorists operationalise their attacks such as ‘open-source jihad’ by groups such as al-Qaeda 5 and the policy implications of these developments in and, subsequently, by ISIS. the Australian context. Understanding the constantly The use of vehicles as a weapon was also a significant shifting threat of how lone-actor terrorism is attack method during that period. The 2016 Nice truck operationalised is essential in understanding how it attack, although not conducted by a lone actor, was may be interdicted and prevented. the most devastating of those attacks and a powerful illustration of the possible impact of attacks using vehicles as weapons. This period also included some of the worst The decade before: lone-actor terrorist mass shootings in history. The 2011 multi-stage attack in and Utøya Island by 2009 to 2018 Anders Behring Breivik and the 2016 Pulse nightclub Lone-actor terrorist violence isn’t a new threat: the mid- shooting in Orlando demonstrated the potential for 1990s were a period of heightened far-right violence in well-armed lone actors to inflict serious harm. In the the US.2 In the post-9/11 period, the perceived terrorist Breivik case, the in-depth Gjørv report commissioned threat shifted to organised conspiracies from various by the Norwegian Government identified several religious groups, although lone-actor terrorist attacks missed opportunities when security services could remained a constant, if relatively low-level, threat. have interdicted the perpetrator as he prepared for his attack, among other failings in responding to a If we can accept the idea that terrorism can emerge incident. Of great concern is also the in ‘waves’ of ideological and operational similarities, fact that other would-be lone actors were inspired by then the years between 2009 and 2012 framed a rising Breivik’s attack. tide of lone-actor violence globally. Increasing in both frequency and societal impact in comparison to any period before then, those attacks were carried out by perpetrators informed by a variety of ideologies and using equally varied levels of operational The Christchurch cluster 3 sophistication. Examples include the 2009 Fort On 15 March 2019, Brenton Tarrant, an Australian Hood shooting, the attempted knife assassination of citizen living in New Zealand and armed with several British parliamentarian Stephen Timms and the 2011 firearms, shot and killed 51 people and wounded Frankfurt Airport shooting. another 40 during afternoon prayers at two mosques The period from 2013 to 2018 marked another in Christchurch. Before his attack, like Breivik, escalation in the prevalence of lone-actor terrorist Tarrant published a manifesto in which he provided attacks. That increase largely coincided with the justifications for his actions and explained his targeting process.6 Indeed, while Tarrant specifically cited attack on the Twitch gaming platform, the Halle the current terrorism environment Breivik as his ‘true inspiration’ ideologically, both terrorist apologised to his audience, saying that attacks shared strong operational similarities. his improvised submachine gun was ‘shit’.16 Both perpetrators went through a years-long Another commonality in this cluster of what we planning phase, carefully selecting their chosen label ‘lone actors’ was the role of the internet and victims on the basis of the victims’ availability, online communities. The perpetrators were all symbolic importance and vulnerability. Both deeply embedded in the far-right communities considered a variety of attack methods that would found on the ‘chans’ (including 4chan, 8chan and maximise their ability to inflict harm, and both less popular derivatives such as EndChan17) and used semi-automatic rifles. other social media services. Before their attacks, Just as the Utøya attack served as a model for and much like Tarrant, these lone actors all Christchurch, elements of the Christchurch announced their plans online (the Poway, El Paso attack would directly inspire several other and Bærum attackers on 8chan, and the Halle attacks in 2019. Those attacks included the attacker on a similar chan-based derivative).18 in California (1 killed, It isn’t surprising that these people all visited 3 injured),7 the Walmart shooting in El Paso,8 similar platforms and participated in the same Texas (23 killed, 23 injured), the Al-Noor mosque online communities—the tendency for lone-actor shooting in Bærum, Norway (1 killed before the terrorists to emulate prior exemplars has only attack, 1 injured),9 and the Halle synagogue been exacerbated by the communicative power shooting in Germany (2 killed, 2 injured).10 of the internet.19 That the Christchurch, Halle and Those attacks were all shootings in which the Bærum attacks were all live-streamed on different perpetrator, explicitly inspired by Tarrant’s platforms is another example of how individuals actions, aimed to inflict mass casualties against are being empowered by technology to inspire a specific ethnic or religious group using one the like-minded, as they use those platforms to or more firearms. The perpetrators themselves spread their atrocities to large audiences and recognised the cluster. Going further than citing gain notoriety. It also shows that some kind of Tarrant’s actions as an inspiration, the Halle company and sense of being part of a group is attacker called himself one of the ‘chosen’ important to lone actors, and this results in them followers of ‘Saint Tarrant’, alongside the Poway having online connections to radicalising material and El Paso perpetrators.11 and groups. In their weaponry, lone-actor terrorists are Clustering isn’t new. Previously, the viral spread of typically constrained by resourcing, sometimes attack methodologies among lone-actor terrorists lacking the social ties, financial resources or was seen in the use of vehicles as weapons. knowledge to obtain black market weapons.12 High-profile events such as the 2016 Nice attack Instead, they often simply use weapons they inspired an ‘imitative wave’ of copycats, such as already have, or what’s legally available. This the 2016 truck attack on a Christmas market in cluster of attacks demonstrates this constraint Berlin and the 2017 Westminster Bridge attack in well. Only the Halle attacker, a former soldier, London.20 A similar wave was observed in Israel, used a crude shotgun and submachine gun which, despite experiencing low but persistent he had manufactured.13 The others used rates of lone-actor vehicle attacks since 2000, legally sourced rifles, and the Poway and faced a sudden increase: 53.2% (33 out of 62) of El Paso shooters used semi-automatic rifles, all such attacks occurred in 2015 alone.21 The as had Breivik and Tarrant. The availability of widespread use of knives in attacks, particularly in semi-automatic rifles is an important element in Europe, also has viral quality. The use of weapons exacerbating the impact of lone-actor terrorists; such as knives isn’t necessarily a demonstration a growing evidence base shows that the use of of operational effectiveness; rather, these those weapons results in significantly higher often suicidal attacks serve as an ideologically casualties during mass shootings.14 acceptable blueprint for action. Shooting attacks also have a visceral power that other methods sometimes lack. A month before the Poway attack, the perpetrator had set a mosque on fire, damaging the building but failing Recommendations to cause any injury.15 Despite the perpetrator As researchers continue to emphasise, and as leaving graffiti at the scene directly linking the demonstrated so vividly by the Christchurch mosque fire to the Christchurch attack, it was cluster, lone-actor terrorists are very likely to the subsequent shooting attack at Poway that leak their intent, because they aren’t wholly granted him widespread recognition. The inability alone.22 This presents obvious opportunities for of lone-actor terrorists to source these weapons security forces to identify people who present a can force them to use suboptimal alternatives, high level of risk, but, more than that, it presents making firearms laws and regulation a powerful an opportunity for counterterrorism forces to mitigator of risk here. Indeed, while streaming his 21 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

understand how extremists may prepare for an attack, 4 ‘Latest issue of Inspire magazine encourages small scale including their proposed attack methodologies, attacks’, Anti-Defamation League, 19 May 2016. weapon choice, targeting and planning. That’s 5 A Reed, H Ingram, ‘Exploring the role of instructional material particularly true in the wake of major attacks such as in AQAP’s Inspire and ISIS’ Rumiyah’, Europol, 26 May 2017, in Christchurch, where an ensuing wave of copycat and online. inspired attacks is a strong possibility. This is a unique 6 Elise Thomas, ‘Manifestos, memetic mobilisation and the time in which the ‘randomness’ of lone-actor terrorism Chan boards in the Christchurch shooting’, in I Kfir, J Coyne is somewhat mitigated, at least until another unique (eds), Counterterrorism yearbook 2020, ASPI, Canberra, 2020, exemplar attack occurs. 19–22. 7 ‘Poway synagogue shooting captured in video prosecutors Maintaining the capability to nimbly identify and react say, as they describe attack’, Los Angeles Times, 2 May 2019, to these emerging waves of lone-actor violence should online. be a priority for security agencies, particularly in the 8 ‘El Paso shooting: what we know’, , 4 August online space, where images and videos of attacks serve 2019, online. not only as entertaining memetic tokens to bond over 9 ‘Norway court jails mosque gunman Manshaus for 21 years’, but as demonstrations of what a successful terrorist BBC News, 11 June 2020, online. operation might look like. For law enforcement, 10 Jenny Hill, ‘Halle shooting: trial begins for Germany maintaining an intelligence presence in those synagogue attack suspect’, BBC News, 21 July 2020, online. online communities, whether they exist in relatively accessible web forums (such as the chan-based 11 Jason Burke, ‘Norway mosque attack suspect “inspired by Christchurch and El Paso shootings”’, The Guardian, 12 August platforms) or in more private and secure communities 2019, online. found on a variety of chat and social software suites (such as Discord) should be a priority. Access to the 12 F Burton, S Stewart, ‘The “lone wolf” disconnect’, STRATFOR Global Intelligence, 2008, online; R Spaaij, Understanding lone latter category poses a significant challenge for law wolf terrorism: global patterns, motivations and prevention, enforcement, although the potential intelligence Springer, New York, 2012. utility is significant. 13 Eric Woods, ‘Right-wing extremists’ new weapon’, Lawfare, I have also identified the importance of firearms in 15 March 2020, online. contemporary lone-actor terrorism. Reducing the 14 E Greene-Colozzi, J Silva, ‘Contextualizing firearms in availability of firearms is one obvious way to mitigate mass shooting incidents: a study of guns, regulations, and lone-actor violence. As in many lone attacks in the US, outcomes’, Justice Quarterly, 10 September 2020. apart from the Halle attack, the weapons used in the 15 Christine Hauser, ‘Graffiti citing New Zealand attack is found Christchurch cluster were legally obtained. The concept after mosque fire in California’, New York Times, 26 March 2019, of risk-based firearm seizure laws has been increasingly online. adopted in the US. Under those laws, government 16 Philip Oltermann, Lois Beckett, ‘Germany’s Jewish leaders agencies are empowered through court-issued condemn police response to Halle attack’, The Guardian, warrants to confiscate firearms from individuals who 11 October 2019, online. demonstrate concerning behaviours.23 Although not 17 ‘Norway mosque attack: Bruised suspect Manshaus appears necessarily applicable to jurisdictions with strong in court’, BBC News, 12 August 2019, online. existing controls on firearms, such an approach has 18 ‘Die wirre Welt des Attentäters’, Der Spiegel, 14 October 2019, obvious utility, given the tendency towards leakage to online. lone actors. 19 Hamm & Spaaij, The age of lone wolf terrorism, 47–48. 20 V Miller, K Hayward, ‘“I did my bit”: terrorism, Tarde and the vehicle ramming attack as an imitative event’, The British Journal of Criminology, January 2019, 59(1):1–23. Notes 21 S Perry, B Hasisi, G Perry, ‘Lone terrorists : a study of run-over Attacks in Israel’, European Journal of Criminology, 2018, 9. 1 P Gill, J Horgan, P Deckert, ‘Bombing alone: tracing the motivations and antecedent behaviors of lone-actor 22 Hamm & Spaaij, The age of lone wolf terrorism, 91; terrorists’, Journal of Forensic Science, 2014, 59(2):425–435; C Clemmow, P Gill, N Bouhana, J Silver, J Horgan, Clare Ellis, Raffaello Pantucci, Lone-actor terrorism: ‘leakage’ ‘Disaggregating lone-actor grievance-fuelled violence: and interaction with authorities, policy paper 4, Royal comparing lone-actor terrorists and mass murderers’, United Services Institute, London, 2016; R Spaaij, ‘Lone Terrorism and Political Violence, 19 February 2020, 11. actors: challenges and opportunities for countering violent 23 J Vernick, T Alcorn, J Horwitz, ‘Background checks for all extremism’, in A Richman, Y Sharan (eds), Lone actors—an gun buyers and gun violence restraining orders: state efforts emerging security threat, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2015, to keep guns from high-risk persons’, The Journal of Law, 120–131. Medicine & Ethics, 2017, 45(1):98. 2 M Hamm, R Spaaij, The age of lone wolf terrorism, Columbia University Press, New York, 2017, 50–52. 3 R Spaaij, Understanding lone wolf terrorism: global patterns, motivations and prevention, 1st edition, Springer, New York, 2012, 29–31. THE CURRENT TERRORISM ENVIRONMENT

Evolving terrorism threats and counterterrorism responses during the Covid-19 pandemic in Southeast Asia

JEREMY DOUGLAS Regional Representative, Southeast Asia and the Pacific, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Bangkok, Thailand

NIKI ESSE DE LANG Counter-Terrorism Advisor, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Bangkok, Thailand

23 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

The UN Secretary-General’s report was published before Introduction a major twin-suicide bombing in Jolo on 24 August 2020, which killed 14 and injured 75.4 Both suspected The Covid-19 pandemic has affected many aspects of female suicide bombers were Philippine nationals our lives. Southeast Asia, where some countries have and widows of well-known Filipino ASG terrorists.5 The been hit hard by the virus, has been no exception. ASG claimed responsibility for the attack by issuing Terrorist groups—as well as counterterrorism a statement through online channels on behalf of practitioners—have been forced to adapt the way IS East Asia Province.6 The first explosion took place they plan and run operations. near a Philippine Army truck carrying out Covid-19 This chapter gives an overview of the (counter)terrorism humanitarian efforts, while the second took place in situation during Covid-19 in Southeast Asia, with a front of the Development Bank of the Philippines, not focus on terrorism by or inspired by Islamic State (IS), far from the Cathedral of Our Lady of Mount Carmel, al-Qaeda, or both. We reflect on how terrorist attacks which had suffered a twin-suicide bombing earlier in have continued and evolved during the pandemic; how January 2019 carried out by an Indonesian couple, terrorists have adopted new (or adapted old) ways of which killed at least 23 and injured 102. fundraising to finance their objectives; and how the use of Jolo is strategically located in the Sulu Sea, close to misinformation, especially online, with the aim of gaining Sabah State (Malaysia), North Kalimantan Province sympathy, recruiting and inciting terrorist acts has surged (Indonesia) and the Mindanao region in the southern due to increased reliance on web-based interactions. We Philippines. Many foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) have also discuss the threat posed by returning and relocating made their way to or through Jolo, as well as many of terrorists from outside and inside the region, considering the neighbouring southern Philippines islands in the the travel restrictions in place. Finally, we consider the Sulu Sea. The US considers those areas to be ‘terrorist potential long-term impacts of the pandemic on the safe havens’.7 It’s estimated that, as of 2019, at least terrorism landscape in Southeast Asia. 59 FTFs had illegally entered the Philippines.8 It’s estimated that fewer than 40 FTFs, mostly Indonesian and Malaysian nationals, remain in the country. The Sulu and Sulawesi seas are infamous for a high Evolving terrorism number of kidnappings for ransom. The most recent took place on 17 January 2020 when eight Indonesian threats in Southeast crew were abducted from a fishing vessel by the ASG off the coast of Sabah, Malaysia.9 According to the Asia during Covid-19: Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), a causal link? the risk of the abduction of crew in the area and waters off eastern Sabah remains high, and new warnings In August 2020, the UN Secretary-General published were issued on 2 July 2020.10 However, no new his 11th report on the threat posed by IS of Iraq and kidnappings have been reported during the pandemic. the Levant (ISIL) to international peace and security, In comparison, throughout 2019, there were two in which he stressed that the picture for Southeast incidents of abductions of crew by the ASG, and in 2018 Asia ‘remains mixed’. He reported that attacks on there were three incidents.11 This downward trend in security forces in the region occur regularly, but that kidnappings for ransom may have to do with the 2017 the pandemic doesn’t appear to have contributed to Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement between Indonesia, additional attacks. However, the Secretary-General Malaysia and the Philippines for coordinated maritime also said that ‘ISIL affiliates continue to operate and patrols in the Sulu Sea, as well as increased Philippine find safe haven in the southern Philippines’ and that Army operations against the ASG since 2017.12 ‘ISIL sympathizers have used the virus as a pretext for fundraising and to advance their propaganda.’1 The 2020 Jolo suicide bombing, ongoing clashes between security forces and terrorist groups and the threat of kidnappings for ransom don’t have a clear The Philippines link with the pandemic. However, the threat situation shows that Covid-19 hasn’t limited terrorist groups’ There were ongoing clashes in 2020 between operations. While it’s been argued that militants security forces and several IS-affiliated groups in the are trying to take advantage of Covid-19 while the Philippines. One of the deadliest was between the Abu military is ‘stretched thin by the pandemic’,13 that Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Philippine Army in Sulu, isn’t particularly evident. Moreover, the pandemic where 11 army personnel were killed.2 Another example has limited the ability of FTFs to travel to the was an attack by the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Philippines.14 That said, the porous maritime borders Fighters on three Philippine Army detachments that between Borneo and the southern Philippines remain reportedly resulted in the displacement of more than susceptible to abuse by transnational organised 6,000 villagers. Two days later, the group fired mortar criminal networks and terrorist groups, despite rounds, hitting a cluster of civilian houses, killing two the increased patrols as a result of the Trilateral children and injuring 13 others.3 Cooperative Arrangement.15 Indonesia Fundraising, recruitment and the current terrorism environment Incidents in Indonesia included the planned potential exploitation of Covid-19 bombing of a police station in central Java by and the non-profit sector Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) in March 2020; The Financial Action Task Force has warned the abduction and beheading of two farmers by of terrorist groups exploiting Covid-19 by Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) fighters on 8 and fraudulently raising funds in the name of 19 April 2020, for allegedly being informants; a humanitarian assistance during the pandemic. failed attack by MIT on a police officer in Poso, For example, several ‘charities’ in Southeast central Sulawesi, on 15 April 2020, which left two Asia have been ‘actively raising funds through terrorists dead; and the killing of a police officer terrorist-affiliated Telegram channels and by an IS and JAD supporter in south Kalimantan Facebook groups to support the families of IS in June 2020.16 Reportedly, MIT documented fighters from Indonesia and the Philippines’.25 those incidents—including the beheadings— JAD, the terrorist group responsible for the May and uploaded images to pro-IS social media. 2018 Surabaya suicide bombings and a less The Institute for Policy Analysis and Conflict successful November 2019 against (IPAC) concluded that ‘the arrival of COVID-19 in a Medan police station, both in Indonesia, are also Indonesia instilled a new optimism in MIT.’17 said to have used the pandemic ‘downtime’ to raise funds through Telegram to support ‘families The online terrorism landscape of the mujahideen’ rather than for operations.26 Experts mentioned in May 2020 that some IS Terrorists’ increased use of online platforms in the supporters in Indonesia ‘were collecting funds to region shows the strongest link to Covid-19. At the buy essentials such as rice and sugar to distribute outset of the pandemic and for several months among themselves, as well as the public after, terrorists, their supporters and potential affected by the pandemic’. Another example is recruits have been increasingly accessing social Jamaat Ansyarul Khilafah, a group claiming to media platforms.18 The Financial Action Task be non-violent but with links to individuals who Force has warned that Covid-19 has led to a rise have committed attacks in the name of IS, which in cybercrime such as and could lead to has reportedly been raising funds before and increased online fundraising by terrorists posing during the pandemic for humanitarian assistance as Covid-19-related charities.19 through its Islamic healing clinics, religious study According to another UN report, a Southeast centres and affiliated charities.27 Asian member state ‘observed that ISIL An additional threat is Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), propaganda in the region was highlighting an the al-Qaeda-affiliated group responsible for the “end-times” narrative, suggesting that Covid-19 and other major incidents, represented divine punishment’.20 Others reported including the 2009 JW Marriot hotel bombing. that IS globally has been publishing propaganda This group, formerly led by Abu Bakar Bashir calling Covid-19 ‘God’s little soldier’, which was and more recently by Para Wijayanto (captured sent to infect and punish unbelievers,21 and that in June 2019 and currently on trial), is far a plague that would precede a catastrophe was from defunct, although it has changed tactics. foretold in religious texts.22 More action-oriented Wijayanto’s arrest and trial have revealed that IS-propaganda messages calling followers to carry JI still has financial and human resources at its out amaliyat (operations) and attacks against the disposal. At the time of his arrest, the group was kuffar (unbelievers) or the ‘oppressors’ have also still able to run a network of preachers, schools, been disseminated on Indonesian pro-IS and MIT corporations, mosques and palm oil plantations. social media channels. Some excerpts from those While this network is on the authorities’ radar and messages were reproduced in IPAC reports.23 IS parts of it have been shut down, there’s still an propaganda messages have found their way to active ‘underground’ JI network that could exploit Southeast Asia through different social media, the pandemic.28 JI has done that in the past, after including Facebook, Twitter and pro-IS Telegram the 2004 Aceh tsunami and the 2006 Yogyakarta channels.24 earthquake, by providing family support, health Malaysia and the Philippines have reported care and welfare, with an intent to recruit new similar trends, but online recruitment and members.29 The arrest of another major JI leader incitement to terrorism were already a major and one of the masterminds behind the 2002 issue in those countries before the pandemic Bali bombings, Zulkarnaen (also known as Aris and, while there may be a larger audience during Sumarsono), on Sumatra island in December Covid, aren’t new phenomena. 2020, and the news that JI recently installed 13,000 charity boxes at marketplaces across Indonesia, confirms these suspicions.30

25 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

The importance of gender dimensions when Counterterrorism in countering terrorism—an issue long overlooked and still inadequately addressed—was highlighted on the face of Covid-19: 10 October 2020 when an Indonesian woman suspected of preparing a suicide attack was arrested with two achievements and ASG members. She was identified as Rezky Fantasya Rullie, and a suicide bomb vest was found during the challenges raid. She’s said to be the daughter of the Indonesian couple who committed the twin-suicide attack in Jolo The UN Secretary-General stated that authorities in January 2019 and the widow of Indonesian FTF in Indonesia and the Philippines ‘have maintained Andi Baso, who was killed in the Philippines in August pressure on ISIL activities through counter-terrorism 2020.36 It’s likely she was living in the Philippines and operations, many of which have succeeded in had travelled there before the Covid-19 pandemic disrupting planned attacks at early stages’. In fact, broke out. Initially, it was reported that she would be between January and July 2020 there were more than deported to Indonesia, but a later report states that 80 terrorism-related arrests in Indonesia, and several she’ll be prosecuted in the Philippines under the new planned attacks were disrupted. Most of the individuals Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (ATA 2020).37 arrested were members of JAD or MIT.31 It’s seen as a welcome development that she’ll be According to IPAC, many early 2020 arrests in Indonesia prosecuted in the Philippines, rather than being were linked to MIT. There were also reported arrests of deported to Indonesia. Before the adoption of the ATA pro-IS individuals without links to MIT or JAD. During 2020, deportation seemed to have been the preferred one arrest in Batang, central Java, on 25 March 2020, method to deal with Indonesian FTFs in the Philippines, the police allegedly found materials meant which was worrying because of the risk of terrorists for making bombs, but no evidence of targets was potentially escaping justice. In September 2020, for 32 found. Apart from those apparent successes, there example, Minhati Madrais, the widow of Omarkhayam have also been challenges, one of them being the Maute of the pro-IS Maute Group in the Philippines, was killing of a 20-year-old male by police in Poso, central deported to Indonesia. She’s alleged to be one of the Sulawesi in April 2020, after the man was mistaken for key people controlling the Maute Group’s financing and 33 an MIT terrorist. is undergoing a mandatory deradicalisation program A recent example of regional collaboration on the in Indonesia, but it isn’t clear whether there’s sufficient maritime front involved an Interpol-led operation evidence for her prosecution.38 codenamed ‘Maharlika III’ in February and March While the use of the ATA 2020 in the Philippines for the 2020. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines prosecution of FTFs is seen as a positive change, the deployed their personnel at strategic points along legislation was passed under a cloud of criticism by known terrorist transit and other illicit trafficking routes civil society groups and the UN human rights office for in the Sulu and Celebes seas. They conducted a series a lack of consultation and for having provisions with of operations, including sea patrols, passenger and potentially negative implications for human rights vehicle checks, and secondary identity inspections of and freedoms.39 To date, civil society groups have any suspicious individuals, resulting in the arrest of filed 37 petitions with the Supreme Court opposing more than 180 people, including a suspected member the new law.40 of the ASG. In addition, 134 victims of human trafficking were rescued and more than €1 million worth of Indonesia has also been pursuing some legislative firearms, illegally assembled and other illicit changes by adopting a presidential regulation on the goods and substances was seized.34 role of the military in counterterrorism, effectively giving the military more powers. This was met with However, authorities committed serious mistakes in criticism from civil society groups citing concerns disrupting planned attacks, especially in relation to over such a broad mandate for the military and the the August 2020 suicide bombing in Jolo. Reportedly, implications that may have for human rights.41 four army intelligence officers, on a mission to locate suspected ASG suicide bombers, were shot and killed While these legislative developments aren’t directly by police. Accounts of what transpired differ, and the related to the pandemic, they may be perceived by incident is currently under investigation.35 the public as bad timing and choice of priorities in a time when people are already facing additional security restrictions. A more securitised approach that involves the current terrorism environment Longer term impacts shutting down certain organisations suspected to be at high risk, or preventing unregistered on Southeast Asian charities from operating, might do more harm counterterrorism than good. There have been some successful The socioeconomic fallout from the Covid-19 counterterrorism operations in response crisis could exacerbate grievances against to threats in Indonesia and the Philippines, government and other drivers conducive to including subregional or international terrorism. For example, government budgets cooperation efforts under the auspices of the available for socio-economic goals, including Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement and Interpol. health and education, may decrease, as well as Sustaining and expanding those efforts will resources currently allocated for counterterrorism be beneficial for the security of the region, work, especially on the preventive side. In especially in ‘hotspot’ areas in and around the addition, a reduction in available funding from Sulu and Celebes seas. International cooperation international donors will negatively affect civil and domestic multiagency collaboration society and intergovernmental organisations remain the keys to success in counterterrorism that are dependent on contributions to sustain operations, as terrorists and criminals don’t and upscale programs addressing conditions respect international boundaries and benefit conducive to terrorism. from internal disputes and competition between national counterterrorism actors. An additional important aspect is that travel restrictions in place due to Covid-19 have At the operational and policy levels, it’s severely reduced the ability of FTFs and their important to understand what conditions might family members currently outside Southeast be conducive to terrorism. They can include Asia to return or relocate to the region. However, social, political and economic inequality; when those restrictions are lifted, it’s likely that ethnic or religious discrimination; lack of many Southeast Asian FTFs and their family self-determination by ethnic or indigenous members will return. As recent history has shown, minorities; lack of resources for education it’s also likely that FTFs from other regions will and socio-economic support; ; and continue to be attracted to conflict-prone areas in grievances that result from heavy-handed Southeast Asia. counterterrorism operations or the adoption of policy, laws and regulations that are perceived as repressive. Consultative processes, fair and transparent accountability measures and an overall primacy of the rule of law and human Conclusions and rights principles are the keys to addressing those conditions and will reduce the pool of people recommendations susceptible to terrorist narratives. The pandemic isn’t likely to hamper terrorist groups in Southeast Asia. We’ve mainly discussed examples from the Philippines and Indonesia attributable to IS-affiliated groups. However, there are other active groups in the region that also pose serious threats to regional peace and security, including those active in Thailand and Myanmar and the New People’s Army in the Philippines. Counterterrorism practitioners should pay attention to other groups, such as Jamaat Ansyarul Khilafah and the remnants of JI, that might operate under the radar and try to recruit and raise funds. One potential approach is through increased dialogue and outreach to the non-profit sector and the general public on terrorism financing risks and the importance of ensuring that donations are going to the charitable causes they’re intended for.

27 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Notes 1 UN, Eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the threat 21 Muhammad Sinatra, Terrorism landscape in the COVID-19 posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and pandemic, policy brief, Institute of Strategic and International the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States Studies Malaysia, 20 July 2020, online; Mia Bloom, ‘How in countering the threat, UN doc. S/2020/7744, ReliefWeb, terrorist groups will try to capitalize on the coronavirus crisis’, August 2020, online. Just Security, 3 April 2020, online. 2 UN, Twenty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions 22 Arlina Arshad, ‘Indonesian terrorists “wait for end of world” Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) as coronavirus bites’, The Star, 18 May 2020, online; IPAC, concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals COVID-19 and ISIS in Indonesia, short briefing no. 1, 2 April and entities, UN doc. S/2020/717, online, paragraph 73. 2020, online. 3 Jasminder Singh, Muhammad Haziq Jani, ‘COVID-19 and 23 IPAC, COVID-19 and ISIS in Indonesia; IPAC, Covid-19 and the terrorism in the southern Philippines: more trouble ahead’, Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT), 5. The Diplomat, 26 August 2020, online. 24 IPAC, COVID-19 and ISIS in Indonesia. 4 Jason Gutierrez, ‘At least 14 killed after suicide bombers hit 25 Iftekharul Bashar, Kenneth Yeo Yaoren, ‘Combating extremist Philippines’, New York Times, 24 August 2020, online; ‘14 killed charities during COVID-19’, East Asia Forum, 15 July 2020, in Jolo twin bombings in southern Philippines’, al-Jazeera, online. 24 August 2020, online; ‘Philippines: twin explosions hit Jolo, 26 Zachary Abuza, Alif Satria, ‘How are Indonesia’s terrorist killing at least 14’, BBC News, 24 August 2020, online. groups weathering the pandemic?’, The Diplomat, online. 5 ‘Suspected Jolo suicide bombers both Filipinos, tracked by 27 IPAC, COVID-19 and ISIS in Indonesia; V Arianti, Muh soldiers killed by cops in June—officials’,CNN Philippines , Taufiqurrohman, ‘The quiet threat of Indonesia’s Jamaah 26 August 2020, online. Ansharul Khilafah’, The Diplomat, 11 August 2020, online. 6 Jeoffrey Maitem, ‘IS militants claim responsibility for Sulu 28 Abuza & Satria, ‘How are Indonesia’s terrorist groups blasts’, Inquirer.net, 25 August 2020, online. weathering the pandemic?’; Prashanth Parameswaran, ‘Where 7 Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country reports on terrorism 2019, is Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia’s terrorism landscape?’, State Department, US Government, 2020, 206, online. The Diplomat, 8 July 2020, online; Farouk Arnaz, ‘Indonesian 8 Bong Sarmiento, ‘ISIS thrives in Covid-19 shadows in police detect resurgence of Jemaah Islamiyah’, Jakarta Globe, Philippines’, Asia Times, 22 May 2020, online. 15 June 2020, online; Bilveer Singh, ‘Jemaah Islamiyah: 9 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and still Southeast Asia’s greatest terrorist threat’, The Diplomat, Armed Robbery against Ships in the Asia–Pacific (ReCAAP), 7 October 2018, online. Monthly report: Piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia, 29 Bashar & Yeo Yaoren, ‘Combating extremist charities during July 2020, online; ReCAAP , ReCAAP ISC weekly report: Piracy COVID-19’. and armed robbery against ships in Asia: 29 Sep—5 Oct 2020, 30 Tri Iswanto, ‘Indonesian militant linked to Bali bombings online. flown to Jakarta for questioning’, Reuters, 16 December 2020, 10 ReCAAP, Monthly report: Piracy and armed robbery against online; Anugrah Kumar, ‘Indonesia: Al-Qaeda linked terrorists ships in Asia, July 2020. use thousands of fake charity boxes to raise funds’, Christian 11 ReCAAP, Piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia: Post, 14 December 2020, online. Annual report, January–December 2019, 16–17, online. 31 UN, Twenty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions 12 Ian Storey, ‘Trilateral security cooperation in the Sulu-Celebes Monitoring Team, paragraph 70. seas: a work in progress’, Perspective, ISEAS—Yusof Ishak 32 IPAC, COVID-19 and ISIS in Indonesia. Institute, Singapore, 27 August 2018, issue 48, online. 33 IPAC, Covid-19 and the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT), 6. 13 Kenneth Yeo, ‘Are Philippine militants looking to take 34 ‘Hundreds arrested in crackdown on terrorist routes in advantage of COVID-19?’, The Diplomat, 1 May 2020, online. Southeast Asia’, news release, Interpol, 22 April 2020, online. 14 Kenneth Yeo Yaoren, Unaesah Ramah, ‘Southeast Asia: 35 Associated Press, ‘Philippine police kill four army soldiers in returning foreign fighters’, The Defense Post, 23 June 2020, deadly shoot-out “mix-up”’, South China Morning Post, 30 June online. 2020, online; Associated Press, ‘Philippine police fatally shoot 15 Prashanth Parameswaran, ‘Are Sulu Sea trilateral patrols 4 army soldiers in south’, Wtopnews, 29 June 2020, online. actually working?’, Asia Dispatches, Wilson Center, 29 January 36 ‘Philippines: suspected female bomber from Indonesia to face 2019, online. charges, expulsion’, Benar News, 12 October 2020, online. 16 UN, Twenty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions 37 ‘Indonesian woman first to be tried under Philippines’ new Monitoring Team, paragraph 71. anti-terror law’, Arab News, 14 October 2020, online. 17 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), Covid-19 and the 38 Amy Chew, ‘Widow of Filipino militant now undergoing Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT), IPAC short briefing no. 3, deradicalization in Indonesia’, Benar News, 30 September 28 April 2020, 5, online. 2020, online. 18 Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate 39 Mong Palatino, ‘How Duterte’s anti-terror law unleashed (CTED), The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on terrorism, public outrage against his leadership’, The Diplomat, 13 July counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism, 2020, online. UN Security Council, June 2020, online. 40 Kristine Joy Patag, ‘With anti-terror law IRR done, time 19 Financial Action Task Force, COVID-19-related money running out for SC to grant immediate relief—petitioners’, laundering and terrorist financing: risks and policy responses, Philstar Global, 15 October 2020, online. May 2020, online. 41 Fynn-Niklas Franke, ‘Talking about counterterrorism in times 20 UN, Twenty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions of crisis’, Bangkok Post, 6 June 2020, online. Monitoring Team, paragraph 75. THE IMPACT OF ONLINE PLATFORMS, SOCIAL MEDIA AND TECHNOLOGY ON TERRORISM

The impact of online platforms, social media and technology on terrorism The impact of technology on extremism

LEVI J WEST Director of Terrorism Studies, Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security, Charles Sturt University Canberra, Australia

