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Words and Deeds: Russian Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Secessionist

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Words and Deeds: Russian Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Secessionist Words and Deeds Russian Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Secessionist Conflicts Geir Flikke Jakub M. Godzimirski NUPI Report Norwegian Institute Norsk of International Utenrikspolitisk Affairs Institutt Utgiver: NUPI Copyright: © Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt 2006 ISSN: 0800 - 0018 ISBN: 82 7002 150-4 Alle synspunkter står for forfatternes regning. De må ikke tolkes som uttrykk for oppfatninger som kan tillegges Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt. Artiklene kan ikke reproduseres – helt eller delvis – ved trykking, fotokopiering eller på annen måte uten tillatelse fra forfatterne. Any views expressed in this publication are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. The text may not be printed in part or in full without the permission of the author. Besøksadresse: C.J. Hambrosplass 2d Addresse: Postboks 8159 Dep. 0033 Oslo Internett: www.nupi.no E-post: [email protected] Fax: [+ 47] 22 36 21 82 Tel: [+ 47] 22 99 40 00 Words and Deeds Russian Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Secessionist Conflicts Geir Flikke and Jakub M. Godzimirski [Abstract] The goal of this report is to examine Russia’s policy towards secessionist con- flicts in the post-Soviet space. In order to better understand Russia’s policy choices in that sphere, the report addresses three key issues: the internal Russian debate on separatism as a security challenge in the post-Soviet space; Moscow’s policies with regard to international in- stitutions, regimes and frameworks; and the rising security agenda of international terrorism. The report is divided into five sections. The first chapter briefly outlines the scope of the study. The second chapter presents a theoretical framework used to address the issue of Russian policy towards the secessionist conflicts. The third chapter contains a detailed case study of Russian policy towards the secessionist conflict between Moldova and Transdni- ester. The fourth analyses Russia’s policy towards the conflicts between Abkhazia and Geor- gia and South Ossetia and Georgia, while the fifth chapter presents authors’ conclusions. The theoretical framework chosen by the authors of this study derives from two major schools in IR theory – the liberal-institutional one, and the constructivist one. On the one hand they raise the traditional neo-liberal question of the validity of institutions in interna- tional relations; on the other hand they ask how the ability of institutional frameworks to address various problems is affected by the identities of the actors who interact in the institu- tional arena. The report addresses the issue of Russian policy towards the secessionist conflicts in the post-Soviet space designed and implemented by President Vladimir Putin’s administration. It departs from the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, where agreements on the withdrawal of Russian forces from both Moldova and Georgia were reached. According to the Istanbul Pact, Russia was to withdraw its forces from these two countries in line with the CFE Treaty. At the same time, however, Russia has been playing an active part in the international com- munity’s attempt at finding a viable solution to secessionist conflicts in the same areas. The report analyses how the Putin administration has framed the issue of secessionist conflicts and separatism in statements and doctrines and how this has influenced Russia’s policy towards the conflicts themselves and towards the institutions that are actively involved in the work on conflict resolution. In the authors view, Russia has since the early 1990s pursued an inconsistent and incoherent policy towards the separatist conflicts in the post-Soviet space. After having recognized the importance of separatism as a security challenge and threat within Russia and within the post-Soviet space, Russia has however chosen not to translate this approach into a viable and coherent policy towards these conflicts. Instead of pursuing a policy of unam- biguous support for the territorial integrity of the states haunted by secessionist conflicts, Russia seems to have adopted a policy of playing the separatist card for its own purposes and has sought to maximize its geopolitical gains and retain some control in the areas that it deems important for the realization of its partly outdated geopolitical strategy. This policy may yield some short-term geopolitical gains, but in the longer term it may undermine Rus- sia’s credibility as a predictable and serious international partner, as a ‘normal’ great power seeking its own new place on the recently redrawn global power map. Contents 1.0 Introduction.....................................................................................7 