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September 2020 MLM VOLUME XI, ISSUE 9, SEPTEMBER 2020 THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION Will Egyptian- The Mysterious Sheikh Salah Al-Qaeda’s Man in Born al-Qaeda al-Shahab al- Hablas: The Idlib Syria—A Post- Media Chief Mohajir—The Leader Facing Mortem Profile of Husam Abd al- New Emir of Down Salafist- Hurras al-Din Rauf Succeed Jihadism and the Leader Abu al- BRIEF Islamic State- Zawahiri? Khorasan Assad Regime Qassam al-Urduni the Taliban JOHN FOULKES SHAN A. ZAIN FARHAN ZAHID MANHAL BAREESH LUDOVICO CARLINO VOLUME XI, ISSUE 9 | SEPTEMBER 2020 Abdulkadir Commandos: Another al- He eventually became an active member of al- Shabaab Commander Succumbs to Ittihad al-Islamiya, an early al-Qaeda-linked Vigorous U.S. Air Campaign extremist group that conducted terrorist attacks and actively fought against Ethiopia and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of John Foulkes Somalia (HACRS, August 28). On September 8, U.S. Africa Command After al-Ittihad al-Islamiya disbanded in the confirmed the death of Abdulkadir Osman early 2000s, Commandos became a leader of Yarow, a.k.a. Abdulkadir Commandos, a Jabhat Islamiya, which fought against Ethiopia notorious commander of the Somali-based al- and the TSG during the former country’s Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab. Commandos was intervention in Somalia in 2006-2009. Jabhat killed in an airstrike outside Saakow, in the Islamiya eventually merged with several other Middle Juba region of southern Somalia, on organizations to form Hizbul Islam in 2009, of August 25 (Goobjoob News, September 9). which Commandos was a founding member. He Sources within the Somali and U.S. militaries was the head of training for Hizbul Islam reported that Commandos was the intended (Strategic Intelligence [Nairobi], August 27). target of the strike soon after the operation took Hizbul Islam merged with al-Shabaab in 2010 place, but AFRICOM did not officially confirm (Garowe Online, August 27). Commandos this until two weeks later (Garowe Online, pushed for the merger, an action that he might August 26; AFRICOM, September 8). have later come to regret. His close associates, Ibrahim Afghani and Moalim Burhan, were later Commandos had an extensive history operating killed by al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi within militant circles in Somalia, holding Godane in July 2013 in an attempt to consolidate leadership positions within multiple extremist his control of the group. Sheikh Hassan Dir groups before joining al-Shabaab. He was Aweys, an extremist leader currently under house allegedly a soldier in the Somali Armed Forces arrest in Mogadishu who Commandos was close before the central government’s collapse in 1991. to ideologically, was also forced to flee and 1 VOLUME XI, ISSUE 9, SEPTEMBER 2020 THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION surrender to the Somali government during this the Somali National Army and the U.S. military. time (HACRS, August 28; The Star, March 14, The United States has launched nearly 50 2017). airstrikes this year, using these attacks to kill multiple senior al-Shabaab leaders. One such Commandos’ position within al-Shabaab was leader, Bashir Qorgab, was, like Commandos, downgraded as a result of his close association killed near the town of Saakow, on February 22 with the losers of the power struggle against (see MLM, April 2). Yusuf Jiis, a founder of al- Godane in 2013. His movements were Shabaab and high-ranking leader of the group, temporarily restricted until his allies within the was killed in an airstrike on April 2 (North Africa group’s military wing argued that his operational Post, April 8). Commandos was involved in the experience was needed by al-Shabaab (HACRS, mass training of new recruits and in military August 28). planning. He has been involved in insurgent movements in Somalia since the early 1990s. Commandos was involved in the planning of The loss of his years of experience could military operations and was relied upon by al- damage al-Shabaab’s operations in the short- Shabaab to negotiate with clan leaders. term. Commandos was a senior commander within al- Shabaab, coordinating the group’s activities in In the long-term, however, Commandos’ death is the volatile region of Lower Shabelle in the unlikely to have a large effect on the Somali country’s south. In addition to planning attacks insurgency. Despite the high tempo of airstrikes against Somali and international forces, he by the United States, al-Shabaab continues to managed the collection of taxes from the local frequently launch attacks in Mogadishu and the populace (Strategic Intelligence [Nairobi], surrounding cities and towns. The group has August 27; Garowe Online, September 10). maintained its revenue streams and continues to Perhaps his role with the most long-term field a steady number of new recruits, and has ramification for the region was as a military demonstrated continued access to and ability to trainer. Commandos trained both regular use improvised explosive