29 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Technology will continue to play a central role in has endured throughout the modern history of the ongoing evolution of the character of terrorism, terrorism, the specific manner in which terrorists including the way terrorist organisations of all practise violence reflects the political, social and ideological persuasions perpetrate violence and the technological context from which they emerge. way they communicate their messages. Technological Even the recent spike in the use of low-capability developments have always shaped the character of tactics such as stabbings and vehicle ramming has terrorism. The discovery of dynamite, the expansion been reliant on technology. IS has run a sophisticated of international air travel and the ubiquity of social and diverse propaganda campaign in social media, media have all been exploited by terrorists. Ensuring identifying targets, endorsing tactics and providing that counterterrorism (CT) policy and practice remain theological and strategic permissions. The IS social abreast of technological developments that are being, media campaign was fundamental to inspiring lone and will likely continue to be, exploited by terrorists actors to commit acts of terrorism and to enabling their and other violent non-state actors is integral to the violence to be perceived and understood as terrorism.7 ongoing success of international CT. The exploitation of communications technology has been, and will continue to be, an essential requirement for terrorism to achieve effect. The print media industry Evolving technology underpinned the spread and impact of anarchist terrorism across Europe and the US in the late 1800s and applications to terrorism early 1900s, in the same way that satellite television and screen media made Palestinian terrorism and political The development, accessibility and affordability of violence emblematic of an entire period of terrorism in contemporary technology has had a substantial impact the 1960s and 1970s.8 In the contemporary environment, on modern life.1 The ubiquity of advanced technological social media and digital technologies have served the devices such as tablets and smartphones, when same purpose. Social media have made extremist and coupled with ready access to an almost infinite body of terrorist content more accessible, and digital technology information and data, has shaped contemporary society has enabled a dramatic expansion in the quality, volume in ways that few imagined.2 It should be unsurprising and diversity of content available across all ideological that terrorists and other violent non-state actors, such as categories. The ease with which terrorist ideology, Mexican drug-trafficking organisations,3 have exploited terrorist narratives and terrorist operational instructions technology for their own purposes. can be accessed has been dramatically enhanced by modern digital technology.9 Technology has been at the centre of recent developments in terrorism and CT. Those developments The campaigns that IS ran, focusing on specific issues reflect a willingness and a need by terrorists to embrace or specific theatres, are reflective of the way digital technology for their operational and strategic purposes. technology has enhanced terrorist propaganda The Islamic State’s (IS’s) social media campaign capabilities. The Marawi conflict in the Philippines is 10 brought tens of thousands of foreign fighters to Syria instructive in this regard. From May 2017 onwards, and Iraq and inspired countless ‘lone actors’ to commit IS ran a diverse and coordinated campaign that sought terrorist violence in the group’s name. That resulted in to contextualise and justify its actions in Marawi while the emergence of a broad range of innovative national actively encouraging supporters to migrate to the and international CT policies and practices involving Philippines in support of its efforts. That included private-sector technology companies and integrated multiple episodes of the Inside the Caliphate video series multilateral CT efforts.4 Additionally, the live streaming that featured an Australian jihadist explicitly encouraging of the Christchurch terrorist attack in 2019 led to a IS supporters to either travel to Marawi or to: renewed effort by governments and the private sector … kill them wherever you find them. If you’re a to attempt to address the proliferation of extremist and tradesman, use your nail gun and nail the kaffir to terrorist content in the online environment, including the head and crucify his body to the woodworks. content related to extreme right-wing ideology.5 If you’re truck driver, ram their crowds until their streets run with their filthy blood. Or pour petrol The exploitation of technology for terrorist purposes over their houses whilst they’re asleep and engulf has been central to the capacity of terrorists and their houses with flames. That way the message will other asymmetrically weak actors to achieve effect. be burnt into their memories.11 Historically, this has occurred in two core domains: technologies of violence and communications The June 2017 edition of the Rumiyah magazine, IS’s technology. Since the invention of dynamite, terrorists English-language online publication, featured a cover have embraced novel and accessible technologies story focused on the ‘Jihad in East Asia’12 as well as a of violence that support their strategic objectives.6 five-page interview with the so-called ‘Amir of Khilafah That approach has underpinned the deployment in East Asia’. Those are but a sampling of the Marawi- of now familiar tactics such as , and Philippines-oriented content released to augment suicide terrorism, the refinement and improvement operations on the ground in Marawi. The operation of improvised explosive devices, and more. While the highlights a microcosm of the approach that IS used nature of terrorism and the deployment of instrumental to substantial effect, enabled by the propagation of and communicative violence for ideological purposes digital technologies. While there’s been some evidence of terrorists’ T he impact of online platforms , social media and technology on terrorism Implications for use of new technologies, such as drones,16 there hasn’t been a wholesale take-up of those counterterrorism technologies by terrorists or other non-state actors. While communications technology such as operations social media has become nearly ubiquitous in its usage by terrorists, the use of drone technology, In much the same way that terrorism is shaped despite the opportunities it presents for terrorist by the availability and exploitation of technology, organisations, hasn’t become a central element CT agencies must ensure that they remain at the of terrorist capability. The Christchurch terrorist forefront of technological capabilities and have used a drone to undertake surveillance of the two a sophisticated and up-to-date understanding mosques he targeted in his attack,17 and that’s of terrorists’ uses of technology. The exploitation been one of the primary ways that terrorists have of social media by IS and the live streaming of used drones. It has contributed substantially to the Christchurch attack in 2019 both provided an terrorist propaganda, both in the Middle East important impetus for CT policies and practices to and South East Asia, but its use as an offensive develop new approaches. capability—as distinct from either a propaganda or a surveillance tool—has been limited.18 The IS social media campaign drove the expansion and refinement of the High Value The limited take-up of drone technology Targeting program, which sought to identify shouldn’t suggest that it’s unlikely to contribute important terrorist actors and ‘remove them from substantially to ongoing developments in the the battlefield’, to include a focus on those with terrorist operational arsenal. Audrey Cronin argues substantial online influence and whose primary that much of the next wave of technological capability lay in the propaganda domain. This is advancement that will be exploited by terrorists reflective of the power that digital technology has will emerge from what she refers to as convergent provided to contemporary terrorist organisations technologies—‘specifically UAVs … other robots, and the way in which CT operations have changed 3D printing (additive manufacturing), and nascent as a result. Targeting propagandists rather than autonomy.’19 Those technologies offer the potential key leaders or explosives experts reflects the for a substantial step change in the affordability, growing power of digital technologies. accessibility and lethality of offensive technological capabilities for terrorists and other non-state IS’s use of social media also resulted in the actors. Policymakers and commanders in theatre formation of a range of multilateral organisations will need to remain abreast of these emerging and private-sector-led initiatives, such as the technologies and their potential adoption and Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism. The deployment by terrorists and insurgents. The forum was established in 2017 as a partnership demonstration of their effectiveness by IS and between Facebook, Twitter and YouTube with others will increase the likelihood of their increased the stated aim of ‘disrupting terrorist abuse of use by terrorists. members’ digital platforms’.13 The emergence of private-sector-led CT efforts reflects some of the limits that states have in seeking to operate in and regulate large-scale private-sector Future challenges and technology companies. Both the IS campaign and the Christchurch recommendations attack have also provided the impetus for There remain numerous challenges for CT increased political and public pressure on policy and practice as it pertains to technology, various unconventional platforms that have in terms of both capability and broader policy become the domicile of terrorists and extremists considerations. Governments and, increasingly, as conventional platforms have become more the private sector must maintain a difficult proactive at addressing their presence. For balance between ensuring that they retain example, as IS increasingly migrated its online leading-edge CT capability while ensuring presence to the encrypted platform Telegram, that their policy settings are proportional and broad public and political pressure resulted in necessary, and that the foundational principles of some efforts to prevent the group exploiting the liberal democracy are preserved and defended: platform.14 In a similar manner, the Christchurch • It will be essential, as communications attack led to companies such as Cloudflare technologies continue to evolve, that CT ultimately removing their cybersecurity services capability remains up to date with those from 8Chan15—the platform most closely technologies’ surveillance and disruption associated with the Christchurch attack and capabilities while ensuring that appropriate numerous other extreme right-wing incidents. platforms for open public discourse remain

31 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

accessible and that the broader public continues to engage in free and open political debate. Notes • There’s an increasing need for a broader 1 AC Madrigal, ‘Tech experts are pessimistic about their industry’, understanding of the types of material that The Atlantic, 21 February 2020, online. contribute to radicalisation. While violent content 2 A Newitz, ‘A better internet is waiting for us’, New York Times, is now addressed in various ways, the ideological 30 November 2019, online. tracts of extremists remain misunderstood and more 3 Joseph Cox, ‘Mexico’s drug cartels love social media’, Vice, difficult to regulate. It’s essential to develop and 5 November 2013, online; ‘Twitter, guns and money: Mexico’s operationalise an improved recognition of the role cartels live large on social media’, NBC News, 14 June 2014, played by manifestos, statements of ideology and online. doctrinal material. 4 Bipartisan Policy Center, Digital counterterrorism: fighting • New communications technologies will emerge and jihadists online, March 2018, online. will need to be considered through the lens of their 5 K Veale, ‘The “Christchurch Call” is just a start. Now we need potential exploitation by terrorists and extremists. to push for systemic change’, The Conversation, 16 May 2019, While those technologies are likely to become online. ubiquitous before they’re regulated or considered 6 TX Hammes, ‘Terror and technology: from dynamite to drones’, for their hostile application, it will be necessary to War on the Rocks, 4 September 2020, online. ensure that governments and the private sector, 7 L West, ‘#jihad: understanding social media as a weapon’, through the various instruments they have developed Security Challenges, 2016, 12(2), 9, 26, online. in response to IS and Christchurch, continue to 8 K Hawa, ‘From Palestine to the world, the militant film of the engage in order to stay abreast of new developments. PLO’, The New York Review, 17 October 2020, 17, online. • It’s also imperative, both from an operational 9 Ines von Behr, Anaïs Reding, Charlie Edwards, Luke Gribbon, perspective and from a broader community Radicalisation in the digital era, RAND Corporation, Santa engagement perspective, that online content, be Monica, 2013, online. it jihadist or extreme right-wing, be treated with 10 C Knight, K Theodorakis, The Marawi crisis: urban conflict and equal severity and urgency. As the ongoing debate information operations, ASPI, Canberra, 31 July 2019, 31, online. about Facebook’s handling of extreme right-wing 20 11 ‘Australian IS fighter calls in video for countrymen to fight in content demonstrates, there’s a need to ensure Marawi or stay and kill “disbelievers”’, SITE Intelligence Group, that extremist content, regardless of its ideological 7 August 2017, online. character or its proximity to power, is dealt with in a 12 ‘IS says losing territory redoubled its efforts and shifted focus transparent, equitable and timely manner. to “Crusader soil” in Rumiyah’, SITE Intelligence Group, 7 June As contemporary communications technology has 2017, 10, online. become a key element of social infrastructure, it’s 13 Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, online. increasingly necessary that those platforms are dealt 14 M Bernhard, ‘Telegram app tackles Islamic State online with in a manner that recognises their significance propaganda’, Wall Street Journal, 26 November 2019, online. and the influence they have over public and political 15 E Stewart, ‘8chan, a nexus of , explained’, , discourse. That will require governments to increasingly 5 August 2019, online. engage with technology companies, and especially 16 MS Schmidt, E Schmitt, ‘Pentagon confronts a new threat social media companies, to play a more proactive role from ISIS: exploding drones’, New York Times, 11 October 2016, in not just the CT space but in the broader domain online. of public discourse. Additionally, foreign interference 17 Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on and extremism increasingly evidence concurrence Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019, ‘Planning the attack’, 21 and interrelationships, so ensuring that democratic The report, 2020, online. discourse and the central role it plays in democratic 18 E Archambault, Y Veilleux-Lepage, ‘Drone imagery in Islamic processes are protected is a core obligation of State propaganda: flying like a state’, International Affairs, 2020, governments and social media companies. The 96(4):955–973, online. protection of democracy and the countering of efforts 19 AK Cronin. Power to the People: How Open Technological to undermine it, be that through the promotion of Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists. Oxford University extremist ideas, the propagation of disinformation Press, 2020, p. 202. online. or the undermining of trust in institutions, must all become part of a broader effort to ensure that the 20 C Knaus, M McGowan, N Evershed, O Holmes, ‘Inside the hate factory: how Facebook fuels far-right profit’, The Guardian, benefits of modern communications technology aren’t 6 December 2019, online; L Beckett ‘Michigan terror plot: why overwhelmed by the costs. rightwing extremists are thriving on Facebook’, The Guardian, Extensive lessons have been learned in recent 10 October 2020, online. years that create opportunities to improve our CT 21 A Romano, ‘Twitter released 9 million tweets from one Russian approaches. This requires leveraging the multilateral troll farm. Here’s what we learned’, Vox, 19 October 2018, online; collaborations that facilitated earlier successes, A Glaser, ‘Russian bots are trying to sow discord on Twitter after reinforcing the public–private engagement that was Charlottesville’, Slate, 23 August 2017, online. born of those challenges, and building a broader coalition focused on protecting democratic discourse and public debate from an increased array of threats. THE IMPACT OF ONLINE PLATFORMS, SOCIAL MEDIA AND TECHNOLOGY ON TERRORISM

Boogaloo Bois: the birth of a ‘movement’, from memes to real-world violence

ELISE THOMAS Former researcher, International Cyber Policy Centre, ASPI Canberra, Australia

33 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Online memes have been a tool for recruitment and The meme bubbled along over the course of 2019, propaganda for established extremist movements spreading across multiple social media platforms. for many years. Whether the memes are created It cross-propagated with other memes and cultural spontaneously by grassroots sympathisers or are part narratives and received a particular boost on of coordinated and deliberate strategies laid out by anonymous imageboard 4chan, especially from its the leadership of extremist groups, they reflect and /k/ board, which is dedicated to discussing weapons. transmit the movement’s ideology. Overt or coded 4chan and other chan boards, including 8chan and references serve as a wink to insiders and, their creators now 8kun, are infamous for having incubated toxic, may hope, an intriguing hint that will make outsiders misogynist, racist, anti-Semitic and at times overtly want to know more. white supremacist cultures. Across 2019, the /pol/ boards (dedicated to discussing politics) on both 4chan However, what’s occurred over the past several years, and 8chan were linked to multiple mass shootings, and accelerated dramatically since the beginning of the including the Christchurch shooting. global Covid-19 crisis, is the opposite process. Beyond just extremist movements generating memes, memes Meanwhile, on the /k/ board the Boogaloo meme are now also inspiring extremist violence. was picking up steam. The legacy of this /k/ board connection can be seen even on different platforms, It’s too early to fully understand how the dynamics of for example in the names of Facebook groups. In the these digital-native forms of extremism may differ from example in Figure 1, run by a self-professed ‘Michigan more traditional extremism, which begins offline and Boog Boy’, the visual style and references of the later moves into online spaces. This analysis will be Boogaloo, including the infamous Hawaiian shirt,7 sit further complicated by issues involving the recording alongside /k/ board and other chan culture references.8 of digital history,1 particularly where crucial historical evidence is in fringe or ephemeral social media Leading up to early 2020, some of the visually spaces that may be deleted before it can be archived distinctive elements of the Boogaloo began to emerge. or analysed. Many were jokey references to codewords, which social media users adopted to avoid content moderation. The clearest example of this so far is the Boogaloo, a The Hawaiian shirts, for example, started as a nod to US-based phenomenon that’s been linked to several the ‘big luau’, which some users began using in place of violent attacks in 2020. At least two people have been ‘Boogaloo’ in an effort to avoid detection. The igloo was charged with terrorism offences,2 multiple murders also adopted as a symbol after the ‘big igloo’ became of law enforcement officers,3 and an alleged plot to another Boogaloo codeword. kidnap Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer.4 The important thing to understand is that, at this stage, These forms of extremism are born and nurtured in there was nothing that could reasonably be considered online spaces. The ambiguity of memes and of meme a Boogaloo ideology. Conceptually, the Boogaloo culture plays a crucial role, but other factors unique consisted of vague references to desiring civil unrest, to digital platforms are also important, such as the opposition to law enforcement (and tax agencies) and potentially radicalising role of algorithms and the a heavy emphasis on gun rights, but beyond those ways in which social media platforms that prioritise broad attitudes there was no coherent ideological engagement create inherently escalatory social basis common to all or even most people engaging dynamics. The media spotlight has also been a major with the meme. There was no widely held consensus galvanising factor. on what should spark the civil war, or what should Understanding the ways in which these digital-native happen after it. There was also no centrally organised differ from traditional or even digitised group structure or clear dividing line between who was extremist movements (that is, extremist groups that or was not a ‘Boogaloo Boi’. For many, it was more a began with a well-established offline existence and long-running social media joke than a meaningful belief later moved into being active in online spaces) will be or desire for real violence. important in order to respond to them effectively. Over the course of 2020, however, that dynamic began The phenomenon now known as the Boogaloo can be to evolve rapidly. This was partly a result of external traced back at least as far as 2018, through references events and how the social dynamics of social media to the ‘Civil War 2: Electric Boogaloo’ on the social platforms drive responses to those events. The social media platforms Facebook and Reddit.5 This was an dynamics of platforms such as Facebook and Reddit adaptation of an existing meme that used ‘Electric create cycles of escalation, in that the design of the Boogaloo’ (a reference to the Breakin’ 2: Electric platform encourages users to compete with each Boogaloo movie) as a reference to a poor quality other to generate engagement, and the most engaging sequel.6 The ‘Civil War 2: Electric Boogaloo’ meme content is often the most extreme. It’s also the most was originally used by US-based gun rights activists likely to be algorithmically recommended or surfaced to refer to the consequences of government or law to others. Algorithms also play a role in spreading and enforcement passing stricter gun control laws or trying cross-propagating Boogaloo content by recommending to ‘take their guns’. users who join one Boogaloo group to join more groups and pages connected to the Boogaloo. T he impact of online platforms , social media and technology on terrorism Figure 1: Facebook page, captured 29 September 2020

Figure 2: The Boogaloo flag mimics the federal security officer outside a courthouse US flag, featuring an igloo and a Hawaiian and critically injured another, stole a car and patterned stripe wrote Boogaloo-related phrases across it in his own blood before finally being caught.14 Over the course of one week in October, a string of at least 16 arrests took place, most connected to a plot to kidnap Michigan’s Governor, Gretchin Whitmer, potentially murder her and spark a civil war.15 A senior law enforcement official reportedly told NBC News that the group ‘believes’ in the Boogaloo.16 The group’s leader, Brandon Caserta, had also posted videos to TikTok of himself in a Hawaiian shirt as he went on an anti-government tirade.17 However, by far the greatest factor in driving the There’s a reasonable debate to be had over how evolution of the Boogaloo from a series of loosely pivotal the Boogaloo was in inspiring those linked social media groups into something much incidents and whether, if the Boogaloo hadn’t closer to an extremist movement seems to have existed, these individuals would simply have gone been the media spotlight. on to commit violence in the name of some other As the tumult of 2020 began to unfold, Boogaloo cause. The same questions could be posed about Bois, in their Hawaiian shirts and often heavily almost any form of extremism, however. The fact armed, became a highly visible presence in that law enforcement consider the movement protests across the US. They were active in gun significant enough to mention it in court rights rallies in January,9 anti-lockdown protests filings—and that one perpetrator considered it in May10 and George Floyd protests in June.11 significant enough to write in his own blood— suggests that the Boogaloo is important to Three men in Nevada, who were described in 12 consider as a form of extremism in its own right court documents as self-identified members of as well as in combination with other forms of the Boogaloo and belonged to a Nevada-based anti-government extremism. Boogaloo Facebook group, were charged with terrorism offences in connection with plans to use All of those incidents were accompanied by waves the protests as a pretext for escalating violence of mainstream media attention, which sought to and targeting law enforcement.13 In another define and characterise the Boogaloo for their dramatic incident, an Air Force sergeant allegedly audiences. The Boogaloo was described variously inspired by the Boogaloo ambushed and killed as a ‘group’, a ‘movement’, a ‘far-right militia’, a California sheriff’s deputy, shot to death a ‘white nationalists’ or even ‘white supremacists’.

35 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

This coverage was, of course, voraciously consumed The closest thing the Boogaloo had to leaders at the by the Boogaloo Bois themselves. The subsequent time were the administrators and moderators of the debates and arguments over whether the media’s largest Boogaloo Facebook groups, some of which characterisation of the Boogaloo was accurate (for had tens of thousands of members. Some of those example, between those who objected to being individuals used their platform to reject the idea that characterised as white nationalists and those who were the Boogaloo was a racist movement, expressing happy to own the label) exposed contradictions that support for Black Lives Matter protesters and had previously been papered over. asserting that the Boogaloo was about opposition to law enforcement and the state, not about In short, the ambiguity of memes and meme culture racial hierarchies. had, for a time, allowed the Boogaloo to mean almost anything to almost anyone, so long as violence against That overt rejection of racism wasn’t uniform, the state was involved. Libertarians and anarchists however, and there continues to be a significant saw an uprising of the people against the oppressions racist element running through the memes and of government; white nationalists saw an uprising conversations in Boogaloo communities. For of white people against political correctness and the example, there was a brief period on some Boogaloo perceived oppression of whites in a multiracial state. Reddit boards in which Boogaloo Bois of colour They both hung out in the same Facebook groups and were posting pictures of themselves to prove that shared the same Pepe, Shiba Inu and Hawaiian shirt Boogaloo followers were neither all white nor memes, largely unaware that those memes were being white supremacists. Some of those posts garnered interpreted differently by each of them. hundreds of positive comments and upvotes. On the same Reddit boards, however, thinly coded references Under the harsh glare of the media spotlight, however, to shooting black people are casually dropped in with those internal fractures were exposed. It was the no disapprobation from other posters. media’s efforts to define the Boogaloo that pushed them to begin to define themselves. What this has led to is an argument over who the ‘true’ Boogaloo Bois are, who has the right to use their The media coverage complicated this in another symbols and who has the power to decide what they way, too. As is so often the case, the visibility that stand for. In the screenshot in Figure 3, for example, the media gave sent a wave of new people flooding moderators of a Reddit board took a stance opposing into the Boogaloo groups across social media, and racism (while implicitly acknowledging that ‘white particularly on Facebook. These new users thought they supremacist nazi shit’ is a problem within Boogaloo were joining the kinds of groups that the media had groups). As commenters on the post noted, however, told them to expect: far-right and with at least a lean other explicitly white supremacist communities towards . What this meant is that, just on Reddit are also using the Boogaloo symbols. at the time the Boogaloo groups were seeking to define Commenters suggest those groups are ‘not the true themselves, they also faced an influx of people looking followers’ of the Boogaloo. to join far-right and white nationalist groups, thereby adding support to those elements of the existing Boogaloo community.

Figure 3: Discussion on a Boogaloo Reddit board To be sure, internal disagreements over what the T he impact of online platforms , social media and technology on terrorism movement stands for and where power lies are Notes nothing new for extremist groups. The Boogaloo 1 Anne Helmond, Fernando N van der Vlist, ‘Social and other similar digital-first forms of extremism media and platform historiography: challenges and aren’t completely different or separate from other opportunities’, TMG Journal for Media History, 2019, forms of extremism and are likely to demonstrate 22(1):6–34, online. many of the same dynamics and characteristics. 2 Amy Forliti, ‘Alleged Boogaloo members face terrorism What does appear to be different, however, is charges in Minnesota’, ABC News, 5 September 2020, online. the speed of escalation (with barely a year from a series of mostly joking memes to all-too-real 3 Richard Winton, Maura Dolan, Anita Chabria, ‘Far-right murders and alleged terror plots), accompanied “boogaloo boys” linked to killing of California law officers and other violence’,Los Angeles Times, by lingering confusion and decentralisation. 17 June 2020, online. The lightning pace of radicalisation has far outstripped the process of ideological growth; in 4 Taylor Hatmaker, ‘Militia tied to plot to kidnap Gov. Whitmer was removed from Facebook in boogaloo short, despite multiple committed and planned purge’, Tech Crunch, 9 October 2020, online. attacks, it’s still not clear who the Boogaloo Bois Know Your Meme are or what they stand for, other than violence for 5 ‘Boogaloo’, , online. violence’s sake. 6 Matt Patches, ‘How “Breakin’ 2: Electric Boogaloo” became a movie and then a meme’, Grantland, That hollowness at the heart of the Boogaloo 22 December 2014, online. doesn’t make it less dangerous. If anything, 7 Henry Navarro Delgado, ‘Far-right “boogaloo” it makes it more volatile. For the majority, it’s movement is using Hawaiian shirts to hide its still mostly a funny internet joke; for a handful, intentions’, The Conversation, 23 July 2020, online. it’s something to kill and die for. This memetic 8 Blyth Crawford, ‘Chan culture and violent extremism’, ambiguity is likely to be easily hijacked to serve a Global Network on Extremism & Technology, range of agendas, or to feed into the world views 31 December 2019, online. of self-radicalising individuals who can read into it 9 Jane Coaston, ‘The Virginia gun rights rally raising fears almost anything they want. of violence, explained’, Vox, 17 January 2020, online. Depending on how you want to count, the 10 Tess Owen, ‘The “Boogaloo Bois” are bringing their Boogaloo as something closer to a meaningful AR-15s and civil war ideology to the lockdown protests’, Vice, 5 August 2020, online. movement than a meme is barely a year and perhaps even only a few months old. It’s far too 11 EJ Dickson, ‘Far-right “Boogaloo Boys” are trying to early to say what its ultimate impact will be. incite violence at protests’, Rolling Stone, no date, online. What it’s already proven, however, is the way in which, given the right digital environment and 12 US District Court, District of Nevada, ‘USA vs. Stephen the right external circumstances, something as T Parshall, aka “Kiwi”, Andrew Lynam and William L Loomis’, 2 June 2020, online. ambiguous as a series of memes and jokes can rapidly transform into the kind of radicalising 13 Derek Hawkins, ‘Federal authorities file charges against force that drives some individuals to ambush 3 alleged Boogaloo followers in Nevada’, Washington Post, 5 June 2020, online. law enforcement, commit murder, write in their own blood across a stolen car or plot to kidnap 14 Lois Beckett, ‘Air force sergeant linked to “boogaloo” a politician. Whatever the Boogaloo may evolve movement charged in federal officer’s death’, The Guardian, 17 June 2020, online. into, one thing’s clear: it’s not just a joke anymore. 15 Kelly Weill, ‘Sixteen “Boogaloo” followers have been busted in 7 days’, Daily Beast, 9 October 2020, online. 16 ‘Brandon Caserta in anti-government TikTok video’, Detroit News, 8 October 2020, online. 17 Ben Collins, Brandy Zadrozny, Tom Winter, Corky Siemaszko, ‘Whitmer conspiracy allegations tied to “boogaloo” movement’, NBC News, 9 October 2020, online.

37 THE IMPACT OF ONLINE PLATFORMS, SOCIAL MEDIA AND TECHNOLOGY ON TERRORISM

Assessing the magnitude of the threats posed by hoax devices in terrorist attacks and effective countermeasures

DR JOSHUA SINAI Professor of Practice, Counterterrorism Studies, Capitol Technology University Laurel, Maryland, USA

39 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Terrorist attackers generally employ real weapons in motivation is to disrupt and tie up law enforcement their attacks, such as firearms, improvised explosive agencies that are forced to unnecessarily expend devices (IEDs), edged weapons such as knives and new valuable public safety resources in responding to hoax technologies such as weaponised unmanned aerial incidents, which they must assume to be genuine. vehicles (drones).1 Such weapons are intended to be as lethal as possible as part of the attackers’ intention to cause mass fatalities and spread mass panic and anxiety throughout the larger public as a way to Types of hoax attacks publicise the extremists’ cause. When real weapons aren’t available, terrorists will use ‘hoax’ firearms or In general, there are three types of hoax terrorist explosive devices, harmless powders in the form of attacks. The first type, which is indirect, consists of fake weaponised letters, or even threatening telephone communicated hoax claims of responsibility by terrorist calls about imminent attacks that don’t occur to terrify groups or lone actors for incidents they didn’t conduct, their intended victims and harass the responding as a way to exaggerate their fighting capability. Such law enforcement agencies. That’s especially the case claims are usually made one day after an attack via for lone-actor terrorists, who lack the financial and a group’s media arm, its supporting extremist social logistical means of organised groups to acquire real media forums, or both. High-profile examples include a weapons. In some attacks, a weapon or a vehicle used claim (which the US Government confirmed was false) to run down pedestrians might be accompanied by an by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in mid-June additional hoax weapon, such as a toy gun or a fake 2016 that its ‘covert unit’ had assassinated an American explosive device, to increase the perceived lethality of military officer who was working at the Incirlik air base the attack. Some terrorist plots that are thwarted by in Turkey, and an October 2016 claim (which the US counterterrorism agencies can involve hoax threats by Central Command denied) that its fighters had shot terrorist ‘wannabes’. down a US A-10 Warthog aircraft in Syria.2 A second type of hoax consists of using hoax devices as a secondary This article covers only the use of hoax weapons part of a real attack using a real weapon. The final and devices during the course of real attacks by type consists of issuing a hoax warning of an imminent ideologically driven extremists. To discuss the attack, generally communicated via a telephone call or magnitude of the threat posed by these types of an email. hoax tactics and weaponry, I explore the motivation for terrorists to resort to such tactics, the types of hoax weapons used, a chronology of significant hoax incidents, and some of the early warning indicators that may be useful to law enforcers in identifying them Chronology of significant as hoaxes, although there’s always a residual risk in assessing an incident as a hoax. hoax incidents This is a listing of significant hoax attacks of the second and third types that have occurred worldwide since Motivations to 9/11. • 11 September 2011: The four Al-Qaeda operatives employ hoax weapons who hijacked United Airlines Flight 93 claimed to possess a bomb they were going to detonate on and devices board the aircraft as they forced passengers to the back of the plane, although no bomb was used in the The use of hoax weapons and devices is due to attack.3 several factors, such as the attackers’ difficulty in • March 2016: Seif Eldin Mustafa used a hoax explosive acquiring real firearms, IEDs or weaponised letter belt to hijack EgyptAir Flight 181, which had departed bombs and packages. In these cases, the next best from Alexandria en route to Cairo. The hoax device weapon becomes a weapon-like hoax device or a fake turned out to be iPhone cases tied together with threatening telephone or email warning. Terrorists cloth. When the aircraft was forced to land in Cyprus, wearing hoax explosive belts, in particular, make it the hijacker surrendered following several hours of difficult for responding law enforcement officers, negotiation.4 who might be wary of shooting at short range for fear • January 2016—March 2017: Hundreds of threats, that such a belt could be detonated and kill them in the form of phone calls and emails, threatening and others. imminent bomb attacks or active shooters were Other motivating factors include a desire to cause made to schools, social centres, and other facilities at least some degree of disruption and panic. The associated with Jewish communities in Australia, attackers understand that even hoax attacks will Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the US. The threats generate massive headlines in the targeted country’s resulted in evacuations and police responses. In media, thereby publicising their cause and projecting all instances, security sweeps found no evidence them as ‘heroic’ actors among their supporters. A final of physical threats. It’s alleged that the suspect, Michael Ron David Kadar, had started making • February 2020: Sudesh Amman, recently T he impact of online platforms , social media and technology on terrorism the threats in 2015, but he was charged for released from prison after serving time for the threats made in 2016, when he turned 18.5 terrorism-related offences, strapped a fake Kadar, an American-born Israeli with a history bomb to his body and stabbed two people on a of mental instability, was subsequently arrested busy street in London.12 in Ashkelon, Israel, in March 2017 and convicted • November 2020: Fejzulai Kujtim carried out a 6 in June 2018. shooting and knifing attack in Vienna, killing • June 2017: Three jihadi attackers rammed four people and wounding 22 others. He was a van into pedestrians on London Bridge armed with an automatic rifle, a hand gun and before exiting the vehicle armed with knives a machete and wore a fake suicide vest. He was and wearing fake explosive belt devices and killed by responding police nine minutes after indiscriminately stabbing people in the nearby the attacks began.13 Borough Market.7 • August 2017: A jihadi driver rammed pedestrians on an avenue that was packed with tourists in Cambrils, a coastal town in Advantages of using Catalonia, killing 14 people and injuring more than 100 before fleeing on foot. Eight hours hoaxes in attacks later, as part of the coordinated attack, a black Audi A3 ploughed into pedestrians at As demonstrated by those ten cases, there are Cambrils, killing a female pedestrian. When the several advantages for the perpetrators in using Audi overturned, five jihadists got out, some hoaxes in their attacks, whether as a primary or a wearing fake suicide belts. Four were killed by secondary tactic. Those advantages include the a policeman at the scene. The fifth escaped but relative ease of manufacture of fake weapons, was later killed by the responding police.8 their use as force multipliers when combined with real weapons, their use to intimidate • October 2017: After using his truck to ram potential victims by convincing people that pedestrians along a mile-long bike path in a more lethal attack might be underway, and Lower Manhattan, killing eight people and their use to give attackers extra time to defend wounding 11 others, Sayfullo Saipov smashed against law enforcers who are uncertain about the truck into a school bus. He jumped out of whether additional weapons, such as IEDs, might the vehicle brandishing what appeared to be be involved. two guns, but were in fact a paintball gun and a pellet gun, shouting ‘Allahu akbar’ (Arabic for For terrorists, especially lone actors with limited ‘God is great’). At that point, a responding New resources, even the simplest fake devices can be York Police Department officer shot him dead.9 made to appear to be real weapons, and their • March 2018: Daniel Frisiello sent deployment in an attack can generate maximum several threatening letters containing a fear among potential victims. For example, the suspicious-looking white powder to several fake devices used by the London Bridge attackers prominent people, including US President in June 2017 were belts mounted with plastic Donald Trump’s sons. One of the letters was water bottles wrapped in silver duct tape.14 opened by Donald Trump Jr’s then-wife, In two of the 2017 attacks (August and October), Vanessa Trump, inside their New York the terrorists used vehicles to ram pedestrians apartment. This wasn’t the first time Frisiello before exiting the vehicles with hoax devices (toy had sent suspicious-looking white-powder guns and fake explosive belts), intending to look letters. He had also reportedly sent one to as though they were escalating their attacks with family members of presidential candidate additional weapons. Those tactics also made Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential the attacks appear more threatening to the election campaign, threatening that the next responding police officers, who were concerned letter wouldn’t be fake if Trump didn’t drop out that firearms would be used to shoot additional of the race. In September 2018, Frisiello pleaded victims or that bombs might be exploded to inflict guilty to 13 counts of mailing a threat to injure a greater casualties. person and six counts of false information and hoaxes.10 During an attack in which the use of a knife might • November 2019: Usman Khan, who had been be accompanied by the detonation of a possible convicted and sentenced to eight years in IED, bystanders are likely to be reluctant to prison for ‘terrorism offences’ and released intervene, fearing that they might be killed in an from prison the previous year, stabbed several ensuing explosion. pedestrians, killing two, near London Bridge. He had also strapped a fake bomb to his body. He was killed by responding police.11

41 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Indicators to pre-empt Notes 1 Ben Hubbard, Palko Karasz, Stanley Reed, ‘Two major Saudi hoax attackers Oil installations hit by drone strike, and US blames Iran’, New York Times, 15 September 2019, online. It’s difficult to identify hoax weapons, especially when they’re used alongside by real weapons. It’s possible, in 2 Glen Johnson, Nabih Bulos, ‘Islamic State claims it killed American working at air base in Turkey’, Los Angeles Times, the case of fake threats, to identify indicators such as 16 June 2016, online. references by an attacker to his exaggerated lethality, grandiose threat scenarios, the wide geographical 3 ‘Flight 93 hijacker: “Shall we finish it off?”’, CNN, 23 July 2004, online. dispersal of claimed targets, the claimed involvement of additional attackers who aren’t likely to be part of 4 ‘EgyptAir plane hijacked, “unstable” man arrested’, CBS News, the plot, and other details that often aren’t present 29 March 2016, online. in real attacks. On the other hand, in the heat of the 5 ‘US-Israeli teen convicted of threats against Jewish centres’, moment, law enforcement responders and others in BBC News, 28 June 2018, online. the immediate vicinity mightn’t be able to distinguish 6 ‘US-Israeli teen convicted of threats against Jewish centres’. fake weapons from real ones, and the consequences 7 ‘London attack: Seven killed in vehicle and stabbing of wrongly judging a weapon to be fake are grave incidents’, BBC News, 4 June 2017, online. enough to prevent people making that call without 8 ‘Barcelona and Cambrils attacks: what we know so far’, compelling evidence. BBC News, 27 August 2017, online. 9 Jamiles Lartey, Amanda Holpuch, Joanna Walters, Jon Swaine, ‘Eight people killed in New York “act of terror” after truck drives on to bike path’, The Guardian, 1 November 2017, Conclusion online. 10 ‘Man who mailed white powder to Trump’s sons gets The use of hoax weapons and devices in attacks, probation’, Reuters, 20 April 2019, online. whether as an attack’s primary or secondary tactic, is 11 ‘Convicted terrorist Usman Khan kills two civilians, injures likely to continue to be pervasive because of the many three in London Bridge attack’, The New Daily, 30 November benefits they provide to perpetrators. Hoax attacks 2019, online. generate widespread media attention and heightened 12 Alexander Robertson, “Streatham attacker Sudesh Amman alarm and disruption, even if they fail to inflict lethal or is latest terrorist to wear fake bomb vest so he can die from other physical damage. ‘suicide by cop’ and become a ‘martyr’,” Mail Online, 3 February, 2020, online. It’s also important to anticipate new types of hoax 13 Kate Connolly, Philip Oltermann, ‘Vienna attack: arrests made weapons and devices being used in terrorist attacks. after four killed in “Islamist terror” shooting’, The Guardian, That includes the potential use of drones that appear 4 November 2020, online. to be weaponised but aren’t. In December 2018, a 14 Yonette Joseph, ‘London Bridge attack: the implements of major incident involving a non-weaponised drone at terror’, New York Times, 11 June 2017, online. Gatwick Airport in the UK caused world-wide disruption 15 Justin Rowlett, ‘Gatwick drone attack possible inside job, say when around 1,000 flights had to be cancelled or police’, BBC News, 14 April 2019, online. delayed. While that turned out to be an insider attack, with no terrorism nexus, it highlights the impact of hoax terrorist threats.15 Terrorist adversaries are always seeking to exploit their targeted authorities’ vulnerabilities by employing real and hoax weapons and devices to spread as much panic and anxiety as possible, both in the immediate vicinity and throughout wider society. Emerging types of hoax weapons and devices, and approaches to deal with them, need to be anticipated by law makers and national security agencies. TERRORISM FINANCING, SUPPORT AND THE ORGANISED CRIME NEXUS

Terrorism financing, support and the organised crime nexus Terrorist financing: global policy challenges and initiatives in 2020

DR GORDON HOOK Executive Secretary, Asia/Pacific Group on Money-Laundering Sydney, Australia

