-HIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

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- G.T?.(k9) 93 COPY NO. Si 25TH APRIL, 19k9 CABINET SITUATION IN Memorandum by the Foreign Secretary and the First Lord of the Admiralty

H.M.S. AMETHYST We circulate for the consideration of the Cabinet the text of the statement which it is proposed should be made to Parliament on the AMETHYST incident (Annex A). 2. Also attached (Annex B) are some details of the incident, not intended to be included in the statement to Parliament, though certain points may have to be brought out in answer to questions which may be raised there. SHANGHAI 3. The rapid advance of the Communist armies and the political situation aroused by the AMETHYST incident also raise certain questions of urgency in connection with ouj? policy in Shanghai. Three telegrams which have been received from H. M. Ambassador, Nanking, the Consul General, Shanghai and the Flag Officer, 2nd in command, Far East, are attached at Annexes C, D and E respectively. Z+. In view of the urgency, the issues raised in these telegrams were considered at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff this morning and in the afternoon at a meeting between the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Defence and the First Lord of the Admiralty. As a result, the Prime Minister approved a telegram in reply (Annex F), which has been sent by the Admiralty to the Flag Officer. A similar telegram has been sent by the Foreign Office to the Consul General. -5. The Prime Minister also approved the text of the Admiralty statement (Annex G) which has been issued in London and communicated by the Foreign Office to Nanking and Shanghai.

E. B. H.

Cabinet Office, S.W. 1.

25TH APRIL, 191+9.

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ANNEX A DRAFT STATEMENT

1. The House will wish to have a full account of the circumstances in which His Majesty's Ships were fired, upon in the river with grievous casualties and damage. 2. I will first explain what.our position is with regard to the civil war in China. It has been repeatedly stated in this House that our policy has been governed by the Moscow Declaration of December 19U5 in which the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union declared a policy of non-intervention in Chinars internal affairs. - In view of the considerable- British interests in China and of the presence of large British communities, His Majesty's Government decided some months ago that His Majesty's Ambassador and His Majesty's Consular Officers in China should remain at their posts and this was announced to the House by my Rt. Hon. Friend in December. In the disturbed conditions which have prevailed in recent months, warships were stationed at Shanghai and Nanking in the event that a breakdown of law and order as the result of hostilities should require the^m to assist in the evacuation of British subjects. 3. I should make it clear that the stationing of these ships and their movements from one port to another in China were undertaken with the full knowledge and consent of the National Government of China. I want to make the point therefore that when the incident took place to which I am about to-refer H.M. S. "Amethyst" was proceeding on her lawful occasions and that there was no other properly constituted authority to whom His Majesty's Government were under an obligation to notify her movements even had they been in a position to do so. h. Early on Tuesday, 19th April the frigate U. M.S. "Amethyst" (Lieutenant-Commander Skinner) sailed from Shanghai for Nanking. The objects of her passage were to relieve H. M. S. "Consort" at Narking, to provide communications for His Majesty's Ambassador, to bring supplies for the British community and to be prepared to carry out their evacuation if need arose. A warship has in fact been maintained at Nanking for a considerable time and passages have been fairly frequent. 5. The opposing Chinese forces have been massed along the . banks of the Yangtse for a considerable time and there have been repeated rumours during recent weeks that the Communists were about to cross the river. The passage of the "Amethyst" was accordingly adjusted to meet the military situation. Arrangements were made at the time to avoid the expiration of a Communist ultimatum to the.effect that in circumstances they would cross on 12th April. Nevertheless, the necessity for relieving H.M.S. "Consort" as early as possible remained; she was -running short of supplies after a long stay at Nanking and a frigate was considered, more suitable for this task than a destroyer. The second Communist ultimatum was due to expire on 21st April. The Flag Officer therefore decided, with the agreement of His Majesty's Ambassador, that the passage should be timed to allow the "Amethyst" to reach Nanking a clear 2k hours before the expiry of this ultimatum. "Amethyst" should therefore have reached Nanking on 20th April. For the same reason the "Consort" was due to leave before "Amethyst's"

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arrival. An intelligence report was received on the 19th which confirmed 21st April as the date for the Communist crossing; hy the time "Amethyst" received this she was Already half-way up.the river. In the light of these facts the decision for "Amethyst" to sail was made and this decision was in my opinion correct..

