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Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 74-10,982

KARGE, Ellen B., 1937- ASPECTS OF TACITUS' PRESENTATION OF TIBERIUS AS PRINCEPS AND PROCONSUL.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1973 Language and Literature, classical

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company , Ann Arbor, Michigan

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. ASPECTS OF TACITUS' PRESENTATION OF TIBERIUS

AS PRINCEPS AND PROCONSUL

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Ellen Karge, Staatsexamen

******

The Ohio State University 1973

Reading Committee: Approved By

Charles L. Babcock

Mark P. 0. Morford Adviser Carl Schlam Department of Classics Meiner lieben Mutter, Frau Dita Karge, gewidmet.

Weihnachten 1973 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation is primarily indebted to my adviser, Professor Charles L. Babcock, whose teaching of Tacitus' Annals motivated me to begin this writing. He has consist­ ently contributed personal interest, effort and time to both my graduate career and to this thesis, and more than this, his knowledge and his standards of scholarship have enlivened my interest 'in Classics. I thank him for his patient direction, advice and encouragement at crucial stages of thinking through central points of this thesis and for sharing with me his invaluable insights into the complex work of this author. I am also grateful to my readers on the examination committee. Professor M.P.O. Morford has been a major source of strength necessary to sustain my work and as the reader of this dissertation has with his expert understanding of Tacitus made many perceptive comments and helpful criticism. Professor Carl Schlam made a number of useful sugges­ tions, as the dissertation was in progress, and has pro­ vided encouragement. I also wish to thank my reading com­ mittee once again for recommending stylistic adjustments, and catching with their good ears many of my repetitions and Germanic inconsonances. My gratitude goes to Professor Stanley Kahrl for his support and his willingness to serve on my oral committee. I am grateful to Mrs. R. F. Sapp and Mrs. Martha Coolidge,

iii without whose assistance the final draft of this disserta­ tion would have never materialized in time.

My very special thanks go once again to chairman

Professor Morford and the entire faculty and staff of the

Classics department for contributing to make my years of the doctoral program one of the most challenging and one of the most delightful experiences of my life, and with a bold conjecture into Tacitus' Annals I would like to say

sine ira [sed magno cum] studio

iiia VITA

November 28, 1937 Born, Elmshorn, Germany

1964 ...... Staatsexamen in Latin and French, University of Hamburg, Germany

Summer, 1958 . . University of Montpellier, France

Winter, 1961 . . University of Grenoble, France

1964-65 ...... Assistant in German Civilization and Language, Lyc6e Camille S£e, Paris

1965-67 ..... Studienreferendarin/Assessorin, Gymnasium Helene Lange, Hamburg

1967-68 ...... Instructor in Latin and German, University of North Dakota • 1968-69 ...... Assistant Professor of Latin and German, Madison College, Virginia

1968-73 ...... Teaching Associate in Classics, The Ohio State University

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field; Classics

Studies in Tacitus' Annals, Roman Historiography and Epigraphy, and Horace: Professor Charles L. Babcock

Studies in Tacitus' Histories and Roman Historiography: Professor Mark P. 0. Morford

Studies in Greek Literature and Historiography: Professor Robert Lenardon

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOV7LEDGMENTS...... ' iii V I T A ...... iv INTRODUCTION ...... vi Chapter

I. THE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE REIGN OF TIBERIUS ...... 1

Part I. Augustus1 and Tiberius' Appointments to Provincial Governorships ...... 2 Part II. Tacitus' View on Appointments to Provincial Governorships and on Individual Governors Appointed by Augustus and Tiberius ...... 57 II. THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT IN MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC SITUATIONS...... 99 Part I. The Mutinies in Pannonia and on the Rhine in A.D. 1 4 ...... 100 Part II. The Campaigns in Germany in A.D. 15 and 1 6 ...... 123 Part III. The E a s t ...... 150 III. TACITUS' PRESENTATION OF PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER AND IN THE EAST . . . 177 Part I. The Mutinies in Pannonia and on the R h i n e ...... 177 Part II. Tacitus' View on Germanicus' Campaigns in Germany ...... 217 Part III. Tacitus' View of the Settlement of the Affairs in the E a s t ...... 259

CONCLUSIONS ...... 282

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 288

v INTRODUCTION

The testimony of the reign of Tiberius in our ancient

sources displays to a large extent consensus on the histor­

ical facts and the personal history of the first successor of Augustus. Except for Velleius Paterculus, the contempor­ ary and admirer of Tiberius, who writes from the stand­ point of a military equestrian to whom the principate afforded opportunities for advancement and whose enthusi­

asm for the regime is therefore understandable, Suetonius

and Dio Cassius are in general.in accordance with Tacitus'

gloomy picture of Tiberius. They rank as independent

authorities,1 since there is no clear sign that Suetonius uses Tacitus, and Dio Cassius, though he could have used

Tacitus, has often more details, which suggests that he went back to sources nearer the events. R. Syme2 con­ cludes that the picture of Tiberius, which reflects in all three authors the same diagnosis, a gradual deterioration

in his character and of his reign, has fixed shortly after

Tiberius' life-time, and belongs to the consensus of

educated opinion, supplemented in Tacitus' account by

^R. Syme, Tacitus, vol. I (Oxford 1958), p. 420.

2Ibid., p. 421.

vi documentary evidence and converted into a work of art by his literary techniques. The question is whether this picture is true or whether Tiberius was not a better princeps than tradition has it.

Tacitus professes to write sine ira et studio,^- a standard claim in ancient historians, but does he measure up to this ideal or has he fallen into the trap of the consensus on Tiberius? This is one of the central ques­ tions asked about Tacitus in the scholarship in the last century.

Tacitus' picture of Tiberius was commonly accepted until the second half of the nineteenth century. Then it was attacked on the basis of the discovery of new evidence, mainly inscriptional, and on the basis of the accepting of a new approach towards historiography’, oriented by factual and impartial information, not by personal inter­ pretation. This prompted a reappraisal of Tacitus'

Tiberius with the result that the. balance was tilted in 2 favor of Tiberius against ancient tradition.

F. B. Marsh3 admits that Tiberius was unpopular from

•^Ann. 1,1.

^Cf. F.R.D. Goodyear, Tacitus, Greece and Rome Surveys (Oxford, 1970), p. 30 ff.

3F. B. Marsh, The Reign of Tiberius (Oxford 1931), pp. 218-229.

• • VI i the beginning because of his reserved manner, yet that the idea of dissimulatio and of the gradual deterioration of his character remains hypothetical. Marsh praises him highly for his administrative capabilities and calls him one of the greatest Roman emperors. Still he cannot deny that despite Tiberius' good intentions the constitution of Augustus broke down in his. hands, but Marsh does not consider him as chiefly responsible for this failure.

After Marsh the movement of criticism in favor of

Tiberius against Tacitus reaches its extreme in

Kornemann's posthumous book on Tiberius,! in which

Tiberius is almost idealized. Kornemann bases his judg­ ment almost exclusively on the Tiberian speeches in which he sees the spirit of Tiberius reflected in its purest form and puts all the failures on the account of others.

Not surprisingly a reverse reaction has set in.

R. Syme sees Tacitus' cynical and bitter picture of

Tiberius as basically correct. With methodical r e a s o n i n g ^ he tries to confirm the author's reading of Tiberius' basic psychological defects, craft, rancour and cruelty

first curbed by discipline or disguised by craft and

^E. Kornemann, Tiberius (Stuttgart 1960), passim, cited in Koestermann, Band II, p. 8 ff.

^syme, Tac. I, p. 420 ff.

viii finally coining to the surface in a warped and unbalanced character. But despite his emphasis on Tiberius' per­ sonal defects, Syme also admits that Tiberius showed consummate ability as a ruler who, as a Roman aristocrat, professed a sincere intention of governing like a true princeps according to the will and the sentiments of the

senate.1 That it turned out otherwise was not wholly his

fault. The senate failed to grasp the chance for power offered them by Tiberius because it had grown used to

subservience and impotence under Augustus, so that

Tiberius became a victim of Augustus as a princeps as he had become as a person.

E. Koestermann in his own estimate of Tiberius2 comes

to a slightly different conclusion. He admits of Tiberius'

psychological Claudian heritage, but he attributes the

deterioration of his character almost exclusively to the

blows and the pressure dealt out to him from outside under

Augustus and during his own reign* He admires his iron

will which maintained itself against adverse circumstances

to the last and gives him credit for his ability as the

administrator of the empire. He failed in his internal

policy for the same reasons as outlined by Syme and the

^•Ibid., p. 427.

^E. Koestermann, Annalen-kommentar, Band II (Heidelberg 1965), p. 8 ff. additional one, Koestermann thinks, that Tiberius the con­ servative was not able to adapt himself - to the changed circumstances of the senate.

R. Seager's biography,1 the most recent work on

Tiberius, is very much in line with Syme's and Koester- mann's opinion as far as Tiberius the princeps and the person is concerned, i.e., he gives him credit for his ability as an administrator and he accepts the picture of his gradual deterioration which, however, Seager does not base on Tiberius' psychological defects alone but mainly on his fears for his own security.2

The review of criticism shows that from initial acceptance of Tacitus' picture*of Tiberius as true, the pendulum has been swinging back and forth from attempts to vindicate Tiberius against ancient tradition to partial or full acceptance of Tacitus' Tiberius. Tacitean criticism generally implicates the personal history of the princeps with the political and social history of the empire, just as Tacitus presents it, because at no time except for this period of transition and consolidation have the personal history of the ruler and the history of the empire been more interdependent.

In this dissertation I will try to develop a slightly

^Seager, Tiberius (London 1972) .

2Ibid., p. 249. *1 different method and isolate in its first part the per­ sonal history of the princeps as Tacitus presents it from the history of the princeps as the continuator of the

Augustan policy. By this division I hope to show Tiberius in a considerably better light than he appears in Tacitus' account. In the second part of the dissertation^ I will examine this result against Tacitus' account and try to find whether he saw Tiberius as the continuator of

Augustus and what his criteria of judgment were.

It is a known fact that Tiberius followed painstak­ ingly the precepts of his predecessor and hardly ever departed from the practice of A u g u s t u s . 3 He has been criticized for this conservatism and the lack of original contribution to the development of the constitutional form of the principate. But his conservatism is understandable if one considers on the one hand his personality and on the other that the emphasis on the continuity between

Augustus and his own principate was a matter of survival as he saw it. Tiberius had two reasons I believe.

Augustus had put him in charge of a system which, as

Tiberius himself admits in the senate meeting, only Augustus was capable of directing; it follows that if he himself

■^Chapter I, Part 1, and Chapter II.

2Chapter I, Part 2 and Chapter III. wanted to keep the system afloat the only way of doing it was to continue along the path of Augustus without new experiments. The other reason concerns his own security.

He was a Julian only by adoption and he knew that he was unpopular with the senate and the people when he came to power. As a Claudian he was constantly exposed to the challenge of the Julian group centered around Agrippina as the direct descendant of Augustus. Although the Julians had as little or as much claim to power as the Claudians, since the principate was not a hereditary office, still the emotional appeal of the descendants of Augustus was strong enough to be a constant worry to Tiberius.^" So he tried to assert the legitimacy of his rule through his status as the adopted son of Augustus by all possible means, one of which was the slavish adherence to Augustus' precepts on the assumption that the more carefully he stuck to Augustus1 principles the more Julian he appeared.

In Tacitus1 treatment of Tiberius there are a number of instances which relate the princeps* attitude to his predecessor, but the references are scanty and concern for the most part only trivial matters. Although Tiberius re­ marks of his predecessor in a speech to the senate in

A.D. 25, "I treat all his actions and words as if they

•*"Cf. Seager, op. cit. , p. 174 ff. have the force of law,"1 little surfaces in Tacitus’ account that makes direct reference to Tiberius, as continuator of

Augustus' policies and practices. Those instances that do concern such matters are the retention of the lex maiestatis2 (which, at the moment when Tiberius decided to reactive it, was still a harmless weapon), the retention of the number of praetorships,3 the rule about the status of

Egypt*4 the process of introducing the members of the im­ perial family to public life,^ the justification for the sentence passed on C. Silanus, in A.D. 22,® the rules against appointing a flamen Dialis to governorships,^ and about punishment of actors.^ It almost appears, considering these instances, as if in Tacitus1 estimate Tiberius can be conceived as princeps without Augustus1 precedents, for none of these instances concerns great issues of policy.

It is the purpose of this dissertation in its first part to show that there is much more material than this in

1Ann. 4.37.

2Ann. 1.72.

^Ann. 1.14.

4 Arm. 2.59.

5 Ann. 3.29.

6Ann. 3.68.

7 Ann. 3.71.

8Ann. 7.77. xiii Tacitus from which we can glean by inference that Tiberius followed his predecessor in important matters of policy and also made his legates and special commissioners act according to the Augustan system. We will see that

Tiberius reveals himself as a constructionalist on the constitution, by which I mean that he carefully followed

Augustan precedents, which to some extent were direct uses of the mos maiorum and- to the greater extent derivations thereof.

I have limited my analysis of Tiberius as the con­ tinuator of the Augustan policy in idea and practice to two issues of provincial policy, (1) the selection of provin­ cial personnel, and (2) the handling of provincial and foreign policy in three areas, the mutinies in Pannonia and Germany, the German campaigns, and the East. The evidence for this analysis is taken to a great extent from

Tacitus. I have tried to abstract from his account the bare facts of the process of administration and choice of per­ sonnel and have supplemented his information with refer­ ences from parallel sources together with some reference, to archaeological, epigraphic and numismatic evidence.

In the second half of the dissertation I have tried to analyze Tacitus' particular interest in the same material, in order to determine whether he uses as a criterion of presentation Tiberius as the follower of Augustus, although he

xiv makes no.direct reference to such-a criterion. I have decided that his criteria of judgment were different and that he may therefore have vitiated or minimized his pres­ entation of the pattern of continuity of the Augustan policy for his own historiographical purposes and personal views.

In the first chapter I have presented an approach to prosopographical material that differs a little from the usual form. I have isolated the material concerning the pedigree, experience and qualification of the Augustan and

Tiberian provincial personnel, gathered from Tacitus and the parallel sources, from the information on the actual performance of these governors, which relies almost exclusively on Tacitus' account, in order to show in the first part to what extent Tiberius followed Augustan prin­ ciples in respect to choice of personnel and in the second part Tacitus' interest in this personnel.

In Chapter II I have described how the pattern of the

Augustan policy unfolds in the reign of Tiberius in the three special areas, and in Chapter III I consider Tacitus' account of these three areas against the results of

Chapter II. My selection of these three areas was guided by the elaborate dramatic and architectural pattern of

Tacitus' narrative, which,considering the usual terseness and selectiveness of his account, must disclose, not only

xv the personal history of the princeps and its impact on the political development of the empire but also something of

Tacitus' general attitude to the principate.

xv-i CHAPTER I

THE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE

REIGN OF TIBERIUS

It is the purpose of this chapter to. look at the imperial provincial administration in the reign of

Tiberius under the aspect of the personnel that adminis­ tered the provinces.

1. I shall look at their legal status in relation to the princeps and then at the individual governors, their p>edigree, experience and qualification in order to make an estimate of criteria of judgment for selection used by Augustus and Tiberius. At the same time I shall discuss the emperor's influence on the selection of governors in senatorial provinces.

2. I will attempt to isolate how Tacitus evaluated these governors according to his set of criteria of what an ideal governor should be like, and how they work out in particular situations, which are almost exclusively military.

1 2 Part I

Augustus1 and Tiberius' Appointments to Provincial Governorships

The Precondition of Augustus* Provincial Policy

In every state internal and external policy are neces­ sarily intertwined. The internal policy can dictate the external policy or the external policy can act as a cohe­ sive or subversive force. Though both spheres revolve around the same political unit, the relation between them is not always equally balanced. Political circumstances can attribute primary importance either to the one or to the other or a third situation can exist, namely that the external policy is almost absorbed by the internal. The history of the Roman republic and of the principate shows that Rome went through all three stages and that the growth of the importance of the internal policy and the decline of the external policy is one of the symptoms of the growth of the empire.

Down to the year 14 6 B.C. the external policy dom­ inated the internal, since Rome had to struggle desper­ ately in order to gain and to maintain the mastery first of the west and then of the east. After 146 B.C. Rome externally was safely beyond the limit of risk. The three major foreign events, the wars against Jugurtha, the

Cimbri and the Teutones, and Mithridates, could no longer shake Rome's power. All three enemies were mistaken about Rome's internal strength as Hannibal had been before them, but they contributed to the triggering off of an internal revolution by bringing Marius, Sulla and Pompey to power, so that during the time of the revolution (at least in its early stage), the external policy still had some impact on the internal policy.

At the beginning of the principate the external policy still played an important role, but by A.D. 14 disputed foreign territory had been almost completely absorbed in form of provinces.'*'

It was Augustus who first adopted a systematic im­ perial policy in the provinces. Although Rome was secure from serious foreign attacks after 146 B.C., the senatorial government never implemented a systematic expansion and administration of the provinces. Two main reasons, I believe,explain this failure: (1) every phase of such an imperial policy would have required the concentration of military forces in the hands of a number of military lead­ ers serving over a period of several years and (2) a systematic provincial administration would have required the build up of a civil service recruited from among a broader social group than the senatorial class. The senatorial oligarchy considered both possibilities as a threat to its own existence, since military leaders sup­ ported by armed forces and a clientela could force their

•*-Heuss, A., RdJmische Geschichte (Braunschweig, 1964), p. 312. will on the senate. Further, the senate was bound to lose

some of its authority when in the civil service another

social group attained to an important position in the

state. The senate's attitude of opposition towards Scipio

Africanus Maior, who first tried to initiate an imperial

policy, and towards Pompey illustrate the point. Sel­

fishly and jealously the senatorial oligarchy tried to

control the privilege of power to the detriment of the

security and the prosperity of the provinces and finally

to its own undoing.

Augustus, supported by the army and as the heir of his

predecessor's provincial clientela, acquired the power in

the state so feared by the senate to the exclusion of any

rival. One of the safest ways to consolidate this power was to initiate a provincial policy that guaranteed

security and prosperity for the provinces. The provin­

cials in fact profited most from the new dispensation.

They had never had any claim to power. For them the change

from the senatorial oligarchy to a virtual monarchy was

not an issue of political liberty and the loss of it, but

simply a change of master. From this new master, however,

they had all to gain, since his power was most secure if

he secured the prosperity of his subjects. During the

republic the provinces had been raided from without by

foreign invaders and had been exploited within by gover­

nors and tax collectors, and during the revolution they were the theatre for the actions of rival politicians and the source of their manpower; under the-principate they were essentially secure and prosperous under the control of the princeps. Augustus had taken control of the army so as to exclude rivals, and his primary concern was to render the provincial borders secure and to control and systematize the internal organization. The system he ultimately developed proved to be satisfactory in subse­ quent generations. Peace and stability in the empire is one of Tacitus' reasons for acceptance of the monarchy, derived from his understanding of what was impracticable in the republic.

« The Administration of the Provinces

Senatorial and Imperial Provinces

During the republic the control of the military forces was held either by provincial governors with imperium or in the late republic by generals with special commands. In each case control over the army was potentially divided between the senate, which author­ ized the raising of an army, and the general who com­ manded it or among several military leaders. This poten­ tial division of allegiance gave rise to the civil wars and near anarchy of the last century of the republic. In his own and the empire's interests Augustus had to assure that he alone remained in control of the armed forces, and he had to seem to achieve this without any change of the republican constitution. In the settlement of 27 B.C., when Augustus returned his extraordinary power to the senate and the Roman people, the senate granted him a special commission for ten years in form of a proconsulare imperium over three provinces, Syria, Gaul and Spain. The new power was technically modest compared to Pompey's special commands and Caesar's authority during his dic­ tatorship, and constitutionally speaking Augustus remained equal in public law to the other proconsuls. The rest of the provinces were, as before, to be administered by governors selected by the senate.

Nominally the new arrangement was the continuation of what had existed during the republic. But Augustus did not in fact surrender any actual power. The real dif­ ference between these senatorial and Caesarian provinces was that the former, on the presumption that they would remain peaceful, were almost unarmed, while the bulk of the army was stationed in the latter, where trouble might legitimately be expected. The senate remained in control of the empire in terms of actual territory, but politically speaking this control was only a matter of surface prestige, because Augustus had arranged the dis­ tribution of the provinces to assure exclusion of any military rivalry to his power. The senate, powerless to do otherwise, acquiesced in his control because it was a guarantee against the resurgence of anarchy. Augustus initially left some token military control to the senate in the three military provinces of Illyricum, Macedonia and Africa, a portion that seemed to balance his own, though the number of legions stationed there was insig­ nificant. As need arose Augustus took two of these provinces under his control also. Illyricum became

Caesarian formally in 11 B.C., and the legion in Mace­ donia was transferred to Moesia in 9 B.C., so that the senate was gradually deprived of nearly all military power.

But Augustus restored Gallia Narbonensis and Hispania

Baetica to senatorial control, which was, however, a mere gesture, since these provinces had'become militarily un­ important. Since the distribution of senatorial and imperial provinces was fluid, the control could change back and forth, but changes were really only made to the ad­ vantage of Augustus' military power, his arcanum imperii.^

The Imperium Proconsulare

The imperium proconsulare was the constitutional basis for Augustus' control of his provincia cind proved to be in later generations the main competence of the princeps, 2 rivalling even the importance of the tnbunician power.

^•Syme R. , The Roman Revolution, (Oxford, 1939), passim. Stevenson, R., Roman Provincial Administration. (New Yorx, 1939), passim. 2 Mommsen, Staatsrecht, III, p. 840 ff. It was the continuation of the republican proconsulship,

but the fundamental difference between imperial and re­

publican provincial administration consisted in the fact

that the princeps as the holder of quite a number of

provinciae could not possibly supervise them in person,

but had to delegate his duties. Augustus here again built

on republican precedents, since the constitutional content

of the imperium proconsulare as compared to the time of

the middle republic, when the holder of the imperium

proconsulare had in fact to spend his term of office in

the province, had undergone a change, a change which is

particularly attached to the career of Pompey. The lex I Gabinia of 67 B.C. had allowed Pompey to appoint his own

legati, a privilege which foreshadows the imperial sys­

tem. Even more important for this discussion, his Span­

ish command in 55 B.C. had entailed the special privilege of governing in absentia through legati, an authority which Pompey had manipulated in order to control the civil

government in Rome on the spot. This was the point at which the imperium proconsulare was divorced from physical

presence of the governor in the province and this is the

type of imperium that Augustus took over. It depended

upon the concept of a power which could be separated from

actual service in the provincia, but which nevertheless

remained theoretically the same.'*' It was up to the princeps

•*-M. Hammond, The Augustan Principate (Cambridge, 1931) , p. 25 ff. whether to stay in Rome and govern through legati, or

whether to do service in the province himself. The possi­

bility of choice was expedient since it permitted the

princeps to go or stay where he was most needed at the

time.

The power continued to be conferred by the senate,

which was the repository of imperium. Both Tiberius and

Augustus carefully stressed the continuation of republican

practices when in the senate meetings of Jan. 13, 27 B.C.

and of Sept. 17, A.D. 14 they had the senate confer the

imperium in order to give it the feeling that it still

shared in the responsibility for the empire.^

The legati of the imperial provinces, who as sign of

their subordination under the imperium proconsulare were

legati Augusti pro praetore, received the full scope of

the princeps' imperium exercised militiae, but their acts,

since they were legally not independent, were valid only with the princeps1 a p p r o v a l . ^

Besides the control of his provincia the first prin­

ceps already had, as the edicts of Cyrene show, some

^■Res gestae Divi Augusti, ed. J. Gage, 2nd ed. , 1950. Tacitus, Annales, TI Tl ff. 2 Cf. Mommsen, Staatsrecht, III, p. 244 ff. J. Bleicken, Senatsgericht und Kaisergericht (Goettingen 1962), p. 140 ff. 10

influence on the administration of the senatorial prov­

inces. But the much debated question of the imperium maius may be summarized here only briefly. Recent

scholarship-*- defines imperium maius as the formula that

For a debate of the older scholarship that defines the imperium maius on the basis of Dio 53,32,4, as a con­ stitutional right superior in its content to that of any proconsul, cf. J. Bleicken, op. cit., p. 149.2. This view has been challenged by J. Beranger, Aspects ideologiques du principat, (Basel 1953), p." 68 ff, and J. Bleicken, op. cit., p. 14 9.2. Both independently from each other come to about the same conclusion. J. Beranger, p. 48, defines the content of the imperium maius by following up its historical development to the conclusion that its content does not differ from the simple imperium, but that it is always an imperium maius quam. This concept originated in the conflict arising from the different interests of two holders of provin- cial imperia, and the formula imperium maius was meant to define their position in relation to each other. Occasions arose at the end of the republic where prob­ lems that needed to be solved exceeded the boundaries of one particular province and an imperium aequum like that conferred on Pompey in 67 B.C. by the lex"Gabinia, caused conflicts with other proconsuls, so that the senate in the crucial year 4 3 B.C. had to resort to the device of making the imperium of Brutus and Cassius in the east maius quam (Cic. Phil. 11.30; 10.26). The conflicts were avoided by a process of subordination in which the superior imperium, however, did not have dictatorial power, but only a temporary precedence which did not affect the content of the imperium of the other holders. 11 relates the position of two holders of provincial imperia to each other, whereby the superior imperium had only a temporary seniority in cases of conflict; this power did not affect the content of the imperium of the other holders with which it was cosubstantial. Imperium maius came into effect in senatorial provinces only with respect to particular problems which the incumbent pro­ consul could not solve. It may not even have been a right with a constitutional basis, but may have accrued to the princeps on the basis of the auctoritas, which no proconsul could resist. This interpretation is, I think, most in line with one of Augustus' basic tenets a of policy, namely, to conceal his real power, because any admission of a constitutionally superior imperium would have characterized his position as absolute and would have formally denied the republican framework of his regime. A simple definition of temporary precedence, however, was inconspicuous. ■*•

The Legati

In this section I shall discuss the choice of pro­ vincial. governors both in the reign of Augustus and of

Cf. J. Bleicken, op. cit., p. 149.2. Tiberius in order to demonstrate the continuity of their provincial policy. Since it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss all of the provincial governors, the selection will be controlled by two aspects: (1) the holders of the most important positions in the empire at the end of the reign of Augustus and during the reign of

Tiberius, i.e., all the military commands, and (2) those governors that are in one way or another relevant to

Tacitus' account.

Since the legati were the guarantors of the provin­ cial administration, much depended on the choice of able and loyal men, and here Augustus had set up a system compatible with republican methods, but at the same time one that would introduce efficiency and could continue under his successors.

The constitutional method by which provincial gov­ ernors were normally appointed under the republic was no guarantee against important provincial commands falling into incompetent hands. The commands quite often required military duties for which the governor appointed was simply not qualified. Since the provincial command was the extension of the magistracy held in the city, ex­ praetors and ex-consuls who may have been quite able ad­ ministrators could be untried in active warfare. No sat­ isfactory means had been developed to appoint to commands only those who had the necessary qualifications. The 13 senate was almost entirely in control of the appointment and showed both lack of judgment and no little favoritism.

The senatorial appointees were sometimes so deficient or politically unpopular that in a serious situation the normal procedure was suspended and appointments were made by popular assemblies by special laws. Popular leaders were thus abetted in their ambitions and their usurpa­

tion of authority contributed to the collapse of the

senatorial control of the state.

Augustus, in order to improve the efficiency of the provincial administration and at the same to control the power of the commanders, regularized and exploited a few useful republican practices. The provincial administra­ tors continued to be selected from the senatorial class,

since the native ability and the long standing traditions of the aristocratic class provided the best leadership.

But in order to guarantee efficiency Augustus enforced a cursus honorum that integrated the administrative and the military training of the future governor. Every consular who had served through the cursus honorum from the bottom ' collected financial and judicial experience during his time as a quaestor and a praetor, and he usually gained military experience as a military tribune or a commander of a legion, so that the social background and the basic training of the governors were essentially the same for

senatorial and imperial provinces. The difference lay in the method of appointment. The senate continued to make appointments according to the republican rules, i.e., an ex-praetor or ex-consul was selected by lot after a fixed number of years for an appointment of normally one year. The appointment for the imperial provinces, on the other hand, was flexible in duration and entirely in the hands of the princeps, which guaranteed personal loyalty, efficiency of the gover­ nor and the security of the princeps' power. The his­ torical record of the first tentative years of the new dispensation reveals that Augustus started with legati of praetorian rank, obviously hesitating to entrust older consulars, whose loyalty he could not trust, with army commands:'1* later his partisans reached consular rank and were available for the needs of warfare and administra­ tion. Once a governor had proved to be loyal and effici­ ent, or had some relation to Augustus' family and was serving well, Augustus tended to keep him in his position or in a comparable one. The historical record shows, be­ sides Augustus' own family members, an elite of the governing class of ten eminent men with careers of long

^■R. Syme, R. R., p. 394 ff. 15 and useful service to the princeps. Although Augustus did not create a new system, but exploited and preserved republican methods of training for and appointment to the provincial command, he introduced efficiency into the system. The senatorial provinces were also now provided more frequently with trained' governors.

It remains to see how he wanted the continuity in the provinces to be guaranteed after his death. The years that followed Tiberius' return to favor in A.D. 4 are characterized by a change in the composition of the governmental party. Augustus may have liked or disliked

Tiberius, that did not matter any more at the moment when I he had decided to launch him into the succession, because he had no other choice. From that moment he subordinated all personal concerns to securing a smooth transfer of power by filling the leading positions in Rome and in the provinces with sure partisans of Tiberius and of himself.

In general Velleius' laudatory labels or verdicts tell their own story about Tiberius' friends or enemies. The

Fasti in Rome show the influence of the aristocratic

Claudian.2 The new party ranged in its composition from

^•Cf. R. Syme, R.R. , p. 398 ff. M. Plautius Silvanus, M. Lollius (cos. 21'P'.C.), L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, L. Calpurnius Piso (cos. 15 B.C.), M. Vinicius, Cn. Cor­ nelius Lentulus, p. Sulpicius Quirinius(cos. 12 B.C.), Paullus Fabius Maximus, P. Quintilius Varus.

2Cf. R. Syme, R.R., pp. 525 ff. 16

the descendants of the old nobility to homines novi of

provincial extraction, who could expect a quick reward

for good and loyal service. At the moment of the death of Augustus all the provincial armies were held by hand-

picked legati who provided the continuity of the

Augustan policy in the first tentative years of the new

ruler. In the beginning of Augustus1 reign there had been three great commands; in A.D. 14 there were seven:

two in Germany; two in Illyricum; one each in Moesia,

Syria, Spain, and Africa.

The Provincial Governors

Germany

The armies of upper and lower Germany were under the command of C. Silius A. Caecina Largus and Aelius Caecina

Severus-*- and under the supreme command of Germanicus over both armies. The imperium on the Rhine was one of the necessities that grew out of the enlargement of the empire.

Since the whole empire was too extensive for one person to control, the princeps had to initiate the establishment of independent imperia for areas that required it. Since this imperium on the Rhine entailed the command of a large part of the army, Augustus chose only generals whose loyalty he could trust, especially the heirs of the principate: Agrippa, Drusus, Tiberius and Germanicus all

^Ann. 1, 31. 17 held this great command.

Germanicus was, next to Tiberius, the most powerful person in the empire. At the instigation of Augustus

Tiberius adopted him as his son in A.D. 4, so that Ger­ manicus as the husband of Agrippina, Augustus' grand­ daughter, was the link that secured the succession for the

Julian dynasty. By A..D. 14 he had had an official career of some distinction:^" he had held the consulship in A.D.

12 and in A.D. 13, was appointed -to the supreme command on the Rhine which was renewed by Tiberius^ in the senate meeting of September 17, A.D. 14. The proconsulare imperium comprised the governorship of Gaul and the com­ mand of the eight legions on the Rhine. The combination was logical and expedient, for Gaul was largely responsi­ ble for the financial and material support of the army, so that Germanicus as governor of Gaul and commander could supervise the regularity of the-supplies. Contained within

1Dio 4 5, 55. 2 Ann. 1, 14. The debate is whether the proconsulare imperium in A.D. 14 was the first or the second grant. Gelzer ("P-VJ., Reihe I XIX, col. 438 1.1. 38 ff.) argues that it was the first grant, since the grant of the pre­ vious year would not have expired.- Germanicus* situa­ tion, however, may have been the same as Tiberius', namely, that his appointment was only valid until a successor was appointed. Tiberius needed for himself the confirmation of the senate and Germanicus had to be reappointed be­ cause Tiberius was the new commander. 18 the provincial command was the right to hold the provin­ cial property census,"'" an administrative function that was initiated by Augustus in 27 B.C. over the whole empire and 2 was from time to time conducted by local governors.

C. Silius A. Caecina Largus, consul of A.D. 13, held the command of the four legions in upper Germany from

A.D. 14-21. He had been a friend of Tiberius, but had switched allegiance to Germanicus.3 He distinguished himself as a military man of considerable talent in the campaigns m Germany 4 and m putting down the insurrec­ tion of Sacrovir,3 yet he seems not to have been free from rapacity, since he was charged with extortion in Gaul. a Aelius Caecina Severus, suffect consul in 1 B.C., commander of the four legions in lower Germany, had al­ ready served as legatus pro praetore of Moesia during the revolt in Illyricum and under Tiberius' general command.

He distinguished himself again in the campaigns in Germany.

He stood close to Germanicus, but may not have been a

1Ann. 1, 31.

2Dio 53.22.5.

3Ann. 4.19.

^Ann., 2.5-27.

^Ann., 3.40 ff.

3 Ann., 4.19. 19 1 close friend of Tiberius; with his forty years of mili­ tary service he belonged to the small group of military men that guaranteed the continuity of the military system and policy of Augustus.

Illyricum

Illyricum was now divided into two provinces: (1)

Pannonia was held by Q. Junius Blaesus/ suffect consul in A.D. 10, probably a step-brother of Seianus* mother.^

He may have risen together with his brother-in-law Seius

Strabo, the amicus of Augustus. Under the patronage of his nephew Seianus he obtained in later years as a reward for excellent services repeated commands in Africa and in 3 Spain. Tiberius had m him a loyal partisan and a gen­ eral of considerable capabilities.

(2) Dalmatia was held by P. Cornelius Dolabella, consul of A.D. 10. He was a grandson of the consul of

44 B.C. and a friend of Tiberius.4 His military ability 5 shows in his later proconsulship m Africa. He enjoyed

^"Vell. 2.112.4 passes an apparently unfavorable ver­ dict on him. ^R: Syme, R.R., Table vi. 3Ann. 3.35; Veil. 2.125.

4Vell. 2.126.

^Ann. 4.23. 20

under Tiberius a favored status at court, but his moral

fibre left something to be desired, since he took an

unbearably sycophantic attitude towards Tiberius.

Moesia

Moesia was held by the sturdy homo novus Poppaeus

Sabinus from Picenum, consul of A.D. 9. He remained in

command until A.D. 35 and distinguished himself in putting

down the Thracian insurrection in A.D. 26. He enjoyed the 2 special amicitia of Tiberius, which Tacitus mentions and

which is revealed also by numismatic evidence, and this may be the reason why Tacitus passes on him the judgment

nullamob eximiam artem, sed quod par negotiis neque 4 supra, a verdict that squares with Sabinus1 performance

in Thrace.

Syria

In Syria stood Metellus Creticus Silanus, consul of

A.D. 7 and legatus of Syria from A.D. 12-17. He did not

distinguish himself particularly, but he developed family

ties to Germanicus by betrothing his daughter to

Germanicus1 son.^

•'•Ann. 3.47.2; 3.69.1. ^Ann. 6.39.1.

Cf. M. Grant, Aspects of the Principate of Tiberius, p. 50 ff. ^Ann. 6.39. 5Ann. 2.43.2; ILS 18 4. 21

Spain

Spain was held by Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, consul of

A.D. 6. Grandson of the brother of the triumvir and son of Paullus Aemilius Lepidus (consul suffectus of 34 B.C.), he was the husband of Scribonia's daughter Cornelia (of

Scipionic descent and half-sister of Julia) and therefore cousin of the Augustus' grandchildren. With his

Scipionic blood and his connection with the dynasty, he was a person of high social distinction. Yet not pede- gree alone but personal capacity and achievement counted also. In the Illyrian revolt (A.D. 6-9) he undertook military duties of high responsibility. In A.D. 8 he was

I in charge of the army at Siscia, while Tiberius was in

Rome, and in A.D. 9 he shared in the final conquest of the country and was awarded the ornamenta triumphalia for his services.3 When the princeps died he held Spain4 and had developed family ties to Germanicus. On the basis of birth, dynastic connection and virtus Augustus recommended him as capax imperii,3 and he "as the Annals unfold

1R. Syme, "Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, capax imperii," JRs, 45 (1955), pp. 22 ff.

2Propertius, 4, 11, 37 f.

3Vell. 2.114.5; 115.2; Dio 56.12.2; 17.2.

4CIL II 2820.

3Ann. 1. 13.1. 22 acquires the lineaments of greatness,"^ avoiding the two extremes of overindependence and servility, saving his dignity and securing the friendship of Tiberius.

Africa

Lucius Nonius Asprenas, consul suffectus of A.D. 6, was governor of Africa. He was the heir of a new family 2 with eminent connections and had served as legate under his uncle Varus in Germany where he saved one legion out of the Varian disaster. He reached the proconsulate in

A.D. 12, holding it for three years 3 and was succeeded by

Lucius Aelius Lamia, consul of A.D. 3, of equestrian ex­ traction, who had served as legatus legionis under

Tiberius in Pannonia. . Highly praised by Velleius4 he was a person of high social distinction.^ He held the command

A.D. 15/16, since we find Furius Camillus in A.D. 17.

The list of holders of the-seven great commands throws some light on Augustus' general principles in making provincial appointments: all of the legati and proconsulars are of consular rank as is befitting for a

^■R. Syme, Tacitus I 382; Ann.' 4.20.2.

3R. Syme, R.R., p. 422.

3AE 1952, 232.

4Vell. 2.116.3.

3Ann. 6.10; Lamia became praefectus urbi in A.D. 33.

6Ann. 2.52. 23

I military command over more than one legion. With respect to their social background three of them^ are of old aristocratic descent and three homines novi of provincial 2 extraction, who were swept into office with the renewed advance of homines novi during the years A.D. 4-14. At least five^ of them stood close not only to Augustus but, what was more important for the smooth transfer of power, stood close also to Tiberius on the informal basis of amicitia. In addition family ties existed between the three holders of the most important commands, Germany,

Spain and Syria, and in case of a break between Tiberius and Germanicus this coincidence might have secured the accession of Germanicus immediately.

Most important of- all, all of the governors, except for Creticus Silanus of whose military career we do not know anything, were military men of great distinction: four of them^ had earned their iaurels already before their appointment in connection with Tiberius' Illyrian or

Varus' German campaign, and four of them were to prove

■^Creticus Silanus; Aemilius Lepidus; Cornelius Dolabella. 2 Poppaeus Sabinus, Junius Blaesus, Nonius Asprenas.

^Blaesus, Dolabella, Sabinus, Lepidus and Aelius Lamia.

^Caecina, Lepidus, Asprenas, Lamia. their ability after their appointment.^-

So in a variety of aspects, in rank, social back­ ground, experience and family connections, Augustus' appointments proved to be excellent and show that he prized capability and the security of the empire. At the same time, however, by putting Germanicus into the supreme command on the Rhine he intended, as the required adop­ tion by Tiberius had shown, to secure the succession for him in a way that he himself wanted.

Tiberius' Appointments to Provincial Commands

All of Augustus' appointments were satisfactory to

Tiberius, or so it seems, since all of the legati were held over in the first few years of the new reign.

Germany

The renewal of Germanicus' imperium was done at

Tiberius' proposal by the senate, since the senate still remained the repository of imperium. This created, con­ stitutionally speaking, a precarious situation in the relation between Germanicus and Tiberius. Tiberius held the proconsulare imperium over all the military provinces.