43 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Terrorist financing in itself, and as a predicate crime to abuse of not-for-profits (including sham charities), money laundering,1 challenges national, regional and online crowdfunding, migrant and trade in global security,2 threatens financial integrity3 and distorts oil, other natural resources and illicit antiquities.10 economies.4 During the 2019 ‘No Money for Terror’ In the last category, the funds generated from the sale ministerial conference in Melbourne, Minister for Home of oil by Islamic State (IS) to support its campaign in Affairs Peter Dutton remarked that the economic impact 2015 were staggering: ‘80,000 and 120,000 barrels per of terrorism globally was US$52 billion in 2017, according day, generating USD $2–$4 million in daily profits. IS to the Global Terrorism Index. The following year, the brought in USD $500 million from oil and gas sales in same index cited a 38% decline, to US$33 billion. On 2015 alone.’11 In addition, the IS trade in antiquities to the basis of the numbers alone, it appears that some raise funds for IS-related attacks in Syria and Iraq saw successes may have been achieved in mitigating the world respond with shock, not only to the abuse of the global threat posed by terrorists, including their historic art and archaeological antiquities but to the financing, but is that the correct inference? scale of funds raised.12 The UN Secretary-General recently observed, in the In late 2020, the FATF reported that the fundraising midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, that ‘terrorist and activities of IS continue to pose a serious global threat violent extremist groups see the uncertainty created by involving numerous revenue sources, including real the pandemic as a tactical advantage.’5 Those comments estate investments, offshore investments in ‘secrecy’ tax are supported by a recent Financial Action Task Force havens and the counterfeiting of medical drugs during (FATF) publication on the risks of money laundering the Covid-19 pandemic, even though, at the same and terrorism financing associated with Covid-19. The time, IS has had to draw on its own financial reserves pandemic has led to the implementation, globally, numbering in the low hundreds of millions of dollars. of a range of financial assistance packages, including social assistance and tax relief, which may represent new avenues for criminal exploitation.6 On that basis, FATF urged that ‘governments should emphasise the importance of implementing the risk-based approach Global compliance when mitigating the risk of funds being diverted to support terrorists and terrorist groups.7 with FATF standards How are countries responding to their obligations The requirement to criminalise terrorist financing to implement counterterrorism financing (CTF) was added to the FATF standards at a special plenary obligations and what are some of the more significant session of the FATF in the months following the issues to be concerned with? Before those questions 11 September 2001 attacks in the US. However, global are answered, it’s worthwhile to revisit, if only briefly, compliance with those requirements in the period the international CTF standards and some of the key between 2003 and 2012 was very low. More than half responses by the FATF. of more than 160 countries assessed in that period failed to implement, to any satisfactory degree, the In summary, according to the UN, terrorism financing required provisions in domestic law, and even fewer occurs when a person provides or collects funds countries displayed effective implementation of their intending or knowing that they’ll be used, in full CTF laws, including investigating and prosecuting or in part, to carry out a terrorist offence or cause offenders. From 2015 to 2016, the FATF undertook death or serious injury or to compel a government a global assessment of countries, referred to as the or international organisation to do or to abstain ‘Terrorist Financing Fact Finding Initiative’. That review 8 from doing anything. While the UN requires a link determined that, out of 194 countries, 13 (including between the financing of terrorism and an act or many considered at high risk of terrorist financing) still acts of terrorism, the FATF standards go beyond that had ‘fundamental’ gaps’ in their legal CTF frameworks, and require countries to criminalise the financing of while many other countries still had some serious gaps, terrorist organisations and individual terrorists without albeit not ‘fundamental’. Those gaps meant failure by a link to a specific acts, consistent with UN Security many countries to fully address and effectively target Council resolutions in which countries are required their terrorism financing risks, including those that to prohibit nationals or any persons and entities may be related to IS. On that point, relatively few of the within their territories from making funds, financial 194 countries had obtained convictions for terrorist assets or economic resources available to terrorists financing.13 In 2020, effective compliance with the CTF or terrorist organisations.9 Unlike money launderers, standards is still a global concern. who seek primarily to profit from their behaviour, terrorist financiers seek to support terrorists or terrorist The ‘Panama Papers’ revelations in 2016 and then activities without a profit motive. the ‘Paradise Papers’ in 2018 raised even more concerns in the global community about the extent Terrorist groups rely on a variety of fundraising and to which terrorism financing was occurring through fund-movement methods to achieve their objectives, products offered by offshore financial centres, and ranging from extortion, kidnapping for ransom and so-called tax havens, to hide and move illicit funds. drug trafficking to less violent or less serious One report put the of funds in offshore measures, including taxation of legitimate trade, havens at 10% of global GDP or US$7.5 trillion.14 Partly in response to those revelations, the FATF A number of cases in the joint report illustrate T errorism financing , support and the organised crime nexus commissioned studies into the risks posed by funding relevant to financing foreign terrorist poor implementation of the beneficial ownership fighters’ travel expenses to conflict zones, 15 standards and found that there were significant sending funds offshore to support local risks of terrorism financing in countries (including terrorist activities in other jurisdictions, and the offshore havens) that fail to implement beneficial purchase of propaganda materials such as flags ownership requirements. and other symbols. Vulnerabilities involving social media platforms include anonymity and encryption. However, even though law enforcement authorities have spent considerable Emerging terrorism time addressing the use of social media for content and propaganda, it’s been remarked financing issues that ‘comparatively little attention has been given to its potential role in countering terrorist Subsequent to raising funds, terrorists are faced financing.’19 More needs to be invested in this with the question of how to move their money. It area, especially to identify users who act on has been observed that ‘terrorists seem to choose behalf of others to raise funds. methods of moving funds that take into account issues of: volume, risk, convenience, simplicity, costs, and speed.’16 However, there are two points Virtual currencies and to note. terrorism financing As law enforcement authorities tighten the noose Virtual currencies (cryptocurrencies or digital on established and previously ‘reliable’ methods currencies) are decentralised units of value to raise and move terrorist funds, novel methods untied to fiat currency and without supervisory emerge to address vulnerability-closure, including oversight. ‘They possess their own unit of account investments in the food, farming, clothing and … while the respective value is determined by construction industries. However, there are supply and demand and trust in the system.’20 concerning levels of understanding by many countries across the globe of their own terrorism According to the RAND Corporation, virtual financing risks. The FATF standards require currencies are fast becoming a concern as new countries to identify, assess and understand their sources of financing for terrorist activities.21 own risks, yet many countries, including those Unlike currency notes, virtual currencies ‘do not that are considered by the FATF and other bodies leave a paper trail for law enforcement to follow as being at ‘very high risk’ of terrorist financing, and in the case of decentralised digital currencies, fail to appreciate the risks within their own records of transaction are not maintained by borders and within their regional context that an intermediary’.22 That makes it difficult to affect their domestic risk environment. construct prosecution briefs should investigations undercover people or groups raising funds With those points in mind, a number of areas for the purposes of terrorism-related acts or present serious and ongoing concerns in relation organisational purposes such as propaganda to terrorism financing and are currently the focus and recruitment. It also makes it difficult to of the FATF and other bodies. They’re also areas undertake tracing and freezing of virtual assets where decision- and policymakers could focus involved in the funding of organisations or their efforts further. their activities. Establishing robust supervisory structures to regulate the use, and exchange, of virtual currencies is an important step in Social media and addressing terrorism financing risks associated terrorism financing with these products. As one academic has observed, terrorist As commented by the director of the US Financial structures, which are traditionally built of Crimes Enforcement Network: loose-knit cells, divisions and subgroups, are As new technologies emerge to serve the ideally suited for soliciting funds on the internet.17 financial industry, FinCEN recognizes the A recent joint typologies report on crowdfunding need for sustained industry cooperation and and terrorist financing estimated that ‘by 2021, a flexible legal and regulatory architecture 3.02 billion people will be using some form of that encourages innovation while allowing social media service.’18 Those services are easy appropriate regulatory engagement and to use, expand the reach of organisations to a effective AML/CFT oversight.23 global scale and provide terrorists and terrorist organisations with a valuable channel to generate large amounts of money in a short period from very small amounts per donor. 45 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

In October 2019, in response to that call and others Some of the issues to be considered and addressed from the international community, the FATF amended in the new project will be the identification regulatory its suite of recommendations to include new measures gaps and how to address them; arms supply sources, designed to address the risks of serious financial crime including national stockpiles and the chain leading relating to virtual currencies and service providers. from those sources; and the use of cash to acquire Recommendation 15 was significantly expanded to illegal firearms on the black market, to name just a few. require countries to formally assess their risks in this The project is expected to report back to the FATF in area and requiring service providers to be licensed 2021 with case studies and recommendations. and registered, which means they must be supervised for compliance with anti-money-laundering / counter-terrorism-financing obligations across a range of measures in the FATF standards, not just those Conclusion and relevant to virtual currencies. It’s early days in the FATF assessment process but, recommendations of those countries that have so far been assessed Terrorism financing isn’t abating. As long as terrorists for compliance with the new standard, many and terrorist organisations seek to progress their aren’t achieving a satisfactory level of compliance, agenda through the commission of violent acts and the thereby posing an ongoing terrorism financing risk. recruitment of individuals to their cause, funds will be necessary. As one avenue of fundraising is identified by Illicit arms trafficking and policymakers and measures are put in place to address vulnerabilities, other avenues open. Countries therefore terrorist financing need to continually undertake assessments of their In a 2017 report published by the Royal United Services terrorism financing risks, not just on a periodic basis Institute in the UK, the links between legal and illegal but as circumstances change, and to align their policies acquisition of firearms linked to terrorist financing was and resources to those new and emerging risks. examined. The report noted that: More needs to be done to address the financing the use of firearms (particularly automatic challenges associated with social media and with weapons) has resulted in casualties on a far virtual currencies, as well as to identify gaps in national greater scale. As such, increased focus should legislation that result in the trade in firearms for be placed on identifying and disrupting financial terrorist purposes. It will be interesting to review the flows [for terrorist financing] related to the trade outcomes of the new FATF project on the links between in illicit firearms.24 terrorist financing and arms trafficking. The report also referenced Australia’s ‘grey market’, Hence, in answer to the questions posed at the which was said to comprise an estimated 250,000 beginning of this paper, the fall in only one year of unregistered guns owned by individuals for recreational global funds generated for terrorism and terrorist purposes. This potential weapons source was support doesn’t necessarily translate into long-term highlighted as a risk for acquisition by ‘lone wolves’ successes. Complacency is a vulnerability easily or terrorist groups at low cost. In highlighting this, the exploited by terrorists. As governments play catch-up report referred to the 2014 Lindt Cafe siege in Sydney, in with legislative responses or fail to close gaps due to which an unregistered sawn-off shotgun was used. their poor understanding of their own risks, terrorists are many steps ahead, looking for new vulnerabilities In June and October 2020, partly in response to the and gaps to exploit. report and partly as a result of the accumulation of FATF member case studies, including from Australia, the FATF agreed on a new terrorist financing research project on the links between arms trafficking and terrorism financing. In proposing the project, the FATF identified some key areas of vulnerability and risks involving legal and illegal sales of firearms and ammunition. For legal sales, there’s concern that arms purchased have made and will continue to make their way into the black market and to terrorists. For illegal sales, the project will look at the acquisition of illegally produced and marketed firearms for the purpose of supplying them to lone-wolf terrorists and terrorist groups. Notes T errorism financing , support and the organised crime nexus 1 The FATF requires the inclusion of terrorism 17 Gabriel Weiman, Terrorism in cyberspace: the next financing as a predicate crime to money laundering. generation, Columbia University, New York, 2015. FATF glossary definition of ‘designated categories 18 Social media and terrorism financing, Asia/Pacific Group of offences.’ on Money Laundering & Middle East and North Africa 2 For instance, in Australia the National Financial Action Task Force, Sydney, Australia, 2019, Counter-Terrorism Plan includes terrorism financing online. as a significant and growing national security threat; 19 Social media and terrorist financing: what are the Australia New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee, vulnerabilities and how could public and private sectors National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 4th edition, 2017, collaborate better?, Royal United Services Institute, online. London, 2019, online. 3 General Assembly resolution S20-2, Political 20 C Brenig, R Accorsi, G Müller, ‘Economic analysis of Declaration and Action Plan against Money Laundering, cryptocurrency backed money laundering’, paper 20, A/RES/S-20/2, 21 October 1998: ‘countering the world ECIS 2015, 6. drug problem together … the problem of laundering 21 Rand Corporation (2019), Terrorist use of of money … has expanded internationally to become cryptocurrencies: technical and organisational barriers a global threat to the integrity, reliability and stability and future threats, online. of financial and trade systems and even government structures’, UN, New York, 10 June 1998. 22 Stephen Platt, Criminal capital: how the finance industry facilitates crime, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2015, 50. 4 F Schneider, D Enste, D. (2002), Hiding in the shadows: the growth of the underground economy, Economic 23 Jennifer Calvary, ‘Stopping terror finance: a Issues series, International Monetary Fund, March 2002, coordinated government effort’, testimony to the US online; ‘The fight against money laundering’, Economic House of Representatives Committee on Financial Perspectives: An Electronic Journal of the US Department Services Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing of State, May 2001, 6(2), online. (FinCEN), 24 May 2016, online. 5 ‘Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council 24 Lone-actor and small cell terrorist attacks: a new front on the COVID-19 pandemic’, UN, New York, 2 July 2020, in counter-terrorist finance?, Royal United Services online. Institute, 2017, online. 6 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), COVID-19-related money laundering and terrorist financing: risks and policy responses, FATF, Paris, France, 2020, 5, online. 7 FATF, COVID-19-related money laundering and terrorist financing: risks and policy responses, 10. 8 General Assembly resolution 54/109, United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing, A/RES/54/109, UN, New York, 9 December 1999, Article 2. 9 Criminalising terrorism financing solely on the basis of aiding and abetting, attempt, or conspiracy is insufficient to meet this additional requirement. 10 Other techniques include sham charities designed to exploit the good intentions of donors and simply asking for money or other assets (which, surprisingly, works in some cases). 11 Homeland Security Committee, Cash to chaos: dismantling Isis’ financial infrastructure, majority staff report, US Congress, Washington DC, 2016. 12 See, for instance, Amr Al-Azm, Katie A Paul, Facebook’s black market in antiquities trafficking, terrorism, and war crimes, Athar Research Project, June 2019, online. 13 FATF, Annual report 2015–16. 14 Annette Alstadsæter, Niels Johannesen, Gabriel Zucman, Who owns the wealth in tax havens? Macro evidence and implications for global inequality, working paper 23805, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, September 2017, online. 15 FATF — Egmont Group, Concealment of beneficial ownership, FATF, Paris, France, 2018, online. 16 Michael Freeman, Moyara Ruehsen, ‘Terrorism financing methods: an overview’, Perspectives on Terrorism, 2013, 7(4).

47 TERRORISM FINANCING, SUPPORT AND THE ORGANISED CRIME NEXUS

Countering terrorist financing: strengthening Indonesia–Australia collaboration

SYLVIA LAKSMI PhD Candidate, Australian National University Canberra, Australia

49 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

The degradation of the capabilities of Islamic body but also as an industry regulator that promotes State (IS), including the territory that enabled it to the compliance of reporting parties by applying values claim a ‘caliphate’, financial assets and revenue by of education, persuasion, consistency, proportionality multinational military coalitions in 2017,1 and the and accountability.9 death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,2 were huge blows to Second, both countries emphasise the domestic the group and its associates. What does it mean for life implementation of targeted financial sanctions relating after the so-called caliphate? History has shown that to terrorism and terrorist financing pursuant to UN the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 didn’t lead to Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999)10 and 1373 the end of al-Qaeda; likewise, the IS caliphate wasn’t (2001).11 Indonesia and Australia continue to improve just territorial but also a caliphate of the mind, as the ‘freezing without delay’12 mechanism that applies to envisioned by the group’s leaders.3 The existence of property associated with terrorism financing offences.13 and support for this type of caliphate has remained a However, along with those useful countermeasures, persistent challenge for the world. Governments have it’s also necessary to reduce the ability of terrorists to particularly focused efforts on terrorism financing to legitimise their sources of funds and their ability to disrupt the viability of the caliphate. funnel funds into various other activities, such as for Whatever other lines of action can be used to degrade military training, propaganda, business activities and the power of concepts such as IS’s caliphate or other support to terrorist families, all of which enable terrorist extremist propaganda and to reduce extremists’ ability groups’ capabilities to commit violence.14 to commit violence, governments must maintain a focus on disrupting and reducing terrorist groups’ financing. The work of Indonesia and Australia provides powerful examples. Current best practices of This paper outlines four key points regarding the bilateral partnership between Indonesia and cooperation in the region Australia in developing counter-terrorism-financing Indonesia and Australia have been expanding their (CTF) measures. I discuss a comparative analysis cooperation on CTF through intelligence information between the two countries’ initiatives, the current exchanges, regional risk assessments and public– tactical relationship and the challenges posed in the private partnerships. contemporary regional CTF context. Finally, I propose several recommendations to improve comprehensive Since 2017, INTRAC and AUSTRAC have cemented strategic partnerships to diminish terrorist money flows. a strategic partnership by establishing intelligence information exchange working groups in collaboration with Southeast Asian and New Zealand financial intelligence units (FIUs). The groups are focused on the identification of IS-affiliated organisations CTF strategic policing in in the Asia–Pacific region, the formulation of red flag indicators of terrorist financing risks and Indonesia and Australia capacity-building programs. The programs consist of the establishment of the multilateral analyst The bombing attack in Bali in October 2002 was the 15 first sign of violent Islamist extremism becoming a exchange program, Analyst Hubbing, and the regional sharper issue in the Asia–Pacific region. The fight Financial Intelligence Analysis Course, which have against terrorism became prominent for local been developed to enhance understanding, analysis, authorities, particularly dealing with terrorist funding. capabilities and sharing of intelligence information CTF policymaking in Indonesia and Australia refers and expertise held by Southeast Asian countries and close partner FIUs such as those in Australia and New to compliance with international standards imposed Zealand.16 To facilitate this collaboration, INTRAC, by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which is an AUSTRAC and FIUs in Southeast Asia and New Zealand intergovernmental body founded in 1989 to develop have been developing a secure online regional policies on money laundering and associated crimes.4 information-sharing platform since 2019. The Terrorist The Indonesian and Australian CTF strategy framework Financing Information Sharing Platform will be used can be divided into two major components. as a medium for exchanging intelligence among FIUs, including to provide quick responses following terrorist First, both Indonesia and Australia established a incidents, and to generate watchlists of persons and robust legal groundwork for CTF.5 In 2002, Indonesia financial transactions. established a financial intelligence unit6 called the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis INTRAC and AUSTRAC have also initiated an innovative Center (INTRAC), which works administratively with regional risk assessment that examines trends in financial regulators to supervise industries.7 Australia trends and risks of terrorism funding. The objective used its existing Australian Transaction Reports and is to strengthen legal, regulatory and operational Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), formed in 1991,8 for this frameworks in identifying, interrupting and prosecuting purpose. AUSTRAC works not only as an administrative terrorist financiers, including foreign terrorist fighters.17 INTRAC and AUSTRAC actively promote the Second, it’s been noted that some returning T errorism financing , S upport and the organised crime nexus practice of public–private partnerships pursuant foreign fighters may support the resurgent to the FATF norms. A robust relationship among Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist group, which sent public and private organisations is essential recruits to Syria.23 The re-emergence of JI has in tracking terrorists’ money trails, including been identified as a current threat to regional extending access to information on targets. For security. Para Wijayanto, a businessman running instance, AUSTRAC launched the Fintel Alliance in palm oil plantations,24 who was believed to 2017 as a public–private partnership that involves be JI’s new leader and was arrested in 2019,25 29 government and private-sector members admitted that the organisation had regrouped (domestic and international), in working together and restructured using his personal funds.26 The to fight against money laundering, terrorism term ‘neo-JI’ is used as a rebranding strategy to financing and other serious crime. The alliance promote new activities and to attempt to change incorporates law enforcement and security perspectives on the group from clandestine and agencies, and also members from private underground to a legitimate ‘legal above-ground organisations such as major banks, money economic and social organisation’.27 The group remittance businesses and gambling operators.18 refocused its mission to a ‘soft approach’ through preaching programs (dakwah), Islamic boarding However, there are some barriers to cooperation schools, entrepreneurship training and social between the two countries, such as legal programs to improve family welfare for its framework limitations on information sharing and members and the broader community.28 confidentiality and differing levels of capability in handling terrorism financing cases. Examples Third, territorial loss has become a push factor include the use of technology to support the for IS militants and foreign fighters to move from analysis process, the capabilities and skills of Syria and Iraq to the Philippines,29 Khorasan30 their analysts, varying levels of cooperation with and Jammu and Kashmir.31 Some Indonesian their respective intelligence and law enforcement nationals have relocated to Khorasan32 or agencies, and access to bank records from attempted to join the Islamic State Jammu and financial industries. Kashmir group.33 An emblematic example of this shift is the Indonesian couple who, after failing to travel to Syria, carried out the Jolo Cathedral bombing in Contemporary January 2019, killing 20 people.34 The Australian Government has also noted a heightened challenges in likelihood of Australian foreign fighters relocating to the Philippines in order to join terrorist groups disrupting terrorism there. For example, Australian nationals Robert Cerantonio35 and Abu Adam al-Australi appeared funding in an IS propaganda video and urged Muslims to join the jihad in the Philippines.36 Therefore, Notwithstanding that Indonesia and Australia the increasing threat of violent extremism have been developing CTF initiatives over many in Southeast Asia, and particularly in the years, the threat environment grows increasingly Philippines, has strong implications for security complex. There are four main challenges in policymaking.37 Indonesia38 and Australia39 disrupting funds to terrorists in the region. also face problems in handling foreign fighter First, crowdfunding through social media returnees who request repatriation. platforms is one of the evolving risks of Finally, another challenge is represented by fundraising in the region.19 Crowdfunding is the advancing technology of financial payment vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists through systems. Innovation in financial technologies not-for-profit organisations and humanitarian brings positive opportunities to developing activities.20 Recently, the Covid-19 pandemic countries,40 but those opportunities also has presented another obstacle to the pose substantial risks, such as the misuse war against terrorism financing. There are of cryptocurrencies by terrorists.41 Terrorists concerns that terrorist groups have used the might use those platforms not only to facilitate crisis to raise and move funds to finance their fundraising for terrorist attacks but also for malicious operations21 under the guise of other suspicious transactions not directed to humanitarian aid through legitimate charities or attacks but which enable terrorist organisations not-for-profits22 and use the internet to facilitate to operate and retain or build support, such as crowdfunding activities. actively recruiting members, supporting foreign fighters’ travels, social welfare for terrorists’ widows and children and support for terrorist inmates’ wives.42 51 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Framing a mutual Notes 1 Mohammed Nuruzzaman, ‘The Islamic State is on its alliance knees, but its legacy will long haunt the Middle East’, The Conversation, 17 July 2017, online. In the face of these challenges, while there have been some notable achievements and successes in the 2 Rukmini Callimachi, Falih Hassan, ‘Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS leader known for his brutality, is dead at 48’, New York Times, longstanding and productive CTF cooperation between 27 October 2019, online. Indonesia and Australia, there’s still a lot of work to be done to address the hurdles. That’s to be expected, 3 Patrick B Johnston, Mona Alami, Colin P Clarke, Howard J Shatz, Return and expand? The finances and prospects of the because just as terrorist groups are adaptive so Islamic State after the caliphate, RAND Corporation, Santa countermeasures should be. A range of considerations Monica, 2019, online. and factors will influence the effectiveness of 4 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), International standards on policy responses. This section proposes several combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism & recommendations for potential policy options. proliferation: the FATF recommendations, June 2019, online. First, there’s a greater need to enhance cooperation 5 In criminalising terrorist financing, Indonesia enacted Law on information exchange. The Terrorist Financing No. 8 of 2010 concerning Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Information Sharing Platform – secure joint online Financing Law Number 9 of 2013 (Undang-Undang tentang information-sharing platform – will be an effective tool Pencegahan dan Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Pendanaan to be used among FIUs for providing timely responses Terorisme, UU no. 9 year 2013. LN No. 50 Year 2013, TLN No. 5406), and Australia passed the Suppression of the Financing to prevent future attacks, thus mitigating the risks of of Terrorism Act 2002 (Cwlth). misusing the financial system for terrorism purposes. Furthermore, Indonesia and Australia could unlock 6 A financial intelligence unit (FIU) works on collecting, analysing and disseminating intelligence information to more opportunities by improving the public–private the stakeholders. partnership program and continuing to enhance information sharing in the region against the threats of 7 International Monetary Fund, Financial intelligence units: an overview, 2004, online. extremism and terrorist fighters. 8 AUSTRAC was named as the Cash Transaction Report Agency Second, the two countries should strengthen practical in 1989 and renamed in 1991; Neil Jensen, ‘Creating an cooperation in addressing the challenges posed by environment in Australia hostile to money laundering and online communication and digital payment systems. terrorism financing: a changing role for AUSTRAC’, Macquarie Because those platforms are susceptible to misuse Journal of Business Law, 2008, 93–112, online. by terrorist groups, governments should enhance the 9 Jensen, ‘Creating an environment in Australia hostile to standards of their respective and joint transaction money laundering and terrorism financing: a changing role monitoring and supervisory frameworks by applying for AUSTRAC’. four strategies: 10 This resolution is related with imposed sanctions to any • Establish or improve a central oversight body for person or entity either ‘designated by, or under the authority of, the United Nations Security Council (the Security Council) supervising and monitoring online charities-based under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, crowdfunding activities. including in accordance with the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions • In response to occasional online transactions, regimes’; UN, Resolution 1267, 1999, online. implement mechanisms to identify, validate and 11 UN, Resolution 1373, 2001, online. verify the digital identities of customers. 12 ‘The Glossary of the FATF Recommendations defines without • Newly sophisticated technologies in financial delay, with respect to the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions systems, including virtual assets and new payment regimes, as ideally, within a matter of hours of a designation methods, pose risks and threats requiring mitigation by the United Nations Security Council or its relevant by authorities. Sanctions Committee (e.g. the 1267 Committee, or the 1988 Committee). For the purposes of resolution 1373(2001), the • Law enforcement efforts and legal sanctions for term without delay means upon having reasonable grounds, noncompliant providers should be improved and or a reasonable basis, to suspect or believe that a person or remain responsive to the changing environment. entity is a terrorist, one who finances terrorism or a terrorist organisation.’ FATF, International best practices: targeted Furthermore, considering the prospect of abuse of financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing donation funds to charities by terrorists, governments (Recommendation 6), June 2013, 9, online. should remain vigilant and implement regulations on 13 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-money crowdfunding and not-for-profit organisations. laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures: Indonesia mutual evaluation report, September 2018, online. 14 APG, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures: Australia mutual evaluation report, April 2015, online. 15 The Nusa Dua Statement was adopted and published 37 Clive Williams, ‘Marawi battle has implications for T errorism financing , S upport and the organised crime nexus at the 2nd Counter-Terrorist Financing Summit in Bali, Australians’, The Interpreter, 24 October 2017, online. Indonesia, 2016, online. 38 Cameron Sumpter, ‘Returning Indonesian extremists: 16 The Bangkok Communiqué document was adopted unclear intentions and unprepared responses’, policy and published at the 4th Regional Counter-Terrorism brief, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, Financing Summit in Bangkok, Thailand, 2018, online. The Hague, July 2018, online. 17 AUSTRAC, The regional risk assessment on terrorist 39 Marcus Tantau, ‘Australia addresses the growing threat financing, 2016. of returning foreign fighters’, The Diplomat, 31 July 2019, 18 AUSTRAC, Fintel Alliance, online. online. 19 Agus Santoso, Sylvia W Laksmi, ‘Regional terrorism 40 Department of Home Affairs, Chair’s Statement, financing risk assessment framework: Southeast Asia 2019 ‘No Money for Terror’ Ministerial Conference on and Australia, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Counter-Terrorism Financing, Australian Government, October 2016, 8(10), online. November 2019, online. 20 FATF, Emerging terrorist financing risks, October 2015, 41 V Arianti, Kenneth Yeo Yaoren, ‘How terrorists use online. cryptocurrency in Southeast Asia’, The Diplomat, 30 June 2020, online. 21 FATF, COVID-19-related money laundering and terrorist financing: risks and policy responses, May 2020, online. 42 Sylvia W Laksmi, ‘Nexus between charities and terrorist financing in Indonesia’, Counter Terrorist Trends and 22 FATF, Emerging terrorist financing risks. Analyses, September 2019, 11(7), online. 23 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Colin P Clarke, Samuel Hodgson, Foreign terrorist fighters from Southeast Asia: what happens next?, International Counter-Terrorism Centre, The Hague, 17 February 2020, online. 24 Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, ‘Indonesia uncovers neo-JI terror group that runs oil palm plantation business for funding’, The Straits Times, 2 July 2019, online. 25 AP, ‘Indonesia arrests alleged Jemaah Islamiah terrorist network leader Para Wijayanto’, ABC News, 2 July 2019, online. 26 Supreme Court of Indonesia, Verdict of Para Wijayanto No. 308/Pid.Sus/2020/PN Jkt.Tim, 2020. 27 Alif Satria, ‘The Neo-JI threat: Jema’ah Islamiyah’s resurgence in Indonesia follows an old playbook’, New Mandala, 16 August 2019, online. 28 Supreme Court of Indonesia, Verdict of Para Wijayanto No. 308/Pid.Sus/2020/PN Jkt.Tim. 29 Zachary Abuza, Colin P Clarke, ‘The Islamic State meets Southeast Asia: ISIS seeks new outposts across the Indian Ocean’, Foreign Affairs, 16 September 2019, online. 30 Ahmad Syamsudin, Tia Asmara, Muzliza Mustafa, ‘UN: Islamic State recruitment of Southeast Asians shifts to Afghanistan’,Benar News, 7 February 2020, online. 31 Amira Jadoon, An idea or a threat? Islamic State Jammu & Kashmir, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 9 February 2018, online. 32 Petir Garda Bhawa, ‘JAD Terrorism Fund Comes from Many Countries, Police Say’, Tempo.Co, 24 July 2019, online. 33 Supreme Court of Indonesia, Verdict of Farid Ramadhan No. 377/Pid.Sus/2020/PN Jkt.Tim, 2020. 34 Ana P Santos, ‘Who were the Indonesian husband and wife behind Jolo bombing?’, Rappler, 27 December 2019, online. 35 Reuters, ‘Robert Cerantonio, leader of Australia’s “tinnie terror” plot jailed for seven years’, South China Morning Post, 3 May 2019, online. 36 Kate Hodal, ‘Australian Islamic preacher arrested in Philippines over alleged Isis links’, The Guardian, 12 July 2014, online.

53 TERRORISM FINANCING, SUPPORT AND THE ORGANISED CRIME NEXUS

Demystifying the terror–crime nexus in Australia

DR JOHN COYNE Head of Strategic Policing and Law Enforcement. Head of the North and Australia’s Security, ASPI Canberra, Australia

55 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Nobel Prize-winning Polish American poet, writer The rise of narco-terrorism in central America, and diplomat Czeslaw Miloz, reflecting on Stalinist particularly that involving Mexican organised crime Eastern Europe, once argued that ‘the true enemy of groups, illustrates how criminal groups can take on man [humankind] is generalisation’.1 While Stalin is terrorist characteristics.6 long gone, and the language is now dated, the quote Academic Klaus von Lampe has identified more aptly reflects the pitfalls of adopting overly generalised than 200 different definitions of ‘organised crime’,7 approaches to the analysis of any nexus between terror and by 2011 Joseph Eason and Alex Schmid and crime. had already collected more than 250 academic, There ought to be little doubt that there are government and intergovernmental definitions of connections of varying degrees between organised ‘terrorism’.8 Schmid argues that these definitions crime and terrorism across the globe.2 Nevertheless, provide academic theorists with 50,000 possible further generalisations and the inevitable sweeping combinations.9 While many a media outlet would statements that so often follow them regarding the like it, no simple Venn diagram (see Figure 4) of terror–crime nexus in Australia, as well as that observed terror–crime relationships that conveys anything in our near region, aren’t very helpful to policymakers. beyond superficial meaning is possible, not even In some cases, policy developed based on such for Australia. The exact nature of these connections generalisations runs the risk of worsening the problem.3 and relationships makes them complex, and extracting much meaning from simple diagrams In this chapter, I explore the challenge of the becomes problematic. terror–crime nexus, primarily in Australia, as well as its essential characteristics. I then consider the additional challenges of the nexus in Australia’s near region. Where are we now? Old and new terrorist groups alike use crime to A problem of definitions fund their nefarious activities.10 Globally, evidence has emerged to suggest that the decline in state It’s clear to even the most casual observer that, sponsorship of terrorism has driven groups globally, there have been connections between such as Hezbollah, the Taliban, al-Shabaab and terrorism and crime for several decades, if not longer. Islamic State to engage in a range of serious and The all too familiar link between the Irish Republican transnational crimes.11 From kidnap and ransom Army and organised criminal activities during the to piracy and drug distribution, terrorist groups are Northern Ireland troubles, which led to the movement using crime to support their causes financially. In of many members into a life of crime, illustrates this doing so, they’re inevitably working more closely, well.4 Similarly, Hezbollah’s ongoing involvement in out of necessity, with criminal groups. And there the global cocaine and illicit tobacco markets raises are more than a few criminal groups that are questions about where and when a terrorist group willing to work with anyone to turn a profit. becomes a criminal group with extremist views.5

Figure 4: The simplified terror–crime nexus

International Transnational terrorism organised crime For many terrorist groups, crime is a necessary T errorism financing , support and the organised crime nexus means to an end, not to mention an act of A transactional political defiance. For some individuals, though, the extremist cause is simply a convenient terror–crime nexus? justification for crimes, and the balance of motivation can shift from extremism to simple As much as the generalised terror–crime nexus criminality for both organisations and individuals convergence model doesn’t work in Australia, through time. Criminal motivation certainly let alone universally, neither does a simplified seems to be the case for many of the Hezbollah transactional crime model (Figure 5) do justice to members involved in the global cocaine trade.12 the policy challenges. In Australia’s case, there’s no clear evidence In the Australian national and regional terrorism of a general convergence between terrorism contexts, criminal facilitators continue to play and transnational organised crime. There has critical roles in enabling terrorist attacks and been, however, an emergence of religious and fundraising, even with the rise of lone-actor political ideology among some organised crime terrorism. There are individuals within, and groups. The New South Wales ‘Brothers 4 Life’ connected with, criminal organisations who street gang has consistently demonstrated how provide links between terrorist groups, with a fusion of religious extremism with criminal varying degrees of visibility of their motivation, activities produces a new dynamic in organised to other criminals who provide illicit services crime.13 The same groups have shown how (for example, money laundering) and products connectivity between convicted terrorists, even (for instance, access to chemicals). In the in maximum-security , can result in broader criminal environment, there are also key the radicalisation of others. It’s still not clear crime enablers who provide specialist criminal whether the use of religion and politics in such capabilities not otherwise readily available. groups is opportunism among a small number of They include professionals such as accountants charismatic individuals or part of a broader trend. and lawyers. In the region, terrorism or ethnic conflicts with The 2015 murder of NSW Police civilian a crime nexus have always been the prevailing worker Curtis Chang by terrorist Farhard Khalil narrative. For example, many of the activities Mohammad Jabar illustrates this point. Talal by the Abu Sayyaf and Maute groups in the Alameddine was found guilty of selling the pistol southern Philippines have appeared to be often that Jabar used to execute Chang. Nonetheless, more about crime and profit than ideology.14 the community, religious and cultural dimensions Similarly, rent-taking by ethnic armed groups in of the circumstances before and after the attack Myanmar’s Shan State, in their part of the regional are somewhat opaque. This observation isn’t a synthetic drug manufacturing and smuggling suggestion that terrorist groups don’t engage with networks, is criminal. Of course, the ethnic groups organised crime groups as key facilitators for the are using the funds to continue to support their provision of goods or services. Instead, it’s an specific ideological causes, but there appears to argument that a simplified transactional model be a genuine possibility that ideology isn’t the doesn’t adequately describe the complexity of sole driver. this nexus within Australia or across the region.

Figure 5: The transactional terror–crime nexus

Provision of products and services

Organised crime— Terrorist groups— driven by profit driven by ideology

Payment of money or transfer of value

57 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

new strategy for a group. Level 6 is now concerned with A terror–crime organised crime groups that have remained criminal but become terrorist outfits, too, and are now engaging nexus paradigm in terror. This chapter uses a terror–crime nexus paradigm based This paradigm, while not without empirical on Schmid’s levels of link intensity between organised weaknesses, provides the intellectual granularity crime and terrorist groups (Figure 6).15 The first four needed by policymakers. The paradigm can be used levels illustrate a transition of terror groups from to contextualise the state of Australia’s and the transactional interaction with organised crime through region’s terror–crime nexus. A single overall ‘score’ to full convergence. This paradigm reverses Schmid’s or ‘assessment level’ shouldn’t be generated from original levels 5 and 6. Level 5 is now concerned with this model or analysis resulting from it. Instead, terror groups that use organised crime methods, not groups of activity can be mapped across the strictly as an evolution from convergence as much as a paradigm, as has been done for Australia in Figure 7.

Figure 6: The terror–crime nexus link paradigm

Terror groups

Level 1: Terror Level 2: Terror Level 3: Terror Level 4: Level 5: Level 6: Crime crime—Weak crime— crime—Alliance Terror Terror use to terror— nexus Regular formation crime— crime— Organised (i.e. Association (i.e. Convergence Groups crime groups transactional (i.e. tactical strategic (merged use organised engage in relationship) relationship) relationship) relationship) crime methods terror

Organised crime groups

Source: A. Schmid, ‘Revisiting the relationship between international terrorism and transnational organised crime 22 years later’, ICCT v Research Paper, August 2018.

Figure 7: The terror–crime nexus in Australia

Level 1: Terror Level 2: Terror Level 3: Terror Level 4: Level 5: Level 6: Crime crime—Weak crime— crime—Alliance Terror Terror use to terror— nexus Regular formation crime— crime— Organised (i.e. Association (i.e. Convergence Groups crime groups transactional (i.e. tactical strategic (merged use organised engage in relationship) relationship) relationship) relationship) crime methods terror

Denotes an assessment of the scope of the Australian terror–crime nexus mapped against Schmids’ paradigm.

