AENEAS IMPERATOR; ROMAN GENERALSHIP in an EPIC CONTEXT a Lecture to the Virgil Society, January, 1980, by R.G.M. Nisbet Aeneas I
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50 AENEAS IMPERATOR; ROMAN GENERALSHIP IN AN EPIC CONTEXT A lecture to the Virgil Society, January, 1980, by R.G.M. Nisbet Aeneas is a man of many facets. He is a second Ulysses, iromersabilis if not versutus, with intermittent hints of Achilles, Hercules, and other heroes. He is a Stoic exemplar, willingly obedient to the fates, and painfully growing in authority on his pilgrimage. He is a proto-Augustus, carrying the destiny of his nation on his shoulders, and prefiguring the political ideology of Virgil's own patrons. In this paper I shall consider him as he undertakes one of the most important functions of Roman government, republican or imperial, the command of an army. The Aeneid is like a great novel of war and politics, and the poet can help the historian not so much by describing institutions as by making attitudes come alive. As the relevant material is scattered, I shall proceed book by book in the chronological order of the events described, that is to say beginning with Book II. At the fall of Troy Virgil must establish three things about Aeneas. In the first place it must be made clear that the disaster was not his fault. In Homer he appears as a prudent soldier and a wise statesman’5', apparently second in esteem only to Hector himself, and after Hector's death his position in the hierarchy ought to have been improved. But in Virgil he is consulted neither on the horse nor the serpents, when the enemy attacks he does not know what is happening, and Panthus has to tell him that the war is lost (324ff.). There was a very literal lack of vigilantia, one of the suspicious Romans' most prized virtues, but though Aeneas uses first person plurals to describe what the Trojans did, he does not seem to admit any individual responsibility. There is an implicit moral on the dangers of oligarchy and plutocracy, where a leaderless nation listens to uninformed voices, and nobody is in overall-charge. Such a lesson would seem a natural one in Augustan Rome, and it is worth remembering that in Horace's third Roman Ode, Troy has been thought to suggest the fallen Republic. Secondly, Virgil must emphasise Aeneas's courage. It could be held against him that he had survived his city, and Turnus touched a sore point when he called him desertorem Asiae (12.15). That is why Virgil makes him organise resistance, though only at a local and subordinate level: he takes up arms without regard for consequences (314 'arma amens capio, nec sat rationis in armis'), if he had been fated to fall he deserved it by his actions (433f« 'si fata fuissent ut caderem meruisse manu'), he emphasises several times his own furor or loss of control 51 (316, 588, 595)* He even takes a leaf out of his enemies' book and stoops to disguise (390 'dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirat?1), but it is made clear by what happens that such subterfuges did no good in the long run: like other successful imperialists the Romans were under the illusion that they themselves fought according to the rules (Liv. 1-53-4 ’minime arte Romana, fraude ac dolo'). The climax comes in the disputed passage where he considers killing Helen at the 2 altar, a scene that is Virgilian not only in style but in imaginative power and psychological appropriateness (extending beyond the immediate context to the epic as a whole). There is a conflict here between the passionate and the reasoning parts of the soul, and it suits the Augustan ideal that rationality prevails. Thirdly Virgil must confirm the legitimacy of Aeneas's imperium; he cannot like de Gaulle appoint himself. In the Iliad Achilles had taunted Aeneas with wishing to succeed Priam, an ambition that seemed absurd as long as the king was in good health and had living sons (20.l80ff.). Now the changed situation must be formally recognised. Aeneas is entrusted with the Penates by Hector's ghost (293ff.), and they are brought by Panthus to the house of Anchises (320f.), who carries them from the fallen city (717). The party does not leave without explicit instructions from Venus Genetrix (6l9f.). Above all, when the flame plays round the head of lulus (682ff.), the spontaneous phenomenon provides an excellent instance of auspicia oblativa, and when Anchises with Roman prudence insists on a double-check, they are promptly converted by celestial phenomena into 3 auspicia impetrativa. All this corresponds to the taking of the omens when a Republican general sets out to war. At this point we are faced by a constitutional puzzle: who has imperium maius? The taking of the omens by Anchises might suggest that the expedition was begun under his own ductu auspiciisque, but such a conclusion is belied by his words 