Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst

BI-WEEKLY BRIEFING VOL. 16 NO. 09 07 MAY 2014

Contents'' ' Analytical'Articles' ! ’S'INCREASING'DEPENDENCE'ON'' ' ' ' '''''3!' Armen!Grigoryan! ! UMAROV’S'DEATH'AND'THE'FUTURE'OF'THE'NORTH'CAUCASUS'INSURGENCY'''6! Tomáš!Šmíd! ! RUSSIA'FEARS'JIHADISTS'RETURNING'HOME' ' ' ' ' !!!!9! Dmitry!Shlapentokh! ! AFGHANISTAN'NATIONAL'ELECTIONS'EXCEED'EXPECTATIONS' ' ' '''12! Richard!Weitz! ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' Field'Reports' ' TAJIKISTAN’S'PRESIDENT'OUTLINES'PRIORITIES'FOR'2014' ' ' !!!16! Oleg!Salimov! ! AZERBAIJANI'JOURNALIST'ACCUSED'OF'SPYING'FOR'ARMENIA'' '''' !!!19! Mina!Muradova! ! 'DISTRIBUTES'PASSPORTS'IN'GEORGIA'' ' ' !!! !!!22' Eka!Janashia! ! KYRGYZSTAN’S'NEW'PRIME'MINISTER'VISITS'MOSCOW'' ' ' !!24' Arslan!Sabyrbekov!! THE CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASS ANALYST

Editor: Svante E. Cornell

Associate Editor: Niklas Nilsson

Assistant Editor, News Digest: Alima Bissenova

Chairman, Editorial Board: S. Frederick Starr

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is an English-language journal devoted to analysis of the current issues facing Central Asia and the Caucasus. It serves to link the business, governmental, journalistic and scholarly communities and is the global voice of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. The Editor of the Analyst solicits most articles and field reports, however authors are encouraged to suggest topics for future issues or submit articles and field reports for consideration. Such articles and field reports cannot have been previously published in any form, must be written in English, and must correspond precisely to the format and style of articles and field reports published in The Analyst, described below. The Analyst aims to provide our industrious and engaged audience with a singular and reliable assessment of events and trends in the region written in an analytical tone rather than a polemical one. Analyst articles reflect the fact that we have a diverse international audience. While this should not affect what authors write about or their conclusions, this does affect the tone of articles. Analyst articles focus on a newsworthy topic, engage central issues of the latest breaking news from the region and are backed by solid evidence. Articles should normally be based on local language news sources. Each 1,100-1,500 word analytical article must provide relevant, precise and authoritative background information. It also must offer a sober and analytical judgment of the issue as well as a clinical evaluation of the importance of the event. Authors must cite facts of controversial nature to the Editor who may contact other experts to confirm claims. Since Analyst articles are based on solid evidence, rather than rumors or conjecture, they prove to be reliable sources of information on the region. By offering balanced and objective analysis while keeping clear of inflammatory rhetoric, The Analyst does more to inform our international readership on all sides of the issues. The Editor reserves the right to edit the article to conform to the editorial policy and specifications of The Analyst and to reject the article should it not be acceptable to our editorial committee for publication. On acceptance and publication of the edited version of the article, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of The Johns Hopkins University-The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies will issue an honorarium to the author. It is up to the individual author to provide the correct paperwork to the Institute that makes the issuing of an honorarium possible. The copyright for the article or field report will reside with the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. However, the author may use all or part of the contracted article in any book or article in any media subsequently written by the author, provided that a copyright notice appears giving reference to the contracted article’s first publication by the "Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies."

Submission Guidelines: Analytical Articles require a three to four sentence Key Issue introduction to the article based on a news hook. Rather than a general, overarching analysis, the article must offer considered and careful judgment supported with concrete examples. The ideal length of analytical articles is between 1,100 and 1,500 words. The articles are structured as follows: KEY ISSUE: A short 75-word statement of your conclusions about the issue or news event on which the article focuses. BACKGROUND: 300-450 words of analysis about what has led up to the event or issue and why this issue is critical to the region. Include background information about the views and experiences of the local population. IMPLICATIONS: 300-450 words of analysis of the ramifications of this event or issue, including where applicable, implications for the local people’s future. CONCLUSIONS: 100-200 words that strongly state your conclusions about the impact of the event or issue.

Field Reports focus on a particular news event and what local people think about the event. Field Reports address the implications the event or activity analyzed for peoples’ lives and their communities. Field Reports do not have the rigid structure of Analytical Articles, and are shorter in length, averaging ca. 700-800 words.

Those interested in joining The Analyst’s pool of authors to contribute articles, field reports, or contacts of potential writers, please send your CV to: and suggest some topics on which you would like to write.

Svante E. Cornell Research Director; Editor, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University 1619 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, USA. Tel. +1-202-663-5922; 1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785 ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 3!

ARMENIA’S INCREASING DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA Armen Grigoryan

Armenia’s Russia-imposed self-isolation from the democratic international community continues and threatens to have economic and social consequences for the country. Russia is increasing its pressure in the South Caucasus, raising the specter of regional destabilization. While Russia already controls the most important sectors of Armenia’s economy, it seems set to reinforce its interests in the country so as to ensure that a fully dependent, loyal Armenia can constitute a tool for the projection of Russia’s political and military influence in the region. Russia’s overt attempt to fulfill its expansionist ambitions endangers the sovereignty of its neighbors, as well as regional stability and energy security.

