No.11 2017 PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WWW.UI.SE The deceptive promise of Xi Jinping’s control? The 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress and its implications for the “new era” Tim Rühlig During the recent the 19th National - Hence, if observers seek to predict Congress of the ruling Communist Party of China’s future development, it is not China (CPC), Party Secretary and country enough to explore Xi’s political vision. President Xi Jinping announced that the - The Party Congress provided an People’s Republic of China (PRC) is indication that the leadership aims to uphold comprehensive party-state entering a “new era”. This announcement is control both politically and of crucial importance: China is controlled economically. It is highly unlikely that by the CPC and the Party Congress is the the CPC leadership will compromise on highest decision-making authority of the the Party’s control and liberalize the Party. Party Congresses are held only once country. every five years. They provide crucial - At the same time, however, China is indications of the country’s future direction. facing severe challenges. Even within China’s political elite, there are - Without question, Xi Jinping has widespread doubts about whether an consolidated his power. However, there agenda that aims to resolve these are some indications that Xi’s power challenges maintaining comprehensive might be overestimated: the country is Party control will be successful. still run by a collective of leaders. - Internationally, this has two implications: In the short-term, proponents of authoritarian control will be encouraged by the CPC’s In reality, however, the power struggles course and could use the Chinese within the Party are more complicated example as a justification. In the long- because of the existence of rivalries within term, however, the PRC’s grave the three factions and alliances across the challenges could fundamentally call three groups. In 2012, for example, Xi was into question whether China’s development path represents a challenged for the party leadership by other sustainable alternative. “Princelings”—Bo Xilai, who was later imprisoned, and his followers. As a result, I draw these conclusions from in-depth Xi has done everything possible to discussions about the implications of the consolidate his power and build up his own Party Congress’ results for China’s future power base with what some observers call with 11 advisers to the Chinese government the new “Xi faction”. Xi initiated a and academic experts (social scientists and comprehensive “anti-corruption campaign” economists) working for leading think tanks to help him to oust political rivals. In and universities in mainland China and addition, he recentralized power in his own Hong Kong. I believe that these voices hands by introducing new decision-making enrich the European discussion in particular organs personally presided over by him. He because all the interviewees have direct is referred to with more new honorary titles access to the government or possess inside than his predecessors; during the Party knowledge of the Party. In other words, Congress some senior cadres even called their perspectives provide an impression of him “helmsman”, a term previously the discussions taking place within China’s attributed only to Mao Zedong. As a political elite beyond the official, public consequence, it is widely believed that the party-state discourse. traditional factions have become rather weak. Is Xi really that powerful? Every five years, before the start of the The most recent Party Congress broke with Party Congress, powerful factions within a number of informal rules that have been the Party struggle for the most influential fundamental to the Party’s personnel posts. In the wake of the Party Congress, decisions in recent years. In order to limit these decisions are formally confirmed and the influence of any individual ruler, in revealed to the public. For around the past 2002 the Party set an informal retirement 15 years, three factions have dominated the age of 68 years for top leaders (and 65 years Party: (1) the “Princelings”, the for senior officials) and allowed the descendants of Communist party Secretary-General of the CPC, who also revolutionaries, led by Xi Jinping; (2) the serves as China’s President, to stay in office “Youth League”, composed of cadres who for just two five-year terms. This year’s served in the Party’s youth organization, Party leadership decision, however, fuels including former President Hu Jintao; and rumours that Xi is seeking to stay in office (3) the “Shanghai Faction”, mostly for longer than ten years, even though he consisting of technocratic leaders under the will have passed the informal retirement age sponsorship of former President Jiang of 68. The most crucial indicator is that all