'nec, nate, tibi comes ire recuso' (2.704), as well as by the traditional form of the legend. Aeneas reports prodigies to his father (3.58f., 179)1 as M. Caedicius did to the magistrates in Livy (5.32.6, cf. 2.36.7)) but Anchises may be acting rather as a priest; by the Roman system religious authority was vested in suitable statesmen (cf. Lao coon and Panthus), who interpreted the divine will more sensibly than whole-time professionals like Calchas or Tolumnius (12.258ff.). Anchises is supported by delecti proceres (58) not a council of war on the Homeric model (it is only the Latins who give scope to a politician like Drances), but an advisory consilium; as the institution was found in many spheres of Roman life, the old man may be represented as pontifex maximus rather than imperator. Apart from his interpretation of religious phenomena, Anchises determines the successive 4 stages on the journey ; Aeneas is thus absolved from responsibility for the wanderings, and in particular for the abortive settlement in Crete (100f.). On the other hand it is Aeneas who organises the details of administration (137 'iura 52 domosque dabam1) and commands in the battle against the Harpies (234ff.), from which his father is excluded by age and infirmity. The allocation of provinciae between father and son corresponds to nothing in historical Roman practice; elderly rulers presented no problem under the Republic, when middle-aged consuls were annually replaced, and in the Principate the issue first becomes important with the declining years of Tiberius. Rather the situation reflects a vision of primitive society: Anchises occupies a position somewhere between Laertes'*, who seems to have abdicated, and Priam, who remains in nominal control even though Hector commands in battle. With the death of Anchises at the end of the third book (709ff.) the anomaly is removed, and Aeneas assumes the undivided authority that pietas had kept him from usurping. When we first meet Aeneas off Carthage, he is shivering in the storm (1.92 ’extemplo Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra1). His sufferings are modelled on those of Odysseus (Horn. Od. 5.297? 5.472) but such weakness is much more conspic- uous 6 at the beginning of the epic. Conventional panegyrics of generals emphas- 7 ised their endurance as much as their courage , and particularly their indifference to the elements, but Virgil is more interested in the Aristotelian distinction between fortitude and insensibility (Eth. Nic. 1115b 24ff.). Augustus himself was surprisingly susceptible to cold, and wore four tunics in the winter (Suet. Aug. 8l-2), and though the poet is unlikely to have intended so specific a reference, he would at least have been aware that the great man's dominance was more psychological than physical. The storm is stilled by Neptune with a calm but firm exercise of authority (1.132ff.), that symbolically suggests Roman imperium. The drill of the Trojans on landing is more systematic than anything in Homer: the lighting of fire and baking of bread (174ff.) follow the prosaic priorities of the Roman army (cf„ 6.8 for aguatio), even if the stag-hunt and roast venison belong to tradit ional epic. The allocution of Aeneas to his men, though formally modelled on Homeric rodomontade (199 *o passi graviora', cf. Od. 12.208ff.) shows a topical awareness of the anxieties of leadership (209 'spem vultu simulat, premit altum corde dolorea1). After a typically restless night (305),the cautious commander sends out speculatores (more professional than the 'looking in all directions' at Od. 10.146), and camouflages his fleet under a wooded cliff (310ff.). In spite of all the Odyssean disappearing-tricks, the meeting with Dido is conducted with realistic circumspection, and Aeneas stays in the background like a Roman imperator till he sees how his legate gets on. There follows top-level diplomacy of the sort that a distinguished personality still could influence in the ancient world: the negotiation is supported by appeals to traditional ties (6l9ff.), military and political alliance is treated in terms of private amicitia (whose - moral component can too easily be underestimated ), and though mutual advantage 53 is implicit in the understanding (548ff., cf. 563f.), the emphasis is placed on magnanimity and obligation. The spontaneous gifts that conclude the conver sations have more binding force than the interchanges at modern State Visits; Q the Homeric pattern would still be valid with foreign potentates, as it surely was in the world of Lawrence of Arabia. But amicitia ought not to have included emotional entanglements; the hint of Cleopatra is unavoidable in a poem written in the decade after her death. Antony might claim precedent in Alexander, who had to deal with the queens of the East, but a Roman imperator should have been less cosmopolitan.