Source: A. Schmid, ‘Revisiting the relationship between international terrorism and transnational organised crime 22 years later’, ICCT v Research Paper, August 2018. The red ovals map particular groups onto the has allowed terrorists and terrorist groups to T errorism financing , support and the organised crime nexus level that their activities and relationships develop extensive criminal contacts. This higher demonstrate, instead of attempting a holistic level connection has led to significant ongoing ‘terror–crime nexus’ assessment for Australia. relationships, providing direct access to key facilitators and illegal professional services Arguably, for the most part, the terror–crime that means the scale of the transactional and nexus in Australia oscillates between levels 1 tactical relationships is greater than in Australia. and 2. There’s sufficient evidence, especially There’s also been a clear long-term trend across from recent publicly available information, the archipelagic region of ASEAN, including the of a transactional relationship, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, of terrorist groups purchase of weapons and, at times, tactical such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah cooperation, especially for money laundering Islamiyah using organised crime methods. and the international movement of terrorist funding.16 There’s also sufficient evidence to suggest a relationship between criminality and extremism in some criminal groups in Sydney and Melbourne.17 But, as highlighted separately Policy responses by Jacinta Carroll and Rodger Shanahan, there In responding to Australia’s domestic terror–crime remains no strong causal link between criminality nexus policy challenge, care must be exercised to and .18 ensure that policy interventions don’t derail other Interestingly, there’s evidence from groups such critical long-term policy efforts, especially those as Brothers 4 Life in NSW that organised crime focused on social cohesion. Proportional policy groups, or at least street gangs, are taking on efforts need to focus on denying terrorist groups some of the characteristics of extremist groups. and individuals access to criminal facilitators who The same thing could be said for some right-wing can enable fundraising or access to capabilities extremist groups, which use ideology to unify such as explosives and guns. Nonetheless, those youth at risk of or involved in criminal activities; policy measures need to be done so that they the 2005 Cronulla riots serve as a good example of aren’t easily manipulated by extremist narratives this dynamic (the red oval on Level 5 in Figure 8). as examples of injustice, which eventually fosters discrimination and social division. Commentary from ASPI’s Counterterrorism yearbook 2020 suggests that there’s a more In 2020, with young Australians bearing the pronounced terror–crime nexus in the ASEAN social and economic brunt of Covid-19, social region (Figure 5). There’s clear evidence that cohesion efforts are critical. Policy measures need there’s an intensified transnational relationship to consider how to prevent young Australians between terrorists and criminals. In Indonesia, from entering the justice system, mainly through the long-term incarceration of terrorist offenders preferencing alternative intervention options

Figure 8: The terror–crime nexus in the ASEAN region

Level 1: Terror Level 2: Terror Level 3: Terror Level 4: Level 5: Level 6: Crime crime—Weak crime— crime—Alliance Terror Terror use to terror— nexus Regular formation crime— crime— Organised (i.e. Association (i.e. Convergence Groups crime groups transactional (i.e. tactical strategic (merged use organised engage in relationship) relationship) relationship) relationship) crime methods terror

Denotes an assessment of the scope of the Australian terror–crime nexus mapped against Schmids’ paradigm.

Source: A. Schmid, ‘Revisiting the relationship between international terrorism and transnational organised crime 22 years later’, ICCT v Research Paper, August 2018.

59 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

over incarceration. The central aim for all Australian governments should be to continue preventing jihadist Notes and far-right extremists from recruiting or radicalising 1 J Borges, J Lawrence (eds), Testimony to the invisible: essays in Australian communities, so it would be a mistake on Sedenborg, Chrysalis Books, 1995. to have social and economic policies that respond to 2 RG Smith (ed.), Organised crime research in Australia 2018, the pandemic adding more young people to the prison research report 10, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2018, population, who are then vulnerable to radicalisation. online. A second priority must be to deny terror groups access 3 H van der Wilt, C Paulussen, ‘The role of international criminal to professional criminal facilitators. To do that, the law in responding to the crime–terror nexus’, European Australian Government must implement tranche 2 of its Journal of Criminology, 25 February 2019. anti-money-laundering / counter-terrorism-financing 4 J Jupp, M Garrod, ‘Legacies of the troubles: the links between legislation.19 The amendments will force lawyers, organised crime and terrorism in Northern Ireland’, Studies in accountants and real estate agents to report their Conflict & Terrorism, 4 November 2019. clients if those clients are involved in suspicious 5 CB Realuyo, ‘The terror–crime nexus: Hezbollah’s global financial transactions. facilitators’, Prism, 2014, 5(1):116–131, online. 6 J Coyne, ‘Santa Muerte’, are the Mexican cartels really coming?, A third priority needs to be a double down on efforts ASPI, Canberra, 11 July 2017, online. to prevent right-wing and religious extremists from 7 Klaus von Lampe, ‘Definitions of ’, Organised radicalising prisoners in Australian jails. Of course, Crime Research, 4 November 2020, online. substantial policy efforts are already underway in 8 J Easson, AP Schmid. 2011. ‘Appendix 2.1: 250+ academic, those environments. However, as future Covid-19- governmental and intergovernmental definitions of terrorism’, related austerity measures arise, there’s likely to be a in AP Schmid (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism temptation to reduce the budgets for programmatic Research, Routledge, Abingdon, 2012, 99–157. efforts where success is more difficult to measure 9 A Schmid, Revisiting the relationship between international quantitatively. That would be a mistake. terrorism and transnational organised crime 22 years later, Finally, the federal, state and territory governments International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague, need to continue their work with communities and August 2018, online. their leaders to prevent the religious or right-wing 10 CP Clarke, ‘Crime and terror in Europe: where the nexus is radicalisation of criminal groups, be they outlaw alive and well’, The RAND Blog, 15 December 2016, online. motorcycle gangs or street gangs. Such efforts need 11 P Wang, ‘The crime–terror nexus: transformation, alliance, to be dually focused. First, community leaders convergence’, Asian Social Science, 2010, 6(6). and families need assistance with knowing when 12 Realuyo, ‘The terror–crime nexus: Hezbollah’s and how to challenge those who would seek to global facilitators’. link political or religious concepts with criminality. 13 L Ferri, ‘Notorious Brothers 4 Life founder Bassam Hamzy Second, efforts should be focused on giving and a convicted terrorist appear in court after “getting into a disgruntled and disengaged young Australians voice violent brawl at Australia’s most dangerous prison”’, , to express their concerns. This effort needs to deny 13 February 2019, online. charismatic carpetbaggers the opportunity to leverage 14 Garret Atkinson, ASG: The father of the swordsman, Covid’s profound social impacts. American Security Project, March 2012, online. 15 Schmid, ‘Revisiting the relationship between international Australia’s terror–crime nexus is significantly different terrorism and transnational organised crime 22 years later’. from that found in Central America, Europe or South Asia, but it’s no less vexing for policymakers. 16 J Carroll, Migration, crime and terrorism: correct figures but wrong message, ASPI, Canberra, 23 November 2016, online. Although groups such as Brothers 4 Life could change this situation quickly, for the time being Australia’s 17 Carroll, Migration, crime and terrorism: correct figures but wrong message challenge remains one of prevention. . 18 R Shanahan, Typology of terror—the backgrounds of Australian jihadis, Lowy Institute, Sydney, 21 November 2019, online. 19 ‘Anti-money laundering’, Policy Agenda, Law Council of Australia, no date, online. TERRORISM FINANCING, SUPPORT AND THE ORGANISED CRIME NEXUS

Fighting organised crime, preventing terrorism: the Italian case

DARIA IMPIOMBATO Researcher, International Cyber Policy Centre, ASPI Canberra, Australia

61 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

In March 2020, Italy emerged as an epicentre of one of Smaller groups were also active, including anarchist, the world’s worst coronavirus outbreaks. The severe separatist and transnational groups. economic and social costs of the pandemic reverberate Meanwhile, powerful Italian organised crime groups to this day as the country struggles to contain the such as the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and the Calabrian spread of the virus. A major consequence of the ‘Ndrangheta continued their criminal activities and pandemic for Italy is the way organised crime groups exerted territorial powers over southern regions of the have benefited from the economic and social downturn country. The 1990s were the peak of terrorismo di mafia affecting the country. While Italy is making efforts to exit (mafia terror), characterised by the use of terrorist a period of protracted economic crisis, those factors are tactics by mafia syndicates to pursue their purposes, also likely to drive an increase in radicalisation. which culminated with the assassinations of anti-mafia Links between Italian organised crime and terrorism judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino. The have been highlighted in the past.1 However, the intensification of terrorist activity by Cosa Nostra, in Covid-19 pandemic is likely to bring about new and particular, was followed by greater law enforcement intertwined challenges for law enforcement. Italy action that seriously undermined the groups’ presents an interesting case for several reasons: its economic, political and association capabilities.3 geographical position at the heart of the Mediterranean, During that time, Italy adopted new legislation that its prominent role in EU institutions, the power of its granted mafia witnesses (also known as pentiti— mafia cartels, and its sophisticated law enforcement repentants) sanctioning and penitentiary benefits as system, which has been developed over a number well as state protection, representing a turning point of years and delivered much success in the fight for anti-mafia prosecutions. Those and other legislative against terrorism. and institutional changes, such as the creation of the This chapter explores the successful mechanisms Direzione Investigativa Antimafia,4 set the basis for the used by Italian law enforcement, guided by the anti-mafia law enforcement successes of the 1990s and Dipartimento di Pubblica Sicurezza (Public Security early 2000s, when there were numerous high-profile Department) under the Interior Minister and arrests and convictions of mafia bosses, and significant investigative coordination by the judicial authorities, confiscations of capital and possessions.5 in addressing the terrorist threat at both the national and international levels. This provides insight into what other Western democracies such as Australia can learn from the Italian model. I also explore the ramifications The terror–crime nexus of having the highest per capita police presence in Europe, and the limitations of an aggressive approach in present-day Italy that at times justifies an excessive use of power or force and results in discrimination and the erosion of Although there’s no tangible evidence of direct links human rights. between transnational terrorist groups and Italian mafias, several confidential investigations into this matter are under way. According to Italian prosecutors, many mafia cartels see associating themselves Italian exceptionalism in with Islamist radicals as a risky business because the Islamists attract the authorities’ attention. That the history of terror assessment, however, excludes neither tangential business relations nor future prospects of collaboration As of January 2021, Italy has been immune from with other terrorist groups or individuals.6 major terrorist attacks linked to international terrorist The terror–crime nexus nowadays is different from groups since 11 September 2001. However, during previous decades. Cosa Nostra and the ‘Ndrangheta the so-called Anni di Piombo (Years of Lead) period are far less likely to engage in terrorist activity, as they between 1969 and 1982, Italy was subject to some of restructured and took a more underground approach the worst domestic terrorist attacks in Europe. That following the crackdown by the authorities in the experience of intense terrorist activity makes for a 1990s. Currently, most collaborations take the form of compelling case study, allowing for the analysis of business transactions. national and transnational terrorist practices, but also to find improved countermeasures applicable at the Most recently, in July 2020, 84 million Captagon pills, international level.2 known as the ‘Jihad drug’ because the Islamic State has reportedly become one of its main producers in During the Years of Lead, one of the darkest and Syria,7 were seized by the Guardia di Finanza (financial bloodiest periods in postwar Italy, several domestic crime police)8 in Salerno. Authorities linked them to the terrorist groups across the political spectrum inflicted Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah and the Neapolitan considerable human, economic and social costs. The mafia group Camorra.9 There are many further better structured organisations were those on the examples of illicit deals between the Camorra and the extreme left, such as the communist Red Brigades, ‘Ndrangheta and groups such as Hezbollah, the Irish and the extreme right, headed by neo-fascist groups. Republican Army, the Basque group ETA, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Carabinieri have highlighted that the T errorism financing , S upport and the organised crime nexus Colombia.10 However, experts have assessed that phenomenon of religious radicalisation is weaker, the risk of terrorists within Italian borders being demonstrated by the lower numbers of Italian sponsored by or receiving arms from organised foreign fighters (currently 146) compared to crime cartels remains low. The territorial nature those from other European countries that have of the cartels’ operations makes it difficult for experienced terrorist activity—especially France outsiders to access the illicit arms market. and Belgium. Despite the low-level threat posed by jihadist terrorism, experts have argued that Currently, the terror–crime nexus is more visible this exceptionalism will soon be over for Italy if it in the authorities’ response and organisational doesn’t solve deeply rooted issues of integration, structure. For example, in 2015 law enforcement racism and irregular migration management.12 institutions assigned counterterrorism duties to the judicial body formerly dedicated to countering organised crime, which was renamed ‘Direzione Nazionale Antimafia e Antiterrorismo’ (National Anti-mafia and Antiterrorism Bureau). Pros and cons of the The Public Security Department is led by the head Italian approach of the police and includes all law enforcement agencies. A fundamental organ in this space is For the purposes of this chapter, I submitted the Direzione Centrale Polizia di Prevenzione a series of questions to the Italian Polizia di (Prevention Police Central Directorate), Stato (state police) and Arma dei Carabinieri which manages all the different aspects of (gendarmerie).13 Their responses reflect the counterterrorism, including prevention and argument that, due to past experiences and investigation. Among the different divisions is the difficulties in dealing with Nucleo Operativo Centrale di Sicurezza (Security and organised crime, Italian authorities are now Central Operative Unit), which is dedicated better prepared than most when dealing with to operative interventions for serious crimes, international terrorism, especially through the including terrorism and organised crime, and activities conducted by the Direzione Centrale is a flagship of Italian law enforcement. Polizia di Prevenzione. The Carabinieri, a militarised police force, also The Italian counterterrorism system is based on has a special operations group, known as the two pillars: legislative updates, which provide Raggruppamento Operativo Speciale, that deals police forces and the judiciary with effective with investigations related to organised crime instruments to ensure a sharp response in and terrorism. The group was originally formed the face of evolving terrorist threats; and an to fight domestic terrorism during the Years integrated approach, which ensures the rapid of Lead. Following its success in defeating the circulation of relevant information and prioritises Red Brigades, it was given more responsibilities collaboration between investigative and in dealing with Cosa Nostra during the 1990s, intelligence apparatuses through activities led by especially high-risk operations involving the the Comitato di Analisi Strategica Antiterrorismo infiltration of gangs. (CASA, Committee for Counterterrorism Strategic Analysis). The increasing power and sophistication of Italian mafias’ criminal activities, which have The CASA is made up of representatives from all infiltrated virtually every sector of Italian society law enforcement and intelligence services and and expanded across the globe, have required acts as an instrument for the Interior Minister the authorities to implement constant changes. to manage information channels, evaluate Consequently, the state has granted authorities terrorist threats and respond to social-order and extraordinary powers, resources and funding. public-security emergencies. It’s a key feature This is considered the main driver for the creation of Italy’s antiterrorism strategy, as a common of what is, according to many, ‘the most advanced platform where security forces share information anti-mafia laws in the world’.11 As the new wave about terrorist groups, intelligence, individuals of international terrorism started to claim victims, and threats, and brings together the expertise Italy had already developed an efficient law of the Polizia di Stato, the Carabinieri, the enforcement structure. Guardia di Finanza, the Penitentiary Police and other intelligence organs, such as the Agency It’s important to note that the jihadist terrorist for Internal Information and Security and the threat is comparatively low in Italy. That’s mainly Agency for External Information and Security. due to social factors, such as a lower level of The efficacy of CASA is a direct consequence of earlier immigration from Muslim countries, and its non-bureaucratic structure and its capacity different obstacles posed by social integration to work extremely fast in accordance with the compared to neighbouring France. In a written estimated risk level. response to a request for comment from ASPI, 63 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Like many other legislative systems, the Italian legislature has been mainly reactive in terms of Covid-19, implications counterterrorism laws. The first definition of terrorism was introduced in the Italian Criminal Code in 1978, for Australia and after the abduction and murder of statesman Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades.14 However, state police believe recommendations that it’s the preventive measures present across the entire territory, not the reactive ones, that differentiate Since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, Italian the Italian system from others. mafias have taken advantage of the state’s struggle to support local communities. It has been widely Due to its particular history, Italy now has the legislative reported that criminal groups have been distributing instruments it needs to rapidly adapt to different types food and other goods to families in need, filling the of threats. In fact, ‘not only can Italian security forces void that institutions left behind and strengthening conduct lengthy surveillance operations, preemptive their grip over the population.19 Nicola Gratteri, Italy’s raids, and expulsions of foreign suspects, but since most prominent ‘Ndrangheta expert and prosecutor, 2005, administrative deportations have also become said that ‘the bosses know very well that in order to a cornerstone of Italy’s counterterrorism strategy.’15 govern, they need to take care of the people in their A legal decree adopted in 2018 has established a territory. And they do it by exploiting the situation new position on the possibility of revoking Italian to their advantage.’20 Additionally, profits from the citizenship. This applies in cases in which naturalised ‘Ndrangheta’s infiltration into Italy’s healthcare system foreign citizens present a threat to national security by have boomed.21 committing serious crimes. The provision applies in the case of a definitive sentencing for crimes committed The strengthening of Italian organised crime groups is with terrorist aims or the intention of subverting the dangerous for Australia, since they have extensive ties 22 constitutional order. Initiated by the Interior Minister, to the country, particularly the ‘Ndrangheta. Similarly, the withdrawal of Italian citizenship occurs within three the potential for increased collusion with terrorist years of sentencing by decree from the President of groups should alarm Australian law enforcement the Republic. agencies. In the light of the peculiarities of the phenomena summarised in this chapter, Australian Despite the enthusiasm of law enforcement agencies authorities should: for those practices, the negative implications can’t • further study the potential for intersectionality be ignored. Human rights and civil society groups between counterterrorism and anti-mafia legislation have highlighted how such overarching powers of the and measures in Australia, which can be done by Interior Minister might present issues of abuse of power 16 following key elements of the Italian example, as as well as discrimination. In 2009, the European well as investigating trends and practices of terrorist Human Rights Court found that Italy’s expulsion of a and organised crime groups and the potential Tunisian citizen, for instance, violated international intersections in their operations human rights law.17 The opacity of these sweeping measures and the veil of secrecy that surrounds most • improve collaboration with countries such as Italy terrorist-related cases make it hard to assess the in order to share anti-mafia and counterterrorism fairness of such prescriptions. techniques and information • push for the improvement of international That attitude has also contributed to a climate counterterrorism, anti-mafia and broader of fear and racism against immigrants, especially anti-organised crime standards. those crossing the Mediterranean from Africa. In 2018, that culminated in the passing of two of the Meanwhile, to address the issues highlighted in this most controversial laws in Italian history. Referred chapter, Italy should: to as porti chiusi (closed ports), the laws prevented • promote a cross-border approach and better disembarkation from boats that sought to bring collaboration between police forces across the EU rescued people to Italian shores. Such laws have been to advance more unified and coordinated action on widely criticised for violating human rights and are still both the organised crime and the terrorism fronts facing international scrutiny.18 There’s no objective • ensure that human rights are respected during data on the systematic use of illegal immigration counterterrorism operations, and continue to by Italian terrorist groups, so a direct connection investigate and prosecute discrimination and human between immigration and terrorism is not only factually rights violations carried out by law enforcement inaccurate, but also dangerous and potentially agencies in their counterterrorism activities conducive to the radicalisation of those who become marginalised within Italian society. • sharpen and rebalance procedures of expulsion and citizenship revocation in order to ensure that they’re transparent and fairly applied. In summary, organised criminal groups 13 In Italy, the state police is the main civil police T errorism financing , S upport and the organised crime nexus remain powerful and the terrorist threat is ever body, responsible for routine policing duties. The present in Italy, despite the advancement of Carabinieri, on the other hand, is the country’s national law enforcement measures. This is particularly gendarmerie, a militarised police force whose main due to the deepening crisis the country has practices fall under the Defence Ministry’s authority. In practice, several overlaps exist between the two law experienced since the beginning of the Covid-19 enforcement bodies. pandemic. This is also likely to result in an uptick 14 Committee on the Judiciary, Terrorism and security: in radicalisation in Italy and around the world, the Italian experience. heightening the risk of intersecting activities between criminal gangs and terrorists, and 15 Andrea Beccaro, Stefano Bonino, ‘Terrorism and counterterrorism: Italian exceptionalism and its limits’, therefore presenting major security concerns. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 9 December 2019, online. 16 Robin Simcox, ‘Is Italy immune from terrorism?’, , 18 July 2018, online. 17 Italia: L’espulsione di un tunisino viola la Convenzione Notes Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo, , 1 Europe’s crime-terror nexus: links between terrorists 5 August 2009, online. and organized crime groups in the , 18 Italy: Revoke abusive anti-asylum decrees, Human European Parliament, October 2012, online. Rights Watch, 31 January 2020, online. 2 Committee on the Judiciary, Terrorism and security: the 19 Salvo Palazzolo, ‘Palermo, il fratello del boss della Italian experience, US Senate, November 1984, online. droga fa la spesa per lo Zen’, La Repubblica, 8 April 3 Letizia Paoli, ‘Mafia and organised crime in Italy: the 2020, online. unacknowledged successes of law enforcement’, 20 Lorenzo Tondo, ‘Mafia distributes food to Italy’s West European Politics, September 2007, online. struggling residents’, The Guardian, 10 April 2020, 4 A direct translation of this is ‘Anti-Mafia online. Investigative Directorate’. 21 Miles Johnson, ‘How the nafia infiltrated Italy’s 5 Paoli, ‘Mafia and organised crime in Italy: the hospitals and laundered the profits globally’, unacknowledged successes of law enforcement’. Financial Times, 9 July 2020, online. 6 Francesco Strazzari, Francesca Zampagni, Between 22 Anna Sergi, ‘The ‘Ndrangheta down under: constructing organised crime and terrorism: illicit firearms actors the Italian mafia in Australia’, European Review of and market dynamics in Italy, Flemish Peace Institute, Organised Crime, 2019, online. 2018, online. 7 Michael Walsh, ‘What is the drug Captagon and how is it linked to the Islamic State group and a drug bust in Italy?’, ABC News, 2 July 2020, online. 8 The Guardia di Finanza is a militarised police body responsible for investigating financial crimes, drugs and smuggling. It operates under the Ministry of Economy and Finance and is part of the Public Security Department, which coordinates the four police branches. The four branches are independently administered, but coexist under the operative coordination of the department and the General Director. 9 Francesco Bongarrà, ‘Italian police: record-breaking drugs bust could have Hezbollah link’, Arab News, 26 December 2020, online. 10 Gabriele Carrer, ‘Droga, armi e ‘ndrangheta. Ecco l’Hezbollah-connection in Italia’, Formiche.net, 27 September 2020, online; Strazzari & Zampagni, Between organised crime and terrorism: Illicit firearms actors and market dynamics in Italy. 11 Strazzari & Zampagni, Between organised crime and terrorism: Illicit firearms actors and market dynamics in Italy. 12 Michele Groppi, The terror threat to Italy: how Italian exceptionalism is rapidly diminishing, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 2017, online.

65 TERRORISM FINANCING, SUPPORT AND THE ORGANISED CRIME NEXUS

Revisiting the terror–crime nexus in Latin America: militant proto-state governance and challenges to state security

DR ALEXANDRA PHELAN Deputy Director, Gender Peace and Security Centre, Monash University Melbourne, Australia

67 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

The conventional view of the terror–crime nexus emphasises the interplay between organised crime Colombia and terrorism, closely examining the links between illicit economic activities and militant non-state actors. Although the 2016 Colombian peace agreement Specifically, the term has most commonly been applied resulted in the formal demobilisation of the to the use of crime by terrorist organisations as a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and source of funding and also relates to the formation of facilitated its transition into a formal political party, alliances between criminal and terrorist organisations.1 the Colombian conflict continues to be marked by Traditionally, the terror–crime nexus has best been a general realignment of militant non-state actors. understood as a continuum, converging when criminal This includes the ongoing presence of the National groups begin displaying political motivations and Liberation Army (ELN), FARC dissident factions and terrorist groups use their political ideology as either a criminal gangs otherwise known as bandas criminales— facade or a justification for their criminal objectives.2 or BACRIM—that continue to vie over power vacuums Where there’s evidence of collusion between organised left after FARC’s demobilisation. crime groups and terrorist organisations, they tend to Since FARC disarmed in 2017, the ELN has increasingly be within weak states where black markets and illicit consolidated as a ‘bi-national ’5—a term economies are largely or completely controlled by recently used to describe the guerrilla organisation’s existing cartels or organised crime groups or newer traditional foothold in Colombia and rapid expansion transnational organised crime groups and terrorists.3 into Venezuela. The ELN formed as a guerrilla Yet, in the context of Latin America, the terror–crime organisation in 1964 in Colombia and began to nexus can’t be understood purely in terms of alliances, consolidate its presence in Venezuela from the early tactics, gains from illicit economies and the real or 2000s. However, it has recently tightened its authority fabricated political justifications of those factors. and influence in Venezuela, particularly in the states 6 Economic regulation and protection are fundamentally of Apure, Táchira, Zulia, Bolívar and Amazonas. political activities carried out by states, regardless of Concerningly, this has included taking control of whether or not they successfully generate political illegal mines and has allowed the guerrillas to use the support or opposition.4 In many respects, the terror– acquisition of gold, coltan and diamond deposits not crime nexus has become closely linked with proto-state only to fund their organisations, but also to pressure 7 governance, as guerrillas, cartels and organised crime the Venezuelan regime. In Táchira, Amazonas and groups alike also integrate illegal economies into Apure, the ELN has strengthened its governance, their areas of control and influence and often redirect imposing curfews, administering both justice and proceeds from them back into communities where punishment in its areas of proto-state authority and they operate. This is designed not only to maintain conducting recruitment campaigns of minors in 8 authority over both territory and lucrative turf, but schools, among other illegal activities. Furthermore, also to persuade and enhance perceptions of their there’s general consensus that the ELN has recently organisational legitimacy over that of their opponents. been distributing state-subsidised food boxes from the Venezuelan local storage and production committees In 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic illustrated the degree (comités locales de abastecimiento y producción). to which non-state armed groups throughout Latin America (such as in Mexico, El Salvador, Brazil and On 29 August 2019, former FARC secretariat member Colombia) wield control or influence over territories Iván Márquez announced a return to arms alongside and further demonstrated the complexities of the former top leaders Jesús Santrich and Henry terror–crime nexus when integrated and consolidated Castellanos Garzón, also known as ‘El Paisa’ and into militant governance. The effects of Covid presented ‘Romaña’, calling for a ‘new phase of armed struggle’ both opportunities and challenges for guerrillas and in response to the Colombian state’s ‘betrayal of the 9 organised crime groups, some of which leveraged Havana peace agreement’. Over the past 12 months, the crisis to strategically reposition, expand their it’s believed that FARC dissidents were able to double presence and enforce arbitrary rule to the detriment their membership from approximately 2,600 to almost of populations living within their spheres of influence, 4,600, with a presence in 138 municipalities throughout 10 as I will demonstrate in the cases of Colombia and Colombia. In addition to the group’s involvement in Brazil. This has significant security implications for the drug trafficking, smuggling and extortion, similarly to state and its efforts to counter the expansion of both the ELN, FARC dissidents have been heavily involved insurgents and organised crime groups, particularly in the illegal mining of gold and other minerals, in areas where the government has been unable—or which has become a critical source of revenue for the unwilling—to fully re-exert authority and the rule-of-law organisation. It’s believed that both FARC dissidents vis-a-vis such militant groups. and the ELN make more than half of their income from mining in Colombia and Venezuela.11 The Covid-19 pandemic has further demonstrated Both the PCC and the CV, along with other gangs T errorism financing , S upport and the organised crime nexus how both guerrillas and organised crime groups exerting control throughout Brazil, imposed have exerted proto-state authority by enforcing social control in response to Covid-19 by way lockdown measures throughout Colombia after of curfews, restrictions on movement and the a national quarantine was decreed on 24 March implementation of specific measures to limit the 2020. Colombia’s Ombudsman’s Office warned spread of the virus. Although President Bolsonaro that BACRIM, ELN and FARC dissidents were taking dismissed Covid as ‘sniffles’, comparing the virus advantage of the pandemic’s lockdown period to to the flu, in April Brazil’s former Health Minister, strengthen their military advantage and impose Luiz Hendrique Mandetta, suggested that the control orders on populations throughout the government may have to coordinate with drug country. This included regulating commercial traffickers in thefavelas over the enforcement and leisure establishments, blocking land and of curfew and other management plans to stop waterways and controlling medical and food the spread of Covid.15 Many favela communities supplies to the point of restricting their arrival. have been abandoned by the state in the fight At least 10 documented homicides were allegedly against Covid and as a result have organised committed because the victims had violated the their own responses to stop the spread. For measures imposed by militant groups.12 example, in Paraisopolis in São Paulo—a favela The groups demonstrate clear examples of in which the PCC is alleged to act as the de facto the terror–crime nexus, yet they also serve as authority—a resident association hired its examples of how such illicit activities have own medical team for the community out of boosted the groups’ resources to the degree that distrust of the government response.16 In Rio de they’re able to exert authority in Colombia and Janeiro, the CV imposed curfews and restricted transnationally into Venezuela. movement after 8 pm in Cidade de Deus. Gangs in other favelas, such as Rocinha, Rio das Pedras and Muzema, issued control orders that were circulated via messaging apps, stating that Brazil baile funk parties were cancelled, that bars were ordered to close (take-away permitted) and Brazil’s two largest gangs—the First Capital that residents must stay home.17 In addition to Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital, PCC), enforcing rules, gangs also handed out welfare traditionally based in São Paulo, and the Red and hand soap and displayed signs asking those Command (Comando Vermelho, CV), traditionally who entered to wash their hands18—active based in Rio de Janeiro—also serve as examples attempts to fill the void of ongoing government of the terror–crime nexus’s complexity, and neglect of those communities. both have continued to pose challenges to the Brazilian state’s ability to exert control over various favelas (slums) throughout the country. In some favela neighbourhoods, it’s common that Recommendations such gangs and drug-trafficking organisations exert more authority and influence than the The convergence of the terror–crime nexus police. The PCC and CV worked closely with each with proto-state governance poses significant other until their longstanding alliance broke down challenges to the state, particularly when such in 2016, contributing to the PCC forming alliances organisations can’t be considered as solely with criminal organisations such as Amigos dos ‘terrorist’ or ‘criminal’ and policy approaches Amigos in order to attempt to exert control over can’t be purely defined in line with either turf in Rio de Janeiro.13 Both groups use violence taxonomy. The two cases of Colombia and Brazil and synchronised attacks, shut down businesses, demonstrate that both guerrillas using crime and destroy public transport and attack both public drug trafficking gangs using violence politically buildings and police stations, often deliberately can further defy a state’s authority when their targeting police in retaliation for gang arrests or activities result in their control of territory and crackdowns. The PCC has used violence, protest social order. This is particularly challenging when and disruption both strategically and politically, illicit economic activities are firmly integrated into employing them as punishment for statements their areas of control. Furthermore, crises such as and acts of political officials and as bargaining the current pandemic can be used by such groups chips in relation to Brazil’s organised crime to enhance their own power, legitimacy and local policies, including incarceration policies.14 support where states fail to respond effectively.

69 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

In order to frustrate the control of such organisations, ‘good governance’ through an increase in state Notes presence and the effectiveness of state institutions 1 Tamara Makarenko, ‘The crime-terror continuum: tracing become key in countering the terror–crime nexus, the interplay between transnational organised crime and particularly in Latin America. In both Colombia and terrorism’, Global Crime, 2004, 6(1), 130. Brazil, armed non-state actors have succeeded in 2 Makarenko, ‘The crime-terror continuum: tracing the interplay wielding control where state presence has been between transnational organised crime and terrorism’, 135. minimal, security hasn’t been consolidated and 3 Steven Hutchinson, Pat O’Malley. ‘A crime–terror nexus? ineffective application of the rule of law has failed to Thinking on some of the links between terrorism maintain order. However, previous attempts at military and criminality’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2007, campaigns (in Colombia) and pacification programs 30(12):1105–1107. (in Brazil) have demonstrated that government policies 4 See D Gutiérrez, José Antonio, Frances Thomson, aimed at territorial reclamation must be overlaid onto ‘Rebels-turned-narcos? The FARC-EP’s political involvement in legitimacy building. In both contexts, impoverished Colombia’s cocaine economy’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, and isolated communities continue to bear the brunt 2020, 44(1):26–51, 7. of both government and non-state actor violence and 5 See Karen Arteaga Garzón, Gwen Burnyeat, Andrei experience the arbitrary enforcement of ‘order’ as Gómez-Suárez, Germán Otálora Gallego, ‘Trump, Venezuela a daily reality. Those communities have developed and the ELN: the geopolitics of peace in Colombia’, America’s varying degrees of mistrust of the state born out of Quarterly, 1 July 2020, online. decades of insufficient social welfare and resources 6 FundaRedes, FundaRedes 2019 Informa Anual, 2020, 35, and, in some areas, outright neglect. Therefore, policies online. that emphasise meaningful investments in both social 7 See ‘ELN in Venezuela’, InSight Crime, 28 January 2020, online. and economic opportunity, combined with adequate 8 FundaRedes, FundaRedes 2019 Informa Anual. consolidation of security and stability, serve best to 9 See Noticias Caracol, ‘Iván Márquez, Jesús Santrich, el Paisa y confront such militant actors. Romaña retoman las armas’, YouTube, 29 August 2019), online. 10 Alexandra Phelan, John P Sullivan, Robert Bunker, ‘Third generation gangs strategic note no. 26: COVID-19, revolutionaries and BACRIM in Colombia’, Small Wars Journal, 2 June 2020, online. 11 International Crisis Group, A glut of arms: curbing the threat to Venezuela from violent groups, Latin America report no. 78, 20 February 2020, 9. 12 ‘Grupos armados se expanden durante la emergencia por coronavirus en Colombia’, El Universo, 18 May 2020, online. 13 See ‘Red Command’, InSight Crime, 18 May 2018, online, for an overview of the CV and ‘First Capital Command’, InSight Crime, 9 July 2018, online, for an overview of the PCC. 14 See Ryan C Berg, Breaking out: Brazil’s First Capital Command and the emerging prison-based threat, American Enterprise Institute, March 2020, 8, 10. 15 ‘Coronavírus: Mandetta dialoga com facções e irrita bolsonaristas’, Metrópoles, 14 April 2020, online. 16 ‘Mistrustful of the state, Brazil slum hires own doctors to fight virus’, Reuters, 3 April 2020, online. 17 ‘Coronavírus: tráfico e milícia ordenen toque de recolher em favelas do Rio’, Agência O Globo, 24 March 2020, online. 18 ‘Brazil gangs impose strict curfews to slow coronavirus spread’, The Guardian, 26 March 2020. COUNTERING AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Countering and preventing violent extremism An evolution of terrorism: the intersection of cybercrime and terrorist activity

DR ANNE ALY MP Federal member for Cowan, Western Australia, House of Representatives, Parliament of Australia Perth, Australia