BACKGROUND: By deciding to General Assembly resolution declaring join the Customs Union, Armenia’s the Moscow-backed referendum government has practically invalid. It should be recalled that in relinquished the country’s sovereignty 2008 Sargsyan not only refused to to Russia. Soon after President recognize the independence of Sargsyan announced the decision in Abkhazia and South Ossetia but also favor of the Customs Union, dim welcomed Georgia’s President Mikheil predictions were made about a de facto Saakashvili in Yerevan a few months annexation to follow. Events in recent later and decorated him with the Medal weeks show that such a prediction was of Honor despite Moscow’s strong not excessively pessimistic. There is displeasure. Currently, Armenia’s practically no doubt that the decision to leadership acts as ordered by the join the Customs Union will be rubber- Kremlin. stamped by Armenia’s National Although Armenian officials have Assembly: the Republican Party of stated on several occasions that they Armenia has a majority of the votes might want to sign the political part of while most of the opposition MPs are the Association Agreement with the reluctant to vote against Russian plans. EU while refraining from the DCFTA, Armenia’s total dependence on Russia the EU has shown little interest in such was bluntly demonstrated by the an arrangement. And after the government’s support for Russia’s demonstration of loyalty to Russia by actions against Ukraine and the supporting the annexation of Crimea, annexation of Crimea. President Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Sargsyan and the Ministry of Foreign Carl Bildt simply ruled out the Affairs welcomed the “referendum” possibility of signing the political part organized at gunpoint by Russian of the Association Agreement, saying troops, and Armenia was one of the 11 that Armenia is “in a different league” states that voted against the UN and that it does not qualify for such a ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 4!

and France do not seem to be ready to present a compelling resolution proposal that would trump the “security” argument of Russia’s loyalists in Armenia. Soon after President Sargsyan’s decision to join the Customs Union, another expansive phase of Russia’s military presence in Armenia began. degree of political affinity as a result of Local and international experts alike its support for Russia’s policies towards have indicated that Russia’s military Ukraine. presence in Armenia, together with the In mid-April, a publication by one of deadlock in the Nagorno-Karabakh Poland’s influential think tanks, the conflict resolution process, may put Center for Eastern Studies, stated that additional pressure on Azerbaijan, thus Russia has consistently taken over threatening the diversification of the control of all aspects of Armenia’s EU’s energy supply. statehood, and that Armenia is In addition, Russia could increase becoming an instrument of the pressure on Georgia, particularly by Kremlin’s policy. Given such attitudes demanding a military corridor across in Poland and Sweden, the two states Georgia to the Russian bases in that introduced the Eastern Partnership Armenia. The South Caucasus is an and have been its main supporters, the especially likely area for further outline for the EU’s future common Russian expansion because it is the only policy vis-à-vis Armenia seems to be region where Russia has enough drawn. leverage for boosting the oil price. IMPLICATIONS: The Armenian Taking over Georgia would allow government has not only isolated the Russia to control the pipelines country from the West, particularly by supplying Azerbaijani oil and gas to making further development of Europe. An even more dangerous cooperation with the EU improbable. scenario would involve provocations Armenia’s deepening dependence on leading to serious clashes between Russia also compromises the Nagorno- Armenian and Azerbaijani forces, with Karabakh conflict resolution process. possible targeting of the pipelines and Mediation by the OSCE Minsk Group other infrastructure, followed by a may practically come to a halt. If Russian “peacekeeping” operation. Armenia is de facto not a sovereign Either scenario or variations of them actor and all crucial decisions are made would allow Russia to increase its oil in Moscow, Russian mediation cannot revenues and at the same time to lead to an agreement. It is also quite restore domination over the entire obvious that Russia will not start Caucasus region. In addition, Russia behaving in a constructive way in the would be able to gain control over the near future. At the same time, the U.S. ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 5! transit route from Afghanistan, and situation unless Armenia’s isolation then to deny NATO access to Central and dependence on Russia are reduced. Asia. This is a critical and difficult task, as The probability of an overt Russian Armenia has been isolated from the invasion in the South Caucasus may outside – by Azerbaijan and Turkey, even grow if more decisive sanctions and from the inside – by its own are implemented against Russia as it government that prefers to give in to continues its subversive operations on Russian demands rather than opting for Ukrainian territory. With an economy cooperation with the EU. Moreover, on the brink of collapse, Moscow would the majority of Armenia’s be desperate to boost the oil price. parliamentary opposition is also pro- However, a lack of decisiveness on the Russian and hardly considers the West’s behalf and further appeasement possibility of becoming a real attempts would also most likely send a alternative to the incumbent wrong signal to and administration without seeking induce him to believe that after taking Moscow’s support. over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and now AUTHOR’S BIO: Armen Grigoryan Crimea he may safely continue is an Armenian political scientist. His expanding his neo-empire in the area of research interests include post- “legitimate” Russian influence. communist transition, EU relations CONCLUSIONS: While the U.S., with Eastern Partnership countries, supported by NATO allies, could start transatlantic relations, energy security, increasing engagement with the South and conflict transformation. He is the Caucasus in order to provide additional author of several book chapters, security guarantees to Azerbaijan and conference reports and analytical Georgia and to protect the transit articles. routes, there is no guarantee of success. The U.S. president needs to convince the Congress, and then NATO’s decision-making must be consensus- based while some NATO and EU members are reluctant to endanger relations with Russia. At the same time, Russia with its one-man rule is not restricted by democratic procedures and can take decisions and act fast; besides, Russian troops are already there – in the North and South Caucasus. Given the level of Russia’s presence in the region, Azerbaijan and Georgia are bound to face a deteriorating security ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 6!

UMAROV’S DEATH AND THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS INSURGENCY Tomáš Šmíd

Federal authorities, the Chechen administration, and North Caucasian Islamist insurgents have confirmed the death of Doku Umarov, leader of the Caucasus Emirate. His successor, Ali Askhab Kebekov, is the first non-Chechen to lead the insurgents in the North Caucasus and is also the first leader who does not have a militant background. This change could signify a considerable shift in how the entire insurgency operates. As Kebekov is a Dagestani Avar, it may be expected that intensification of the “Dagestanization” of insurgents, which has already been underway for several years, will continue. In addition, he will influence operations as a religious leader and not as a fighter.