Germanicus' imperium was inferior to his because of its territorial limitation. He was in public law equal to a senatorial governor, a senatorial governor, however, in an

•^Silius, Blaesus, Dolabella, and again Caecina. 25

imperial province, with consequently a double loyalty, to

the senate as the formal source of his power and to the

princeps as his father. The difficulty for Tiberius was

that he could not fully control Germanicus. Although

there were precedents from the time of Augustus for im­

perial interference with senatorial governors, the right

to interfere was never a constitutional power, but only an

exercizing of temporary precedence in cases of conflict,

and the evidence shows that it was limited mainly to munic-

- ipal jurisdiction and arrangements when the senatorial

proconsul could not perform his duties.'*' So Tiberius had

no legal basis or valid precedents for interfering with I Germanicus' imperium when they disagreed on important

matters or for overriding it; nor could he recall him as

he might a legatus pro praetore, since his imperium was

derived from the senate. This made for a precarious

relationship between the two in public law. If Germanicus

had wanted he could have turned his imperium to his own

advantage. On the other hand Tiberius could not escape

giving it to him, since this was the arrangement of

Augustus. Any change would have appeared as an accusation

^A. von Premerstein, "Die 5 neugefundenen Edikte des Augustus aus Kyrene," Zeitschrift Savigny Stiftg. 48 (1928), pp. 419 ff. 26 of incompetence or disloyalty and would have alienated public opinion.

In addition to the question of imperium, what hold did Tiberius have over Germanicus on the basis of his patria potestas, a power through which Augustus had such a strong hold over Tiberius? The patria potestas seems to have been limited to private affairs, since the father probably could not control a son who was holding a magistracy,^ so that the son's sphere of competence as a magistrate may have been carved out of the patria potestas.

The arrangement is logical for Roman social thinking, in which the loyalty to the state overrides the loyalty to the family in cases of conflict. Germanicus had indepen­ dent imperium, which evidently was carved out of

Tiberius' patria potestas and which limited Tiberius' hold over him in private law when Germanicus acted as a magis­ trate. This is, I believe, the reason why Tiberius never seems to make use of his patria potestas, since he knew

So at least it was by the time of the Justinian Digest, M. Girard, Manuel de droit Romain, p. 197. It says that during the republic and the early principate the offices that specifically exempted an individual from the patria potestas were those of Flamen Dialis and vestal, but by thetime of the Justinian Digest an indi­ vidual was so exempted by becoming a patrreran, a consul, a praefectus praetorio, a praefectus urbi, a magister militum or an episcopus. My assumptron rs that these exemptions had existed earlier, though unofficially, and that they may have been formalized first by the Justinian Digest. 27

that it was limited. Germanicus certainly could, if he

had wanted to, have bent to Tiberius1 wishes as Tiberius

had done to Augustus' precepts, but he did not have to, so

that Tiberius' hold over him in public as well as in pri­

vate law was weak. The smoothness of the conduct of the

political and administrative business between them depended

on their personal relationship and on whether Germanicus

was willing to comply with Tiberius' decisions.

Silius was continued in upper Germany till A.D. 21

and Caecina in Lower Germany was replaced some time be­

fore A.D. 21 by Visellius Varro,^- consul suffectus of

A.D. 12, probably a friend of Tiberius. Unlike the ener­

getic Caecina and Silius, Varro was invalidus senecta, so

that Tiberius' replacement was not a fortunate choice,

and in a case of conflict it was the experienced Silius

who took charge of the command. His successor was

L. Apronius,2 suffectus of A.D. 8, a homo novus, who had

served with Tiberius during his campaign in Illyricum.

After his consulship he had received further military

training as legatus legionis of Germanicus in Germany and

was proconsul of Africa from A.D. 18-21 during the war

against Tacfarinas. In A.D. 28 he was put in command of

^Ann. 3.43.

2Ann. 4.74.

3Ann. 3.21. 28 the four legions in lower Germany and was in charge of putting down the revolt of the Frisians. Although he looms large in the imperial and the senatorial service he never seems to have accomplished anything conspicuous.^

His intervention in the revolt of the Frisians proved to be an utter failure due to his lack of foresight and tactical skills, so that not only did his appointment prove to be a mistake on the part of Tiberius but even more so the fact that he was continued in the command until A.D. 34. The appointment certainly had a political background. L. Apronius was not only a person who had risen from among the men that had campaigned with I Tiberius, but by this time had also established important family connections. He was the father-in-law of Cornelius

Lentulus Gaetulicus, whose daughter was probably be-

O trothed to Seianus1 son. Seianus during his ascendancy needed to bind at least a few of the great nobles to him­ self and to place them at the points where friends were most needed, one of which was the command on the Rhine.

In A.D. 29 Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus, consul of

26, who was descended from the old aristocracy and whose family had always been close to the dynasty, was appointed

1Ann. 1.55.3; 3.21.

3Ann. 4.73.

3Ann. 6.30. legate of upper Germany. From then on the command on the

Rhine was in the hands of generals who were friends of

Tiberius ^nd at the same time would accept Seianus for

family reasons. Of these Lentulus was also a good

choice'*' from the military standpoint, whereas L. Apronius'

position was only explainable by the working of patronage.

Illyricum

In A.D. 17 Drusus took command of the Illyrian 2 forces for the special purpose of supervising the pro­

vincial border during the power struggle between Arminius

and Maroboduus and with instructions to further by diplom­

acy the Roman interests at Maroboduus1 expense, which he

did successfully.

Moesia

Poppaeus Sabinus was kept in office until A.D. 34.

In A.D. 15 Macedonia and Achaea 3 were transferred into the

imperial system and added to his command. Individual

governors, however, were probably appointed to each of the

three provinces or at least to Moesia, according to what

surfaces in Tacitus' account about the Thracian campaigns.•

•^He was in command for ten years, Suet. Galba, '6.2. 30

Sabinus must have had the supervision over these gover­ nors, to whom he delegated special tasks. They were:

Latinius Pandusa,^ legatus pro praetore in A.D. 18, but hardly adequate for his task as mediator between the

Thracian king and Tiberius. He was succeeded by

Pomponius Flaccus, consul of A.D. 17, who had been in the military service in Moesia already before his 3 appointment as a governor. Since he was a friend of

Rhescuporis, he was accomodatior ad fallendum and helped to solve the Thracian problem in a diplomatic way. He certainly was appointed for good reasons. His successor was

P. Vellaeus,4 otherwise unknown except for his bril- I liant performance in quelling the Thracian insurrection in

A.D. 21. He was succeeded by

Pomponius Labeo,^ of whom nothing else is known than that he held the command for eight years and had to per­ form special tasks for Sabinus during the Thracian insur­ rection of A.D. 26.

Syria and the East

The appointments to the east and Syria during the years

^Ann. 2.66. 2 Ann. 2.66.

^Ovid, Pont. 4.9.75 ff.

4Ann. 3.39.

5 Ann. 4.47. 31

of A.D. 17-20 offer a very complex picture. A number of

problems in various provinces of the east that had arisen

prompted the granting to Germanicus of the so-called

imperium maius, by which he became again as in Germany a

senatorial appointee who was exempted from imperial

interference, but in turn was superior to other senator­

ial governors and imperial legates in the east. This

type of imperium is, as Beranger1 has shown, the continu­

ation of the imperium maius that had arisen in the late

republic. It was nothing else than a formula meant to

define the position of two holders of imperia in relation

to each other in order to guarantee the smooth conduct of

business in an area with problems that involved more than one particular province. But the imperium maius could

function ideally only when the subordinate was willing to

comply. In practice, however, there was some margin for

obstruction. The imperium maius developed at the end of

the republic was carried over into the empire as the

imperium of special commissioners, which, like the

republican commands of Pompey, Cassius and Brutus, con­

tinued to be isolated and attached to particular circum­

stances, special areas and particular persons. In fact as

in the republic, it was limited to the east (in Agrippa's

case also to Pannonia), where the cases of a problem which

1Beranger, op. cit., p. 68. Cf. above p. 10. touched on, several provinces the political circumstances and geographical structure prompted an imperium over­ riding that which controlled the individual provinces.

It stayed occasional and was granted to members of the imperial family who were considered to be the heirs of

Augustus at the time, Agrippa in 12 B.C.1 and Gaius in

1 B.C.; these appointments, besides being aimed at solv­ ing problems, were also meant to advance the holders as heirs of Augustus.

Tiberius followed this Augustan pattern. But his reasons for Germanicus1 appointment were surely complex.

On the one hand it gave him the opportunity to show to the public that he trusted Germanicus' abilities and that there existed the same spirit of loyal cooperation between him and his adopted son as there had existed between Augustus and his respective appointees. On the other hand it allowed him to separate Germanicus from the armies on the Rhine and to remove him from Rome (where he enjoyed popular favor and where people could not fail to notice that Tiberius felt insecure in his presence), into an area where his activity could be checked. Germanicus*

*3 activity m Germany at the head of a large army had shown

1Josephus, Ant. 16, 3.3 in the east,which may have been imperium maius', and Dio 54. 28. 1 in Pannonia.

2Dio 55, 19-Zon. 10,36, Xiph. 101, 32-102, 4.

^Cf. Chapter II, part 2, p. 33

that it was impossible to control him when his purposes differed from those of Tiberius, and to entrust him with

the command of the army in Syria would have been as dangerous. Therefore Tiberius decided to build into the

appointment, within the framework of the constitutional possibilities, a "safe device" by which he could control him without direct interference with his .imperium. He

appointed his close friend Cn. Calpurnius Piso as legatus pro praetore of Syria-*- as a means of keeping a check on

Germanicus. E. Koestermann2 has discovered by a close comparison of the two precedent cases for Germanicus1 mission (the missions of Agrippa and Gaius to the east) that Tiberius by appointing Piso as legatus pro praetore deviated from the Augustan pattern.for the sake of a special purpose. The evidence2 affords the conclusion that during the missions of both Agrippa and Gaius the governorship of Syria was vacant, i.e., no legate com­ manded the four legions stationed there, and so the army must have been directly entrusted to the special commis­

sioners for the purpose of enforcing their arrangements in the east by a display of armed force. In the case of

Gaius, who because of his young age needed assistance,

1Ann. 2.43, 1.

2"Die Mission des Germanicus im Orient," Historia, 7 (1957), p. 333 ff. 3 From 23-13 B.C. and also in 1 B.C. no legatus pro­ praetor e of Syria is recorded, Mommsen, R . G pT TUTT 34

Augustus.did not give him a legatus in order to support him, but adiutores, an informal group of older friends, among them Lollius^- and Quirinius.^ The difference in the case of Germanicus was that if Tiberius appointed a legatus pro praetore, Germanicus had no army at his dis­ posal which he could command directly, so that his com­ petencies gave a complex picture: he had imperium maius 3 . and was even consul, but he had no army over which to exercise his imperium. The army instead was entrusted to a legatus pro praetore who was responsible to Tiberius, the source of his appointment and from whom he could receive orders, so that the conduct of business in Syria was controlled from both sides. Although Germanicus would always have the 'precedence over the legate, there was some margin for obstruction between them. As the republican example of Brutus and Hortensius had shown,^ smooth conduct of business was only guaranteed if the legate was willing to submit to the orders of Germanicus and put the army at his disposal whenever he requested it. It was therefore important for Tiberius, if he wanted to check Germanicus, to choose as.his legate a person whom

■hfell. 2.102.

3 Ann. 3, 48.1.

3Ann. 2.53, 1.

^Cic. Phil. 10.36. 35 he trusted and who was not beholden to Germanicus, so that in case of conflict Germanicus would have the feeling that he could not have his way against Tiberius, of whose will the attitude of the legate was meant to be indicative.

Had the fact that Germanicus had no direct control over the army already aroused his and others' suspicions, the choice of the person whom Tiberius put in' charge must have done so -even more.

Since A.D. 12,^ Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus

Silanus, consul of A.D. 7, had been in command of Syria and must have acquired considerable experience in the east with which he could have supported Germanicus1 conduct of business. As far as Tiberius' concern for the empire was concerned he should have left him as his legate. But

Creticus Silanus, like Aemilius Lepidus in Spain, stood close to Germanicus through family relationships, so that he had to be removed to assure that Germanicus be kept away from the army. This removal could always be explained by the fact that Creticus had been in command for so long. But the nature of the man whom Tiberius chose as Creticus' replacement left little doubt as to the intent of the princeps.^ Piso was a man notorious-

^Ann. 2.43.

^Cf. Koesterman, ad Ann. 2.43. 36 for his independence of spirit, to an extent that could even be embarrassing for Tiberius himself, •*• and his reputation for ferocia and crudelitas had already by

Neronian times become an exemplum. His enmity towards

Germanicus and the independence which suggested potential trouble recommended him both for the appointment and as an alternative focus of loyalty for the troops. The situation was further favorable for Tiberius in that Piso was accompanied by his wife Plancina, probably a descend­ ant of Munatius Plancus, consul of 42 B.C., and from a / family which had remained in close proximity to the princeps. She enjoyed the confidence of Livia and was an enemy of Agrippina, so that the antagonism of the men on the political and personal level was reinforced by the personal enmity of their wives.

It is interesting to note that later Tiberius, when this appointment proved to have the gravest consequences for himself, tried to cover up this initial design of putting a check on Germanicus by making the senate share in the responsibility for Piso's appointment. When he was holding the cognitio for Piso's trial he noted the source of the appointment: adiutoremque Germanico datum a

•'•An n . 1.74,5; 2.43.

2seneca, de ira, 1.18; 3. 37 se auctore senatu rebus apud Orientem administrandis^-; this was in contradiction of the facts. Tiberius attempted here, where everything for his advantage de­ pended on separating himself as much as possible from

Piso, to make the appointment look like Augustus’ treat­ ment of Gaius: like Lollius and Quirinius he styled

Piso "adiutor" and as appointed with the approval of the senate, conveniently forgetting that he had initially stressed Germanicus1 sapientia that would not have needed an adiutor. His intention was to uphold for public opinion the facade of the Augustan pattern in order to stress his loyal cooperation with Germanicus. In fact ft Germanicus1 imperium maius was merely a facade, since

Piso was not an adiutor but a legatus pro praetore and not a friendly advisor but an emeny sent out in order to protect Tiberius from Germanicus.

After Germanicus1 death and Piso's dismissal from

Syria, the situation became complex again. His friends

Vibius Marsus, consul suffect of A.D. 17, and Cn. Sentius

Saturninus, consul suffect of A.D. 4, both close to

^Ann. 3.12,1.

^Cf. E. Koesterman, op. cit., p. 337. R; Seager, op. cit., p. 98, seems to take for granted that Tiberius had consulted the senate for Piso's appointment as a legate, but one has to consider that the facts contradict the speech and that Tiberius tries to shed responsibility. 38

Tiberius, who had probably originally been on the staff of Piso but had at some point gone over to Germanicus, must have considered Piso's dismissal as justified and

have assumed the right to solve.the problem of the 2 governorship of Syria on their own. The validity of

the new appointment of

Sentius Saturninus was questionable, since the only person to appoint or dismiss a legatus pro praetore was’

Tiberius. In public law Piso was still governor, since the province had not been taken away from him, but

Tiberius did not assume the responsibility of regulating the problem. The reason is, I think, easy to find.

Germanicus' death and the charge of poisoning against Piso had prejudiced public opinion against both Piso and

Tiberius, since it had escaped nobody's notice that

Tiberius had let the obstruction happen in Syria or had even promoted it; he was drawn by public opinion into the charge of poisoning. If he in any way wanted to secure his own position he had to separate himself from Piso now.

Re-establishing him in Syria therefore, which would have, been the legally right procedure, would have pointed to

■^Cf. E. Koestermann, op. cit. , p. 357.

^Ann. 2.74. 39 his cooperation with Piso. On the other hand, to recall him to Rome and replace him would have meant that in a crisis he dropped his best friend. Both solutions were emotionally repellent to public opinion and that is why

Tiberius did not interfere at all and rather let the provincial staff make arrangements. Sentius Saturninus may later have been appointed officially or approved by

Tiberius, since he is mentioned as his legate in A.D. 21.

His successor was Aelius Lamia,^ the former procon­ sul of Africa who was to be appointed praefectus urbi in

A.D. 32. When he was appointed to Syria is unknown, since he was retained in Rome and never entered his province, which probably was under the control of the legionary legate Pacuvius,^ who*is the only person mentioned in

Syria for this time. The reasons for Lamia’s retention in

Rome are open to conjecture. The legate of Syria was as always the chief mandatory in the provinces beyond the sea and the powerful army could only be entrusted to a safe partisan. Lamia would have perfectly fitted these qualifications, because he stood close to Tiberius and had Considerable military experience; there was no reason for Tiberius to believe that he could have turned

^Ann. 6.27.

^Ann. 2.74; Sen. E£. 12.8. 40 dangerous. It is very possible, however, that Seianus

suggested the device of retention, since the appointment

falls into the time of his ascendancy. Although there is nothing known about Lamia1s relation to Seianus it may have been Seianus’ idea to keep the control of the armies out of the hands of a man who was more loyal to Tiberius

than to himself.

Pomponius Flaccus^ was appointed to Syria probably

in A.D. 32, but died the next year and the province re­ mained vacant for almost two years.

In A.D. 35 the renewal of the Armenian-Parthian prob­ lem required the appointment of a competent legate of

Syria, L. Vitellius, consul of A.D. 34, father of the later emperor. He was of equestrian extraction and his

father Publius had already served as procurator. He proved to be an able and energetic governor, as Tacitus1 account of his performance bears out, and a man very different when a provincial governor and later when he was one of

Claudius' cabinet members.

Spain

When Aemilius Lepidus was discharged is not known, though certainly it was before A.D. 21, because he is

^Ann. 6.27.

2Ann. 6.31-34; 6.41-44. 41 proposed for the governorship of Africa in A.D. 21. In 1 o A.D. 23 L. Arruntius,-1- consul of A.D. 6, was appointed, but like Aelius Lamia he was retained in Rome. He was the descendant of a new family in the governmental party and he had Pompeian connexions,^ to which Tiberius was responsive and therefore may have helped his career.^

Arruntius was wealthy, energetic and eloquent and

Augustus considered him as one of the four capaces imperii,^ for which reason he may have been suspect to

Tiberius. In addition to that Arruntius took an attitude of pacific opposition. He was hostile to the prefects g of the guard, Seianus and Macro, who lodged charges against him from which he escaped by suicide.^ The reason for his retention in Rome is obvious. Arruntius was hostile to Seianus and therefore his appointment to the command in Spain would have been hazardous to Seianus *

^ n n . 3.32.

2Ann. 6.27.1.

3Ann. 3.31.3.

4syme, R.R., pp. 434 ff.

C Ann. 1.13. Cf. H. Benario, "Imperium and capaces imperii," AJP 93 (1972), pp. 14-26.

**Ann. 6.48.

7 Ann. 6.47. 42

ambition. Instead of Arruntius a certain L. Piso, prob­ ably only of praetorian rank, acted in the absence of the consular legate,^- but he was killed by A.D. 25 because he was oppressive.^

Africa

Since Africa was a senatorial province the appoint­ ment to the governorships remained as it had been under

Augustus, in the hands of the senate, and it may there­

fore be assumed that theoretically any qualified con­ sular could achieve it. But already under Augustus the appointments of Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus, Cornelius

Balbus, Nonius Asprenas and Aelius Lamia showed that in

fact nobody was named who was disapproved of by the princeps. This is due to the fact that Augustus con­ trolled the appointments a little further down the ranks.

As in the imperial provinces the governors in the senatorial provinces continued to be recruited from ex­ magistrates of whom the ex-consuls received the more

important, the ex-praetors the less important provinces.

In the selection of the proconsuls the republican use of the lot still survived, i.e., praetorian and consular provinces were allotted out of the number of available ex-praetors and ex-consuls, and also the principle laid

•^Syme, Tac. , App. 63.

2Ann.,4.45. down in Pompey's law of 52 B.C./ that an interval should

lapse between a magistracy and a provincial governorship/

was continued. The lapse of-time, however, was subject

to fluctuation, due to a number of factors that operated

to modify the order of seniority among the ex-consuls to

be admitted to the balloting, such as the privilege of a

number of children, personal withdrawal, death of a con­

sul or absence on another mission.^- In the early prin-

cipate of Augustus a five years' interval seems to have

been the rule, which expanded to a norm of ten years

under Tiberius. In this way the method of appointment

remained republican and the balloting was in the hands

of the senate. But Augustus had made sure in other ways

that nobody got into the senatorial governorship whom he

did not want, since he exercised control over the elec-

tions of magistrates by designatio of candidates. A

careful selection was made of those who were allowed to get into a career which might lead to a provincial gover­

norship, of a senatorial as well as of an imperial province, with the only difference being that for sena­ torial provinces the candidates had to wait five or ten years respectively after their magistracy in the city. Thus, although the senate was allowed in senatorial'prov­ inces to make its own appointments, this "libertas" was

lCf. R. Syme, "Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, capax imperii, JRS 45 (1955), p. 25. 2Stevenson, R., op. cit., p. 106. 44 vitiated by the fact that after a lapse of time senatorial provinces were infiltrated with ex-magistrates who were friends and partisans of the princeps and who felt a greater loyalty to the original promoter of their career than to the senate. Consequently they promoted the im­ perial cause to its logical conclusion that the senatorial provinces became in time imperial. Africa is a case in point.^

All the consuls of the first decade A.D. were in the second decade up for balloting for the two consular sena­ torial provinces, Asia and Africa, so that although the governors were determined by lot, which theoretically I could mean a sacrifice in efficiency, in practice all of them were in one way or another close to the princeps, since he had promoted their career. Most had acquired considerable experience after their consulship in the imperial service as legatus legionis or legatus pro praetore, so that by the time of the balloting for Asia and

Africa the lot could only fall, with a few exceptions, on highly qualified persons who were loyal to Tiberius.

Although chosen by lot, they were as reliable as if they were handpicked by the princeps, who, while according'to the senate the freedom to make the appointment, did not run any risk.

■^In A.D. 38. Cf. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, p. 293. 45

The list of the governors in Africa under Tiberius shows:

Furius Camillus, consul of A.D. 8 and up for the balloting in A.D. 17,1 descendant of the "second founder of Rome" whose family had been restored to its high stand­ ing by Augustus. In the confrontation with Tacfarinas he had had the chance of reviving the laurels of his family for the last time, as Tacitus remarks with some nostalgia.

He was followed by

L. Apronius (A.D. 18-21)2 Q. Junius Blaesus (A.D. 21-

23) and by P. Cornelius Dolabella (A.D. 23-24)"* who were well known from their previous service in imperial provinces. The appointment of Blaesus is revealing of .

Tiberius' attitude towards senatorial appointments.

In A.D. 21 Tacfarinas renewed his attacks at a moment when Apronius was to be replaced. At this point Tiberius 4 interfered with the senate's procedure of selection. He was convinced that the consulars who were up for the bal- loting were incapable of waging war and therefore

^Ann. 2.52.

2Ann., 3.35.

2Ann., 4.23.

^Ann., 3.32.

^The consuls of A.D. 11 were Manius Aemilius Lepidus, T. Statilius Taurus, Cassius Longinus. 46

recommended that the senate should suspend the normal pro­

cedure and should appoint a proconsul with special mili­

tary qualifications. The interference of the constitu­

tionally-minded Tiberius is striking? but in the crisis

the senate, blind to the danger, would have appointed the

wrong man, whereas the princeps as a general saw the

danger clearly, so that the crisis forced the interfer­

ence upon him. His imperium maius gave him, as in the

- case of Augustus, the right to interfere, but whereas

Augustus might have made the appointment directly extra

sortem, Tiberius respected the constitutional proprieties

and left the choice up to the senate. The senate, how­

ever, shrank from the responsibility of making an appoint­

ment and asked Tiberius to do so. This prompted a

protest'1' from the constitutionally-minded princeps, who

reproved the senate for referring all matters to him.

The interference itself showed the senate'.s incompetence

to make military appointments altogether, but this subse­

quent episode shows both how Tiberius tried to let the

senate have its way within the sphere of its competence,.

and how the senate could not generate initiative any more,

because it had been so trained to submit to the auctoritas

of the princeps that it did so automatically even if he

did not want it to do so. Tiberius was frustrated in

1Ann.,3.35. 47 his attempt to let the senate take its responsibilities,

and that is why he protested; he did not understand that the senate had been trained to submission and the senate did not understand that Tiberius' concern for its pro­ prieties was honest.

Nevertheless Tiberius still did not interfere dicta-

torially, but proposed two persons from whom the senate could choose: M. Aemilius Lepidus and Q. Junius Blaesus, both of them of admirable military experience and suitable

for special appointments for military needs. Tiberius as

a general knew what was required. The senate decided for

Blaesus, after Lepidus had diplomatically withdrawn, a since he knew that Blaesus, as Seianus1 uncle, would pre­ vail over him. The old aristocrat considered it to be below his dignity to be eliminated by a homo novus and the episode shows the tacit working of Seianus1 ambition.

The history of the appointment of Blaesus is an excellent example of the establishment of the imperial system in a

senatorial province for good reason: the senate was blind to the crisis in Africa and incapable of making the right appointment; it was afraid to make up its own mind about whom to choose and incapable of standing up to

Seianus, as Lepidus knew. It was in each instance the weakness of the senate that prompted imperial interference by forcing the decision on Tiberius. Finally the person that had the support from the most ambitious man in the 48 state was chosen. \ All four governors in Africa in the reign of Tiberius that we know of’*' show that the imperial system had now perpetuated itself and forced itself into the senatorial provinces: all had been consuls in the first decade A.D., recommended by the princeps to the senate, and so were friends of either Augustus or Tiberius or of both. Apronius,

Blaesus, and Dolabella were related to Tiberius on the informal basis of amicitia, as M. Grant^ argues on the basis of numismatic evidence. Although the senate was still permitted to make its own appointments and Tiberius in­ sisted on it, the consolidation of the imperial system and the working of patronage rolled over them. Tiberius, as much as he insisted on constitutional proprieties, in practice could as well have handpicked governors for

Africa: it would not have made much difference.

^Vibius Marsus, consul of A.D. 17, governor of Africa from A.D. 27-30,ought to be included. 2 M. Grant, Aspects of the Principate of Tiberius, p. 50 ff. All three governors were permitted the right of coinage in Africa and this right, if parallel to that of the senatorial governors under Augustus,was only given to the amici of the princeps. It developed under Augustus and Tiberius respectively at a time when both stood in need to emphasize reliance on friends for the succession, namely in 9 B.C. after Drusus' death and in A.D. 21 after Germanicus' death. 49

Asia

Asia was a little less fortunate than Africa in its governors obtained by balloting.

The governor of A.D. 11 Volesus Messalla, consul in

A.D. 5,was charged with extortion.'*'

Sometime between A.D. 15 and 20 Poppaeus Secundus, consul suffectus of A.D. 9 and brother of Poppaeus

Sabinus, of prinvincial extraction, was governor. Like his brother he was bound to Tiberius on the informal basis of amicitia.2

In A.D. 20/21 C. Junius Silanus, consul of A.D. 10, was governor and like Volesus Messalla was charged with 3 extortion.

In A.D. 21/22 Manius Aemilius Lepidus, consul of

A.D. 11,grandson of the triumvir on the paternal side and a descendant of Sulla Felix and Pompeius on the maternal side, who had acquired prominence in the last decade of

Augustus' reign, became governor.^ Tiberius had refused 5 to let him be admitted to the balloting for Africa, since this position required military experience and Lepidus

1 Ann., 3.68.1. 2 M. Grant, op. cit., p. 53. 3 Ann.,3.66.

^Cf. Syme, Tacitus, App. 65.

5Ann.,3.35.2. 50

did not have this qualification. He went to Asia instead,

but remained an inconspicuous character.

For the year A.D. 22 Ser. Cornelius Maluginensis, con­

sul suffectus of A.D. 10, alleged that his name ought to

be admitted to the sortition for Asia. Since he was a

flamen Dialis, however, he presented a peculiar case. Ac­

cording to old custom flamines were not permitted to go to

the provinces. But Maluginensis insisted till his case was

referred to Tiberius. The decision was made by Tiberius,

however, not as princeps interfering in senatorial appoint­

ments but in his capacity as pontifex maximus. Tiberius

followed the Augustan precepts to the point that a flamen was not permitted to leave the city for more than two nights, and instead of Maluginensis Fonteius Capito,1 consul of A.D. 12, was sent to Asia. He seems to have been

inconspicuous, but was prosecuted for extortion and let off in A.D. 25.2 He was succeeded by Marcus Aemilius

Lepidus,^ consul of A.D. 6, a senior consular of twenty years' standing, who had previously missed his chance to be admitted to the balloting, once because he was absent

1Ann. 2.71.1.

2Ann. 4.36.3.

^Ann, 4.56.3; coins of Catiaeum, BMC, Phrygia 263, nos. 261; PIR2 A 369 C III, p. 11. 51 on another mission in Spain and once because he had with­ drawn before a candidate for Africa who was more accept­ able to the masters of patronage.

Normally the tenure in senatorial provinces was for one year/ as most of the cases show to be true; an extension of imperium/ however, was possible in particular cases and when circumstances required it, as is shown by the length of tenure of Blaesus and L. Apronius in Africa.

But in the last years of the reign of Tiberius strange things began to happen to the senatorial proconsulates, since Tiberius encroached alarmingly on the sphere of the senate by refusing the appointment of new proconsuls for

Asia and Africa. In Africa C. Vibius Marsus, consul of

A.D. 17/is attested from A.D. 27-30^/succeeded by M. 2 Junius Silanus, consul of A.D. 19, who held the post till A.D. 35. Asia had one governor for six years, A.D. 3 29-35, P. Petronius. Tiberius further interfered with 4 the senate's appointment by excluding C.. Galba from the balloting, probably because he saw that Galba was incom­ petent, since his acerbitas and tristitia^ were notorious.

1CIL, VIII 10568.

2ILS, 6236.

3Dio 58.23.5; PIR 1, p. 198.

4Ann♦,6.40.

^Suet., Tib., 51.1. 52

Conclusion

The fact that Tiberius kept in office all of the

governors whom Augustus had appointed to the most important

military positions shows most clearly that he wanted to be

the continuator of the policies of his predecessor, not

only with respect to the administration of the city, but

also in the provinces.

He further emphasized continuity by entrusting only

the heirs of the empire (as Augustus had done with Drusus,

Agrippa, Gaius and himself), with major commands for the

purpose of executing foreign policy. With Germanicus1

appointment to the east, this intention became especially

clear, since Tiberius, although he vitiated the Augustan

pattern of Gaius' appointment, still tried to keep the

Augustan facade for public opinion.

The continuity also shows in recruiting from the

consular ranks as is befitting for the commands over a

legion and in recruiting from the same social background: old aristocratic families,xl municipal aristocracy, 2 and 3 homines novi of municipal and equestrian extraction.

^Lentulus Gaetulicus, Cn. Piso, Furius Camillus, Man. Aemilius Lepidus, M. Aemiiius Lepidus, the Silani, Sentius Saturninus. 2 Arruntius, Aelius Lamia.

^visellius Varro, L. Vitellius, Poppaeus Secundus, L. Apronius, P. Petronius. 53 With respect to experience Tiberius1 21 new appointments

show 14 persons- who either did not have major experience

or of whose experience prior to their appointment we do 1 9 not know. Five have had military experience in the

time of Augustus. In the case of Lentulus Gaetulicus it

was especially his father who distinguished himself, which

might have given some expectations as to the abilities of

the son; Cn. Piso had apparently already failed as gov­

ernor of Spain.3 As to the governors' achievement during

the reign of Tiberius, the five^ who really distinguished

themselves are Augustus' appointees. From among the

appointments of Tiberius quite a number may have been

capable but did not have the chance to perform,' and only 6 five show some achievement, ' whereas four are utter 7 failures, most prominent among the latter Cn. Piso.

It may safely be stated that although Tiberius continued

■^Varro, Pandusa, Flaccus, Vellaeus, Labeo, Saturninus Vitellius, Camillus, Marsus, Silanus, Capito,Petronius^Drusus, Arruntius. 2 Apronius, Lentulus Gaetulicus, Lamia, Lepidus, Piso. 3Ann . 3.12.1.

^Silius, Caecina, Blaesus, Dolabella, Sabinus.

^Gaetulicus, Arruntius, Lamia, Secundus, the Silani. c Vellaeus, Flaccus, Vitellius, Camillus, Saturninus.

^Visellius Varro, L. Apronius, Silanus, Piso. along Augustan lines, it was Augustus who made in general the better appointments. Tiberius1 appointees are not only mostly inconspicuous in our sources but also were often weak, and it is significant that Tiberius kept only

Augustan appointees in office for long tenure,^ whereas from among his own only Gaetulicus and L. Apronius are known for long tenure.

The long tenures are one of the features that dis­ tinguish Tiberius' from Augustus' appointments. Augustus' appointees in general did not hold long commands but rather served in many commands; they seldom stayed for 2 more than three years, whereas Tiberius preferred long tenures, of which Poppaeus Sabinus in Moesia is- the best example. This practice may have had cogent reasons, namely that Tiberius did not have anybody else he could entrust with provincial administration, as his other appointments show, or that he saw no reason for change, if an arrangement proved to be satisfactory., whereas new appointments may have been attended by hazards. The long tenures were clearly to the advantage of the empire whose various parts still differed so widely from each other that it proved expedient for the process of

Romanization that governors with long experience in the

■^Silius; Creticus, Sabinus. 55 area supervise the adaptation of the Roman administration to the varying local conditions.^

Another feature in which Tiberius differed from

Augustus was in the appointments that were controlled by

Seianus in the second half of his reign. Besides the case of Blaesus, who got into the governorship of Africa by the tacit working of patronage, Seianus* direct inter­ ference can be seen after the year A.D. 23. Standing in need of control over the holders of the great commands, he probably contrived the appointment of L. Apronius and

Lentulus Gaetulicus to the two commands at the Rhine, since both commanders were close to him as well as to

Tiberius. In Moesia Poppaeus Sabinus was bound through his son-in-law T. Ollius to'Seianus on the informal basis of amicitia. For Spain and Syria Seianus may not have found anybody who would have been loyal to himself and at the same time be acceptable "to Tiberius, so that all he could do was keep the control out'of the hands of com­ manders that were clearly hostile to him. Seianus may be considered as a major factor responsible for the weakness of the provincial appointments from A.D. 23 until his death in 31.

■^Cf. Marsh, op. cit. , p. 157.

^Ann. 13.45.1. 56

With regard to senatorial provinces Tiberius followed

Augustus* example: he left the appointment in the hands of the senate and let it continue the method of balloting.

He only made suggestions when the senate was unable to see the requirements of the moment, but even then he in­ sisted that it take the initiative within its competence.

All this is in keeping with his attitude in the first half of the reign during which the emphasis on the sen­ ate's liberty was a program by which Tiberius tried to give proof of his republican attitude to the senatorial aristocracy. The refusal of Maluginensis* appointment is also a case in point to confirm his devotion to the republican mos maiorum.

At the end of his reign, however, withdrawn to

Capreae and frustrated with the senate's inability to take responsibilities or tired of the meticulous conduct of affairs, he became autocratic in such instances as retaining governors in office for six years and excluding

Galba from the balloting singlehandedly. 57

Part II

Tacitus* Views on Appointments to Provincial Governorships and on Individual Governors ' Appointed by Augustus and Tiberius

The Long Tenures

Only in one passage in the Annals, besides his general remarks in Ann. 4.6 that Tiberius conducted a prosperous provincial policy, does Tacitus concern himself with pro­ vincial administration theoretically.

In Ann. 1.80, in connection with the transfer of the administration of Achaea and Macedonia to Poppaeus

Sabinus, Tacitus makes some general remarks about Tiberius* practice of long tenures by not,ing the reasons for this practice as they appeared to different groups of Tiberius* contemporaries: (1) Tiberius disliked to make new deci­ sions (taedio novae curae); (2) only very few people should have the privilege of a governorship (invidia); (3) he was afraid for himself, if he appointed a brilliant general who might turn rebellious, or, if he appointed an incompetent man, he was afraid of provincial mismanagement (anxium judicium). Although Tacitus mentions these points with apparent impartiality, namely in a discussion of individual advancement in Tiberius’ time, his own standpoint is never­ theless clear: the various arguments have one point in common— they are all disparaging to Tiberius and reflect an aristocratic senatorial standpoint. They are views 58

expressed by those groups that were still under the in­

fluence of the republican tradition. Since these men

regarded public office as something that had to rotate and

in which everybody who belonged to the senatorial oligarchy was entitled to share,'*' Tiberius' policy of

long tenures potentially deprived them of their share of honor and dignity. Although the views are disparaging,

they are not mere expressions of discontent, but taken

individually, they have some validity, if one considers

the personality of Tiberius.

The first argument (taedio novae curae) is very

true. For a character so handicapped it would in fact have been a strain to make new appointments to seven great commands every year or two, especially since he did not have enough persons available (a fact which he himself 2 complained about in A.D. 34) and \tfhen he saw no reason

for change if existing arrangements proved satisfactory.

The second suggestion, that he wanted to exclude as many

people from office as possible (invidia) is a typical

senatorial argument of a group that feels deprived of its

share of authority. This reason need not be taken seri­

ously, since at least in the beginning of his reign

■*"Cf.' Marsh, The Reign of Tiberius, p. 157.

2Ann., 6.27. 59

Tiberius was interested in winning the support of the aristocracy, his own social class, by deference to the senate. The third suggestion, that he was afraid of the hazards that attended new appointments (anxium iudicium) is not entirely groundless, for a capable general might turn rebellious. Tiberius' check on Germanicus in the east is proof of his anxiety. It was better to leave a competent and unambitious man like Sabinus in his post, once he had been found to be useful. All these reasons are tied to the personality of the princeps by what must be interpreted as pejorative language, taedio novae curae, invidia, and anxium iudicium. Tacitus never mentions that

Tiberius may also have thought of the advantage of the empire by leaving governors in the provinces for a long time as appropriate links for the process of Romanization in areas with varying local conditions. Jealousy, grudge and anxiety are for him the only hidden springs of Tiberius' actions. His senatorial viewpoint may have been influenced by Agricola's experience with Domitian, who denied him the governorship of Syria, which would have been the culmina­ tion of his career, because he was afraid of Agricola's excellence.^ In the same way the motivation from anxiety is transferred to Tiberius but Tacitus' view is

-*-Agricola, 4 0. 60 therefore personal and does not necessarily disclose the whole truth.

The Retention of Governors in Rome

Tacitus adds to the survey of reasons for long tenures the remark that Tiberius lacked decisiveness to such a degree that he did not allow governors whom he had appointed to leave the city. This refers to the retention of Aelius Lamia and Lucius Arruntius ,•** a circumstance for which no certain explanation can be given. One way of arguing is that they were retained through the influence of Seianus, since Seianus wanted to keep the control of the provincial commands out of the hands of persons hostile to him, and Arruntius had risen to a position of power in the senate from which he had to be overthrown if

Seianus ever wanted to be assured in his power. The governors thus detained would have been obliged to manage their provinces through deputies of lower ranks who would be less able to build up resistance.

Tacitus' argument for retention is metus on Tiberius' part. So far as known, however, Tiberius had nothing to fear from Aelius Lamia, the friend whom he entrusted with the prefecture of the city, and whom Tacitus portrays as a

•1-Hist. 2, 62 quern (Arruntium) Tiberius ob metum retinebat. ~ 61

lively old man and of whom he says genus illi decorum.^

In the case of Lucius Arruntius Tacitus' explanation might be more acceptable: as the son of a father who, like

Tiberius' own father, had escaped to Sextus Pompeius during

the triumviral period and benefited from amnesty later, he

had strong republican learnings. Augustus had declared

him capax imperii^ and, since he was dives and promptus, he

aroused Tiberius' distrust, especially since in the senate

he took an attitude of pacific opposition^ and kept com­

pany with the opposition party around Asinius Gallus and

Mamercus S c a u r u s . ^ For Seianus and Macro he was an

obstacle on their path to dominance and both of them tried

in vain to overthrow him.^ Whatever the true motives may have been to detain the two governors, Tacitus' motiva­

tion of metus on the part of Tiberius is in line with his

general ideas about the relation between princeps and

general, that the jealous and insecure ruler is always

afraid of the competent general: Domitian-Agricola,

Tiberius-Germanicus, Nero-Corbulo. The real reason,

1Ann. 6.27.2.

