The Spread of Al Shabaab
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The spread of Al Shabaab from Somalia to Kenya and beyond The NSD-S HUB was established at Allied Joint Force Command Naples in order to improve NATO awareness and understanding of the opportunities and challenges from the South, while contributing to the overall coordination of NATO activities and efforts. NSD-S HUB products are developed with a direct engagement of regional experts, open-source information from governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, academic institutions, media sources and military organizations. By design, NSD-S HUB products or links to open-sourced and independently produced articles do not necessarily represent the opinions, views or official positions of any other organization. The spread of Al Shabaab from Somalia to Kenya and beyond 3 NATO Strategic Direction South Hub EXECUTIVE SUMMARY arakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujahidin, known throughout the world as Al-Shabaab (AS), is a H powerful and resilient armed group based in Somalia but has also demonstrated its capability to carry out deadly attacks in neighbouring countries in East Africa. AS’s long-standing links with Al Qaeda (AQ) also mean that ongoing AS activities and presence could extend AQ’s power projection into East Africa and beyond. Key actors in international security and the Global War on Terror have challenged AS directly and indirectly through support to the Somali federal government on the recognition that AS represents a threat to international security and the assumption that it has expansionist intentions beyond Somalia into the region and possibly beyond. This assumption is analysed herein based on a full review of the academic and policy literature on AS, of AS statements, a series of interviews carried out with senior Somali and international officials, AS high-level and low-level defectors, followed by an online workshop involving Hub analysts and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). The group’s intentions, capabilities and opportunities are investigated in detail and the primary findings are: AS has the intention to control Somalia and indeed ‘Greater Somalia’ – an idealized nation which relates to the geographical area where Somali people live and includes parts of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Its attacks on foreign interests in Greater Somalia might be in retaliation for what is often a predominantly military presence in Somalia or to expand beyond Somalia/Greater Somalia. AS is a resilient organization which has demonstrated its ability to transform itself and its activities when necessary. Its financial capabilities are growing and diversifying and it retains strong communications and messaging capabilities. There is little indication that they have the capability of carrying out attacks beyond East Africa, but this cannot be discounted. The actions of AMISOM (African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia), upcoming federal elections, and other conflicts in and near the region could all have significant impact on AS’ intentions and capabilities. Constant and coherent monitoring of the development of a variety of potential opportunities, which could drastically impede or indeed pave the way for an AS expansion, is essential in the short to medium-terms. 4 The spread of Al-Shabaab from Somalia to Kenya and beyond NATO Strategic Direction South Hub TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .........................................................................................................................3 TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................................4 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................5 Methodology ....................................................................................................................................6 Local, Global or ‘Glocal’ ....................................................................................................................7 INTENTIONS .........................................................................................................................................9 CAPABILITIES ......................................................................................................................................13 Number of Members ......................................................................................................................13 Recruitment ....................................................................................................................................14 Training ...........................................................................................................................................15 Weapons and Explosives ................................................................................................................15 Leadership, Command and Control ...............................................................................................15 Governance ....................................................................................................................................16 Intelligence .....................................................................................................................................16 Communication and Propaganda ...................................................................................................16 Finance ...........................................................................................................................................17 OPPORTUNITIES .................................................................................................................................20 The Withdrawal of AMISOM ..........................................................................................................20 Armed Conflicts in the region beyond Greater Somalia ................................................................21 The Fractured Nature of Somali Politics ........................................................................................22 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................23 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................25 The spread of Al Shabaab from Somalia to Kenya and beyond 5 NATO Strategic Direction South Hub INTRODUCTION arakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujahidin, better known as Al-Shabaab (AS), meaning “The Youth” in H Arabic, is the largest militant organisation based in Somalia and is also active in neighbouring countries, most notably Kenya. It is one of the most enduring non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in sub-Saharan Africa. It grew and emerged as an independent organisation and leading member of the Somali insurgency in connection with the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia at the time of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Since its founding, AS has had ties to Al Qaeda (AQ). The group has engaged in bombings, suicide attacks and armed assaults, especially against Somali government targets, foreign troops, diplomats, and civilians. In 2010, Al Shabaab was in control of a considerable portion of central-southern Somalia, building a complex structure of governance in territories under its control. The group physically dominates less territory than it has done in the past. AMISOM assessments estimate the group to have physical control of somewhere between 20-30% of rural south-central Somalia, down from a peak of 80% between 2007 and 2014. The group no longer controls any major cities nor, importantly, seaports. The international community has identified AS as a major threat to international security, particularly focusing on its established links to AQ and the expansion of its area of activities beyond Somalia into Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda and beyond. The widespread assumption within the international community has long been that, if left unchecked, AS would expand across the region and as such extend the global reach of its ally, AQ. The primary aim of this research project is to interrogate this widespread assumption and examine whether AS is an expansionist NSAG with regional or global intentions. Is it primarily a nationalist group focused on controlling Somalia or is it a complex mix of both nationalist and global agendas? It is fundamental to clarify the concept of ‘expansion.’ This is particularly relevant considering the documented reduction in geographical area controlled by AS and its membership over the past decade. Traditionally, the concept of expansion is quite straight-forward. In the case of AS the issue is more complex. This is primarily because the national borders in the region, which would normally assist in deciding whether an organisation might expand locally or globally, are not of great significance here. AS, indeed, has made it clear that it considers “Greater Somalia”, roughly equated to all of the geographical areas in which Somalis live, to be their area of responsibility. For this reason, this paper assesses the issue of expansion from two distinct perspectives. The first is the question of whether AS is likely to expand within the confines of Greater Somalia, regardless of the national territory in question – to AS this is a form of local expansion. The second is whether or not AS is likely to expand beyond the confines of Greater Somalia,