Zemin. the elected members of the all-powerful 2 © SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | NUMBER 11/2017 Standing Committee of the CPC’s Politburo “Thought” (a term that was previously are rather old. The youngest, Zhao Leji, will reserved for “Mao Zedong Thought”) is be 65 at the time of the next Party Congress introduced as signalling a “new era”. It is in 2022. Nobody was promoted from the so- for these reasons that Xi is widely believed called sixth CPC leadership generation— to be the most powerful Chinese leader the generation after Xi, which means that no since Mao. potential successor was elevated to the Standing Committee. However, while Xi might be more charismatic than his direct predecessors, his In addition, Xi successfully installed close charisma is hardly comparable to Mao’s or friends on to the CPC’s Central Committee Deng’s. Some Chinese experts argue that and in the Politburo as well as among Xi’s accumulation of offices rather influential provincial leaders. Even more demonstrates the limits of his power. In importantly, the new leadership of China’s contrast to Xi, Mao and Deng did not need People’s Liberation Army is closely allied such a multitude of formalized offices to with Xi Jinping. govern the country, but largely relied on their personal authority. Even though Party Furthermore, Xi’s political visions were factions have been weakened, the incorporated into the Party’s Constitution interviewees are convinced that Xi still has and termed “Xi Jinping Thought on many enemies within the Party—not least Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for because of the anti-corruption campaign. a New Era”. Although it is not unusual for Most crucially, however, the composition the visions of China’s leaders to be added to of the new Standing Committee of the the CPC constitution, Xi is only the third CPC’s Politburo signals certain limits to (after Mao and Deng Xiaoping) to have his Xi’s power: name explicitly attached to it. Moreover, Xi’s Xi Jinping (64) CPC Secretary-General Li Keqiang (62) Li Zhanshu (67) Wang Yang (62) Li Zhanshu and Xi Jinping have been Li Keqiang is China’s Prime Minister. He From his time as Guangdong Party chief, is a trained economist and widely friends for more than 30 years. This Wang is seen as a liberal hopeful among indicates that both hold similar political believed to be a supporter of economic the CPC leaders: He carried out liberal reform. He rejects economic stimulus opinions. In recent years, Li served as economic reforms. In Wukan village he Xi’s chief of staff, working hard to programs and supports the Free Trade allowed a protest leader to become the Zone in Shanghai as well as business tax consolidate Xi’s power: For example, he local party chief. Some observers hold breaks. His influence diminished after the was the first to publicly refer to Xi as the disputed belief that Wang has stock market crash in 2015. China’s “core” leader. changed in recent years and become a Xi loyalist. Wang Huning (62) Zhao Leji (60) Han Zheng (63) A former university professor, Wang Zhao Leji had no previously close ties For most of his political career, Han Huning served as theorist and speech with Xi but in recent years has served as Zheng worked in Shanghai. He is widely writer for Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi the head of the CPC’s Organization known for his loyalty to the Party leaders Jinping. He is believed to be the Department. In this position, he has – whichever faction is governing. In order intellectual mastermind behind several of proved loyal to Xi Jinping by placing Xi’s to avoid negative reports, he has tightened the CPC’s core concepts, such as “Three friends and allies in the positions of the Party’s control of the Shanghai press. Represents”, the “Scientific Outlook on cadres disciplined for corruption. Han is often linked to Jiang’s “Shanghai Development” and the “Chinese Dream”. faction”. 3 © SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | NUMBER 11/2017 Only Li Zhanshu has been a close friend of therefore moved up from the CPC Central Xi for many years. Zhao Leji, another newly Committee to the Politburo but not on to the elevated member of the Standing Standing Committee. Committee, has proved his unconditional loyalty to Xi in recent years. Wang Huning All in all, the composition of the CPC’s served as a theorist under Xi but also Standing Committee does not reflect advised Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. It is unlimited power in the hands of Xi. This is unclear whether he can be considered a not to say that he has not surpassed his most member of an intra-party faction; some recent predecessors’ influence. In fact, there attribute him to the “Shanghai faction”. The seems to be no clear rival to Xi in the CPC other Standing Committee members have who might question his power.