^PIR, A 28; cf. R. S. Rogers, "Lucius Arruntius," CP 26 TT^l) , p. 31.

3Ann. 1.13.

^Ann. 1.12. 5Ann. 3.12.

6Ann. 6.5; 6.4 8 . 62 however, is perhaps found not in the fears of Tiberius, but in the role of Seianus, to whom both candidates were not welcome, and who played upon Tiberius' fears for his own purposes.

The Provincial Governors

In his assessment of the first nine years of

Tiberius' reign-*- Tacitus states that Tiberius, while ac­ cording proper preference to blood and family, insisted upon advancement for merit, which comprised splendid achievements in war and administration. The principle of selection could not have been more fortunate, and it remains to observe if and how this assessment is borne out in Tacitus' judgment on individual governors.

The Tacitean account of the provincial governors is, compared to our parallel literary sources in Dio,

Suetonius and Velleius Paterculus, by far the most com­ prehensive, and our historical interest in the individuals is therefore necessarily oriented by him. But not all of the governors are extensively dealt with, for Tacitus does not write Roman provincial history but the political history of the empire from the standpoint of a senator^ who is interested in the tension between and the relation of the monarchy of the Caesars to the old governing order of

•*~Ann., 4.6. £R. Syme, Tac. I. preface, p. v. 63 the aristocracy. He therefore focuses on the forces at work that bring- about the process of political and social change. His account of history is not limited to mere information, but each part of it is functional for the analysis of the process of transformation. Single events, like the ones in the long narrative parts, have exemplary validity for this purpose, in the same way that the treatment of characters is controlled by the idea of their relevance to the history of the empire. This rele­ vance, in respect to provincial governors, need not necessarily be in their capacity as provincial governors, but can include their service as senators in Rome, as the example of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus will show.

Tacitus elaborates on those aspects of a person when he is historically relevant, as for example, Calpurnius Piso, who, measured in words and chapters, takes up the largest space of all governors, not because he was governor of

Syria from A.D. 17-19, but because he is involved in the story of Germanicus, whose fate signalized a turning point in the reign of Tiberius. On this criterion the extent of the treatment of the governors varies. Three of the thirty governors under discussion are not mentioned at all1 in the Annals. In general the Augustan appointees

1Poppaeus Secundus; M. Junius Silanus; Publius Petronius. 64 play a larger role than the Tiberian ones-*- and most of them get only very little attention or are barely named because Tacitus must not have considered them as rele- vant to his theme, although we know from our other sources that some of them were quite capable military men. 2

In order to set up a number of reliable criteria of judgment of how Tacitus evaluated provincial governors and which qualifications he considered to be important, it will be useful to look at some provincial governors whom Tacitus clearly admired. These are the great gen­ erals Agricola, Germanicus and Corbulo who deserve in

Tacitus' opinion the credit of extending the empire against the will of a suspicious ruler who tried to impede their ambition. They foreshadow the martial emperor Trajan and at the same time they are successors of the great empire-builders of the republic who have become legendary figures,-* so that one may say that Tacitus' admiration for them is based on two aspects: his admiration for Trajan's efforts and for republican imperialism.

^*Silius, Caecina, Blaesus, Dolabella, Sabinus, and Lepidus loom large in the Annals as compared to only three of Tiberius' appointees: Cn. Piso, Drusus, and Lucius Vitellius. 2 Nonius Asprenas, Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus, Aelius Lamia. •> R. Syme, Tac. II, p. 4 58. 65

In the case of Agricola, his picture is greatly over­ drawn for the purpose of correcting the Flavian propa­ ganda which had understated Agricola's achievement.-*- He is stylized into the ideal of a provincial governor, larger than life, and therefore the specific qualifica­ tions may stand out more obviously than in the case of

Germanicus and Corbulo, who both are, in my view, drawn closer to reality.

Agricola's achievement is Britannia inventa et subacta. Germanicus had set himself the task of con­ quering Germany. "Corbulo thought of nothing less than the reconquest of all that Lucullus and Pompeius had won."

This task was, so Corbulo thought, required for the power

O and the honor of the empire. Tacitus may have agreed with these ideas of reconquest or not. There are hints that he thought that problems of foreign policy could be solved by diplomacy and his narrative of conquest "often enough discloses hazards and losses.^ But he was inter­ ested in the virtus of the commander, which could still unfold under the conditions of the principate and maintain itself against adverse circumstances.

■*"H. Nesselhauf, Tacitus und Domitian, Hermes, 80 (1952), pp. 122 ff. ------

^Agr., 38.

^Cf. R. Syme, Tac. II, p. 4 93; Ann. 13.34.2.

4Ann. 6.32 ff. 66

The career of Agricola shows careful training in civil and military affairs during which he acquired a

sense of proportion, escaping both ostentation and the

suspicion of timidity. His campaign in Britain is dom­

inated by the idea of conquest. From the first day on he is constantly active, but always controlled by ratio and constantia.^ He does not shun personal involvement, but

# O shares in the labor and penculum of his soldiers. His activity is driven on with resolution and energy: terruerat, inrumpere, caedere, pellere characterize his temper; on the other hand he displays with almost

Virgilian ethics humanity towards conquered people.^ 5 Warfare is controlled by consilium and conquest is fol­ lowed by the practice of the arts of peace, particularly just administration, since he understands that no conquest is useful, if it is not accompanied by the process of "" £ Romanization. Battles are fought against fierce people 7 and adverse circumstances, and personal concerns are

~*~Agr. , 18 .

^Agr., 18.5; multus in agmine 20.

^Agr., 20• 26.

^Agr., 20.

5Agr., 21.

^Agr., 26.

^A gr., 25. 67 subordinated to the idea of conquest, which culminates in the description of the battle of Mons Graupius.^ All'of

Agricola’s characteristics are focused upon here once again and culminate in his display of eloquence, with moral appeals to virtus, decus and gloria.

In Rome Agricola accommodates himself to the circum­ stances of the principate and displays discretion and submission to authority. Altogether he is the moral and political ideal of the new aristocracy of Tacitus’ own time, whose qualities fall short of the spectacular, but who display the virtues that in ancient days won the empire.^ Whereas Agricola is stylized into an ideal, I Corbulo and Germanicus are drawn closer to reality, since they are more centrally functional in the history of the empire. Both of them display basically the same charac­ teristics as Agricola. Corbulo, when he arrived in the

East, drew all eyes because he was tall of stature and had speaking appeal, in his actions he shows himself implger, providus, severus and sapiens. Coercit, excindit, capit, expugnat characterize his temper. Germanicus by contrast displays in addition to all these characteristics also more lenient sides: mira comitas, civile ingenium, in hostes m a n s u e t u d o Summarily it may be said that all three of

•*~Agr. , 35-39 .

2R. Syme, Tacr I, p. 26. 3Ann. 13.50. ^Ann. 1.33. 68 them display common characteristics that Tacitus must have considered as the ideal qualifications of a provincial governor acting in a military situation: the desire for conquest, in which virtus can unfold still under the changed conditions of the principate; intensity and integrity of effort despite adverse circumstances; the energy, perseverance and eloquence with which the goal is reached, but also the humanity and the moderation towards subjects and the just administration of the conquered territory.

How do the Augustan and Tiberian appointees fit into this framework.? a Except for Poppaeus Sabinus, Tacitus never passes an explicit judgment on them, so that his view must be abstracted from their actions and the language that

Tacitus uses. Out of the nine Augustan appointees only five are extensively dealt with in the first hexad of the

Annals. All of them are involved in military situations that end in success: Silius and Caecina in the campaign in

Germany and Silius in putting down the insurrection of

Sacrovir, Blaesus in quelling the mutiny in Pannonia,

Dolabella in defeating the Numidian Tacfarinas and Sabinus in putting down the Thracian insurrection in A.D. 26. All of them, therefore, are mainly to be considered under the aspect of their martial qualities. 69

Germany

Silius , the commander of the four legions of upper

Germany for seven years, distinguished himself as vlr

triumphalis in the campaign of Germanicus,1 though

Tacitus’ narrative hardly bears out the triumphal merit.

His great moment comes-in the insurrection of Sacrovir.

He shows himself as an energetic person^ whose action is

controlled by speed.^ Anticipating victory and conscious

of past achievement as victor Germaniae, he addresses the

soldiers with a speech that is the expression of heavily

•overbearing Roman self-consciousness^ and pride. The

success of the campaign unfortunately turned his head to

a degree that he became an object of hatred to Tiberius,

because he had risen to a position 'of power from which

Tiberius felt threatened, especially by a person more

energetic than he himself. As a result in Silius1 trial

of A.D. 24, contrived by Seianus because Silius had

stayed loyal to the interests of Germanicus1 widow/

Tiberius refused to grant him any advantage. Tacitus, who

sides with Silius, builds him up like a statue: moderator

1Ann., i, 72.

2Ann., 3.40-47.

Ann., 3.43, vrgenti Silio. 4Ann., 3.45: fremente etiam gregario. mile. sAnn., 3.46. ^Ann., 4.18. 70 ingentis exercitus per septem annos, partis triumphalibus, victor Sacroviriani belli, maiore mole prociderat.^ He becomes the exemplum of the fall of a great commander through the intrigues of a man who grasps for power and a princeps whose fears have been worked upon and whose grasp of realty has so considerably weakened that he de­ prives himself of one of the most competent men for service.

Caecina, the commander of the four legions on the lower Rhine, whose earlier career as a legatus pro praetore of Moesia is narrated by Velleius and Dio and which shows him already as a commander of considerable courage and talent, is Germanicus1 most reliable commander. He is often sent on missions of exploration and bears the brunt of the battles and attacks with considerable energy.

His great moment comes on the retreat from the confronta­ tion with Arminius,^ which is characterized by the

Leitmotif cuncta pariter Romanis adversa, a situation similar to the Varian disaster and dominated by Caecina:

~*~Ann. , 4.19.

2Velleius, 2.112.4; Dio, 55.29/30.

^Ann., l, 56, exterruit Caecina hue illuc arma ferens.

4Ann., 1, 64-68. quadragesimum id stipendium Caecina parendi aut imperitandi habebat, secundarum ambiguarumque rerum sciens eoque interritus. Caecina,is an experienced soldier who meets danger with calm and never gives in to adversity. When visited by a terrifying dream— Varus with voice and ges­ ture beckoning him to destruction— he pushes him away,.a

Stoic reaction, denoting absence of fear of death. In the battle he is always conspicuous. His valor is cinemato- graphically focused upon when, in a general panic where his auctoritas, preces and manus have failed to keep the soldiers in the camp, he throws himself in front of the gate in order to save the day. With his forty years of service he knows all the possibilities of how to compel the soldiers to return to order, a characteristic which also shows in his address before the moment of escape, remarkable for its calm and restraint.^" He advises discipline and order, depicts the consequences of flight with moderate emotional appeals to home and military honor. It is not a flamboyant speech, like one by'

Agricola or Germanicus, but controlled and adequate to the situation, and it bespeaks the experience of a soldier with forty years of service.

In A.D, 20 Caecina comes up as a senator with a motion on the issue whether provincial governors should be 72 allowed to take their wives to the provinces,^- and as an old-timer with gravitas he pleads for the hard course, a

Cato on the Oppian laws,2 His opinion is defeated by the more moderate Valerius Messalinus. Both antithetic speeches, displaying the old and the new, focus on social change supported by Tacitus, who is not a blind admirer of the old but is aware that times change and not always for the worse.3

The whole picture of Caecina thus displays a double standard of judgment. As a provincial governor he is a man of considerable valor and experience who meets danger with calm and control, he is not spectacular and only moderately energetic, closer to Poppaeus Sabinus than to

Germanicus; as a senator, however, the Elder Cato in the principate, Tacitus considers him clearly as an anachronism.

Illyricum

Blaesus, the commander of the legions in Pannonia and commander .in Africa, and Cornelius Dolabella are both portrayed as capable military men. Blaesus per­ forms in the. mutiny with the skill of a seasoned profes­ sional emphatically staking his life for the loyalty to

Tiberius,^ quelling the mutiny with pervicacia and multa

1Ann. 3.33.

2Livy, 34, 1-8.

3Ann. 3.55.5: non omnia apud priores meliora. ^Ann. 1, 17. 73 arte dicendi.^ His campaign in Africa, for which he was nominated through the working of patronage as Seianus' uncle, deserves Tacitus' praise, as is borne out in the narrative. The campaign is controlled by speed, skillful tactics m beating the enemy at his own game, and ener­ getic involvement. The homo novus is portrayed as a seasoned professional, energetic, eloquent and loyal, and although he is advanced through his nephew Seianus the working of patronage has not blinded Tacitus to the recognition of his real worth.

In the same way as Blaesus Dolabella performs magnificently in Africa and deserves the credit of having ended the war. 4 Like Blaesus he operates with speed, 5 with tactical skills ahd circumspection. His able conduct as a governor, however, did not guard him from dishonor in Rome, where he took an unbearably sycophantic attitude with proposals which Tiberius rejected each time sarcas- tically, so that Tacitus' narrative again displays a

1Ann. 1,17. ^Ann., 3.72 dare id sehonori Seiani, . . . ac tamen res Blaesi dignae decore tali fuere. 3 Ann.,3.74, dux ipse arta et infensa hostibus cuncta fecerat. ^Ann., 4.24-26. 5 Ann., 4.25, cito agmine.

^Ann., 3.47.3; 3.69.3. double standard of judgment. Dolabella as a provincial governor measures up to good standards, but as a senator he is objectionable.

Moesia.

Poppaeus Sabinus. Without Tacitus' account Poppaeus

Sabinus would have been a very shadowy historical figure, since he has left scanty traces in imperial history elsewhere, but Tacitus, with his account on the Thracian campaign and his formal obituary notice,'*' has retrieved this sturdy homo novus from oblivion. Sabinus became a vir consularis and triumphalis. On what merit? Nullam

o ob eximiam artem, sed quod par negotiis negue supra erat is Tacitus' surprising verdict for a man who had held the provincial command over Achaea, Macedonia, and Moesia for twenty-five-years and had quelled the insurrection of the

Thracians m A.D. 26. A close.study of his performance during the campaign, however, shows that the verdict is borne out by his actions.

The campaign is narrated with abundance of detail on the operations of the Roman army against the Thracians who struggle for their bid for freedom, but Sabinus himself 75 remains inconspicuous in the action. It is his soldiers who do the fighting, not he himself.^ He controls the campaign only by the performances of routine work: the planning, the marshalling of troops, light attacks. His

strategy is based on beleaguering a hill fort and he per­ forms an able and solid piece of work in laying the

foundation for the siege,2 but he is very'little of an inspiring commander and his address to the soldiers^ is not more than a low-keyed call to order. Conduceret, mittit, occupat, obsidium coepit— that is the temper of

Poppaeus Sabinus, characterized by solid work, but immo­ bility, the opposite of Agricola and Germanicus if measured against their energy and desire for conquest, a competent preserver of the existing order, 'unambitious and very congenial to Tiberius, who had nothing to fear from him, but a governor who falls far below Tacitus' criteria of the quality of a good governor. Par negotiis neque supra, he states with an undertone of bitterness, for in his estimate Sabinus should not have blocked the governorship of three provinces for twenty-five years, and thus have

^Ann., 4.50.

2An n., 4.47.

Ann. , 4.49, obsidium coepit per praesidia .quae opportune immuniebat.

^Ann., 4.50, . . . Sua quisque munia servarent immoti. excluded more able and energetic men who were entitled to their share of office.

For Tacitus, Sabinus was relevant to history as an example of a type of homo novus who was congenial to the

Caesars because of his plain merit and steady service, and because they had nothing' to fear from him. Honors and office in Sabinus1 case were not based on eminent virtus, but on the working of patronage: principum amicitia consulatum ac triumphale decus adeptus.^ These men have a chance to survive, complying and competent but uninspiring— this seems to be Tacitus' attitude. It should be kept in mind, however, that these men of long I tenure did a great service for the consolidation of the empire; but Tacitus' criterion for a provincial command was virtus, and the martial energy that it implies; that is why he has little admiration for Poppaeus Sabinus.

Syria and Africa

Creticus Silanus, governor of Syria, is mentioned without any further detailed information,^ and so is Africa' 3 Nonius Asprenas, since both of them were not involved in major issues of foreign policy. 77

Spain

Marcus Aemilius Lepidus. As opposed to the other

Augustan provincial governors, Lepidus, the friend of

Tiberius, whom Augustus had considered as capax imperii'1' on the basis of his social distinction and his personal capacity, figures in Tacitus.' narrative only as a senator.

Without mention of his Scipionic ancestry or his military achievements he rises to stature on the basis of the civic virtues of a senior statesman.2 The reason is obvious, since Velleius says with reference to his provincial administration of Spain: in summa pace et quiete continuit. 3 Tacitus was not interested in * the provincial a governor whose role was unspectacular, but only.in the performance as a senator, which was remarkable. His two most conspicuous actions were first, the assumption of patronage in the trial of Piso where he was ready to plead for the just cause against popular opinion and against Tiberius' fears; and second, his intervention,

^Ann., 1.13. 2 R. Syme., "Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, capax imperii," JRS, 45, (1955), p. 22 ff., retrieves, by a redistribution of references between Manius and Marcus Lepidus on the basis of internal criteria, eight passages for Marcus which now together with three others build up the picture of the senior statesman.

3Vell., 2.125.5. 78 although fruitless, in the trial of Clutorius Priscus, the first case of judicial murder in the reign of Tiberius, where as the only consular he tried to advise a merciful line^ reminiscent of Caesar's in Sallust's Coniuratio

Catilinae . This compelled Tacitus to doubt whether the favor of princes was ordained by predestination and to wonder if a man's prudence might not count for something and enable him to steer a safe and honorable course in public life equally removed from defiance and servility.

Marcus Aemilius Lepidus was such a person. As opposed to the other two capaces imperii, Asinius Gallus with his inordinate ambition and Lucius Arruntius with his atti­ tude of opposition, Lepidus secured the friendship of the princeps but at the same time stood- up in order to defend the just cause.

Conclusion

Tacitus' narrative shows that he considered all of the Augustan appointees (and Tiberius shares in the merit, since he kept them all in office) as capable provincial governors when acting in military situations and as guarantors of the security of the borders of the empire.

Although almost all of them share in some aspects in the ideal of Agricola, his energy, his integrity, his desire for conquest and his eloquence, they are all colorful

XAnn. 3.49-50. individuals in their own right: Silius, competent and energetic but slightly overbearing; Caecina, sturdy and experienced, but not spectacular, and as a senator an anachronism; Blaesus, pointedly loyal, energetic and

skillful; Dolabella, competent in the field, but objec­ tionable as a senator; Poppaeus Sabinus, slow and unam­ bitious, but a solid worker and a preserver of the exist­ ing order. Marcus Aemilius Lepidus alone comes in only as a senator, preserving through his uncompromising attitude his dignity amidst a subservient senate.

Tiberian Appointees

Germany

Visellius Varro, the successor of Caecina on the lower Rhine, is dismissed with the remark of invalida senectus^ over against Silio vigente. He falls in

Tacitus' opinion far below the standards of a good-mili­ tary man.

Lucius Apronius, although he looms large in the im­ perial and senatorial service, is not treated by Tacitus as a conspicuous figure. In his campaign in Africa^ he stands out for his harsh enforcement of discipline, but hardly for any contribution to ending the war. The gov­ ernors of Africa accomplished enough to obtain the V. 80

triumphal insignia,1 while they left the enemy at large.

Three statues decorated the city of Rome already and the

war in Africa was not yet at an end; so goes Tacitus'

verdict on the general performance of the governors,

including Apronius.

In the revolt of the Frisians Apronius contributes

to the defeat of the. Roman army2 by wrong strategy and neque

dux Romanus ultum iit aut corpora humavit, quamquam multi

tribunorum praefectorumque et insignes centuriones

cecidissent, is Tacitus1 bitter comment on the conduct of

the commander, since the burial of the soldiers belongs

to his duty and the fulfillment or the failure in this

respect become in the Annals and in the Histories a 3 topos for right or wrong moral conduct.

Lentulus Gaetulicus had acquired a popularity among

the troops that compared to that of Germanicus: mirumque

amorem adsecutus erat, effusae clementiae, modicus

severitate.4 He therefore had achieved a position of power

from which he could put conditions even to Tiberius, when

charged for his close affiliation with Seianus, so that

1Ann. 4.23.

2Ann. 4.73.

•^Cf. Germanicus on the Varus battlefield 1. 61, against Vitellius on the battlefield at Cremona, Hist. 3, 70.

4Ann. 6.30. 81

Tiberius preferred to dismiss the case instead of risking his own security. Tacitus' wording shows that he admired

Gaetulicus' steadfast attitude.

Illyricum

Drusus. During the struggle between Arminius and

Maroboduus Tiberius decided to send Drusus to supervise the border in the north, paci firmator.^ He had already displayed courage and steadfastness combined with 2 rhetorical skill in the mutiny m Pannonia, and although

Tacitus certainly does not approve of him as a person,0 he still gives him credit for his achievements on missions: haud leve decus Drusus quaesivit, inliciens Germanos ad discordias.^

The other commanders of Illyricum hardly surface, but Publius Vellaeus is credited with swift action: ad

exsolvendum obsidium simulque cuncta prospere.gesta.

^Ann., 2.62.

O , Ann., 1.29, quamquam rudis dicendi, nobilitate ingenita incusat pnora, negat se terrore et minis vinci. 3 Ann., 1.29, promptum ad asperiora ingenium, 4.2, animo commotior, urbano luxu lasciviente.

^Ann., 2.62.

5Ann., 3.39. Syria

Syria was held from A.D. 12-17 by Creticus Metellus

Silanus when Tiberius replaced Silanus by Cn. Calpurnius

Piso,l his personal friend with, the explicit intention that he act as a check on Germanicus during his mission 2 to the East. Since he was a man notorious for his inde­ pendence of spirit and his enmity towards Germanicus, this attitude recommended him for the position. He was the son of a bitter and obstinate republican who had fought to the last against Caesar in Africa, and had followed Brutus and Cassius after Caesar's murder. Per­ mitted to return to Rome, he had only after a number of years condescended to accept the consulship that Augustus had offered him in 23.B.C. The son, on the contrary, had accepted an official career from the beginning, but had never put aside his proud republican attitude, so that he sometimes became embarrassing eVen to Tiberius. -The most conspicuous example of this comes in the senate when

Tiberius, in an outburst of anger about the slander that 3 Granius Marcellus had launched against him, asserts that

■*Tor a full development of Piso and his significance in the Annals, cf. Chapter III, 3, p. 259 ff. 83 he too will cast his vote in the trial; Piso slyly asks him. Quo loco censebis, Caesar?, thus pointing to the discrepancy between Tiberius professed libertas towards the senate and the fact that the senate in reality was not free any more.

His republican attitude shows once again in a discus­

sion in the Senate over the issue of whether a prolatio of senatorial debates is advisable when Tiberius is absent from Rome.-** Piso, who displays his independence,

insists on the freedom of senatorial debates also during the princeps1 absence, which is certainly Tiberius' sense

in the beginning of his reign, when he insists on the

senate undertaking its responsibilities. Manebant etiam turn vestigia morientis‘ libertatis, Tacitus states with

some approval of Piso's attitude. Or did Piso by speaking up intend to gather around himself the silent majority of the senate that thought as he did, in order to strengthen his own position in the senate?

Piso's great entry in the Annals, however, comes before his appointment to Syria.^ In a moral foreshadow­

ing, which Tacitus usually reserves for his most prominent characters who in some way or other affect the course of

■*-Ann. 2.35

2 Ann. 2.43. 84 events, he has abstracted from Piso's subsequent actions the underlying moral forces, so as to set the reader on the track of how the character of the person is to unfold and to suggest the forces that shape the events. A man of an intractable character, with a family tradition of hostility to the Caesars, Piso is described as ingenio violentum et obsequii ignarum, and endowed with insita ferocia a patre. His wife's position is reinforcing:

Plancinae nobilitate et opibus. A man who by nature would not stop at anything, supported by social distinction, wealth and the friendship of Tiberius— that is Calpurnius

Piso. His arrogance is pointedly brought to the level of I the reader's perception with one item: he considered himself as almost equal to Tiberius and Tiberius' sons as inferior to himself, which shows the attitude of inde­ pendence a nobilis still could assume in the beginning of the reign without running the risk of being eliminated, and which explains partly his attitude of hostility towards

Germanicus.

It remains to be asked— and this is a question for which neither Tacitus nor our parallel sources provide an answer and which therefore must necessarily remain speculative— what Piso's ultimate personal purposes were.

Independence and obstruction for the sake of obstruction are certainly not ends in themselves for a person of 85

Piso's nature and ambition, and the explanation that he

only intended to ingratiate himself with Tiberius is

certainly not valid, since he acted too often against him.-*-

There was a rumor that Augustus had considered Piso

as a possible capax imperii^ in the place of Lucius

Arruntius. Birth, republican leanings, social distinction

and wealth certainly qualified him to be named in company with the two other possible candidates, namely, M.

Aemilius Lepidus and C. Asinius Gallus, although he could

certainly not compete with the personal attainment and

the dynastic connections of Lepidus. But simply to be named in rumor as a possible capax must have raised Piso's

hopes extraordinarily and may have stimulated him to play

the role in fact, since he would, as Tacitus says, hardly

admit Tiberius' superiority and regarded the princeps'

sons as inferior.

On this assumption I would like to look at the infor­ mation that Tacitus gives of Piso under two aspects:

(1) why Tacitus considered Piso so important, and (2) whether this information does not at the same time disclose

something about Piso's personal intentions, so that all of his various and sometimes paradoxical actions could be

tied to one single purpose, namely, to rise to a position

-*~Ann. 1.74; 2.35; 2.55.

2Ann. 1.13. 86 of power, from which at the lowest estimate he could face

Tiberius on an equal footing.

Piso's characteristics, as outlined by Tacitus, are borne out by the action which unfolds into a series of obstructions that reach staggering heights, focused upon in examples and pictures and shaped by Tacitus1 vehement language. In Athens he undercuts Germanicus popularity by a slanderous and tactless speech (saeva oratione)

At the same time he may have intended to show that he him­ self is a person to be reckoned with. In Syria he up­ sets the morale of the soldiers for the sake of binding the army to himself by complete relaxation of discipline, and by favoring the worst elements (his friends) by putting 2 them into a position of power. The life in the camp is characterized by desidia, in the city by licentia, and the soldier is vagus and lascivus, calling Piso parens legionum. One only has to recall Agricola, Germanicus and

Corbulo for a moment (ratio, consilium, labor, periculum, impiger, providus, seyerus) in order to realize that

Tacitus stamps Piso as the complete antithesis of a good provincial governor, and as one whose loyalty to the

•*-An n . 2.55.

^Ann. 2.55.5 largitione, ambitu, infimos manipulafum iuvando, severos tnbunos demoverat.

3Cf. p. 64 ff. 87 princeps becomes questionabl-e when he tries to bind the troops to himself and not to Tiberius.

The allegation of Fulcinius Trio during Piso's trial that Piso governed the province of Spain ambitiose avaregue,^ which Tacitus leaves an open question as to its truthfulness, nevertheless fits into the picture of Piso as provincial governor also and at the same time extends this attitude into the past, so as to underline that Piso was always the same. His refusal to send troops to

Germanicus' support is motivated by Tacitus ob superbiam2 and when asked for the reasons he answers, vultu firmato and contumacibus precibus. At Germanicus1 tribunal he I conducts himself so as to disturb the process of judicial administration, atrox 'et dissentire manifestus for the sake of showing his own importance.

After Germanicus1 return from Egypt he has cancelled all of his previous arrangements obviously for the purpose to bind the province to himself as much as he had bound the army to himself, and when it comes to a confrontation between Germanicus and himself he displays the old unbroken spirit of boldness, nec minus acerba ab illo in Caesarem.

•'■Ami. 3.12.

2Ann. 2.55.

2 Ann.2.69. His attitude during Germanicus' illness and after his death which leaves him with the suspicion of having poisoned him, because he had behaved in a way so as to arouse his suspicion, is no less provocative than before.

He keeps the Antiochians from bringing thankofferings for

Germanicus1 health (plebem per lictores proturbat),1 and displays gaudium when he hears the news of his death.

This is stressed in brief pictures, caedit victimas, adit templa.

When confronted with the question of whether to return to Rome after Germanicus' death or to regain his province by civil war Tacitus shows, how easily Piso according to his nature (haud magna mole Piso, promptus ferocibus in sententiam trahitur)3 is inclined to go the way of force.

The logic of the decision is obvious. Piso knew that he had alienated public opinion"by the suspicion of having poisoned Germanicus and he may have also been uncertain of how Tiberius felt about him after his provocative action and after having implicated the princeps in the suspicion about Germanicus' death. If he ever wanted to retrieve himself from the disaster he had first to regain a position 89 of power which could only be done-by trying to regain the province by civil war.

After his defeat and on his return to Rome he dis­ played despite the weakness of his position the same unbroken spirit of defiance, focused upon in the picture of his arrival: vultu alacris, which prejudiced p u b l i c opinion against him even more and made it more difficult to defend himself against the charge of poisoning.

During the trial, which in my feeling is more the trial of Tiberius than it is the trial of Piso, because the charge of poisoning had implicated Tiberius, Piso remains passive and commits suicide, when he sees that he has no chance to escape because Tiberius had abandoned him skillfully.

As stated before, Piso is the provincial governor who is most extensively dealt with by Tacitus. The in­ tractable nobilis with a family tradition of hostility to the Caesars is stamped in his moral foreshadowing by such words as insita ferocia, ignarus obsequii and violentus.

This picture is borne out by his actions in general and sometimes focused upon cinematographically in close-ups: his attitude in Athens, in Cyrrus, his firmatus vultus, and his arrival and banquet in Rome.^ All these pictures are functional in shaping the reader's impression of Piso, as does the specific language that Tacitus uses. Ferocia,

•^Ann. 3.9. 90 ira, superbia, oratione saeva, precibus contumacibus, largitio, ambitus, desidia, .licentia, corruptio mark the moral diagram of the proud noble, as verbs of strong physi­ cal action, increpat, exterritam, abiecit, proturbat mark his temper.

It remains to ask why Tacitus dwells so extensively on Piso, especially on scenes that remain inconsequential, like his arrival in Athens or in Rome. Piso, because of his close friendship with Tiberius and his hostility towards Germanicus, and because of the fact that Tiberius had appointed him as governor of Syria just at the moment when Germanicus was sent on his mission to the East, had I implicated Tiberius in the suspicion of poisoning which arose and was never dissipated afterwards.

Piso's insubordination is harped on again and again with a variety of literary means of expression, so, as to create for the reader the process of charging the atmos­ phere to the point at which the rumor of poisoning could arise and be believed. Tacitus believed that this had the gravest consequences for the reign of the princeps and therefore felt justified from a literary as well as from a historical standpoint in the extensive development of Piso as the device for presenting this crisis.

But besides Tacitus' view of Piso as the political key factor for the crisis in Tiberius' reign his information 91

affords also some conclusion as to Piso's own ambitions as

a historical figure. Since Augustus may have played with

the idea of considering him as a capax imperii, it would not be surprising if the intractable noble would have

intended to build up a position of power for himself, for he would have been the more safe the higher up he was.

In this light a variety of his actions could be tied to

this single purpose. in the senate he may have wanted to appeal to the silent majority by his attitude of Libertas.

In the province his interests were probably only partly coterminous with Tiberius' own, namely against Germanicus, who was in the way of both of them, and therefore Piso constantly tried to undercut his popularity. The fact that Piso tried to bind the troops .to himself lends further support to this theory. The truth may very well be what Germanicus' friend Vitellius says: that Piso was motivated rerum novarum studio, although we have to take the prosecutor's language into account. But this aspect of Piso is underplayed in Tacitus' account because it remained inconsequential. Piso had been mistaken in his means of how to go about building up his power, he had used insubordination and tactlessness and had failed. Had he been successful in regaining his province and the support of the army, historical events and the outcome of

^Ann. 3.13. 92 the trial might have been different, but as it was, Tacitus takes him only from the aspect with which he was histori­ cally relevant: the intractable noble, a device for deep­ ening Tiberius' crisis.

After Piso the most conspicuous commander in Syria is

Lucius Vitellius who handles the renewed Armenian-

Parthian problem with diplomacy and a moderate display of force. Tacitus portrays him as one of those dubious characters, like Salvius Otho,^ by pointing to the good sides of a bad man. He commended him for the capacity which he showed as a legate of Syria, regendis provinciis prisca virtute egit,2 but damned him for his subservience 3 later at court, turpe in servitium mutatus. As in the case of Dolabella and to some extent of Drusus, a man could be quite a capable provincial governor, although his personal qualities left something to be desired.

Africa

Furius Camillus is credited with having renewed the laurels of his ancestors by defeating Tacfarinas, although he was thought of as bellorum expers,^ for which reason

^Ann. 13.4 6.3.

2Ann. 6.32.

2Ann. 6.32.4.

^Ann. 2.52. 93

Tiberius was so much more inclined to grant him triumphal ornaments, because he had nothing to fear from him.

Vibius Marsus^ in his capacity as a provincial gov~ ernor is not commented upon, nor are C. Junius Silanus and Fonteius Capito in Asia.

Asia

Manius Aemilius Lepidus is portrayed from two sides o m the senatorial debate about his appointment to Africa.

Sextus Pompeius launches an invective against him as being lazy, impoverished and a disgrace to his family. The senate shields Lepidus: he is more gentle than lazy, and he sustained his rank without reproach. After a public discussion of his personality and his capacities he appears, on the most favorable interpretation as a nonentity, a quiet and inconspicuous man.

Conclusion

Tacitus says^ that Tiberius, in the selection of his officials, insisted upon advancement for merit. As far as the retention in office of the Augustan appointees is concerned this statement is borne out. All of them were capable provincial governors or remarkable senior

1Ann. 6.47.

^Ann. 3.32.

3 Ann. 4.60. 94 statesmen, and all of them shared in some aspects in the ideal conceived of in the person of Agricola.

With respect to Tiberius' own appointees the state­ ment is subject to question. Visellius Varro was weak,

Lucius Apronius not competent, Cn. Piso the complete antithesis of the ideal of Agricola and Manius Lepidus a nonentity. Only Lentulus Gaetulicus, Tiberius' own son

Drusus, Lucius Vitellius and Furius Camillus show some achievement, though by no means spectacular, and no one does or has the opportunity to measure up completely to

Agricola.

All of them are, however, like the Augustan appoint­ ees, colorful individuals: Lucius Apronius, forceful when it comes to enforcement of discipline, irresponsible when it comes to retrieving a disaster; Gaetulicus, popular and conscious of his position of power; Drusus, skillful in handling military situations diplomatically, as a person objectionable; Piso, a paradigm of insubordination and of provincial mismanagement; Lucius Vitellius, skilled in the arts of diplomacy, objectionable as a personality;

Furius Camillus not really spectacular, but the reminder of an old and glorious name; and Manius Aemilius Lepidus, a man who has done no harm, but falls far below the standards of his family. 95

Summary of Chapter

The fact that Tiberius kept in office all of the governors whom Augustus had appointed to the most impor­ tant military commands and that he recruited from the consular ranks when replacing Augustan personnel, shows most clearly that he wanted to be the continuator of his predecessor, not only with respect to the administration of the city, but also in the provinces.

Two features, in which Tiberius' policy distinguishes itself from Augustus’ are: (1) the long tenures, a fact for which no single certain reason can be given and (2) the influence of patronage during the rise of Seianus, whereas as far as we know Augustus did not let anybody else make such an impact on his decisions.

With regard to the senatorial provinces Tiberius fol­ lowed in the first part of his reign the way in which

Augustus had set up the system, namely to leave the appointments in the hands of the senate. But in the second half of the reign his interference took more and more autocratic forms, which the senate did not make any attempt to resist.

In a variety of aspects as to rank, social background, family connections and achievements Augustus' appoint­ ments proved to be excellent and show that he prized capability and reliability to the general benefit of the empire. When Tiberius starts replacing the Augustan per­ sonnel his twenty-one new appointments show a great num­ ber of persons who either do not have adequate experience or of whose experience prior to their appointment we do not know. As to their achievements during his reign

(only the Augustan appointees really distinguish them­ selves) only five show some achievement, whereas four are utter failures and most of them do not have the chance to perform. It may safely be stated that in gen­ eral Augustus made the better appointments, although

Tiberius continued his personnel policy.

For Tacitus the idea of continuity in this repsect is not relevant. For him the hidden sources of Tiberius' actions were other than the Augustan precepts. With respect to provincial appointments this shows in two items his comment on long tenures and the detention of governors

He is concerned with what these two items tell about the character of Tiberius; namely: taedium novae curae, invidia, anxium iudicium and metus. These are the actual reasons for Tiberius' actions, he thinks, but his view does not necessarily disclose the whole truth.

As far as his information about the individual gov­ ernors is concerned Tacitus also does not press the point.

Rather his main interest is how these individuals per­ formed (whether appointed by Augustus or by Tiberius 97 apparently did not make any difference to Tacitus), and what they contributed to the fate of the empire. This he reveals by the choice of his language and the manner of presentation, one of the most effective features of which is, I think, the cinematographical close-up.

On the criterion of Agricola as an ideal all of the

Augustan appointees appear as capable provincial gover­ nors when acting in a military situation and as guaran­ tors of the security of the borders of the empire. Their attitudes and their temper are expressed in vivid pictures that could bear the labels: virtus and ratio (Caecina in front of the gate of the camp), fides (Blaesus on the tribunal), celeritas (Silius putting down the insurrec­ tion of Sacrovir), and their temper- is expressed in the verbs: interritus, exterruit (Caecina) or conduceret, occupat (the slow Poppaeus Sabinus who was not more than par negotiis).

The Tiberian appointees are in general less exten­ sively dealth with, because they were not involved in important actions, but since they include a number of failures they show negative as well as positive values: impietas (Lucius Apronius on the battlefield), ferocia and pertinacia (Piso in almost every action), prisca virtus (Vitellius).

As stated before Tacitus is not interested in them 98 in their capacity as provincial governors but in their contribution to the fate of the empire. On this criterion it does not surprise that Piso receives inordinate emphasis as Tiberius' major disaster, over whom Tiberius had lost control. He was the device that triggered the crisis from which Tiberius' reign was never to recover, and Tacitus by showing Piso in every important or unimpor­ tant action recreated the steps that were leading up to this crisis. CHAPTER II

THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT IN MILITARY

AND DIPLOMATIC SITUATIONS

After having looked at the imperial provincial admin­

istration in the reign of Tiberius in terms of the per­

sonnel that administered the provinces under the aspects both of the criteria of judgment for selection used by

Augustus and Tiberius and of Tacitus1 criteria of presen­ tation of the individual governors, in this chapter I will go into the details of the conduct of policy in

special areas (1) the mutinies on the northern frontiers,

(2) the campaigns in Germany, and (3) the diplomatic settlement of affairs in the east. I shall look at the material under the aspects of the ideas and the adminis­ trative techniques with which the problems arising in these areas were solved and see if Tiberius showed himself again as the continuator of the Augustan policy.

99 100

Part I

The Mutinies in Pannonia and on the Rhine in A.D. 14^

The Grievances

The need for security of the empire had forced on

Augustus the duty to create a standing army. The personal

armies of the republican generals, capable of warding off

foreign attacks and of winning victories in civil wars,

were not capable of protecting an empire, since they

could not perform long standing garrison duties. Augustus

saw that a permanent force was necessary which could

maintain order, and this only if he transformed the army

into a standing force of professional soldiers, capable

of serving long periods of garrison duty in every part of

the empire, and if he made the force directly responsible

to himself, thereby avoiding the potential of rivalry for

power based on independence of command and the inroads on

the authority of the state, both of which had occurred

during the republic.

The creation of the standing army responded also to a

social and economic interest. Since Marius soldiers had

been professionals, not tied to land holdings, and inter­

ested in making a living from military service. Augustus

responded to this interest by regularizing the years of

^Ann. 1 16-30; 1 31-53; Suet. Tib. 25; Dio 57, 4-6, Veil. Pat.2.125.

v 101

service with a fixed pay and a grant of land at retirement.

