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Home , Han Zheng, Hu Chunhua, Jiang Zemin, Li Zhanshu, Wang Huning

No.11

2017

PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE

OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WWW.UI.SE

The deceptive promise of ’s control?

The 19th Congress and its implications for the “new era”

Tim Rühlig

During the recent the 19th National - Hence, if observers seek to predict Congress of the ruling Communist Party of ’s future development, it is not China (CPC), Party Secretary and country enough to explore Xi’s political vision. President Xi Jinping announced that the - The Party Congress provided an People’s Republic of China (PRC) is indication that the leadership aims to uphold comprehensive party-state entering a “new era”. This announcement is control both politically and of crucial importance: China is controlled economically. It is highly unlikely that by the CPC and the Party Congress is the the CPC leadership will compromise on highest decision-making authority of the the Party’s control and liberalize the Party. Party Congresses are held only once country. every five years. They provide crucial - At the same time, however, China is indications of the country’s future direction. facing severe challenges. Even within China’s political elite, there are - Without question, Xi Jinping has widespread doubts about whether an consolidated his power. However, there agenda that aims to resolve these are some indications that Xi’s power challenges maintaining comprehensive might be overestimated: the country is Party control will be successful. still run by a collective of leaders. - Internationally, this has two implications: In the short-term,

proponents of authoritarian control will be encouraged by the CPC’s In reality, however, the power struggles course and could use the Chinese within the Party are more complicated example as a justification. In the long- because of the existence of rivalries within term, however, the PRC’s grave the three factions and alliances across the challenges could fundamentally call three groups. In 2012, for example, Xi was into question whether China’s development path represents a challenged for the party leadership by other sustainable alternative. “”—, who was later imprisoned, and his followers. As a result, I draw these conclusions from in-depth Xi has done everything possible to discussions about the implications of the consolidate his power and build up his own Party Congress’ results for China’s future power base with what some observers call with 11 advisers to the Chinese government the new “Xi faction”. Xi initiated a and academic experts (social scientists and comprehensive “anti-corruption campaign” economists) working for leading think tanks to help him to oust political rivals. In and universities in and addition, he recentralized power in his own Hong Kong. I believe that these voices hands by introducing new decision-making enrich the European discussion in particular organs personally presided over by him. He because all the interviewees have direct is referred to with more new honorary titles access to the government or possess inside than his predecessors; during the Party knowledge of the Party. In other words, Congress some senior cadres even called their perspectives provide an impression of him “helmsman”, a term previously the discussions taking place within China’s attributed only to . As a political elite beyond the official, public consequence, it is widely believed that the party-state discourse. traditional factions have become rather weak. Is Xi really that powerful? Every five years, before the start of the The most recent Party Congress broke with Party Congress, powerful factions within a number of informal rules that have been the Party struggle for the most influential fundamental to the Party’s personnel posts. In the wake of the Party Congress, decisions in recent years. In order to limit these decisions are formally confirmed and the influence of any individual ruler, in revealed to the public. For around the past 2002 the Party set an informal retirement 15 years, three factions have dominated the age of 68 years for top leaders (and 65 years Party: (1) the “Princelings”, the for senior officials) and allowed the descendants of Communist party Secretary-General of the CPC, who also revolutionaries, led by Xi Jinping; (2) the serves as China’s President, to stay in office “Youth League”, composed of cadres who for just two five-year terms. This year’s served in the Party’s youth organization, Party leadership decision, however, fuels including former President Jintao; and rumours that Xi is seeking to stay in office (3) the “ Faction”, mostly for longer than ten years, even though he consisting of technocratic leaders under the will have passed the informal retirement age sponsorship of former President Jiang of 68. The most crucial indicator is that all Zemin. the elected members of the all-powerful

2 © SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | NUMBER 11/2017 Standing Committee of the CPC’s Politburo “Thought” (a term that was previously are rather old. The youngest, , will reserved for “Mao Zedong Thought”) is be 65 at the time of the next Party Congress introduced as signalling a “new era”. It is in 2022. Nobody was promoted from the so- for these reasons that Xi is widely believed called sixth CPC leadership generation— to be the most powerful Chinese leader the generation after Xi, which means that no since Mao. potential successor was elevated to the Standing Committee. However, while Xi might be more charismatic than his direct predecessors, his In addition, Xi successfully installed close charisma is hardly comparable to Mao’s or friends on to the CPC’s Central Committee Deng’s. Some Chinese experts argue that and in the Politburo as well as among Xi’s accumulation of offices rather influential provincial leaders. Even more demonstrates the limits of his power. In importantly, the new leadership of China’s contrast to Xi, Mao and Deng did not need People’s Liberation Army is closely allied such a multitude of formalized offices to with Xi Jinping. govern the country, but largely relied on their personal authority. Even though Party Furthermore, Xi’s political visions were factions have been weakened, the incorporated into the Party’s Constitution interviewees are convinced that Xi still has and termed “ on many enemies within the Party—not least with Chinese Characteristics for because of the anti-corruption campaign. a New Era”. Although it is not unusual for Most crucially, however, the composition the visions of China’s leaders to be added to of the new Standing Committee of the the CPC constitution, Xi is only the third CPC’s Politburo signals certain limits to (after Mao and ) to have his Xi’s power: name explicitly attached to it. Moreover, Xi’s