71 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

It’s now almost two decades since the attacks heralded a seismic shift in international and Terrorism typologies national security. Much has been said about how those attacks changed the world—how they brought about The risk of terrorism, like the risk of most criminal a new era, in which both terrorism and acts of terror activities, can be evaluated as a combination of by non-state actors have become par for the course in opportunity, capability and intent. Legislative measures security assessments. that allow for the arrest, detention and incarceration of people who are found to be planning an attack and As we move into a remodelled era in which states— laws that make it illegal to travel to certain conflict North Korea, China and Russia—are growing their role zones to join terrorist groups address opportunity. as key players in international security, we could be Targeting terrorism financing, recruitment and training easily misled into suggesting that we’re returning to addresses capability. But in a contemporary, low-tech an international security landscape reminiscent of the terrorist environment—where a terrorist attack can be Cold War. Indeed, in 2006, the dominant mission of carried out by a single person with a simple weapon the US Department of Defense in international security such as a knife, gun or vehicle with little or no planning, was its ‘long war’ against international terrorism. Now, no financial investment and no special training— it seems, the long war is coming to an end, and a new opportunity and capability are much more difficult to war has begun. The 2018 US National Defense Strategy detect and prevent. affirms that: Indeed, the greatest dilemma for modern The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and counterterrorism is intent. In a world where intent security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic evolves in the dark spaces of the internet, where competition by what the National Security Strategy individuals draw inspiration from YouTube videos, classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly social media posts and anonymous chatrooms, we clear that China and Russia want to shape a world desperately need a comprehensive approach to consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, counterterrorism that incorporates prevention and diplomatic, and security decisions.1 early intervention strategies. It would be imprudent to jump too quickly to a conclusion that terrorism no longer presents a confronting threat to national and international security. Equally imprudent would be the assumption Disposition to violence that a Cold-War-like duality is now the definitive In the 1990s, Helmut Willems studied the development issue for international security. Even as we watch the of xenophobic violence and the social and biographical retreat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the traits of perpetrators, including their criminal histories reclaiming of 65,000 square kilometres of land and the and disposition to violence.2 He found that up to much-heralded defeat of ISIS forces in Syria and Iraq, 10% of perpetrators had prior records for politically at least seven counterinsurgency conflicts still rage motivated crimes and that up to 35% had prior records across the Middle East and North Africa. In October 2020, for other crimes. Willems distinguished four perpetrator amid a global pandemic, deadly attacks in France and types, which differed in political–ideological orientation Austria reminded the world that ISIS-inspired lone actors and propensity to violence: right-wing activists, were not only operational, but capable of carrying out ethnocentric youth, criminal youth and fellow travellers. terrorism. In November, ISIS claimed responsibility for an Three of those types had some history of criminal attack on Kabul University that killed at least 32 people. activity: right-wing activists typically had prior records Almost two decades of combating violent jihadism for multiple political crimes; ethnocentric youth for reveals a pattern in which the decentralisation of the juvenile crime; and criminal youth for multiple criminal threat from one theatre of violence sees the spreading activities. Willems’s model posits that the right-wing and revival of the threat in another theatre. Dedicated activists are ideologically driven, while xenophobic foreign fighters are likely to be nomadic, migrating youth tend to be driven by perceived grievances. from one conflict zone to the next. The most important lesson from this is that military strikes can destroy Of particular interest is the finding that criminal youth terrorist training camps and their capabilities but they with a history of violence didn’t appear to have marked will not kill terrorism; that is, the underlying ideas, right-wing ideological leanings or political interests: ideology and narrative and their regenerative capacity In terms of the propensity to violence, this is a to attract adherents who are willing to fight, kill and markedly action-oriented, aggressive, and violently die. Behind all forms of terrorism, be it violent jihadism disposed type. Here violence is seen not as a means or far-right violent extremism, is an ideology that of political conflict, but as a normal element of frames the world in an ‘us versus them’ binary and, in daily life and conflict resolution which needs no the minds of its adherents, justifies a violent response specific legitimation. to perceived oppression and injustice. Moreover, that ideology has a lingering appeal that may recede Criminal youth tend to come from unstable family or surge in response to global or regional incidents backgrounds and have lower education attainment and conflicts. levels. Their violence isn’t an expression of ideological or political identity, but a factor of their personal That behaviour starts with a search: C ountering and preventing violent extremism experiences and their own aggressive impulses. • The seeker is primarily motivated to acquire any In comparison, right-wing activists tend to come information about an extremist ideology or idea from relatively stable backgrounds and have and is likely to be cognitively open to receiving higher education levels; their propensity for new information. violence is politically motivated and legitimised • The lurker has already narrowed their by their strongly held ideologies. information sources and has started to rigidify This suggests that there’s an important distinction their mindset around extremism, while their to be made between perpetrators for whom social media associations start to gravitate violence is legitimised as a means to an end towards ideological themes. for an ideological cause and perpetrators for • The inquirer uses political aggression in their whom violence is detached from any ideological posts as they begin making connections identity. The latter are also high-trait aggressive between a perceived obstruction to their personalities with a history of violent or own life goals and the actions of their aggressive behaviour. Though they may hold out-group. Their likes and associations may certain attitudes or feelings that align with be skewing towards certain extremist or a particular ideology, they’re not cognitively extremist-sympathising pages. radicalised to the extent that they identify • The advocate adopts a confrontational and completely with that ideology. declarative posting style. Their profile and The contemporary threat in the domestic arena is cover photos contain symbols associated with characterised by low-tech attacks carried out by an extremist ideology, images associated with single individuals using guns, knives and vehicle conflict, or both. Their likes and associations ramming (or a combination of those). These overtly support an ideology. kinds of attacks are relatively easy and cheap to • Finally, the activator is either activating, or carry out and require no planning, and hence can about to activate, their extremist ideologies circumvent many security measures. They’re also offline in the commission of a violent by no means new or innovative—for example, extremist act. vehicle ramming has been used as a tactic of terror for at least two decades. The Counter Within this framework of online behavioural Extremism Project has documented at least profiles, there are certain markers—thematic, 53 vehicular terrorist attacks over that period, emotional and behavioural—that can be used to collectively resulting in the deaths of at least build a more comprehensive profile of a potential 202 people and the injury of at least 1,123 others.3 suspect. They are detectable on the average user’s social media profile. Thematic markers include These attacks are the most challenging for allegiance to radical groups or figures, in-group law enforcement agencies. In these cases, ideology and pride, out-group derogation, proactive identification using traditional forms and identification as a ‘soldier’ or ‘warrior’, as of intelligence gathering, such as human expressed through symbols, likes, associations, sources or surveillance, is particularly difficult, images and subscriptions. Key emotional markers and, as a result, law enforcement is placed at are anger and contempt for and disgust at the a disadvantage. out-group. Behavioural markers include fixation (an increasingly pathological preoccupation with a person or cause); identification (a desire to be or identify as an agent for a cause); and Behavioural indicators leakage (the communication of the intent to carry out violence). As the world moves to social media for everything from news to entertainment to Policymakers and counterterrorism practitioners quotidian social interaction, so too has terrorism. can use online behaviour profiles, such as those For example, the attacker who ploughed a van detailed in this paper, to identify and disrupt into pedestrians in Toronto in 2018, who was part possible terrorist operatives who also have a of an alarming ‘incel’ subculture, used Facebook social media presence. In the development of to declare his attack. the behaviour profile detailed here, my research team was able to identify a number of persons Public declarations on social media of intent of concern. The Counter Narratives to Interrupt to carry out an attack are more common than Online Radicalisation (CNIOR) program, headed we realise and are often a reliable indicator by me, developed the Interrupting Online of an impending attack. This means that it’s Radicalisation Toolkit, which provides guidelines possible to track and trace online behaviours and instructions for law enforcement and on social media to proactively identify potential counterterrorism practitioners on how to use violent attackers.4 behavioural indicators to identify and disrupt potential terrorists. 73 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

In September 2020, Westpac was fined $1.3 billion for Technology and breaching AML/CTF laws 23 million times.8 terrorism In the past, cyber terrorism has been a contested concept, with no agreed-upon definition. It’s now One of the most compelling reasons to assess threat generally accepted that cyber terrorism involves the use and capability continuously is that terrorists and of computers to create a severe disruption to critical criminals always find new ways to do harm. Just as infrastructure, causing death or the spreading of fear. terrorism has pervaded our lives in ways that turn But the use of digital and online technologies to enable everyday items into weapons and everyday activities terrorism, whether by providing a platform to inspire, into platforms for recruitment and influence, we recruit, communicate and coordinate or to raise illegal must also meet the new challenges of security by funds, has not really been considered in that definition. turning our expertise to the internet and information and communications technology. In response to law enforcement’s increasing awareness of terrorists’ use of social media, and measures to mitigate any continued Conclusion and threat, terrorists and criminal groups have migrated to the Dark Web and encryption services, wherein they recommendations can operate in obscurity. The interface of cybercrime and terrorism gives us a Terrorists have been using the ‘darknet’ in the same more practical way to conceptualise cyber terrorism way as they have been using the surface web—to in the modern context, and a more concrete target for recruit, radicalise and influence, as well as to finance focusing our efforts. To that end, I suggest a definition and coordinate attacks. Since 2015, there has been of cyber terrorism as ‘the use of cyberspace to enable, a significant increase in the use of Telegram (an inspire, influence or direct a terrorist attack or to raise encrypted instant messaging platform) by terrorist funds to facilitate such attacks’. actors. Telegram has now become the preferred online platform for ISIS supporters to distribute propaganda, This approach to cyber terrorism would allow law coordinate and communicate, replacing social media enforcement practitioners and legislators to target applications such as Twitter and Facebook. Telegram online activities used in support of a terrorism. was used to coordinate attacks inspired or directed by For this reason, Australia needs to ensure that our the Islamic State in Paris (2015), Brussels (2016), Berlin AML/CTF laws are up to the task of preventing criminal (2016) and Istanbul (2017).5 syndicates and terrorist actors from exploiting our financial systems. In 2017, a crackdown on popular darknet markets AlphaBay and Hansa was a response to serious Australia also needs more trained experts in early concerns about the use of those platforms to facilitate detection, with more resources devoted to monitoring communication between terrorist actors. That followed online behaviours that precede violent action. the take-down of the Silk Road in 2013 and another University courses that equip graduates with the operation in 2014 that seized around half a dozen understanding and skills to tackle cyber-enabled darknet sites. Each time, the darknet has bounced criminal activity of all types (including terrorism) need back. The latest crackdown drove cybercriminals to be more widely available. to migrate to messaging apps such as WhatsApp, It’s imperative that our future law enforcement Facebook Messenger and Telegram in order to trade practitioners have a strong understanding of how the stolen credit cards, account information, malware internet, in all its pervasiveness, has become a tool and drugs.6 for opportunists who seek to exploit it for criminal What we’re seeing is a more coordinated integration purposes. Our future counterterrorism preparedness of cybercrime and terrorism. In January 2015, depends on it. evidence emerged of a terror cell using bitcoin to fund operations. In another instance, an Indonesia-based group collected bitcoin donations on the darknet and hacked a trading website using a stolen identity. The group collected around US$600,000 via a series of cybercrimes.7 In Australia, recent high-profile breaches of anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism-financing (AML/CTF) provisions by two major banks and casino operators have shone light on systemic gaps in our provisions. The Commonwealth Bank of Australia was recently found to be in breach of AML-CTF laws in 52,700 instances and was fined $700 million for failing to report multiple deposits made for money-laundering purposes through its ATMs. C Notes ountering and preventing violent extremism 1 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the of America, US Government, January 2018, online. 2 H Willems, ‘Development, patterns and causes of violence against foreigners in Germany: social and biographical characteristics of perpetrators and the process of escalation’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 1995, 7(1):162–181. 3 Vehicles as weapons of terror, Counter Extremism Project, December 2020, online. 4 The online behavioural profile presented in this chapter is based on my work as Director of the Countering Online Violent Extremism research program based at Curtin University, Western Australia. That work has been published elsewhere. 5 C Bennett, ‘“Trucks, knives, bombs, whatever”: exploring pro-Islamic State instructional material on Telegram’, CTC Sentinel, 2018, 11(5):23–29. 6 Samuel Gibbs, Lois Beckett, ‘Dark web marketplaces AlphaBay and Hansa shut down’, The Guardian, 21 July 2017, online; ‘AlphaBay: Global authorities shut down dark net market 10 times the size of 2013’s Silk Road’, ABC News, 21 July 2017, online; Chris Baraniuk, ‘AlphaBay and Hansa dark web markets shut down’, BBC News, 20 July 2017, online. 7 Resty Woro Yuniar, ‘Bitcoin, PayPal used to finance terrorism, Indonesian agency says’, Wall Street Journal, 10 January 2017, online. 8 James Eyers, ‘Westpac settles AUSTRAC case for $1.3b’, Australian Financial Review, 24 September 2020, online.

75 COUNTERING AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The evolution of resilience to violent extremism

PROFESSOR MICHELE GROSSMAN Research Chair in Diversity and Community Resilience, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University Melbourne, Australia

77 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

‘Resilience’ has been a byword in preventing and This formulation of resilience recognises that our countering violent extremism (P/CVE) approaches ability to prevent violent extremism from taking for at least a decade.1 But what does resilience to hold of vulnerable individuals and groups, and our violent extremism mean, how has it evolved over time, capacity to resist the messaging and narratives what gaps persist, and how responsive are current promoted by violent extremists as solutions to resilience-based policies and programming in a problems or grievances, is in large part dependent on complex contemporary threat landscape? how resilient we are at different scales—individual, family, community or society. It also considers the resilience of the many different, interacting systems that support or undermine our individual and collective Overview wellbeing—health, education, cultural, legal, economic, environmental, and so on. Resilience has become embedded in P/CVE thinking to the extent that many now consider it a ‘key ingredient to effectively manage terrorism’.2 A wide range of national, international and multilateral policy Individual and frameworks and bodies have at some point explicitly framed ‘resilience’ as a core element of their resourcing community resilience and programming approach.3 At the level of individual resilience to violent Debate continues about how best to define resilience, extremism, researchers have identified psychosocial ranging from seeing it as an individual or collective trait protective factors linked to empathy;9 self-regulation/ that enables ‘bouncing back’ from crises or challenges4 self-control and value complexity;10 self-esteem and to more nuanced approaches that understand assertiveness;11 intercultural tolerance of diversity;12 resilience as multidimensional social processes.5 One and the ability to recover from a terrorist attack or point of agreement, however, even when concepts or reject extremist narratives.13 Alongside these are more definitions vary, is that adversity or challenge must social ecology-oriented models that link individual be present for resilience to emerge. Violent extremism resilience capacity to interactions with social contexts and terrorism are key examples of adversities in which and systems such as families, schools, workplaces resilience may surface and be tested at various points and the broader community.14 Protective factors of risk and impact. in these more socially dynamic models emphasise In response to calls for greater clarity about how the features such as social coping skills through anger concept of resilience can successfully inform management and conflict resolution; democratic P/CVE models,6 resilience as resistance, resilience as citizenship; counternarratives; internet safeguarding prevention, resilience as adaptation, or resilience as measures; social and civic participation; a supportive recovery variously appear in a wide range of articles, and warm family environment; autonomy, self-esteem policies, programs and strategies, sometimes deploying and sense of agency; and social and emotional different concepts within the same framework: for wellbeing and life skills.15 Neither the presence nor example, within different components of the UK’s the absence of these factors is predictive of who may CONTEST strategy, resilience is respectively defined or may not radicalise to violence, but they do identify as community recovery from a crisis or disaster but the multiple forms of social capital that can enable also as community resistance to terrorist ideology.7 resilience to violence to develop and thrive.16 However, the most common concept of resilience in Yet the dominant trend has evolved to concentrate P/CVE contexts is linked to prevention of and resistance primarily on building community rather than to violent extremism. individual resilience to violent extremism. This For the most part, this understanding is grounded reflects three trends in the way that the field has in the social-ecological model of resilience.8 This evolved in its thinking about resilience over time. model conceptualises resilience as a social process, First, such thinking relies on an understanding rather than simply an individual trait or characteristic. of violent extremism itself as comprising social It sees resilience as the ability to thrive in contexts ecologies of group-level rather than individual-level of adversity through positive, prosocial adaptation processes, based on an understanding of radicalised and transformation; emphasises the importance of individuals as embedded within and influenced identifying and mobilising protective factors that by group-level processes and networks. Second, can offset risks and vulnerabilities; and highlights it has been shaped by the pragmatic needs of the capacity to access, navigate towards and draw governments that have sought to extend and simplify on resilience resources that support coping with and their policy reach as much as possible in relation to overcoming hardship in culturally meaningful and violent extremism by focusing resources and efforts socially just ways. on primary, ‘whole of society’ prevention efforts through encouraging the non-violent resolution of grievances and addressing the underlying C ountering and preventing violent extremism adversities that have seeded those grievances. Persisting gaps and Third, and most problematically, it has relied on a tendency to attribute violent extremist new challenges ideologies and behaviours to communal identity structures (such as religion, race and gender) in resilience to rather than to communal ideological or belief structures (for example, violent jihadist, white violent extremism supremacist, incel). Yet gaps in how P/CVE frameworks conceptualise and operationalise resilience to violent extremism persist. One gap is the tendency to see resilience as stopping at the threshold of individuals and The ‘community’ in communities, without considering the need for comparable resilience—marked by features such community resilience as openness to experimentation and learning, the capacity to adapt and transform, and both to violent extremism redundancy and participation across multiple, interdependent systems24—at the levels of ‘Community’ in the context of resilience to policy and governance, for example, by being violent extremism can sometimes denote more willing to genuinely share power with either (or both) a spatial concept of community, communities when designing government– such as a geographical or physical place, or a community partnerships, or enhancing multiple relational concept of community based on sense reporting channels for community concerns of belonging, , support, acceptance about violent extremism across states and or similarity.17 As a result, policy approaches territories. Such a stance fails to account for the have often centred on an understanding of range of co-occurring systems that make up the P/ community resilience to violent extremism that CVE resilience matrix. stresses the relationship between resilience and social capital.18 If the drivers of violent A second gap is the failure of much P/CVE policy extremism are bound up with socially based and programming to engage systematically dynamics and adversities, then the solutions with the resilience of violent extremist groups that seek to protect against those drivers and movements themselves. Multisystemic must also be socially based and enacted (by resilience, for example, includes features such addressing economic disadvantage, social as openness to new information, the capacity to marginalisation and exclusion, or the sense integrate environmental shocks and the ability of political disenfranchisement in particular to pivot towards new behavioural regimes. communities, for example).19 Yet, regardless This can easily be applied to various terrorist of whether ‘community’ is defined spatially, or violent extremist movements themselves, relationally, or both, policy risks can emerge which have demonstrated their capacity over when complex communities are treated as time to integrate environmental shocks (such homogeneous entities, rather than as social as financial or territorial losses), initiate new formations involving contested or multilayered behavioural regimes (for example, shifting from views, positions and forms of power and large-scale, high-tech to small-scale, low-tech influence within them. One example of these domestic attacks), and transform in response risks is the tendency to favour policy-focused to various stressors (such as internal leadership dialogue with male community leaders in competition or digital take-downs). They have ways that ignore or minimise the effectiveness also proved adept at negotiating new resources of women’s influence and contributions by decentralising resource bases to create local in developing community-level solutions franchises or diversify digital platforms and and interventions.20 strategies. Recognising and addressing these resilient features of terrorist movements is an At its best, this has enabled a move away from essential part of our own resilient response when more securitised approaches based on ‘risk we’re designing and trialling interventions. society’21 assumptions that target particular communities as suspect, vulnerable or Finally, a new challenge is whether the focus deficient,22 instead emphasising the positive on building broad, community-level resilience resilience capital23 that communities bring responds sufficiently to the current threat to the challenges of preventing or resisting landscape. Community resilience to violent violent extremism. extremism assumes that we’re trying to reach,

79 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

support and strengthen the resources of vulnerable people through the systems in which they’re embedded, Notes including the family, education, the workplace or 1 A Dalgaard-Nielsen, P Schack, ‘Community resilience to broader social messaging. Yet the rise of lone-actor militant Islamism: who and what? An explorative study of terrorism and the emergent threats of right-wing violent resilience in three Danish communities’, Democracy and extremism arguably present a more complicated Security, 2016, 12(4):309–327, online; M Grossman, M Peucker, landscape than that of the past 10 years—one in which D Smith, H Dellal, Stocktake Research Project: a systematic ‘community’ is often digital in nature, based on social literature and selected program review on social cohesion, connectivity through amplified grievances rather than community resilience and violent extremism 2011–2015, prosocial support, and also one in which vulnerable Victoria University and Australian Multicultural Foundation, people are frequently disconnected from, disenchanted Melbourne, 2016; PH Longstaff, NJ Armstrong, K Perrin, WM Parker, MA Hidek, ‘Building resilient communities: a by or mistrustful of established systems that might preliminary framework for assessment’, Homeland Security otherwise support them. This raises the question Affairs, 2010, V1(3), article 6, online; B Spalek, L Davies, of whether we need to reconfigure our approach to ‘Mentoring in relation to violent extremism: a study of role, building community resilience to violent extremism purpose, and outcomes’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, by attending further not only to individual resilience 2012, 35(5):354–368, online; M Grossman, K Hadfield, capacity, but also to more generalised community P Jefferies, V Gerrand, M Ungar, ‘Youth resilience to violent resilience that can help restore confidence and extremism: development and validation of the BRAVE connection with the social resources needed to help measure’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 30 January 2020, people cope with multiple challenges, including loss online; S Weine, S Henderson, S Shanfield, R Legha, J Post, of trust in the public sphere, lack of economic security ‘Building community resilience to counter violent extremism’, Democracy and Security, 2013, 9(4):327–333, online. and the perception of being socially devalued or ‘left behind’. Such generalised community resilience also 2 M Dechesne, ‘The concept of resilience in the context needs to address and, where possible, positively exploit of counterterrorism’, in U Kumar (ed.), The Routledge international handbook of psychosocial resilience, Routledge, the shifting ecology of online communications and the London and New York, 2017, 414–423. centrality of digital literacy and consciousness that’s Building Resilience now reshaping our cultures and societies in many ways 3 This includes Public Safety Canada’s Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy and at many levels. (2013), the Council of Australian Governments’ Australia’s The evolution within the P/CVE field on the Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Strengthening our Resilience importance of building systems that go beyond (2015), the US’s Strategic Implementation Plan for an immediate concern with social or political Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (2011), and components of the UK’s Prepare violence towards protective factors such as social and Prevent streams within its anti-terrorism CONTEST capital and connectedness, economic and social strategy (2011). Internationally, building resilience to violent support and development systems, and education, extremism also features strongly in the policy and practice health, social welfare and human rights has been a frameworks of multilateral bodies such as the European welcome development. Commission’s Radicalisation Awareness Network, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund and the Global Building resilience to violent extremism means Counter-Terrorism Forum. developing not just a ‘whole of community’ but a 4 S Mohaupt, ‘Review article: Resilience and social exclusion’, ‘whole of systems’ approach that encompasses all Social Policy and Society, 2009, 8:63–71. Longstaff et al., the actors involved in the P/CVE matrix, including ‘Building resilient communities: a preliminary framework governments and terrorist movements alike. We also for assessment’. need to engage in continuous assessment of whether 5 M Ungar, ‘Practitioner review: diagnosing childhood the policy and program settings for resilience to violent resilience—a systemic approach to the diagnosis of extremism developed over the past decade are now adaptation in adverse social and physical ecologies’, The responsive to the current domestic and transnational Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 2015, 6(1):4–17. threat landscape. online; M Ungar, ‘Systemic resilience: principles and processes for a science of change in contexts of adversity’, Ecology and Society, 2018, 23(4):34, online; AS Masten, ‘Resilience in developing systems: the promise of integrated approaches’, European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2016, 13(3):297–312, online. 6 Longstaff et al., ‘Building resilient communities: a preliminary framework for assessment’; M Grossman, H Tahiri, P Stephenson, Harnessing resilience capital: an investigation of resilience and cultural diversity in countering violent extremism, Australia – New Zealand Counter-terrorism Committee, Canberra, 2014; M Grossman, ‘Resilience to violent extremism and terrorism: a multisystemic analysis’, in M Ungar (ed.), Multisystemic resilience: adaptation and transformation in changing contexts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021. 7 K Hardy, ‘Resilience in UK counter-terrorism’, 13 Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), ‘Ex post C Theoretical Criminology, 2015, 19(1):77–94. paper, research seminar’, 17 October, RAN, Amsterdam, ountering and preventing violent extremism 17 October 2018, online. 8 C Hunter, ‘Is resilience still a useful concept when working with children and young people?’, Journal 14 U Bronfenbrenner, PA Morris, ‘The bioecological model of the Home Economics Institute of Australia, 2012, of human development’, in RM Lerner, W Damon (eds), 19(1):45–52; L Liebenberg, M Ungar, F Van de Vijver, Handbook of child psychology: theoretical models of ‘Validation of the child and youth resilience measure-28 human development, John Wiley & Sons, New York, (CYRM-28) among Canadian youth’, Research on Social 2006, 793–828. Work Practice, 2011, 22(2):219–226, online; AS Masten, 15 S Sieckelinck, AJ Gielen, Protective and promotive ‘Global perspectives on resilience in children and factors building resilience against violent radicalisation, youth’, Child Development, 2014, 85(1):6–20, online; RAN issue paper, European Commission, 2017. D Stokols, RP Lejano, J Hipp, ‘Enhancing the resilience 16 Grossman et al., ‘Youth resilience to violent extremism: of human–environment systems: a social–ecological development and validation of the BRAVE measure’, 2. perspective’, Ecology and Society, 2013, 18(1):7, online; M Ungar, ‘Resilience across cultures’, British Journal of 17 Ellis & Abdi, ‘Building community resilience to violent Social Work, 2008, 38:218–235, online; M Ungar, ‘The extremism through genuine partnerships’, 291. social ecology of resilience: addressing contextual and 18 Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, Community resilience cultural ambiguity of a nascent construct’, American to militant Islamism: who and what? An explorative Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 2011, 81(1):1–17, online; study of resilience in three Danish communities’; Ellis Ungar, ‘Practitioner review: diagnosing childhood & Abdi, ‘Building community resilience to violent resilience—a systemic approach to the diagnosis of extremism through genuine partnerships’; Grossman adaptation in adverse social and physical ecologies’; et al., Harnessing resilience capital: an investigation M Ungar, ‘Systemic resilience: principles and processes of resilience and cultural diversity in countering violent for a science of change in contexts of adversity’, Ecology extremism; Grossman et al., ‘Youth resilience to and Society, 2018, 23(4):34, online; TM Yates, AS Masten, violent extremism: development and validation of the ‘Fostering the future: resilience theory and the practice BRAVE measure’. of positive psychology’, in PA Linley, S Joseph (eds), 19 J Day, S Kleinmann, ‘Combating the cult of ISIS: A social Positive psychology in practice, John Wiley & Sons, approach to countering violent extremism’, The Review Hoboken, 2004, 521–539. of Faith & International Affairs, 2017, 15(3): 14-23, online. 9 A Aly, E Taylor, S Karnovsky, ‘Moral disengagement and 20 M Grossman, S Carland, H Tahiri, A Zammit, Roles of building resilience to violent extremism: an education Women in Supporting and Opposing Violent Extremism: intervention’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2014, The Australian Landscape, Australia-New Zealand 37(4):369–385, online; BOUNCE, Resilience training, Counter-Terrorism Committee, Canberra, 2018, online. network and evaluation STRESAVIORA II (Strengthening 21 U Beck, Risk society: towards a new modernity, Resilience against Violent Radicalisation 2015–2018, trans. Mark Ritter, Sage Publications, London, 1992; European Commission with the Egmont Institute, A Giddens, ‘Risk and responsibility’, Modern Law Review, Brussels, 2018; F Lösel, S King, D Bender, I Jugl, 1999, 62(1):1–10; D Lupton, Risk, Routledge (Psychology ‘Protective factors against extremism and violent Press), London, 1999. radicalization: a systematic review of research’, International Journal of Developmental Sciences, 22 A Kundnani, ‘Radicalisation: the journey of a concept’, 2018, 12(9):1–14, online; W Stephens, S Sieckelinck, Race and Class, 2012, 54(2):3–25, online; B Spalek, H Boutellier, ‘Preventing violent extremism: A review of ‘Community policing, trust and Muslim communities in the literature’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2 January relation to “new terrorism” politics and policy’, Politics 2019, online; EL Taylor, PC Taylor, S Karnovsky, A Aly, and Policy, 2010, 38(4):789–815; online; F Vermeulen, N Taylor, ‘“Beyond Bali”: a transformative education ‘Suspect communities—targeting violent extremism at approach for developing community resilience to the local level: policies of engagement in Amsterdam, violent extremism’, Asia Pacific Journal of Education, Berlin, and London’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 2017, 37(2):193–204, online; B Van Brunt, M Murphy, 2014, 26(2):286–306, online. A Zedginidze, ‘An exploration of the risk, protective, 23 Grossman et al., Harnessing resilience capital: an and mobilization factors related to violent extremism investigation of resilience and cultural diversity in in college populations’, Violence and Gender, 2017, countering violent extremism. 4(3), online; S Sieckelinck, AJ Gielen, Protective and 24 Ungar, ‘Systemic resilience: principles and processes promotive factors building resilience against violent for a science of change in contexts of adversity’. radicalisation, RAN issue paper. European Commission, 2017. 10 Lösel et al., ‘Protective factors against extremism and violent radicalization: a systematic review of research’. 11 BOUNCE, Resilience training, network and evaluation STRESAVIORA II (Strengthening Resilience against Violent Radicalisation 2015–2018. 12 HB Ellis, S Abdi, ‘Building community resilience to violent extremism through genuine partnerships’, American Psychologist, 2017, 72(3):289–300, online.

81 COUNTERING AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Operational perspectives on terrorism and managing the risk

COMMANDER SANDRA BOOTH Australian Federal Police Canberra, Australia

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR DR NATALIE DAVIS Australian Federal Police Canberra, Australia

83 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Overview Counterterrorism Over the past decade, the numbers of terrorist strategies to deal with investigations and people charged with terrorism-related offences in Australia have continued high-risk terrorism to rise. As a result, the number of convicted terrorism offenders released from prison has also increased and offenders will continue to do so. In the changing landscape of terrorism and investigations, law enforcement and From 2019, about 70 individuals have been or are due its partners must increasingly share information and for release from prison, having served their sentences respond collaboratively to all threats to the community for terrorism-related offences. Questions have been from ideologically driven attacks. In addition to raised about the risk posed to the community by the the ongoing risk of violent Islamic extremism, that release of those offenders. While some international landscape includes growing threats from right-wing recidivism rates are reportedly as low as 0%,7 those extremists using the internet to promote their ideology. figures have been affected by the attacks by Usman Khan and Sudesh Amman, who were released terrorism offenders, in the UK in 2019 and 2020, respectively. The low rate of recidivism in a single jurisdiction is in Operational perspectives contrast to relatively high rates of criminal and terrorist recidivism elsewhere.8 on terrorism affecting However, law enforcement agencies have encountered difficulties in assessing recidivism internationally Australia because of a number of factors. Those factors include differences in the definition of recidivism, which might Since September 2014, when the national threat involve the commission of subsequent terrorism level was raised to ‘probable’, 128 people have been offences after a term of imprisonment or engaging charged as a result of 59 counterterrorism-related in other criminal acts, or cases in which no one was operations around Australia.1 The landscape for charged (such as when someone has died as a result terrorist activity is dynamic and evolving, and, of their own actions). Further difficulties lie in the low although Islamic extremism continues to cause the base rate of terrorist offences and in the lengthy prison highest workload for government agencies, Australian terms imposed, both of which make it difficult to Federal Police Deputy Commissioner Ian McCartney establish empirical evidence of recidivism. For example, has identified an increase in investigations associated one terrorist offender in Australia isn’t due for release with other ideologies.2 Far-right extremism is now until 2060, so it’s difficult to determine her risk of future seen as an increasing concern for law enforcement. violent extremist activity or support for violent activity Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) after her release. Director-General Mike Burgess has also acknowledged those rising concerns and has estimated that ASIO’s Finally, the notion that offenders disengage from workload dealing with far-right extremists has terrorism while in prison is now being reconsidered. increased to 30%–40%, up from 10%–15% before 2016.3 While an offender might display positive behaviour Burgess has stated that right-wing extremists are more in custody, they may have merely ‘gone grey’ while organised, sophisticated, ideological and active than in incarcerated. There is danger in placing too much previous years. emphasis on an offender’s good behaviour in custody. Many terrorist offenders commit their offences when Since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, their behaviour is otherwise prosocial, and evidence the UN Security Council, along with law enforcement suggests that they behave well while in custody.9 and intelligence agencies, has acknowledged increasing concern for at-risk individuals who are vulnerable to extremist ideologies that promote Legislative options violence.4 Young people being aggressively radicalised both on- and offline has been highlighted as an Through the Criminal Code Act 1995, a court may ongoing threat to Australia.5 Burgess expanded on determine that a convicted terrorist offender may pose those concerns, stating that the novel coronavirus had an unacceptable risk of violent extremism if they were reinforced conspiracy theories, and that the pandemic to be released from prison. The court can make orders is being used by radicals online as ‘proof’ that for the person to be placed on an interim control order, democratic societies are at risk of collapse and that a identifying controls to mitigate the risk they may pose race war is inevitable.6 Although the narrative used by to the community. Such controls can include curfews those groups might not be convincing to most people, and bans on access to certain websites or associates. that message could work with people vulnerable to the The conditions must be specific to the violent rhetoric, which might result in increasing support for extremism risk posed by the individual. Although not a the use of violence to achieve political goals. requirement under the legislation, consideration may also be given to their likelihood of successful and cognition. Some assessors have placed weight C ountering and preventing violent extremism reintegration into the community and their social on the reported responses of convicted terrorists networks, which may mitigate the risk of future to questions about their intentions, motivations ideologically driven violent behaviour. and experiences. However, due to issues such as recall bias and political bias, care should be taken when interpreting a person’s account of Risk assessment and mitigation why they joined a group.11 There are also possible problems involving self-censorship, as convicted The release of a terrorism offender at the interviewees may adjust their accounts to fit a completion of their sentence when there broader political narrative. are still concerns about the risk they pose to the community is a vexing problem for Risk assessments are regularly conducted on decision-makers. It’s vexing partly because offenders to determine their risk of reoffending in the core concept of our justice system is that the future. Risk assessment instruments for future offenders should be returned into society once sexual offending (such as Static-99R or RSVP) or they have served their sentenced terms. violent offending (such as HCR-20) can help to identify factors that may increase the likelihood of The control order regime was established to the person reoffending. Empirical data supports ensure the physical safety of the community by the use of certain instruments to assess the risk of mitigating the risks of individuals participating in sexual and violent offending, but not for violent future violent extremist activities. Although not extremist offending. This means that the hazard in required as part of a control order, there’s also a question isn’t common compared to other forms focus on assisting each individual to reintegrate of behaviour, and a violence risk assessment into the community on release. instrument might not identify the risk for violent Risk is difficult to quantify, but risk assessments extremism; for example, such instruments don’t are more useful, robust and defensible when seek information on violent extremist ideology.12 they consider all factors that affect the individual In the terrorism arena, the base rate for offending, offender and the likelihood that they’ll cause compared to the numbers of sexual and violent harm to the community. offenders, is low and is likely to remain low. As an example, the base rate for homicide in the A violent extremism risk assessment shouldn’t be US in 2018 was 5.3 cases per 100,000 people.13 completed in isolation. A comprehensive picture In comparison, the rate for major cardiovascular of the individual can be gained from additional disease was 163.6 cases per 100,000 people in information about them, such as a psychometric the same year.14 In terrorist cases, the rate is assessment, their history, their social networks even more problematic: in 2018, 45 people were and protective factors that might mitigate the killed by terrorist acts in the US,15 which leads risk and inform a more comprehensive risk to an estimated death rate due to terrorism assessment. Although risk can never be entirely of 0.014 cases per 100,000 people. Therefore, eliminated (or it wouldn’t be risk), effective risk although the base rate for terrorist events is management can minimise and mitigate risks extremely low and the recidivism risk is difficult to that have been clearly identified. quantify, the consequences of such an event can The factors that affect a risk assessment can be a catastrophic death toll and psychological include both static and dynamic factors. Static damage to the population in general. factors (for example, a childhood history of family dysfunction) are unchangeable over time, whereas dynamic factors (such as access to weapons, the person’s social networks and Recommendations support, and external environmental factors such as foreign policy) are changeable. While static to counter terrorist factors are important considerations, dynamic risk factors can be more telling in a context of violent extremism. Risk assessments need to threats and be repeated in an ongoing process sensitive to triggers (such as changes in the person’s family) funding support to and the emergence of new forms of threat (for example, a new social network of supporters of terrorist groups violent extremism). The assessment needs to be The future for the investigation, management based on a risk model that identifies those factors and mitigation of the risk of violent extremists that are most influential in changing the level of to the Australian community will continue risk. That, in turn, assists in prioritising resources to be a vexing problem for government and and approaches relevant to the specific risk.10 non-government agencies. No longer does When assessing a person’s risk of future violent law enforcement focus solely on the arrest, extremism, it’s important to assess their behaviour charging and sentencing of offenders to 85 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

reduce the risk of violent extremism to public safety. Government and non-government Law enforcement must be dynamic, malleable and agile to respond to emerging issues and the changing collaboration terrorism landscape. Those employed to counter Law enforcement, intelligence and non-government terrorism need to stretch themselves and collaborate agencies should continue and enhance their with non-traditional partners to develop new and collaboration to establish procedures and processes innovative strategies to address the issue. That to address the ongoing risk posed by individuals and will continue to require a shared and collaborative groups who want to harm the community. It’s only response by government and non-government through shared responsibility and collaboration that agencies, along with communities, who are often we’ll be able to understand the enduring risk posed by best placed to identify an individual’s increasing violent extremists intending to destabilise democratic support for violent extremism, to report concerning and multicultural societies and to identify, assess and behaviour, to help redirect the individual away from mitigate that risk. violent radicalisation and to reintegrate them into the community through intervention programs.