The number of legions was established at 28 when Augustus

disbanded the enormous army he controlled after Actium

and Alexandria. This was the minimum necessary force

consistent with the safety of the empire. The main forces

were stationed in camps at the strategically most impor­

tant points of the empire, the Rhine, the Danube and

Syria, for the double purpose of defense against invasion

and of military control over the provincials themselves.

By regularizing and expanding the army system

Augustus built on republican practices, but with a multiple

purpose in mind: to respond to the needs of security of

the empire, to serve the social and economic interests of

the soldiers, and, by keeping the control to himself,

both to avoid the danger of military usurpation that could

overturn the government and to exclude the army from any

"interference in politics."

As to the aspects that interested the soldiers most,

the term of service and the pay, Augustus' policy was a

gradual one, for stabilization was possible only when the

frontiers acquired an aspect of permanence. In 13 B.C.

Augustus established a regularization of pay and service,

which removed the army finally from the field of politics.

^■R. Syme, R.R. (Oxford, 1939). A. Heuss, op. cit., p. 298. R. Stevenson, op. cit., p. 125 ff. H. H. Scullard, op. cit., p. 251 ff.

v 102

The settlement provided 12 and 16.-years of service for the praetorians and the legionary soldiers respectively and a

* • 1 o bonus at their discharge. In A.D. 5 he had to raise the term of service to 16 and 20 years respectively, prompted by the increasing shortage of recruits.

Although he was the commander-in-chief of the army he was carefully intent on regulating the conditions of service through the senate which voted on his proposals and which he also encouraged to make proposals in turn, however little he himself took them into consideration.^

He insistedon giving the senate the feeling that it shared in the responsibility for the army, thus continu­ ing republican practices, and so the senate's consent was technically necessary,* also/ to change the conditions of service.

In A.D. 6 he established the aerarium militare^ from which the bonus was to be paid at a later date instead of at the moment of the discharge in the camp. Since the income of the aerarium,considering the sources,^ was

1Dio 54, 25, 5.

2Dio 55, 23, 1

3Dio 55.23.1

4Dio 55. 25.4.

^Dio 55, 25; Mon. Anc. 3.17; Suet. Aug. 48,2.

6Ann. 1 78; Dio 55, 25; 55, 32. 103 fluctuating, Augustus may not always have been able to pay at the time of the discharge. As a result the problems of payment and of the lengthening of the terms of service triggered off discontent among the soldiers. When, after the revolt in Illyricum and the Varian disaster, Augustus was forced to resort to drastic measures of recruitment and to insert the vernacula multitudo into the service,

this became the disturbing element that finally stirred up the mutiny.^*

Tiberius inherited Augustus' problem and with the advent of a new princeps a mutiny was only a matter of time. Augustus himself still had enough auctoritas to keep the army in check, but Tiberius was necessarily much weaker than he, since his position was initially not secure. Great as his military accomplishments had been, they had not given him a hold over the common soldier,

for, much as Velleius in his panegyric fashion describes the soldiers' devotion to Tiberius, there are indications that this was not necessarily so. Tiberius had commanded the armies in Germany and in Illyricum for ten years, but even an appeal to this relationship is ineffectual2 and

1Ann. 1 31.

2Vell. Pat. 2 104.4.

2Ann. 125; 134.4; 142.3 104

it is easy to imagine Tiberius' bitter disappointment at

the fact that the mutiny broke out just among his own

legions.

The demands were: a raise of pay,-*- the payment of the

legacy of Augustus, 16 years of service like the

praetorians, no retention in the reserve force and the

immediate payment of the bonus in the camp at the end of

the service. It was impossible for the emperor actually

to respond to any of the demands, except for the legacy

of Augustus. A raise of pay might have triggered off a

O financial crisis and the grant of early demobilization v?as incompatible with the security of the empire, since

early demobilization on a large scale would have left

gaps in the strategic placement of-the legions.

Tiberius' Control of the Mutinies

How was Tiberius, as the holder of the imperium

proconsulare over a provincia which included the two

provinces in which the mutinies broke out, to cope with

the crisis? The mutinies involved seven legions, i.e.,

one fourth of the entire armed forces, and Tiberius felt

the army to be a real and threatening power (multa et

diversa angebant ) that in the beginning of his reign

•^•Ann. 1 17. r-~ CO

^ Ann. 1 •

■^Ann. 1 47. 105 now put him to test.

Augustus himself as established princeps had never faced a crisis of such magnitude and therefore Tiberius did not have any direct pattern to follow, but Augustus' handling of certain problems of foreign policy of similar importance will have served him as a guideline. The career of Pompey had shown how the imperium proconsulare gradually became divorced from service in the province and had developed into a position in which the princeps could choose whether he wanted to stay in Rome and govern the provincia in absentia through legati or whether he actually wanted to do service in the province also.-**

During his years abroad Augustus had left things in Rome in the hands of such party loyalists as Maecenas and

Statilius Taurus. There were risks of security, however, as the incidents of Varro Murena and Egnatius Rufus showed. From 12 B.C. on, when he could entrust major duties to Drusus, Tiberius and a new generation of con- sulars he never again left Italy, not even during the crisis of Varus, but kept the empire in control from a central position through provincial governors and bureaucratic officials. In the same way Tiberius' absence from Rome could have been dangerous. When he came to

1Cf. p. 8 ff. 106 power his situation was one of internal insecurity; he was not popular with the plebs,'*' secret conspiracies seemed to 9 threaten^ and nobody could predict the outcome of the mutinies and their repercussions in Rome. It was impor­ tant to keep obvious and firm control of the central gov­ ernment, especially since he had nobody of the stature of Augustus' lieutenants around to whom he could delegate his authority. Security was Tiberius1 innermost reason for staying in Rome, as Tacitus sees it: fixum Tiberio fuit non omittere caput rerum negue se remque publicam in casum dare. His other anxieties were,however, no less justified: which of the two armies should he visit first without making the other one jealous, and what would happen if his authority was spurned? This is plausible argumentation, especially since Tiberius must have been aware of the lack of popularity with the army; therefore he tried to meet the crises through his delegates. But popular opinion felt differently about his decision and by voicing its discontent with his performance in the city'* pressured him to perform his duties i$ the provinces as the holder of the maiestas imperatoria and as

"'‘Ann. 1 5.

^Ann. 2.27.

3 Ann. 1 47.1.

4 Ann. 1 46. 107 severitatis et munificentiae summum. As to the first demand/ the display of the authority of the imperator, pop­ ular opinion is justified, since the imperial office carried a prestige to which nobody else in the state could attain. But as to the popular conception of Tiberius as the ultimate source of verdicts and concessions the demands were as far as their legal aspects were con­ cerned^- unjustified and were symptomatic of popular mis­ conceptions about the competence of the imperial office.

To the public the princeps appeared already as the all- powerful ruler, which he de facto was, but Tiberius stuck to the rules of the constitution de jure in order to give proof of his republican attitude to the senatorial aristocracy. Neverthelesshe constantly pretended to give in to popular pressure, made preparations for his departure, and always found an excuse not to leave. This performance has often been taken as indecision and in

Tacitus' account it gives him the air of hypocrisy. In fact, however, this was the only possible attitude, be­ cause Tiberius had to do everything in order to keep the support of the people, who from their limited view of the requirements of the empire could not perceive Tiberius' reasons. For Tiberius it was a requirement of diplomacy to satisfy public opinion by deceit, which, however, he

•*"Cf. p. 102. 108 could not quite conceal and so he left people with the impression of having been deceived.

Tiberius' decision to keep control of the central government and to pretend to be leaving shows that he met the crisis with coolness and decisiveness. It was wise for at least two reasons: he followed Augustus' later pattern by staying in Rome, in order to avoid distur­ bances there and the possible spurning of his authority abroad,and pretended to leave in order to keep public opinion on his side; his staying was perfectly legitimate within the framework of the constitution as long as he had subordinates who remained loyal to him.

The legati of the imperial provinces had received almost the full scope of the princdps' imperium exercised militiae, but since they were legally not independent their acts were valid only if the princeps did not object.

These powers included the right of capital punishment over the common soldier for desertion and mutiny. This authority normally belonged to the holder of imperium and with the delegation of duties on subordinates had been extended to the legatus pro praetore, so that in the two provinces under discussion Germanicus, Caecina,

Silius and Blaesus were qualified to mete out punishment.

Their power, however, did not include the right tc make concessions to the soldiers since the conditions of 109 service continued to be regulated, by the senate-*- and the consent of the .senate was necessary when the princeps wanted to propose a change. Since the army had pledged its loyalty to the princeps and the imperial family it was of utmost importance that the mutinies be handled by members of the imperial house who were loyal to Tiberius. In the case of Germanicus there was no problem of position; he was the heir-designate- and the soldiers would always recognize him as the most important member of the imperial house. Only his loyalty was questionable, so at least

Tiberius thought, but interference with Germanicus1 imperium would have been interpreted as a public accusa­ tion of incompetence. The problem arose with Blaesus in

Pannonia, since he was. a homo novus not particularly close to the dynasty. Would he have sufficient authority to keep the army loyal to Tiberius? Tiberius thought that not and that the situation required a bloodmember of the dynasty; that is why he sent Drusus in support of Blaesus.

In the same way and for the same purpose for which

Augustus had sent Lucius to the army in Spain and the

Gaius as intermediator in problems that had arisen in the east, the display of the prestige of the imperial house,

Tiberius sent Drusus and thus once again followed the

Augustan pattern not only in its idea and purpose, but in

1Cf. p. 102. 110 its practical execution as well. .Augustus had given adiutores to the young Gaius, Lollius and Quirinius, in order that he be supported by advisors, in the same way

Tiberius sent along with Drusus Seianus and the primores civitatis,^ among them a number of amici. The military protection was well chosen: 2 praetorian cohorts with an elite group of soldiers as reinforcement, part from the praetorian cavalry and-part from the German bodyguard, known for its valor and loyalty to the princeps. The choice clearly bespeaks circumspection on the part of

Tiberius, he made the right estimate of the gravity of the danger and responded without leaving any risks of security.

Drusus was at this time consul designatus for the year A.D. 15 and so approached the end of the civil cursus honorum. He had not yet had a provincial command and little military experience, so that the privilege of being dispatched to the army depended exclusively on his blood relation to Tiberius. His acts were legally justi­ fiable only when he acted according to Tiberius' patria potestas, because he was not a magistrate at the time with a sphere of competence of his own. Since Drusus had little military experience and was, as Tiberius knew, subject to ill temper, Tiberius' choice could have been a mistake had it not been that Drusus carried the prestige

■^Ann. 124. 111 of being his son. In order to balance off Drusus' inade­ quacies he wisely gave him Seianus, rector iuveni, who was to keep a watchful eye oh him. Seianus^-rose under the patronage of his father, a man of equestrian rank and municipal extraction who won prominence in the late years of Augustus as holder of two of the three great equestrian prefectures.3 Brothers, cousins and uncle were of consular rank and surrounded by this powerful group

Seianus' potentia stood close to the dynasty. In his early career he served on C. Caesar's mission to the east, probably also in an advisory capacity, and this may have been the occasion on which he ingratiated himself with Tiberius.^ At the latter's accession he had already risen to the greatest equestrian distinction, the pre­ fecture of the praetorian guard which he shared with his father. Tiberius' choice to send Seianus along was a lucky one. Drusus needed guidance, if matters were not to go over his head; Seianus had experience with princes, he had military experience and the authority over the

^His family affiliation goes back on his father's side to Terentius Varro and on the mother's side to the patrician Cornelii Maluginenses; cf. R. Syme, R.R., Table vi.

3The governorship of Egypt and the prefecture of the praetorian guard.

3Ann. 4, 1.

^Tiberius was in Rhodes, abandoned by all friends. 112 detachment of the praetorian guard, in case it should be necessary to strike; as Blaesus1 nephew he could play the mediator between Blaesus and Drusus in case of friction.

He was the key-figure of the mission and at the head of the cohors Drusi, composed of the primores civitatis, the amici Caesaris.

The circle of amici principis, which included members of senatorial and equestrian rank, developed out of the coteries of the party dynasts of the Republic and came to be an advisory body of the princeps. Their vital function was that of supporting the government with their advice, for which purpose they could be called in for day-to-day informal consultation. They were not a constitutional body with fixed membership, but an informal group that may have developed out of the clientela relationships based on customary law; and when serving under differ­ ent emperors they provided the essential continuity of the imperial policy."*- The cohors Drusi was a selection of

Tiberius' larger advisory body of men, who were the repository of essential experience. ^ Drusus1 comites were selected for the special purpose of accompanying him abroad, since they were useful on missions where the emperor did not want to display his imperium and necessary

■*"Cf. J. A. Crook, Consilium principis, (Cambridqe, 1955), pp. 4-56.

^Suet. Tib. 51. 113

since Tiberius sent Drusus with no definite orders, but

ex re consultaturus.

The most respectable person of the embassy is 2 Cornelius Lentulus, a representative of the oldest nobility, ante alios aetate et gloria belli. He had

served as legatus Augusti against the Dacians and cele­ brated a triumph over the Getans.^ He therefore must have known the situation in Pannonia well and Tiberius again

shows that he made a wise choice with him, since he was both a friend and an expert in the same way that Lollius and Quirinius had been both friends of Augustus and

•experts in the east. The choice of the embassy and its I military protection show how seriously Tiberius took the situation. He acted with utmost circumspection, he chose men of experience and prestige and the elite of his soldiers in order to meet the danger.

With respect to the group in Pannonia

Tiberius always had the legal possibility of interference if things went wrong, since all of the commanders had duties delegated by him. In Germany the situation was different. Germanicus held his imperium from the senate

^Ann. 1 24.

2Ann. 1 27.

3 Ann. 4 44. 114 and, as outlined above,^ Tiberius' hold over him in pri­ vate and public law was weak. Germanicus, if he wanted, could always bend to Tiberius' wishes, as Tiberius had done to Augustus' precepts. But he did not have to do so and the smoothness of the conduct of the political and administrative business between them depended on their personal relationship and whether Germanicus was willing to act in support of Tiberius' wishes or not. It re­ mains to see now how the holders of imperium and the legati handled the mutinies, how they stuck to their com­ petences and how they measured up to the trust of hand­ ling the crisis properly that Tiberius had put into their I hands.

Pannonia

The points of interest in the narrative of the mutiny, relevant to the process of government in a military situ­ ation are: Blaesus' address to the soldiers,2 the dispatch of the embassy to Rome, Drusus' performance, Tiberius' letter 4 and the execution of the ringleaders. 5 Blaesus'

1Cf. p. 25 f. 2 Ann. 1 18.

^Ann. 1 19.

^Ann. 1 25.

^Ann. 1 29. 115 call to order and moral appeal is effective at once and he

succeeds in channeling the demands of the soldiers through their proper channel, the central government in Rome, which shows his willingness to defer to Tiberius and the

senate and to stick to constitutional process. When the mutiny flares up again Drusus is on the spot with a

letter from Tiberius containing some vague instructions

to solve immediate problems at once but to submit the

demands to the senate, and when the mutiny finally cools down, he/like Blaesus, sends an embassy to Rome in order A. to channel the demands for change of conditions of ser­ vice through the appropriate system.

As to the punishment of the ringleaders the decision of whether to punish or not is reached only after an

informal consultation of the amici, which shows that the

individual general is by now, as compared with republican

times when the automatic penalty was decimatio meted out

to entire units, given a greater option in matters of

inflicting penalties. The penalty chosen is not

decimatio, which certainly was prejudicial to recruitment

since it included innocent people, but it only affects

the culprits, and this points to the growing sense of the

claims of humanity in the military system.

It is debatable whether Drusus, who is not a magistrate

at the time, is entitled to mete out the punishment, since 116 capital sentence was up to the legatus pro praetore. It

seems as if he, giving way to a natural•impulse, encroaches on Blaesus' competence on the strength of his higher prestige as Tiberius' son. But both Blaesus and Drusus, with regard to the other aspects of the process, handle

the situation with proper regard to their competences and

in submission to Tiberius' and the senate's authority.

Germany

The points of interest in the narrative are: 1 o Germanicus' appeals, his concessions to the demands^ and the execution of the culprits.3 After moral appeals prove to be ineffective Germanicus resorts to making concessions to the soldiers: discharge after 16 years of service and

4 years in the reserve force and the payment of the leg­ acy of Augustus. Both concessions are a mistake. It never occurs to him that he could have tried, like Drusus and Blaesus, to refer the demands to Tiberius and the senate, since such concessions were not a matter that a proconsul could decide singhlehandedly. Since the regu­ lation of service affects the army system in the whole empire, Germanicus' action is not only beyond the scope

^Ann. 1 34.

2Ann. 1 36.

3 Ann. 1 44. 117 of his imperium; in addition he commits the central government to Obligations which are inconsistent with the safety of the empire, since a lowering of the term of service would have to be conceded to all the legions.

The payment of the legacy of Augustus, even in doubled form, is equally not within the sphere of his com­ petence, since the executor of the imperial will was

Tiberius as Augustus' son and legal heir, and a distri­ bution by Germanicus meant that the soldiers could have considered him as the lawful heir.-*- Considering

Tiberius' sensitivity this point is hardly likely to have been lost on him, especially since Tiberius himself after his adoption by Augustus submitted so scrupulously to 2 • Augustus' patria potestas, that he did not even make any use of the rights of a head of family which he had lost with the adoption.

As the concession of lowering the term of service is a mistake in public law, so the distribution of the legacy is a mistake in private law, mistakes of which

Germanicus is perfectly aware, since he tries to cover them up by the forgery of the letter from Tiberius. This action is not only outright deceit but it also has .a certain irony, in the fact that, while Tiberius

-*-Cf. Furneaux I ad Ann. 1 35,2.

2Cf. Suet. Tib. 15,2. 118 scrupulously avoided interference in decision making if it was not directly his business, his son forces on him a decision of which he cannot approve. Tiberius gave in for the time being since a cancellation might have triggered a new mutiny, although the illegitimacy must have affected the constitutionally-minded princeps.

Another irregularity in Germanicus1 conduct occurs with the execution of the ringleaders which was the responsibility of himself, Silius and Caecina. Germanicus, however, in order to avoid the blame, turns it over to the legate of the 1st legion, who in turn has the culprits brought before his tribunal in the presence of the legions themselves, and if their guilt was attested by their com­ rades, they were led outside the camp to their execution.

Hence the actual judges were the legionary soldiers, not their commanders.

To leave the capital punishment up to the legatus legionis and to the soldiers themselves shows that

Germanicus handled the enforcement of discipline with irresponsible laxity which could easily develop into mob violence. The irregular procedure of punishment is re­ peated in the camp of Caecina. Germanicus turns over the responsibility to Caecina, as is legitimate, but Caecina hands it on to the standard-bearers who initiate an indiscriminate slaughter, brutal and unjustified, since 119 the majority of the soldiers had remained loyal. For this state of affairs Germanicus is indirectly responsible, instead of making the right use of his imperium he re­ sorts to a shedding of responsibilities that triggers off mob violence. In the case of the concessions he went beyond, in the case of the enforcement of discipline he fell below, the duties comprised in his imperium, and both attitudes must rightly have aroused Tiberius’ mis­ trust ,

After the mutinies were successfully quelled the only routine duty left for Tiberius was the final report to the senate. As the republican provincial governor always had to give an account at the end of the year to the senate as the repository of his imperium and the ultimate guarantor of the provincial administration, in the same was it was mandatory for Tiberius as the holder of an imperium proconsulare entrusted to him by the senate to continue the republican practices. He shared the incom­ ing reports from his delegates with the senate.

With respect to Drusus he openly praises him;^ with respect to Germanicus he diplomatically covers up his mistakes in the senate and does not pass the slightest censure upon him. He even extends the concessions to

^Ann. 1 52. 120

Pannonia, with the consent of the- senate, since Germanicus had committed him to them. Since they were inconsistent with the security of the empire, however, he later cancels them at the appropriate m o m e n t . ^ Tiberius reveals himself in this situation as a diplomat whose concern for the security of the empire and his own position overrides his

strong concern for the constitution.

Summary

Tiberius' attitude towards the crisis shows that he acted with circumspection. According to the pattern of

Augustus he stayed in Rome, but he made sure that in both

Pannonia and Germany, like Augustus in important cases of provincial administration, members of the imperial house made use of their prestige in order to bind the loyalty of the troops to himself. For the rest of the conduct of business he gave his legati wid.e-ranging power, so that he did not have to interfere unless it should be neces­ sary. The pattern of the conduct of business thus shows the flexibility of the provincial administration and the relative independence of the provincial governors in the beginning of the principate (Drusus is even sent ex re consultaturus) as opposed to a century later when the

Ann. 1 52.

^Ann. 1 78. 121 imperial administration through its own weight had become so entrenched in the provinces that Pliny as governor of

Bithynia would not even dig a ditch without asking

Trajan.^ The handling of the mutinies shows that

Tiberius could rely on his delegates Drusus and Blaesus because they deferred to the central government in matters of condition of service, they fulfilled the duties com­ prised in their competence which is directly derived from Tiberius, whereas Germanicus concerning this point bends his authority in respect to the senate as well as in respect to his father, i.e., in public as well as in private law.

In matters of the punishment of the ringleaders both mutinies show, as compared to republican procedures, that a greater latitude was given to the individual general.

This also had its bad effects, since officers who were not competent took over the executions in both provinces and in Germany the "senatorial proconsul" fell short of the responsibilities of his imperium. Thus the flexibility of the provincial administration also involved greater hazards when Tiberius did not control the process directly, but all mistakes in these instances fortunately remained inconsequential since the mutinies were promptly quelled.

•^•Pliny Epp. X passim. 122

As for Tiberius' role is concerned he sticks, great as the crisis was, and despite his overlooking of irregu­ larities in each province, to the rules of the constitu­ tion and to proper procedure, keeping the central posi-

ir, tion Rome and reporting to the senate like a republican proconsul. From now on he will handle every crisis in the provinces in the same way. The handling of the in­ surrection of Sacrovir in A.D. 21^ and of the Frisians in

A.D. 28^ show the same pattern: here as there he resisted public pressure to go to the provinces as long as he had reliable legates operating for him and in both instances he refrained from interfering with their command, thus maintaining the flexibility of administration on the edges of the empire. In both cases he also made final reports to the senate, even as late as A.D. 28 with the revolt of the Frisians, which shows that in matters con­ cerning the administration of the empire Tiberius wanted the senate to be informed. He retained the pattern of the proper process developed in the republic and by Augustus, even when already removed from the events and withdrawn to

Capreae and at a time when the relations between him and the senate were almost completely broken.

■'•An n . 3.40-47 .

2 Ann. 4.72-7 3. 123

Part II

1 The Campaigns in Germany in A.D. 15 and 16

In order to understand the process of government dur­

ing Germanicus' campaigns in Germany in A.D. 15 and 16, in

terms other than those of Tacitus, namely, as being

controlled by the psychological warfare between a jealous

old ruler and a hopeful but luckless young prince, it is

necessary to try to define Tiberius' and Germanicus'

respective objectives in the war and to see how far they were coterminous. As far as Tiberius' objectives are

concerned, one may safely assume that he followed

Augustus' policy.

Ever since Quintilius Varus was defeated by Arminius

in A.D. 9 the revenge for the clades Varianae was, just

like the revenge for Crassus1 defeat in Parthia, a re­

quirement of primordial importance for external policy.

Augustus had appointed Tiberius and Germanicus for the

task, but just how much.of an achievement Augustus consid­

ered to be a successful revenge is uncertain, since there

is no direct public statement on his policy in Germany

after A.D. 9. The reason is obvious, I believe, namely

that he had to keep the idea of reconquest alive in public

opinion, however little that may have suited his own

1Ann. 1 55-72; 2.5-26. 124 objectives of revenge. The history of the idea of revenge for Carrhae shows that revenge can start from the idea of reconquest as the maximal objective, but finally boil down to the simple recovery of the standards, interpreted as a military victory. What within this range the Augustan-

Tiberian concept was, is uncertain, but I think that there is conclusive evidence for the fact that to begin with the idea of reconquest can'be eliminated.^-

Tacitus defines the objective as: abolendae magis infamiae ob amissum cum Quintilio Varo exercitum quam cupidme proferendi imperii, a statement which excludes the idea of reconquest, but does not quite do so if not

1-The discussion whether Augustus thought of reconquest of Germany has been ranging .from complete denial to accept­ ance with a variety of arguments for both theses. The strongest propagators of denial are Mommsen, Roem. Gesch. v 50; Marsh, The reign of Tiberius, (Oxford, 1939)1 pi 7T ff. Recently C. M. Wells, The German ~ Policy of Augustus (Oxford, 1972), p. 236 ff., has reexamined the question and concludes on the basis of archaeological evidence that tribes from the east were pressing on central and northern Germany and to keep them in check would have been beyond Rome's means. The modern propagators of the idea of recon­ quest are: E. Koestermann, Kommentar, Bd. I ad_ I 3,6 , on the basis that Augustus had sent Germanicus to Germany— reliqua belli patraturum (Veil Pat. 2.123.1): D. Timpe, Per Triumpf des Germanicus (Bonn, 1968), and based on his results R. Seager, Tiberius (London, 1972) . Timpe, p. 33 ff., bases his argument on literary evidence, Tac. Ann. 1 11,5 and R.G. 26.1, which he finds inconclusive, at least to the point of excluding the idea of the Rhine as - a frontier, and on the evidence for the type of warfare con­ ducted from A.D. 9-12, Dio 56.24.6; Suet. Tib. 18; Veil Pat. 2, 120 which he calls (p. 36): Stil e m e r radikalisier- ten Kolonialkriegfuehrung, die den Feind systematisch zu ruinieren sucht. 1 argue the interpretation of both types of evidence. ^Ann. 1,3,6. 125 supported by further evidence, since it may be a statement ex eventu.

As stated before, Augustus had given to Tiberius the advice consilium intra terminos coercendi imperii,^ and what he considered as termini in Germany is stated in the

Res Gestae: Gallias et Hispanias provincias item Germaniam, qua includit Oceanus a Gadibus ad ostium Albis fluminis pacavi.2 He states exactly what he has conquered, namely

Gaul up to the Rhine front, and of Germany only the coast­ line, ^ so that I believe that, considering the two state­ ments together, Augustus did not think of the Elbe as a frontier any more after A.D. 9.

This assumption is reinforced by looking at the type of warfare conducted between A.D. 9-12. Tiberius, who assumed command in A.D. 9, hardly ever moved beyond the

Rhine or, if he crossed the river, he did not go very far and fought no battles, but was mainly occupied with re­ storing the discipline in the army.^ The years of A.D.

12-13, when Germanicus was in command, are fully

W . 1 11, 5.

2R.G. 26.1. £ * I.e., the Batavi, the Frisii who revolted only in A.D. 28, and the Chauci who supported Germanicus, Ann. 1 60.

4Dio 56.24.6; Suet. Tib.18. 126 characterized by inaction. Nothing really looks like an attempt at reconquest, but it may be that both Tiberius and Germanicus were occasionally displaying their force and waiting for a favorable moment for the revenge, which presented itself in A.D. 15. Tiberius, however, consid­ ered the revenge as fulfilled by the recovery of the standards,'*' since, he had, in accordance with Augustus, given up on the idea of reconquest.

Quite different was Germanicus1 idea. The type of warfare of the campaigns of A.D. 15 and 16 shows that he aimed at reconquest. Motivated to equal and even increase the glory of his ancestors, he felt the moral obligation to live up to the glory of his father Drusus and

Tiberius and started h-is operations by large scale prep­ aration, the census in Gaul. The tactic of far-flung war­ fare shows that his aim was to subdue and cut off indi­ vidually the four major tribes from the Cherusci, whom he planned to subdue last, and advance to the Elbe frontier.

The inscription of the trophy established after his victory over Arminius3 clearly states this aim as does his request to Tiberius to grant him one more year for the

^•Cf. p. 128 ff.

2AnnJL.43; 2,7,2.

3Ann. 2 ( 22 . 127 conquest of Germany.

If Tiberius and Germanicus1 aims iri Germany were not coterminous, one has to ask at what point Tiberius wanted to stop the war, i.e., when did he consider the revenge for the Varian disaster to be fulfilled and for what rea­ son. D. Timpe, I think rightly, determines this moment at the end of the summer campaign of A.D. 15, by arguing from the standpoint of internal as well as of military policy.

By establishing the chronology of the different honors bestowed on Germanicus by Tiberius in a climactic arrange­ ment, he comes to the conclusion,,by a process of elimina­ tion, that the triumphal decree of the year A.D. 153 must I have been passed at the end of the summer campaign of that year together with the bestowal of the triumphal ornaments on Silius, Caecina and Apronius.4 At the same time, Timpe argues, the decree for the arch of Tiberius on the Forum, which was dedicated in A.D. 16,5 must have been passed, so that all three things together, triumphal decree, ornaments and the decree for the arch indicate since there

■'"Ann. 2 26. o Timpe, Triumph, p. 4 6 ff. 3Ann. 1 55.

4 Ann .1.72.

5Ann. 2 41; Timpe, Triumph, p. 50: it must have taken about a year to build the arch. 128 were no higher honors that Tiberius wanted the war to be at an end. The fact that no further honors were decreed in A.D. 16 and that Tiberius never accepted his acclama­ tion as imperator in that year'1' point in the same direction.

The question is what were Tiberius' reasons at this point? In A.D. 15 his position was still insecure. He needed success. In the summer campaign of the year

Stertinius, a cavalry man in Germanicus1 legion, had recovered one of the standards lost with Varus.^ As a parallel to the recovery of the Parthian standards by

Augustus in 20 B.C., Tiberius decided to take this as the symbol of successful revenge. *The architectural parallel of the arch of Tiberius with its inscription ob signa recepta cum Varo amissa ductu Germanici, auspiciis

Trberi, with the arch of Augustus, built for a success conducted by Tiberius under the auspices of Augustus, was meant to symbolize for the public on the one hand the same spirit of loyal cooperation between Germanicus and

Tiberius as the one that had existed between Tiberius and

Augustus, and on the other hand to be a symbol of the same

^Ann 2.18,2; c f . KoeStermann, ad loc.

2Ann 1,60.

^Ann 1. 53. type of external policy and success. The effect of this symbolic parallelism is heightened by the juxtaposition of the arches at opposite ends of the street in front of the Basilica Julia and the Aedes Castrorum and by the fact that it was through the arch of Tiberius that the triumphal procession left the Forum to begin its climb up the sacra via to the Capitol.

It was certainly not alone by the aspect of internal policy that Tiberius was motivated to declare the war at an end. The war was planned probably in the winter of

A.D. 14/15^ under favorable circumstances for R o m e , 2 when the power struggle between the Cheruscans, Arminius and his pro-Roman father-in-law Segestes, in which Arminius probably had attempted to get rid of Segestes and to con­ solidate his own power, had ended in a momentary success O for Segestes, with whose support Germanicus thought it would be easy to defeat Arminius. But unfortunately the power structure in Germany changed in the spring of

A.D. 15, and Arminius, who had got the upper hand, rallied more tribes to his cause than Germanicus had anticipated.^

This made the campaign extremely unfavorable for him: he

1Ann. 1.53.

^Cf. Timpe, p. 65 ff., R. Seager, p. 74. 130

barely escaped aequis manibus,-*- and he had considerable

losses of man power and material, while Caecina's retreat o almost put the Varian disaster to shame. A renewed

attack in A.D. 16 must have appeared extremely risky, if

not impossible to Tiberius, so that also from the mili­

tary standpoint, since the initially favorable circum­

stances had changed and a conquest involved considerable

losses, he had to declare the war at an end after the

summer campaign of A.D. 15.

This state of affairs illuminates now, I think, better than Tacitus' presentation of the psychological

O warfare between princeps and general alone, the fact that the antagonism between Tiberius and Germanicus had not only a psychological aspect but also a political and military factor.

For a whole complex of reasons, thus factual as well as psychological, Tiberius wanted the war to be at an end.

But Germanicus did not bend to his father's authority, because in almost studied disobedience he wanted his own conquest of Germany and so conducted the campaign of

A.D. 16 without Tiberius' support.

^Ann. 1 63.

^AnnJ. .65-68.

^Cf. Chapter III, Part II, p. — 131

Tiberius was helpless and frustrated, since an

attempt to recall might have led to an open refusal.

Besides being constitutionally impossible, since German­

icus 1 imperium was derived from the senate, and his patria potestas did not apply v/hen the son was a magis­ trate, recall would have meant a public accusation of

incompetence which would have worsened his relation with

Germanicus. His only choice was to make his intention absolutely clear and to 'recall* him as subtly and as generously as possible, by showering him with honors and by using persuasion when honors did not avail anything.

The Conduct of the Campaigns

The war is conducted ductu Germanici, auspiciis • 1 * Tiberii, i.e., Germanicus as the holder of the proconsu­ lar imperium is responsible for the military operations for which Tiberius in Rome has the auspices. What, power of making decisions is comprised in the imperium and how is

it borne out in the narrative?

The imperium of the provincial governor in a military

situation included in addition to major rights the right to wage but not to declare war, to make treaties at his own risk, to delegate duties, to be saluted as imperator and to claim a t r i u m p h . ^ Since the war in Germany had been going

^Ann. 2,41,1.

^Cf. M. Hammond, p. 12 ff. 132 on since A.D. 9, it was Germanicus' decision to wait for a favorable moment to strike. He saw a chance of defeating

Arminius with support from Segestes at the moment v/hen he planned his attack, in aestatem summa ope,^ but a sudden shift of power in favor of Arminius must have prompted his decision to start already in the spring. Tiberius does not interfere with the decision either pro or contra, because he also certainly estimated the situation as favorable.

A different matter, however, is the decision for the summer campaign of A.D. 16. As stated above, Tiberius wanted the war to be at an end, but Germanicus, motivated by his idea of reconquest, renewed the attack on his own.

Tacitus sheds some light on-the antagonism between

■Germanicus and Tiberius, quanto acriora in eum studia militum et aversa patrui voluntas celerandae victoriae intentior,^ but he locates the antagonism exclusively in the realm of psychological warfare without uncovering the real reason: the difference of the two objectives. The decision here is again Germanicus1 own, although this time it no longer has Tiberius' support, Tiberius on his part respects Germanicus1 sphere of competence.

1Ann. 1.55.

2 Ann. 1.5. 133

The third initiative to wage war on Germanicus1 part comes after A.D. 16, when he asks Tiberius to give him one more year to reconquer Germany.^ This time, however,

Tiberius imposes his view on Germanicus not by commands but with persuasion.

All three instances show that Tiberius at decisive stages of the war, which was conducted under his auspices, always respected the magistrate.1 s sphere of competence, even if he did not agree with his policy.

As the decision to attack so the planning of the warfare is entirely in Germanicus' hand. The census in

Gaul serves the large scale preparations, and fortifica- I tions beyond the Rhine and concern for the protection of the march are part of guaranteeing the safety of the operations in A.D. 15. The most careful preparations are made before the campaign of A.D. 16.^ Tacitus provides an insight into Germanicus' considerations based on the experiences of the previous year. They are the more intensive, because he now had to win the war at any price, since his operations were no longer assured of Tiberius' support.

Germanicus' position of supreme command shows in the decision to attack, in the planning and in the general

J-Ann .2.2 6.

^Ann. 2,5. 134 conduct of the battles,-*- but he also delegates duties and here it is important to see to whom, i.e., what his criteria in choosing delegates were. Normally the lower rank officers from primus pilus down, were excluded from taking over special tasks. The two legates that first were entitled to take over major duties were the legati pro praetore Caecina and Silius. Of these Caecina, with his forty years of military service, is charged with major responsibilities in the campaign of A.D. 15, especially to bear the brunt of the attacks.2 Germanicus first of all relied on the commander with the greatest experience.

In the campaign of the next year it is Silius, a legatus I pro praetore whose career as a major commander was still to come, who is more prominent certainly because Caecina 3 has suffered heavy losses on his retreat.

•^The fact that Germanicus' imperium did not only include military but also diplomatic duties in foreign relations is shown by the fact that Segestes, the prince of the Cheruscans asking for help against Arminius, addresses himself to Germanicus (Ann. 1 57). Germanicus gives him a domicile on the left bank of the Rhine and takes Thusnelda into royal custody in Ravenna (Ann. 1 58), Normally foreign relations of this type were up to the arbitration of Tiberius and the senate (cf. Maroboduus, Ann. 2 63, Tacfarinas, Ann 3 73), but the imperium and the special position as successor must have entitled Germanicus to settle diplomatic affairs, especially in an emergency case as this one of Segestes.

2Ann 1,56; 1 60; 1,65-68.

2Ann. 2,7; 2,25. 135

Next in order of seniority are the legati legionis^ of whom L. Apronius,'*' P. Vitellius^ and Seius Tubero,^

a friend of Germanicus and suffect consul with him in

A.D. 18, are singled out for special assignments, all of

less importance than those of the legati pro praetore.

Of these L. Apronius is probably the one with the great­

est military experience, considering his participation

in the Illyrian revolt.

From the lower ranks it is L. Stertinius, a prefect of a cavalry unit, who performs major tasks, comparable to those of Silius and Caecina.4 His extraction is uncertain. It may be that he is of equestrian rank and serves as praefectus alae, one of the posts in the sequence of military service after-the military tribunate^ and which prepares for the equestrian career, or it may be that he is promoted from the ranks of the common soldier and has received an equestrian post for his services; as such he would be one of those prefects whose long experi­ ence as a soldier was a valuable asset in the leadership of the army.

^Ann. 1.56.

^Ann. 1.70.

^Ann. 2 ,2 0 .

4Ann. 1.60; 1,71; 2.8; 2,22.

^Cf. Parker, p. 189. 136

Germanicus' choice when delegating duties clearly shows that he observed the rules of the chain of command and chose delegates from the performance of major duties from the ranks of the higher officers, with the possible exception of Stertinius, and that he placed emphasis on experience.

Tiberius' Competence of Control of the V7ar

The auspices of Tiberius.^ Although Tiberius had no right to interfere with Germanicus' conduct of the war and his imperium, nevertheless the war was conducted under his auspices,^ i.e., the imperial auspices overrode Germani­ cus 1 independent imperium. The auspices belonged to divination, one of the most characteristic features of ancient religion, and were meant to reveal whether an action was in accordance with the will of the gods. The right to take auspices grew out of imperium, and it was the privilege of the magistrates with imperium in republi­ can times: consul, proconsul and praetor held auspices before entering office, holding assemblies and before

■^Cf. M. Grant, Aspects of the principate of Tiberius, (New York 1950) , p. 6"O'. FT! Hammond, The Augustan principate (Cambridge, 1939), passim.

2Ann. 2,41. 137 setting out for war.-*- Auspices and imperium were coterminous and those who held them could under proper circumstances claim a triumph and the title of imperator. •

Under Augustus taking the auspices evolved into a formal imperial privilege, not only over the imperial but p occasionally also over the senatorial provinces.

The evolution of the monopolization by the imperial family of the auspices' is due, I believe, to two strands of development operating together: (1 ) the process of subordinating the army, general warfare and its rewards to the control of the emperor, a process that was especially promoted by A g r i p p a , ^ and (2) the development of the religious authority of the emperor, which started when

Octavian by taking on -the name of Augustus linked him­ self with the auspicial authority of Romulus, who had founded Rome after an augustum augurium, and was increased when Augustus became pontifex maximus? this probably facilitated the enhancement of the imperial auspices and, though the imperium of the emperor was still the precondi­ tion for taking the auspices, the scope of their

-*"Also the Censors were entitled to hold auspices. O AIn Africa A.D. 6 : auspicns Imp. Caesar is Aug. pont. max. patris patriae, ductu Cossi Lentuli, PIR^,II,p.333, ho. IJZTT. ------3Cf. p. 139 ff. 138 application could go beyond the range of the emperor1s presence and directive.