6. What could not have been foreseen before the incidents v/as the repeated and deliberate attacks by massed artillery on the four warships, and on the Sunderland Plying Boat, whose neutral character and peaceful intentions were all fully known to the Communist forces. For example, both' "London" and "Black Swan" were prominently displaying white flags. Perhaps the high light of humanity was the machine­ gunning of the men being disembarked from the "Amethyst" under the white flag, many of them seriously wounded, or while still swimming in the water. The same policy appears to be reflected in the refusal of the Communist authorities in Peking even to receive a letter from His Majesty's Consul asking them to order their forces to stop firing and allow our ships to give medical relief and evacuate the wounded.

7. To turn to the narrative of events when "Amechyst" had reached a point on the Yangtse River some 60 miles from Nanking, at about nine o*clock in the morning on the 20th, Chinese time, she came under heavy fire from batteries on the North bank, suffered considerable damage and casualties and eventually grounded on Rose Island. After this, the Captain decided to land about sixty of her crew, including he-r wounded, who got ashore by swimming or in sampans, being shelled and machine gunned as they did so; we know that a large proportion have, with Chinese help, arrived at Shanghai.

8. Vice Admiral Madden, the Flag Officer 2n3 i/c Far Eastern Station ordered the destroyer H.M.S. "Consort" (Commander Robertson) from Nanking to go to "Amethyst's" assistance, and the frigate H.M.S. "Black Swan" (Captain Jay) from Shanghai to Kiang Yin, I4O miles down river from the "Amethyst". 9. "Consort" reached "Amethyst" at about three in the afternoon and. was immediately heavily engaged. She found the fire too hot to approach "Amethyst" and therefore passed her at speed down river. She turned two miles below and again closed "Amethyst" to take her in tow. But she again came under such heavy fire that she was obliged to abandon the attempt, although she answered the shore batteries with her full armament and signalled that she had silenced most of the opposition. Half an hour later her signals ceased, though in fact she was making a second attempt to take "Amethyst" in tow, having turned, down-stream again. This attempt also failed and she sustained further damage and casualties during which her steering was affected. . She therefore had to continue downstream out of the firing area.

10. Meanwhile, the Cruiser H.M.S. "London" (Captain Cazalet), v/earing the flag of Flag officer 2nd i/c, was also proceeding up the Yangtse at best speed. 11. The three ships "London", "Black Swan" and "Consort" met at Kiang Yin at about eight that evening. It was found that "Consort" was extensively damaged; she was ordered to proceed to Shanghai to land her dead and. wounded and effect repairs.

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12. At about two o'clock in the morning of the 21st the "Amethyst" succeeded in refloating herself by her own efforts and anchored two miles above Rose Island. She could go no further as her chart was destroyed. Her hull was holed in several places- her Captain severely wounded, her First Lieutenant wounded, and her Doctor killed. There were only four unwounded officers left, and one telegraphist to carry out all'wireless communications.

13. Later the same morning the "London" and the "Black Swan" endeavoured to close the "Amethyst", but met with heavy fire causing some - casualties. The fire was of course returned, but the Flag Officer then decided that it would not be possible to bring the damaged "Amethyst" down river without further serious loss of life in all ships; he therefore ordered the "London" and "Black Swan" to return to Kian Yin.

11).. At Kiang Yin they were fired upon by batteries, and suffered considerable casualties and damage. Both ships afterwards proceeded to Shanghai to land their dead and wounded and to effect repairs. 15. That afternoon a Naval and a R.A. F. Doctor, with medical supplies and charts, were flown by a Sunderland aircraft of the Royal Air Force to the "Amethyst". Both the ' aircraft and the "Amethyst" were fired upon. The ship was hit, but the Sunderland managed to transfer the R. A.F. Doctor and some medical supplies before being forced to take off. The "Amethyst" then took shelter in a creek. 16. During the night of the 21st-22nd "Amethyst" succeeded in evacuating a further batch of her wounded to a nearby town. After doing so, she moved 10 miles up river under cover of darkness, though under rifle fire from the banks, and again anchored; she then completed the landing of all her more seriously wounded, including her Captain. I am sorry to say that this very gallent officer, who had insisted on remaining with his ship up to this time, died of his wounds soon after. There remained on board three R.N. officers, 1 R.A.F. Doctor, 52 ratings and 8 Chinese. At about this time Lt. Cdr. Kerans, the Assistant Naval Attache at Nanking, reached the ship and assumed command. 17. Another courageous effort to reach "Amethyst" was made by the R.A.F. in a Sunderland on the afternoon of the 22nd. but the aircraft v/as driven off by artillery fire without succeeding in making contact. The "Amethyst" then moved a further four miles up river. She was in close touch with the Flag Officer, and after a number of courses had been considered it was decided that she should remain where she was. 18. Perhaps I may at this point anticipate two questions which may possibly be asked. First, how was it that H.M. Ships suffered such extensive damage and casualties, and second, why they were not able to silence the opposing batteries and fight their way through. In answer to the t?irstj, I would only say that Warships are not designed to

operate in rivers against massed artillery and infantry sheltered by reeds and mudbanks. The Communist forces ,appear to have been concentrated in considerable strength and are reported as being lavishly equipped with Howitzers, medium artillery and field guns. The above facts also provide much of the answer to the second question only I would add this. The Flag Officer's policy throughout was designed only to rescue H.M.S. "Amethyst" and to avoid unnecessary casualties. There -was no question of a punitive expedition and H.M. Ships fired only to silence the forces firing against them.

