The 2005 Ljubljana Ministerial Council Meeting

Victor-Yves Ghebali1

Initiated in a context of crisis (that is, against the background of Russian threats and pressure for radical change in the OSCE), the Slovenian Chairmanship performed rather honourably throughout 2005. However, despite the absence of a dramatic showdown at the 13th Ministerial Council Meeting (Ljubljana, 5-6 December 2005), it did not fully succeed in overcoming the OSCE crisis and putting the Organization back on the track of normality. Although the Council arrived at a set of 19 routine decisions and some Ministerial Statements, it could not adopt (for the third year in a row) a general political Declaration because of Moscow's refusal to reconfirm its Istanbul military commitments — an issue linked to the ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty as well as to the settlement of frozen conflicts in Georgia and Moldova.2 Furthermore, failing to agree on any concrete reform item, the Ministers ended up adopting a comprehensive but vaguely worded reform agenda charting a course of action for 2006. The present analysis comments on the decisions (or non-decisions) concerning the Istanbul commitments and OSCE reform, as well as the main substance of those technically that are related to the politico-military and the human dimensions.

The Istanbul Commitments, the CFE Treaty and Frozen Conflicts: A paralyzing interconnection The Ljubljana Ministerial Council meeting definitely confirmed that the intricate issues of frozen conflicts, Istanbul military commitments and the Adapted CFE constitute the most serious politico-military set of problems presently plaguing the OSCE. In contravention of the Istanbul commitments (and, in any case, against the will of the host States), Russia still maintains armed forces in the breakaway region of Transdniestria (Moldova) and military bases in Georgia, including in breakaway Abkhazia. The matter is further complicated by the fact that NATO countries — supported by a clear majority of the CFE Treaty Parties — have made the full implementation of the Istanbul commitments a prerequisite for moving forward with the ratification of the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty.

1 Victor-Yves Ghebali is Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. 2 As something of a substitute, the CIO issued (as in similar previous cases) a statement reflecting the position of the overwhelming majority of the participating States: MC (13). JOUR/2 Annex 2 of 6 December 2005. For the successive versions of the draft Ljubljana Ministerial Declaration, see MC.DD/14/05 of 18 November 2005, MC.DD /14/05/Rev. 1 of 25 November 2005, MC.DD /14/05/Rev. 2 of 29 November 2005, MC.DD /14/05/Rev. 3 of 30 November 2005, MC.DD /14/05/Rev. 4 of 2 December 2005, MC.DD /14/05/Rev. 5/Corr.1 of 5 December 2005, MC.DD /14/05/Rev. 6/Corr.1 of 6 December 2005 and MC.DD /14/05/Rev. 7 of 6 December 2005. The 2005 Ljubljana Ministerial Council Meeting 5

The Istanbul Commitments/ CFE Treaty Connection Through the Istanbul commitments, Moscow accepted that it would destroy and withdraw its armaments limited by the CFE Treaty in Moldova by the end of 2001 and complete the withdrawal of its troops stationed there by the end of 2002. Similarly, it pledged to reduce, to certain specific levels, the amount of its CFE — related military equipment in Georgia by no later than 31 December 2000; it also promised to complete negotiations in 2000 regarding the duration and modalities of the functioning of the Russian military bases at Batumi (Ajaria) and Akhalkalaki (near the Georgian-Armenian border), as well as to disband and withdraw from its military bases at Gudauta (Abkhazia) and Vaziani (near Tbilisi) by 1 July 2001. The process of armament destruction in and withdrawal from Moldova was achieved shortly ahead of time, on 14 November 2001. In Georgia, the Vaziani base was closed and handed over to the host State in due time; military equipment was withdrawn from the Gudauta base in 2001, but the latter was not closed on the pretext that the population of Abkhazia did not approve of the departure of Russian troops. All the other Istanbul commitments concerning Moldova and Georgia have remained unfulfilled. As a reaction, the NATO countries linked the ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty to Moscow's compliance with those commitments and also the 3 new CFE flank limits in the North Caucasus. Russia did bring its Treaty — Limited Equipment in the North Caucasus into line with the flanks limits, but rejected the other linkage as groundless: it argued that the Russian-Georgian and Russian-Moldovan agreements reached at Istanbul were of a bilateral nature and did not imply any legal obligations with regard to third countries. In the draft text of the Ljubljana Ministerial General Declaration, the Slovenian Chairmanship invited the participating States to ‘welcome the significant progress made towards the fulfillment of the commitments undertaken at the 1999 Istanbul Summit, and look forward to early full implementation of these commitments by all the parties concerned’.4 The language was innocuous: it imposed no specific deadline and implied (as upheld by Moscow) that the Istanbul commitments also imposed obligations on the host States, while generously crediting Russia with ‘significant progress’. Considering that description difficult to swallow, the GUAM States tabled an amendment referring only to ‘certain progress’, regretting the absence of the withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova in 2005 and calling upon Moscow ‘to resume without delay and complete the withdrawal process’.5 Russia refused to acknowledge its Istanbul withdrawal commitments and dismissed any Istanbul commitments/CFE linkage. It once more pretended that it ‘has fulfilled without exception all of its commitments’ related to the CFE Treaty

3 See § 51 of the Final Communiqué of the Florence Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 24 May 2000. Moscow’s compliance with the new flanks limits was acknowledged in § 15 of the NATO Prague Summit Declaration of 21 November 2002. 4 See § 8 of MC.DD/14/05 18 November 2005, § 9 of Rev. 1, as well as § 10 of Rev. 2 to Rev. 7 (emphasis added). 5 PC.DEL/1215/05 of 1 December 2005 and § 10 of MC.DD /14/05/Rev. 4 of 2 December 2005.

Helsinki Monitor 2006 no. 1