BACKGROUND: On April 8, FSB already chosen Ali Abu Muhammad – Director Aleksandr Bortnikov officially the jihadist name of Ali Askhab announced that Umarov, whose death (Aliaskhab) Kebekov, an ethnic Avar had been rumored since January, was from Dagestan – as Umarov’s indeed dead. Chechnya’s President successor. Ramzan Kadyrov declared Umarov’s Umarov’s death marks an indisputable death publicly in mid-January. turning point in the history of the However, Kadyrov could not be Caucasus Emirate and the overall considered a credible source of North Caucasian armed resistance information since he has already against the federal center. On the other “buried” Umarov several times only for hand, any truly strategic “shift” in the it to emerge later that Abu Usman, as insurgency corresponding to the one he is known by his jihadist name, was taking place during Umarov’s era, or still alive. Nevertheless, when the more precisely his early period as the North Caucasian Islamist insurgents leader of the North Caucasian themselves confirmed Umarov’s death, underground, should not be expected in the information was considered to be the foreseeable future. Umarov was a credible. Bortnikov’s declaration, which veteran of the Chechen resistance, came three months after the first which was long characterized by an reports and three weeks after the ethnocentric orientation towards the insurgents officially confirmed the Chechen national element. A strong death of their leader, renders the news Islamist tendency was always present, almost certainly true, although however, which grew stronger after the Umarov’s body has not yet been First Chechen War primarily through discovered. The insurgents have also radical and even extremist Salafi Islam. ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 7!

certain sense, the insurgency will come full circle, as Dagestan was the original gateway of Salafi ideals to the North Caucasus, although the First Chechen War and the ensuing chaos fundamentally contributed to their popularization and diffusion, which were completed with the outbreak of the Second Chechen War. While in charge of the Chechen According to local sources, Kebekov is Republic of Ichkeria, Umarov took the also known to be an opponent of decisive step to turn from Chechen terrorist suicide attacks; and a change in ethnonationalism towards supraethnic tactical-operational approaches may Salafism when he announced the end of therefore be expected. Although Ichkeria and the formation of the Kebekov himself does not have field Caucasus Emirate, which is intended to command experience, it can be assumed become an Islamic state encompassing that he will revert to tactics typically the entire North Caucasus. associated with classical insurgency and Umarov was no theologian, however, partisan warfare, meaning primarily and his religious education was very acts of sabotage on military targets, poor. He was, on the contrary, a checkpoints, bases, convoys, and relatively seasoned fighter, and his machinery. The first such attack took decision was motivated primarily by an place on April 3 in the Achkoy-Martan effort to make it easier for ravaged district of Chechnya near the border Chechnya to spread the resistance to with Ingushetia, where a detonation other Muslim republics in the North destroyed an armored personnel carrier, Caucasus, as well as by the realization killing four soldiers. This attack also that only a supraethnic idea could raise highlights the fact that, although the the collective resistance of Muslim center of the resistance has shifted to nations more or less frustrated by the Dagestan, Chechnya will certainly not politics of the federal center and its cease to be an arena for armed attacks local representatives. against the state’s power – regardless of IMPLICATIONS: Kebekov will not Kadyrov’s despotism and the state change this orientation if only because terror asserted over Chechen society. he, unlike Umarov, is a theologian and According to reports from Chechen an ideologue of the North Caucasian observers and humanitarian workers, it resistance. Based on his origins and due has been possible since Umarov’s death to Kadyrov’s brutal and unscrupulous to trace a paradoxical growth of counterinsurgency policies, it is insurgent activity, including the possible that the insurgency will strengthening of personnel in the form “Dagestanize,” and that the process of of Chechen youth departing “for the shifting the center of the rebellion away forest.” This is an important fact from Chechnya will be completed. In a ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 8! because, through his terror against the risky given the fact that Moscow is population, Kadyrov has nearly using a rhetoric legitimizing separatism managed to deprive the fighters of their similar to that which it has long refused social base. Chechnya thus features a to acknowledge in the context of the relatively ambiguous situation, whose North Caucasus. As a result, Russia has further development hangs in the not hesitated to kill more than 100,000 balance. people in both Chechen wars and the The situation in Dagestan, however, is subsequent low-intensity currently more favorable to the counterinsurgency war. The right to insurgency. The type of vertical power national self-determination, which exercised by Kadyrov is not possible Moscow is now supporting in Ukraine, there, as Dagestani society is highly is in fact precisely what Chechens polyethnic compared to the nearly demanded at the beginning of the 1990s, monoethnic Chechnya. There is also which started the process that has not greater freedom of speech in Dagestan, been resolved to date. which allows considerable AUTHOR'S BIO: Tomas Šmíd is opportunities for propaganda. Indeed, assistant professor at Masaryk this is the only strategy possible in University. He was a Fulbright Fellow Dagestan, which has a historically at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute stronger tradition of Islamic in 2010-2011. institutions and scholars. Religious ideology has therefore been utilized more extensively in Dagestan as it has not been possible to draw upon human resources from a war-torn and revenge- seeking society as has been done in Chechnya. Considerable changes to the North Caucasian underground can still be anticipated, though they will be more of a tactical and operational character. The basic strategy of using Salafi Islam as an umbrella ideology in the fight for an independent region in the Russian Federation will continue. CONCLUSIONS: Current events in the North Caucasus overlap in the long term with developments in Ukraine.

However, this should not divert attention away from the changes taking place there. Indeed, Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine are rather ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 9!

RUSSIA FEARS JIHADISTS RETURNING HOME Dmitry Shlapentokh

The Kremlin is facing a new set of terrorism-related challenges in the Middle East and Central Asia and has engaged in several moves to counter these threats. Russia’s policy on Syria can partly be seen in this light – the risk of terrorists acquiring either chemical weapons or the skills to use them could have grave consequences for Russia itself. Accordingly, while continuing to support the Syrian regime, Moscow pressured its Syrian allies to comply in destroying their chemical weapons. Moscow is also increasingly concerned over the aftermath of NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, and over the prospect of both Syria and Afghanistan transforming into training camps for terrorists who could then return to Russia.