2.0 Russia and Separatism: Theoretical Framework.............................9 2.1. The OSCE and Post-Soviet Conflicts: Istanbul ...........................15 2.2. Putin’s Russia and Separatism.....................................................19 2.2.1. Putin’s approach to separatism and state integrity............21 2.2.2. Separatism and territorial integrity in Russian doctrines..24 3.0 Moldova: The ‘Synchronization’ Strategy....................................29 3.1. New Disclaimers against the OSCE and Deviation.....................33 3.2. The Primakov Initiative: ‘Synchronization’ and Default.............35 3.3. Unsynchronized Withdrawal: Russia Starts CFE Process...........38 3.4. CIS ‘Socialization’: New Russian Proposals...............................41 3.5. The CIS and Gas: Moscow’s ‘Federal’ Intermezzo.....................46 3.6. The 2003 Watershed: The Kozak Memorandum.........................50 3.7. Maastricht and Beyond: Big Politics ...........................................54 3.8. Conclusions: Fewer Words, More Deeds ....................................58 4.0. Russia, Georgia and Separatism ..................................................63 4.1. Conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia – pre-2000 Trajectory 63 4.2. Georgia and Separatist Conflicts – 1999–2003 Dynamics ..........68 4.2.1. OSCE and conflicts in Georgia 2000–2003......................72 4.3. The 2003 Watershed and Separatist Conflicts.............................74 4.3.1. The OSCE and conflicts in Georgia 2003–2005...............78 4.4. Russia’s Role in the Conflict Solution: Words and Deeds ..........79 4.4.1. Russian official discourse and action................................86 4.4.2 Russian alternative discourses and actions ........................96 4.5. Russia and Separatist Conflicts in Georgia: Summing up.........103 5.0. Conclusion .................................................................................107 1.0 Introduction1 Throughout the 1990s, Russia’s policies toward secessionist conflicts have been highly ambivalent. Post-Soviet ‘frozen conflicts’ have offered numer- ous challenges in regions seen as vital to Russia’s interests, attracting the attention of the UN and the OSCE, and producing many initiatives for their resolution. Yet, as of 2006, they are far from resolved. International conflict resolution schemes have not produced consensus, and warnings that the con- flicts themselves might ‘unfreeze’ and become active have been heard with increasing frequency. In addition, Russia’s relations with the ‘host states’ of some of these conflicts have soured, after initial hopes that they would be- come active participants in a revived CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) cooperation. This report examines Russia’s policy in three conflicts in the post-Soviet space: Moldova–Transdniester, Abkhazia–Georgia and South Ossetia– Georgia. These conflicts surfaced as a direct consequence of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and were to a certain extent defined by this event. Yet, in the course of the 1990s and the early 2000s, new and complex patterns have emerged, with Moscow back-pedalling on several issues linked to mili- tary withdrawal and general attitudes to the conflicts themselves. We suggest that three important elements should be taken into account: the internal Rus- sian debate on separatism as a security challenge in the post-Soviet space; Moscow’s back-pedalling policies with regard to international institutions, regimes and frameworks; and the rising security agenda of international ter- rorism. We start out with a short discussion of the various schools in international relations, querying whether the constructivist school has ignored some of its implicit references to neo-liberal theories in international relations. We raise this question because reciprocity and trust seem to be on the decline between Russia and the major institutions brokering these conflicts. Second, a sepa- rate chapter focuses on the institutional framework for addressing these con- flicts – basically that of the Istanbul Pact of the OSCE. We analyse how the Putin administration has framed the issue of secessionist conflicts and sepa- ratism in statements and doctrines. Thirdly, we offer two detailed case- studies, from Moldova and Georgia, tracing Russia’s path from semi- compliance toward a more unilateral and less ambiguous policy. Finally, our findings are summarized in the concluding chapter. 1 The authors are grateful to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence for financial support to this project. The views defended in this report are those of the authors and are not in any way an expression of the views of the MoD. 2.0 Russia and Separatism: Theoretical Framework The theory basis of this study derives from two major schools in IR theory. On the one hand we raise the traditional neo-liberal
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