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Preface Chapter 1 Notes Preface 1. For this insight, as for so many others, I am in debt to Kevin Schilbrack. Chapter 1 1. A version of this chapter was first read at a spring 2010 Humanities Center colloquium at Drake University, then at the fall 2010 annual conference of the American Academy of Religion, and finally at the spring 2011 conference on the future of continental philosophy of religion at Syracuse University. I thank those whose critical comments have aided its development: Jennifer McCrickerd, Craig Owens, and Joseph Schneider (in the case of the first read- ing); Jerome Gellman, Michael Rea, and Kevin Schilbrack (in the case of the second reading); and Ron Mercer, Dan Miller, and Nick Trakakis (in the case of the third reading). 2. Trakakis, The End of Philosophy of Religion, 1. Curiously, Trakakis takes analytic philosophy of religion in particular, if not analytic philosophy in general, to be moribund (1, 113)— an assessment that is plainly at odds with the continued resurgence of analytic philosophy of religion. 3. Ibid., 2, 6; see also 11, 24. 4. Ibid., 6, 29, 25. As these quotations illustrate, Trakakis’s objection to theod- icy is moral (11): theodicy fails to take suffering seriously (11) and therefore exhibits deep moral incoherence, inexcusable moral insensitivity, and equally culpable moral blindness (18). For Trakakis, “detached reflection” is not in itself something to be lamented. But “when our gaze turns to the evil and hor- rible suffering we inflict upon each other on a daily basis, dispassionate and abstract theorizing (at least of the kind recommended by theodicists) seems wholly inappropriate” (24). And since every theoretical discourse has a social and political praxis, Trakakis believes we must ask whether the praxis medi- ated by the theodicists serves to transform life and reality or to legitimize and mystify the status quo (25– 26). The answer to this question, for Trakakis, is as follows: “[T]heodicies mediate a praxis that sanctions evil” (28– 29). 5. It isn’t that Trakakis is unaware of this diversity (47, 49– 50); it’s just that he continually reduces it. 6. This is one of two fronts in Trakakis’s critique of the “scientific ideal of objec- tivity” in analytic philosophy of religion, the second of which concerns the 140 Notes realist nature of “God- talk” in analytic philosophy of religion. Here, too, actual diversity is unnoted. 7. Trakakis, The End of Philosophy of Religion, 59, 76. 8. Ibid., 59. 9. Caputo, in Trakakis, The End of Philosophy of Religion, 59. Of course, Trakakis here cites Caputo approvingly. 10. Trakakis, The End of Philosophy of Religion, 60, 75; see also 76. 11. These sections mostly pit Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion (such as D. Z. Phillips) against non- Wittgensteinian analytic philosophers of religion (such as Richard Swinburne). But Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion are often located within the analytic fold. Moreover, the general claims that Traka- kis makes against analytic philosophy of religion are never directly attributed (by quotation) to any particular analytic philosopher of religion. Here are two such claims. First this, “Unlike analytic philosophers, who fear that such views are a threat to truth and rationality, for Caputo and other like-minded conti- nental philosophers the acceptance of perspectivism makes possible a new way of seeing and understanding, one in fact that opens the door to religion after it had been slammed shut by the modernist Enlightenment critique” (The End of Philosophy of Religion, 59). Then this, “The opposing view— accepted, inci- dentally, by the majority of contemporary analytical philosophers of religion— holds that religious beliefs purport to express ‘facts’ that are objective in much the same way that the facts accumulated by scientists are thought to be objec- tive” (75). 12. Rea, “Introduction,” 9. 13. Ibid., 12. 14. This is Trakakis’s reason for devoting an entire chapter to the differences in style between analytic philosophy of religion (Plantinga) and continental philosophy of religion (Caputo). In the context of this chapter (ch. 3), Trakakis accuses analytic philosophy of religion of sins of both commission and omission: on the one hand, the scientific- technical style and mood of detached- disinterested investigation in pursuit of objectivity (End of Philosophy of Religion, 43); on the other hand, a failure to be literary- artistic, avant- garde, and culture- critical (51). And in the subsequent chapter (ch. 4), Trakakis roots these sins in analytic philosophy of religion’s positive assessment of the role and value of scientific forms of discourse and reasoning (70). 15. Not that I object either to spiritual formation or to a certain philosophy of religion that serves the interests of some concrete religion; it’s just that a philosophy of religion that is a historically grounded and religiously diverse area of scholarly inquiry— a philosophy of religion that is informed by and invested in the academic study of religion—isn’t the former and doesn’t do the latter. 16. Trakakis, The End of Philosophy of Religion, 115, 2. 