devices. Though fighters and members of the Jaysh al-Ayman, an Commandos was a high-value target due to his elite unit al-Shabaab created to carry out attacks direct connection to the training of al-Shabaab inside Kenya. He was involved in preparing fighters, his death is unlikely to significantly hundreds of people for operations inside Kenya reduce the Somali terrorist group’s core and Ethiopia over the past ten years from his capabilities. base in the Lower Shabelle (HACRS, August 28). John Foulkes is the Editor of Militant Leadership The al-Shabaab commander was killed in a joint Monitor. raid by the Somali National Army (SNA) and the United States. According to General Ismail Abdimalik of the SNA, Somali Special Forces (or Danab) approached a meeting of al-Shabaab militants in Saakow, killing “several.” Commandos was killed in a separate U.S. airstrike during the raid (Garowe Online, August 26). Abdulkadir Commandos’ death represents another setback for al-Shabaab at the hands of 2 VOLUME XI, ISSUE 9, SEPTEMBER 2020 THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION Will Egyptian-Born al-Qaeda return, al-Rauf worked as a secretary and computer administrator in the office of the then- Media Chief Husam Abd al- Egyptian Minister of Agriculture, Dr. Youssef Rauf Succeed Zawahiri? Wali. Shan A. Zain In 1989, al-Rauf and his wife moved to Pakistan and joined the Service Bureau, an organization in Peshawar co-founded by late al-Qaeda figures Husam Abd al-Rauf is among the few remaining Abdalla al-Azzam and Osama bin Laden. al-Qaeda figures with a public profile. A prolific During his stint with the bureau from 1989 to contributor to al-Qaeda’s jihadist productions 1995, he took on various roles such as treasurer and publications, al-Rauf has repeatedly in the financial department, administrative threatened to target Western countries. He is manager, and a member of the editorial board credited with reviving and modernizing al- of al-Jihad magazine, an Arabic monthly Qaeda’s media operations, in particular the launched by Abdallah al-Azzam. In July 1995, group’s official outlet, al-Sahab. He is believed to al-Rauf and his family moved to Kabul to be a close aide of the ailing al-Qaeda leader supervise some of the bureau's projects in three Ayman al-Zawahiri and a key official involved in Afghan provinces (Mobtada, August 20, 2018; al-Qaeda's day-to-day operations. The al-Qaeda Daral Marif, January 13). official, who is fluent in English, was the long- time editor of the group’s now-defunct flagship Role as al-Qaeda Propagandist magazine Vanguards of Khorasan. Earlier this year, the FBI added him to its list of most wanted Al-Rauf got his first taste of media experience terrorists, saying his crimes included conspiracy with al-Qaeda when he was made the editor of to kill U.S. nationals. al-Qaeda’s Vanguards of Khorasan magazine. He edited the publication beginning with its first Education and Background issue that came out following the 7/7 London bombings in 2005. Al-Rauf also prolifically Hussam Abd al-Rauf, a.k.a. Abd-al-Hadi wrote in the magazine about al-Qaeda’s jihadist Mustafa, was born in Egypt in 1957. He is well ideology. educated, having graduated with a degree in agriculture from a university in Cairo in 1979. He wrote a number of articles and appeared in He studied English and joined the Egyptian several videos propagating al-Qaeda’s jihadist Ministry of Agriculture in 1981, where he was in views and threatening attacks against the group’s charge of handling the ministry’s foreign enemies. In 2006, for example, al-Rauf relations. Al-Rauf also gained computer threatened attacks against Canada unless the expertise, and in 1988 he turned down an offer country withdrew its troops from Afghanistan to pursue higher education in the United States, (Al-Jazeera, October 29, 2006). citing his hatred for America (Al-Marjie, August 1, 2019). Al-Rauf ’s first appearance in a video produced by al-Qaeda’s media arm al-Sahab was in June The al-Qaeda official started his jihadist career 2013 when the terrorist group sought to in 1986, when he joined hundreds of Arab capitalize on the Arab Spring revolutions that fighters in Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet were sweeping through several countries in the occupation. He stayed in the country for nine Middle East and North Africa. The lengthy months before returning to Egypt. Following his documentary-style video was packed with 3 VOLUME XI, ISSUE 9, SEPTEMBER 2020 THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION historical references and religious quotations, considered to succeed the current al-Qaeda and centered on al-Rauf declaring the Arab leader (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 30). In an Spring a failure in an attempt to convince indication of his position within the group, in Muslims that armed jihad was the only viable 2014, a letter sent by al-Qaeda’s branch in Iraqi path to overthrowing repressive regimes in the Kurdistan addressed al-Zawahiri along with al- region (Emaad.net, June 28, 2013).
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