Policy and legislation Notes 1 Correct at 27 January 2021. Policymakers in government are essential in working alongside law enforcement to develop options for 2 Senate Estimates, 20 October 2020. the mitigation of the risk posed by those who support 3 ‘Neo-Nazis among Australia’s most challenging security violence to achieve their goals and propagate their threats, ASIO boss Mike Burgess warns’, ABC News, 24 February beliefs. This has been demonstrated, for example, 2020, online. by the Australian Federal Police engaging with the 4 Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), Department of Home Affairs to develop policies and Member states concerned by the growing and increasingly transnational threat of extreme right-wing terrorism, CTED strategies to address violent extremism in Australia, trends alert, UN, July 2020, online. including by addressing legislative gaps as we continue to learn about the evolving terrorist environment. That 5 Senate Estimates, 20 October 2020. work has included social cohesion and community 6 ‘Neo-Nazis among Australia’s most challenging security engagement activities to integrate those vulnerable to threats, ASIO boss Mike Burgess warns’. radicalisation and support for violence into a pluralistic 7 A Silke, J Morrison, Re-offending by released terrorist prisoners: and multicultural society. separating hype from reality, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague, 2020. 8 MB Altier, E Leonard Boyle, JG Horgan, ‘Returning to the Human sciences and practitioners fight: an empirical analysis of terrorist reengagement and recidivism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 18 November There’s an increasing recognition of the need for 2019, online. See also B Hasisi, C Tomer, D Weisburd, social science researchers to collaborate with law M Wolfowicz, ‘Crime and terror: examining criminal risk factors enforcement practitioners to develop theories on new for terrorist recidivism’, Journal of Quantitative Criminology, and emerging issues and to identify opportunities 2020, 36:449–472. to mitigate terrorism risks. Research helps inform 9 J Hall, Terrorist risk offenders: independent review of statutory decision-making based on evidence about the multi-agency public protection arrangements, UK Government, motivations, intent and ideological drivers of 2020, online. violent extremists. 10 K Roberts, J Horgan, ‘Risk assessment and the terrorist’, Perspectives on Terrorism, 2008, 2(6). To make it more likely that people at risk of violent 11 T Schmutz, ‘“Lone soldiers” in the Israeli military—a research extremism will be identified early and risks to the note on the conceptualization of foreign fighters’, Terrorism community will be reduced, we need to identify typical and Political Violence, 23 October 2020, online. behaviours of supporters of extremism, consider 12 RTI International, Countering violent extremism: the the whole of their life cycle when they come to the application of risk assessment tools in the criminal justice and attention of authorities, and address concerning rehabilitation process, US Department of Homeland Security, behaviours through mitigation strategies. Although 2018, online. it isn’t possible to predict precisely who will go on 13 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, to commit violent extremist acts, the identification 2018, US Government, 2018 online. of potential indicators of violent extremism and the 14 Number of deaths due to diseases of the heart per 100,000 professional judgement and experience of human population. Timeframe: 2018, KFF, 2019, online. science practitioners support law enforcement 15 START: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and decisions that are often made in real time and during Responses to Terrorism, Trends in global terrorism: Islamic critical stages of an investigation. State’s decline in Iraq and expanding global impact; fewer mass casualty attacks in ; number of attacks in the United States highest since 1980s, University of Maryland, October 2019, online. COUNTERING AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Understanding transitions to violence and the role of practitioner– academic partnerships

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER ROSS GUENTHER Public Safety and Security, Victoria Police Melbourne, Australia

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR DEBRA SMITH Principal Research Fellow, Institute for Sustainable Industries & Liveable Cities, Victoria University Melbourne Australia

87 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Since the establishment by the Islamic State of Iraq and • High-risk terrorism offenders (HRTOs): In recent the Levant (ISIL) of its so-called caliphate in June 2014, years, a number of terrorism offenders have been the Australian domestic terrorist threat environment released from prison, and it’s expected that this has undergone significant change. In Victoria, and for number will continue to grow. The management of the rest of Australia, this transformation was marked by these individuals is resource intensive and highly Numan Haider’s attack on two members of Melbourne’s complex, while community expectations might Joint Counter Terrorism Team in September 2014. even dictate a need to manage HRTOs for years. Arguably the first attack of its type anywhere in the To a significant extent, therefore, their status as Western world in response to ISIL’s call for domestic individuals who represent a risk of terrorist violence acts of violence,1 that incident had many of the is determined by their previous offending. While hallmarks that would come to characterise future that’s clearly an important consideration, ultimately actual and planned attacks in other parts of Melbourne HRTOs’ medium- to long-term management should and Australia. largely be determined by the extent to which they represent an unacceptable risk to community The operational implications for counterterrorism safety. That requires the development of indicators (CT) policing have been both complex and profound that are sensitive to tipping points, because not as a result of the elevation to a new level of the threat everyone who’s radicalised will engage in violence.4 of lone-actor, low-capability terrorism. The direct This, of course, also needs to be balanced against operational effects of overseas events and propaganda, other types of risk, in the understanding that the increasing influence of mental health issues terrorist offending can take various forms, not all and the truncation in some instances of terrorists’ of which necessarily involve direct engagement decision-making and planning processes have in violence. complicated matters further. In fact, the appeal of ISIL’s ideological message achieved a level of motivational • Residual or ongoing risk: Events over the past resonance previously unseen in Australia, no doubt several years, both in Australia and overseas, bolstered by the idea of the purported caliphate itself. indicate that individuals who were formerly the The result has been a significant proliferation of CT subject of a CT investigation may re-emerge, persons of interest (POIs). months or years later, as significant terrorist risks. Indeed, some have chosen to engage in attacks In more recent times, the growth in right-wing that resulted in injury and the loss of life.5 Those extremism has added to the challenges of managing incidents have forced police to reconsider how a rising, and increasingly diverse, POI cohort. The they manage this ‘residual’ risk. The challenges ability of police to identify and prioritise risk so that associated with doing so, however, are significant. resources can be allocated where they’re needed Finite resources clearly dictate that the focus most is therefore a key prerequisite for effective POI of operational CT policing should be on those management. Critically, this includes the capacity to individuals who represent the most significant and make distinctions, sometimes quite subtle, between imminent risk. However, we also know that risk individuals who are sympathetic to a terrorist cause isn’t static. Police therefore need the confidence to and those who are more susceptible to using violence downgrade the priority of POIs where the available based upon their beliefs. intelligence and professional judgement dictate. The need to make that important distinction, and The capacity to confidently make such evaluations, the challenges inherent in being able to do so, were however, in no small part depends on the ability revealed in a recent UK Government report that of police to possess and then contextualise examines terrorist recidivism. The report asks its new intelligence on those POIs as part of an readers to consider the case of an individual released ongoing risk assessment process. Establishing a from prison after serving a short prison term for nuanced, contemporary and empirically based downloading suspicious material likely to be useful understanding of the diverse circumstances under to a terrorist. It goes on to ask, ‘What is the likelihood which individuals can transition to violence is a key that they will go on to carry out a violent attack on foundation upon which this process rests. members of the public? What is the likelihood that • Countering violent extremism (CVE): Within they are merely fixated on extreme material readily Victoria Police, CVE has for the past 10 years been available on the Internet?’2 Those questions are more a critical component of the force’s diverse CT than just an exercise in intellectual curiosity.3 They have arrangements. The very nature of this work involves significant real-world implications for operational CT working closely with community-based partners policing because they directly inform priorities and the who, with the support of police, are taking on allocation of intelligence and investigative resources. increasing responsibility for the management of While it isn’t possible to predict with certainty whether CVE participants. Providing those partners with an individual will engage in terrorist violence, the information to enhance their understanding of ability to make nuanced judgements about how people behaviours indicative of imminent terrorist activity make the critical transition to violence has several can aid their decision-making on when a client implications for a range of CT activities, including in the may better be managed by police. The mutual following areas: identification and acceptance of critical thresholds of escalating risk, and the processes that they might trigger, are fundamental to effective The combined Victoria University and Victoria C ountering and preventing violent extremism POI management and the maintenance of Police research team adopted a comparative trust and transparent police–community case study approach, drawing on 12 cases relationships. of people who had engaged in or attempted to engage in violent extremism and six cases Given the operational importance of identifying of people who expressed support for violent individuals who are mobilising towards violence, extremism but stopped short of transitioning to Victoria Police’s Counter Terrorism Command violence. The supporters who didn’t transition undertook internal research to identify specific to violence acted as a control group. Including circumstances that might contribute to an a control group is methodologically important individual escalating from support for an to understand what factors distinguish between ideology towards some form of terrorist action. radicalisation and an individual’s mobilisation to Based on an in-depth examination of Victorian violence, yet they’re remarkably rare in studies case studies, the research resulted in the of violent extremists.7 The Victoria University development of a framework focused on four researchers gathered data from various open distinct circumstances that may correlate with sources, and Victoria Police added data from an escalation towards committing a violent restricted sources where it was available. attack in Australia or participating in a foreign incursion. Those four circumstances were: The project found empirical support for a • a confluence of events generating intense number of the variables examined. The most emotions and/or grievance strongly supported of the four circumstances highlighted by Victoria Police’s internal research • exposure to means and opportunity capable was the third (costs associated with action are of recalibrating perceived chances of success lowered and the costs of not acting are raised), • costs associated with action are lowered and in which four of the six associated variables the costs of not acting are raised were present. We also established support • the intensification of perceived pressure to for two of the seven variables associated with act. the first circumstance (confluence of events to generate intense emotions and/or grievance), The research further developed 19 as well as one of the variables associated with corresponding observable behavioural both other circumstances (intensification of indicators related to those four circumstances. perceived pressure or need to act and exposure to Therefore, the framework that originated means and opportunity capable of recalibrating from this knowledge was an important step perceived chances of success). towards generating new hypotheses and better distinguishing individuals who may be The results of the study pointed to the mobilising towards violence from those who importance of collaborative research between demonstrate broader support for the ideology law enforcement and academia to enable without intending to act. Victoria Police the generation of fine-grained insights subsequently sought to test those hypotheses, into mobilisation from supporter to active working with academics at Victoria University participant in violent extremism, which are so to develop a systematic and scientific method operationally important. Generating data points that enabled the integration of open and from closed sources enriched the evidence closed data sources to expand and deepen the base and significantly contributed to the ability police research. to develop control cases and make useful comparison points. From a research perspective, the project represented an opportunity to work with highly From the perspective of operational CT targeted data that focused specifically on policing, the research outcomes have formed mobilisation to extremist violence, rather than the foundation for the contemporisation of the broader and more contentious concept of tools used by investigators and analysts to radicalisation. Indeed, research on radicalisation prioritise POIs. Importantly, this has led to has been widely criticised for contributing to a focusing on risk factors and behavioural the creation of ‘suspect communities’, partly indicators previously not formally included through a lack of focus on how to identify the in the POI assessment process, particularly few people who are inclined to act violently on those grounded in individuals’ emotional extreme views.6 The lack of research focusing states. Moreover, the research identified some specifically on mobilisation is in part a result of risk factors considered counterintuitive, the the difficulties involved in accessing information presence of which may previously have led on individuals in the lead-up to engaging to a downgrading or moderation of a POI’s in violence. risk profile. Ultimately, these new insights reflect the mutable nature of the terrorist

89 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

threat and therefore the need to regularly revisit our contemporary understandings and assumptions of Notes how and why individuals are radicalised to violence. 1 ISIL spokesman Abu Mohammad al-Adnani made the speech Beyond the project outcomes, several other ‘Your Lord is ever watchful’, which called for domestic acts of benefits arose from the collaborative, co-production violence, on 20 September 2014. Haider’s attack was on 23 September 2014. approach. For the police personnel, being physically embedded in the academic research team with 2 Jonathan Hall, Terrorist risk offenders: Independent adjunct status provided greater insight into the Review of Statutory Multi-Agency Protection Arrangements, UK Government, 2020, 7, online. processes underpinning scientific inquiry, enhancing transferable skills that can be used in their core roles 3 Recent attacks in the UK, including those perpetrated by in policing. It also generated greater transparency individuals who participated in terrorist rehabilitation and reintegration programs, demonstrate the risk of terrorist and practitioner confidence in the outcomes and recidivism. For example, Sudesh Mamoor Faraz Amman and applicability of the research. For the academics, Usman Khan were responsible for attacks in London in 2020 working alongside the police personnel provided and 2019, respectively. rare insight into how terrorism research is applied 4 Jamie Bartlett, Carl Miller, ‘The edge of violence: towards operationally, while also providing an opportunity telling the difference between violent and non-violent to nuance their understanding of violent extremism radicalization’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 2012, 24(1). in ways that will shape and influence their further 5 See, for example, Dominic Grieve, The 2017 attacks: What studies. It also helped them understand the limits needs to change? Westminster, Manchester Arena, London of open-source data, providing insight into how that Bridge, Finsbury Park, Parsons Green, Intelligence and Security data can most effectively be used, as well as some of Committee of Parliament, UK, November 2018, online. its limitations. 6 Michele Grossman, Mario Peucker, Debra Smith, Hass Dellal, For both partners, the importance of developing a Stocktake Research Project: A systematic literature and selected research relationship that extends beyond a specific program review on social cohesion, community resilience and violent extremism 2011–2015, Department of Premier and short-term project became clear. While there are Cabinet, Victorian Government, 2016; Kristina Murphy, Adrian several models for conducting joint police–academic Cherney, Julie Barkworth, Avoiding community backlash in the research, the benefits of co-production through a fight against terrorism: research report, Australian Research program of iterative research, building each stage Council (grant no. DP130100392), 2015; Arun Kundnani, on previous knowledge, provides a strong model ‘Radicalisation: the journey of a concept’, Race & Class, 2012, for combining the resources, skills and expertise of 54(1). the different organisations to achieve more targeted 7 Bartlett & Miller, ‘The edge of violence’; Michael Jensen, Gary and operationally applicable results. While this LaFree, Patrick A James, Anita Atwell-Seate, Daniela Pisoiu, does sometimes result in demands on each party as John Stevenson, Herbert Tinsley, Empirical assessment of they navigate their different working cultures and domestic radicalization (EADR), final report to the National expectations, each party becomes more adapted Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, US Department to their role in the applied research process as the of Justice, Washington DC, 2016, online. relationship matures and carries that forward into new areas of inquiry. COUNTERING AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Countering violent extremism: the New South Wales approach

PIA VAN DE ZANDT Director, Office of Community Safety and Cohesion, New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice Sydney, Australia

AFTAB MALIK Research and Community Engagement Manager, Office of Community Safety and Cohesion, New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice Sydney, Australia

MADELEINE COOREY Senior Policy Officer, Office of Community Safety and Cohesion, New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice Sydney, Australia

91 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

In New South Wales, our countering violent extremism and universities. In its first two years, COMPACT (CVE) efforts are distinct from but complementary to reached more than 20,000 young people, and 66% our counterterrorism programs.1 While counterterrorism of participants reported that they had developed a is led by law enforcement and security agencies, greater level of acceptance of and respect for others.8 CVE programs are primarily led by social policy COMPACT programs are locally designed, managed agencies, working closely with NSW communities. Our and implemented in the community.9 By facilitating CVE strategy encompasses programs that focus on relationships within communities (‘social bonding’), prevention and early intervention, such as support and between communities (‘social bridging’) and between wellbeing programs in schools, a community helpline, communities and institutions (‘social linking’), we and efforts with the NSW Police Force to combat bias ensure that everyone who wants a role in preventing crimes.2 NSW agencies also deliver more targeted violent extremism has one.10 interventions, such as mental health support for fixated To ensure that we engage with and hear from new people who pose a threat, interventions for young voices, we held a series of in-depth dialogues with people in youth justice and case management for those Muslim youth leaders, women and religious leaders at risk of violent extremism, including families of foreign during 2019. Those roundtables helped us to engage fighters returning to NSW. Because we, as a society, all with Muslims from diverse religious practices, share responsibility for countering hate and extremism, ethnicities and cultures and understand barriers that the NSW Government engages with community leaders, may exist to engaging with existing CVE initiatives. We business and local government. We also work closely also gained insights from the community into possible with academics and experts to commission research new approaches to CVE. to ensure that we have the capability to respond to emerging issues. Our CVE efforts seek to build resilience Recurring criticisms that arose across our engagements and cohesion and protect, divert and disengage included confusion about CVE and its intersection with individuals from violent extremism. Underpinning counterterrorism; the persistent view that CVE focuses that approach is an emphasis on evidence, trust upon and securitises Muslims; and the perception that and transparency. political rhetoric and media representations of Islam and Muslims play a role in creating societal divisions. We also learned that Muslim communities are willing to engage with CVE programs if the conditions are right; Community as a that there’s an opportunity for governments to better communicate what CVE is and the role law enforcement source of strength plays; and that communities are seeking agency and autonomy, to be empowered to tell their own stories, Engagement with communities is fundamental to including that of an ‘Australian Islam’—an expression of the NSW approach to CVE.3 We view our diverse Islam that’s culturally relevant and, importantly, deeply communities as a source of strength, not suspicion. connected with Australia’s past.11 Cognisant of such CVE is framed as ‘a social issue with security issues, the NSW Government is investing $12.3 million implications’—not a security issue with social in CVE in 2020–21, with a focus on community-based implications.4 In NSW, we’ve found that consultation programs. This may allow space for communities to with, and providing feedback to, communities builds challenge stereotypes and misconceptions about trust and transparency.5 Recognising that both global faith and tell their own stories. Opportunities to build events and domestic political rhetoric can affect on the trust already established with community social dynamics, the NSW Government engaged with leaders by NSW Police in CVE were also evident. While community stakeholders—even those sceptical of the we acknowledge the inherent tensions of police process—to co-design a strategic communications involvement in CVE, we work closely with NSW Police plan for use by our political leaders in the event of a to manage those tensions with communities so that terror attack. Likewise, we developed a community critical partnerships can be sustained.12 Importantly, awareness-raising campaign about new laws designed by pursuing a broad-based CVE strategy, we may to protect people from public threats of violence, allay the apprehensions and fears held by Muslim based on their race or religious affiliation, with Keep communities and enhance their engagement with our NSW Safe, which is a coalition of 31 individuals and CVE programs.13 community groups.6 While Islamist terrorism remains the most prominent The NSW CVE approach encourages community threat,14 we can’t ignore the threat posed by autonomy, supporting communities to find solutions other extremist ideologies—most notably far-right to our social cohesion challenges. The Community extremism.15 We commissioned Macquarie University Partnership Action grants program (or COMPACT), led researchers to investigate the online narratives of by Multicultural NSW, is one such example.7 COMPACT far-right extremists. They found that those narratives is made up of an alliance of more than 60 grassroots highlighted the theme of a ‘white identity’ under community organisations, including charities, NGOs, threat, which is also evident among far-right extremist sporting associations, private sector partners, schools organisations in North America and Europe.16 The research raised awareness for government evidence-based CVE programs and evaluate C ountering and preventing violent extremism and civil society about the revolutionary them.20 Confronted by Covid-19, we’ve also begun and antisocial agenda of far-right extremist to monitor the impact of the pandemic on social organisations. The project revealed a risk of a cohesion by analysing publicly available data ‘creeping threat’ to liberal democracy when the to gauge public sentiment and identify pressure activities of far-right extremists seek to widen points that may strain social cohesion and foment the range of acceptable social and political violent extremism. discourse in our society (the ‘Overton window’) by using narratives that challenge Australian liberal democracy.17 Next steps We’re adapting our programs to changing The need for circumstances, such as those presented by the Covid-19 pandemic. For example, funding for better metrics and COMPACT, our community grants program, has been increased. Developing global citizenship and evaluation digital intelligence will be a focus of programs for young people, and we’ll seek to work more closely Since 2015, the NSW Government’s investment with local government and the private sector to in CVE has sought to increase the capacities reduce hate and extremism. of communities and government to respond A key challenge for the future of our CVE program to violent extremism and mitigate its social is its positioning in relation to counterterrorism. impacts. The program has focused on There are risks that confidence and trust can be improving understanding of the complexities of undermined by the ‘securitising’ of programs, radicalisation across government and service participants and communities. Over time, as providers.18 An independent evaluation found agencies’ programs continue to mature, it makes that our efforts increased community resilience, sense to make CVE ‘business as usual’ and build it strengthened protective factors against violent into broader, mainstream government strategies. extremism in NSW and increased CVE expertise That would also help address CVE’s reputation and capacity in government. Significant as being simply a part of counterterrorism. For relationships were also built across government example, CVE programs in schools might best and with the community.19 sit within broader programs targeting antisocial As part of an emphasis on evaluation, NSW is behaviour, while intervention programs for working to ensure that all CVE projects have young people at risk of extremism might work a strong program logic to ensure that there’s best as part of broader crime prevention efforts. a coherent set of objectives and supporting If we’re ultimately successful in embedding activities to achieve the stated outcomes. This CVE as business as usual for NSW Government includes a robust data collection and evaluation departments, and overcome the trust deficit plan. We aim to develop better metrics by with communities, we’ll nonetheless still need collaborating, for example, with the Scanlon to be able to identify CVE activities so that their Foundation and other civil society organisations, successes may be measured, and any failures to better understand the extent of social cohesion scrutinised. In ‘mainstreaming’ CVE initiatives, within NSW and the challenges and threats to our whole-of-government coordination and multicultural society. accountability shouldn’t be lost. Currently, we’re working to align our CVE program The NSW Government would like to build CVE indicators to the available evidence on ‘what expertise among a broader group of policymakers works’ in other programs, such as youth crime and practitioners—people working in child prevention and youth justice programs, drawn protection, housing, mental health and disability from criminology, child protection and public services and people in community-based health literature. We’ll continue to examine organisations in NSW. We’re investing in whether this direction is viable and whether it improvements to our intervention program can adequately measure success in diverting or to better support at-risk individuals to resist disengaging individuals from extremism. violent extremist ideologies, including through a multi-NSW-agency panel. We’re implementing We’ve also developed a web-based, publicly more rigorous screening, assessment and case available CVE program design and evaluation management for people at risk of extremism tool, funded by the Australian Government. It and developing an evidence base for our aims to assist CVE practitioners in government interventions. Our multi-agency approach—which and community organisations to develop robust, includes representatives from NSW Police and

93 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

health and education authorities—is also used to 8 Acil Allen Consulting, NSW Countering Violent Extremism support families returning from foreign conflict zones Program evaluation, October 2019, 28–29, online. as they reintegrate into NSW. In the youth justice arena, 9 Jackson et al., Practical terrorism prevention, xiii. we’re developing an evaluation framework so that we 10 Stephens et al., Preventing violent extremism, 8. can build a better understanding of ‘what works’ for 11 While unrelated to and independent from CVE, Sheikh young people in detention. Wesam Charkawi, a Sydney-based scholar, locally funded and produced a documentary that sought to empower NSW CVE practitioners engage in a global environment marginalised Muslim youth with a narrative that provided and collaboration—local, national and international— them with a sense of connection with Australia’s historic past. as a foothold into better practice. Importantly, we’ll Sheikh Wesam Charkawi, Before 1770, Abu Hanifa Institute, continue to emphasise that CVE is an issue that affects online. all of society, so we must work with a broad range 12 Adrian Cherney and Jason Hartley acknowledge the of stakeholders to ensure that our society remains ‘problems’, ‘challenges’ and ‘inherent tensions’ of police resilient, strong and cohesive. involvement in CVE efforts, but argue that the ability of police to ‘reconcile and manage’ those tensions with community stakeholders will determine just how effective and sustainable such partnerships will be. Adrian Cherney, Jason Hartley, ‘Community engagement to tackle terrorism and violent Notes extremism: challenges, tensions and pitfalls’, Policing and Society, 2017, 27(7):750–763, online. 1 Such complementarity is explained by the NSW Counter Terrorism Strategy. See Department of Communities and 13 NSW engages with a wide range of non-Muslim and Muslim Justice, NSW Counter Terrorism Strategy, NSW Government, stakeholders representing diverse communities and 2020, online. ethnicities. In late 2019, that engagement led us to fund the Collaborative Approaches to Counter the Extremist Right-Wing 2 Bias crime is described as crime in which ‘the victim is and Threat conference. The symposium targeted because of an aspect of his or her identity, including challenged the perception that CVE is concerned only with race, ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation.’ See Gail Mason, Islamist-inspired extremism, which, in turn, generated interest ‘A picture of bias crime in New South Wales’, Cosmopolitan and intrigue in our work from sceptics and critics alike. The Civil Societies: an Interdisciplinary Journal, 2019, 11(1), online. conference was described by the organisers as ‘the first 3 We believe that the best defence against violent extremism is countering violent extremism (CVE) government-funded strong, resilient individuals and communities. For example, conference in Australia and the world dedicated specifically see Multicultural NSW, COMPACT: Program and Grants to examining the impact of the extremist right-wing and Information 2020–21, NSW Government, 2020, online. Islamophobia on social cohesion after the 15 March 2019 4 Anne Aly, Anne-Marie Balbi, Carmen Jacques, ‘Rethinking terrorist attack in New Zealand’. See Derya Iner, Priscilla Brice, countering violent extremism: implementing the role of Collaborative approaches to counter the extremist right-wing civil society’, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter and Islamophobia threats: a report on the NSW conference Terrorism, 2015, 10(1):9. Also, a recent review of CVE literature held on 21 November 2019, Charles Sturt University, Sydney, concludes that attempts to achieve a non-securitised 2019, 2. Isaac Kfir has observed that, while Islamophobia approach have resulted in efforts to build community and is rising, there exists a ‘fundamental misunderstanding’ of individual resilience. See William Stephens, Stijn Sieckelinck, what it is. See Isaac Kfir, 18 years and counting: Australian counterterrorism, threats and responses Hans Boutellier, ‘Preventing violent extremism: a review of , ASPI, Canberra, 2019), 5, 22, online. For insights into the relationship between the literature’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2 January 2019, Islamophobia and radicalism, see John L Esposito, Derya Iner online. (eds), Islamophobia and radicalization: breeding intolerance 5 As has been noted, CVE generally operates in a ‘significant and violence, Palgrave Macmillan, Switzerland, 2019. trust deficit’. See Brian A Jackson, Ashley L Rhoades, 14 The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Jordan R Reimer, Natasha Lander, Katherine Costello, Sina states that the ‘principal source of the terrorist threat remains Beaghley, Practical terrorism prevention: reexamining US Sunni Islamist extremism’. ASIO, ASIO annual report 2018–19, national approaches to addressing the threat of ideologically Australian Government, 2019, 19, online. motivated violence, Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center, 2019, 3. Trust can be regained a number of ways, 15 For example, ASIO acknowledges that the threat from the which include empowering local communities to deliver extreme right-wing in Australia has ‘increased in recent initiatives they believe address violent extremism and forming years’ (ASIO, ASIO annual report 2018–19, 20), whereas partnerships between organisations countering far-right the US Government describes white supremacist violent extremism and Islamophobia that have robust evaluation extremism as ‘one of the most potent forces driving domestic Strategic processes in place to assess the success or failure of CVE terrorism’ (Department of Homeland Security, Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence, initiatives. See Nada Roude, ‘Australian Muslim leaders’ US Government, 2019, 10, online). The UK Government perspectives on countering violent extremism: towards recognises extreme right-wing terrorism as ‘a growing developing a best practice model for engaging the Muslim threat’ (HM Government, CONTEST: the United Kingdom’s community’, PhD thesis, Charles Sturt University, 2017. strategy for countering terrorism, June 2018, 8, online), and 6 The campaign can be viewed at Stop Public Threats, online. Canada recognises that the threat of violent extremism ‘is 7 A first-of-its-kind community resilience-building initiative, constantly changing’ and that ‘some individuals within the COMPACT seeks to mitigate the social impacts of violent far-right movement have espoused, glorified, promoted, and extremism. Urbis, Evaluation of the COMPACT Program, report even engaged in violence’ (Canada Centre for Community prepared for NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet, Engagement and Prevention of Violence, National Strategy 28 November 2018, online. on Countering Violent Radicalization to Violence, Canadian Government, 2018, 1, online). 16 Department of Security Studies and Criminology C (DSSC), Mapping networks and narratives of online ountering and preventing violent extremism right-wing extremists in New South Wales (version 1.0.1), Macquarie University, 9 October 2020, online. 17 ‘[T]he Overton Window can both shift and expand, either increasing or shrinking the number of ideas politicians can support without unduly risking their electoral support’; Nathan J Russell, An introduction to the Overton window of political possibilities, Mackinac Center for Public Policy, 4 January 2006, online. The research also noted that issues for future consideration included building awareness about the civic underpinnings of representative liberal democracy and the threat of right-wing extremism, and expanding the current CVE infrastructure provided by the NSW Government to those vulnerable to this kind of extremism. The researchers noted that local government was well placed to deliver programs in some communities. See DSSC, Mapping networks and narratives of online right-wing extremists in New South Wales. 18 The evaluation of NSW’s CVE Program demonstrated that the program achieved significant reach—nearly 1.5 million people in NSW were affected, including through engagement with communities, service providers, 130 schools, government and local councils. Acil Allen Consulting, NSW Countering Violent Extremism Program evaluation. 19 Acil Allen Consulting, NSW Countering Violent Extremism Program evaluation. 20 The tool includes examples of relevant, valid and rigorous CVE indicators and data collection methods that can be tailored and adapted to support project-level evaluations in government and non-government programs. It contains CVE evaluations from Australian and international jurisdictions and allows users to review examples of various approaches to CVE program evaluation. See Adrian Cherney, Jennifer Bell, Ellen Leslie, Lorraine Cherney, Lorraine Mazerolle, ‘Countering violent extremism evaluation indicator document’, National Countering Violent Extremism Evaluation Framework and Guide, Australian and New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2018, online.

95 COUNTERING AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The new far right: construction of hatred against the Islamic community in multicultural Australia

ANGEL ADAMS PhD candidate focusing on online and offline extremism in Australia at Deakin University Melbourne, Australia

97 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

The construction of a Western identity and power superior. That originated from the desire to dominate relations during the colonial period still permeate and impose white-centred norms over ‘other’ non-white some Australian public discourses, creating a challenge individuals. Through colonisation and racialisation, to social cohesion in the country. Western narratives the concept of the ‘other’ took on a global dimension.6 of a fear of the ‘other(s)’ bring disengagement to a During the colonialist era, ideologies, institutions multicultural society and can potentially lead to a and practices were focused on establishing the white more unstable environment in which hatred, exclusion empire, which created an asymmetrical relationship and violence are legitimised and deemed necessary with the ‘other’ and deeply unfair power structures. to combat what’s perceived to be a national threat. Most importantly, the global context at that time in The inflation of counterterrorism policies after 9/11 history was one of conflict against those being colonised throughout Western countries contributed to an and, above all, coloured people. Thus, ‘whiteness increase of fear of the ‘other’ and the racialisation studies’ sought to intensify a global narrative of power of Muslims, leading to a significant increase in relations between the white dominant and the coloured Islamophobia.1 The fear of Islamist terrorism inspired a colonised, leading to a perception of a new white era and global ‘moral panic’ that fostered division and suspicion justifying the colonisation of ‘inferior’ races. against Islam and Muslims in Western societies, Additionally, racial identification of nations enabled fuelling narratives of exclusion by the far right. For geopolitical alliances based on national race identities, instance, the ‘ Theory’, which was demonstrating the transnational character of the social adopted by Christchurch’s terrorist attacker and holds construction of whiteness. For instance, when Theodore Muslim migrants to be an existential threat to Western Roosevelt dispatched the US’s Great White Fleet around countries, led to the killing of 51 Muslim worshippers in the world, the flotilla visited Australia in 1908, where 2019, according to the report of the New Zealand royal Rear Admiral Sperry greeted Australians as a ‘white man 2 commission that investigated the attack. to white men’.7 Australia had assimilated the Western Although a majority of Australians perceive transnational features of ally nations, which were 8 as positive for the country, negative constituted as an Anglo and white identity. feelings towards the Islamic community have increased Nevertheless, the Australian ‘imagined community’9—a 3 within the past year, which correlates with exclusionary nation imagined and socially constructed by people who discourses and their current expansion through social perceive themselves as part of the same community— and mainstream media. The dissemination of extreme developed a unique set of characteristics that would far-right public narratives by mainstream sources can distinguish Australians from people of other white-Anglo legitimise the exclusion of minority groups depicted nations. The Australian sovereign state was socially as outsiders, increase the risk of a perpetual cycle of constructed based on an ethnic nationalist identity, in 4 radicalisation and weaken democratic mechanisms which shared culture and ethnic origins would unite and institutions. Thus, the current and persistent spread individuals.10 of far-right extremist groups in Australia highlights the importance of addressing, preventing and combating Nationalist discourses have been demonstrated, historical constructions of racism and exclusion throughout history, to be centred on the exclusion of embedded within liberal democracies and multicultural people who don’t share the same national identity. Western countries. Australia should focus strongly on Some researchers suggest that the best option supressing racially and ethnically motivated violent for Australia would lie in a more inclusive type of 11 extremism and invest in research to understand the nationalism, in which policies and education would dynamics, trends, tactics and international connections focus on social inclusion and institutions would of transnational nationalist and xenophobic groups, embrace diversity, in order to constitute a more united especially white supremacists, in order to prevent multicultural nation. Christchurch-inspired attacks and the spread of hatred. An inclusive and diverse national identity could increase feelings of belonging and solidarity among citizens. Nevertheless, for Australia to truly embrace multiculturalism, it needs to accept new creations of Legitimising a its own national identity and to contest old ideologies that could potentially harm its diversity.12 Australia’s far-right narrative national identity should always seek to look towards the future in order to open itself to new social constructions From the late 1900s onwards, ‘whiteness studies’ and of identity, which would ultimately increase feelings discussions became prominent in the US and the UK. of belonging. Initially, debates focused on differences and relations with the ‘other’ and how blacks could merge into The end of the White Australia policy in the early 1970s, ‘better selves’. and the implementation of an integration policy based on multiculturalism, demonstrated a national interest Race discussions occurred, but the concept of whiteness aimed at increasing social justice and equal rights in a became prominent in global politics and centred the highly diverse nation. It also demonstrated a positive 5 white-Anglo community as the dominant race. The change towards immigration and minorities within white race was described as homogenous, privileged and the country. Australia’s contemporary public discourses Australian NFR movements are rooted in a C ountering and preventing violent extremism and increasing number of new far-right (NFR) belief in white supremacy. They fear failing movements are stoked by global or local social, their Anglo-Saxon identity15 and seek to protect political and economic events. For instance, NFR traditional and conservative Western values in groups have increased their online and offline lieu of multiculturalism, globalisation, or both. activism amid concerns over globalisation, Most NFR groups can be defined as sociopolitical immigration and terrorism, taking a more movements with multiple far-right features and anti-Muslim and ‘patriotic’ approach since the agendas that depend on the country’s political mid-. landscape and current concerns about national threats. Hence, it’s essential to understand the In 2016, the populist One Nation party won local context in order to identify those groups’ four seats in the Australian Senate with a volatile agendas and construction of narratives. political campaign focused on anti-Islam and anti-immigration. Contemporary politicians NFR groups have been demonstrated to be with far-right perspectives focus on the negative fundamentally anti-Muslim or anti-Islam and aspects of immigration, driving public and to project some form of cultural and racial 16 political opinions to justify the use of oppressive superiority. They deem certain peoples to pose and exclusionary policies as a right of the state in a cultural, security, racial and ethnic threat to the 17 order to preserve Australians’ security, culture and nation, which is a sentiment that’s at the core of values,13 which helps to legitimise NFR groups in the strong vigilante aspect inherent in NFR groups’ the Australian public sphere. Therefore, it’s possible activism. to identify some contemporary conservative public After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a sociopolitical figures and NFR groups’ discourses exploring a context of increased ‘moral panic’ and extensive politics of fear, due to an exaggerated concern of media coverage heightened anti-Muslim replacement by the ‘other’ identified in Australia’s sentiment.18 That was evidenced by the ethnocentric inception. Importantly, though, appearance and growth of a range of NFR groups Australia currently faces a less advanced far-right using anti-Islam and anti-Muslim rhetoric in threat in numbers and virulence compared to Western countries.19 In Australia, they have other nations, such as the US and Germany. The included the Patriot Defence League Australia, prevalence of NFR groups appears to be driven by Aussie Angels Against Sharia, Stop the Mosque, a global phenomenon of grievance and anxiety in , the political party Australian various ‘nationalist’ and populist groups. Liberty Alliance, the , Antipodean Resistance, Nationalist Alternative Australia, the and the Soldiers of Odin. Some of the NFR groups have assumed Identity politics a perspective different from that of old-school fascists or neo-Nazi groups.20 For example, some in the West groups have demonstrated a level of acceptance for immigration if immigrants assimilate and The modern Australian national identity was built accept Australia’s ‘true’ national identity.21 on a transnational white-Anglo character, providing the basis for today’s far-right groups to develop a However, studies have shown that most NFR narrative of exclusion against Islam and Muslims groups have a shared belief that the Islamic community ‘contaminates the nation’s pristine (the ‘other’). Those groups’ white 22 has influenced current racial tensions, which are cultural environment’, employing a narrative rooted in the foundation of the nation-state on of hatred and vilification of Muslims and Islam, ethnic-nationalist ideas. The continuous presence justified on the ideological arguments explained of the far right on the fringes of Australian politics above. That bigotry and hatred intentionally harm inclusiveness and damage the human dignity of is buttressed by Australia’s history of whiteness, the Islamic community. As a result, the Australian having as a dominant characteristic the exclusion Islamic community has been subject to hatred at a of the ‘other’14 that’s embedded in an emotional disproportionately higher rate than other minority connection to an idealised past and anxieties groups, especially online.23 about the changing social order. NFR groups usually appropriate populist discourse Political discourses rooted in a history of by highlighting what in their eyes is the best pronounced ethnic-nationalist identity can be an approach to combat what they perceive to obstacle to inclusiveness and equality within liberal be injustices in the public realm, and which is democratic and multicultural countries. They can supported by the centuries of white history and affect a country’s policies, leading to the passing of exclusion that affirms their version of the history exclusionary legislation and the maintenance of a of Australia. Additionally, NFR groups perceive system of exclusion and racism against Indigenous themselves as being engaged in a ‘war’, adopting people, minorities and immigrants in opposition to approaches that exceed normative democratic the ‘true’ nationals. practices and can culminate in violent extremism. 99 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