It is natural that Tiberius' auspices, even if they are not coterminous with the direction of the war, should cover the war in Germany, since it is within the sphere of his provincia. But it is questionable if Germanicus as the holder of the imperium proconsulare did not have auspices of his own. M. Grant1 assumes that the vice- gerents, Germanicus and Drusus, 2 possessed a sort of auspicia minora. It may be that Germanicus had such auspicia for the campaign of A.D., 15, since he received the title of imperator and a triumph, but there is no direct evidence for it. That he entirely lacked auspicatio, however, is not true either, since he held ad hoc auspices in the field3 before the campaign of

A.D. 16.^ The question is whether these auspices are auspicia minora or whether they are the only ones held for this campaign, considering the fact that Tiberius after the triumphal decree in A.D. 15, which used the language ductu Germanici auspiciis Tiberii, disassociated himself from the war. It is possible that the campaign of A.D. 16

1M. Grant, op. cit♦, p. 60. n Drusus, cf. Ann. 2.19, repetendis auspiciis.

3 Ann ♦ 1.14.

^As an augur he was entitled to do it. 139 was no longer covered by his auspicial authority, but that

Germanicus was fighting suis auspiciis.' He may have tried to maintain Tiberius' coverage of the war by having his soldiers proclaim the princeps imperator,1 a title that

Tiberius, however, never accepted, and erect a trophy in his name.^

The distribution of military honors. Connected with

Tiberius1 position as the holder of auspices was the right to receive the triumph and the title of imperator, a privilege to which any holder of imperium and auspices was entitled, but which by this time, except for the pronconsul of Africa, Q. Junius Blaesus,^ had been modi- I fied into an imperial privilege, occasionally extended to members of the imperial family with imperium. The his­ tory of the fate of these military honors since the triumviral period clearly shows the shift of triumphal honors to the imperial house, a shift of which Agrippa was the main promoter,4 when he undertook to refuse a triumph

-*-Ann. 2 18.

2Ann. 2 2 2 .

3Ann. 3 74.

4Cf. M. Hammond, op. cit., p. 48 ff. A list of the triumphal honors shows the pattern of the gradual exclu­ sive assumption of the honors by the imperial house. 38 B.C. Agrippa refuses a triumph (Dio 48.49.4) After 30 B.C. Nonius Gellius still is acclaimed imperator (ILS 895; Dio 51.20.5) 27 B.C. M. Licinius Crassus is deprived of the title 140

in 38 B.C. to the advantage of Octavian, under whose com­ mand he had fought. This shift was completed when

Agrippa refused a triumph for a second time in 14 B.C.

From that time on triumphs were only allowed for the

imperial family; for non-imperial generals they were re­ placed by triumphal insignia/ a fact that shows that mili­

tary glory was jealously absorbed as a personal preroga­

tive by the princeps.

For the campaign of A.D. 15 three different types of honors are distributed. A triumph^and the title of

imperator3 to Germanicus, and triumphal insignia to

Silius, Caecina and L. Apronius.3 All of these honors were'decreed by the senate, and probably all at Tiberius1 proposal. The triumph is, according to Timpe's chronology,

of imperator and the spolia opima (Dio 51.25.2) 11 B.C. L. Cornelius Balbus receives the last non­ imperial triumph (CIL I p. 461) After 16 B.C. Tiberius and Drusus are acclaimed imperator (CIL IX 244 3; Ann. 1.3) 14 B.C. Agrippa refuses a triumph a second time (Dio 54.24.8) 2 or 3 B.C. Sulpicius Quirinius receives the triumphal ornaments (ILS 918) 7 B.C. Tiberius receives a triumph A.D. 12 Tiberius receives the second triumph Germanicus receives the triumphal ornaments A.D. 21 Q. Junius Blaesus is the last non­ imperial imperator (Ann. 3.74)

3-Ann. 1.55.

3Ann. 1.58.

3Ann. 1.72. 141 decreed together with the honors for the legates, because the honors for .Germanicus formed a climactic arrangement, the order of which was not reversible. Germanicus first became imperator and then triumphator. If one looks at the achievements for which these honors are given, one notices that they are hardly deserved. The title of imperator is given for the spring campaign in A.D. 15 against the Chatti, who rose again in the next year; of the triumphal insignia only Caecina deserved them for his courage displayed on the retreat, but L. Apronius v/as only in charge of building bridges, and Silius does not surface at all in A.D. 15. The most obvious dispropor­ tion, however, between achievement and honor is the tri­ umph, which is decreed for the hardly decisive confronta­ tion with Arminius.

The only explanation for these honors is that they are not meant to be honors for military achievements but have a purely political background, the reasons for which have been stated before. Tiberius had no other way of stopping the war than by showering Germanicus with honors, which were meant to bribe him to come back. But Germanicus did not listen, and started the next campaign on his own.

For the year A.D. 16 no further honors on the part of

Tiberius are recorded, the triumph had been the non-plus

^Ann. 1.63. 142 ultra. But in this campaign it is Tiberius who receives two honors. He is acclaimed imperator^ on the battlefield of Idistaviso. His failure to accept the acclamation is,

I think, evidence for the fact that he did not support the war any longer, for had he accepted, it would have appeared f o that he had not withdrawn his disapproval. Further O a trophy is dedicted m his name. Germanicus acts here in accordance with the' practice in existence since

Augustus, namely to confer the title of imperator on the commander-in-chief of the army. As it appears to me, however, these two honors given to Tiberius could also be interpreted, considering that Tiberius did not support the campaign, as an attempt on Germanicus* part to make him accept it. We thereby the ironic reversal of situa­ tion, that Tiberius in the campaign of A.D. 15 tries to bribe Germanicus to stop the war, and Germanicus in the campaign of A.D. 16 tries to bribe Tiberius to accept the war, both by showering honors on each other.

Types of informal interference.4 since Tiberius had no formal authority to interfere in Germany he employs several types of informal interference in the form of

^Ann. 2.18. 2 Cf. Koestermann, ad^. 2 18.

3Ann. 2 .2 2 .

^Ann. 1.61; 1.69; 2.5; 2.26. 143 criticism and persuasion.

When Germanicus fulfills his duties as a general by performing belated funeral rites for Varus' soldiers,

Tiberius criticizes himTacitus gives several reasons.

Either Tiberius criticized everything that Germanicus did or he was afraid that the spectacle would alarm and de- o press the army. This supposition is not unreasonable, because the sight of the battlefield could either move the soldiers to greater anger against the Germans, or it could also have the opposite effect, as Tiberius as an experienced general knows. When Caecina on the retreat was heavily attacked the memory of the Varian disaster certainly contributed to the outbreak of the panic.

Tiberius' third a-rgument, that Germanicus as an augur should not have allowed himself to come into contact with the remains of the dead, shows Tiberius as the ritualist and pontifex maximus. Members of priesthoods were not 3 permitted to touch corpses, and Tiberius himself took such precepts very seriously, as is shown in his seeking 4 absolution after touching the corpse of Augustus. His

•I Ann. 1.61.

3Pace R. Seager, p. 78.

3Gell. 10,15, 25.

^Dio, 56, 31,3. 144 criticism here is based on his respect for the state religion.

Next Tiberius launched an informal criticism against

Agrippina,^ who received the returning soldiers at the bridgehead on the Rhine. she performed a real service in a moment of crisis, but Tiberius saw in it only a proof of courting the favor of the legions for sinister purposes and an offense against his imperial dignity.

In the matter of ending the war, since the honors missed their purpose, Tiberius tried by persuasion.

Since he was no doubt growing increasingly worried and impatient, his informal warnings, crebrae epistulae, 2 must have begun early in A.D. 16. The disturbances in

Armenia in that year made him think of proposing

Germanicus for the command in the east,^ for this appoint­ ment would cover two purposes: to separate Germanicus from the legions that were his basis of power, and to flatter him by appointing him to a command that seemed more important on the surface. But this command was not a matter of immediate assignment. In the meantime Tiberius has to try otherwise, but to be tactful about not accusing

Germanicus of incompetence, for although Germanicus had won

1Ann. x 69.

^ Arm. 2 26.

3 Ann. 2 5. 145 a battle, Tiberius knew that victorious expeditions with­ out consolidation of the conquered territory were futile.

He bent over backwards and tried a whole series of pos­ sible persuasions: by recalling him to the triumph, he appeals to his sense of duty; by giving him credit for his victories but by underlining that the campaigns had also brought heavy losses, he appeals to his ambition but also to his sense of responsibility; by pointing to his own experience in dealing with the Sugambri and Maroboduus and by advising him to use consilium instead of vis and to leave the Germans to their internal discord, he appeals to reason. But when all of this fails, he resorts again to bribery by offering him the second consulship, and by asking him to leave an opportunity of military glory to

Drusus, he plays on his affection for his step-brother.

Since Germanicus wanted to avoid an open breach, he re­ sisted no longer, but he interpreted his recall as jeal­ ousy and a desire to deprive him of his honor, whereas in fact Tiberius' judgment to call off the war rests on a solid basis of fact. The conquest of Germany would have required more than intermittent victories in battle that brought heavy losses of men and money, and would have required a thorough conquest followed by a provincial or­ ganization, a task the difficulty of which is best exemplified by the many years spent in organizing Gaul. 146

To do this again was at this moment beyond Rome's means.

Suetonius claims^ that Tiberius dismissed Germanicus' deeds as futile and his victories as ruinous to the state; this only a more blunt statement of Tiberius' opinion as given by Tacitus. But Tiberius' advice to use diplomacy by giving the Germans rope to hang themselves, i.e., to use consilium instead of vis, a basic tenet of his foreign policy which emphasizes peace, appeared to him as the safest way.^

It is difficult to assess afterwards whether Tiber­ ius' or Germanicus' German policy was right. On the war- front it looked as if one more year would suffice for the conquest, on the homefront it did not. One more campaign in fact may have proved who was right and moder specula­ tions favor either side.3 I tend to believe that

Tiberius was right for the warfare had so far only con­ sisted in winning battles, involved heavy losses and finally had not led to any conquest as the rising of the tribes showed.

•^•Suet., Tib. 52.2.

2Ann. 2.63.3; 2.64.1; 6.31.

. ^Cf. E. Koestermann, Die Feldzuge des Germanicus, von. 14-16 n. Chr., Historia, 6 CL956), p , 429 ff. 147

Summary

The analysis of the wars in Germany based on perti­ nent portions of Tacitus' account and on outside evidence, both literary and architectural, again shows, I think,

Tiberius as the continuator of the Augustan policy in idea as well as in its practical execution. Both of them thought of the revenge of the Varian disaster in terms of less than complete conquest of Germany to the Elbe, probably only at the level of the revenge for Carrhae, the recovery of the standards, because a conquest would be hazardous and require provincial organization. When one standard was recovered Tiberius took this as the symbol of a successful revenge, expressed in the archi­ tectural parallel of the arch of Ti'berius with the arch of

Augustus, erected after the revenge for Carrhae. It was meant to stress to public opinion the continuity of the same type of external policy and success, and in its inscription: ductu Germanici, auspiciis Tiberii to symbolize the same spirit of loyal cooperation between

Tiberius and Germanicus that had existed between Augustus and Tiberius.

The continuity shows further in leaving Germanicus in charge of the revenge, although he had roused Tiberius' suspicion about his intentions already during the mutiny.

But this was the way Augustus had handled major problems 148 of foreign policy, by entrusting them only to the heirs of the empire. The problem arose out of the fact that

Tiberius' and Germanicus' ideas about the aims of the war differed and that Tiberius had no legal means to interfere with Germanicus' imperium: he had to let him act within the sphere of his competence if he wanted to maintain before public opinion that he trusted Germanicus and that his intentions to preserve the constitution of

Augustus and the mos maiorum was honest. As little as

Augustus interfered with any of the heirs' imperium, at least as far as is known, so little did Tiberius, but he tried to stop the war by those legal means at his dis­ posal, namely, the bestowal of triumphal honors through the senate. The bestowal of military honors since the triumviral period has shown the shift of triumphal honors to the imperial house, whereas for non-imperial generals they were replaced by triumphal insignia. As Augustus had bestowed a triumph on Tiberius in 7 B.C. and A.D. 12 for his achievements in Illyricum, so Tiberius continued the same practice by bestowing the triumph on Germanicus, not, however, for an achievement but because he wanted to indicate to him that he wanted the war to be at an end.

On the legati he bestowed triumphal insignia, which was in keeping with Augustan practice since 2 or 3 B.C. at the latest. Germanicus also in turn operated within the 149 sphere of the competence of his imperium, which he exer­ cized for different ends than those envisaged by Tiberius.

Perfectly legitimately he delegated certain portions of his own assigned special duties to qualified people of the upper ranks and followed the practice in existence since Augustus, namely, to confer the title of imperator on the commander-in-chief of the army, Tiberius. When he finally gave in to Tiberius it was for personal reasons: he bent to his persuasion in order to avoid tension.

Both of them mainly adhered to recognized constitu­ tional process, but their ideas about the German question differed. For Tiberius his inability to control

Germanicus by legal means on the one hand, and his un­ willingness to interfere dictatorially on the other, put his desire to preserve the constitution of Augustus to the hardest test. 150 Part III

The East

Augustus had given to Tiberius the piece of advice coercendi intra terminos imperii,^ because he felt that the Roman empire had reached its natural boundaries.

Tiberius, following this advice, contented himself with consolidating Rome's hold on her possessions and facili­ tating their gradual Romanization. For both these objects the maintenance of peace was essential and that is why he preferred in any given situation of external policy to employ diplomacy rather than the use of force. Only in situations where no peaceful solution was possible, did he engage in warefare, but here also, as his attitude towards the wars in Germany shows, his policy was guided by the principle to use armed forces as little as pos­ sible. Consilium, sapientia and astus,2 if necessary, together with a moderate display of force are the basic tenets of his foreign policy, which guaranteed peace, and he employed them when dealing with the problems of foreign policy arising in the East, where he especially followed the Augustan pattern of diplomacy.

■^Ann. 1. 11,4.

2Ann., 2. 26; 2. 63; 2, 64; 6. 32.

2Ann. 2.53-61; 2.69-81. 151

In the east a number of problems were arising in the

areas of Cappadocia, Commagene, part of Cilicia, the Mons

Amanus, Syria, Judaea and Armenia.1 Asia Minor had ever

since the regional settlement of Pompey in 63 B.C. been

divided into a continuous mass of Roman provincial ter­

ritory with a number of client-kingdoms around the edges.

Later, as a consequence of Antony's distribution of

provincial territory, only the provinces of Asia and of

Bithynia and a small part of Cilicia were directly sub­

ject to Roman rule. The rest was governed by princes of

Asianic birth2 acting as instruments of Roman rule. It

is probable that this arrangement temporarily made for

increased efficiency in the government of these regions, but the extensive use of this form of administration

retarded Romanization and its economic development.

This condition had to be changed if Asia ever was

to become an integral part of the Roman empire.

Augustus on coming to power initiated no steps which would have been subversive of the existing position of client rulers. Nevertheless since the kingdom of Parthia

stretched beyond the frontiers of their territories, it was necessary to avoid indefinite reliance on the fidelity

^Ann. 2.1-5; 2. 42.

2Amyntas of Galatia, Deiotarus Philadelphus of Paphlagonia,Polemo of Pontus, Archelaos of Cappadocia and two dynasties in Commagene and the Amanus. 152

of the client kings, who occupied positions of strategic

importance. So, as occasion offered, Augustus converted

client kingdoms into provincial territory. When Augustus died he had brought the middle part of Asia Minor under

direct Roman control,so that only the east was left in the

hands of kings, and here Rome's impact was strengthened

because the east was under the sway of two rulers, loyal

to Rome and powerful enough to serve as a bulwark against

the Parthians.’L He had initiated the process of substi­ tuting the influence of the west and had moved closer to

the direct control of positions of strategic importance.

No sooner was Augustus dead than events began to move again, since Tiberius, as was to be expected, continued his policy of converting client-kingdoms into provincial territory and the first occasion was offered in A.D. 17, when Archelaos of Cappadocia died and Commagene and the

Mons Amanus fell vacant through the deaths of Antiochus III 2 and Philopater II. This was the first problem that re­ quired solution. The second one was that Syria and Judaea

asked for a remission of tribute? since for both provinces

the original assessment,conducted by Sulpicius Quirinius

^The marriage of Pythodoris of Pontus and of Archelaos of Cappadocia was doubtless the result of Roman diplomacy, so that all of the east was under the sway of the two rulers.

^Ann. 2.42.4

3Ann. 2.42.4. 153 had proved in time to be too high.

The third and most important problem was arising in

Armenia. The kingdom of Parthia had been a constant men­ ace to Roman interests in Asia and after his predecessors'

failures in their attempts of conquest, Augustus directed his policy to the maintenance of peace by diplomacy. The essential factor in his policy was Armenia, for as long as it remained in close alliance with Rome there was little danger that the Parthians would venture on an invasion of the Roman provinces. But Augustus' various attempts to create a Roman protectorate ended in a series of frustrations and anarchy.^ in the beginning, when

Armenia was in close alliance to Parthia, circumstances enabled Augustus in 20^ B.C. .to place one of the two royal princes of the Armenian house on the throne and to come to terms with the Parthians by diplomacy.2 Their succes- O sors,J however, showed Parthian•leanings and Augustus' second pawn of the Armenian royal house was expelled.^

In 1 B.C. Gaius Caesar for the first time made a member of a neighboring royal house ruler of Armenia,^ but the

1Ann. 2. 1-4.

2Tigranes II; cf. Magie, op. cit., p. 476.

^Tigranes III and Erato; cf. Magie, op. cit., p. 482 f.

^Artavasdes.

^Ariobarzanis of Media. 154 experiment failed again, leaving Armenia in anarchy. No pro-Roman, whether a member of the royal house of Armenia nor from a neighboring kingdom thus could hold his own against nationalistic feelings and Parthian aid. But all of this touched no vital point of Roman interests, because it remained inconsequential for the immediate welfare of the provinces. For Tiberius it was therefore a matter of continuing Augustus' policy of diplomacy, preferably by finding a ruler for Armenia who could maintain himself.

In A.D. 11 Vonones, son of Phraates, driven from the

Parthian throne by Artabanus, a rival pretender, seized the Armenian throne. He was refused recognition by Rome since his support might result in a war with Artabanus and there were doubts-as to'his ability to maintain him­ self in Armenia, so that he was likely to be liability rather than an asset. It seemed wise to keep him as state prisoner, when he fled to Syria. ■*"

This was the state of affairs in A.D. 17. It bore some similarities to the situation in 20 B.C. and 1 B.C. when Tiberius and Gaius were on their missions to settle affairs in the east. Both times the Armenian ruler dis­ played leanings to Parthia and both times it had been necessary by diplomacy and a moderate display of force to replace him by a pro-Roman ruler, which also brought the

Parthian king to a peace agreement of which the repeated

^-Ann. 2.5. 155 meetings at the Euphrates,that punctuate the history of the Roman— Parthian relation,are the symptoms. Now the task was the same, namely to prevent the Parthians from taking over Armenia by putting a pro-Roman ruler on the throne of Armenia without endangering the peace and at the same time to intimidate the Parthian king. The person for a task of such difficulty was obviously Germanicus, since previous experience had shown that only a member of the imperial house had the sufficient prestige to impress the

Parthian king and Germanicus* prestige as the emperor's heir might be thought likely to give him an advantage.

Tiberius in dealing with the east set out again on the path of Augustus, both in respect to the idea of the policy as well as to its practical execution.

Tiberius1 Control of the Eastern Affairs

The appointment of Germanicus and Piso. According to the rules of procedure for an appointment with imperium Tiberius raised the question in the senate and argued that the problems of the east could only be solved by Germanicus1 sapientia and the senate responded: decreto patrum permissae Germanico provinciae quae mari dividentur, maiusque imperium quoquo adisset quam iis qui sorte aut mis&i principis obtinerent.^ He received the

•^•Ann. 2,43.1. 156 so-called "imperium maius," by which he became again as in

Germany a senatorial appointee who was exempted from imperial interference, but in turn was superior to other senatorial governors^and imperial legates in the east,^ as Agrippa and Gaius had been in 12 and 1 B.C. The only irregularity in the repetition of the pattern was the appointment of Cn. Calpurnius Piso to the governorship of

Syria. Piso therefore, held command over the army, which in the case of Gaius had been directly entrusted to the special commissioner. Although Germanicus had the stronger formal position over Piso, still there was, since the imperium maius was only the definition of a temporary precedence, some margin for obstruction which Piso in the sequel exploited fully. By.appointing Piso and by pitting him against Germanicus Tiberius thus created a situation from which trouble was bound to arise. Suspicion was aroused on the part of Germanicus, among his friends and the people, because the appointment had to be understood as an expression of Tiberius' mistrust. In the event it triggered the crisis in which Tiberius almost became a victim of himself, because he had set up the snares in a way that he could be trapped in them.

^•Cf. p. 31 ff. 157

The Occulta Mandata

Besides the original appointment of Germanicus and

Piso Tiberius' control of the administration of Syria hardly ever surfaces, except for his direct interference with Germanicus' visit to Egypt, which will be discussed below.^ It looks as if he lets Piso and Germanicus act on their own and this would not be unusual, for Tiberius normally did not interfere with the holder of imperium, especially not with Germanicus, nor did he interfere with his legates in their spheres if not necessary. The situ­ ation in the east, however, was of great political impor­ tance and for this reason Tiberius probably played a greater role than that which is visible on the surface.

The evidence that sugg'ests his interference is, credidere quidam data a Tiberio occulta mandata;^ the epistulae^ which Tiberius and Piso refused to disclose during the trial; and the Pisonis libellum^ of which Tacitus has heard and which was never published. These are the bare facts of information about Tiberius' involvement. That he will have given Piso secret instructions is hardly doubtful, but to what degree they may have differed from the orders that

■^Cf. p. 164.

2Ann. 2.43.

3Ann. 3.14.

^Ann. 3.16. 158

every legate of the princeps must have received is a

matter of conjecture, since it is impossible to coordinate

these mandata with specific actions of Piso.^ That they

contained, however, directions that were aimed against

Germanicus is beyond doubt, since otherwise, both Tiberius

and Piso, the latter fearing for his family if he dis­

closed anything against Tiberius and the former fearing

for himself, would have had no reason to withhold their

correspondence during the trial. There must have been

some political dynamite, so that the whole truth could not

be let out.

The Distribution of Honors ■ - ■' | At the end of Germanicus' successful conduct of

affairs in the east the senate, probably at Tiberius' pro­

posal, decreed for him and for Drusus, who at this time had

just finished his mission in Pannonia, an ovatio2 together with two arches at both sides of the temple of Mars Ultor.

Marsh, The Reign of Tiberius, p. 89 makes some gen­ eral suggestions as to their content. E. Koestermann, p. 340 ff., makes several assumptions of Tiberius' specific directions which he gains from observing Piso's and Germanicus' attitudes at particular points. They will be discussed below. R. Seager, p. 98, considers them as the usual mandata for legates, since it would be rash to conjecture in the face of hostile sources. But I think Piso's and Tiberius' refusal to disclose evidence proves that it contained critical material.

2Ann. 2.64. 159

This action shows again that Tiberius was carefully intent on satisfying public opinion by honoring Germanicus and, since it coincided with Drusus' success, of emphasizing the spirit of loyal cooperation, within the imperial house.

This was Tiberius' control of the affair in the east according to what surfaces. As before he prompted the initial appointment of Germanicus to the imperium maius, but thereafter he let him act on his own. It is even doubtful whether he gave him any instruction as how to settle the problems that had arisen; it may, however, be that he made suggestions to settle it according to the

Augustan pattern. Many problems, however, may have been left entirely up to Germanicus to be solved on the spot which would be a further indication of the relative flexibility of the provincial administration in the begin­ ning of the principate. Tiberius' trickiest devise was to appoint Piso as his legate, because in this way he had a personal agent, who could impose a check on Germanicus.

As to public opinion, however, Tiberius did everything to dispell any sucpicion of mistrust by honoring Germanicus with a great command and an ovatio.

The Settlement of the Affairs in the East

The settlement of the affairs in the east involved a variety of heterogeneous actions, not all of them strictly 160 speaking administrative ones, but all of them should be mentioned, because they show, I think, that not only

Tiberius but also Germanicus, here, acted in the spirit of Augustus when solving problems of provincial and external policy.

Germanicus* journeys to Syria and to Egypt. Both trips form the framework of the whole mission to the east.They have variously been interpreted as Germanicus* interest in sightseeing^ or as a political propaganda trip,^ but the two views are not mutually exclusive, if one considers Germanicus* philhellenism as well as his presumed role as the future heir of the empire. His I visit to Drusus may not have been more than a display of loyal cooperation between the two brothers,^ but his assumption of the consulship at Nicopolis, a city founded by Augustus in order to commenorate his victory at Actium, may have been a subtly provocative act,that was meant to mark Germanicus out as the future ruler of the empire.

The rest of the trip looks like a protracted triumphal

■'•Ann. 2.53; 2.59-61.

^Ann. 2.53.

■^Koestermann, p. 342 ff.

^Koestermann, p. 339, interprets it as a little more provocative act, namely that Germanicus wanted to show himself to the legions. 161 celebration. In Athens he won the hearts of the Athenians by his affability, Lesbos deified Agrippina after she had given birth to Julia Livilla,^ and further inscriptional evidence and statues from the Aegean and along the coast of Asia Minor^ show that Germanicus was worshipped almost like a god.

E. KoestermannJ interprets this journey as mainly a trip of demonstration, consciously meant to have effect and to win adherents for Germanicus, whom he sees turning slightly rebellious against Tiberius. I believe, however, that it was not designed as a political propaganda of this sort, for Germanicus, who was aware of Tiberius' mistrust, might not have wanted to increase it. Rather it was conceived as a parallel to the trip of Gaius, whom

Augustus deliberately wanted to introduce as his heir while he was on his mission in the east. The cities had conferred on him as on Germanicus honors appropriate to the princeps' son; he was hailed at Ilium, Miletus,

Heraclea and in almost all the cities along the coast of

Asia Minor,^ and by nothing else could Germanicus have emphasized his role as Tiberius' heir better than by

^Ann. 2.5 5; Suet. Gaius 3.2 ILS 8788.

2cf. Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor, pp. 497 ff.

3Ibid., p. 339.

^Cf. Magie, op. cit., p. 482. 162

legitimately repeating the Augustan pattern, probably even with Tiberius' approval.

The honors attributed to him by the Asiatic cities

and the enthusiasmywhich his visit prompted were not

necessarily due alone to his personal ability to

fascinate, but were at the same time the expression of the

eastern lands of the worship of power. The first man in

Rome or his representative, when controlling the east, could not escape the rank and the attributes of a king or

a god, so that this first part of the mission unfolds

according to the established pattern, and also includes

as in the case of Gaius and of Agrippa, the regulation of

internal affairs in the provinces of Asia.-*-

A parallel to the trip to Syria is the journey to

Egypt,2 in its motivation a combination of sight-seeing, propaganda and the conduct of business. On the pattern of Gaius who in 1 B.C. also sailed to Egypt, although with

Augustus' permission, Germanicus may have intended to show himself as the future heir there also and simply grasped

the opportunity for action as it arose, when the shortage of corn in Alexandria required regulation. The

Alexandrians obviously asked for his help and Germanicus

assumed the role of a provincial governor: he relieved

•IAnn. 2.54.2. ^Ann. 2.59. 163 the shortage of grain by opening the granaries of

Alexandria and even issued decrees.^ Unofficially the trip enhanced his popularity to the extent that he was forced to check the cheering of the Alexandrians,2 be­ cause Tiberius, considering his usual mistrust, was bound to be resentful. What Germanicus' ultimate purposes were in Egypt, is hard to say,2 but his speech in Alexandria, which was a sincere ring, proves that he felt that his journey was covered by the commission that had put him in charge of the eastern provinces, and that he had been sent by Tiberius to settle the affairs in Alexandria.

Consequently he considered Egypt like the rest of Asia

(as Gaius had done) as belonging to the sphere of com­ petence comprised in his imperium maius. The wording of the senatorial decree, permissae provinciae, quae mari dividuntur, maiusque imperium, quoquo adisset, quam iis gui sorte aut missu principis obtinerent,^ does not ex­ clude Egypt; on the contrary, in case of a crisis he was entitled to assume the role of a provincial governor, as

^Hunt and Edgar, Select Papyri II (Loeb 1935) , 211,

2p. Oxy, 2435.9 ff. (Oxyrhynchus Papyri, XXV, 102

2Koestermann, p. 349, assumes that the trip gave him also the opportunity to consolidate his position isince the constant and not at all obscure mistrust of Tiberius may have shaken his loyalty.

4 Ann. 2.43.1. X64 he had done in the cities of Asia. This action, however, was most welcome to himself, since it gave him also the opportunity to show himself, like Gaius, as the heir of the empire. For him the trip was perfectly legitimate and it also had its precedent case. But this was not the way Tiberius took it. Germanicus1 successful conduct of business in the east^ had greatly increased his prestige.

In Syria there was Piso to keep him away from the army.

But who would control him in Egypt? The possession of

Egypt, because it was the granary of Rome, was almost as dangerous as the command over the troops in Syria for somebody who wanted to turn it to his own advantage.

These must have been Tiberius 1'considerations, which account for his sharp reaction.2 The only weapon he had at his disposal in order to check Germanicus' advance in

Egypt— and here he reveals himself again as the con- structionalist acting on Augustus' precepts— was a rule laid down by Augustus that no senator should set foot in the country without express permission of the princeps.

But the legal aspect is not at all clear, because this rule does not have to apply to Germanicus. Germanicus was not any senator but the princeps1 son and the holder of imperium maius, the decree for which could be

^Ann. 2.56.

2 Ann. 2.59 acerrime increbuit. 165 interpreted as including Egypt, apd one who could invoke the precedent case of Gaius against the rule of Augustus.

In Tiberius' thinking, however, Egypt was not at all accessible to a governor, but retained its special status as his own private property and so was outside of

Germanicus1 imperium. Both sides were right and had they trusted each other they could have clarified the mis- \ understanding ahead of-time or Tiberius could have over­ looked the administrative irregularity, but, as it was, the two were bound to clash and this was to contribute to the build-up of tension.

Both of Germanicus' journeys thus unfold on the established pattern and are legitimate, considering

Germanicus' imperium maius. • Since, however, the trip unfolds like a triumphal celebration in Tacitus' account it is tempting and possible to interpret it as a provoca­ tive act, meant to gather support for Germanicus' cause, in the face of the alienation of Tiberius.-*- But I believe that it was not a provocative act. The parallel with

Gaius is obvious, and the devotion of the east to

■^Koestermann, p. 353, bases his speculation on Piso's letter to Tiberius (Ann. 2.78) which may disclose the truth, namely segue pulsum ut locus rebus novis patefieret. I am reluctant to accept this statement as true, since Piso's attitude at that moment was controlled by the idea of retrieving his position and he knew that Tiberius would easily lend his ear to accusations against Germanicus and thereby, as he hoped, would overlook Piso's own mistakes. 166

Germanicus was not merely a sign of his charisma but also

an expression on the part of the easterners of their

worship of power. Moreover, outside evidence, the speech

of Germanicus in Alexandria, appears to have an honest

ring. The journey, then, was his method of introducing

himself as the heir of the empire to his future subjects

and at the same time of regulating internal problems in

the provinces, a duty that fell within the sphere of his

commission as had been the case with Agrippa and Gaius.

The Conduct of the Affairs in the East

Armenia. Augustus' several attempts to establish a

pro-Roman ruler had issued in a series of frustrations, because no king could hold his own against nationalistic

feelings. If Germanicus' choice of a ruler should guarantee any stability in Armenia and be advantageous for

Rome, too, he had to look for a person who would least offend national feelings and also be loyal to Rome. This was, as in the case of Gaius, a representative from a neighboring royal house, Zeno, son of Polemo and

Pythodoris of Pontus, who had won the affection of the people of Armenia, since he had shown himself familiar with Armenian ways. Thus from this aspect the choice

commended itself and it was also expedient for Rome,

since it united the neighboring states of Pontus and

Armenia in the hands of the royal house of Pontus, which had proved its loyalty. So Germanicus followed the

Augustan pattern, which had repeated itself twice so far,-*- by uniting the line of defense against the Parthians in the hands of one royal house. In addition to the precedent this proved to be a solid arrangement for 16 o years, because Zeno enjoyed popularity in Armenia.

With or without Tiberius' directions Germanicus followed the Augustan pattern in its idea as well as in its practical execution. According to the custom estab­ lished by Tiberius himself in 20 B.C. and by Gaius in

1 B.C.— that the representative of the Roman princeps places the diadem on the new ruler's head as a symbol of his recognition of Rome's suzerainity— Germanicus crowned

Zeno in Artaxata.^ The installation of the king had so far never been possible without a military escort and the use of armed force, because the ruler had always stirred up nationalistic feelings and the display of force had always been required to force the Parthian king into sub-

■ mission. Consequently Germanicus, following up the established custom, legitimately ordered Piso to send him

^Augustus had probably brought about to promote the marriage of Pythodoris of Pontus and Archelaos of Cappadocia, and Gaius by choosing Ariobarzanis of Media united Media and Armenia. 168 troops. This order Piso disobeyed and thereby exposed

Germanicus to the potential danger of a civil war in Armenia.

The proper conduct of policy in Armenia, both as the situation and the established custom required, had thus been vitiated by the circumstances of rivalry into which

Tiberius had put Piso and Germanicus.

As in the case of Tiberius and Gaius the Parthian king Artabanus was intimidated by the successful Roman policy in Armenia, and since his own position was not consolidated, he was ready to come to terms with the

Romans by a treaty concluded at the Euphrates. Germanicus granted the request for a renewal of the treaty and showed willingness to remove all causes of anxiety for Artabanus by removing Vonones, his rival pretender, from Syria.^

Cappadocia and Commagne. While regulating affairs in

Armenia Germanicus dispatched legates to Cappadocia and

Commagene in order to superintend their organization as provinces, thus following the Augustan pattern of convert­ ing client-kingdoms into provincial territory. The two legates sent to the two areas were Q. Veranius and Q.

Servaeus, close friends of Germanicus. On the annexation of Cappadocia a form of government was established that had not yet been employed in Asia Minor but nevertheless had precedents in the reign of Augustus. Like the smaller

^•Ann. 2.58. 169

European districts of Rhaetia and Noricum, it was placed under the charge of an equestrian procurator,-** whose position corresponded to that of the prefect of Egypt, as an agent of the princeps, on the theory that Tiberius was the direct successor of Archelaos. The advantage of this arrangement is clear: Tiberius had difficulties in filling the aerarium militare, and he needed a secure source of income. Cappadocia was wealthy and was used to paying high taxes to the king, so that the expected returns enabled Tiberius to lower the 1 percent sales tax, con­ tributed to the aerarium militare, under popular protest, to 1/2 percent and the tribute in Cappadocia itself was likewise reduced, which added to the popularity of the

Roman rule.

The problem of the status of Commagene was especially difficult, since Antiochos IV left children, but their claims were disregarded. Commagene was incorporated into the province of Syria.2

Cuncta socialia prospere composita,^ Tacitus sums up

Germanicus' conduct of business, which probably includes the solution of the remaining problems in Syria and Judaea.

This summation shows that Tiberius.made a good choice in

1Dio 57.17.7.

2Ann. 2.56.

2 Ann. 2.57. 170 sending Germanicus, his policy was logical and aimed at the genuinely satisfying and the balance of the interests of all people concerned.

The Administration of the Province of Syria

As far as the regulation of affairs outside Syria was concerned Germanicus' success is obvious, but within the boundaries of Syria his actions were impeded by Piso.

Quite aside from his obstruction in unofficial matters, there was a series of actions that interfered with the administration of the province. They are mentioned by

Tacitus because they are illustrations of the antagonism between Pisp and Germanicus, which took an ever more visi­ ble form, and they are symptoms of the consequences of

Tiberius' arrangement. The provincial administration could be controlled from both sides: Germanicus on the one and Piso-Tiberius on the other,1 and although Germanicus had with his imperium maius the temporary precedence in regulation of affairs, he had to interpret Piso's obstruc­ tions as indicative of Tiberius' will. Piso behaved in a manner which confirms that Tiberius' primary concern in appointing him was to keep the Syrian legions away from a close attachment to Germanicus, since Germanicus had already won the favor of the troops in Germany. Piso,

^■Cf. p. 34 ff. 171

however, exploited this concern in order to bind the

troops to himself, probably to his own advantage.

The latent antagonism between the two first came to

an open break when Piso withheld the troops that German­

icus had ordered him to send to him to Armenia.'*- Piso further undertook to obstruct the judicial admin­

istration. As provincial governor with imperium Germani­ cus was entitled to conduct civil jurisdiction as was

Piso as legatus pro praetore. But since he was Germanicus1

subordinate he only had the function of an assessor on the prince's consilium, because the imperium maius of

Germanicus overrode the rights of the legatus pro praetore.

Instead of cooperating Piso, as was to be expected, took an attitude of opposition and seldom appeared at the tribunal.

*-Koestermann, p. 346 , thinks of two possibilities: either Piso acted on his own or he had orders from Tiberius, differing from the orders that Germanicus had received, which would show that he wanted to undermine his power. I do not think, however, that Tiberius,'who knew from personal experience that a successful Armenian policy could only be conducted with a display of force, would have dared to risk Rome's prestige by letting Germanicus go unescorted, but that Piso acted on his own, interpreting the princeps1 general basic tenet to prevent Germanicus from getting a hold over the troops, as a mandate to disobey his orders wherever possible and at whatever risk. 172

After Germanicus1 return from Egypt he found that all of his arrangements had been reversed. What these arrange­ ments exactly were is not known, but at some time before he left for Egypt, Germanicus must, on account of. his imperium maius, have ordered certain regulations concern­ ing the army and city,in these taking precedence over Piso, so that the provincial administration had taken a certain pro-Germanicus turn.-*- - During his absence, however, Piso had reversed his order, which was, however, only a pro­ vocative act and completely useless,since, when Germanicus returned, he could overrule Piso again.2 In the ensuing conflict Piso left the province and with this brought about the situation that Tiberius had tried to avoid, namely that Germanicus got the command over the army.

His subsequent illness and his death, however, do not afford any conclusions as to what he would have done.

On Piso's return in fact, he decided that the latter should

^Ann. 2.69.

2Koestermann, p. 352, supposes that Piso had secret orders from Tiberius to rescind Germanicus arrangement. This reasoning is, however, I believe, not quite cogent for what interest could Tiberius have had to stir up trouble in Syria that would impair the Roman prestige?

2Koestermann, p. 352, believes that under the re­ peated blows from Tiberius he turned rebellious and that there may be a grain of truth to Piso's assertion that Germanicus aimed at stirring up a rebellion. 173 not profit by his death and sent him a renuntiatio

amicitiae. Tacitus leaves the question open whether

Germanicus also ordered him to leave the province or whether Piso left on his own. Since, however, the

evidence^- speaks for the fact, I believe that Germanicus ordered him to leave, although his imperium did not give him the right to do this and Germanicus in a sense ordered Piso to commit, treason by abandoning his command.

The fact is explainable, however, if one considers that

the order came at a moment, when Germanicus was already convinced that Piso had poisoned him. In the crisis

thus he must have lost his good sense and definitely did

something illegal.

The problem of the vacancy in the governorship of

Syria after Germanicus1 death was solved by the provincial

staff instead of,as would have been proper by Tiberius.

But, as I have suggested, Tiberius' interference either in

favor or against Piso's reappointment would have been repellent to public opinion at this moment, since Piso had

implicated Tiberius in the charge of poisoning. The re­

appointment therefore would have signalized cooperation and a recall would have meant that he had dropped his best

friend in the crisis. That is why he let the provincial

staff handle the problem.

•*-Ann. 2.76-81. 174

The administration of Syria during the years A.D.

17-18 thus offers a complex picture: the proper process of government, in which Piso. could have: always submitted to Germanicus* higher authority, in order to guarantee a smooth conduct of affairs according to the established pattern of the relation between a provincial governor and a special commissioner, was vitiated by Piso's conduct as an obstructionist, a fact for which Tiberius ultimately was responsible.