1-9. I will at this point briefly summarise the losses and damage which resulted. The casualties were:-

H.M.S, "London"; 13 killed. 15 wounded. H.M.S. "Consort"; 10 killed. k seriously wounded. H. M. S. "Amethyst"; 19 killed. 13 wounded. H.M.S. "Black Swan"; 7 wounded. In addition, an unknown number of the crew of H.M.S. "Amethyst" may have been killed or wounded while they were swimming ashore; some 10 ratings are still missing. Of the damago to the ships, the "London" suffered the most severely, having been holed repeatedly in her hull and upper works. The damage to the "Consort" and the "Biack Swan" was less serious. "London" and "Black Swan" have already completed their emergency repairs. The "Amethyst" suffered severe damage but was.repaired by the efforts of her own crew to be capable of- 17 knots. 20. The House will wish to know whether any steps were taken by our authorities in China to make contact with the Communist authorities. Some time has lapsed since Communist forces overran Mukden, Peking and Tientsin where we have Consular posts. His Majesty's Consular Officers at these posts have been endeavouring for some time past to reach day-to-day working arrangements with the local authorities. Their approaches have, however, been rejected on every occasion without any reason being given for such rejection.

21. When H.M.S. "Amethyst" was fired upon "by Communist forces H.M. Ambassador instructed H.M.. Consular Officer in charge at Peking to communicate to the highest competent Chinese Communist authority by whatever means possible a message informing them of this and seeking the issue of immediate instructions by them to their Military Commanders along the Yangtse to desist from such firing. A subsequent message emphasised the urgent need of medical attention of the casualties and reiterated the request for instructions to ' prevent further firing upon these ships of the Royal Navy engaged in peaceful and humanitarian tasks. The local Communist authorities, however, refused to accept the Consul's letters.

22. At this time Mr. Edward Youde, a Third Secretary in H.M. Foreign Service who has a good knowledge of Chinese, volunteered to try and contact the Communist forces north of Pukou in the hope of reaching some Commanding Officer with sufficient authority to stop the firing. H.M. Ambassador agreed to this attempt and Mr. Youde passed through the Nationalist lines on the night of 21st April. Thanks to his courage and determination Mr. Youde succeeded in reaching the forward headquarters of the People's Liberation Army in Pukou area on 23rd Aprili He described the situation as he knew it when he left. Nanking on 21st April and pointed out to them the peaceful and humanitarian nature of the mission of H.M.S. "Amethyst" and requested that she be allowed to proceed to Nanking or Shanghai without further molestation. Their headquarters took the line that clearance had not been obtained from the People's Liberation Army and that she had entered the war area. They also complained of heavy casualties incurred by their troops as a result of fire from H.M. Ships. They refused to admit justification or self-defence. After consulting higher authority the headquarters stated that in the circumstances they would be prepared to allow the ship to proceed to Nanking but only on condition that she should assist the People's' Liberation Army to cross the Yangtse. Such a condition was obviously unacceptable.

23* M'y attention has been drawn to- a communique broadcast by the Communists which said that on the date in question warships on the Yangtse opened fire to prevent its crossing by Communist forces. It v/as not imtil the following day that they learned that these ships were not all Chinese but that four British ships were among them. The Communists state that their forces suffered 252 casualties as a result of this firing and claim that His Majesty's Government have directly participated in the by firing on Communist positions. These *laims are, of course, so far as they relate to His Majesty's Government or the Royal Navy, as fantastic as they are unfounded.

2k. If there was any initial misunderstanding as to the nationality of H.M.S. "Amethyst" this would have been speedily resolved had the authorities in Peking acted on H.M. Ambassador's message. Moreover, had the Communist authorities objected in the past to the movement of British ships on the Yangtse it was always open to them to raise these through our Consular authorities in North China. It is the fact that for reasons best known to themselves the Communists have failed to notify any foreign authority present in areas which they have occupied of the channels through which contact can be maintained and that they have rejected all communications made to them. In these circumstances His Majesty1 s Government can only reserve their position.

