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Citation: International Circumstances in the Asia-Pacific Series, Japan Digital Library (March 2016), http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/digital_library/china.php The Political Possibilities of China’s “Party-State System”* Takashi Suzuki “Les grands hommes, en apprenant aux faibles à réfléchir, les ont mis sur la route de l’ erreur.”1 —Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics In other works, the author has analyzed the developmental process and actual state of the political rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the start of the 2000s, focusing on the CCP’s political approach toward the new social stratum, with the CCP’s political adaptability in mind. In concluding this book the author would like to diagram the political relationships between China’s ruling regime and Chinese society as they exist today. At the same time, while referencing several related researches, the author will overview the discus- sions on this subject to date and add some of his own observations on the political possibilities for China’s “party-state” system. The specific topics of concern will be (1) the control structure for the newly emerging socioeconomic elites, (2) the party-state system’s governance capacity and its legitimacy to rule, (3) the current state of political power relationships, (4) the directionality and “room for choice” of Party-led political reform, and (5) further points to consider regarding the dynamism of Chinese politi- cal reform.2 I. The Control Structure for the Newly Emerging Socioeconomic Elites In a paper published in 1999, Roderick Macfarquhar et al. point out of China’s private entrepreneurs group that “at the end of the twentieth century they have not yet developed into an independent capitalist or middle class able to assert itself in its own right.”3 However, in their concluding remarks they also make the following observation. In brief, while we cannot hope for the political maturation of the Chinese middle class to the point where it will be able to exert pressure regarding important political issues in the near future, over the mid- to long-term, “a growing and diverse middle class may organize itself politi- cally as an alternative to the party-state.”4 Regarding the above passage, in response to the question of Chinese democratization led by the newly emerging elite and middle class (middle stratum), I have to agree with this view which has been generally accepted in the Western academic community in recent years, based on the findings of my research presented here and elsewhere (*see the original book). In short, the members of the new social stratum are continuing to be proactively integrated into the party-state system through party member * This article was originally published as 鈴木隆「『中国の党＝国会体制』 の政治的可能性」 鈴木隆『中国共産党の支配と権力―党と 新興の社会経済エリート』 慶應義塾大学出版会、2012年、終章、347-366頁. 1 recruitment, the United Front, and other diverse channels. At the same time, a power elite alliance is steadily being formed between on the one hand party and political leaders seeking personal advance- ment through the growth of regional economies and, on the other, the new social elites who are feverishly seeking to secure their own economic interests. For this reason, it is unlikely that any systemic transfor- mation away from authoritarianism will be led by the newly emerging elite class, that is to say, we cannot expect them to display, at least in the short term, the kind of political initiative as the “vanguard of democratization” that I shall discuss later. Indeed, even today, more than a decade after MacFarquhar’s observations, no collective political behavior among these people has not yet been confirmed. At least up to the present time, the CCP’s polit- ical control over the newly emerging socioeconomic elites—which can be encapsulated in the two key- words, “control” and “cooptation”—has been functioning effectively for the maintenance of the party-state system. Moreover, regarding as well the securing of the party’s political hegemony into the future, the CCP continues—through its various political systems—to achieve a degree of success in institutionaliz- ing the consciousness and behavior of the new social stratum. This fact powerfully suggests the possibil- ity of the long-term continuity of the newly emerging elite classes’ conciliatory attitude toward the regime. Figure 6-1 is a conceptual diagram, based on the essence of this monograph, of the political rela- tionships between China’s current ruling structure and Chinese society with a focus on the CCP’s politi- cal approach toward the new social stratum. Using this diagram, we can generalize the Chinese Communist Party’s political control of the newly emerging socioeconomic elites into the following four elements (1) ideological penetration, (2) organizational control, (3) physical coerciveness, and (4) alloca- tion of benefits. Figure 6-1. Diagram of Political Relationships between the Party-State System and Society with a Focus on Political Approaches to the New Social Stratum 2 First, regarding the ideological penetration, the CCP has been implementing political and ideolog- ical education directed at the new social stratum systematically and extensively. However, the efficacy of these activities in achieving ideological alignment remains ambiguous overall. In reality, what one detects widely in place of declining socialist principles is the conservative disposition of the newly emerging elite groups toward preserving the status quo. Second, party-building in the “new economic organizations” and “new social organizations”—col- lectively referred to as the “two new organizations”—encompassing new business and social organization models outside of traditional Party reach to which many members of the new social stratum belong has been stagnant both qualitatively and quantitatively except for a few occupational groups. As a result, social surveillance capacity via Party organizations is definitely declining. In order to reinforce this weak- ening of control at the organization level, the CCP has been compelled to promote individual cooptation initiatives vis-à-vis the socioeconomic elites, including ‘corporatism(ist)’ (fatuan zhuyi) group approaches. Regarding the third element of physical coerciveness, the strengthening of political control by the CCP’s Organization Department and the United Front Work Department has already made a consider- able progress through, for example, party-building for designated professions like lawyers and accoun- tants and strengthening management of peoples, especially representative individuals in the new social stratum, using human resources databases and other tools. At the same time, the regime’s capacity for selective suppression also appears to be sufficiently guaranteed for now through the installation of these kinds of “power infrastructure.” Fourth, the fruits of sustained economic growth have not only brought numerous material benefits to the new social stratum, but also fostered an attitude of acceptance toward the regime. However, on the other side of the coin, this method of procuring support, in combination with the overall weakening of socialist ideology, will likely work to exacerbate the opportunistic behavior patterns of the newly emerg- ing elite class that depends largely upon favors provided by the ruling regime. This situation harbors a dual meaning of both strength and weakness for the CCP’s control of the elites. II. Governance Capacity of the Party-State System and the Legitimacy of Rule Figure 6-1 also indicates the two effects that the CCP’s political approach to newly emerging elite groups will likely have on the ruling regime’s capacity to govern. One is a positive effect for the CCP and the pragmatic goals of this approach, in other words, the enhancement of the party-state system’s governance capacity and political cohesiveness through strengthened social management and improved technologi- cal rationality in the policy process based on “deliberative democracy” theory. The other is that this mode of response by the CCP will further exacerbate systemic collusion between the government and the eco- nomic elites, and will make it more difficult to prevent government corruption, correct the wealth gap, and overcome the political alienation of China’s socioeconomically disadvantaged. Therefore, as a nega- tive effect, the possibility cannot be denied that this approach could erode the perception of the govern- ment’s legitimacy in the eyes of system participants other than the new social stratum and invite an overall decline in governance capacity and political authority. The problem today is that the negative aspects of this balance of plusses and minuses already appear to be coming to the fore, and the balance of stability in political society seems to be diminishing. For example, according to an Asian Barometer social survey implemented in China in 2002 as part of an international comparative research project, among all survey subjects (3,183 subjects), those replying that “the economy has become less equal” and “government’s effort to control corruption has become less adequate” stood at 74.7percent and 83.2percent, respectively, with approximately 40% of respondents 3 replying that the majority of or almost all [italics from the original text] local officials had dirtied their hands with corruption.5 Regardless of what the real state of affairs may be, the spread of such an execrable social image of local governance already far transcends the usual meaning of the word “serious.” Again, as regards the wealth gap problem, Edward Friedman has observed that, as an important shared element in the experience of democratization among East Asian countries, “The East Asian experience does not support the conventional wisdom about socioeconomic development delivering an easy transition from wealth to democracy.