Conclusion

The process of government in the east has shown that it unfolds on the pattern of the Augustan policy. Choice of personnel is another matter and because of the per­ sonality of Tiberius falls short of the Augustan pattern of success. In order to execute the task Tiberius had the senate appoint Germanicus with imperium maius, as

Augustus had appointed Gaius, but since Tiberius was afraid, for some good reasons, that he could not control

Germanicus, when he was in command of the legions in

Syria, he deviated from the precedent case by appointing a personal agent as legatus pro praetore of Syria. To the public, however, he kept up the Augustan facade- when he styled Piso adiutor and made it believe in the spirit of loyal cooperation, first by appointing Germanicus and by then granting him an ovation. Little surfaces of his 175 interference with the administration; it was his right to give mandata to Piso, the scope of which is, however, a matter of conjecture, but they certainly contained direc­ tions aimed at Germanicus. In other respects Tiberius avoided interference, thus continuing to guarantee the flexibility of the administration on the edges of the empire.

Considering the whole complex of the conduct of business in the east, one may say, Tiberius made a good choice with Germanicus. His two journeys to Syria and to

Egypt unfolded on the established pattern of introducing the heirs of the empire, and since Germanicus was a charismatic leader, he easily fascinated the easterners, who as they had done with Gaius, worshipped him like a god. His policy was logical and aimed at genuinely sat­ isfying the interests of all people concerned. The installation of Zeno pleased the Romans and the Armenians, the treaty with Artabanus pleased the Romans and Parthians, and foreign kings showed readiness to submit to the Roman suzerainity. The termination of the royal houses in

Cappadocia, Commagne and probably in the Amanus, marks an advance in the process begun by Augustus of converting client-kingdoms into provincial territory, with the result that safe for the kingdom of Pontus and two smaller principalities all client states of Asia were now Roman 176 provincial territories. Everything except for the pro­ vincial administration of Syria turned out to be a full

success for Germanicus. Here the proper process was dis­ turbed by the personal antagonism between him and Piso.

Piso acted as the personal agent of Tiberius and under­

stood his assigned role of keeping a watching eye on

Germanicus and of keeping him away from the army to include obstructing the conduct of affairs in all aspects, to a great extent certainly without Tiberius1 approval.

The princeps must have realized more and more that he had appointed the wrong man. Piso exploited the margin for obstruction between Germanicus1 and his own roles and escalated the tension between them to the extent that

Germanicus, when his ejad approached, became convinced that he had been poisoned, and this in turn had the grav­ est consequences for Tiberius himself. One may say that the ultimate source for the provincial mismanagement is

Tiberius' error in his choice of Piso and his mistrust in

Germanicus, both elements that place him in less favorable light, when he is compared in personnel and administra­ tive matters with his predecessor. CHAPTER III

TACITUS' PRESENTATION OF PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS ON

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER AND IN THE EAST

Part I

The Mutinies in Pannonia and on the Rhine

Tacitus is concerned with other factors than the proper process of handling military situations, although he furnishes all the details from- which we can derive

Tiberius' position: he acted as a constructionalist on the constitution in provincial administration by retaining the view of the central position in Rome (the proconsul­ ship) as it had developed since Pompey, leaving consider­ able independence to his delegates and performing such duties to the senate as the submission of final reports.

We can also glean from his account how Tiberius1 delegates performed,if they adhered to proper process or if they strained their authority. But these points do not receive particular emphasis and it remains to ask, what Tacitus felt was so important about the mutinies.

Tacitus' accounts of the two mutinies are the fullest we have as compared to the other sources. They are two self-contained dramas, built on the same pattern of

177 178 dramatic development, and meant to show the relation be­ tween the army and the new emperor. There is consensus in all three parallel sources against Tacitus on one point: Dio, Suetonius and Velleius'1’ report that the motives for the mutinies were political as well as eco­ nomic. They suggest that, the soldiers, in addition to their complaints about the conditions of service, were dissatisfied with Tiberius as a princeps and wanted either another ruler or Germanicus as princeps.

Tacitus cuts across this tradition. In Pannonia the political motive is missing altogether, since, as he estimated, there was no other competent leader to whom the power could have been given. In Germany the political motive is subordinated to the main demands, and seems to be considered only by a few on the selfish ground that they suspected Germanicus to be more ready to pay the legacies of Augustus. After Germanicus'• dramatic refusal of power no more is heard of it, which proves that, in Tacitus' estimation, it was not a major factor. Tacitus knew from the vantage point of his own time that in A.D. 14 the time was not yet ripe to reveal the arcanum imperii.

In other aspects the parallel sources support Tacitus' accounts in their general outline. Velleius2 places

•*-Dio 57.4; Suet. Tib. 51; Veil. 2.125.

2Vell. 2.125. 179 emphasis on the quality of leadership, thus mirroring the official version and flattering Tiberius; Suetonius^ places emphasis on Germanicus' resistance to the offer of power; and Dio^ gives an account of the main facts. Only

Tacitus gives a full picture recreating all the forces that prompt the logical sequence of events, which, in the light of the elaborate structure, shows that he attributes special significance to the drama.

The process of both mutinies is controlled by the interaction of the leadership, which stays loyal to the central government, and of the soldiers with their demands. The demands, according to Tacitus, are now the factors that set the process ift motion, i.e., they are mainly influential in his view of the forces at work in shaping historical events of such threatening magnitude.

. 3 Pannonia

The conditioning factors for the mutiny in Pannonia are the change of government, the hope for gain in civil war, and the fact that Blaesus had suspended the work of the soldiers because of public mourning. The state of mind of the soldiers, idleness, insubordination and day­ dreaming, are fertile ground for Percennius, a claqueur

■^Suet. Tib. 25.

2Dio 57.4-6.

^Ann. 1.16-30. 180 of the vernacula multitudo, who knows how to take advan­ tage of this mood. His persistent and highly rhetorical speech,the dramatic effect of which is heightened by the circumstance that it is held at night, opens a release valve to the soldiers' grievances and the crowd reacts with rioting. Tacitus brings this dramatically to the level of the reader's emotional perception by placing emphasis on details of strong physical action.

Blaesus' intervention secures a momentary effect, but through a concatenation of circumstances, the detachment from Nauportus, which acts like a fermenting on the sol­ dier's mind, and Blaesus' flogging,cause a general panic

(always recreated with emphasis on strong physical action) which prepares the ground for the intervention of the psychopath Vibulenus, a man even lower than Percennius.

His lies are easily believed, which shows that the sol­ diers by now are ready to listen to anybody and to vent their hatred on whomsoever they can seize. Tiberius' m letter triggers a new crisis, since the princeps has post­ poned action on the soldiers' grievances while awaiting senatorial consideration. Tiberius has miscalculated their feelings. They understand the letter rightly— it means no concessions, and though Drusus acts with firmness, the mutiny flares up again. Only with the eclipse of the moon does the reversal set in, and Tacitus turns the dramatic 181 possibilities of this incident to. the fullest account. It seizes on the superstition of the masses, who interpret celestial phenomena as having a bearing on their life, and thus the eclipse makes it easy for the leadership to induce repentance. Reinforcement comes with punishment of the ringleaders, and with the storm and bad weather, which, like the eclipse of the moon, seizes again on the minds of the soldiers and strengthens their mood of repentance.

Tacitus has given here an analysis of the factors at work that shape the course of events. As an expert observer he knows the way of thinking of the common man. It is not the grievances alone that set off the crisis, but the soldiers' shifting mood; idleness, Percennius speech, the arrival of the detachment from Nauportus, flogging,jail,

Vibulenus1 histrionics, Tiberius' letter, the eclipse of the moon, bad weather are the decisive factors that work on the soldiers' mind and set them into action. All these forces are vividly drawn and dramatically fully exploited, so as to bring out the worst aspects of the common man's nature and to recreate for the reader the emotional experi­ ence.of the magnitude of the crisis.

On the other side stands the leadership, Blaesus and

Drusus. Blaesus interferes energetically (increpat, retinebat singulos, clamitans) and Tacitus focuses on his attitude in a vivid picture which could bear the label 182 loyalty. With passionate words, reported in oratio recta for the sake of greater effect, Blaesus .threatens suicide by staking his life in return for the loyalty of the soldiers to Tiberius, and he insists until all of them have noticed (pertinacia). Only after they have been sobered down by his shock treatment does he attempt

(multa arte dicendi) to appeal to their reason and sense of shame, Blaesus reveals himself here, and Tacitus underlines his attitude by his use of words and pictures, as the seasoned professional, who has the levelheadedness to cope with the crisis, but at the same time also as the man of unswerving loyalty to Tiberius.

Drusus has some initial effect because of his imperial prestige, but after the reading of his father's letter the imperial dignity is spurned, a fact that Tiberius had anticipated, and only after the eclipse of the moon has prompted a change of heart is Drusus effective again with his appeal to reason and no little display of harshness.

The relation between the commanders and the army shows that Blaesus and Drusus perform with loyalty and firmness and if necessary with force, but at the same time Tacitus makes it very clear that it is not the strength of leader­ ship alone that is effective in the process. Chance is a decisive element here through the eclipse of the moon.

Two elements interest Tacitus in this account, the emotional 183

factors at work that shape the ac.tion, the dramatic pos­

sibilities of which Tacitus exploits to the fullest, and

the reliability of the leaders^whose attitude is equally

well brought to the reader's level of perception. He is

not concerned merely with the constitutional process but

he probes beneath the surface in order to uncover the

forces that shape an historical event and puts them into

their logical sequence'.

The Rhinei

The mutiny on the Rhine is in the same way character­

ized by fluctuation in the mood of the soldiers. The

conditioning factor of the outbreak is the same as before:

idleness and the mood of the city riff-raff, not used to

•military service. Yet the onslaught is much more power­

ful, since no individual like Percennius arouses the

masses, but all act in unison in a sort of "disciplined

lack of discipline." This is the situation with which

Germanicus is confronted. The strength of the soldiers'

feeling takes shape in physical action and Germanicus'

appeals and concessions tend to make things worse instead

of better, since the soldiers' see through his trick and

start a rioting again that almost ends in a general'

~*~Ann. 1.31-50.

^Cf. Koestermann, adloc. 1.31. 184

slaughter. The scene is dramatically heightened in

Tacitus' account by such details as the.soldiers' raid on

the headquarters during the night and Plancus' refuge to

the altar.

The situation would have deteriorated had not the

departure of the women by chance brought about a change of

heart. The pathos and sentimentality of the sceneworks on

the soldiers' mind; this is the kind of emotional appeal

to which they respond. The fact that the women go unguarded

touches upon their sense of protectiveness. They remember what they had temporarily forgotten— their loyalty to

Agrippina' family— Agrippa, Augustus, Drusus— their

thoughts drift here and thereuntil Germanicus picks up

the feeling and effects the completion of the catharsis, he observes in process. As with the mutiny in Pannonia

Tacitus gives a full picture of the process and of the dramatic forces that initiate the crisis: the mood of the

soldiers, the concessions, the arrival of the embassy and

the departure of the women. Again he presents a logical

analysis of the working of the minds of the soldiers.

On the other side he focuses on the leadership of

Germanicus, but with devices different from those he uses

in presenting the mutiny in Pannonia. The interaction

between commander and army is not only a single event, but

at the same time serves as the first act in a three-act 185 drama that unfolds between Tiberius and Germanicus as principal.characters: the mutiny, the campaigns in Germany and the mission to the east are its framework.

Right before his account of the mutiny Tacitus, in a foreshadowing, pinpoints the basic tension between

Germanicus and Tiberius: anxius in se occultis patrui aviaeque odiis quorum causae acriores quia iniquae.^ It is an atmosphere of mistrust, and one has to ask from what evidence Tacitus has derived his judgment, in order to show its validity. Several factors which make the argu­ ment plausible^ operate together. Augustus had forced

Tiberius to adopt Germanicus as his son and to secure the

I succession for him in the place of Tiberius' own son

Drusus, so that Germanicus1 own position must have been a source of resentment. In addition to that Tiberius had some reasons to be afraid of Germanicus, since in accordance with the arrangements of Augustus, Germanicus was 'in com­ mand of eight legions on the Rhine,in a position from which Tiberius could not recall him as he could a legatus pro praetore. He was in practical possession of a military power with which he could quickly force Tiberius to turn over the power to himself. And it must be remembered also that Germanicus had his own clientela based on a number of

3-Ann. 1.33.1.

^D.C.A. Shotter, "Tacitus, Tiberius and Germanicus," Historia, 17 (1969), p. 195 ff. influential friends and, it may be noted, he had be­ trothed two of his children to the children of the holders of the remaining two most important provincial commands,

Creticus Silanus^ in Syria and Aemilius Lepidus^ in

Spain. In addition to these factors Augustus had con- templated nominating Germanicus as his heir, so that

Tacitus' statement of Tiberius' anxiety, causa praecipua ex formidine, ne Germanicus . . . habere imperium quam expectare mallet, is very well founded.4 Tiberius' fear is also attested by Dio, who may be dependent on a dif­ ferent source, so that Tacitus' outline seems to be bas­ ically true. For Tacitus, Tiberius' fears were also justi­ fied on psychological grounds, because his mistrust was prompted by Germanicus' nature and'attitude. Tiberius knew his ambitious and fiery character, since he had campaigned with him, and nobody could guarantee how he would behave after Augustus' death.

Tacitus further points out that Germanicus has inher­ ited the tremendous popularity of his father Drusus, because, as people thought, Drusus would have restored

1Ann. 2.43, ILS 184.

2Ann. 6.40.

■^Suet, Gaius, 4.

4Ann. 1.7.

^Dio 47.13.6. cf. Shotter, op. cit., p. 200. 187 libertas, an expectation which was quickly transferred to

the son.1 He had as well inherited his father's manly

beauty and his winning grace in conversation, civile in-

genium and mira comitas,2 which contrasted with Tiberius'

grim and reserved nature.

To make things worse the strained relationship be­

tween the two was enforced by the enmity of Agrippina and

Livia.^ since Agrippina was associated with the Julia

group and was Augustus' real granddaughter, whereas Livia

had no children from Augustus, Livia wanted to promote her

son Tiberius' line, and therefore considered Agrippina with stepmotherly hatred (novercalibus Liviae in

Agrippinam stimulis). Since both women were extremely domineering it is easily understandable that Livia may have

fanned Tiberius' anxieties. Tacitus thus has a number of

factual and psychological reasons operating together in order to charge the atmosphere:- -

Germanicus was in command of eight legions and

might be tempted to take over. The two men were

temperamentally incompatible. Tiberius could not

.measure up to Germanicus openness, charm and

popularity. He knew it and he resented it. Ger­

manicus in turn saw through Tiberius' nature: he

1Ann. 1.33.2.

2Ann. 1.33.2

^Ann.1.33.3. 188

knew that Tiberius hated him and he also knew

that this hatred was unjustified, because he had

no intention of doing what Tiberius suspected he

might. But he did nothing to abate this concern, on

the contrary, he behaved in a way that must have

even more aroused Tiberius1 suspicion. Tiberius

in turn had no legal tool with which to check him

and had to comply with Augustus' arrangement of

accepting Germanicus as his successor in prefer­

ence of his own son. The only possible attitude

for him,in order to maintain to public opinion the

appearance of loyal cooperation, was to conceal his

private feelings, which was, however, never natural.

This is the background against- which* their relation­

ship unfolds. The vignettes which Tacitus gives are not unfounded, but substantiated by the parallel sources and will prove to be true in subsequent actions. Tacitus has only abstracted from the sequel the underlying moral

* forces which explain Tiberius' so often ambiguous actions

and has put them in front of the three acts, so as to

shape the reader's thinking about what is to come.

The relation between Germanicus and Tiberius has often been taken as being central to Tacitus' view of the prin- cipate, in which true republican virtus cannot any longer

function freely but is always curbed by a jealous ruler. 189

On such a view Germanicus has always been interpreted as

the political hero, but recent critics have not failed to

read in between the lines that Germanicus1 achievement,

considering his concessions, his method of punishment and

his warfare in Germany, was not particularly glorious and

that Tacitus has adorned and enhanced him* or that "he

did what he could for him with difficult material."^

Shotter in his recent study has reexamined the relation­

ship between Germanicus and Tiberius to decide that

Tacitus has furnished an accurate picture, neither black­

ening nor whitewashing the one or the other. In fact,

Shotter emphasizes the shortcoming of Germanicus not so much in terms of the actual mistakes that he made but in

terms of Germanicus' general performance, which he calls

histrionic, effusive and ineffective. It will be one of

the aspects of the following discussion to see if this

judgment is true or if there is- not more rationality to

Germanicus in Tacitus' presentation.

That Tiberius' fears were unjustified from the stand­

point of Germanicus is made clear by Tacitus right in the

beginning of the mutiny, quanto summae spei propior,

tanto impensius pro Tiberio niti, and although his loyalty

1R. Syme, Tac. I, p. 254.

^B. Walker, op. cit., p. 9. 190

to Tiberius cannot have sprung from a genuine devotion to

Tiberius as a person, since he knew that the latter hated

him, still loyalty to the princeps at least as one of the

forces that keep the empire together must have been his basic conviction, as is borne out by the subsequent nar­ rative. He administered the oath to the army and to the

Gallic tribes thereby, as Octavian had done for himself before Actium,^ binding-army and provinces to Tiberius.

And from this point on all of Tiberius' reactions of mis­ trust to Germanicus will appear to the reader as malicious, since he knows better, although they are understandable from the standpoint of Tiberius, given the factors of insecurity outlined above. 2 In Tacitus' brief, report of the speech, which

Germanicus addressed to the mutineers while the revolt is in process, he notes that Germanicus turns the soldiers' mind to the idea of personal loyalty to the commander-in- chief. Veneratione Augusti, victorias . . . Tiberii,

Italiae consensum, Galliarum fidem are the keywords,3 but he turns immediately from the point of loyalty to harping 4 on their sense of shame, this proves to be ineffective,

Isyme, R.R., p. 438 .

2Ann. 1.34.

3Ann. 1.34.4.

^Ann. 1.35 modestia militaris, decus disciplinae. 191 since for the soldiers loyalty and shame do not have the same value as they have for Germanicus and their feelings about having been unfairly treated are too strong to be appeased by moral appeals. This is where Germanicus miscalculates. When the soldiers offer him the imperium/ his attitude is focused upon in a vivid picture in which he threatens suicide for the sake of demonstrating his loyalty and he accompanies his physical action with passionate words that carry religious overtones.1 This has been interpreted as an impulsive, desperate action on the part of Germanicus, who resorts to histrionics with the effect of gambling away his imperial dignity, whereas

Blaesus with the same action rfeveals himself as a o seasoned professional.

I would interpret Tacitus' presentation differently: the soldiers have touched on a vital spot in Germanicus1 moral attitude and have put him in a situation where he had to react immediately without deliberation. How could he have reacted? with rage? With indifference? Nothing, I think, except what he did, namely to stake his life for his loyalty to Tiberius, could have been a more effective

■^Ann. 1.35.4, quasi scelere contaminaretur praeceps tribunal! desiluit T ! ! at ille moriturum' potius, quam fidem exueret^ clamitans ferrum a latere diripuit eiatumgue in pectus deferebat. . . .

^Shotter, op. cit., p. 198. 192

and a more honest reaction. For him loyalty is a deep

conviction and a true value for which he would be ready

to die. That is the idea,I think,Tacitus wants to convey.

It is an impulsive but not a desperate and histrionic act,

because it is not a show but the most effective expression

of his true feelings. The reason why it appears as a

histrionic act lies, I think, in its consequence: the

soldiers do not feel and think as he does; to them loyalty does not mean anything, and that is why they poke fun at him. Their feelings for their grievances are too strong

and for this reason Germanicus1 action and speech miss

their points. The fact that Blaesus in Pannonia succeeds with a similar action is explained in the lesser strength of the soldiers' feelings and that they still more easily respond to the value of loyalty, not because Blaesus was a more seasoned professional."^"

The blow to Germanicus' dignity seems to heighten his nervousness, so that in the council of friends he resorts to partial concessions. Whether this is an act of desper­ ation again is questionable. Certainly it is constitu­ tionally wrong, but it must be considered that the deci­ sion was reached only after deliberation about the dangers 2 involved in making all concessions or none. To clarify

^Ibid., p. 198.

2 Ann.1.36. 193 this process Tacitus puts in the discussion, as he will always do later whenever Germanicus develops a plan of action, in order to stress the rationality of his acts.

It seemed to be the best solution to him at the moment, wrong though it proved to be in the sequel. It must understandably have disturbed Tiberius who, as their relationship stood, must have interpreted it as an attempt on Germanicus1 part to corrupt the army for his own pur­ poses. At this Tiberius must also have felt frustrated that Germanicus had interfered with his rights and com­ mitted him to concessions that he could not afford. That the concessions would be ineffective, because the soldiers saw that the remedium had beeA forthcoming too quickly, may not have been foreseeable from Germanicus' standpoint.

I think Tacitus, by showing how the solution was reached, makes it clear that it could have worked. Germanicus is not to be blamed alone for the fact that it did not work— and Tacitus emphasizes this by the picture of the soldiers' plundering the general's treasury— ^but the mob is respons­ ible for it also; that is why Tacitus focuses scornfully on the rapacity of the crowd.

When the soldiers invade his private quarters

Germanicus again responds by a speech, and again his

^•Ann. 1.37. harping on moral appeals1 proves to be ineffective. At the latest by now he should have understood— and the criticism of his officers makes this clear also— that his way of moralizing, honest as it is on his part, and his leniency are not the way to quell a mutiny of that strength. The soldiers are simply too irresponsible and emotional to respond. VJhether the saving departure of the women was engineered by Germanicus or not Tacitus leaves an open question, but it would be understandable that

Germanicus uses the scene as a last resort. It is often interpreted as a piece of theatre,2 engineered by Germani­ cus and characteristic of his melodramatic sense. I would interpret Tacitus' presentation a little differently. In its form it is in fact a melodramatic piece but in its motivation serious and calculated. V7hat is at stake, is not only the security of the empire and of Tiberius' position at the moment but also-Germanicus1 security of position as the future princeps, if he fails to get and retain the loyalty of the troops. He has failed several times with his moral appeals that went beyond the soldiers' head, since they did not respond to loyalty. Now he has to get down to their level of understanding in order to

1Ann. 1.39.

2R. Seager, op. cit., p. 68. 195

induce repentence. He seizes upon the pathetic departure

of the women as just the right kind of emotional appeal

that the soldiers respond to. It touches on their sense of responsibility. Notions which had been obliterated

come to the fore again, centered around Agrippina's family

and her ancestry, and induce the catharsis needed.

This moment prompts Germanicus' dramatic speech,^- the only one besides the speech from the deathbed, presented

in oratio recta, which fact expresses its significance to

Tacitus' plan. It is interpreted by Shotter and Seager

again as characteristic of Germanicus1 histrionic behavior.

It is true that the speech is rhetorical and fulsome in

its external form, which, compared to the speech in

Alexandria, reveals one true aspect of his nature, his sense of drama. As far as its content is concerned it is not at all histrionic, but, reminiscent of Scipio

Africanus1 energetic address to the mutineers in Spain,

it picks up with remarkable skill the soldiers' mood point by point and insists on a series of disgraceful paradoxes that complete the catharsis.

Germanicus starts his first paradox with a reference to his family, whose life, he says, he would stake for the

^Ann. 1.42-43.

^Shotter, op. cit., p. 198; Seager, op. cit., p. 68.

•^Koestermann, adloc. ; Livy 28. 26-27. 196

soldiers' glory. Thus he shows them the care and concern he has for them, but they return this care with a threat to kill his family so that he has to protect it from them.

The point of the reference could hardly have been missed: the soldiers had just felt pity for Agrippina so that this harping on previous disgraceful attitude must have touched them even more and deepened the effect of the change of heart. The reference to the family is followed by a general account of the soldiers' misbehavior. They had not dnly failed as soldiers by taking the son of the princeps a prisoner but also as citizens by violating the right of the senatorial embassy.

Then he shapes their mind*to loyalty to the princeps and to himself by listing a series of successful quellings of mutinies, showing the respect that Caesar and Augustus enjoyed with the legions. For the soldiers these are great examples to which they could easily respond.

Germanicus, by stressing his descent from Augustus at this point, points to the loyalty that they owe to him and by

implication points to his position as the legitimate future heir of the empire. The mention of Augustus certainly must work like magic on their minds since they had just in­ cluded him in their expression of concerns, so that

Germanicus' statement hits the right point. 197

The second reference to a disgraceful paradox con­ cerns their attitude towards Tiberius: they were the very legions that he had led to victory and from him they had received rewards and now they were the only ones to cast a shadow on the general rejoicing at his accession. This is again a paradox that must affect them deeply at this stage and one which Germanicus reinforces by a renewed listing of their misdeeds in rhetorical overstatements.

The list is rounded off by a reference to the first contio in which friends restrained Germanicus from com­ mitting suicide. If we keep in mind that the soldiers had changed heart this reminiscence of their disgrace must have deeply affected their senie of shame. The reference contains one more disgraceful paradox. After Germanicus had shown in the beginning that he was ready to stake his and his family's lives for the glory of the soldiers, the reference that all they did for him was to burden his conscience with guilt feelings, must have had a strong effect. The reproaches certainly sound low, morally speaking, but it must be remembered that this is the kind of appeals to which soldiers respond.

Their sense of military honor is stung by the refer­ ence that the Belgae may avenge the Varian disaster instead of they themselves. This picks up the jealousy they felt 198 for the Treveri which they had just voiced.^- Only when

Germanicus is fully sure that he has completed the cathar­ sis does he fall into praying to Augustus and Drusus to help the soldiers to wipe out their disgrace, thus for a last time bringing back to their mind the ideal leaders around whom their thoughts had centered.

The speech certainly bespeaks rhetorical skill not only in its flourish but particularly in its content.

Far from being merely histrionic it shows that Germanicus very deliberately picks up all of those points that had moved the soldiers' hearts and puts the speech under the controlling idea of harping on their sense of shame in order to complete the change of heart and purgation of guilt feelings.

The rest of the narrative of the mutinies is taken up by the description of the execution of the ringleaders.

As with the concessions granted to the soldiers earlier

Germanicus again commits a constitutional mistake, because he does not stay within the limits of his responsibilities.2

In fact he becomes the source of communal slaughter. He was aware of the weakness of his position, which might increase, he thought, if he took responsibility for the

^Ann. 1.41.

^Cf. p. 118 ff. 199

punishment. Instead of making right use of his imperium

he resorts to procedures of delegation and thereby trig­

gers off mob violence. But Tacitus' presentation of

events seems to suggest a different interpretation. It

does not seem that Germanicus does anything wrong, but

rather only wants to increase the soldiers' conscious­

ness of guilt. In this way he will prepare them emotion­

ally for the thrust into Germany in order to work off

their guilt feelings and to reestablish their sense of

pride. In this Tacitean light his action does appear as

a well-engineered psychological trick. But still the

fact of the mob violence cannot be denied, nor can

Germanicus' ultimate responsibility. Tacitus focuses on

the slaughter in the camp of Caecina with words of scorn,

permissa vulgo licentia atgue ultio et satietas,^- but he

only records Germanicus' emotional reaction,when he sees

the sight.

Why does Germanicus get away without Tacitus' dis­

approval? I think, as with the concessions, Tacitus sees

here the responsibility for failure more in the crowd.

The only aspect that seems to interest him is the behavior

of the mob when left alone; that is why he emphasizes it

in the picture of violence. There would not have been any

violence,if the crowd had been responsible. Since it was

^■Ann. 1.47.

f 200 not it had to be blamed. This is the way Tacitus thinks,

I believe.

At this point at the end of the mutiny a judgment should be made of the picture which Tacitus has drawn of

Germanicus so far. He has clearly indicated Germanicus' basic ineffectiveness in handling the mutiny: three times his speeches and actions fail because he miscalculates the soldiers' feelings and their irresponsibility. He also shows that the concessions which were constitution­ ally wrong had in addition to that the wrong effect on the soldiers. He leaves the reader to infer that

Germanicus was responsible for the communal slaughter.

If one goes by these criteria Germanicus surely was a failure, and the picture is confirmed by Dio^v that the young Caesar was unable to cope with the munity. In this respect, then, he is very little of a political hero.

Nevertheless critics still believe that Germanicus comes out as a hero and that Tacitus has enhanced and adorned him. I think the ambivalence of the picture comes about by applying two different criteria of judgment at the same time. On the criterion of moral integrity

Germanicus comes out as a paradigm of virtus; his loyalty, his moral appeals, his openness, his sincerity and his emotionalism make him a radiant figure. Tacitus truly

^■Dio 57.5-6. 201 shows that he has mira comitas and civile ingenium, com­ bined with a sense for melodrama. But on the criterion of efficiency he proves to be a failure. Here, I think,

Tacitus does not see the mistake as lying only with him.

The soldiers, too, are responsible for the course of events. His appeal to loyalty could have worked if the soldiers had had a sense of responsibility; the conces­ sions could have been acceptable were it not for the crowd's rapacity; and the avoidance of the responsibility for meting out the penalties might not have ended in a communal slaughter, if the crowd had not acted so irra­ tionally. Most of these crowd-scenes are focused upon by

Tacitus in close-ups, and since all of his pictures are functional these are meant to point out that the responsi­ bility does not lie alone with the leadership. In the same way in the city the responsibility for the decline of the senatorial order does not lie with the princeps alone but as well with the attitude of the senators themselves.

This, of course, does not acquit Germanicus of his mistakes, but I believe that Tacitus thought the mistakes were not as important a factor as the behavior of the crowds in triggering the crisis.

Actually Germanicus' mistakes remained historically irrelevant, too. The mutiny was quelled: that was impor­ tant and Germanicus by his moral appeals had helped with the suppression. His concessions were first extended to

Pannonia and then cancelled at the appropriate moment without any consequences. So also his irresponsibility in turning over the punishment to the crowd was a single mistake and was quickly forgotten. What was important was his sound morality because this affected the history of the Roman state. And that is, I believe, the reason why he appears as an admirable figure in the mutiny and sticks in the reader's mind. He is not enhanced and adorned; all the information of his successes and failures of the meeting is there. But Tacitus places emphasis on certain admirable aspects in Germanicus, which are, I think, intertwined with his historiogfaphical purposes in pre­ senting the mutinies as a whole. These I will discuss below.

Tiberius and the Mutinies

Tiberius surfaces three times during the mutinies:

(a) in the course of the mutiny in Pannonia,2 (b) in the course of that in Germany,^ (c) and with his final report to the senate,^ and his appearances are blended into the

-*-Dio 57.5-6.

^Ann. 1.24.

3Ann. 1.46.

4 Ann. 1.52. 203 narrative.^ In the first passage Tacitus' point of inter­ est is Tiberius' reaction to the mutiny. His position in

Rome is not yet consolidated and he would have preferred to conceal everything, but circumstances forced him to send out a delegation. Secrecy as a requirement of statecraft is very understandable from Tiberius' standpoint, but

Tacitus' wording, abstrusum et tristissima quaeque occultantem, strikes a key note of Tiberius' character, dissimulatio. In unimportant as well as in important matters he tried to cloak his thoughts, but he could never conceal anything successfully.

The other point of interest to Tacitus in the passage

(the choice of the delegation is reported without any political accent) is the choice of Seianus as rector iuveni. His appointment is due to influence magna apud

Tiberium auctoritas, Tacitus remarks contemptuously,2

As the process of government is controlled by a hierarchic structure, Tacitus mirrors the process by flashing with his camera from the provinces back to Rome, in between,the structural principle, developed in the Histories, which is the artistic expression of the process of government of the principate that works through dele­ gation in the provinces.

2Cf. R. Syme, Tac. I, p. 413. Seianus, the eques­ trian, in the reign of Tiberius, Pallas, the freedman, in the reign of Claudius (Ann. 12.25) Polycletus, the slave, in the reign of Nero (Ann. 14.39,1) all of them have auctoritas, and the fate of auctoritas, as used by Tacitus, is a symptom of the progressing social revolution. 204 solely to the working of patronage, Tacitus offers no word that Seianus was a good choice in other'respects also.

Quite apart from the general response of Tiberius to the mutiny, Tacitus' sole interest in it is what it tells about Tiberius, especially his tendency of dissimulatio and about Seianus, and in particular his auctoritas. Both characteristics will prove to be historically relevant and that is of interest to Tacitus.

The second passage focuses on the popular reaction towards the mutinies in Germany and in Pannonia and on

Tiberius' decision to stay in Rome. Tiberius was very unpopular with the people, we have heard in Tacitus' a foreshadowing and here in the crisis, which reveals the weakness of his position, this unpopularity is heightened by the general panic and first takes verbal expression.1

The people want Tiberius to go to the provinces, since they do not trust Germanicus' and Drusus' ability. Their demand is not particularly disquieting in itself.since it can be explained by their panic, but the side remarks that are dropped, as presented by Tacitus, must affect Tiberius deeply, because they reveal a good amount of truth about him: people make reproaches on his cunctatio ficta; his game in the first senate meeting was unmasked and everybody

1-Ann. 1.46.1. 205 knew that only he alone had the real power whereas the senate and the people were invalida and •inermia. The disparaging talk about his activity in Rome, sedere in senatu, verba patrum cavillantom, also strikes a true note. Tiberius could be bitterly sarcastic, and satis prospectum urbanae servituti. sufficiently expresses the general resignation that people felt about his reign already, although it had hardly started.

To what extent Tacitus identifies with this popular opinion is a matter of conjecture, since the talk hits true points as well as revealing misconceptions. He cer­ tainly accepts Tiberius' cunctatio ficta and the senate's and people's feeling of being i'nermia and invalida, but otherwise, I think, his choice of words to render the slanderous popular language (cavillantem) indicates that he disowns himself from their opinion. He simply renders popular feeling for the sake of recreating for the-reader the emotional experience and the kind of pressure to which

Tiberius was exposed and with which he had to cope.

Tiberius' unshakable attitude (immotum, fixum) in de­ fiance of popular pressure is impressive and impressed

Tacitus, too, I think.All of his reasons for staying

1-Cf. Tiberius' explanation for remaining in Rome during the revolt of Sacrovir, III.47, when the pressure on him was even more severe (44). 206 are plausible, but the people have no feeling for his con­ siderations. Tiberius knew it and therefore pretended to give in to them, because he knew that he could not con­ vince them. Unfortunately he could not deceive them either, for all his feverish activity (iam iamque iturus, legit comites, quaesivit impedimenta) and his vague excuses were seen through. Tiberius was unpopular, and no matter what he did, he could not retrieve himself from that unpopularity. His accession to power had been thought to be a shadowplay and since then he was not believed.

Tacitus inserts this passage to show Tiberius' relation to the people, which was controlled by his unpopularity, mutual mistrust and pretense, 'in the course of his reign popular opinion became a key factor, because popularity was attached to Germanicus and any thrust of Tiberius against Germanicus was to tilt the balance even further.

Therefore Tacitus considered it important to focus on any instance that disclosed something about the relation be­ tween princeps and people.

The chapter on the final report1 to the senate gives a disquisition on Tiberius' mixed and concealed reaction to Germanicus' handling of the mutiny and his subsequent successful short invasion of Germany. He was glad that the mutiny was quelled but he was worried about the means that

1Ann. 1.52. 207

Germanicus had employed, especially the monetary conces­

sions^ that had been granted and the fact that he had acquired gloria belli. Since their relation was controlled by mutual mistrust this reaction is very much in keeping with Tiberius' feeling about Germanicus that cheap success may go to his head. Tiberius, however, had to display to the senate the attitude of loyal cooperation with Ger­ manicus. He had to make sure that none of his misgivings

should become public and therefore he praised Germanicus

inordinately. Since every senator knew that he mistrusted

Germanicus, his speech had as usual a very insincere ring, because Tiberius' style always betrayed his inner feelings. Magis in speciem shows Tacitus’ key word, which

is for him a historiographical device to denote Tiberius' constant manner of cloaking his thoughts. He never succeeded in concealing his true feelings without leaving people and senate with the feeling of having been-deceived.

Dio's1 account reveals the same observation in a much

sharper form though, which suggests that Tacitus' picture

is basically true. Everybody in the senate noticed that his low-keyed eulogy of Drusus had understandably a much more sincere ring, since in addition to the fact that

Tiberius had no reason to fear Drusus, Drusus had acquitted

1Dio 57.6.2. 208

himself of his mission altogether more successfully with­

out encroaching on the senate's and Tiberius' prerogative.

Tacitus' main interest in the final report is again

the discrepancy between Tiberius' genuine and pretended

reaction to the handling of the mutiny: for the sake of

political expediency he cloaked his feelings before the

senate as well as before the people.

Conclusion on the Mutinies

The analysis of the process of handling the mutinies has shown that it reflects a certain pattern set up by

Augustus. Tiberius as a constitutional conservative holds the proconsulship as it had developed since Pompey and works as Augustus had through legates in the provinces.

•In the special crisis that requires the imperial pres­ tige, he acts with circumspection and sends a delegation chosen on the pattern of Augustus when he sent Gaius to the east. But by entrusting the major duties, as Augustus had done, to legates, h e .guarantees the flexibility of the administration on the edges of the empire. The legates, except for Germanicus, adhere to proper process and refer to the central government matters that are not comprised in their competence.

From Tacitus' account we can glean all of this infor­ mation, but it remains politically without accent, because these were not the elements that triggered and quelled the mutinies. Tacitus was interested in the relation and the interaction of the leadership and the crowd and in the particular forces that set off and averted the crisis.

Tiberius is not interesting as an administrator and as continuator of Augustus, but in the way he responded to the crisis. He would have preferred to conceal everything to begin with; that attitude strikes a key note in

Tacitus' interpretation. His relation to the people was controlled by his awareness of unpopularity, and there­ fore he had to respond with dissimulatio. But dissimulatio did not help. His game was always unmasked and never made him more popular with the people, honest and plausible as his own reasons for staying in Rome and pretending to go were. The same thing happened in the senate: the senators knew that he hated Germanicus even while praising him. That did not help to secure the senate's confidence. In each instance it is the " dissimulatio that interests Tacitus, because this is the key factor responsible for the decline of the senatorial order. The senators never really saw through Tiberius, be­ cause he used to hide his thoughts; therefore they always acted as they thought might suit him, and thus prompted their own undoing.

In the account of the mutinies Tacitus demonstrates the depth of perception of a Thucydides for the heterogen­ 210 eous causes that trigger a crisis, which Thucydides pinpoints in such passages as the plague, the weakness of leadership, mob violence and tyche. So Tacitus presents all the factors that cause the ups and downs in the muti­ nies: the general mood and the condition of the soldiers, their irresponsibility when left to themselves, chance events, melodramatic scenes. The dramatic possibilities of these incidents are turned to the fullest account.

Opposed to this is the strength of the leadership, its loyalty and its partial efficiency. The point of loyalty is especially driven home with Blaesus and Germanicus.

Their attitudes are stressed in pictures on the tribunal and in their speeches, whereby Germanicus especially appears as an individual of multiple facets: he displays moral integrity, mira comitas, civile ingenium, although on a practical level his handling of the mutiny is to a great extent ineffective. Here, however, Tacitus seems to put the blame on the attitude of the crowd, because they

* are expected to show some responsibility. Also, the best leadership does not avail anything if the crowd on its part is unwilling to take suggested responsibilities. So

Tacitus seems to conclude with acute perception for the distribution of responsibilities.

Beyond Germanicus' performance in the mutiny his appearance is functional in his relationship to Tiberius. 211

It was controlled by mistrust, justified from Tiberius' standpoint, unjustified in reality. The mutiny throws some light on the build-up of tension. Germanicus' atti­ tude must have really frightened Tiberius, and if he mis­ trusted him already before, he must have done so even more afterwards. Germanicus had encroached on his rights by winning popularity with the soldiers, so Tiberius thought, and thus had bound the troops to himself.

The build-up of tension between the two is a key factor in Tiberius' reign, so Tacitus thought, because it finally leads up to the crisis from which Tiberius is never to retrieve himself and which has a lasting impact on his own reign and on future historical developments.