Xi Jinping (64)

CPC Secretary-General

Li Keqiang (62) (67) Yang (62) is China’s Prime Minister. He Li Zhanshu and Xi Jinping have been From his time as Party chief, is a trained economist and widely friends for more than 30 years. This Wang is seen as a liberal hopeful among believed to be a supporter of economic indicates that both hold similar political the CPC leaders: He carried out liberal reform. He rejects economic stimulus opinions. In recent years, Li served as economic reforms. In Wukan village he programs and supports the Free Trade Xi’s chief of staff, working hard to allowed a protest leader to become the Zone in Shanghai as well as business tax consolidate Xi’s power: For example, he local party chief. Some observers hold breaks. His influence diminished after the was the first to publicly refer to Xi as the disputed belief that Wang has stock market crash in 2015. China’s “core” leader. changed in recent years and become a Xi loyalist.

Wang Huning (62) Zhao Leji (60) Zheng (63) A former university professor, Wang Zhao Leji had no previously close ties For most of his political career, Han Huning served as theorist and speech with Xi but in recent years has served as Zheng worked in Shanghai. He is widely writer for , and Xi the head of the CPC’s Organization known for his loyalty to the Party leaders Jinping. He is believed to be the Department. In this position, he has – whichever faction is governing. In order intellectual mastermind behind several of proved loyal to Xi Jinping by placing Xi’s to avoid negative reports, he has tightened the CPC’s core concepts, such as “Three friends and allies in the positions of the Party’s control of the Shanghai press. Represents”, the “Scientific Outlook on cadres disciplined for corruption. Han is often linked to Jiang’s “Shanghai Development” and the “”. faction”.

3 © SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | NUMBER 11/2017 Only Li Zhanshu has been a close friend of therefore moved up from the CPC Central Xi for many years. Zhao Leji, another newly Committee to the Politburo but not on to the elevated member of the Standing Standing Committee. Committee, has proved his unconditional loyalty to Xi in recent years. All in all, the composition of the CPC’s served as a theorist under Xi but also Standing Committee does not reflect advised Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. It is unlimited power in the hands of Xi. This is unclear whether he can be considered a not to say that he has not surpassed his most member of an intra-party faction; some recent predecessors’ influence. In fact, there attribute him to the “Shanghai faction”. The seems to be no clear rival to Xi in the CPC other Standing Committee members have who might question his power. However, their own power base outside of Xi’s the CPC’s leadership line-up signals that the Princeling faction: Prime Minister Li country is still rather governed by a Keqiang is a Youth League faction member collective. Xi might be very powerful but he and is regarded as being close seems to rely more on his colleagues than is to it. Finally, is traditionally widely believed. Hence, if foreign seen as a member of the Shanghai faction. observers wish to speculate about China’s In short, the Politburo’s Standing future they must not just take account of the Committee includes fewer members of Xi’s political visions of Xi Jinping but broaden faction than might be expected from the their perspective to the collective CPC “most powerful man since the death of leadership. Mao”. New market economic reforms for Another sign that Xi’s power has its limits China? is the fact that his close ally, , Just a few years ago, in 2013, the third retired for reasons of age. Observers had Plenary Session of the 18th Central speculated that if Xi left him in office, this Committee announced that the market would signal that he did not plan to retire in should be “decisive” in China’s future five years when he himself reached development. In the West, many reacted retirement age. Finally, even the fact that no enthusiastically. However, even in 2013 a designated successor has made it on to the more detailed analysis fuelled scepticism, Standing Committee is not necessarily a and no comprehensive market-oriented sign of Xi’s power: While Xi has been reforms were implemented. The CPC successful in preventing the promotion of leadership under Xi Jinping is seeking to and , two make the economy more efficient but not protégés of the former presidents Jiang and more liberal. Hu and widely seen as potential successors, his own protégé Chen Min’er was elevated In recent years the Party has been far from to the Politburo but not to the Standing withdrawing from the economy. On the Committee. Chen’s rise has still been rapid, contrary, it has established new Party but it appears that he must follow the pre- Committees in private companies, existing informal rules of the Party, which including those with significant amounts of prescribe that leaders are only promoted to foreign investment. The political leadership the next organ up and cannot skip. Chen promotes mergers and acquisitions to make