BACKGROUND: For several years, This situation, however, has recently the Kremlin has shown little concern changed. By the beginning of the over terrorists or potential terrorists Second Chechen War, the number of from the North Caucasus or other foreign fighters and funding declined Muslim enclaves of the Russian considerably in Russia. At the same Federation going to Afghanistan to time, another trend emerged: increasing fight. The late Emir Seifullakh, one of numbers of Russian jihadists went to the leaders of the North Caucasian foreign countries to fight, primarily to resistance, even claimed that the Afghanistan and later to Syria. While Kremlin has supported such ventures in some of these fighters became fully the past. The reason for such a engaged in foreign wars and the calculation was quite clear: those who international jihad movement, others were training to fight in foreign decided to return to Russia to proceed countries would most likely never with the fight and apply the skills they return to Russia. The Kremlin’s chief had acquired abroad. Moscow has concern was not the Russian Islamists become increasingly concerned over who went abroad but the foreign this development, especially regarding jihadists, mostly of Middle Eastern and the ability of returning jihadists to use Pakistani origin of various ethnic acquired experiences or materials to backgrounds who came to Russia. The engage in terrorist attacks using foreign fighters brought not only weapons of mass destruction. stamina, dedication and expertise but Moscow’s concerns were not also weapons and funds. Some of the groundless. Russian authorities have foreign fighters, such as Ibn al-Khattab, started to deal with jihadists who, upon played an important role in the First receiving training and experience in Chechen War. ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 10!

chemical weapons is not a sham and cannot be reduced to a desire to provide his U.S. counterpart with an excuse for not launching a strike against Syria and a possible broader conflict with Iran. The Kremlin genuinely wants to eliminate chemical weapons that could, especially in the case of the Assad

regime’s collapse, fall into the hands of Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan, return the jihadist insurgents who could then to Russia. Their plans to use weapons transport them to Russia. The same of mass destruction either directly or consideration also plays a role in the indirectly are not just empty talk. In Kremlin’s desire to keep Assad in October 2013, Russian law enforcement power. The Russian government arrested two young men from the understands that the entire chemical North Caucasus who planned to blow weapon stockpiles might not be up the Maradykovskii factory in the destroyed and that the regime’s collapse Kirov region. could well help potential terrorists The factory engages in the destruction obtain chemical weapons for future use of chemical weapons, and an explosion in Russia. Secondly, the Kremlin has in the facilities could lead to mass now started to comprehend the danger casualties. The detained men had a map that Russian jihadists who are trained of the factory and possibly a helper to fight in foreign countries could inside among the factory personnel. return to Russia in the future. It has They had passports for travel abroad also begun to consider instability far and were planning to go to Syria. One from Russia’s borders as a security local noted that such an alarm problem for Russia itself and has ended (perepolokh) had not been heard in the its policy of implicitly encouraging region in at least the last ten years. jihadists from Russia to go abroad to Alarmed by the event, the authorities fight, and Russian authorities now treat increased security arrangements in the them in the same way as those who are Kazan Gunpowder factory. Yet, they preparing to fight inside Russia. For were not able to prevent another example, in May 2013 Russian law terrorism attempt. On November 16, an enforcement arrested the members of a unknown individual fired a rocket at terrorist organization in Astrakhan the petro-chemical plant in who recruited people to fight in the Nizhnekamsk, again a target against North Caucasus, as well as Afghanistan which a successful terrorist attack could and Syria. have led to mass casualties. Finally, the Kremlin’s desire to increase IMPLICATIONS: What do these its influence in Central Asia is not due developments imply for Moscow’s exclusively to its interest in reaping foreign policy? To start with, President economic benefits or preventing the Putin’s interest in eliminating Assad’s U.S. and China from increasing their ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 11! influence in the region at Russia’s return home after receiving training expense. It is also due to a genuine fear and combat experience in Syria and of an influx of jihadists from elsewhere. It especially dreads the Afghanistan with experience in potential use of weapons of mass handling all types of weaponry. Indeed, destruction by these fighters and has already at the May 2013 CSTO summit already experienced a handful of such in Bishkek, Putin expressed concern attempts. While the Kremlin over NATO’s planned withdrawal understands that the West is facing a from Afghanistan. It is clear that the similar problem, the development of Kremlin, while pleased with the decline deeper cooperation to counter of U.S. influence in many parts of the international terrorism is unlikely due world, views the abrupt end of the not just to events in Ukraine but also U.S.-led venture in Afghanistan as because of a general Russian distrust of deeply concerning. The Kremlin Western intentions. understands the risk that jihadists could AUTHOR’S BIO: Dmitry well move north – to Central Asia and Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of Russia proper. History, Indiana University at South There is no doubt that Moscow’s Bend. anxiety will increase when the actual withdrawal starts. While the common interest in curbing the spread of jihadism outside Afghanistan and Syria is a factor that could provide a ground for cooperation between Russia and the West, such prospects do not seem overly optimistic, as demonstrated by the experience of the Sochi Olympic games where Moscow rejected broad U.S.-Russian intelligence cooperation against the terrorist threat. Although limited cooperation on these issues is possible even in the perspective of current developments in Ukraine, the Kremlin remains deeply suspicious of

Western intentions.

CONCLUSIONS: Moscow desire to limit U.S./Western influence is just one of one of the variables determining Russian foreign policy in the Middle

East and Central Asia. The Kremlin is increasingly concerned that increasing numbers of jihadists from Russia could ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 12!