But there remains still the question of Tacitus' historiographical purposes in his account of the mutinies, for there has to be a reason why, as compared to the parallel sources, his account is the most comprehensive and displays such an elaborate structure. One must also explain why Germanicus comes out as an admirable figure despite his mistakes. Various reasons have been advanced for the inordinate length,'*’ e.g., that it shows Tiberius' unpopularity with the troops as well as with the people, that it introduces the political hero Germanicus, and that it is meant to display the historian's rhetorical and

talker, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 212 dramatic skills. All of these reasons concern more the

form, I think, than the content. If Tacitus' long narra­ tive accounts are always functional in the analysis of the fate of the Roman Empire, the elaborate artistic form must indicate that Tacitus attributed special signifi­ cance to the mutiny,which points to something of impor­ tance beyond the actual course of events in the mutinies themselves.

After the reign of Tiberius Rome went through several mutinies. The arcanum imperii, i.e., the fact that the emperor's power rested on the army, was revealed in A.D.

69, when the armies from Spain, Germany, the Danube and the east marched on Rome and engaged in civil war that almost brought the empire to .its ruin, in order to bring their generals to power in the competition for the! purple that arose after Nero's death.

In A.D. 89 Antonius Saturninus, commander on-the

Rhine, attempted to overthrow Domitian, but was put down by a loyal legate, Lucius Maximus.^-

In A.D. 97 the old senatorial appointed to the throne,

M. Cocceius Nerva, suddenly adopted Trajan, the commander of the legions on the Rhine as his heir.^ Nerva had for­ feited his authority, the praetorian guard rose, and he

iDio 57.11.

^Dio 58.3. 213 decided to reach out for support to the general on the

Rhine, for he was the most powerful person in the empire.

The legions on the Rhine were self-confident, because

they remembered earlier proclamations and wars. They knew

that Rome was in their power,Tacitus says, while des­ cribing the mutiny in A.D. 14, a statement, that can only be fully understood from the vantage point of his own

time. This is certainly evidence for the fact that Tacitus

did not see the Tiberian mutinies as an isolated event.

We do not know how Tacitus viewed the situation in

A.D. 89 and in A.D. 97, but we have evidence in the

Histories for how he viewed the forces at work that prompted the crisis in A.D. 69: the mood of the soldiers and the weakness of leadership. The feeling of the armies

in Germany, conditioned by the special situation of A.D.

68 after the victory over Vindex, is resentful against the partisans of Galba. The armies are conscious of their

strength and eager for war and booty, and they grow intol­ erant of orders and hostile to their officers. Their

leaders are altogether bad characters, who pledge their

loyalty to whoever seems to offer the greatest advantage.

Perfidia ducum3 is their common characteristic. Vitellius

■'■Ann. 1.31. Cf. Syme, Tac. I, p. 13.

2Hist. 1.51.

3Hist. 3.17. 214 relaxes the discipline-*- and does everything in order to gain the favor of the soldiers. The motives and activi­ ties of Fabius Valens and Caecina Alienus in triggering off the crisis are vividly drawn.2 Valens has denounced

Verginius Rufus to Galba and had been instrumental in murdering the legate of lower Germany without receiving a reward from Galba. Caecina after services to Galba had been found out in bribery. Both of them therefore insti­ gate Vitellius to overthrow Galba and to seize power. They set out on the march to Rome: massacring, bribing and looting, sic est ad Alpes perventum.3

Equally subversive are Mucianus in Syria (his piece of advice to Vespasian, confuglendum est ad imperium4 may be contrasted with Germanicus, potius. moriturum quam fidem exueret) and Antonius Primus in Moesia, a man who takes risks, who is energetic, a master of persuasion and in­ trigue, greedy and rapacious, an evil man in peace but indispensable in war.^ These are the forces at work, not the particular incidents, that prompt the crisis in A.D.

69 and almost bring the empire to fall; especially it is the moral weakness of leadership.

3-Hist. 1.52.

^Cf. R. Syme, Tacitus I, p. 166 ff. ^Hist. 1.66.3.

4Hist. 2.76.

^Hist. 2.86. 215

The same potential of danger, is inherent in the muti­

nies of A.D. 14. But this time still it is the moral

strength of leadership that saves the day. Blaesus,

Drusus and Germanicus are loyal- to the central government;

their attitudes are focused upon in cinematographical

close-ups, when Blaesus and Germanicus1 loyalty find visual

expression in the scene on the tribunal. Blaesus dis­

plays pervicacia and appeals to custom, discipline and

orderly procedure, and so does Drusus. Germanicus appeals

to moral forces, gratitude to Tiberius, Augustus and

Drusus, shame, honor and glory. In both mutinies these

are the factors that fascinate Tacitus; it is the moral

forces, the integrity, the loyalty of leadership that

keep the empire together. Quite detached from the actual

process and the incidents of the mutinies, Germanicus1

tactical mistakes and his inefficiency, there is another

level of thinking in Tacitus' mind. He was not so one­

sided as to blame only Germanicus' for his mistakes or

praise him for his virtus; both the mistakes and the moral

integrity are aspects of the same person, but it is the . virtus that fascinates him, even more so since he has lived

through the crisis of A.D. 69. Tacitus puts Germanicus up

as a paradigm of virtus against the dim background of and

as a corrective to the generals' attitude of A.D. 69, which had left such a deep impression of human nature's

potential for evil. 216

His histographical purposes in the whole presentation of the mutinies have to be seen against this background of

A.D. 69. It was a military crisis with a considerable potential for danger, and Tacitus artistically recreates this danger with its forces at work. It is from the vantage point of A.D. 69 that the mutinies receive their significance and it is the pathos of A.D, 69 that here again takes artistic form, created by a historian and artist who grasps historical events not as isolated facts but in their symptomatic and cyclic character. 217

Part II

Tacitus1 View on Germanicus1 Campaigns in Germany

If one compares Tacitus' account of the German cam­ paigns from A.D. 14-161 with the account in our parallel sources it is striking to notice the parallel fate of

Tacitus' account of the conquest of Britain by Agricola: both wars have left scanty traces in imperial history elsewhere.2 The contemporaries/ Velleius Paterculus3 and

Strabo,^ both focus attention only on the splendor of the triumph with which Tiberius lavishly showered Germanicus after his return. Velleius considered Germanicus' achievement only as the continuation of a glorious war initiated and conducted primarily by Tiberius. Pliny the

Elder,3 writing 20 books of Bella Germanica in Claudian-

Neronian times, dealt with the wars in Germany as a genre and collected the single conflicts as he collected diseases and plants elsewhere. Germanicus' achievement thus was only an episode in a long conflict from which the interest

1Ann. 1.52-71; 2.5-26.

2For a discussion of Tacitus' relation to the parallel sources, cf. D. Timpe, op. cit., p. 11 ff.

3Vell.2.129.2.

^Strabo 7.1.4.

5pii.ny Ep. 3.5.4. 218 in the single event had faded. Suetonius mentions

Germanicus' victory-^- but he dismisses the wars as ruinous to the state.2 Dio Cassius,3 finally, only mentions two incidents: the expedition against the Marsi which/as in

Tacitus4 is only advised in order to reestablish the morale of the army,3 and the decree for Germanicus' s triumph. The sources thus show that the historians before and after Tacitus found hardly anything memorable about Germanicus' campaigns, probably because there were on the whole no long-lasting successes. They deal briefly with the warfare but elaborate on the triumph, which v/as seen as the reflection of the war in Rome; in other words, it was the official version of the success of Tiberius' frontier policy. This is the importance that posterity attributed to Germanicus' campaigns and against which

Tacitus' account has to be seen. Tacitus certainly did not

^Suet. Gaius 1.1.

2 Suet. Tib. 52.2

3Dio 57.6.1.

4Ann. 1.50-52. 5 D. Timpe, op. cit., p. 51, interprets the expedition against the Marsi as the first stage of the entire war which he interprets as the war of Germanicus, without co­ gent reasons, though, I believe.

6Dio 57.18.2. 219 find the war memorable on the basis of its success, since he did not consider it as being ended,^ and therefore the significance the war had for him and the justification for the long narrative must be looked for elsewhere.

2 Germanicus* Conduct of the War

Already the first venture into Germany in the fall of

A.D. 14-3 leaves us with a very definite impression of

Germanicus as a capable strategist. The invasion is prompted by the soldiers' need to work off their feeling of guilt and frustration and Germanicus lets himself be guided by this psychological development; which he himself had partly contrived by reminding the soldiers of their duty to avenge the Varian disaster.^ Tacitus sees no weakness or passivity in his attitude when he gives in to the s o l d i e r s . 5 Rather, after watching the development of

•^Ann. 2.41.2.

2The interpretation of the strategic aspects of the wars relies on E. Koestermann' s article "Die Feldzflge des Germanicus in 14-16 n. Chr.," Historia 6 (1950, p. 429 ff. I think that E. Koestermann, by interpreting Tacitus' account with a glance at the map of the area,comes to valid conclusions about Germanicus* strategic genius.

3Ann. 1.50-52.

4Ann. 1.43.

^D. Timpe, op. cit., p. 25, suggests that Tacitus' account almost gives the impression of undignified passivity. 220 the soldiers' feeling, Germanicus does the right thing at the right moment, namely, instead of attempting either to order them or restrain them he yields in order to let them work off their frustrations and thus achieve the catharsis fully.

Tacitus presents his advance over the Rhine into the territory of the Marsi as controlled by concern for secur­ ity and speed. Germanicus mores along the limes that

Tiberius once built and pitches the camp in an advantageous position. After useful consideration he chooses the longer but safer road and sends Caecina ahead in order to pave the way. The troops are divided in order to devastate a wider area, and so the invasion* itself unfolds success­ fully according to plan. The method of warfare is objec­ tionable because of the indiscriminate slaughter of the sleeping Germans and the destruction of sacra and profana.

In its type it is the continuity of the scorched earth warfare initiated by Tiberius, which aimed at ruthless extermination of the enemy. The method is applied by

Germanicus several times from now on, against the Chatti1 . 2 and against the Marsi. It is certainly not heroic and hard to balance off with Tacitus' statement of

Germanicus1 mansuetudo in hostem.3 Although there is no

■^•Ann. 1.56.

3 Ann. 2.25. 3Ann. 2.72. 221 justice in it the explanation may perhaps be that

Germanicus aimed at the conquest of Germany and that he saw the only way of achieving this goal not only in win­ ning battles but in the radical extinction of the tribes.

Previous experience had proved that a purely military occupation and victories in battle were futile. Still

Tacitus' choice of words (semisomnos, inermis, profana, sacra) indicates that the brutality of the procedure did not escape his notice, and whether justifiable or not,it was inhuman.

On the retreat Germanicus anticipates an attack from the flanks and therefore marches in battle formation, a measure which, together with a short appeal to the soldiers at the right time, prevents .the army from falling into a second Varian disaster.

The entire invasion prompts the reestablishment of the soldiers' self-confidence and loyalty to the leader­ ship and thus creates a good basis for the campaigns of the next year. The success of the Roman army goes to the credit of Germanicus in Tacitus' account.

The Campaign of A.D. 15

After the successful invasion of the fall of A;D. 14 we hear all of a sudden in A.D. 15^ that Germanicus

^Ann.1.55. intensified his plans, abandoned the so-far-applied scorched

earth tactic for a wide-ranging tactic, and prepared him­

self for that summer to restore the Elbe as the frontier of

the Roman empire. But he changed his plans quickly and

started the attack earlier in the spring against the

Chatti. Timpe^ has tried to uncover the reason for the

sudden change of plan. The war was probably planned in the

winter of A.D. 14-15 under favorable circumstances for

Rome. The power struggle between the Cheruscans, Arminius

and his pro-Roman father-in-law Segestes, in which

Arminius probably had attempted to get rid of Segestes and

to consolidate his own power, had ended in a momentary

success for Segestes,2 who had even recovered his

daughter from Arminius. With Segestes1 support Germanicus

‘must have thought it would be easy to defeat Arminius, or

at least that the favorable circumstances would be a

plausible justification for why Germanicus started his

campaign only now and not earlier. The choice of the

moment thus shows, that he wanted to start his invasion at

the minimum risk of security. But unfortunately the con­

figuration of power in Germany must have changed by the

spring, ending finally in the capture of Segestes by

Arminius, so that Germanicus had to change his plans

Id , Timpe, op. cit., p. 43 ff.

2Ann. 1.57.3. 223 quickly if he wanted to take advantage still of the more favorable situation.

A look at the map shows that his attack on the Chatti^ was meant to put the Cheruscans under pressure by isolating them from the south, so that we recognize here already that

Germanicus1 steps were considered. He moved with utmost attention to security by entrusting the four legions only to his most reliable commanders, by moving along his father's path and by securing the retreat with fortifica­ tions. Apronius was left in custody of roads and bridges.

The attack was conducted with speed so as to take the

Chatti by surprise and the type of warfare was the same as in A.D. 14, with the obvious aim that only radical exter­ mination would eliminate the Chatti as a factor of power.

At this moment Segestes, whose situation had 2 worsened, sent a request to Germanicus for liberation and this gave Germanicus the opportunity to show to the

Germans Roman fides and dementia. Not only did he come to the aid of a Roman ally of unswerving loyalty but also extended his generous treatment to his less-loyal son, who, hoping for Germanicus' clemency, was received gracefully.

Germanicus here displayed those Roman characteristics which

~*-Ann. 1.55; for a map cf. R. Seager, op. cit., p. 310.

2Ann. 1.57.

3Ann. 1.57.2 since the time of Caesar had become a political program.

His after-thought might have been to rally more tribes to his cause, especially perhaps Arminius' uncle Inguiomerus who had pro-Roman leanings,^- by displaying such ostenta­ tiously generous Roman treatment.

So far his undertaking had been a success, but when

Arminius entered the plan the situation changed radically,2

Tacitus makes the reader understand. Several factirs, I think, operated. Germanicus had miscalculated Arminius' strength and the hold which he had over the Germanic tribes on account of his strong personality. But more important was the fact that Germanicus had given him the most powerful incentive for rallying the German tribes to his cause by an irretrievable mistake, which touched on

Arminius' sense of honor: he had taken Thusnelda captive.3

The power pattern shifted significantly to his disad­ vantage, since even Inguiomerus joined Arminius. Never­ theless, Germanicus was driven on by the idea of conquest.

Although the new situation frightened him (maior Caesari metus) he decided to execute what he had initiated. Thus he was ready to display his virtus even against changed and 225 and unfavorable circumstances for,which, however, he him­ self was to some extent to be blamed. Although frightened,

Germanicus still made his plan calmly for the summer campaign,as Tacitus stresses, taking precautions in order to prevent the war from raging out of control. He continued his strategy of isolation of the cheruscans by splitting his forces for a pincer movement against the Bructeri.1

Germanicus showed once- again, even though his move guaranteed only a partial success,because the Bructeri had slipped away, that it was strategically planned carefully and by no means the result of improvisation.

If Koestermann1s2 estimate of the situation that followed is correct,Germanicus found himself now confronted with the task of planning for the thrust into the stra­ tegic center of lower Saxony, the rallying-point of the hostile coalition. It included the overcoming of a diffi­ cult mountain barrier and the march through the swamp of the Teutoburg forest, for which, as Tacitus emphasizes, appropriate security measures were taken by sending

Caecina ahead to reconoiter the area. If our knowledge of the area thus helps to assess Germanicus1 achievement it must be noted that his aim of reaching the most advan­ tageous position despite natural obstacles adds to his ability as a general.

■*~Ann. 1.60. 2Koestermann, op. cit., p. 441. ff. 226

After leaving Varus' battlefield Germanicus' plan of

attack was revealed directly. Since the season was

advanced he had to take the risk of following and attack­

ing Arminius, who was drawing him deep into the country.

He had miscalculated the tactic of the chieftain, who had

started on the German version of the Punica fraus, and

therefore it is so much more to his credit that despite

all the odds against him and the general confusion of his

cavalry, he stayed level-headed and saved the day by

quickly deploying the legions into battle formation.^

This inspired confidence in his own soldiers and fear in

the enemy so as to decide the battle at least aequis manibus.

In the assessment of Germanicus' performance at this

point according to Tacitus' account, I think Koestermann^

rightly gives him credit for mastering the situation. His

achievement, although far from spectacular, since he had

to learn first how to adapt himself to Arminius in order to

defeat him, just as Caesar had to learn from Vercingetorix,

is proof of his decisiveness and circumspection.

Since the season was advanced he could not follow up

his momentary success without risking heavy losses and so

^Ann. 1.63. 2Ann. 1.63.

^Koestermann, op. cit., p. 446. 227 he decided for retreat. The argument that the division of his army was a miscalculation because Caecina and Vitellius met with disaster on the retreat, has, I think, been con­ vincingly refuted by Koestermann.^ Germanicus had no other choice. The whole army on the march through the country would have been exposed to Arminius* attacks, and since the ships on the other hand did not have enough loading

space in order to take- on the whole army, he was compelled to divide his forces.

If one considers the campaign as a whole as presented by Tacitus there is hardly any reason to blame Germanicus as a general— on the contrary he laid his plans carefully as far as foreseeable and even when circumstances and

incalculable factors p.laced-the odds against him he rose to the situation and mastered it. But beside his strategic talentthere are two other aspects of Germanicus which unfold in Tacitus' account of the campaign: his pietas on the battlefield of Varus^ and his c o m i t a s 3 towards his

soldiers on the return.

When the army on its way to the strategic center of the hostile coalition crossed the field of the Varian dis­ aster Germanicus and the soldiers decided to pay final

•^Ibid. , p. 446.

^Ann. 1.61.

^Ann. 1.71. 228 tribute to the fallen soldiers. As proper burial of a family member in antiquity was a religious duty imposed by a sense of morality on the surviving family members, so the burial of the soldiers was the duty of the general and the performance of these rites became a criterion for his moral conduct. Tacitus highlights this attitude by a memorable scene, recreating impressionistically the atmosphere of other-wordliness1 into which the army moves and which has such a deep impact on their emotions that their actions acquire almost a sacred character. By acting together with them Germanicus becomes their socius

i . doloris which shows them his concern.for them.

But it is not only to the dead that he shows concern but'also to his soldiers. Since he is aware that the campaign in its outcome with all the losses has been more of a disaster than of a success,he helps at the return to the camp the soldiers who have suffered heavy losses with funds distributed from his own pocket. But not only by financial help does he bind the soldiers to himself but also by improving their morale, belittling their losses . and praising their heroic deeds. When touring the "hos­ pital" he finds the right word for everybody, and therefore it is easily understandable that he secured their support.

■*-Cf. R. Baxter," Virgil ’ s Influence on Tacitus Annals I and II,"CP (1972), p. 246 ff. 229 Tacitus recreates exactly those elements that are func­ tional in making the reader believe that Germanicus really did become the idol of the common soldier and understand why they followed him. His civile ingenium and mira comitas as opposed to the characteristics of Tiberius, who, although a capable general, never succeeded in secur­ ing the confidence of the common soldier, are real assets in the conduct of the campaign.

Summary of the Campaign of A.D. 15

In summary it may be said that although the campaign with respect to its outcome was more of a disaster than a success, still the performance of Germanicus as a general in Tacitus' account is certainly admirable, whereas the disasters in the confrontation with Arminius and on the retreat are attributable to Arminius1 incalculability and natural set backs. From the viewpoint of strategy

Germanicus decides to start the invasion at a favorable moment but quickly changes plans and adapts himself to new situations. The planning of the moves is carefully thought out by the strategy of isolating the center of the hostile coalition. When his moves prove to be a failure,he is able to retrieve himself by quick reactions. Though the retreat was a disaster still the ratio for the division of i the forces bespeaks the circumspection of the general.

With respect to his moral qualities his fides and dementia 230

find expression in liberating Segestes and his son, in his

pietas on the field of Varus and finally in his comitas

towards the soldiers, so that one may say that this first

campaign shows Germanicus1 best, qualities and capabilities.

What he needed for ultimate success was experience with

the incalculable new enemy, and knowledge of the terri~

tory. To collect these he had time on this campaign and

it is interesting to see how Tacitus presents him in the

following campaign when Germanicus draws the conclusions

out of his earlier experience.

The Campaign of A.D. 16

The quick renewal of the campaign during the next

year is, as Tacitus sees it, prompted on Germanicus1 part

by the psychological warfare between him and his father.

Germanicus is aware that Tiberius disapproves of his moves

therefore he decides to take advantage of the soldiers' mood and to bring the war to a successful end before

Tiberius could possibly interfere.1 Not a word that

Tiberius has practically declared the war to be at an end

by obtaining the decree for the triumph, because its goal,

the revenge of the Varian disaster, has been reached.

That Germanicus has collected experience during the'first

campaign which he applies in the planning of the second

campaign is made clear by Tacitus in reproducing

1Ann.2.5.1. 231

Germanicus1 considerations with respect to the planning of the new move.1 These include such concerns as the choice of an expedient battlefield, the season, the disadvantage of long marches, concern for the soldiers, and difficulty of supply, so that after a long deliberation the voyage by sea seems to be most expedient.^ It carries the soldiers close to the battlefield without wearing out their energy on long marches. Germanicus had learned that he could not win against Arminius if his soldiers had to overcome a number of natural obstacles first. The reason why Tacitus dwells so extensively on these considerations is, I believe, to show that Germanicus in all situations acted with rationality. He penetrates his mind in order to illuminate those sources of action that prompt the success. The extensive description of the building of the fleet serves the same purpose. The preparation is con­ trolled by the idea of expediency, only the most reliable commanders are in charge of the construction and the ships are built on purpose with large loading space and potential for swift movement, since the campaign of the previous year had shown that the disaster on the sea was caused by ships that did not meet these qualifications.

Ann. 2.6.

^The authenticity of the voyage by sea is supported by the evidence of the fragment of Albinovanus Pedo, an officer of Germanicus' staff, in Seneca Rhet., Suas. 1.15 (=FPL, pp. 115-116). 232

As in the previous year the operation again starts with the tactic of isolating the Cheruscans by invading the territory of the Chatti/ who had risen again.^ The operation serves at the same time the purpose of fortify­ ing the area adjoining the Rhine front so as to advance the strategic line of defense. Germanicus lays his plan carefully.2

With respect to the moves of the fleet Tacitus notes the only strategic mistake that Germanicus committed by anchoring on the wrong bank of the Ems river. This was really the only mistake of calculation that may have been vividly discussed on his staff. It caused a delay of several days, which may have been a vital time factor for the conduct of the final battle, because Germanicus had to retreat early in order to escape the storms of the sea in the fall. The experience of the previous year had taught him.

Before the final confrontation with Arminius on the battlefield of Idistaviso there is again a number of preparatory moves that bespeaks Germanicus' circumspection and sense of duty.2 Under the idea haud imperatorium ratus to expose the legion to the final confrontation without

^Ann. 2.7.

2C f. Koestermann, op. cit., p. 44 9.

2Ann. 2.11. 233 preparing a camp for a retreat, Germanicus sends the

Batavian advance troop over the Weser for the purpose of clearing the ground. Although the move was pushed back it still had its desired success: the army could pitch the camp. So far the physical preparation for the battle: the operation had unfolded meticulously according to the s planning of the general staff except only' for the one mistake which may have caused some delay.

Equally important is the moral preparation of German­ icus himself as well as of his soldiers. In order to test his hold over the common man he decides to roam around their tents at night-*- in order to listen to their conver­ sation. The act itself has again something of the romantic coloring that Tacitus loves to lavish on Germanicus, and although the spying in itself may be objectionable,Tacitus again, in order to show that his hero's intentions were pure, illuminates the reason for this action. It is the most reliable way to find out what the soldiers really thought; fama fruitur, nobilitas ducis, patientia and comitas together with admiration for his physical appear­ ance give him moral support and the assurance that the soldiers will fight for him wherever he leads them (gratiam in acie faterentur). The passage is meant on Tacitus' part to do two things:to enhance and adorn Germanicus but

^•Ann. 2.13. 234 also to recreate the force that contributes most to the final success, namely the assurance of moral support. The dream that Germanicus has in the night right before the battle^- (his superstitious nature is receptive to dreams) and the favorable auspices are positive foreshadowings of his undertaking and add to the moral support that he needs in order to meet Arminius.

In the same way he prepares the army morally for the ensuing battle by an address. Far from the flamboyant style of his speech which he held before the mutineers it is sapientia provisa aptaque imminenti pugnae.^ He discusses the advantage of their position, points to the Germans' disadvantageous equipment (a knowledge which he may have acquired from the German soldiers in his army) and gives some directions of how to use this advantage. In addition to that he makes a right estimate of the barbarian psychol­ ogy by pointing to their moral weakness: they don't have the sense of shame and honor and will leave the battlefield 0 in a danger. The speech bespeaks level-headedness. It does not inspire false optimism. Arminius is a difficult enemy; the Romans have to be adequately informed of their real advantages so as to meet the danger. With the right estimate Germanicus gives only those instructions that are

^Ann. 2.14.

^Ann. 2.14. 235 really useful for the moment without exaggeration and thus prepares the soldiers in the most effective way.

Tacitus' description of the battle itself shows that

Germanicus marshalled his troops in an unusual but flex­ ible way-*- so that they could attack from a marching position and reach the enemy wherever necessary. This way

Arminius would have no advantage from a renewed deception.

The plan unfolds into a concerted action and a tactic of envelopment which secures the victory for the Romans and the spontaneous acclamation of Tiberius on the battle­ field. According to Tacitus the victory surely goes to the credit of Germanicus, who has planned the battle, although the lack of discipline of Arminius, whose con­ cept of attack had been disturbed, had played into his hands. But this was not yet the end, since the self- conscious Germans renewed the attack from a new position advantageous for them. Nothing’ escaped Germanicus' notice.

He adapted himself to the new situation as well as possible but the battle nevertheless became agonizing and the victory was only due to the Romans' superior equipment. .

•Again as in the previous years Germanicus decided for early retreat because the season was advanced. Unfortu­ nately, however, this foresight did not avail anything when

•^■Cf. Koestermann, op. cit., p. 457 ff. 236 the fleet was overcome by the storm. Seeing so many of his soldiers lost Germanicus was close to committing

suicide in the flood. This action has often been taken as effusive and pathetic, but I think that despite its

Virgilian overtones Tacitus notes the breakthrough of

Germanicus' genuine feeling .of responsibility and shows how strongly he feels attached to his soldiers.

In order to balance off the losses he decides to make two quick thrusts against the Chatti and the Marsi,-*- who had risen again when they heard of the Roman losses at the sea. The thrusts are controlled by speed (eo promptior

Caesar pergit introrsus) and reestablished the Roman position of power, since the enemy was convinced that the

Romans were unconquerable. Thus is explainable the con­ viction which grew at the front that the war could be ended within a year. After Germanicus and his soldiers had seen the enemy frightened by the Roman virtus they were convinced, supported by their success, that the strength of the enemy was weakening. Tacitus adequately recreates this feeling so as to make the reader see why

Germanicus and the army felt cheated when Tiberius pres­ sured Germanicus to break off the war. The overall success, at least as far as strategy was concerned, may

^Ann. 2.24. 237

have blinded those at the front to the real situation# which Tiberius recognized much better from the perspec­

tives of experience and distance.

Summary of the Campaign of A.D. 16

As in the first campaign Tacitus' presentation of

Germanicus as a general leaves nothing to be desired. The

ratio belli is all-pervasive: in his consideration for

preparation based on prior experience, in advancing the

strategic front, in moving with care, in calculating

Arminius1 tricky tactic, in adapting himself quickly to

new situations and in balancing off losses by quick

thrusts in order to reestablish the Roman prestige. The moral guidance which he shows in his address is equally

level-headed. He receives more support from his soldiers

by their favorable statements.

As far as military tactics are concerned Germanicus

is certainly the general who has the ability to extend the

Roman frontier to the El£e river, so Tacitus thinks. But

his performance does not appear as spectacular. He is

perhaps of all of Tiberius' provincial governors the only

one who fully measures up to Agricola in all aspects. But

whereas Agricola is idealized and his achievements are

greatly overblown, Tacitus' Germanicus moves in a real

situation. He is exposed to a difficult enemy and to a 238 number of setbacks that are beyond his calculations and therefore make his campaign look much less spectacular.

Tacitus1 outlook also may have been more mature when he wrote the story of Germanicus and may have known that victories were not easy even for a brilliant general.

Tacitus has not excessively enhanced and adorned Germani­ cus; he has only in a few places put on a- little coloring in order to bring some basic characteristics out clearly: his popularity and his sense of responsibility. But in all other matters, I think, his account allows us to conclude that he made an adequate assessment of him as a general.

The reason that he does not appear as an ideal like

Agricola may be due to the differing natures of the works.

The encomiastic biography admits of a certain license as to its truthfulness. Exaggeration and idealization are as in funeral eulogies almost a requirement of tact, and since Tacitus is defending his father-in-law against a propaganda that had underestimated his achievement, this fact may have contributed to the idealization, whereas the criteria of presenting the Roman history in the Annals were more rigorous as to presumption of truthfulness.

The Role of Tiberius in Tacitus1 Presentation of the war in Germany

I In Chapter II, part 2 it was stated that Tiberius inherited from Augustus the problem of revenge for the

Varian disaster and that the solution of the problem had

! 239 two aspects, a political and a military one. To both of them this revenge did not mean a full conquest of Germany, but probably only the recovery of the lost standards.

That would suffice for public opinion as the symbol of the reestablished Roman prestige. Further, the chronology of the honors for Germanicus, which as objective material speak their own language about Tiberius' intentions, indicate that Tiberius wanted the war to be at an end after the summer campaign of A.D. 15. That was when he had the senate pass the decree for the highest honor, the triumph and the triumphal arch, because he considered that the minimal objective, the recovery of the standards, had

I been achieved. This gave him the opportunity to stress to senate and public opinion the loyal co-operation between him and Germanicus and also the successful continuity of the Augustan external policy.

From the military standpoint also, the war, as

Tiberius thought, was disadvantageous to say the least.

The initially favorable configuration of power within the hostile German coalition, which had promised to bring quick success against Arminius, had changed in the spring of

A.D. 15 to Rome's disadvantage.

The invasion into the territory of the Chatti, the

Marsi and the Bruct.eri had guaranteed only a partial suc­ cess, because these tribes rose again in the next year. 240

In addition to this the retreat had brought considerable losses. In no way were Tiberius' expectations under which the campaign had been started fulfilled. Therefore he gradually realized during the summer of A.D. 15 that it was ruinous for the state and had better be ended.

Germanicus, however, did not listen to these signals and continued the war on his own, which put Tiberius' desire to respect the precepts of Augustus to the hardest test.

It needed persuasion, the offer of the second consulship and the commission to the east in order to bring Germani­ cus home.-*-

From Tacitus' presentation alone we would hardly be able to extract the policy of Tiberius. He furnishes a number of items of information so that we can glean this result from it, but his account is organized according to different criteria.

Koestermann, Historia, 6 (1957), p. 465 takes the standpoint of Germanicus and Tacitus, namely that the con­ quest could have been-successfully ended if Tiberius had given Germanicus one more year. Tiberius should either have pursued the war to its conclusion with the revenues of the new province of Cappadocia to finance it or never have allowed it to be started at all. Koestermann thus accepts Tacitus' interpretation that the only reason for Germani­ cus recall was Tiberius' mistrust. Considering the new theory of Timpe, however, this criticism needs revision. The important point is that Tiberius had shown that'he wanted the war ended at the end of the summer of A.D. 15. He had a number of political and military reasons. No matter how valid they were in reality, they were cogent ones for him,so that his recall of Germanicus was not exclusively due to personal motives. 241 The relation between Germanicus and Tiberius was, as he has pinpointed in Annals 1.33, controlled by mistrust.

A number of factual and psychological factors operated to charge the atmosphere in addition to family rivalry.

Tiberius' anxiety was understandable, given Germanicus* nature, his power, popularity? Tiberius could not guarantee what he would do as the conqueror of Germany, so that besides the political and military reasons for ending the war there were in reality personal ones also.

For Tacitus these become the controlling factors of his narrative.

After the quelling of the mutiny Tiberius had already shivered at the idea of Germanicus' gloria belli.^ But he had maintained the facade of loyal cooperation. How does he react now during the war? Several places of interfer- ence have to be considered. The account of the year

A.D. 15 opens with the puzzling statement, decernitur

Germanico triumphus, manente bello.3 Normally Tacitus relates these events at the appropriate place at the end of the campaign.4 Even more puzzling is the addition that this triumph was decreed manente bello. The decree thus

^Ann. 1.53.

2Ann. 1.55; 1.61; 1.69; 2.5; 2.27; 2.41.

3Ann. 1.55.

^Ann. 2.52; 3.74. 242 does not.honor Germanicus1 final success, for the war was not ended. As the discussion of Germanicus' conduct of war has shown, Tacitus sees the campaign as a high aim in itself, meant to avenge Varus and to extend the empire.

The triumphal decree comes therefore at the wrong time.

That Tiberius was paranoid, showered Germanicus with honors, and thus betrayed his high aim, must be Tacitus' thought.

The triumph was a paradox, namely to honor Germanicus in public opinion, but it was in reality the emanation of mistrust, and Tacitus emphasizes this paradox by the puzzling position of the decree at the opening of the year and the criticism implied in manente bello. The same criticism is implied in bellumque, quia (Germanicus) prohibitus erat pro cdnfecto accipiebatur.1 Just as

Tiberius honored Germanicus at the wrong time, so also

Tiberius considered the war at an end at the wrong moment.

Equally puzzling is the report of Tiberius' bestowal of the triumphal ornaments on Caecina,Silius and A p r o n i u s . ^

Although reported at the right time, at the end of the year, the honors still surprise,because through Tacitus the reader knows that only Caecina deserved reward. What had Silius and Apronius done? Did Tiberius want to. bribe them and draw them away from Germanicus by honoring them

•*-Ann. 2.41.

2 Ann. 1.72. < 243

unduly? That is the impression the reader gets and, I

think, it is intentional. The general impression is that

Tiberius did everything at the wrong time and distributed

rewards undeservedly and thus betrayed Germanicus.

Triumphs, triumphal ornaments, thus become for Tacitus

concealed symptoms of criticism and betrayal.

As outlined above,^ there are also two direct inter­

ferences by Tiberius with the conduct of the war: the

criticism of Germanicus on the battlefield of Varus3 and

of Agrippina when she performs her extraordinary wifely

duty.3 Here the criticism takes open forms for the first

time. In the first case it was stated that Tiberius'

criticism was understandable from his standpoint as a

general. The aspect of the Varian'camp could cause

demoralization among the soldiers. Justified also was the

criticism of Germanicus1 disregard of the state religion

from Tiberius' standpoint as a ritualist and pontifex

maximus. The point may even have had Tacitus' support, « since he was himself a quindecimvir, and critics have so

far taken Tiberius' objections as justified.^ I believe,

however, that Tacitus' opinion is implied in the way he

xCf. p. |. If3 3Ann. 1.61.

^Ann. 1.69.

^Cf. Shotter, op. cit., p. 198. Koestermann, ad loc., p. 161. 244 puts this criticism into the text. He creates an atmos­ phere of other-worldlinessthat rouses the soldiers' and

Germanicus' emotions. Their minds are occupied with other things than proprieties of state religion. At this point

Tiberius produces some remarks that, besides being petty, also miss the point, for the soldiers are not demoralized, but on the contrary they are roused to greater anger, as

Tacitus has just said, ira in hostem aucta.

Tiberius' suggestion misses the mark. And what did this criticism of Germanicus in his competence as an augur mean? Was he to disregard his duty as a general for that reason? Tiberius' remarks must have been a matter of discussion in the headquarters or at court in order to be transmitted to tradition, because he had leveled at

Germanicus the inappropriate criticism at the inappropri­ ate time. Tacitus brings this out so glaringly by inter­ twining the gloomy atmosphere in the field with Tiberius' pettiness. There was only one explanation for it:

Tiberius mistrusted Germanicus so much that he criticized everything,whenever he had the opportunity, so Tacitus thought at this point.

The criticism of Agrippina is very much along the same lines. This time, however, Tiberius does not interfere openly, but Tacitus illuminates the thought in his mind.

Since Tiberius' mistrust of Agrippina is as justified as 245 his mistrust of Germanicus from his own standpoint, he can

only interpret her action as a proof of courting the favor

of the legions for sinister purposes and as an offence

against his imperial dignity. His respect for tradition

also was offended when he saw a woman performing the military duties of an officer. But his criticism again

hits beside the mark. Agrippina was at this moment per­

forming a real service for the sake of consolidating the

Rhine frontier. Tacitus again brings out the inappro­

priateness by a glaring juxtaposition of the real situ­

ation and of Tiberius' thoughts: they bespoke mistrust,

which in addition was fanned by Seianus as his sinister

game starts.

Since after A.D, 15 Tiberius wanted the war at an end

and Germanicus had not understood his signals, he started

looking for other opportunities to recall him in a way

which would not be a public accusation of incompetence.

The disturbances in the east^ were a welcome pretext, so

Tacitus says, because assignment to the east would separ­

ate Germanicus from the army on the Rhine. Thus Tiberius'

mistrust is the only motivation that Tacitus can find for

his decision, whereas in reality this reason was only one

out of a whole number. Tiberius was so paranoid that his

3-Ann. 2.5. 246

fear could even go to the extreme of wanting to expose

Germanicus to casibus et dolis. I don't think that this remark is meant to blacken Tiberius, but that Tacitus here only recreates his understanding of Tiberius' mentality: his mistrust could go into unfathomable depths. One never knew what he was thinking and to play with the idea of getting Germanicus out of the way would be in character.

Tiberius' considerations are here again put into sharp contrast with Germanicus intentions, quanto acriora in eum studia militum et aversa patrui voluntas celerandae victoriae intentior. The antagonism between the two is thus located exclusively in the realm of psychological warfare without uncovering equally valid and perhaps more pressing reasons: the difference of the two objectives of the war. Thus in Tacitus' account it appears as if

Tiberius had only personal reasons to recall Germanicus.

Germanicus' popularity with the troops and with the people had increased, and the grasp of reality of the grim old

Claudian, who was certainly endowed with psychological shortcomings, began to weaken. That is why he started depriving himself of the only person on the Rhine capable of restoring the Roman prestige in Germany. Tacitus further puts the thoughts of both of them in juxtaposition and thus stresses again the glaring contrast: Tiberius has the wrong idea at the wrong time, and he intends to 247 betray the aim of extending the empire, preparing his

decision deeply in the recesses of his tortured mind and a

long time ahead.

The same point of contrast is stressed in Tacitus'

account of Germanicus' final recall. Germanicus and his

soldiers on the warfront are optimistic, they have just

come back from the victory over Arminius and have made up

for the losses on the retreat.^- One more year would

suffice, they think, to finish the war successfully, because the enemy is wavering (labare hostem). But that

is not what Tiberius thought: sed crebris epistulis

Tiberius monebat rediret ad decretum triumphum. Nervously

Tiberius has been writing letters for quite a while and has tried to interfere with the successful conduct of the war at the wrong time, Tacitus seems to say.

Tiberius' presumed reasons are stated at full length by Tacitus and it is worthwhile to look at their validity.

His first argument shows that he assessed the situation in

Germany adequately; he gives Germanicus credit for his victory, but points also to the losses of manpower and material on the retreat. The reasons sound thoroughly honest. To Tiberius, who had the perspective of the whole empire from the home front, the prospect of success did not appear as optimistic, even after Germanicus' victory. The

•^Ann. 2.26. 248 second argument * that it would be better to use consilium instead of vis, also has a true ring, if one considers that one of Tiberius' basic tenets of foreign policy was to use armed forces only as little as possible.

Like Augustus, whose view he adopted, he was convinced that the empire had reached its natural boundaries and that the maintenance of peace was more important than the expansion. He corroborates this conviction with examples from personal experience, in particular his policy against the Sugambri, the Suebi and Maroboduus. In each instance he had succeeded by military operation first to defeat the center of the hostile coalition, without, however, driving the success home by exterminating the tribes.

Hence he carried the warfare just to the point at which

Germanicus stood now with Arminius. For the rest Tiberius had settled the affairs successfully by diplomacy, so that he gained the criterion of judgment for the present situ­ ation from his own experience and thus makes his argument extremely plausible, I think. This is Tiberius' stand­ point, not Tacitus' view.