For instance, uncontrolled hatred and the white The decrease appears to correlate with an increase in negative supremacist beliefs of one man resulted in the mass feelings towards Muslims and Islamic communities. In 2019, interviewer-administered surveys showed that 21%–25% killing of 51 Muslims in Christchurch. of people expressed negative feelings towards Muslims. In the self-completion version of the survey, in which people tended to be more open and transparent, the rate was much higher at 39%–41%. In 2019, 85% of Australians perceived Conclusion ‘multiculturalism’ as being suitable for the country. Andrew Markus, Mapping social cohesion: the Scanlon Foundation Australia, being one of the world’s most multicultural surveys, Scanlon Foundation Research Institute, 2019, online. countries, needs to continue to address, prevent and 4 Tahir Abbas, Islamophobia and radicalisation: a vicious cycle, contain historical structural racism embedded in Oxford University Press, 2019. institutions and directed not only against the Islamic 5 Marilyn Lake, Henry Reynolds, Drawing the global colour community but also against other minorities. That’s line: white men’s countries and the question of racial equality, necessary in order to increase feelings of belonging and Melbourne University Publishing, 2008, 1. sociopolitical justice, which would reduce the risks of 6 Shiells, ‘Immigration history and whiteness studies: political violence and radicalisation. Australia should American and Australian approaches compared’, History seek a contemporary national identity that’s consonant Compass, 2010, 790–804. with its demographics in order to increase social 7 Lake & Reynolds, Drawing the global colour line, 3. cohesion. It should constantly seek to prevent hatred 8 Leigh Boucher, ‘Trans/national history and disciplinary and violence and protect democracy. amnesia: historicising white Australia at two fins de siècles’, in Jane Carey, Claire McLisky (eds), Creating white Australia, A broad range of people from the national to local levels Sydney University Press, 2009, 47. need the resources to directly integrate security work 9 An allusion to Benedict Anderson’s concept of imagined with social cohesion strategies. For instance, police community. Anderson depicts a nation as a socially could receive broader training to identify hate crimes’ constructed community, imagined by the people who perceive motivation and be supported to collect information into themselves as part of that group. a national database, providing valuable information to 10 Danielle Every, Martha Augoustinos, ‘Constructions of Australia different agencies and Australian researchers. Teachers in pro- and anti-asylum seeker political discourse’, Nations and Nationalism, 8 July 2008, 562–580. also play a crucial role in promoting democratic values and practices and developing pedagogical strategies 11 Every & Augoustinos, ‘Constructions of Australia in pro- and anti-asylum seeker political discourse’. to further engage students in questioning the use of 12 Anthony Moran, ‘Multiculturalism as nation-building in violence as a means of change. It’s also important that Australia: inclusive national identity and the embrace of policymakers understand the context, complexities and diversity’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2011, 34(12):2153–2172, doi: implications of discriminatory policies and mitigate 10.1080/01419870.2011.573081. the risks of possible counter-reactions when creating 13 Every & Augoustinos, ‘Constructions of Australia in pro- and new policies. anti-asylum seeker political discourse’. Additionally, while giving voice to political dissent is an 14 Boucher, ‘Trans/national history and disciplinary amnesia: integral part of a democracy, allowing groups to promote historicising white Australia at two fins de siècles’, 44–48. fear, hate, racism and exclusion can eventually lead to 15 Every & Augoustinos, ‘Constructions of Australia in pro- and irreparable wounds in the country’s history, raising the anti-asylum seeker political discourse’. risk of a backlash against democratic processes. If we 16 Mario Peucker, Debra Smith, Muhammad Iqbal, ‘Not a monolithic movement: the diverse and shifting messaging of don’t address these issues appropriately, groups with Australia’s far-right’, in Mario Peucker, Debra Smith (eds), The exclusionary identities can become the norm, along with far-right in contemporary Australia, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. radicalisation, leading to a perpetual cycle of instability 24 17 Peucker et al., ‘Not a monolithic movement: the diverse and in the country. Above all, Australians’ pursuit of change shifting messaging of Australia’s far-right’. needs to be achieved through inclusive democracy and 18 Hannah Ritchie, ‘Does the news reflect what we die from?’, governance and never through violence. Our World in Data, 2019, online. 19 Mario Peucker, Debra Smith, ‘Far-right movements in contemporary Australia: an introduction’, 1, doi: 10.1007/978- 981-13-8351-9_1. Notes 20 Peucker & Smith, ‘Far-right movements in contemporary Australia: an introduction’, 6–7. 1 Ihsan Yilmaz, ‘The nature of Islamophobia: some key features’, in Douglas Pratt, Rachel Woodlock (eds), Fear of Muslims? 21 Jade Hutchinson, ‘The new-far-right movement in Australia’, Boundaries of religious freedom: regulating religion in diverse Terrorism and Political Violence, 15 July 2019, 1–23, doi: societies, Springer, Cham. 10.1080/09546553.2019.1629909. 2 Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on 22 Peucker & Smith, ‘Far-right movements in contemporary Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019, Report, online. Australia: an introduction’. 3 The Scanlon Foundation has found a consistently high level 23 Derya Iner, Iman Zayied, Matteo Vergani, ‘Analysis of of endorsement of multiculturalism up to 2018, ranging from Islamophobia Register Australia data 2014–2015’, in Derya 83% to 86%. Australians have been consistent in perceiving Iner (ed.), Islamophobia in Australia 2014–2016, Charles Sturt ‘multiculturalism as being good for Australia’. In 2019, there University and ISRA, 2017, online. was a decrease in the level of acceptance of multiculturalism. 24 Abbas, Islamophobia and radicalisation: a vicious cycle. COUNTERING AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Young people and violent extremism in the Covid-19 context

PETA LOWE Principal Consultant, Phronesis Consulting and Training Newcastle, Australia

101 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Young people’s vulnerability to and involvement housing, mental health and experiences of social in violent extremism has been exacerbated by the isolation, all of which are factors that can contribute global Covid-19 pandemic. Increasing experiences of to radicalisation.8 social isolation, more time spent online as a result of Many of the initiatives and resources targeting violent lockdowns and school closures, growing expressions extremism before Covid-19 have been redirected of anti-government sentiments and increasing to much-needed health and social responses to unemployment, poverty and social inequality have the pandemic. While the medical and economic all exacerbated pre-existing vulnerabilities that young responses have supported many through the health people have to extremist narratives. Now, more than and financial impacts of Covid-19, addressing broader ever, prevention and diversion efforts are needed to radicalisation push factors such as poverty and identify and address the contributing push and pull socio-economic inequality and increased funding factors at both the individual and community levels. and resourcing for general mental health initiatives and responses have provided generic prevention interventions addressing some radicalisation pull factors or personal factors, specific diversion or Young people and detection resources have been redirected.9 That redirection, together with the need to cease many violent extremism in the existing preventive and diversionary initiatives or redesign them for virtual service delivery, has current context left vulnerable and at-risk youth without those protective interventions. In a year that’s been marked by uncertainty, fear and unprecedented social restrictions, it’s There have been many experiences of increased understandable that governments, civil society and connection and engagement within family private organisations have focused their efforts and relationships and local communities in response resources towards other risks and needs. But, as to the social restrictions. The lockdowns have has been pointed out by many experts in countering provided valuable time and opportunity for families violent extremism and terrorism, all levels of society to reconnect, spend time together and engage with need to come together to develop and deliver new each other without the pressures or interruptions and focused attention to the global prevention and of pre-Covid daily life. The refocusing has also had countering of violent extremism, particularly to the positive impacts on communities; there have been engagement of young people in the responses.1 many stories of grassroots, community-driven initiatives to support people within the community Many extremist groups—including right-wing groups remaining socially distanced but connected and from neo-Nazis and fascists, such as the Atomwaffen increased feelings of community belonging.10 Division2 and ,3 to QAnon; left-wing groups, However, while we’ve seen some positive impacts including anti-fascists and eco-terrorists, such as from Covid-19 restrictions, we’ve also seen many Global Rebellion;4 and Islamist extremist groups, such of the negative impacts: data reveals skyrocketing as ISIS and al-Qaeda have been exploiting current domestic violence rates, increased conflict and use of political and social contexts, taking advantage of violence and aggression, and unprecedented demand moderate protests or movements to spread their for mental health support and services.11 extremist narratives, expand their support base and recruit new members by feeding uncertainty and Many young people, in particular, have been amplifying anti-government rhetoric and concerns.5 negatively affected by lockdowns and social Some have weaponised Covid-19, encouraging restrictions, resulting in an absence of engagement followers to spread the virus intentionally.6 Others with their usual support systems and networks of have hijacked anti-lockdown protests in an attempt people who are outside their immediate family: peers, to shape anti-government narratives and have used coaches, youth workers and teachers, who are also internet and social media platforms to spread their well placed to observe and respond to changes in a propaganda and recruit members. The spread of young person. That lack of engagement in support disinformation, conspiracy theories and propaganda networks outside the family unit makes young people has the potential to damage young people who are already feeling marginalised, or searching significantly, particularly those already marginalised, for identity and belonging, even more vulnerable as they’ve been spending more time in online to the messages from extremist groups seeking to environments and less time in social, recreational, provide connection and answers as to why they’re educational or community settings. UK Counter feeling that way, feeding any existing grievance or Terrorism Policing calls the current environment a frustration. Increasing concerns from children and ‘perfect storm, one which we cannot predict and young people about mental health, social isolation that we might be dealing the effects of for many and negative impacts on family were reported during years to come’.7 In Australia, many peak youth and a study, co-authored by the Australian Human Rights children’s rights bodies are concerned about the Commission, into the impacts of Covid-19 on children impact Covid-19 is having on youth employment, and young people who contact Kids Helpline.12 The report reflects a broad societal challenge with respect to children and young people, their mental C ountering and preventing violent extremism health and their perceptions of isolation and Countering and disconnection from their communities and regular social networks in an environment preventing violent contributing to potential push and pull factors for young people turning to violent extremism. extremism with Additionally, this environment reduces early opportunities for people who are well placed young people to observe and respond to changes in a young person’s behaviour. It’s often people outside the There’s much focus internationally on the best family household who notice and can respond practices for preventing and countering violent to the early changes observable when young extremism with young people. Most efforts people become vulnerable to, or are in the focus on addressing push factors and macro process of, radicalising to violent extremism. In drivers (such as poverty, limited educational and July 2020, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) employment opportunities and persecution or warned that the risk of children and young injustice) and pull factors (such as perceptions people being influenced by Islamic State and of group belonging, the influence of peers or right-wing extremism was increasing and significant leaders and the search for status supported a bill for proposed new laws that and identity). would enable the AFP and ASIO to question A number of recent studies in Australia children as young as 14 if they’re suspected of have sought to highlight the specific factors planning a politically motivated attack.13 The contributing to youth radicalisation to violent AFP stated that it held growing concerns about extremism, as well as exploring the factors the increased likelihood over the past six years contributing to youth resilience to violent of young people being involved in terrorist extremism, in order to inform best practice attacks, citing an increase in children and young principles for preventing and countering people in Australia being targeted by overseas specifically within the Australian context. A study right-wing extremist groups. The proposed into the development and validation of the legislation and the assessment it’s based on Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism predate the effects of the pandemic on young (BRAVE) measure for youth resilience to violent people, which are likely to have increased those extremism found that there are five main factors challenges. Similarly, I wrote last year about the that contribute to resilience: complex factors that contribute to young people • cultural identity and connectedness—the young being significantly more vulnerable to influence person’s familiarity with their own culture and and radicalisation to violent extremism than their belief that their culture is accepted by the adults, and those factors continue to be wider community influential—increasingly so in the current Covid-19 context.14 • bridging capital—having trust in and connection to others outside their own group Additionally, ASIO reported to a parliamentary • linking capital—having trust in and the ability inquiry in September 2020 that far-right violent to connect to government and government extremism makes up about 40% of its current organisations counterterrorism caseload (an increase of about 15% since 2016), calling it a ‘real and growing’ • violence-related behaviours—a willingness to threat.15 And, while right-wing extremism has speak out against violence-related behaviours long been considered a real threat by those • violence-related beliefs—the degree to which working in frontline contexts, the Christchurch violence has been normalised or is seen to attacks in 2019 heightened media and public contribute to status and respect.17 awareness about this issue. Right-wing While the study was based on 18–35-year-old extremism in Australia has been called a participants, the findings reflect what are ‘creeping threat’ in a recent study by Macquarie accepted as the factors that are most significant University into how right-wing extremists are for adolescents in terms of risk, and therefore using social media and online networks to opportunity, to build resilience to violent further recruitment and spread propaganda extremism. Most importantly, it highlights the and extremist narratives.16 The study highlights areas of risk that have been contributed to and how the narratives and messages of right-wing exacerbated by the Covid-19 context, particularly extremist groups are finding their way into having trust in the government and connection political and social norms, mainstream media, to those outside one’s own group, both of which social media and online platforms, particularly have been targeted, particularly by right-wing those frequently used by young people. extremists. While the Australian state, territory and federal governments’ active and successful

103 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

management of the pandemic is likely to have revived broader trust in government in Australia, right-wing Recommendations extremist narratives seek to portray government actions as evidence of agendas to restrict citizens’ freedoms While Covid-19 has highlighted the risk of and or to target particular groups and can add to the exacerbated concerns about young people’s ‘evidence’ for those already seeking to find an answer involvement in violent extremism, and particularly or cause. the increase in their engagement with right-wing extremism, it has also provided opportunities for Another Australian study conducted by the University of the development and delivery of prevention and Queensland reviewed open-source information about diversion interventions to respond to those risks young people who had committed or been convicted and vulnerabilities. There are a number of areas of terrorism-related offences. It highlighted the need to for government policy and investment to focus on, focus on the following contributing risk factors: including the following actions: • social dislocation (including • Create and use online platforms and forums as a way educational disengagement) of effectively communicating about and countering the • active engagement with online social media spread of false information and conspiracy theories. • exposure to other radicalised networks and This would be best achieved by empowering and associates resourcing key actors, such as community and youth leaders, to combat hate speech and the spread of • personal grievances and, in particular, triggering false information online. events.18 • Develop online resilience-building initiatives and Despite the limitations of the study (a small sample campaigns specifically designed by and for young size and the uncertain reliability of open-source people. Such initiatives should target online spaces information), it highlights important risk factors to be where young people connect and spend most of their addressed in prevention and diversion interventions time. Engaging young people in the development and adds to the existing literature underpinning the and implementation of such campaigns can increase development of intervention programs and services. the relevance of the initiatives for other young Of most significance, particularly in the current context, people; provide an outlet for them to express and is the risk associated with social dislocation, including discuss their concerns and hopes; empower them educational disengagement. For many young people to be agents of change in their communities and who were already struggling to remain engaged in society; and magnify peer-to-peer engagement and education before the lockdowns, this additional influence. These initiatives should be co-designed time away from educational settings may have only with young people and involve education, training disengaged them further. Other than the pandemic, and ongoing support for the young people involved. suspensions or expulsions from school also contribute • Partner with current actions and investments in to social isolation, educational and community mental health, education, employment and resilience disengagement and increased time spent online. for young people generally across Australia. This These studies reinforce the importance of the early should include existing services, such as Kids identification of and intervention with young people at Helpline, Youth Action, Headspace and Reach Out, to risk of radicalisation. They highlight the additional risks explore designing into them elements that can also and concerns about social isolation and online social assist in preventing youth radicalisation. media engagement making some young people open • Invest in and support local communities, leaders and to ideas about governments being less trustworthy organisations to build and deliver locally led initiatives because of their pandemic response actions, but also to support local vulnerable young people within their the reduced opportunity for those engaged with a own communities. young person to identify and respond to early changes • Develop and deliver awareness and skills development in behaviour that could indicate risk or vulnerability to programs that focus on improving young people’s radicalisation to violent extremism. media literacy and critical thinking skills. Such programs should promote and encourage the critical analysis of information and its reliability and build young people’s awareness and understanding of online platforms and spaces, such as how social media platforms use algorithms to determine what information is directed to users. • Engage young people in the design and 8 Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), Impacts C ountering and preventing violent extremism development of ‘safe spaces’, both virtual and of COVID-19 on children and young people who contact physical, where they can ask questions and Kids Helpline (2020), 15 September 2020, online. engage in conversations about topics and issues 9 Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, that confuse or frustrate them. Such spaces The Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on terrorism, should use trained professionals with a strong counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism, understanding of youth and violent extremism, UN Security Council, June 2020, online. so that they’re able to maintain dialogue with 10 ‘People are putting bears in their front windows to vulnerable youth. bring children joy’, SBS, 8 April 2020, online. • Develop and deliver education and awareness 11 Else Kennedy, ‘The worst year: domestic violence soars in Australia during COVID-19’, The Guardian, sessions for young people about the process and 1 December 2020, online; ‘COVID-19 information for indicators of radicalisation. The sessions would workplaces’, Safe Work Australia, 29 April 2020, online; help them to develop knowledge and skills Liam Mannix, ‘Here comes the COVID-19 mental health to identify when/whether they or their peers surge’, Sydney Morning Herald, 14 June 2020, online. and friends are being targeted by extremist 12 AHRC, Impacts of COVID-19 on children and young narratives or recruiters. At the early stages of people who contact Kids Helpline (2020). radicalisation, being able to identify seemingly 13 Anthony Galloway, ‘“Emerging issue”: AFP warns small changes can have a big impact on children being influences by right-wing extremism’, successful diversion interventions. Sydney Morning Herald, 9 July 2020, online. • Develop and deliver education and awareness 14 Peta Lowe, ‘Youth and violent extremism’, in Isaac Kfir, sessions for professionals, frontline workers and John Coyne (eds), Counterterrorism yearbook 2020, volunteers engaged in youth service delivery and ASPI, Canberra, online. community organisations. The aim should be to 15 Paul Karp, ‘ASIO reveals up to 40% of its build their awareness and understanding of the counter-terrorism cases involve far-right violent indicators of radicalisation and opportunities extremism’, The Guardian, 22 September 2020, online. for diversion for young people. 16 Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Mapping networks and narratives of online right wing extremists in New South Wales, Macquarie University, Sydney, 2020. Notes 17 Michele Grossman, Kristin Hadfield, Philip Jefferies, Vivian Gerrand, Michael Ungar, ‘Youth resilience to 1 Eric Rosand, Khalid Koser, Lilla Schumicky-Logan, violent extremism: development and validation of Preventing violent extremism during and after the BRAVE measure’, Terrorism and Political Violence, the COVID-19 pandemic, Brookings Institution, 30 January 2020, online. Washington DC, 28 April 2020, online. 18 Adrian Cherney, Emma Belton, Siti Amirah Binte 2 ‘’, Southern Poverty Law Center Norham, Jack Milts, ‘Understanding youth (SPLC), Montgomery, Alabama, no date, online. radicalisation: an analysis of Australian data’, 3 ‘David Lane’, SPLC, no date, online; Jane Coaston, ‘The Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political New Zealand shooter’s manifesto shows how white Aggression, 15 September 2020, online. nationalist rhetoric spreads’, Vox, 18 March 2018, online. 4 Global Rebellion, online. 5 UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, Stop the virus of disinformation: the risk of malicious use of social media during COVID-19 and the technology options to fight it, November 2020, online; Anna Patty, ‘Extreme right groups exploiting virus fear and tension’, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 March 2020, online. 6 Debbie White, ‘Terrorists could use “coronavirus spreaders” in new jihadi attacks, Russian intelligence reportedly claims’, , 30 June 2020, online; Jeff Charles, ‘Threat of domestic terrorism arises amid COVID-19 pandemic’, Red State, 19 August 2020, online. 7 Michael Steward, ‘Impact of COVID-19 is creating “perfect storm” for radicalisation risk, terrorism police warn’, East Anglian Daily Times, 20 November 2020, online.

105 COUNTERING AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The impact of natural disasters on violent extremism

LYDIA KHALIL Research Fellow, Lowy Institute and Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University and member of the Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies (CRIS) Melbourne, Australia

107 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

According to the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction During the pandemic, some of the disinformation and the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology has been generated and spread via coordinated of Disasters, major natural disasters such as floods, campaigns and bots, but mostly by former US droughts and heatwaves have doubled in the past President Trump and conspiracy-theory groups, who 20 years, and we should expect more of the same in were identified as super spreaders of disinformation the coming decades.1 The coronavirus pandemic that via social media posts that were then amplified by swept through 2020 was a long anticipated global coverage in the traditional media.6 pandemic that resulted in necessary yet unprecedented The consequences of the mis- and disinformation crisis restrictions that have frayed the social fabric and will go beyond implications for the management of natural have long-lasting societal impacts. The concurrent disasters, but they’re directly relevant. Governments, crises of 2020, which turned the year into a personal particularly Western democratic governments, are and collective across continents, no longer able to control the flow of information clarified that the multilayered political, economic as they could in the pre-internet era, and that will and environmental effects of natural disasters2 aren’t complicate governments’ messaging as they address limited to the developing or conflict-prone parts of our disasters and emergencies. Therefore, the increased world, but will also affect high-GDP economies and occurrence and scale of natural disasters and complex established democracies that are facing substantial emergencies such as the pandemic, occurring within a challenges, such as inequality, the erosion of the contested information environment, will undoubtedly acceptance of evidence-based knowledge and challenge governments’ disaster and emergency democratic backsliding. We’re all now living in a more responses in a number of ways—including by spurring uncertain and insecure world that will be affected violent extremism. by complex emergencies and natural disasters into the future. Alongside evidence that natural disasters are on the rise, there’s been an equally unprecedented spread Natural disasters of misinformation, disinformation and contestation about the causes and origins of those crises.3 In the as a potential push current information environment, it has become increasingly difficult for governments and other factor towards violent authoritative sources to provide accurate messaging that cuts through. extremism Multiple emergencies and crises in a post-truth age will What drives individuals to commit violence based not only challenge government’s disaster response and on their beliefs or radicalises them towards violent recovery efforts, but potentially spur antigovernment extremism is an essential yet still contested sentiment, violent extremism and even low-level civil question among researchers and counterterrorism conflict—something largely unaccounted for in the practitioners alike. However, we do know that disaster and emergency management (DEM) plans of it’s often a combination ofpull factors (personal advanced economies and democracies. motivations and drivers) and push factors (broader societal, environmental and structural conditions that can be conducive to extremism and violence). Previous research findings have demonstrated that The rise of the natural disasters such as bushfires, hurricanes, earthquakes and pandemics have the potential to act ‘infodemic’ as push factors. The Director-General of the World Health Organization Much of the study of push factors from natural disasters (WHO) has stated that, alongside the Covid pandemic, or resource scarcity has been in developing and we’re in the midst of an ‘infodemic’—the rapid spread conflict-prone regions, rarely in advanced economies of misleading or fabricated information that ‘like the and consolidated democracies. Yet what research on virus … is highly contagious and grows exponentially’ natural disasters and the risk of violent civil conflict has and complicates response efforts.4 Disinformation has been done demonstrates clear links. Studies into the become so robust that the WHO convened the first-ever effects of natural disasters on civil conflict demonstrate ‘Infodemiology’ conference to define the discipline and that disasters can have structural effects that affect establish a community of practice and research.5 the distribution of resources, income and wealth and can provide the motive, incentive and opportunity for violent action. They can also heighten grievances and provide openings for groups with pre-existing grievances to act violently against the state.7 Likewise, research on natural disasters and We’ve seen that extremist movements— C ountering and preventing violent extremism their role in provoking terrorism demonstrates a particularly right-wing extremist movements in correlation. In the previous decade, researchers Western democracies—have instrumentalised Claude Berrebi and Jordan Ostwald, in their and exploited recent crises to mobilise and justify study of 167 countries from 1970 to 2007, found and extend their narratives. During the bushfires that an increase in deaths from natural disasters in Australia, far-right actors pushed narratives resulted in an increase in terrorism-related through coordinated social media campaigns deaths and attacks in the following two years. that maligned minorities and opponents on the They hypothesised that the turmoil caused by left; for example, some posted that the fires were emergencies exacerbated vulnerabilities that the work of Islamist arsonists or were caused terrorists then exploited, and that post-disaster by insufficient backburning due to Greens party instability and political tensions could manifest as or Antifa opposition, while also legitimising terrorism or violent extremism. the use of violence against those groups.10 A similar dynamic was in play during the US More recent research has shown that the increase forest-fire season. in terrorism after disasters is not only correlated with but related to the government’s response; Extremist groups have also latched on to it’s the ‘portrayal of government responses to disasters as catalysts for ‘accelerationism’—a a natural disaster that impacts subsequent theory of creative destruction proposing that terrorism rather than the natural disaster itself’.8 any point of upheaval is an opportunity to usher Poor disaster and emergency management, or in and accelerate the demise of current societal the perception of it, can act as a push factor by structures and governments and impose new exacerbating existing grievances. ones.11 Groups such as the Atomwaffen Division, The Base and the Sonnenkreig Division are all Findings on the effect of natural disasters on right-wing extremist groups that have promoted terrorism in previous decades also found that the accelerationism.12 The Boogaloo movement in effect was concentrated in countries with low to the US has also been a proponent of the same middle-range GDP and that countries with higher theory—its name is a reference to what its GDP didn’t experience increases in terrorism adherents believe to be a future civil war.13 The following disasters or emergencies.9 It was adoption of this philosophy by extremist actors assumed that richer countries had more resources is problematic for DEM efforts because it implies to effect disaster recovery and combat terrorism. that any crisis will be an opportunity for violence Yet, nowadays, we can no longer assume and targeting, regardless of the government’s that high-GDP economies and established emergency response. democracies with yawning inequality gaps and Accelerationism also coincides with the experiencing democratic backsliding are immune history of and tendency towards conspiracism, from violence, polarisation and extremism after millennialism14 and apocalyptic obsessions of natural disasters—particularly in the current the extreme right. Natural disasters can play into information environment. those beliefs and mobilise individuals to action.15 Previous examinations of the issue have focused The extreme right has a long history and on the correlations between natural disasters association with conspiracy theorising and and terrorism and crime or on the effect of conspiratorial thinking,16 and more recent government responses in influencing the research examining conspiracy beliefs and trajectory of the terrorism risk in the aftermath. violent extremist intentions also confirms that ‘a Yet, in the experience of both the bushfires conspiracy mentality leads to increased violent and the pandemic of 2020, we have seen that extremist intentions.’17 Extremist actors use the response of extremist actors—particularly conspiracy theories and disinformation about far-right actors—isn’t exclusively dependent disasters as a delegitimation tool, putting forward on an objective analysis or assessment of a the idea that government institutions have no use government’s response; nor did extremism or value or are the hostile actors, not legitimate emerge exclusively in the aftermath of the crisis. authorities that can help, respond or recover.18 Instead, we’ve observed extremist actors not Furthermore, deliberately spreading only reacting to the government response but disinformation has become a form of attack pre-emptively undermining it and using disasters in and of itself. For example, some right-wing as opportunities to challenge government extremist groups encouraged followers to spread legitimacy and spread disinformation and disinformation about the coronavirus in order conspiracy theories in order to sow distrust and to exacerbate tensions, undermining democracy foment polarisation. and government authority and social cohesion.19

109 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Conspiracy theories connected to Covid-19 and other There have also been anti-elite sentiment and natural disasters and intersecting with 5G, QAnon and targeting. Extremists have made unfounded claims other conspiracies have already inspired plots and against elite elements such as Bill Gates, the Gates attacks,20 but they also form part of a longer continuum Foundation and George Soros (claiming that they’re towards violent extremism through what the late using the pandemic to make money by promoting scholar Ehud Sprinzak termed ‘transformational allegedly harmful vaccines29), while also undermining delegitimation’ brought on by gradual disillusionment experts and institutions such as the UN, the US Centers with democracy, the state and other institutions of for Disease Control and Prevention, and others. This authority.21 anti-establishment, anti-institutional and anti-elite sentiment is encapsulated in the QAnon conspiracy At other times, extremist narratives have downplayed theory, which exploded in reach and adherents during the seriousness of an emergency as part of the the pandemic.30 delegitimation of government and authority, dismissing the threat of Covid-19 and claiming that it’s a hoax or The evidence of this phenomenon is most prevalent in an elite conspiracy. They’ve also pushed narratives the US, but similar instances have occurred in Australia denying that climate change extended and exacerbated and Europe. One man was charged with sending the effects of the bushfire season in Australia.22 threats to kill Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews over his government’s pandemic response.31 A Europol briefing The global pandemic has played into anti-globalisation warns of the growth of right-wing extremism and that: and nativist attitudes among various extremists. Data extracted from Australian far-right and extremist social COVID-19 could further escalate some of these media has shown persistent narratives about how trends, given the potential economic and social globalisation has contributed to the spread of Covid, impact of the pandemic worldwide … the that multiculturalism is a failure and that the pandemic propaganda of the various scenes has addressed restrictions are an opportunity to press for more the COVID pandemic, trying to capitalise from it and permanent limitations on immigration, and extolling reinforce own narratives, propagate misinformation white supremacy.23 and perceived societal division.32 Extremist actors have also used disasters and Other conspiracy theories abound, such as the belief emergencies to bolster their existing frameworks and that ‘COVID-19 is a genetically engineered virus created beliefs. White supremacist groups have blamed the by world banks to kill off weaker humans.’33 During the multicultural societal model for the pandemic and bushfires in Australia, a conspiracy theory, expanded ethnic diversity for the spread of the virus—calling and spread by extremist actors and groups online, it the ‘diversity flu’. The UN has highlighted a growth proposed that the bushfires were deliberately lit in in ‘Covid-19 related hate speech’ targeting certain order to clear land so that the government and the ethnic groups or foreigners, warning that it could private company behind the proposed high-speed rail ‘trigger social unrest and intergroup violence, possibly project wouldn’t have to pay people for their land.34 enhancing the conditions conducive to conflict and States of emergency, in which democratic governments atrocity crimes’.24 invoke emergency powers after natural disasters, also Indeed, extremist actors have used the crisis to play into the narratives of anti-government extremists. make direct calls to action. Leaked US Department What are necessary extensions of government of Homeland Security memos have highlighted authority and curtailing of individual liberties during an that right-wing extremists have called on adherents emergency, extremists frame as tools of social control to purposely spread the virus among minority and evidence of authoritarian tendencies, playing into communities and law enforcement targets.25 Federal the concern that temporary restrictions will become Bureau of Investigation agents killed known right-wing a permanent feature of life and governance. In the extremist Timothy Wilson in a shootout during a US, for example, there have been (disrupted) plots by sting operation because Wilson was planning to use anti-government extremists against the Governor of a to blow up a hospital treating a number Michigan over coronavirus restrictions.35 Earlier in the of Covid-19 patients.26 American senior public health year, one man deliberately derailed a train to target expert Dr Anthony Fauci has needed extra security a US Navy hospital ship, claiming that its presence because of a number of credible threats against in Los Angeles was part of a government takeover.36 his safety.27 Extremists have urged followers to use An expanded ‘sovereign citizen’ movement fuelled homemade chemical weapons to target essential by online conspiracies in Australia has held illegal businesses that serve minority communities.28 anti-government protests over restrictions,37 leading to a number of arrests.38 Anti lockdown protests fuelled by far right extremist elements and conspiracists and attacks against disease control centres were also prevalent in Europe.39 C An agenda for Notes ountering and preventing violent extremism 1 Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters future research (CRED), UN Office of Disaster Risk Reduction,Human cost of natural disasters: an overview of the last 20 years When it comes to future natural disasters and 2000–2019, 2020, online. emergencies, and disinformation about them, we 2 Using the CRED definition of natural disasters: R Below, must recognise that those disasters will play into A Wirtz, D Guha-Sapir, Disaster category classification the hands of extremist actors. Therefore, there are and peril terminology for operational purposes, CRED, several questions in need of further exploration. Brussels, October 2009, online. Can emergencies and natural disasters be drivers 3 M Cinelli, W Quattrociocchi, A Galeazzi, CM Valensise, of violent extremism not only in conflict-prone E Brugnoli, AL Schmidt, P Zola, F Zollo, A Scala, ‘The regions but also in high-GDP countries? Do COVID-19 social media infodemic’, Scientific Reports, emergencies and natural disasters create new 2020, 10:16598, online. conditions for radicalisation, or exacerbate or 4 ‘Director-General’s remarks at the media briefing on intersect with existing conditions and drivers? 2019 novel coronavirus on 8 February 2020’, World What existing grievances can be exploited and Health Organization (WHO), Geneva, 2020, online. what new grievances might be created in the 5 ‘1st WHO Infodemiology Conference’, WHO, Geneva, wake of an emergency or disaster? Is there 2020, online. evidence that extremist narratives about natural 6 S Ali, ‘Combatting against Covid-19 & misinformation: disasters are influencing the mainstream? How a systematic review’, Human Arenas, 2020, online; should this knowledge be not only incorporated S Evanega, M Lynas, J Adams, K Smolenyak, in countering violent extremism (CVE) programs, ‘Coronavirus misinformation: quantifying sources and but proactively accounted for in DEM planning? themes in the COVID-19 “infodemic”’, Cision Global How can DEM incorporate CVE? What do different Insights, 2020, online. Evanega et al. found that ‘media experiences, both in government responses mentions of US President Donald Trump within the to disasters and in the effectiveness, virality context of COVID-19 misinformation made up by far the and reach of extremist disinformation, in largest share of the infodemic.’ different societies tell us about managing future 7 Philip Nel, Marjolein Righarts, ‘Natural disasters and disaster responses and increasing public trust the risk of violent civil conflict’, International Studies in government? Quarterly, March 2008, 52(1):159–185, online. 8 Daren Fisher, Laura Dugan, ‘The importance of The events of 2020 have revealed the urgency governments’ response to natural disasters to reduce of addressing those questions. In dealing with terrorist risk’, Justice Quarterly, 15 November 2019, doi: natural disasters, governments have focused 10.1080/07418825.2019.1685120. primarily on traditional categories of DEM, such 9 Claude Berrebi, Jordan Ostwald, Earthquakes, as recovery response, public health, disaster hurricanes and terrorism—do natural disasters incite planning, border security and economic stimulus. terror?, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, September Governments also traditionally put together 2011, online. strategic communications campaigns to project a 10 Timothy Graham, ‘How extremist messaging co-opts sense of control and authority and to mitigate the emergency events’, The Interpreter, 21 December 2020, spread of disinformation that commonly emerges online. during times of crisis.40 But a key element in 11 Ashton Kingdon, The gift of gab: the utilisation of disaster response and recovery is maintaining not COVID-19 for neo-Nazi recruitment, Global Network on only the functioning of governments and society Extremism & Technology, 7 May 2020, online. but also trust in the government and its systems 12 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Samuel Hodgson, Colin P and the cohesiveness of society. Clarke, The growing threat posed by accelerationism and accelerationist groups worldwide, Foreign Policy Natural disasters can intersect with Research Institute, 20 April 2020, online. disinformation and not only produce a steady 13 The Boogaloo: extremist new slang term for coming erosion of trust and the delegitimation of civil war, Anti Defamation League, 26 November 2019, government authority that can lead to violent online. extremism but also produce other harms in the 14 Millennialism or millenarianism is the belief in that process. If CVE isn’t addressed during times of there will be a radical or transformational changes to crisis, that will make maintaining and recovering society after a major cataclysm, destruction or the ‘end government legitimacy and social cohesion in the of days’. 41 long term all the more difficult. 15 Michael Barkun, Disaster and the millennium, Yale University Press, 1974. 16 See Seymour Martin Lipset, Earl Raab, The politics of unreason: right-wing extremism in America, 1790–1970, Harper & Row, New York, 1970.

111 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

17 Bettina Rottweiler, Paul Gill, ‘Conspiracy beliefs and 39 John Henley, ‘Latest corona virus lockdown spark protests violent extremist intentions: the contingent effects across Europe,’ The Guardian, 3 November 2020, online. of self-efficacy, self-control and law-related morality’, 40 Joshua Roose, Lydia Khalil, ‘Countering extremism and Terrorism and Political Violence, 20 October 2020, doi: conspiracies in a global pandemic’, ABC Religion and Ethics, 10.1080/09546553.2020.1803288. 11 September 2020, online. 18 For an understanding of conspiracies as a delegitimation tool, 41 Anna Patty, ‘Disaster planners warn conspiracy theories pose see Russell Muirhead, Nancy L Rosenblum, A lot of people are a security threat’, Sydney Morning Herald, 13 September 2020, saying, Princeton University Press, 2019. online. 19 Andrew Silke, COVID-19 and terrorism: assessing the short- and long-term impacts, Pool Re, 5 May 2020, online. 20 Silke, COVID-19 and terrorism: assessing the short- and long-term impacts. 21 Ehud Sprinzak, ‘The process of delegitimation: towards a linkage theory of political terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 1991, 3(1):50–68. 22 ‘Why wasn’t there more prescribed burning and would it have helped?’, ABC News, 6 January 2020, online. 23 Author’s unpublished dataset. 24 United Nations guidance note on addressing and countering COVID-19 related hate speech, UN, 11 May 2020, online. 25 Department of Homeland Security, White racially motivated violent extremists suggest spreading the coronavirus, weekly intelligence brief, US Government, 17–21 February 2020, online. 26 Adam Goldman, ‘Man suspected of planning attack on Missouri hospital is killed, officials say’,New York Times, 25 March 2020, online. 27 Dan Diamond, ‘Fauci gets security detail after receiving threats’, Politico, 1 April 2020, online. 28 Lydia Khalil, ‘COVID-19 and America’s counterterrorism response,’ War on the Rocks, 1 May 2020, online. 29 ‘Far-right exploitation of COVID-19’, briefing note, Institute for Strategic Dialogue and BBC, 12 May 2020, online. 30 Marc Andre Argentino, ‘QAnon conspiracy theories about the coronavirus are a public health threat’, The Conversation, 9 April 2020, online. 31 Jenny Noyes, Simone Fox Koob, Fergus Hunter, ‘NSW man charged with emailing threat to kill Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews’, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 January 2021, online. 32 Europol, Written contribution to JPSG reporting on the fight against right wing extremism and terrorism (RWE), unclassified briefing, EDOC# 1127986v1, 21 September 2020, online. 33 Erin Pearson, Simone Fox Koob, ‘It’s better to die on your feet, bailed protest planner told police’, The Age, 11 September 2020, online. 34 Cameron Wilson, ‘I can’t believe I have to say this, but the bushfires were not deliberately lit to make way for high-speed rail’, Buzzfeed News, 11 January 2020, online. 35 Hannah Allam, ‘Michigan authorities charge 13 in plot to kidnap Governor Gretchen Whitmer’, NPR, 9 October 2020, online. 36 Dakin Andone, ‘Engineer accused of crashing train said he was “suspicious” of nearby coronavirus relief ship, Justice Department says’, CNN, 2 April 2020, online. 37 Michael McGowan, ‘The threads that don’t connect: Covid gives Australian conspiracy theorists a common home’, The Guardian, 2 August 2020, online. 38 Danny Tran, ‘Anti-mask “sovereign citizen” granted bail after allegedly coughing on woman in Melbourne cafe’, ABC News, 27 August 2020, online. COUNTERING AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The importance of inter-office coordination in counterterrorism: the Israeli case study

PROFESSOR BOAZ GANOR Ronald S Lauder Chair for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya and founder and the Executive Director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism Herzliya, Israel

113 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

On 5 September 1972, during the 20th Olympic Games The Munich attack brought to light the critical need for in Munich, Germany, eight terrorists who were members internal coordination and international cooperation of Black September (Fatah’s foreign terrorist attack among intelligence, security and enforcement agencies, apparatus) broke into the Israeli athletes’ quarters, government ministries, and many others who deal murdered two of them and captured another nine as with CT. Professional reasons, such as the natural . Later, during a rescue attempt by German inclination of intelligence agencies to protect their security forces, the terrorists murdered all nine sources and treat intelligence as a rare resource that hostages. That attack, having garnered unprecedented needs to be highly protected and sparingly shared with media coverage by virtue of the multiple media crews others, coupled with personal considerations such as covering the Olympics, is considered by many scholars ego clashes and rivalries, are indeed the real enemy to be the genesis of modern terrorism. The attack of an effective CT effort. Thwarting attacks, mitigating shocked the Israeli public, who demanded an inquiry attacks’ consequences and damages and strengthening into the intelligence and security failings that allowed the public’s resilience all require close cooperation it to happen. The Israeli Government formed an inquiry among multiple entities, including: committee, identifying several coordination faults • intelligence agencies—in Israel, the Military between Israeli and German security forces. Following Intelligence Corps, the Israel Security Agency (ISA) the review, then Prime Minister Golda Meir appointed and Mossad a special adviser on counterterrorism (CT) to the Prime • government ministries, such as the ministries of Minister. This chapter highlights the achievements Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Public and perspectives of various special advisers on the Security, Tourism, Education, Justice and so on critical role of inter-office coordination in the Israeli Government to this day, as a way of providing insights • security and law enforcement agencies and first on CT for other jurisdictions. responders (Police, Prisons Service) • the media, including social media and internet The first special adviser for CT appointed by Prime companies Minister Meir was the outgoing head of the Intelligence Corps, General Aaron Yariv. Yariv determined that the • other relevant elements, such as professional experts adviser’s job was to advise, coordinate and supervise and scholars, community leaders, private-sector the build-up and execution of Israel’s CT strategy as security and technology companies and non-profit well as to coordinate the various agencies dealing organisations (Figure 9). with the subject matter, including the Israeli Defense Only a consistent and well-coordinated effort among Forces, the intelligence community and the Ministry for those groups and individuals can lead to an effective 1 Foreign Affairs. campaign against terrorism.

