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Iran Human Rights Documentation Center Iran Human Rights Documentation Center The Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC) believes that the development of an accountability movement and a culture of human rights in Iran are crucial to the long-term peace and security of the country and the Middle East region. As numerous examples have illustrated, the removal of an authoritarian regime does not necessarily lead to an improved human rights situation if institutions and civil society are weak, or if a culture of human rights and democratic governance has not been cultivated. By providing Iranians with comprehensive human rights reports, data about past and present human rights violations and information about international human rights standards, particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the IHRDC programs will strengthen Iranians’ ability to demand accountability, reform public institutions, and promote transparency and respect for human rights. Encouraging a culture of human rights within Iranian society as a whole will allow political and legal reforms to have real and lasting weight. The IHRDC seeks to: Establish a comprehensive and objective historical record of the human rights situation in Iran since the 1979 revolution, and on the basis of this record, establish responsibility for patterns of human rights abuses; Make such record available in an archive that is accessible to the public for research and educational purposes; Promote accountability, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Iran; and Encourage an informed dialogue on the human rights situation in Iran among scholars and the general public in Iran and abroad. Iran Human Rights Documentation Center 129 Church Street New Haven, Connecticut 06510, USA Tel: +1-(203)-772-2218 Fax: +1-(203)-772-1782 Email: [email protected] Web: http://www.iranhrdc.org Photographs: The front cover photograph is of the reflection of the main building of the Telecommunication Company of Iran. The portrait is of the Chief Prosecutor of Tehran, Saeed Mortazavi. Photographs used throughout the report were obtained online or from the respective individuals. © 2009 All Rights Reserved. Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, New Haven, Connecticut Ctrl+Alt+Delete: Iran’s Response to the Internet Iran Human Rights Documentation Center May 2009 Table of Contents Introduction.................................................................................................................................................1 1. The Challenge Presented by the Internet in Iran............................................................................3 1.1. Proliferation of Internet Access...................................................................................................3 1.2. Freedom of Expression................................................................................................................4 1.2.1. History of Expression in Iran Before the Internet ...................................................................5 1.2.2. Migration of Expression to the Internet ................................................................................10 2. Iran’s Regulation of Internet Expression.......................................................................................12 2.1. Laws Regulating Expression .....................................................................................................12 2.1.1. The Press Law.......................................................................................................................12 2.1.2. The Islamic Penal Code.........................................................................................................15 2.1.3. Other Laws............................................................................................................................16 2.2. Internet-Specific Laws...............................................................................................................17 2.2.1. The Cyber Crime Penal Code................................................................................................17 2.2.2. The Urgent Bill Regarding Punishment for Crimes Disturbing the Public Mind .................19 3. Technical Methods Used to Control and Alter the Web in Iran..................................................20 3.1. During the Reformist Era (1997-2005)......................................................................................20 3.2. Post-Reformist Era ....................................................................................................................22 3.3. Legal Analysis of Iran’s Technical Methods.............................................................................24 4. Arrest, Detention and Torture of Cyber-Journalists and Bloggers.............................................25 4.1. Arrests in Tehran During the Reformist Era..............................................................................25 4.2. Arrests Outside Tehran During the Reformist Era ....................................................................37 4.3. Arrests Post-Reform Era............................................................................................................40 4.4. Legal Analysis of Arrests, Detention and Torture of Internet Users.........................................42 5. Conclusion.........................................................................................................................................45 Methodology ..............................................................................................................................................46 Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................................47 Appendices.................................................................................................................................................49 Introduction On September 27, 2007, in an appearance at the National Press Club in Washington D.C., Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad responded to a question regarding limits on expression by asserting that “freedom is flowing at its highest level” in Iran. He later insisted that “all voices should be heard.”1 Despite these declarations and notwithstanding the Islamic Republic’s international and constitutional obligations, the Islamic Republic of Iran consistently violates the fundamental human right to freedom of expression of its residents. In fact, Iran has been called the Middle East’s biggest prison for journalists and regularly ranks close to the bottom in the annual Worldwide Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders (RWB).2 Iranians have been battling for their rights to free expression for over a century. Periods of relative freedom have been followed by severe crackdowns on expression of dissent. Iran experienced a period of relatively free and open expression following the election of President Khatami in 1997. However, within a few years, conservative elements aligned with the Supreme Leader cracked down on traditional media outlets—newspapers, radio and television. To survive, many editors resorted to self-censorship. Journalists and others engaged in expression faced enormous obstacles in reaching their audiences. At the same time, the Internet was becoming a viable means of mass communication. Consequently, many journalists and others migrated to the Internet, creating blogs and websites. The regime has responded by controlling and altering the Web accessed by Iranians through several overlapping strategies. It applies existing laws that severely regulate traditional expressive activity— newspapers, radio and television—to Internet expression. It is also developing Internet-specific laws and creating multiple regulatory bodies charged with Internet oversight. Thus, simply to access the Internet, Iranians must often navigate through a legal and administrative maze. In addition to using laws that restrict content, the regime is experimenting with technical methods to control and alter the Web. These include shutting down websites at their sources, blocking specific websites so users cannot access them, filtering out large parts of the Web, restricting Internet speeds, and flooding the Web with the regime’s ideas and opinions. At the same time, Iran has continued to use some of the more traditional means of repression: cyber- journalists and bloggers have been arrested, detained and tortured. Faced with threats against their lives and the safety of their families, many engaged in self-censorship or fled Iran. Some paid with their lives. All of these methods are intended to increase the price of expression in general, and Internet expression in particular. As Sina Motalebi, an Iranian blogger who was arrested and interrogated for his Internet activity, explained: I had written in my weblog [that] blogging is a free way for expressing your views and beliefs, without any costs, without any need [for] technical knowledge or financial power, things like that; and the [interrogator] told me: “we want to prove that you are wrong. There are several costs; there are very high costs to blogging, and we want to make you an example of that. Yes, we can’t trace every single blogger who criticizes our government, but we can scare them out.”3 1 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Remarks at the National Press Club (Sept. 24, 2007), in President Ahmadinejad Delivers Remarks to the National Press
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