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS EXCEED EXPECTATIONS Richard Weitz

Compared with the disastrous 2009 national elections and this year’s pre-ballot worries, the first round of voting in Afghanistan’s presidential elections went much better than forecast or feared. Turnout so exceeded expectations that many localities lacked sufficient ballots on hand, while the Taliban was unable to conduct any spoiling attacks even in its traditional strongholds. Nonetheless, several key uncertainties remain unresolved that will determine the success of what should still be Afghanistan’s first peaceful presidential transition in its history.

BACKGROUND: Some seven of Afghanistan’s population. They will million votes were cast for one of the 11 likely rally behind Ghani, perhaps men on the April 5 ballot, yielding a enough for him to overcome his respectable 60 percent turnout. Of those second-place finish in the first-round votes cast, 36 percent were by women ballot. If he loses, more Pashtuns might and 64 percent by men. The two support the Pashtun-dominated frontrunners, Abdullah Abdullah, who Taliban. If Afghanistan’s national received the most votes, and Ashraf minorities and other interest groups Ghani are headed for a runoff next feel they lack legitimate opportunities month. The results confirm to express their views through the Afghanistan’s status as a functioning political process, they will more likely electoral democracy in which multiple take up arms against the government or candidates compete for the highest stand aloof as the country descends offices in elections whose outcome again into civil war. cannot be predicted in advance. Whatever the outcome, a critical issue Yet, ethnicity could play a more is whether the losing candidate will delicate role in the current voting than accept the results with grace or in 2009. The absence of strong political challenge them as fraudulent. Since parties leads Afghans to vote on the avoiding shame is important in Afghan basis of ethnicity (Pashtuns, Tajiks, culture, the losers have an incentive to Hazaras, and Uzbeks are the four claim fraud as the reason for their largest groups). Although Abdullah is defeat. Even before this year’s ballot, half Pashtun, he is commonly seen as Abdullah had called fraud his main an ethnic Tajik leader from the north. opponent. His claim that fraud cheated The Pashtuns, who divided their vote him of victory in his 2009 race against in the first round, comprise 43 percent ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 13!

would not establish the power centers, but he soon grew in office. It seems likely that, if elected, Abdullah would break from his rhetoric and exploit his powers to the fullest. IMPLICATIONS: One hoped for result of next month’s final round of voting is that the both presidential frontrunners have said that they will quickly sign the Bilateral Security incumbent President Hamid Karzai Agreement (BSA) with the U.S.. For marred Karzai’s second term in office. reasons really know only to him, Karzai Unlike in 2009, on this occasion the has declined to sign the negotiated text. members of the Independent Election The U.S. needs the BSA, effectively a Commission and the Electoral status-of-forces agreement, in order for Complaints Commission (ECC) have the Pentagon and its NATO partners been selected by civil society groups to keep troops in Afghanistan beyond and others rather than being all Karzai’s the end of this year. Meanwhile, the men. Karzai either limited his efforts to Obama administration still has not manipulate the results this time or was announced how many U.S. troops it ineffective in doing so. Whatever fraud intends to keep in Afghanistan after occurred in April appears to have little 2014 if the BSA takes effect. The impact on the outcome, since Abdullah resulting uncertainty is deepening and Ghani received many more votes Afghan fears of abandonment, than the other candidates but fell well encouraging the Taliban to wait to see short of a majority. Still, the eventual if the ANSF will lack any direct foreign winner would be wise to offer losers combat support, and making it harder government posts or other concessions to induce fence-sitting third parties like to keep them satisfied. Pakistan to side with Afghanistan’s There are already fears that neither new government and armed forces. man will prove strong enough to Another uncertainty is how the Russia- govern the country effectively in the West split over Ukraine will affect face of powerful regional warlords. regional security dynamics. On the one Abdullah has even called for reforming hand, neither NATO nor Russia want the political system to give more power to see the Taliban return to power. On to regional and local officials. the other, Russia might retaliate for Afghanistan’s constitution gives the Western sanctions by reducing its president considerable powers, support for NATO’s Afghan mission. including authority to appoint most For now, Moscow has found common national and even local officials. Karzai cause with Karzai, who is also alienated was originally chosen with expectations from the Western powers. Karzai’s that he would be a weak president that government was one of the few that ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 14! backed Moscow’s annexation of the Afghanistan’s current “Decade of Crimea. Russia has also recently Transformation” envisages moving the reached a deal with India under which country from corruption and New Delhi would pay Russia to dependency to societal renewal and provide Kabul’s government with economic integration and prosperity. In weapons, allowing both countries to its Tokyo Mutual Accountability exert greater influence on the Afghan Commitments, the Afghan government war despite their shared refusal to send pledged to conduct free elections, combat troops to Afghanistan. advance human (especially women) The Afghan National Security Forces rights, combat corruption, and expand (ANSF) performed better than private sector-led growth while expected in maintaining Election Day reducing national dependence on security. Doing so again in June, during foreign assistance. Afghanistan the second ballot, could prove more experienced exceptionally rapid GDP difficult since the Taliban, while growth last year but that was partly due harboring its strength in the hopes of to good weather leading to a good seeing the departure of most if not all harvest. This year could see a sharp foreign troops, will made a greater drop due to the ongoing withdrawal of effort to disrupt the ballot. The layered foreign troops and aid workers. security concept, which looks good on International aid levels are falling paper, has yet to prove its value in rapidly, as they have in earlier conflicts practice. in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere when the foreign military presence was As confirmed by the most recent semi- sharply curtailed. Years of wasted and annual Report of Security and Stability misused aid are also making it hard to in Afghanistan. The ANSF still suffers persuade donors that need to spend from serious weaknesses in such critical more now to avoid paying badly later. enablers as maintenance, logistics, air Congress looks like it might authorize support, and intelligence. One reason only half of the US$ 2.1 billion in aid NATO wants to keep some 10,000 that the Obama admonition originally troops in Afghanistan after this year is requested. Developing Afghanistan’s to fill these gaps through additional natural riches requires achieving greater training, equipping, and advising. With integration with the rest of Central and its new Resolute Support Operation, South Asia, but for this to happen NATO would transition from Afghanistan needs improved security providing direct combat support, and and a better business climate – lower more recently unit-based security force corruption, more transparency, assistance, to assistance concentrated in improved regulations, and so forth – to several basic functions. NATO attract more foreign capital and personnel would also work with the entrepreneurs. The resurgent drug trade main Afghan government security exacerbates these problems. ministries to improve their managerial procedures. CONCLUSIONS: Thus far Afghanistan looks to be holding ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 15! elections sufficiently free and fair to produce a government that has enough domestic authority to mobilize the Afghan nation against the Taliban and sufficient international legitimacy to continue receiving vital economic and security assistance. Political reality means that Western governments would find it harder to sustain their high level of support to Afghanistan if the country experienced yet another flawed election. Nevertheless, the new Afghan government and its partners still need to overcome critical security, economic, and diplomatic challenges to finally turn the tide on Eurasia’s longest twenty-first century conflict AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute.

! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 16!

TAJIKISTAN’S PRESIDENT OUTLINES PRIORITIES FOR 2014 Oleg Salimov

On April 23, Tajikistan’s President Tajikistan’s transporting infrastructure Emomali Rakhmon gave his annual is the foremost task in expanding its address to parliament, summarizing the export potential. Still, the address 2013 year and outlining priorities in lacked detailed overview and particular Tajikistan’s development for 2014. means for resolving Tajikistan’s Tajikistan’s economy was the primary transporting isolation. Rakhmon and most detailed part of the speech. referred to the Dushanbe – Kulma, Rakhmon called for higher China highway and Turkmenistan- participation in world trade processes, Afghanistan-Tajikistan railroad as stressing the need for export increases. critical for the country’s economic He outlined his vision of improving development. At the same time, the export through government assistance president failed to mention that the and fees reassignment. Rakhmon highway to China, in fact a announced the state support to private reconstruction of a Soviet-era production enterprises in 2014-2020, motorway, evolves slowly and depends establishment of new free economic on financial assistance from China’s zones, and introduction of export fees Export-Import Bank. Also, while on raw cotton, silk, and other raw Turkmenistan has entered active stages materials to stimulate production of railroad construction process, the manufacturing inside the country. Tajik part is still in its technical- Rakhmon is concerned with the lack of economic substantiation phase of interest to production enterprises from development. The railroad Dushanbe – Tajik entrepreneurs which are the Kurgan-Tube has stalled due to engine for export increase in any financial difficulties with Tajikistan country. In spite of similar statements once again placing its hopes on China’s in his previous address, the actual investors. Moreover, the 2011 report on environment for entrepreneurship in transportation and communication in Tajikistan worsened in 2013. The hopes Tajikistan prepared by the Asian of private sector for self-regulation and Development Bank indicates the loss of open dialog with the government were 80 percent of Tajik transporting lost with the dismissal of its infrastructure system after Coordination Council and arrest of its independence. Among other leader Zaid Saidov in May 2013. shortcomings the report points out the low quality of existing roads and The perspectives of export in Tajikistan bureaucratic obstacles which force depend greatly on the country’s ability transit transport to seek alternative to deliver its products to prospective routes bypassing Tajikistan. consumers. The development of ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 17!

Rakhmon called for a shift of attention stages of development and presumably from agrarian to industrial sectors, outweighs risks over profit. Rakhmon’s whereas he has previously praised the expectations towards state enterprises progress in the country’s agrarian stock trade potential hence seem segment of economy. The unsubstantiated and premature. improvement of socioeconomic Regarding Tajikistan’s foreign policy, conditions for farmers is seen as the the turmoil in Ukraine produced an primary objective for the Tajik ambiguous situation for a number of government in 2014. Yet, Rakhmon post-Soviet republics. The Tajik regime avoided reporting on the progress of is still contemplating the appropriate two key government acts, from 2007 reaction to the intensified West-Russia and 2009, which define agrarian reform confrontation. The continuous silence in Tajikistan. In 2013, Rakhmon spoke on the crisis in Ukraine was present about required improvements in land also in Rakhmon’s address to rehabilitation, melioration system parliament. Rakhmon noted the renovation, and seeds selection, the difficulty of defining the course of the results of which were not mentioned in foreign policy for Tajikistan due to the the current address. The proposition on increased complexity of international higher export fees on raw cotton, which relations among world leaders. should stimulate manufacturing and However, the calibrated advances industrialization, terminates the towards Russia are visible in provision on simplifying raw cotton Rakhmon’s call to consider Tajikistan’s export as outlined in the 2007 act. geopolitical location and the country’s Another new step is the preparation for reliance on its closest long-term state enterprises involved in the partners. Rakhmon noted valuable exploration of natural resources to enter spiritual-cultural and economic world financial markets in 2014. connections with Russia. Russia holds a Rakhmon ties these hopes to the leading position among foreign country’s potential in coal, gas, and oil investors in the Tajik economy. The extraction. However, according to the past year also saw the finalization of U.S. Energy Information Russia’s military base extension in Administration, in the period 1992-2013 Tajikistan in exchange for privileges Tajikistan’s consumption of petroleum, for labor migrants and tariff-free fuel gas, and coal was continuously supply to Tajikistan. exceeding the country’s production The relationships with Iran and capabilities. Also, according to a 2011 Afghanistan were singled out into a investment outlook report prepared for separate group due to common ethnical Tethys Petroleum, the largest investor heritage. The Tajik president also in Tajikistan’s gas and oil industry, by pointed out China as its main economic Halyk Finance, an affiliate of the partner in Asia and the role of the U.S. National Bank of Kazakhstan, the and the EU as partners in fighting exploration of major oil and gas deposits in Tajikistan is still in its early ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 18! terrorism and drug trafficking in and a sense of accountability. Tajikistan. Accountability needs to be established The general notion of the president’s through a system of control over the address is the continuous growth of the implementation of directives delivered country’s economy, ongoing in the annual address, while the results, socioeconomic improvements, whether negative or positive, should be improving business conditions, the presented and explained and relevant progressive reduction of poverty, and conclusions formulated. Otherwise, the overall prosperity in the conditions of a address will remain the routine out-of- persistent world economic crisis. In a touch speech having little to no effect number of ways, the 2014 address is a on the country’s developmental paraphrased version from the year processes. before. Both speeches are a compilation of the same general ideas, recurrent prospects, and motivational calls for action. Rakhmon’s address lacks a review of failures of the previous year

! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 19!