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25o The House will wish to join me in expressing sympathy with the relatives of all those who have been killed or wounded in this-action and in expressing admiration of the coixrage of all those who took part in it. Four names deserve special tribute. Lt. Commander Skinner, R. N., the Captain of the "Amethyst", and Lt. J.C. Weston, R..N. his First Lieutenant, (who for a short time succeeded his Captain in command of the ship) lost their lives through their devotion to duty. Both were severely wounded but remained at their posts, fighting and manoeuvring the ship' and removing the wounded to safety. Both left the ship too late to receive effective surgical aid fo r themscive s.

26. Telegraphist J.L. French showed superlative devotion to duty. He was the only telegraphist left in the "Amethyst" after the early hours of 21st April; and from then onwards his efforts kept the ship in almost continuous communication with Shanghai. ' 27* The fourth name is that of Mr. Youde, whose one man mission through the Communist Armies I have already described.

28. Without a doiibt .many other cases of bravery and devotion will be revealed when all the facts are known. But we already have ample evidence that the conduct of the whole ship's company of H.M.S. "Amethyst" was beyond all praise, though a considerable proportion were young sailors under fire for the first time. We have had reports of seamen and marines remaining at their task for up to 2k hours though badly wounded, and of men declining to have their wounds treated until cases they considered more urgent had been dealt with. I have heard too that in H.M.S. "London" and "Black Swan",, when there .was a possibility of volunteers being flown to "Amethyst";, there was almost acrimonious rivalry for selection, - as.they put it "to go back for more".

29J In conclusion, I should mention that the United States naval authorities at Shanghai placed their resources unstintingly at our disposal, and the kindness and help of the British communities at Shanghai have been beyond all praise. Finally, the Chinese Nationalist, forces in Chinkiang area were most helpful in providing medical aid and stores which they could ill afford. The House will join with me in expressing our gratitude to all of these.

ANNEX B SUPPLEMENTARY wwiaa

lgence of Communist plans

3 * AMETHYST*S position- on-22nd April and after. . To retan to the AMETHYST 'S narrative. By the afternoon of the 22nd she had reached a fairly safe position. Pour possible courses of action were considered. (a) to attempt to get dov/n river to Shanghai Ob) to attempt to get up river to Nanking (Q) to abandon the ship (a) to stay where she was Her Commanding Officer held himself ready to follow any of these courses. Reports which began to come in of the crossing of Communist troops above and below her position meant that attempts to reach Shanghai or Nanking at this time would almost certainly end in disaster. Further damage might sink the ship; the crew though in good heart were physically exhausted and of course depleted in numbers; navigation of the Yangtse is always difficult and virtually impossible at night; the radar and gyro compass were out of action and the magnetic compass doubtful. The courageous Captain v/as unwilling to abandon his ship until the result of the approach of a mission sent to the Communists should be known; there was also, a possibility that the Ambassador himself might negotiate a safe passage with the Communist authorities at a later stage or even that the ship might slip down later, after the crew had been rested and the armies had completed their crossing. She was now in a comparatively safe position and in fact was only fired on twice in the next 1+8 hours. So she remained where she was, shifting berth slightly on two occasions. ho Risks attendant on passage of the Yangtse, The passage has always been regarded as one of some risk in case irresponsible elements ori-"either bonk opened fire. Nevertheless, the Naval Commander-in-Chief decided that, since there had been no opposition or protests on either side and since our aim was peaceful, the passages should be continued until it became apparent they would be opposed; I full:/ endorse his decision. ­

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The House will of course appreciate that if during these months passages had been stopped because of the uneasy situation, or because of individual scares, (of which there were many), the requirements of the Embassy and the British community in Nanking would not have been met. The Navy has always been prepared, and I hope will always be prepared, to take justifiable risks in carrying out its tasks.

5* Have the Americans or French recently had warships at Nanking?

,/It is not known whether a U.S. warship has been at Nanking in recent weeks. Information is being urgently obtained through the U.S. Naval Attache^

There are no indications that a French warship has been at Nanking in the last 6 weeks.

Both the Americans and French have ships at Shanghai - ­ (Woosung).

6 e Why was air cover not provided?

Air cover would have been inconsistent with the peaceful intent of H.M.S. AMETHYST. In fact, air cover would not have been available. Beaufighters from Singapore could not have arrived before Tuesday, 26th April. 7, Why is Admiral-Brind still in London?

The Commandor-in-Chief was paying a special visit by air to England to attend exercise Trident with other Commanders-in- Chief . This visit was arranged last January. His presence in London has been most helpful in the handling of the situation. Arrangements have been made for his return by air on Thursday, several days earlier than originally intended.