4 © SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | NUMBER 11/2017 China’s national champions internationally growth is heavily reliant on state investment competitive and increase the country’s and soft loans handed out by state-owned international economic leverage. Instead of banks. According to the International privatizing state-owned enterprises, they Monetary Fund, China’s level of have been strengthened. indebtedness is as high as 235 per cent to GDP and could reach 280 per cent by 2020.2 This Party Congress did not send any Other estimations are even worse. signals to indicate a revision of this policy. Independent analysis suggests that the non- The New York Times published a performing loan quota could be as high as quantitative analysis of CPC leaders’ 10 per cent and some believe it to be 25 per speeches at Party Congresses over the past cent. 20 years. It found that mentions in Xi’s speech of “the market”, and “reform and The CPC leadership acknowledges the need opening up”, which is the official phrase for for economic reform but CPC officials aim Deng Xiaoping’s market-economic to avoid reforming the country along the reforms, are at a historic low in Xi’s lines of liberalization and privatization. speech.1 Instead, the Chinese leadership strives for more efficiency without giving up the party- Experts believe that Xi has never favoured state’s control over the economy. At the market-economic reforms but the 2015 same time, however, many political and stock market crash, which led millions of economic advisers to the CPC and the Chinese to lose their aging provisions Chinese government are sceptical about strengthened his fear and rejection of liberal whether the CPC’s reforms maintaining reforms. Although Standing Committee comprehensive control can successfully members Li Keqiang, Wang Yang and, to a tackle China’s economic challenges. It is lesser extent, Han Zheng are widely unclear how the CPC can tackle the believed to be reform-oriented leaders, it is country’s pressing challenges without more than doubtful whether they will be further liberalization. Hence, even among able to reverse Xi’s policy. Instead, the China’s government economic advisers, promotion of Xi’s main economic adviser, many believe that, in the long-term, China’s , to the Politburo is widely believed continued emphasis on state control will to have strengthened Xi’s economic course. undermine Chinese success and call into question the PRC’s image as a potential role Even though there are no signs that the new model for other developing countries. Chinese leadership is striving for fundamental economic reform, China’s Can we expect any political reform? tremendous economic challenges might Political liberalization is not on Xi’s force the country to take action. China’s agenda. During the Party Congress, Xi GDP grew by 8–14 per cent in the first made it clear that he aims to consolidate the decade of the . Ever since, party-state’s power. Only few years ago, growth rates have been falling to 6.7% in China’s leaders feared the societal and 2016 according to official data. In China political effects of the Internet. They were this trend is referred to as the “new normal”. concerned that even limited room for free Even more worrying is the fact that China’s speech and political discussion in

5 © SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | NUMBER 11/2017 cyberspace would ultimately question CPC village protest leaders to be elected as rule and fuel demands for genuine village party chiefs. democracy. However, by now the Internet has been turned into an effective tool of the Within the Party, the anti-corruption Chinese party-state’s power that has the campaign should be expected to continue, potential to fundamentally reshape China’s albeit with some revisions: While Xi’s close authoritarianism. ally Wang Qishan, who previously led the campaign, has retired, there is no question Most crucially, China is gradually over the loyalty of his successor, Zhao Leji, introducing a new system of social credit to Xi. Corruption is a genuine problem in scores based on big data collection, China. Most of the 1.3 million cadres who connecting data on different aspects such as have been disciplined in the past five years payment of bills on time, traffic offences were targeted not for political reasons, but and comments on social media platforms. because they were indeed corrupt. This is From these data, algorithms will determine particularly true of local and regional party where people are allowed to live, work or officials, who often have close ties with go to school. In essence, this goes far local businesses which fuels corruption. beyond classical censorship because it aims The central leadership has correctly not only to restrict freedom of speech, but diagnosed that if this widespread (local) to standardize human behaviour. Citizens corruption is not ended, it could ultimately are conditioned to act “normal”, and question the CPC’s political credibility and “normal” behaviour is defined by the CPC’s threaten its long-term survival. As a algorithms. consequence, Xi Jinping decided not only to launch the anti-corruption campaign, but In addition, the personnel decisions made also to recentralize power. At the same time, by the Party Congress signal a rejection of however, insiders describe how the anti- political reform: , China’s corruption campaign has spread fear and serving Vice-President, who is considered paralysed large sections of the party-state’s to be rather reform-minded, has not only apparatus, which prefers to remain passive lost his seat in the Politburo but did not even rather than make a mistake. make it on to the Central Committee. The new Standing Committee member Wang The Party recently announced that the anti- Huning, in turn, was already writing in the corruption work will be perpetuated, second half of the 1980s that pluralization institutionalized, widened and formalized in and democracy were a challenge for China. 2018. It is not the party but the state In his view, China should become a “neo- authorities that will be in charge, however, authoritarian” state. This is particularly and it seems that the system of extra-legal remarkable because the 1980s was the most prisons, shanggui, will be abolished, which liberal period in modern China. In essence, would remove the most arbitrary, non- only the promotion of Wang Yang into the transparent and cruel component of the Standing Committee contradicts the signal campaign. At the same time, even after the for more rigidity in China’s political sphere: reforms, those suspected of corruption will When he served as party chief in still be denied access to lawyers and face Guangdong province, Wang allowed local unfair trials. Chinese experts believe that Xi