Figure 9: Domestic counterterrorism coordination in Israel

PM

Prime Minister’s office

Government spokesperson Internal Intelligence Service

Public Security Ministry External Intelligence Service

Defence Ministry Police

Ministry of Interior The Counter- Prisons Service Terrorism First responder organisations Justice Ministry Coordinator Magen David Adom (Red Cross), firefighters

Foreign Ministry Army

Health Ministry Military Intelligence

Tourism Ministry Civil society organisations

Ministry of Finance Municipalities Exactly for that reason, Prime Minister Meir However, due to the separation of authorities C ountering and preventing violent extremism decided to form the Counter-Terrorism in a democratic regime none was willing to Coordination Office after the Munich attack. be instructed by the other, so the need for Between 1972 and 1999, all prime ministers coordination became even more acute, although appointed advisers for CT. The appointees were it was difficult to execute and synchronise.6 usually senior veterans of one of the security That said, not all leaders of Israel’s various apparatuses in Israel and had a close personal, intelligence and security services favoured the confidant-type relationship with the Prime adviser’s activity. They saw the position as a Minister. This informal personal relationship was gatekeeper between them and the Prime Minister of utmost importance in guaranteeing the success regarding CT issues, which didn’t sit well with of the coordination of Israel’s CT efforts. The fact them. Jacob Perry, who served as the head of the that the adviser had an open door to the Prime ISA, stressed that intelligence and operational Minister’s chambers created attentiveness and entities in Israel cooperated well, so the adviser’s reception within the various agencies, as they position was redundant. His position was that tried to avoid unnecessary conflicts between the adviser didn’t add anything to CT efforts and, the adviser and their teams. Meir Dagan, who at most, the position served as a landing spot served as the adviser for CT for Prime Minister for some of the graduates of Israel’s defence Benjamin Netanyahu (1996–1999), explained apparatus.7 Shlomo Gazit, the former head of the that the adviser draws their authority from their Intelligence Corps, thought the same.8 Against ability to bring disputes to the government’s table that backdrop, Meir Dagan cautioned that the for decision-making.2 Prime Minister Netanyahu adviser mustn’t think that they are senior to explained that, even though the adviser is merely the ISA or Mossad. On the contrary, they should a coordinating body devoid of any real authority, support those agencies’ CT activity, connect the adviser can ‘establish order’ by reporting to it with other CT activities of other agencies, the Prime Minister.3 The adviser has managed to synchronise all efforts and guide a coordinated resolve many interagency conflicts by reaching strategic policy.9 out to the Prime Minister for decisions. In 1996, following a wave of suicide attacks Rafi Eitan, who served as the adviser for in Israel, the government formed the Counter Prime Minister Menachem Begin between Terrorism Bureau (CTB), with a special focus on 1978 and 1981, said that attendees at the the prevention of suicide attacks by Hamas and weekly coordination meeting presented all the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.10 At first, the bureau intelligence warnings they had and deployed their was separate from the CT adviser to the Prime forces according to their decisions. Eitan stressed Minister’s office. After a few months, Dagan was that the weekly meeting focused on defensive appointed as both the head of the bureau and the aspects rather than offensive ones.4 Yigal Pressler, adviser to the Prime Minister on CT. After Dagan who served as adviser to Prime Minister Itzhak was replaced, the position of adviser to the PM on Rabin between 1992 and 1996, clarified that the CT was cancelled; however, the CT coordinator bulk of his job was to coordinate security within maintained his role as head of the bureau. The the state, including between the police, the Israel CTB was subsequently moved from the Prime Defense Forces, civil guards and the population Minister’s office to the National Security Council in general, in order to better defend against in 2001. At that point, the weekly coordination terror threats. He also stressed that he dealt meetings ceased. with reviewing the security of Israeli installations overseas.5 All the advisers emphasised that their The ministerial committee for national security job didn’t include responsibilities for coordinating issues determined that the National Security the various intelligence agencies, as they mostly Council ‘will operate as a designated permanent focused on the security–defensive derivative staff whose job is to create efficiency in the fight emanating from the intelligence gathered. against terrorism, by forming recommendations, Meir Dagan added that he mostly dealt with setting goals and initiating plans of action; strategic and CT policy issues that required maximising capabilities and resources; setting coordination among the various government priorities and following up on execution of agencies, such as contending with the terrorist decisions’.11 The head of the CTB was appointed organisations’ infrastructure—recruitment, by and reported to the Prime Minister. The incitement, finance and so on. Dagan said that, bureau comprised representatives of the various during his appointment, there was a critical government ministries and security and defence need to coordinate legislation and enforcement apparatuses, and all carried out their activities as activities among the police, ISA, various ministries per their prescribed authority and responsibilities, and others. Dagan further stressed that the as the formation of the bureau replaced neither importance of the coordination stemmed from the above entities nor their authorities, division of the fact that all those entities came from different roles or responsibilities.12 branches of government (legislative, executive, judicial) and they all had to act in concert. 115 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

In 2001, the ministerial committee for national security • Special responsibilities: The CTB recommended issues moved the CTB under the auspices of the the transfer of security responsibility for the border National Security Council,13 and in 2005 it resolved crossings between Israel and the Palestinian that the bureau would serve as the staff of the Prime Authority to the Israeli Airport Authority. Within this Minister as well as the government and its committees framework, the bureau allocated a significant portion on CT issues.14 of the special US aid to counter terrorism to acquire advanced inspection equipment (for goods and The responsibilities of and issues dealt with by the CTB cargo) and the development of a biometric array. over the years can be gleaned from the annual reviews The CTB also formalised recommendations to published by the Office of the Prime Minister: contend with unconventional terrorism as well as • Policy and core issues: The CTB formalised strategic cyber terrorism.15 principles for the Israeli policy on CT and contending with the Palestinian Authority on terrorism issues, as In addition, the CTB dealt with aviation, marine 16 well as operational concepts to contend with core and land security. It was in charge of issuing travel 17 terrorism issues. warnings to Israeli tourists and businessmen overseas; formalised the security principles for schools,18 school • Routine security: The CTB held weekly assessment trips19 and the protection of critical infrastructure and meetings on terrorism threats and made national strategic installations20 (including gas rigs21 recommendations on the response to those and sea ports22); examining ‘super terrorism’ threats,23 threats. The unique value of this assessment is setting the division of roles and responsibilities for the that it reflected an integrated threat landscape protection of public officials;24 reviewing technologies and incorporated operational responses into that to protect buses from explosives,25 the security of the intelligence picture. Additionally, the CTB dealt, Israeli water supply network26 and drone threats;27 ad hoc, with unique threats that required an securing Israel’s biometric database;28 and reviewing integrative interagency or public–private response. safety and security aspects of vehicles29 and the receipt • Critical infrastructure security: This issue was central and review of passenger name record information on to CTB activity. The bureau conducted preparatory all flights in and out of Israel or passing through its work on the general principles and policy of airspace.30 infrastructure security and handled multiple security problems that arose over the years. Moreover, it took At the end of 2017, the CTB was consolidated with part in supervising the security regulations in Israel the Internal Security and Home Front division in the and abroad. National Security Staff (the new name of the National Security Council) and dubbed the Division for Counter • Position papers: The bureau intensively issued Terrorism, Internal Security and Home Front, headed position papers on the division of roles and by Brigadier General (Res.) Yigal Slavik. The division’s responsibilities, reviewing and improving processes mandate has been expanded and defined as the in CT and its derivatives. staff organ for the Prime Minister, the government • International cooperation: The CTB dealt with CT and its committees on CT and home-front readiness resource allocation and monetary supervision, in emergency situations. The division coordinates enlisting the international system to fight the activity of all entities dealing with those matters terror infrastructure, developing CT dialogues to continuously improve the national response to with other countries, reducing potential terror various terrorism threats and home-front readiness threats by cooperating with other countries and for emergencies. Its goals are to improve contending fighting institutions that served as ‘fronts’ for with terrorism threats in Israel or abroad, threats of war terrorist organisations. and emergency situations. The division coordinates • Legislative and regulatory: The bureau acted to and regulates interagency protection for public promote legislative and regulatory amendments officials and delegations, marine and aviation security (the Order for Prevention of Terrorism, the and the improvement of civilian security systems. It Money Laundering Law) to improve the ability to also coordinates and regulates terrorism prevention contend with terrorism in general and provide activities on Israel’s international borders (land, air, sea) solutions for particular problems. The CTB and the internal border crossings on the ‘security fence’ also led Israel’s contribution to UN activity on and Gaza. It acts to promote national preparedness international legislation to combat terrorism vis-a-vis super terrorism and unconventional terror and terrorist organisations’ infrastructure and attacks and dangerous materials. Finally, the division is support mechanisms. responsible for promoting international cooperation in the fields of CT and home-front protection.31 C

Figure 10: The role of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator ountering and preventing violent extremism

PM

Advising and reporting to the PM

Translating the PM’s world view Directing CT technological into operational commands efforts—R&D, procurement

Setting and updating Promoting academic the CT strategy CT research (conferences)

Coordinating between operational Promoting public CT awareness and civilian agencies (regulating) and resilience (Media)

Setting the agencies boundaries Developing contacts with (preventing overlaps and gaps) relevant community leaders

The Counter- Solving personal and Coordinating Terrorism agencies rivalries CVE activity Coordinator

Overseeing Promoting international CT preparedness CT initiatives

Representing the government Advising parliamentary in international CT forums committees (bilateral and multilateral

Assessing Preserving contact victims CT intelligence of terrorism

Setting/participating in Balancing between CT efficiency professional committees and liberal values

Advising the public—issuing Assessing concrete national terrorism warnings and local terrorism threats

The coordinator must remember that, even though Summary and they speak for the country’s most senior leader— the Prime Minister—they are merely an adviser and conclusions coordinator and therefore forbidden from taking a role in decision-making as far as CT is concerned. Judging from the Israeli experience in CT, one In that sense, the coordinator is not part of the can determine that the formation of an entity hierarchical chain of command of the country’s coordinating the intelligence community, law intelligence and security apparatuses, even though enforcement agencies, government ministries under certain circumstances the coordinator and civilian entities is a required condition to may direct those agencies’ activities vis-a-vis the ensure effective CT efforts of the combined state ever-changing terrorism threat. The coordinator apparatus, prevent terrorism and maximise must avoid damaging the interactions between the national capabilities and resources. Prime Minister and the heads of the intelligence To win the trust and cooperation of the myriad and security agencies and must also bear in mind agencies and entities, the CT coordinator has that they aren’t responsible for gathering and to be appointed by and report to the chief analysing intelligence. decision-maker in the state (in Israel, the Prime The role is critical in coordinating the diverse Minister) and have direct and constant access to and important roles and responsibilities of that decision-maker. The role of the coordinator is myriad organisations focused on CT operations, varied and includes all of the activities outlined in policy and law. It’s clearly a major challenge but Figure 10, and more. a necessary one to ensure effective inter-office coordination in government. 117 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

Notes 1 Yariv Aharon, ‘A strategy to counter Palestinian terrorism’, 26 Government of Israel’s Resolution no# 633 Re the Formation of in Merari Ariel (ed.), On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism: a National Authority for Water Security, 11 November, 2006, Proceedings of an International Seminar, Tel-Aviv, 1979, 1; online (in Hebrew). On terrorism and combating terrorism, University Publications 27 Israel’s State Comptroller Special Report on Israel’s of America, USA, 1985, 6. Preparedness to Fend Off UAV Threat,2017, online (in Hebrew). 2 Interview with Meir Dagan, 4 December 1998. 28 Information on the trial period for the inclusion of biometric 3 Interview with Prime Minister Netanyahu, 20 December 1999. identifiers within identification documents and databases, 4 Interview with Rafi Eitan, 31 October 1999. pursuant to the Inclusion of Biometric Identifiers Within Identification Documents and Databases – 2009, published 5 Interview with Yigal Pressler, 31 October 1999. 4 March, 2017, online (in Hebrew). 6 Interview with Meir Dagan; B Ganor, The counter-terrorism 29 Government of Israel’s Resolution no# 1925 Re GPM Gas puzzle: a guide for decision makers, Routledge, 2017, 61. Propelled Vehicles, 6 June, 2002 (updated 29 December, 2019), 7 Interview with Meir Dagan; Ganor, The counter-terrorism online (in Hebrew). puzzle: a guide for decision makers, 60. 30 Government of Israel’s Resolution no# 2258 Re Receipt of 8 Shlomo Gazit, 7 November, 1999. Personal Information from Airlines on Passengers Entering, 9 Interview with Meir Dagan. Departing or Passing through Israel, 30 November, 2014 (updated 18 September, 2017), online (in Hebrew). 10 Report on the Office of the Prime Minister, State Comptroller’s Office, 2016,online (in Hebrew). 31 Israel National Security Council (NSC), ‘Lottery Division in TF and Home Front’, NSC, no date, online (in Hebrew). 11 Israel’s State Comptroller Annual Report No# 57B, Report on Israel’s Security System, 2006, online (in Hebrew). 12 Israel’s State Comptroller Annual Report No# 57B, Report on Israel’s Security System, 2006, online (in Hebrew). 13 Israel’s State Comptroller Report on the National Security Council, September 2006, online (in Hebrew). 14 Israel’s State Comptroller Report on the National Security Council, September 2006, online (in Hebrew). 15 Yoel Hasson (ed.), Information on the Office of the Prime Minister’s Activity in 2000, October 2001 (Israel’s State Comptroller’s reports) (in Hebrew). 16 Public tender for the Prime Minister’s Office, 1 March 2020, online (in Hebrew). 17 Israel’s State Comptroller Annual Report No# 54B, Report on Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003, online (in Hebrew). 18 Minutes no# 294 of the 13th Knesset Culture and Education Committee, 1 August, 1995 online (in Hebrew). 19 Minutes no# 86 of the 14th Knesset Culture and Education Committee, 24 June, 1997 online (in Hebrew). 20 Israel’s State Comptroller Annual Report No# 54B, Report on Prevention of Events Involving Hazardous Materials, 2003, online (in Hebrew). 21 Amir Oren, ‘The Brussels and Istanbul attacks have proved: the lottery is unnecessary’, Haaretz, 25 March 2016, online (in Hebrew). 22 ‘Law for Regulating Security in Public Bodies (Amendment no. 10), 5719–2019’, Open Knesset, 4 June 2018, online (in Hebrew). 23 Threats that are the next level up compared to current terrorism patterns and have a direct bearing on national security; Israel’s State Comptroller Annual Report No# 57B, Report on Israel’s Security System, 2006, online (in Hebrew). 24 Israel’s State Comptroller Annual Report No# 53A, Report on Israel Security Agency’s Security Division, 2002, online (in Hebrew). 25 Amos Harel, ‘The Counter-Terrorism Headquarters is planning protection for buses’, Haaretz, 22 August 2011, online (in Hebrew). About the authors

LEANNE CLOSE

Leanne Close APM is the former head of the counterterrorism program at ASPI. She is a member of the Victorian Government External Advisory Panel on Countering Violent Extremism and the ACT Sentence Administration Board. Leanne currently works at the Business Council of Australia. Before joining ASPI, Leanne was a Deputy Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (AFP), with over 33 years policing and law enforcement experience. As Deputy Commissioner National Security, she was responsible for counterterrorism operations, the protection of VIPs and critical infrastructure, and aviation operations. Leanne was also the AFP representative at the Australia—New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee. From 2015 to 2019, she was the Co-Chair of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing. Her qualifications include a Master of Education Leadership from the University of Canberra and two Graduate Certificates in Professional Development Education (University of Canberra) and Applied Management (Australian Institute of Police Management).

THOMAS MORGAN

Thomas Morgan is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Economics and Peace, where he’s the chief researcher on the Global Terrorism Index and Global Peace Index. In 2013, he was a visiting researcher at the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Institute at the University of Oxford. He holds a Master of Economics degree from the University of Sydney.

OLIVIA ADAMS

Olivia Adams is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Economics and Peace. Before joining the institute, she worked as a research assistant at the Lowy Institute. She holds a Bachelor of International Relations from King’s College London, where she focused on counterterrorism, gender and international security.

DR DAVID HAMMOND

Dr David Hammond is the Research Director at the Institute for Economics and Peace. Before being appointed Research Director, he worked at the institute as a Senior Research Fellow from 2012 to 2018. In 2016 and 2017, he was a visiting Research Fellow at King’s College London. He holds a PhD in Operations Research from the University of Portsmouth.

119 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

DR JOHN BATTERSBY

Dr John Battersby is a Teaching Fellow at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University, Wellington, lecturing in intelligence and counterterrorism. Graduating with a PhD in History in 1995, John was a research historian with the Crown Law Office, advising the Crown on the NZ Wars aspects of Treaty of Waitangi claims. In 2005, he joined the NZ Police and served in frontline roles before joining the School of Leadership, Management and Command at the Royal New Zealand Police College, Porirua. In 2016, John was a Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University, Wellington, where he commenced research into the impact of terrorism in New Zealand— an interest that has led to a number of publications since. John is also Managing Editor of the National Security Journal and a regular commentator on security issues in New Zealand.

CHRISTOPHER WINTER

Christopher Winter is a PhD candidate at Victoria University. His work explores the situational and emotional dimensions of lone-actor terrorist violence though a micro-sociological framework. He is also a member of the Applied Security Science Partnership at Victoria University. He holds a BA in Politics and a Master of Counter-Terrorism Studies from Monash University.

RAMÓN SPAAIJ

Ramón Spaaij is a sociologist based at Victoria University and the University of Amsterdam. He co-leads the Applied Security Science Partnership at Victoria University. His books include The age of lone wolf terrorism (Columbia University Press, 2017, with Mark S Hamm) and Understanding lone wolf terrorism: global patterns, motivation, and prevention (Springer, 2012).

JEREMY DOUGLAS

Jeremy Douglas is the Regional Representative of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, overseeing and managing operations and strategy from Myanmar to the Pacific in the areas of the rule of law, non-traditional security threats, law enforcement, criminal justice and drug-related supply and health issues. He is also the UNODC liaison to China, Korea, Japan and Mongolia and to regional organisations, including ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. He has held this role since 2013. Jeremy is a graduate of the London School of Economics in the UK and Bishop’s University in Canada.

NIKI ESSE DE LANG

Niki Esse de Lang has worked as Counter-Terrorism Advisor with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for Southeast Asia and the Pacific since November 2017. Before joining UNODC, he completed over three years of service as Evidence Reviewer with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Office of the Prosecutor, in Leidschendam, The Netherlands. Previously, Niki also worked with two NGOs on the Thailand–Myanmar border on issues of internal armed conflict and human rights. He earned two Master of Laws degrees from the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands and specialises in criminal law, international law and human rights law. During his studies, he interned with the Amsterdam Court of Appeals, Criminal Department, a human rights law firm and with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Bangkok, Thailand. Niki has previously published on issues such as anti-terrorism blacklisting in the EU, national human rights commissions in Southeast Asia and the dire human rights situation of Muslim minorities in Myanmar. LEVI J WEST Levi J West is the Director of Terrorism Studies at the Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security at Charles Sturt University (Canberra). He has previously lectured to law enforcement, intelligence and military audiences both domestically and internationally, including at Oxford University, New York University, the Naval War College in the US, the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation in Indonesia, the National Security College and the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at ANU, and at the Australian War College as well as delivering numerous bespoke presentations to various organisations within the national security apparatus. Levi holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Politics and International Studies from Southern Cross University; a Master of International Security Studies and a Master of Policing, Intelligence, and Counter Terrorism from Macquarie University; and a Graduate Certificate in National Security Policy from the ANU. He’s currently a PhD scholar at Victoria University, Melbourne.

ELISE THOMAS

Elise Thomas is a former researcher with ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre. She also works as a freelance journalist and an open-source intelligence analyst with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Her work covers a range of topics, including disinformation, influence operations, conspiracy theories and online extremism.

DR JOSHUA SINAI

Dr Joshua Sinai is Professor of Practice, Counterterrorism Studies, Capitol Technology University, in Laurel, Maryland. He also serves as Adjunct Faculty, Department of Criminal Justice, Southern New Hampshire University, in Manchester, New Hampshire, where he teaches a graduate-level distance learning course on global terrorism. He also serves as a consultant to TorchStone Global, a national security firm.

DR GORDON HOOK

Dr Gordon Hook is the Executive Secretary of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional organisation, based in Sydney. The APG consists of 41 member countries in the Asia–Pacific region and 40 observer countries and organisations. Gordon has conducted 14 mutual evaluations of APG member countries since 2006. Mutual evaluations assess a member country’s compliance with the Financial Action Task Force’s global standards against money laundering and terrorist financing. Gordon has degrees in philosophy and law, including a PhD in law from Victoria University of Wellington. He practised private and public law in Canada and in New Zealand prior to his current position and also served in the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal New Zealand Navy as prosecuting counsel in numerous courts-martial in Canada, Germany and New Zealand. Gordon is a barrister and solicitor of the Manitoba Queen’s Bench (1984) and the High Court of New Zealand (1996).

121 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

SYLVIA LAKSMI

Sylvia Laksmi, an Indonesian national, is a renowned subject‑matter expert in the field of anti‑money‑laundering and counter‑terrorism‑financing. Since 2007, she has worked as a senior financial intelligence analyst in the Indonesian Financial Intelligence Unit in the specialised area of financial crimes intelligence investigations. Sylvia is currently a PhD candidate at the Australian National University, examining Indonesian counterterrorist financing policies and their impact on terrorist operations in Southeast Asia and the Asia–Pacific. Apart from her research work, she’s also an established trainer who has provided training to government officers and private‑sector specialists domestically as well as at the international level. In 2016, she was called upon to be a member of the National and Regional Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorist Financing Team to develop risk assessment projects and a training syllabus. Her other notable posts include Teaching Fellow of Military and Defence Studies Program for the Australian War College at the Australian National University; Adjunct Lecturer at Charles Sturt University, Canberra; Research Fellow in International and Strategic Studies at the University of Malaya; Visiting Scholar at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism, Singapore; and Senior Researcher at the Centre for Terrorism and Radicalism Studies, Indonesian Police Science College. In 2019, given her considerable depth and credibility, Sylvia was called upon to assist the Philippines Government in a project for Peace Youth Communities to generate counter‑narratives against IS‑inspired groups and the Communist Party. She holds a Bachelor of Political Sciences, which included a thesis on the Abu Sayyaf Group, from University Padjadjaran (Indonesia), and an MSc focused on terrorist financing study from the University of Indonesia.

DR JOHN COYNE

Dr John Coyne is Head of Strategic Policing and Law Enforcement and Head of the North and Australia’s Security at ASPI. He was the inaugural head of ASPI’s Border Security Program and more recently established the North and Australia’s Security Program. John has worked in intelligence and national security for over 25 years. He’s been an intelligence professional at tactical, operational and strategic levels across a range of military, regulatory, national security and law enforcement organisations. Since commencing at ASPI, John has conducted field research on Mexican organised crime; biosecurity; regional coastguards; border security; people smuggling; illicit drugs; corruption and foreign bribery; regional intelligence sharing; and ASEAN economic integration. He has authored numerous research publications and provided expert commentary to media and news outlets.

DARIA IMPIOMBATO

Daria Impiombato is a researcher with ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre. Her research interests include human rights, grassroots movements and activism in authoritarian regimes, Chinese public and foreign policy and the role of communications and new media in international politics. She also researches broader issues of national security, counterterrorism, organised crime and policing. She has published reports and articles about censorship and surveillance on Chinese apps, as well as the EU’s relations with China, among other things. Daria has a Bachelor of Chinese Studies from Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy, a Master of International Relations and a Master of Journalism from Monash University. She has studied Mandarin at Tsinghua University in Beijing. DR ALEXANDRA PHELAN

Dr Alexandra Phelan is Deputy Director of Gender, Peace and Security Centre (Monash GPS), and a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Monash University. In 2019, she completed her PhD, which examined why the Colombian Government alternated between counterinsurgency and negotiation with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Based on an extensive examination of negotiation documents and primary FARC material, field work and interviews with former and active FARC, ELN, M-19 and AUC members, she critically examined the role that insurgent legitimation activities had in influencing Colombian Government responses between 1982 and 2016. Before she was appointed as a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, she was a postdoctoral fellow at Monash GPS. She was also a visiting scholar at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies, Walsh School of Foreign Service (2019). Alexandra’s research interests include insurgent governance and legitimation activities, insurgent women, political violence and organised crime, with a particular focus on Latin America. She edited the book Terrorism, gender and women: toward an integrated research agenda (Routledge, 2021). She currently serves on the editorial board for Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.

DR ANNE ALY MP

Dr Anne Aly MP has been the federal member for Cowan since 2016. By her late twenties, Anne was a single mother of two young boys earning the minimum wage to put food on the table. She went on to study for her Masters and PhD and worked as a professor, academic and practitioner in counterterrorism and countering violent extremism. The founder of People against Violent Extremism, Anne was the only Australian representative to speak at President Obama’s 2015 White House summit on countering violent extremism. Inducted into the Western Australian Women’s Hall of Fame in 2011, Anne was nominated for Australian of the Year in 2016 and received the prestigious Australian Security Medal.

PROFESSOR MICHELE GROSSMAN

Professor Michele Grossman is Research Chair in Diversity and Community Resilience at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University, where she also serves as Director of the Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies and Convenor of the AVERT Research Network for Australian terrorism studies. Her research and publications on preventing and countering violent extremism have had key national and international academic, policy and practice impacts. Michele is on the editorial board of Terrorism and Political Violence and on Hedayah’s International Advisory Board, and is a Robert Schuman (Distinguished Scholar) Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence as part of a Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation project, among other appointments.

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR DR NATALIE DAVIS

Associate Professor and Federal Agent Natalie Davis commenced her policing career with the Australian Federal Police in 1987. She has diverse experience in criminal investigations, including a two-and-a-half year attachment to the National Crime Authority and as the Principal Operational Psychologist. She has been an operational psychologist in the AFP for more than 20 years after receiving specialist training in the UK. She’s currently the Principal Operational Psychologist, providing behavioural science advice to investigative teams and operations and oversight of operational psychology within the AFP.

123 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

COMMANDER SANDRA BOOTH

Sandra Booth began her policing career with the Australian Federal Police in 2000. She has diverse experience in criminal investigations and has worked in a broad range of operational areas, including ACT Policing, Specialist Response Group, People Smuggling, Organised Crime and Intelligence. Promoted to the AFP Executive in January 2019, she had responsibility for the joint counterterrorism teams in Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia. In May 2020, Sandra assumed the role of Commander Counter Terrorism—Enduring Risk Investigations to manage AFP responsibilities in relation to the release of high-risk terrorist offenders and national risk analysis and disruption. Her AFP experience includes two deployments to Solomon Islands, a short-term deployment to Timor-Leste and three years as the Senior Liaison Officer in Jakarta, where she worked closely with the Indonesian National Police on terrorism, narcotics, people smuggling and child protection operations. Sandra has been conferred with a Masters in Leadership and Management from Charles Sturt University, is a graduate of the FBI National Academy, and has been awarded the Commissioner’s Group Citation for Conspicuous Conduct, the Commissioner’s Group Citation for Excellence in Overseas Service and the AFP Operations Medal for Operation Crowea, among others.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER ROSS GUENTHER APM

Ross Guenther APM, Deputy Commissioner Victoria Police, joined Victoria Police in 1985. He’s an accomplished police officer, and his professional experience encompasses the leadership and management of teams across investigative, general policing, specialist operations and business environments. As a commissioned officer, Ross has managed and led successful change management programs at Victoria Police’s Centre for Investigator Training, Airlie Leadership Development Centre, Security Services Division and more recently as a Divisional Manager within the Southern Metropolitan Region. In 2015, he was promoted to the rank of Assistant Commissioner and in 2016 became the inaugural head of Victoria Police Counter Terrorism Command. In June 2016, Ross was honoured to receive the Australian Police Medal as part of the Queen’s Birthday honours, the citation praising his ‘strong and deep commitment to people and leadership development’. In 2017, he was elected to the Leadership in Counter Terrorism (LinCT) Alumni Association Executive and currently holds the role of President. In 2019, Ross joined the International Association of Chiefs of Police and was subsequently nominated as a member of its Committee on Terrorism. Ross was appointed Deputy Commissioner, Public Safety and Security in July 2020 and has portfolio responsibility for Counter Terrorism Command, Crime Command and Transit & Public Safety Command. He holds a Masters degree in criminology along with professional qualifications in project, business, training and strategic management streams.

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR DEBRA SMITH (PHD)

Associate Professor Debra Smith (PhD) is a Principal Research Fellow at Victoria University. Her research focuses on questions of violent political extremism, social conflict and social change. She has a particular interest in the role of emotion within violent extremism beliefs and action, in the role of social media in radicalisation to violence, and in translating research for applied practitioner outcomes. Debra co-leads the Applied Security Science Partnership, which brings together researchers and law enforcement practitioners to undertake collaborative applied research on violent extremism for translation into frontline practitioner tools. She recently co-edited the first book on Australia’s contemporary far-right and is currently co-authoring International terrorism and counter terrorism in the Australian context. In 2020, Debra was awarded the Vice-Chancellor’s Award for Excellence in Research (Individual). PIA VAN DE ZANDT

Pia van de Zandt is the Director of the Office of Community Safety and Cohesion at the NSW Department of Communities and Justice. The office works closely with NSW Police, Corrective Services, Youth Justice and a range of social policy agencies such as Multicultural NSW, Education and Health to advise on policy related to terrorism and violent extremism. The office leads strategy development and implementation on CVE, and designs and delivers programs to promote community safety, cohesion and inclusion.

AFTAB MALIK

Aftab Malik is the Research and Community Engagement Manager at the Office of Community Safety and Cohesion.

MADELEINE COOREY

Madeleine Coorey is a Senior Policy Officer at the Office of Community Safety and Cohesion.

ANGEL ADAMS

Angel Adams is a PhD candidate with a focus on online and offline extremism in Australia at Deakin University and an international security research analyst with a focus on political violence, radicalisation, online and offline extremism and P/CVE programs in the Asia–Pacific and the Americas. She recently graduated from Monash University with a Master’s degree in international relations, focused on political violence and counterterrorism. Angel obtained an Advanced Certificate in Politics and International Studies at the University of Melbourne and a Bachelor of International Relations at the Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro.

PETA LOWE

Peta Lowe is a Principal Consultant with Phronesis Consulting and Training. She is the former Director, Countering Violent Extremism for Juvenile Justice in the NSW Department of Justice. Peta has over 15 years experience working with young people involved with the justice system and has worked with individuals, families and communities to address offending behaviours and criminogenic risks. Peta graduated from Newcastle University in 2005 with a Bachelor of Social Work (Honours Class I) from Charles Sturt University. In 2010 she was conferred with a Masters of Social Work (Advanced Practice / Couples and Family Therapy Specialisation) from Queensland University of Technology. In 2016, she completed a Graduate Certificate in Business (Public Sector Management) and most recently, in 2018, from Charles Sturt University, was conferred with a Masters in Terrorism and Security Studies (Postgraduate University Medal). Peta participates as an international expert with the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law in Malta, working on the institute’s Juvenile Justice Initiative, and is a Specialist Consultant with the CVE Unit at the Commonwealth Secretariat. She has also provided assessments related to risk for terrorism offences before the Supreme Court in Victoria.

125 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

LYDIA KHALIL

Lydia Khalil is a Research Fellow at the Lowy Institute and the Alfred Deakin Institute at Deakin University and a member of the Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies. She has a broad range of policy, academic and private-sector experience and has spent her career focusing on the intersection between governance and security—whether it be understanding the rationales behind terrorism and counterinsurgency, how to create governance systems that lead to functioning societies, effective policing strategies or the security and policy effects of new technology. Lydia’s professional background in politics, international relations and security has focused on US national security policy, , Middle East politics and counterterrorism. She has held previous positions at the Council on Foreign Relations, the US Department of Defense, and the New York and Boston police departments. Lydia is a frequent media commentator and conference speaker and has published widely on her areas of expertise. She holds a BA in International Relations from Boston College and a Masters in International Security from Georgetown University.

PROFESSOR BOAZ GANOR

Professor Boaz Ganor is the Ronald S Lauder Chair for Counter-Terrorism and former dean of the Lauder School of Government and Diplomacy at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya in Israel. He is the founder and executive director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. In 2019–20, he was on sabbatical from IDC Herzliya and served as a visiting fellow at ASPI, as an adjunct professor at the Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security at Charles Sturt University and as the Aaron and Cecile Goldman Visiting Israeli Professor and Israel Institute Fellow at Georgetown University. In his previous sabbatical (2008–09), he served as a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Boaz serves as the founding president of the International Academic Counter-Terrorism Community, which is an international association of academic institutions, experts and researchers in fields related to the study of terrorism and counterterrorism. Boaz has served as a consultant to the Israeli Government on counterterrorism and was appointed as a member of the International Advisory Team of the Manhattan Institute to the New York Police Department. He obtained his BA in Political Sciences from Hebrew University and his MA in Political Studies from Tel Aviv University (thesis: ‘Terrorism and public opinion in Israel’). His PhD thesis for the Hebrew University was on Israel’s counterterrorism strategy. Acronyms and abbreviations

AFP Australian Federal Police AML/CTF anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism-financing ASG Abu Sayyaf Group ATA 2020 Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (Philippines) AUSTRAC Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre BACRIM criminal bands (bandas criminales (Colombia) CASA Committee for Counter-Terrorism Strategic Analysis (Comitato di Analisi Strategica Antiterrorismo) (Italy) CTB Counter Terrorism Bureau (Israel) CTF counterterrorism financing CV Red Command (Comando Velmelho) (Brazil) CVE countering violent extremism DEM disaster and emergency management ELN National Liberation Army (Colombia) FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) FATF Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering FIU financial intelligence unit FTF foreign terrorist fighter FTF foreign terrorist fighter GDP gross domestic product GTD Global Terrorism Database GTI Global Terrorism Index GTI Global Terrorism Index HRTO high-risk terrorism offender IED improvised explosive device IEP Institute for Economics & Peace INTRAC Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center IPAC Institute for Policy Analysis and Conflict IS Islamic State ISA Israel Security Agency ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

127 COUNTERTERRORISM YEARBOOK 2021

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ISWAP Islamic State West Africa Province JAD Jamaah Ansharut Daulah JI Jemaah Islamiyah MENA Middle East and North Africa MIT Mujahidin Indonesia Timur NFR new far right NGO non-government organisation P/CVE preventing and countering violent extremism PCC First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital) (Brazil) POI person of interest ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia RUSI Royal United Services Institute (UK) START Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism TSA Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (New Zealand) UN United Nations