If he had returned at once' he would have been of no service either in the Admiralty or on his station while on passage at this critical time. The Admiralty has complete confidence in Vice-Admiral Madden, his Second-in-Command.

8. Did the Nationalist forces fire on H.M. Ships?

- We are advised that they did not.

9 0 It is undesirable for security reasons, to give a detailed explanation of the AMETHYST'S present condition and possible courses of action, unless the AMETHYST1S position has ­ substantially altered by the time this statement is made.

ANNEX 0 120 COPY OF TELEGRAM FROM H.M. AMBASSADOR. NANKING, TO FOREIGN OFFICE No.k89 dated 2hth April. 1 QUoT :

In so far as political considerations are concerned, I feel that the withdrawal of the warships at this moment would he unfortunate in view of the attitude of the Communists as contained in statement quoted in my telegram k88. We have maintained that the presence of these ships in Chinese waters is for peaceful and humanitarian purposes. Their withdrawal now might undermine the validity of our case as well as increase local panic.

It is vital that all three Governments concerned (United States, French and His Majesty's Government) should take similar action. My French colleague is inclined to think that the ships should be maintained until definite decision regarding evacuation of foreign nationals is reached and acted upon, and should then be promptly withdrawn. In view of the recent developments, I agree with this proposal and consider it undesirable for H.M. Ships to be in Shanghai when the Communists arrive. I have consulted my Commonwealth colleagues who are in complete agreement.' I will try to consult my United States colleague in the course of the day.

3. I fully endorse the view of His Majesty's Consul General Shanghai set.forth in paragraph 3 of his telegram 79 to me. ii. It is too early to judge from their actions here what are the attitude and intentions of the Communists.

ANNEX D COPY OF TELEGRAM FROM CONSUL-GENERAL, SHANGHAI. TO FOREIGN OFFICE No.238 of 2hth April. 1 9k9*

Communist comment as made here says that at first the ships were mistaken for Nationalist vessels but that later it was realised that they were British ships sent (sic) to interfere with the crossing in the interests of the Nationalists. It claims that our ships fired first of all, and that Communists suffered 262 casualties "for which British Imperialists will be held responsible".

2. I do not admit this as meaning that the British communities here or elsewhere will suffer reprisals, but if the Communists do come quickly to Shanghai they may arrive in angry mood with British in general and Royal Navy in particular. It is, of course, probable that their arrangements for crossing at one point in question were effectively disjointed. 3. I submit that from the political angle it is out of the question to think now of bringing troops from Hongkong to assist in any evacuation -and I shall advise the Emergency Committee in that sense unless otherwise instructed. I am showing this telegram to Admiral Madden. k. Any guidance you can give me about the attitude or intentions of the Communists will be welcome. -9­

ANNEX B COPY OF TELEGRAM PROM FLAG OFFICER, SECOND IN COMMAND. FAR EAST, TO ADMIRALTY

I concur that troops cannot- now he used with advantage. 2. In any case it seems probable that there will not now be any time for the ordered plan for evacuation to be used.

3* Consul-General informs me that he is arranging for voluntary evacuation of non essentials by commercial sea passage and aircraft and anticipate that this new plan does not need Naval aid. ­

k* It seems that the presence of Warships at Shanghai can only be an irritant to the Communists when they arrive and that they may constitute a positive disadvantage to the British Community.

5* I therefore intend to reduce the number of Warships at Shanghai immediately by sailing SHOALHAVEN for Kure tomorrow Monday and CONSTANCE for the Chusan Archipelago on the following day. ' ­ 6. The departure of LONDON and BLACK SWAN must depend on circumstances, but I intend to avoid if possible, the risk of being locked in by. Communist control of the river. I have little information as to rate of advance of Communists but it seems very rapid indeed.

7* Consul-General agrees that ships should not remain in these circumstances. I shall remain in the vicinity. 8. I have exchanged views on this subject with Comnavwestpac who holds similar view that this risk must not be run.

APPENDIX P . COPY OF TELEGRAM, FROM,, ADMIRALTY TO FLAG OFFICER. SECOND IN COMMAND. FAR EAST

Your 2M627

- . ) Act at your discretion, in consultation with the Consul General.

APPENDIX G Statement His Majesty's Ships have been at Nanking and Shanghai solely to provide assistance for Commonwealth nationals in case of a breakdown of law and order during any change-over of authority. As soon as circumstances permit, it is intended to withdraw British warships and to continue normal procedure with regard to. visits to foreign ports­