Salvaging the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty Regime: Options for Washington
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Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS Salvaging the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty Regime: Options for Washington Anne Witkowsky Sherman Garnett Jeff McCausland Arms Control Series Paper 2 • March 2010 Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS Salvaging the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty Regime: Options for Washington Anne Witkowsky Sherman Garnett Jeff McCausland Arms Control Series Paper 2 • March 2010 Acknowledgements We thank those officials who assisted us within the For facts on the Conventional Armed Forces in Eu- Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implemen- rope Treaty, we drew on Dorn Crawford’s pamphlet, tation and the Bureau of European and Eurasian “CFE: A Review and Update of Treaty Elements,” Affairs at the Department of State, and within the U.S. Department of State, March 2009. Office of International Security Affairs at the De- partment of Defense. We also thank Dorn Crawford, We express our gratitude to the Department of State Craig Dunkerley, Stephen Flanagan, Fiona Hill, Mi- for funding our work, and to the Center for Strate- chael O’Hanlon, and Theodore Piccone for taking gic & International Studies for hosting the project the time to review the draft of this paper and for the and supporting us. The views and recommendations helpful suggestions they provided. We thank Justi- expressed in this paper are, of course, our own. They nas Sileikis for his research and administrative sup- do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Gov- port. We appreciate Steve Pifer’s patient assistance ernment or the Department of State. with the editing and publication of this paper, and express our gratitude to Gail Chalef for her help in the paper’s production. FRE O IGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l s e r i es s A lvAg i n g t h e C o n v e n t i o n A l A r m e d F o rC es i n e u ro p e t r e At y r eg i m e : o p t i o n s Fo r W A s h i n gto n ii Table of Contents Acknowledgments . ii Foreword . iv 1. Introduction and Summary of Recommendations . 1 2. Background and Context . 4 3. Key Interests . ........................................................... 11 4. Options . 17 5. The Way Forward After CFE . 22 Appendix I: Acronyms . 25 Appendix II: CFE Key Dates . 26 Appendix III: CFE Map . 28 End Notes . ................................................................ 29 About the Authors . 30 FRE O IGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l s e r i es s A lvAg i n g t h e C o n v e n t i o n A l A r m e d F o rC es i n e u ro p e t r e At y r eg i m e : o p t i o n s Fo r W A s h i n gto n iii Foreword When the Obama administration took office in to take account of these changes. Due to Russia’s 2009, it made clear its view that arms control offers failure to fulfill side commitments it made at that a useful tool for advancing U.S. national security in- time, the new treaty remains unratified by NATO terests. In relatively short order, the President and members, and Moscow announced in December his administration stated their interest in reducing 2007 that it was “suspending” its observance of the the number and role of nuclear weapons; launched original treaty. negotiations to conclude a successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START); announced a nu- Two years later, the CFE Treaty regime—a cor- clear security summit in Washington; and expressed nerstone of European security—remains in limbo. their desire to secure ratification of the Comprehen- This situation reduces transparency regarding mili- sive Test Ban Treaty. Washington has also grappled tary forces; creates uncertainty about the intentions with the threat posed by a nuclear North Korea and of some countries; raises questions about Europe’s a nuclear aspirant, Iran. broader security architecture; and may make the Obama administration’s desire to tackle the chal- This early focus on controlling and reducing nuclear lenge of reducing tactical nuclear weapons more dif- weapons is understandable. As the administration ficult. has entered its second year, it has begun consider- ing other arms control challenges as well. One is the For many years, Anne Witkowsky, Sherman Garnett question of conventional forces in Europe. To signal and Jeff McCausland have thought long, hard and its importance, in early February, Secretary Clinton creatively about conventional arms control in Eu- announced the appointment of Ambassador Vic- rope, both in the U.S. government and outside of toria Nuland as Special Envoy for Conventional it. In this paper, they offer options for how Wash- Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). ington might proceed to salvage the CFE Treaty re- gime. This work makes a superb contribution to a The CFE Treaty, signed in 1990, stabilized military discussion that is developing now within the U.S. relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and government and NATO capitals. The Brookings resulted in the destruction of tens of thousands of Arms Control Initiative is pleased to publish it as pieces of military equipment. Subsequently, how- the second paper in its Arms Control Series, with ever, the end of the Warsaw Pact, collapse of the the goal of stimulating a parallel public discussion. Soviet Union, and NATO enlargement dramatically altered the European security landscape. In 1999, Steven Pifer CFE member states signed the Adapted CFE Treaty Director, The Brookings Arms Control Initiative FRE O IGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l s e r i es s A lvAg i n g t h e C o n v e n t i o n A l A r m e d F o rC es i n e u ro p e t r e At y r eg i m e : o p t i o n s Fo r W A s h i n gto n iv 1. Introduction and Summary of Recommendations the issue (CSBMs) grew out of a particular security context in the 1980s, one dominated by bloc-to-bloc tensions Russia’s “suspension” of the implementation of the between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and conven- Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe tional force imbalances at the heart of Europe. CFE (CFE) since December 2007, and its recognition of specifically was part of a larger effort to address, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states ultimately transform, bloc-to-bloc military competi- following the Georgia-Russia conflict in August tion, one that included new policies toward Russia, 2008 cast a long shadow over the future of the CFE the former members of the Warsaw Pact and other Treaty. These actions make longstanding efforts to former Soviet states and, later, a transformed and ex- transition to the follow-on Adapted CFE Treaty dif- panded NATO. ficult at best. Some in Washington and Europe feel that new efforts are required to shake loose the log- The CFE Treaty adapted to the changes that followed jam. For others, the treaty has less and less relevance the fall of the Berlin Wall and contributed predict- to the evolving European security environment, and ability and transparency in military forces as Europe little should be done to save it. This paper examines a was transforming throughout the 1990s. Yet the fate set of issues crucial for understanding if and how the of the treaty is currently caught in the middle of the treaty matters, possible U.S. options to address the uncertain security environment in the eastern part of current dilemma, and the likely consequences if the Europe, the eventual shape of which remains one of treaty should fail to survive the current challenges. the continent’s most important strategic and security challenges. The larger context—and the broad poli- Any debate over the CFE Treaty must recognize the cies that the United States adopts to shape that con- broader European security context. Policymakers text and respond to these challenges—is central to should not set out to save this treaty simply for the this analysis, and to any decisions that the U.S. gov- sake of preserving arms control in Europe, as arms ernment takes for the way ahead on the CFE Treaty. control can never be an “end” in itself. Arms control grows out of a security context and helps to address The CFE Treaty and the related CSBM regimes the core dilemmas of that context through negoti- have become pillars in the architecture of the un- ated constraints upon the treaty parties. These di- divided Europe that the United States and its allies lemmas might also be addressed by adjustments to have sought to build since the Cold War ended. To levels and locations of weapons deployments, doctri- a certain extent, this vision of integration is at risk nal changes, and unilateral or alliance actions of one of being lost, and CFE’s complete unraveling would sort or another. signal deepening divisions in Europe. The Russians assert that the CFE Treaty has been overtaken by The CFE Treaty and the parallel European regime events and must be superseded by the 1999 Adapt- of confidence- and security-building measures ed CFE Treaty, which has not yet been ratified by FRE O IGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l s e r i es s A lvAg i n g t h e C o n v e n t i o n A l A r m e d F o rC es i n e u ro p e t r e At y r eg i m e : o p t i o n s Fo r W A s h i n gto n 1 NATO members.