The last suggestion, finally, that the-revenge for

Varus has been fulfilled, is honest also after the recovery of the standards. The idea of leaving the Germans to their internal discords is understandable. For how often had tribal rivalries already played into the Romans' hand, and 249 had not the internal weakness of the Parthians and its advantage for Rome just furnished again'a good example, as Caesar's experience in Gaul had done also?

Germanicus will not listen to reason and therefore

Tiberius resorts to the offer of the second consulship, thus putting Germanicus' modestia to an even harder test,

Tacitus says. By this he means, I think, that the offer of the triumph had not impressed Germanicus, he was not the kind of person who would have needed public recognition of this kind just as he omitted to put his name on the monument at the Elbe river. The second public office was a different matter, a more powerful means, Tiberius thought, and in order to make sure that Germanicus would certainly come he plays on his affection for Drusus.

Germanicus understood. Tacitus' last word concerning /» the issue is haud cunctatus est ultra Germanicus quamquam fingi ea segue per invidiam parto iam decori abstrahi intellegeret.^ By reproducing the impression of Germanicus, who from the beginning knew that his father hated him but who at this point did not understand his reasons, Tacitus finally unmasks what he sees as the princeps' ulterior motive, invidia. Mistrust is a powerful factor in Tiberius' dealing with Germanicus and it has shown all the way a long

Ann. 2.26.5. 250

Tacitus so emphasizes the point that it blinds him to the validity of the real arguments that Tiberius has. The way he reports them they sound as if they are all pretexts, produced in an impressive series by a panicked princeps.

They are proofs of his deceitful mentality.

That Tacitus does not do justice to Tiberius at this point is obvious. This injustice does not lie so much in mentioning the factor of invidia, for this was a true one, but in the distribution of the weight of the reasons, of which invidia becomes the predominant one.

A final note only on Tacitus' presentation of German- icus' triumph in A.D. 17. The fiction that all of Germany had been conquered was maintained: triumphavit de Cheruscis,

Chattisque et Angrivariis guaegue aliae nationes usque ad

Albim colunt.^ This is the official version, attested also by Velleius Paterculus, Suetonius and Dio Cassius.2 But

Tacitus knows better: bellum . . . pro confecto acci- piebatur. Outwardly Tiberius honored Germanicus for com­ plete victory, but unfortunately he was not able to deceive anybody. People knew that he hated him and that is why an occulta formido was spreading: the darlings of the Roman people were shortlived. Tacitus reproduces the disquiet with which people looked at the two and which explains why

•*~Ann. 2.41.

2Vell. 2.129.2; Suet. Gaius 1.1; Dio 57.6.1. 251

Tiberius thought that Germanicus had to be removed to the east. If he were present in Rome everybody would notice their strained relationship and Tiberius' fears even more, and Germanicus would gain the benefit from such observa­ tions.

Summary

In the account of the campaign Tacitus has thus given very much his own version of the war. He brings out artistically Tiberius' mistrust of the young prince in mentioning Tiberius' interferences; in each instance, the decree of the triumph, the bestowal of the triumphal ornaments, the criticism of Germanicus on the battle field of Varus and of Agrippina at the bridgehead, his speculation of removing Germanicus and his final recall by persuasion, everything is done at the wrong time and for the wrong reasons. This is emphasized by the juxtaposition of the thoughts at the home- and at the war-front. Disre­ garding the fact that the war aims of Tiberius and German­ icus were different, Tacitus thus subordinates the factor of the conduct of warfare solely to the controlling idea of psychological warfare. Invidia on the part of Tiberius against the young, capable and successful prince, whom he deprives of his glory, is the key factor to which all other reasons are subordinated. It remains to ask: what was

Tacitus' justification for this, presentation? 252

In Tacitus' opinion the war,.as his presentation shows,

was important, because it was conducted for the empire by a

general of military genius who displayed courage and other

aspects of virtus. The integrity and the intensity of

Germanicus' efforts to expand the empire against adverse

circumstances and against a hostile princeps— that is what

fascinates Tacitus. He pinpoints his virtus in such pas­

sages as the planning, the recovery after the disasters,

the antagonism of Tiberius, the dramatic final confronta­

tion with Arminius and the recovery of territory after

losses on the retreat. Germanicus appears as the true

successor of the republican empire-builders and it is from

the standpoint of republican imperialism and of Trajanic

energy that Tacitus argues.^

The conquest first of the west and then of the east were the great achievements of the republic that had

secured the dominion of the world. Since Lucullus it had been an open secret that a Roman general could take his

armies anywhere and Caesar's conquest of Gaul was the most

powerful political propaganda in proof of this capability.

Tacitus was proud of Trajan's expansion of the empire

as far as the Indian Ocean, and in his report about the

conquest of Britain by Agricola, he says that the virtus

•^Cf. R. Syme, Tac. II, p. 492. 253 exercituum et Romani nominis gloria^- had required the thrust into Caledonia. He treats the Roman conquerors with admiring sympathy, which he shows not only in his treatment of Germanicus but also in his treatment of

Agricola and of Corbulo.

Tacitus disapproves of .the fact that Augustus and

Tiberius stopped the conquest of Germany and retreated to the Rhine. The sound piece of advice that Augustus had 2 gxven to Tiberius, coercendi intra terminos imperii, is commented upon by Tacitus' incertum rnetu an per invidiam, a suggestion which is certainly unjustified, since the limitation to the Rhine as border was dictated by reasons of expediency. But Tacitus' disparaging statement is explainable by his usual animosity towards purely defen­ sive policy or diplomatic agreements. He interprets them as emanations of the princeps* fears to entrust commands to persons of ability, because that might lead to rebellion.

For this reason even Augustus, in Tacitus' opinion, did not allow anybody to rise to military glory and to that end he followed a policy of peace. In the same way Tacitus indicted Tiberius' foreign policy as that of a princeps incuriosus proferendi imperii. Tiberius is afraid of

^•Agr. 27.1.

2Ann. 1.11.

3 Ann. 4.6. 254 anybody with power, so his reign, also, is a peaceful one.

Consiliis et astu res externas moliri, arma procul habere,i s Tacitus' bitter comment on Vitellius1 settle­ ment of the affairs in the east. When the Frisians in­ flict losses on Roman forces Tiberius tried to hide the fact, ne cui bellum permittat.^

It is certain that Tacitus accepts Germanicus* interpretation of the situation in Germany, namely that the conquest was possible and would have needed only one more year, so that his bias for Germanicus is not neces­ sarily only a bias for the person but also admiration of republican imperialism,which has blinded him to the ade- I quate presentation of the historical facts. The criteria of presentation are therefore colored by personal bias of basic political tenets. But Tacitus was not a blind admirer of conquest in itself. His narrative often dis­ closes hazards and losses. Trajan's thrusts were memor­ able, but they had disasters in the sequel: it had proved to be unwise to expand the empire beyond the Euphrates.

In the same way Corbulo's expedition led to heavy disaster and we have seen how in the German campaigns Tacitus focuses in cinematographical close-ups on the losses. But

•^Ann. 6.42. 2 Ann. 4.73. 255 still it is the virtus, the desire for conquest, that

fascinates him and this is one of the criteria of his

presentation.

But Germanicus' virtus and his own admiration for

republican imperialism are not Tacitus' sole reasons for

the extensive presentation of the wars in Germany, so much more developed in comparison to the parallel sources.

The fear of losing personal power is the strongest

trait in all of Tacitus' principes, Augustus, Tiberius,

Nero, Domitian, and the trait is even seen in Oriental kings.^ Augustus had created subsidia dominationi.2

Tiberius' paranoia caused his reign to be ended in terror as was Nero's. The desire for'power thus controls all of their actions, and a person who displays military ability consequently runs the greatest risk of being thwarted by the princeps. In Nero's and Claudius' time the most not­ able deprived general is Corbulo. But Tacitus has even a more striking example of the relation between princeps and general from personal experience in the case of Domitian and Agricola.

The biography of his father-in-law is meant to be a corrective of the Flavian propaganda, which had over­ estimated Domitian's campaign in Germany at the expense of

•*-Ann. 6.44.

2Ann. 1.4. Agricola's achievement in Britain. Tacitus magnifies

Agricola's campaign as compared to the parallel sources and attributes to his virtus-due reward, because it had not received its full credit from the emperor. All

Agricola had been rewarded with at his return were triumphal ornaments and some comment about the command of

Syria. But as it turned out for Agricola, who had. made a discrete arrival in Rome and retired into private life without much else to hope for,neither the proconsulates of Asia and of Africa nor the governorship of Syria ever materialized. Domitian had graciously granted Agricola the leisure and had accepted his thanks when he asked for retirement.1 That was the reward for a successful general.

There was only one explanation for the fact that Agricola had not received his credit: Domitian was afraid of him and feared for losing his power to a more capable man, who had achieved more than a pretended successful campaign against the Germans and who enjoyed popular favor because of his poised personality and of his achievement. The

Agricola thus pinpoints the basic tension between princeps and general which had proved to be in history an ever- recurring human phenomenon. 257

The situation between a powerful general who had the support of the.army and a prestigious record of military achievement and a princeps who had the civil authority but whose power depended on the loyalty of his commanding general had repeated itself in imperial history. The princeps1 insecurity in the face of his general had always taken the same psychological expression: the princeps feared for his position and consequently tried to curb his general's ambition.

The problem of Agricola and Domitian repeats itself in the relation between Germanicus and Tiberius. German- icus has at the moment all the military power and

Tiberius' imperial authority is valid only if supported by the power of his general. Would Germanicus try to overthrow him, especially since he knew that he hated him? There­ fore the campaigns are put under the controlling presenta­ tion of the personal antagonism between Germanicus and

Tiberius. They disclose according to Tacitus' personal judgment the recurring problem of a princeps' anxieties when faced with a brilliant general. So Tacitus' narra­ tive points to the symptoms of the eternal conflict that arises out of the division of power and authority and is his dramatic indictment of the princeps' attitude.

Since he himself had experienced this problem in observing Domitian's attitude to Agricola the personal 258 experience takes artistic form of paradigmatic character in the German campaigns again. History always unfolds along the same pattern, as long as human nature stays the same, Tacitus seems to say with resignation, and the

Agricola and the German campaigns are the media for this discussion of exemplary validity. 259

Part III

Tacitus View of the Settlement of Affairs the East

In Chapter II, Part 3, I have stated that Tiberius dispatched Germanicus to the east according to the theoretical and practical pattern of the Augustan policy, but that in the choice of his personal agent Tiberius fell short of the Augustan pattern, of success, because Cn.

Calpurnius Piso developed into a paradigm of provincial mismanagement. Tiberius made a good choice with Germani­ cus, who fascinated the easterners. His policy was logical and aimed at genuinely satisfying the interests of all people concerned. Everything except for the provincial administration of Syria turned out to be a full success.

Here the proper process was disturbed by the personal antagonism of Germanicus and Piso.

Just as the wars in Germany so the regulation of the affairs in the east have left scanty traces in imperial history elsewhere, although a prudent policy was followed, that guaranteed a long-lasting success of almost twenty years.

Velleius Paterculus*- mentions only the honor of being sent overseas given to Germanicus. Suetonius2 and Dio

^-Vell. 2.129.

2Suet. Gaius 2 and 4. 260

Cassius^ mention the mission summarily but elaborate on

Germanicus1 death and the charge of poisoning^which impli­ cated Tiberius and Piso. So one may say^that it was the

sensational aspects of this mission that aroused poster­ ity's interest.

Tacitus' version of the mission unfolds into a meticulously detailed and meandering dramatic narrative/ in which the actual settlement of affairs in the east takes up only very little s p a c e ,2 so that one has to ask, what Tacitus found to be so memorable about the mission.

Early in A.D. 15 Tiberius had played with the idea of removing Germanicus from the army on the Rhine by sending him as his special commissioner to the east.^ The triumphal celebration -in A.D. 17 had convinced him that he had to remove him from the people in Rome as well. For all his feverish activity to display mutual cooperation between himself and his adopted son, the grant of the triumph, the distribution of money in Germanicus' name and the assumption of the consulship together with him, he could not convince people of his sincerity towards German­ icus ; Nee ideo sincerae caritatis fidem adsecutus,

!Dio 57.18.6.

2Ann. 2.56.

3Ann. 2.5. 261

amoliri iuvenem specie honoris statuit-*-— this was what

people believed. These are, as Tacitus sees it, Tiberius’

only reasons to send Germanicus on the mission, namely the

anxiety that he may win the support of the people as much

as he had won the support of the army, and it must be

remembered also that Germanicus had the support of a major

faction at the court. That was too much for Tiberius,

so Tacitus thought. Tacitus does not mention that

Germanicus was the only possible good choice on Tiberius' part for the difficulty of the task in the east and that

Augustus would probably have sent him there also in the

same circumstances. On the contrary by placing the empha- sis on Tiberius' anxiety (struxit causas aut forte oblatas 3 arripuit), he prejudices the reader sufficiently against

Tiberius' statement when recommending Germanicus in his pro­ posal to the senate, nec posse motum Orientem nisi

Germanici sapientia componi.^ It was again only another of those public displays of trust and loyalty, Tacitus thinks, which nobody would believe to be honest. Thus he logically continues, as he had done with the campaigns in Germany, to present the appointment only under psychological

^Ann. 2.42.

^Ann. 2.43.

3Ann. 2.42.

4 Ann. 2.43.1. 262 considerations, whereas in reality Tiberius' reasons were surely more complex.

He had Germanicus appointed by the senate with a generous amount of power, but Tacitus points to the hollow­ ness of this apparent generosity in the next sentence, starting with a telling conjunction: sed Tiberius demoverat

Syria Creticum Silanum, per adfinitatem conexum Germanico,

. . . praefeceratque Cn. Pisonem.-^- That was for Tacitus the evidence of Tiberius' duplicity in this matter and the reason to unmask his generosity as just another example of species. The intractable noble with a family tradition of hostility toward the Caesars and of specific hostility toward Germanicus recommended* himself for the task of putting a check on Germanicus' possible ambitions,2 and in his moral foreshadowing Tacitus leaves no doubt about how

Piso will act.

According to Tacitus Tiberius intention in appointing

Piso hardly escaped anybody's notice. Germanicus recog­ nized it as Tiberius' expression of mistrust and knew, that

Piso's actions were meant to be indications of Tiberius'will.

For the people the perception of Tiberius' mistrust had increased Germanicus' popularity: Germanico alienatio

^Ann. 2.43.2

2Cf. p. 83 ff. 263 patrui amorem apud ceteros auxerat,^The appointment of

Piso thus becomes a key passage in Tacitus' scheme,that

sets the stage for the unfolding of the action to its fruition. There are two groups: Tiberius and Piso as opposed to Germanicus, his friends and the people. Any unfriendly thrust from Tiberius-Piso will increase popu­ lar exasperation and sympathy for Germanicus, so that from now on the narrative of the eastern affairs will be put by Tacitus into the controlling framework of the in­ compatibility between Piso and Germanicus, which will eventually have its fruition in the trial of Piso.

Germanicus' journey to Syria is underscored in

Tacitus' account by the idea of his interest in sightsee­ ing, in winning the easterners by his affability, probably with respect to his role as the future heir of the empire.

His visit with Drusus may not have been more than the dis- play of affection and cooperation with his brother, his visit to Actium a display of his pietas towards his ances- tors, since we have seen this aspect of his aristocratic attitude before in his speeches.3 In Athens he wins the hearts of the Athenians by adapting himself to their local customs. There may not be any sinister design behind this

-*-Ann. 2.43.

2Ann. 2.53.

3Ann. 1.42; 43. 264 attitude,1 but as he will show from now on, his adaptation to local customs in the east will aid in binding the easterners to Rome, whereas any display of Roman austerity and dignity may have the opposite effect. So far German­ icus has always appeared as the embodiment of the forces that keep the empire together. The rest of his journey also may have been controlled by this idea, as he visits

Euboea, Lesbos, Pontus, Ilium, Colophon and the oracle of 2 Claros,, where the divine answer announcing Germanicus' early death may have contributed, considering his super­ stitious nature, to his later belief that he had been poisoned.

After Germanicus had won the hearts of the Athenians by his affability Piso starts with boisterous action and a slanderous and tactless speech to curb his popularity in Athens. This is their first open clash and is brought out by Tacitus in a telling juxtaposition of their differ­ ing attitudes.^ just as Tiberius, Piso starts doing things at the wrong time and for the wrong reasons and thereby contributes to the build-up of 'tension. Germanicus still

1Koestermann, "Mission," p. 339, without cogent reas­ ons in my view, interprets it as a little more provocative act, meant to win the Athenians for his own purposes.

2Ann. 2.54.

^Ann. 2.53 and 2.55. 265 reacts with politeness since he knows why Piso had been sent and that he enjoys Tiberius' protection. But Piso# not receptive to leniency hurries to Syria in order to arrive there first and to bind the legions to himself by drastic measures.

To what extent Piso was supported by Tiberius at this point# Tacitus does not make clear. The actions themselves suggest that he acted completely for his own purposes# for

Tiberius the disciplinarian and traditionalist can hardly have approved of Piso' undermining the army's morale.*-

It must be assumed that Piso# by binding the troops to himself, not to Tiberius— a suggestion supported by the evidence that the army called him# not Tiberius, parens legionum— wanted to secure a position of power for himself.

Plancina's parading in front of the troops and aping

Agrippina in order to court the soldiers' favor points in the same direction.2 How Tiber'ius felt about this is uncertain. He may have realized by now that he had appointed the wrong person,but he went along with Piso as long as he kept the army away from Germanicus. Germanicus for the moment did not interfere,because he had to hurry to his point of destination, Armenia, to execute his mission.

The settlement of affairs itself is recorded by Tacitus

iAnn. 2.55; cf. p. 86.

2 Ann. 2.55. 266 only briefly and without any political accent,'*' for two reasons, I believe. The settlement was•executed in agree­ ment with Tiberius. It had no effect on the worsening of

Germanicus' and Tiberius1 relationship and it was not functional in the build-up of tension, which is Tacitus' main interest. Secondly, tbe peaceful installation of the client-king, i.e., the whole repetition of Augustus' pattern of peaceful foreign policy in the east, did not allow for the display of Republican virtus in the defense of the Roman empire. That is, I believe, why Tacitus underplays the issue. 1

Of quite a different importance is the sequel, be-

I cause here the incompatibility between Germanicus and

Piso first reaches the political level and starts affect­ ing policy decisions.

When requested to send troops to Germanicus, Piso disobeyed, obviously under the influence of Tiberius' basic tenet to keep Germanicus away from the troops, which he interprets as obstruction at any risk.3 The case was never cleared up, because v/hen Germanicus and Piso met in the winter quarters in Cyrrus both controlled their para­ doxical feelings:3 Piso, conscious of the weakness of his

J-Ann. 2.56.

2Ann. 2.57.

3Cf. Koestermann, "Mission," p. 343. 267

position, hiding his fear behind a pretence of courage, since he felt he was being backed up by Tiberius; and

Germanicus, angry that his orders had been disobeyed but fearing Piso's support from Tiberius, not daring a con­ frontation but departing in hatred.-*- The antagonism between them, first latent and covered up by Germanicus' politeness, was still concealed, but was soon to erupt openly.

Piso did not limit his provocative attitude to matters concerning provincial administration but displayed it on diplomatic missions as well: he pounced with indiscretion on the luxury displayed at the state banquet, given in honor of Germanicus by the king of the Nabataeans,3 trying again as in Athens to crub Germanicus' popularity by making himself important. In both instances Germanicus still reacted with calm, obviously trying to avoid any conflicts with Tiberius. But his attitude toward"

O Artabanus and his removal of Vonones from Syria show that the rivalry has now moved from personal attacks to the level of political decisions. He refused to meet Artabanus at the Euphrates so as to avoid displeasing Tiberius, and

Vonones was removed from Syria both,because of Artabanus*

■^Koestermann, "Mission," p. 452.

3 Ann. 2.57.

3Ann. 2.58. 268 request, and for the reason that he was a friend of

Piso's, according to Tacitus' interpretation.

Having settled the affairs entrusted to him,-**

Germanicus took time off in order to visit Egypt. The

journey was probably prompted by a combination of sight­

seeing and the conduct of business on the pattern of

Gaius who had also sailed to Egypt. In Tacitus' account

the emphasis is heavily on sightseeing, the concern for

Egypt was only a pretext. This interpretation gives him

the opportunity to elaborate on Germanicus1 philhellenic

interests. Through the informality of his conduct, his

Greek clothes, his imitation of Scipio Africanus, he acquired an overwhelming popularity which is reflected by outside evidence in hi-s speech in Alexandria.2 The

informality here suggested ties in with his conduct in

Athens and at the banquet of the Nabataeans and it is meant to signalize in both instances his adaptation to the customs of the east, which is in Tacitus' sense, I believe, one of the forces that keep the east and the west together.

As Germanicus had displayed in front of his soldiers mira comitas and civile ingenium, so he does it here again in a different form. As it was in the Germanies an asset of the

1Ann. 2.59.

^Pap. Oxy. 2435, ed. Turner. 269 general, so here it is an asset of the sepcial commis­ sioner to the east.

His interest in sightseeing is emphasized by an impressive series of places that are named: Canopus,

Thebes, the statue of Memnon, the Pyramids, Syene and others,^- so as to recreate for the reader the attitude of almost Herodotean curiosity and an atmosphere of the exotic. Tiberius . . . acerrime increpuit quod contra instituta Augusti . . . Alexandriam introisset3 Tacitus reproduces Tiberius' sharp expression of anxiety that

Germanicus might use the granaries of Egypt to his own advantage. As outlined above,3 Tiberius' criticism was legally correct, as Germanicus' entry into Egypt was cor­ rect from Germanicus1 standpoint. But Tacitus makes his own judgment on the point very clear by literary devices of juxtaposition. As he had done in his description of

Germanicus' performance in the atmosphere of other­ worldliness on the Varus battlefield and of Tiberius' untimely interference as an expression of mistrust,4 so here Tacitus has Germanicus move in an exotic world, with his mind on other things than on the rules of Augustus.

^Ann. 2.60.

2Ann. 2.59.

3Cf. p. 164.

4Cf. p. 244. This creates the impression that Tiberius' petty remarks again come at the wrong time and can only be interpreted as a sign of mistrust, so that this interference becomes functional in the build-up of tension that worsens their relations.

At Germanicus1 return from Egypt Piso's cancellation of his provincial arrangements prompts for the first time an open outbreak of hostilities, and in the ensuing con­ flict, Piso, probably because he was not sure,whether

Tiberius still supported his plans and because he could not prevail over Germanicus, gave way under pressure and left the province by his own decision.1

At this point occurred Germanicus' illness, which must have been a sort of intermittent fever.^ Tacitus ex­ ploits the ups and downs of the.illness in order to record that reaction of Piso which convinced Germanicus that he has been poisoned. After leaving Syria Piso waited for the outcome of Germanicus' illness and took up his old game of obstruction. Then he waited again for the outcome of the illness probably intending to take pos­ session again of his province after Germanicus' death.

Piso's conduct on the whole convinced Germanicus of his responsibility for the illness and Tacitus makes it very 271 clear: Piso had opposed him in Athens, at the banquet, at the tribunal, he had refused to send troops to his support, he had rescinded his provincial arrangements, and now he was lurking some place outside of Syria. Tiberius had criticized his own son's entry into Egypt, and so Germani­ cus found himself isolated from all sides. There was only one explanation for his illness, so Tacitus makes the reader believe: Piso had poisoned him and the discovery of the maleficia^~ in his bedroom (Germanicus was super­ stitious by nature) reinforced this belief, as the oracle 2 at Claros may also have done.

The extent of Germanicus* conviction is brought out by Tacitus in Germanicus' speefch from the deathbed.3

Tacitus has meticously recreated those external forces that led up to the suspicion, and now he enters into his mind and recreates the forces that set the revenge against

Piso in motion. The emotional build up of anger breaks in violently, scelere Pisonis et Plancinae interceptus;^ however, Germanicus carefully excludes Tiberius from sus­ picion so as to protect his family from him after his death. But his carefulness did not avail anything; his

^Ann. 2.71.

2Cf. p. 264.

3Ann. 2.72.

^Ann. 2.72. 272 friends and the people saw through the game and Tiberius could not escape being implicated,because he was Piso's superior and friend. The suspicions themselves, whether accurate or not, were for Tacitus less important than the fact that they were believed, because this motivated the prosecutors to bring Piso to a trial, which was to have the gravest consequences for the reign of Tiberius. That is the reason why Tacitus insists so much on showing how the suspicions originated.

After Germanicus1 death Tacitus' account up to the trial of Piso is controlled by two themes: the conduct of Piso and Plancina and popular reaction to Germanicus1 death. At the news of Germanicus' death, received intemperanter, Piso displays a gaudium which is reinforced by Plancina, who puts on brightly colored cloths. What reasons can be advanced for this unbelievable attitude?

Piso and Plancina may have regarded Germanicus as a traitor to Tiberius, an argument which would be substan­ tiated by Piso's letter to Tiberius-^- in which he charges

Germanicus with res novae, so that his gaudium would ingratiate him with Tiberius. The argument is attractive, but there is, I believe, another possibility. Piso felt that he was on the losing side and assumed an attitude aimed at retrieving his position; the best way to dispel

■*\Ann. 2.78. 273 the suspicion of having poisoned Germanicus must have appeared to him to be an attitude of defiance, for had he kept hiding or pretended mourning people would have inter­ preted it as hypocrisy. Defiance against popular fury, which he also displayed later at his arrival in Rome, could more easily be interpreted as the sign of a clear conscience. It prompted, however, the opposite effect.

After Germanicusr death his friends immediately undertook to prosecute Piso in Rome, but Piso also started into action, stimulated by his centurions to regain the command of the army in Syria by civil war. The only point he had in his favor was,that he could still claim to be the rightful legate of Syria, since Tiberius had not re­ called him; but he was mistaken about the loyalty of the army that had called him parens legionum. After a short­ lived success and desperate attempts to win over his soldiers, expressed by Tacitus in terms of strong physical action consistent with his characterization of the man,'*- he had to surrender. Victa pertinacia, Tacitus says; pertinacia personified has been overcome.

One may ask for the justification of the long narra­ tive of the altercation in Syria. I believe, it is meant to make the reader believe, why Tiberius later in the trial

1Ann. 2.81; pro muris modo semet aflictando, modo singulos nomine ciens, praemns vocans seditionem coeptabat. was convinced that Piso had done something wrong, a fact which he could use as the only grounds to retrieve himself

from the disaster.

The other theme, the popular reaction to Germanicus'

death, is also meticulously recorded. The death of a

charismatic leader always prompts an overwhelming reaction

on the part of the people; hence popular reaction to

Germanicus' death has been copiously handed down to

tradition. Foreign nations and kings in Asia lamented,

such was the clemency and the nobility of the young

Caesar. Some noted resemblance to Alexander a parallel

much to the advantage of Germanicus. If he could have,

he would have conquered the world like Alexander. The

eulogy is grotesque, considering the facts of Germanicus' campaigns in Germany and the peaceful investiture of a

client-king, but it recreates what people thought about him. 2 The reaction in Rome was no less overwhelming. Grief

over Germanicus’ death and anger against Piso and Tiberius

alternated. Wild stores were sweeping through the crowds

during the phases of Germanicus' illness: his mission to

the east, Piso's appointment, Livia's conversation with

Plancina, everything made sense all of a sudden— Germanicus 275 had been removed from the scene in Rome in order to be

eliminated, and he had been removed^because Tiberius was

afraid that he might have restored republican freedom.

This is what people believed, and it was the logical

consequence of their admiration of Germanicus, the son of

Drusus, as outlined in Ann. 1.33. The statements are not

Tacitus' own judgment, but they are reported as what

people believed in order to underscore how much they mis­

trusted Tiberius.

The bitter news of Germanicus1 death causes renewed

reaction: honors, statues, arches were decreed in an

overwhelming number.^ The return of Agrippina to Italy,2

the funeral and Piso's provocative arrival in Rome2 were the occasions for more emotionalism and criticism against

Tiberius.

It is easy to grasp why Tacitus dwells so extensively on all the details and especially on the strength 'of popular reaction.^ It is not alone meant to enhance

Germanicus.5 Rather the narrative is functional in

1Ann. 2.83.

2Ann. 3.1.

2Ann. 3.9.

4cf. Shotter, op. cit. p. 209.

5Walker, op. cit., p. 125. 276 recreating the atmosphere in which Tiberius had to con­ duct the following trial and which explains the miscarriage of justice. The people had always favored Germanicus, especially when they realized that Tiberius hated him.

Now the suspicion of poisoning,attached to Piso and impli­ cating Tiberius,had carried •them to the limit of frenzy.

This is the outcome of the initial configuration in which

Tiberius had pitted Germanicus and Piso against each other. He himself was trapped in his own snares. People had to be prejudiced against both of them and this had the gravest consequences for the fair conduct of the trial, so Tacitus thought.

Piso remains passive during the trial, which in my feeling is more a trial for Tiberius than it is the trial of Piso,"*- since Tacitus flashes the light on the issue of how Tiberius retrieved himself from his error. Piso had the people's and senate's feeling against him and could hardly expect a fair hearing. But he was Tiberius' friend and he had been his choice and Tiberius had given him instructions directed against Germanicus. Therefore he had some reason to count on Tiberius' support. But he had implicated Tiberius in the suspicion of poisoning German­ icus and Tiberius was virtually indicted with him.

Tiberius had recognized that he had made a grave mistake

^Ann. 3.10 ff. 277 by appointing Piso and even more so by giving him secret instructions and finally by not interfering with his actions. All he wanted was to retrieve himself from this error, and to accomplish this Piso had to be abandoned skillfully, since everybody knew that he had supported him.

In the cognitio^ Tiberius displays impartiality in stating the triple charge of disobedience towards Ger­ manicus, of poisoning and of stirring up civil war. He also states the possibility of Piso’s innocence, criti­ cizing the accusers' rashness. It is a brilliant speech and impartial, also, when taken out of its context.

Despite its apparent impartiality Tiberius knew that

Piso in reality had no chance, because in one respect he does not disclose the whole truth: he shifts the responsi­ bility of Piso's appointment to the senate and he with­ holds the information that he gave instructions to Piso by correspondence, which he later refuses to disclose des­ pite the pressure from the senate. This is the aspect of guilt in which Tiberius is implicated: the whole truth could not be let out without shaking his own position and he had to use craft in order to retrieve himself, consid­ ering the overwhelming popular pressure which Tacitus has recreated so vividly.

■^Ann. 3.12. 278

Although the charge of poisoning could not be estab­ lished, the senate's and the people's feeling remained the same, insisting on Piso's guilt. In fact the people were so prejudiced that they threatened to lynch him in the case of his acquittal. Tiberius had refused to come to his friend's aid on the poisoning charge because he was afraid of stirring up more popular hatred. Therefore he turned to the undeniable charge of high treason as a convenient alternative focus of interest.! When Piso finally noticed that Tiberius showed himself implacable and refused to produce relevant evidence, he found himself isolated and realized that he had no chance to escape.

He committed suicide and by so'doing he left Tiberius with the odium of having failed to support his best friend.

Piso was certainly guilty of high treason, as Tacitus' report discloses, and his property was therefore con­ fiscated. But that was not what was historically-rele­ vant: the question of Germanicus' death was never cleared up. Tacitus' accounts shows that it was highly improbable that Piso did kill Germanicus by showing how the suspicion, based on Piso's general attitude and on a few circum­ stances', originated in Germanicus' head, and by revealing

1 Shotter, op. cit., p. 212, believes that Tiberius was so divorced' from reality that he did not even concern himself with the charge of poisoning, but I think that Tiberius knew very well what was at stake and used the alternative charge only as a means to back himself up. 279 that the prosecution could not establish the guilt either.

But popular feeling and his own partial ‘implication in the suspicion prevented Tiberius from coming to his friend's aid against this charge and so he had to drop him en­ tirely in order to secure his own position. That is what interested Tacitus in the trial: Piso may have been guilty of high treason, but that is not why he committed suicide, but rather because he could not escape the sus­ picion of having killed Germanicus and because Tiberius did not help him. Tacitus sees him in this trial, I believe, as a victim of the craft of Tiberius, who had to struggle for survival, a victim who desperately pleads a innocent for the sake of protecting his family.^ But

Piso's suicide did not avail Tiberius anything: the sus­ picion was never dissipated that Piso had killed Germanicus and that Tiberius was involved. And in addition to that he had sacrificed his best friend. That was what "people believed. His scheming was unmasked and the basis of confidence in his reign was shattered. That is, I think,

Tacitus' political interest in the trial. After the trial popular hatred and distrust gathered about Tiberius and made it ever more difficult for him to restore confidence in his intentions. Up till this time Tiberius had been

^Ann. 3.16. 280 unpopular, but he was still respected; now respect gaveway to suspicion and hatred. The case of Piso thus marks a turning point in his reign.1 Tacitus dwells so extensively on Germanicus1 mission to the east to use it as a medium in order to provide the reader with the emotional experi­ ence of how the turning point occurred.

The mission is controlled through Tacitus' account by the idea of the incompatibility between Germanicus and

Piso. It was known that Tiberius hated Germanicus, had removed him to Syria under the pretext of honoring him, had given him Piso as a legate and had pitted them against each other in a situation from which trouble was bound to arise. The people were from the beginning on the side of

Germanicus so that any thrust from Tiberius-Piso was bound to increase Germanicus' popular favor and exasper­ ation with the princeps. Since Piso now behaved in such a way as to arouse in Germanicus the suspicion that he had been poisoned, this suspicion prompted popular fury against

Tiberius and Piso. That is the fruition of Tiberius' arrangement.

In recreating the forces of pressure to which

Tiberius now was exposed during the trial, Tacitus makes the miscarriage of justice understandable. Tiberius could

iCf. Marsh, op. cit., p. 103 ff. 281 not give Piso a fair hearing on all charges without alienating people completely, so he resorted to the trea­ son charge and dropped his best friend and loyal agent.

The truth was never cleared up, since everybody stuck to his prejudice. Senate and people stayed convinced that

Germanicus had been poisoned, to which Piso hopelessly pleaded innocent, Tiberius skillfully abstained from any clear judgment, for that suited him best. And so the truth got lost, because everybody twisted facts to his own ends.1

With the depth of perception of a Thucydides for the causes and symptoms of a diseased society, which he pin­ points in such passages as the revolution of Corcyra or the Melian Dialogue, Tacitus records the trial of Piso as the eternally valid symptom of a diseased political process. The mission of Germanicus to the east, the person of Piso, the attitude of Germanicus and the' popular reaction thus become devices, used'by Tacitus, to make the diseased process understandable. The trial of Piso was the inevitable outcome of the mission to the east and it was paradigmatic of the problems of the principate because it prompted severe loss of confidence in Tiberius and a sub­ sequent decline in the effectiveness of his performance as princeps.

1Cf. Shotter, op. cit., p . .211. CONCLUSIONS

The material in the introduction has shown that Tacitus has a number of references that point to the fact, that

Tiberius was guided by the precepts and the spirit of

Augustus. But the common denominator of these references showed Tacitus, that they were politically completely irrelevant. It is a known fact that Augustus had an enormous hold on Tiberius; for Tiberius clinging to his predecessor precepts, was a matter of survival, since

Augustus had created a new system and the best way to keep the system afloat was to act exactly as he had done. .

I have tried therefore to present from Tacitus1 accounts and from outside evidence proof that Tiberius in fact was guided by Augustus also in matters of greater impor­ tance. Tacitus fails to develop this fact either expressis verbis or by covering up the facts on purpose.

The analysis of the method and choice of the provin­ cial governors has yielded the result that Tiberius showed continuity in Augustan personnel policy by keeping all of the governors, whom Augustus had appointed to the most important military commands in office, by entrusting major

282 283 duties of crisis level only to the heirs of the principate and by recruiting from consular rank and from the same social background as Augustus had done. As to the exper­ ience and achievement of governors in Tiberius' reign, the five who really distinguished themselves are the Augustan appointees, whereas, when Tiberius starts replacing

Augustan personnel, his choice includes a number of fail­ ures, most prominent among them Cn. Calpurnius Piso.

With regard to senatorial provinces Tiberius followed the system and the practice which Augustus had set up, by leaving the appointment in the hands of the senate and only towards the end of his reign exercising autocratic methods of interference. '

From Tacitus' account we can glean the principle of continuity only by inference. His interest focuses on the individual governors and.only in so far as they are rele­ vant for their relation to the princeps and for important developments in the history of the Roman empire. His narrative shows in his language and almost pictorial pres­ entation that he considered all of the Augustan appointees as capable provincial governors acting in military situ­ ations and guarantors of the security of the borders of the empire. All of them share in some aspects in the ideal picture, he has given of Agricola as a governor, and all were colorful individuals in their own right, be it as a pro­ vincial governor or as a senior statesman. With respect 284 to Tiberian appointees Tacitus shows by the same literary means that all of them were much less capable persons in military situations, and, as senators often objectionable.

Thus all of them seem more to contribute to the decline than to the success of the empire, and Tacitus especially

singles out Cn. Calpurnius Piso as a device to demonstrate the deleteriousness to the principate.

The study of the three special areas has also, as has the analysis of the provincial governors, revealed that

Tiberius followed the Augustan policy in idea as well as in its practical execution. In the mutinies he kept the position that Augustus had assigned to him and operated through legates who either fulfilled or fell short of their constitutional responsibilities. In Germany

Tiberius insisted on the token revenge for the Varian disaster, but he limited the empire at the Rhine river, as

Augustus had suggested to him to do, and in matters of conduct of the war and the distribution of the rewards he also continued the customs developed by Augustus. In the east he similarly continued the policy initiated by

Augustus in settling affairs by diplomacy, getting control of Armenia by a pro-Roman ruler and by converting client- kingdoms into provincial territory. He also pursued

Augustus' policy by entrusting this task only to the heir of the principate. 285

In summary one may say that the policy of the histori­ cal Tiberius with regard to the issues mentioned would hardly be thinkable without Augustus.

In Tacitus’ account this point is not developed. The mutinies on one level of thinking, i.e., in terms of the

relation of the princeps to the governor, are functional

in building up the tension between Tiberius and Germanicus which in turn contributed to the build-up of the tension

in the relation of Tiberius to the senate and people. On another level the mutinies are an analysis of the forces at work that trigger a potential crisis of considerable magnitude for the empire and of the forces that save the day, especially the moral strength of leadership. Examined on the background of the crisis of A.D. 69 they show that

Tacitus isolated the account as an example of symptomatic character to the future crises of the principate.

In his account of the German campaigns Tacitus has chosen to place emphasis on the psychological warfare between a general of considerable qualities of leadership and a princeps w#o regards his achievements with mistrust

and curbs his glory. We saw that .this distortion of the

facts is based on Tacitus' bias for republican imperialism and on his personal experience with the conflict that

arises out of the division of power and authority in the case of Agricola and Domitian. 286

In Tacitus' presentation of the settlement of affairs

in the east the political issue gets lost completely, but

the conduct of affairs is controlled by the antagonism

between Piso and Germanicus, which triggers the crisis in

Tiberius' reign/from which he is never to retrieve

himself.

Tacitus' accounts have clearly shown that his criteria

for choice and development of material are often colored

by personal experience. The precepts of Augustus as one of the sources of Tiberius' actions are not developed.

For Tacitus, Tiberius has an independent existence,whereas

the historical Tiberius is unthinkable without his pred­

ecessor. Why does Tacitus leave such an important issue out of the picture? I think it can be explained by noting his historiographical purposes. His theme is the analysis of the political and social change of the Homan government, and he sees the personal relations between the princeps and the senators and governors as prompting this change. m Here Tiberius' personality comes into play, his basic

characteristics, mistrust and craft, were the key factors with which he undermined the morale of the senate and the

state. Selective and perceptive as Tacitus' accounts to

this point of the issue are, there was no room for Tiberius as the continuator of Augustus, because it was

not with the Augustan precepts that he undermined the state. But instead of this, with.respect to the three areas dealt with, Tacitus has given us with the depth of perception of a Thucydides an eternally valid analysis of the forces that trigger and quell a crisis of power, of the recurring issue of the conflict resulting from the division of power and authority, and of a diseased political process. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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