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Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. Bell & Howell Information and teaming 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA UMI800-521-0600 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY, 1945-1964: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP, POLICY AND MANPOWER MANAGEMENT by Captain(N) Wilfred Gourlay Dolphin Lund, OMM, CD, (Rat'd) B.A., University of Victoria, 1971 M.A., Queen's University, 1972 Diploma (M.M.Sc.) Naval War College, 1980 Diploma, National Defence College of Canada, 1990 Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in the Department of History We accept this dissertation as conforming to the required standard Dr. D. Zimmerman, Supervisor (Erepartment of History) Dr. P.E. Roy, Departmental Member (Department of History ) Dr. W.T. Wooley, Departmental Member (Department of History) Dr. M.L. Hadley[ Outride Member (Department of Germanic^mdieâï Dr. R.F. Sarty, External Examiner (National War Museum) © Wilfred Gourlay Dolphin Lund, 1999 University of Victoria All rights reserved. This dissertation may not be reproduced in whole or in Part, by photocopying or other means, without the permission of the author. 11 Supervisor: Dr. David Zimmerman ABSTRACT This study examines how well the senior leadership of the Royal Canadian Navy managed the persoimel component of its post-World War II expansion from 1945 to 1964. It challenges the popular myth that the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) experienced a "golden age" during this period because of the persistence of inadequate personnel policies and poor manpower management that negatively affected the operational capability of the fleet. The two themes of the postwar period are the effort of the Royal Canadian Navy to build the fleet and the challenge of producing trained pasonnel in sufficient numbers to man the ships. After demobilization, the navy had virtually to be rebuilt Canada joined NATO in 1949, and the RCN assumed a heavy commitment to anti-submarine warfere (ASW) that drove expansion. In its zeal to be a strong alliance partner the RCN was over-committed from the outset through its opat-ended policy of providing as many anti-submarine escorts as possible. Over-commitment, trying to man too marty ships with too few trained persoimel, immediately became the major fector affecting personnel policy. The study shows that the Royal Canadian Navy was relatively successful in achieving its goal of providing the maximum number of ASW escorts possible but that ovCT-commitment constantly outstripped manning resources and defeated an inadequate personnel managanent systan. Instability in ships' companies became chronic. The navy continualty fell short in its training and manning requironents which lowered fleet opoational readiness. The deliberate over­ commitment in the ratio of ships to trained pCTSormel replicated in many respects the problems that the navy had experienced during the Second World War. Personnel shortages, particularly in trained tradesmen, resulted from structural and morale problems created by policy decisions. The I l l situation was exacerbated by poor personnel planning and managemenL The training system was starved in order to man obsolete ships to meet NATO force goals. The wastage rate was unaccqitabty higb because the navy foiled to offer an attractive career. There was r^caice by senior leadership to implement changes in the personnel structure in response to contemporary demands and pressures. When sweqiing radical changes were introduced simultaneously in 1960, the alreacfy stressed personnel system was overwhelmed. An acute shortage of technicians resulted that led to a collapse in manning on the east coast in 1964. The stucfy demonstrates that although the RCN identified deficiencies respecting the posonnel system and structure, it had limited success in developing adequate policies fijr either correcting problems or implementing changes. Personnel policy is also used as a vdiicle to examine naval policy in general and to identify and discuss the dominant themes, issues and personalities that defined requirements and infiuœced the decision-making prcxxss. Particular attrition is paid to roles of the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Naval Board. The effect of inconsistent government support on long-term naval planning and civil-military relations during the pericxi are also analysed. Examiners: Dr. D. Zimmerman, SupervisorZ^epartment of History) Dr. P.E. Roy, Departmental Member (Department of History) Dr. W.T. Wooley, Departmental Menjbéf (Department of History) Dr. M.L. Hadley, Outside^ember (Department of Dr. R.F. Sarty, RxteniM Examiner (National War Museum) IV TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Certificate o f Examination .............................................................................................i Abstract............................................................................................................................ii Table of Contents ..........................................................................................................iv Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... v Abbreviations .................................................................................................................vi Introduction ..................................................................................................................... I Chapter 1: The Family Navy................................................................................ 23 Chapter 2: The Doldrums..................................................................................... 67 Chapter 3 : The "Viper" Joins The Navy..........................................................116 Chapter 4: Troubled Waters ................................................................................163 Chapter 5 : New Horizons ...................................................................................218 Chapter 6: Growing Pains ...................................................................................269 Chapter 7: A Formidable Programme .............................................................. 314 Chapter 8: A Return To Pragmatism. .............................................................. 359 Chapter 9: A Golden Moment ........................................................................... 402 Chapter 10: Treading Water ................................................................................ 448 Chapter 11 : Collapse.............................................................................................487 Conclusion: .................................................................................................................. 530 Bibliography: ...............................................................................................................547 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to acknowledge the support and patience of my wife Virginia without whose continued encouragement this research project would have been neither begun nor completed. The research involved work at the National Archives of Canada and at the Directorate of History, National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. Dr. Roger Sarty, then Senior Historian at the Directorate of History, provided every kind of intellectual and practical assistance both at the directorate and in accessing materials at the National Archives of Canada. The valuable assistance through oral interviews was given by; Rear-Admiral R.M. Battles, Rear-Admiral J.A. Charles, Vice-Admiral D.A. Collins, Vice-Admiral H.G. DeWolf, Rear-Admiral C.J. Dillon, Vice-Admiral K.L Dyer, Rear-Admiral W.M. Landymore, Rear-Admiral R.W. Murdoch, Rear-Admiral R.J. Pickford, Rear-Admiral D.W. Piers and Rear-Admiral A.H.G. Storrs. There are others who gave oral interviews are now deceased and their contributions are respectfully remembered, especially Louis Audette and Rear-Admiral Dan Hanington for their encouragement Mrs. Barbara Morres allowed use of Rear-Admiral E.P. Tisdall's, her father's, personal documents. Mrs. Elizabeth Turk provided access to correspondence of both her father. Commodore H. Groos, and uncle. Captain D. Groos. Dr. David Zimmerman, my supervisor, provided guidance and helpful suggestions during the course of research and writing that greatly