17. Ibid., 47– 48. 18. Ibid., 11. Notes 141 19. Such considerations are not absent from Trakakis’s coauthored essay with Mon- ima Chadha, “Karma and the Problem of Evil.” See also Purushottama Bilimo- ria’s “Duhkha & Karma.” 20. Trakakis, The End of Philosophy of Religion, 11. 21. Ibid. 22. Once again, this isn’t to say that there aren’t a good many contexts in which it is inappropriate, morally wrong even, to engage in the understanding, com- parison, and evaluation of reason-giving about “evil.” But, again, philosophy of religion isn’t one such context. If philosophy of religion is to investigate, among other things, the existence and nature of ultimate beings or principles or forces, then philosophy of religion must ask about the ramifications of “evil” for such beings or principles or forces. And although it’s quite possible that we might find all these reasons wanting, we’d want to refrain from rushing into such judg- ments before a thorough investigation. Moreover, we wouldn’t want to beg the question by assuming that ultimate reality exists and is of a certain mysterious nature— for this itself would also be under investigation. 23. “Shared standards” refers to the standards of accuracy, consistency, scope, sim- plicity, and fruitfulness that Thomas Kuhn believed were shared among the scientific community and therefore constituted characteristics of a successful scientific theory. See Chapter 6 for more on this. 24. Trakakis, The End of Philosophy of Religion, 115– 16. Trakakis seems to be refer- ring here to the Australian David Tacey, not the American David Tracy. 25. Ibid., 116–117. Trakakis attributes “reasoned trust” to Hans Kung; “mystical faith” to David Tacey. 26. Ibid., 84. 27. Ibid., 88. 28. Ibid., 89. The quote in this extract is from Kazantzakis’s Poor Man of God. 29. Trakakis, The End of Philosophy of Religion, 1, 113, 2. This is surprising given that Trakakis does quote approvingly Bruce Wilshire’s proposal that philoso- phers of religion join religious studies departments where “they may be less tempted to ignore the history and practices of the world’s great religious tradi- tions” (Wilshire, in Trakakis, The End of Philosophy of Religion, 122). 30. Ibid., 115. 31. This is to say that whatever else it means to do philosophy of religion in a manner that is informed by and contributes to the academic study of religion, it at least means to do philosophy of religion in a manner that is historically grounded and religiously diverse. As I indicate in my preface, I will therefore use these phrases interchangeably. 32. There is, to be sure, a diversity of kinds of theology, some of which just might be religiously impartial and diverse (and therefore look more like certain kinds of philosophy of religion). The border between philosophy of religion and phil- osophical theology is therefore porous. Still, I take philosophical theology to be the investigation of the ideational structure of some religious tradition, usually Christianity, as undertaken from the vantage point of an adherent of that reli- gion and for the ends of that religion. (Or course such theology might also be 142 Notes comparative, but even when so it is undertaken from confessional standpoints and for confessional ends.) Such theology is what my historically grounded and religiously diverse philosophy of religion studies, not what it does. For a little more on this, particularly with respect to how philosophy of religion might rec- ognize “existential entanglements” while at the same time maintaining a “loy- alty criterion,” see my explication of Wesley Wildman’s Religious Philosophy as Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry in Chapter 6. 33. Peterson and VanArragon say their textbook is “designed to feature some of the most important current controversies in the philosophy of religion,” and thus that its debates are between “recognized experts” on “key questions” (“Preface,” xi). 34. Nagasawa and Wielenberg say their volume “aims to gather together papers written by some of the best philosophers of religion of the new generation,” providing “an opportunity for young and up- and- coming philosophers of religion to review these developments [of earlier philosophers of religion] and introduce their own cutting- edge research” (“Introduction,” vii). 35. Kvanvig says his edited volume “continues the initial intention behind the series of attracting the best work from the premier philosophers of religion, as well as including the work of top philosophers outside this area when their work and interests intersects with issues in philosophy of religion”; he therefore believes that his edited volume contains “contributions by an impressive group of phi- losophers on topics of central importance to philosophy of religion” (“Editor’s Introduction,” vii). 36. Goodchild indicates that the work presented in his collection is by “the con- temporary inheritors of this tradition [of Enlightenment philosophy of reli- gion]”; he then goes on to summarize the contents of the collection as five different approaches to the field of continental philosophy of religion (“Con- tinental Philosophy of Religion,” 28, 29– 38).
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