6 © SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | NUMBER 11/2017 was forced to agree to these reforms after sign of the crisis that will ultimately pressure from rival party factions. undermine confidence in China’s potential as a role model for other countries. The CPC’s Party Congress shows no sign of openness to political reform or societal Summary: What are the main results of liberalization. At the same time, some of my the Party Congress? interviewees made clear that the Party’s In recent years, China’s internal tightening grip on power over the society development has been carefully monitored should be interpreted as a sign of anxiety. by other countries around the world. The Party is attempting to contain societal Authoritarian developing countries in pluralization. In particular, the young urban particular treat the PRC as a potential role Chinese middle class is dissatisfied with its model for their own development. Hence, daily life. Its members suffer from China’s domestic future is of enormous environmental degradation, hours-long importance internationally. Xi consolidated commuting to work in China’s mega cities, his power at the recent Party Congress but jobs below their level of qualifications and his influence should not be overestimated. the lack of a social welfare system. In the Hence, when foreign observers seek to absence of a pensions scheme, a significant understand the future of domestic proportion of younger people support their policymaking, they should not focus retired parents. Most of the promises made exclusively on Xi but take account of the at the Party Congress targeted this group of fact that the CPC is still run as a collective. people. In his speech, Xi pledged to Liberalization of the economy, society and improve the environment, balance social the political sphere are not in the CPC cleavages and install a comprehensive leadership’s interests. However, regardless pensions system for all Chinese. However, of its seeming stability, it is doubtful how all these initiatives carry enormous costs. In stable the current system would remain in a the light of China’s aging population, it will severe economic crisis. Mao Zedong was a be the young, well-educated middle class revolutionary who loved chaos and unrest. that will have to pay for all these promises. Xi is quite the opposite. He strives for order, Economic reform, a reduction in calmness and the containment of China’s overcapacity and digitalization could well pluralizing society. His emphasis on cost millions of jobs and increase stability indicates that he and his leadership unemployment. Hence, Xi’s promises are a have identified all too well the omnipresent great risk to him. Expectations have been risks that endanger CPC rule in the medium- raised and the Party will feel an obligation term. to deliver for China’s middle class. This carries important implications for In the light of these risks, the tightening grip China’s potential as a role model for other on power is most likely a sign of the CPC’s developing countries: In the short-term, and Xi’s anxiety. Comprehensive control China’s emphasis on the party-state’s seems to serve as reinsurance for the party control over politics, the economy and to allow it to stay in power even if it cannot society will further encourage authoritarian deliver on its far-reaching promises. Hence, leaders to reject liberalization. China’s increased party-state control may well be a successful development could serve as a

7 © SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | NUMBER 11/2017 justification for following the Chinese model. In the long-term, however, China faces a severe risk of crisis that could well lead to a questioning of whether China’s developmental path provides a sustainable alternative for other countries. Even advisers to the Chinese government and insiders to the party-state interpret the turn to comprehensive control under Xi Jinping as a sign of weakness rather than strength.

Tim Rühlig is a PhD candidate at the Goethe University Frankfurt. He was a Visiting Fellow at UI in 2015.

Endnotes

1 Chris Buckley and Olivia Mitchell Ryan, ‘Environment, security, power: What China’s changing vocabulary reveals about its future’, New York Times, 19 October 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/ 10/19/world/asia/china-xi-jinping- language.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestop ic%2FChina, accessed 2017-10-19. 2 International Monetary Fund (IMF), People's Republic of China: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report 17/248 (Washington, DC: IMF, 2017).

8 © SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | NUMBER 11/2017

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