AZERBAIJANI JOURNALIST ACCUSED OF SPYING FOR ARMENIA Mina Muradova

The arrest of an Azerbaijani journalist result of an agreement between Ankara and political analyst involved in public and Baku. Some analysts believe the dialogue between Azerbaijan and action is part of Erdogan’s campaign Armenia could endanger people’s against the leader of the Islamic diplomacy within the Nagorno- Hizmet movement, Fethullah Gülen. Karabakh conflict resolution process. In early 2014, another Azerbaijani Rauf Mirgadirov has been a journalist of Turkish newspaper correspondent in Ankara for the Baku- Today’s Zaman, Mahir Zeynalov, was based newspaper Zerkalo (Mirror) for deported from Turkey. the last three years. His press Yet, the difference between two cases is accreditation was suddenly cancelled that Mirgadirov is suspected of spying and he was asked to leave Turkey for Armenia and the charges brought immediately. Mirgadirov arranged to against him are high treason and leave Turkey by bus for Georgia, but espionage, which envisages a was forced off the bus and deported to punishment from 10 years in prison to a Baku, where he was arrested upon life term sentence. arrival. He is now under investigation Mehman Aliyev, Director of the Turan by the Ministry of National Security. news agency, said that Mirgadirov was According to Rachel Denber, Deputy forced to leave the country because of Europe and Central Asia Director at his government-critical articles. Human Rights Watch, “The possible “Recently, he has criticized both coordination between Turkey and Azerbaijani authorities and Erdoğan’s Azerbaijan to return Mirgadirov to government for violations of human Azerbaijan without due process should rights and democratic freedoms,” be immediately and thoroughly Aliyev said. investigated … Turkish officials Mirgadirov promoted public dialogue brazenly snatched Mirgadirov up between Armenia and Azerbaijan, without cause and unlawfully returned which have not had diplomatic him to Azerbaijan. These shameless relations since the early 1990s due to the violations should be investigated and conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. those responsible should be held to Azerbaijani prosecutors state that account.” Mirgadirov is suspected of having Mirkadirov’s arrest three days after transferred classified information about Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Azerbaijan’s political and military Erdoğan’s visit to Baku raised sectors to Armenian intelligence suspicions among many in Azerbaijan between 2008 and 2009, “including that the journalist’s arrest was the photos and schemes to be used against ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 20!

Azerbaijan.” They claim that these EU and other international supposed meetings occurred in organizations and foundations and that Armenia, Georgia and Turkey. were aimed at encouraging the peace Prosecutors pointed out Laura process between two countries. Bagdasarian, an Armenian journalist Yunus said, “I do not accept any who is known for her cooperation with charges against Mirgadirov and if he the well-known Azerbaijani human was arrested for contacts with rights activist Leyla Yunus, as an Armenians within our projects, then let Armenian “intelligence agent.” the government arrest me … The Mirgadirov's lawyer, Fuad Agayev, treason and espionage charges brought predicted that “other local journalists against Mirgadirov, an active and civil society activists who participant of conferences and the cooperated within the Bagdasarian- projects implemented jointly with Yunus joint project could also be Armenian NGOs, are putting an end to prosecuted.” On April 30, prosecutors visits of civil society activists of began questioning journalists with Azerbaijan to Armenia and to the connections to Mirgadirov as well as enhancement of public diplomacy and the Institute for Peace and Democracy civil society in Azerbaijan … It makes led by Yunus. participation in ‘citizen diplomacy’ A few days after Mirgadirov’s arrest, dangerous.” Yunus and her husband Arif Yunus The Azerbaijani government is deeply were stopped at the airport when they skeptical about the possible were departing for an international contribution of citizen diplomacy to conference in Brussels. The prosecutor- resolving the long-lasting conflict. general’s office said the Yunus couple “People’s diplomacy is an important was detained on April 28 because they but not decisive element of the “tried to flee the country” after being Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno- summoned as witnesses in a criminal Karabakh conflict,” Deputy Foreign case. Yunus was released from Minister Araz Azimov remarked on the detention after questioning by sidelines of the Second Global Forum investigators and the office of her of open societies in Baku. “That is, if institute was searched. The prosecutor- the people’s diplomacy plays the role of general’s April 30 statement did not an impulse, then it will be possible to elaborate on the criminal case, but it speak about the importance of its role said the criminal investigation would in resolving the conflict. However, at continue. Yunus says investigators the moment, we do not see any steps in asked her about her ties with this direction.” Mirgadirov. Agayev, Mirgadirov's lawyer, stated She noted that Mirgadirov took part in that his client did not have access to projects that were supported by classified information and that the Germany’s Friedrich Ebert Foundation, charges are therefore groundless. the British and Polish embassies, the “Maybe investigators have some photos ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 21! or videos where Rauf sits with Armenians at one table. But it is not serious to arrest a prominent journalist based on that,” the lawyer said. Mirgadirov acknowledged his participation in various conferences hosted by international organizations in Armenia and other countries, where he represented Azerbaijani civil society groups and presented the interests of his country, but he said that his participation was legitimate. Agayev noted that Mirgadirov considered the charges to be bogus and intended to intimidate other human rights activists and journalists in the country. The arrest comes just weeks before Azerbaijan assumes the rotating chairmanship of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers. According to CPJ research, Mirgadirov is the ninth journalist behind bars in Azerbaijan.

! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 22!

MOSCOW DISTRIBUTES PASSPORTS IN GEORGIA Eka Janashia

On April 22, Georgia’s ministry of However, Georgia’s MFA said the foreign affairs (MFA) dismissed reports about distribution of Russian information about the mass distribution passports have been overstated. of Russian passports to ethnic According to Deputy Foreign Minister Armenians residing in Georgia’s David Zalkaniani, the Georgian Samtskhe-Javakheti region. Armenians government is studying the constitute 54 percent of the population amendments cautiously to elaborate in the region, which borders Armenia corresponding legal mechanisms, and and Turkey to the south and southwest. reminded that Georgian legislation Georgian media reported in April that rules out multiple citizenships. lines of people were queuing to obtain Whereas Russia’s new citizenship Russian passports outside the former legislation could be considered a cause Russian embassy in Tbilisi. The rising for concern, the ruling Georgian Dream demand for obtaining Russian (GD) coalition has reacted calmly. citizenship was triggered by the President Georgi Margvelashvili said amended law on citizenship that came Georgia should remain alert but must into force in Russia recently. The law not overstate the danger. envisages fast-track procedures for Margvelashvili does not believe that granting Russian citizenship to foreign isolating Moscow is a right choice, citizens or persons without citizenship, “because alienating Russia makes who or whose families live within the Russia even more aggressive, borders of the former Russian empire or unpredictable and dangerous.” the , and speak fluent There is “nothing special” about the Russian. The special commission will law facilitating the issuance of Russian determine the applicants’ eligibility passports, according to Zurab through interviews conducted in Abashidze, Georgia’s special envoy to Russian consulates across the post- Russia, who put the Russian legislation Soviet area. Approved candidates must in relation to the developments in renounce their prior citizenship, Ukraine and doubted that it had any according to the law. relevance to Georgia. Abashidze’s Allegedly, the amendment encouraged comment came after he met with applications from Russian-speaking Russia’s deputy foreign minister for a Georgian citizens, especially those who sixth round of talks in Prague on April seek jobs in Russia to provide for their 16. According to Abashidze, Karasin families through remittances. assured him that Russia did not plan to prevent Georgia from signing an ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 23!

Association Agreement with the EU Migrant workers constitute a this summer. considerable share of these, though Whereas GD is downplaying the issue, some also seek Russian citizenship in one of its leaders, Minister of Defense order to obtain a state pension – which Irakli Alasania, declared that the is higher in Russia than in Georgia – or Kremlin intends to split public opinion other economic benefits. on foreign policy to increase its The distribution of passports in leverage in Georgian society. This Georgia may reach out to vulnerable method has already been tried in segments of the population and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, incentivize them to obtain Russian and is now actively being carried out in citizenship, which may be what Ukraine, Alasania said. According to Alasania implied by the division of Alasania, the distribution of Russian society and potential threats coming passports to Georgian citizens is not from the Kremlin. This is especially alarming because the situation is under true for the Samtskhe-Javakheti region, control. However, anti-state densely populated by ethnic Armenians organizations have been appearing like who hardly know Georgian but speak mushrooms recently in Georgia and the Russian fluently. The “passportization” government needs to confront it of compactly settled ethnic minorities through consolidating its resources and may well enable Moscow to repeat a enhancing its counterintelligence Crimean scenario in Georgia. The services, the minister said. government’s immediate task should On April 23, the NGO Eurasian choice thus be to better explain the advantages of Georgia held a meeting at Tbilisi’s of the Association Agreement and the international press-center. The head of visa liberalization policy with the EU. the organization, Archil Chkoidze, The Ukrainian case demonstrates that strongly questioned Georgia’s pro- the Kremlin can use its proclaimed Western course and insisted that right to protect its citizens as a reason Georgia’s foreign policy priorities must to invade any post-Soviet country. be determined by a referendum. The Notably, the 2008 Russia-Georgia restoration of territorial integrity and August war was preceded by a process economic prosperity is only possible of intense “passportization” in through rapprochement with Moscow, Georgia’s breakaway regions. he said. Such opinions may indeed reflect the approaches mentioned by Alasania. Likewise, Georgian analysts claim that the threats coming from Russia are real and should be countered adequately. Many Georgian residents hold both Georgian and Russian passports, often illegally, to simplify travel to Russia. ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 24!

KYRGYZSTAN’S NEW PRIME MINISTER VISITS MOSCOW Arslan Sabyrbekov

On April 29, Kyrgyzstan’s newly As part of his official visit, Otorbaev nominated Prime Minister Djoomart met with representatives of the Otorbaev paid his first official visit to Eurasian Economic Commission to Moscow. During his two days in the finalize the “road map” for Russian capital, Otorbaev met with his Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the Customs Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev, Union. As a result of these talks, the and held talks with Gazprom’s Chief new head of Kyrgyzstan’s government Executive Officer Alexey Miller and stated that the road map is practically the new deputy Prime Minister Igor completed and expressed his hope that Shuvalov. After his official meetings, it will be soon approved by the Board of Otorbaev held a press conference with the Eurasian Economic Commission. representatives of Russian media and Only afterwards will Bishkek take met with Russian Central Asia experts further actions to finalize the entry into to discuss the state of bilateral relations. the Union. Kyrgyzstan’s entry into the Russia-led At this stage, no one questions Customs Union was the main subject Bishkek’s accession to the Russia led discussed between the Prime Ministers. Customs Union. Agreements have been In his meeting with Medvedev, reached, the road map is being finalized Otorbaev stressed that Russia is and and Bishkek's preferences are being will remain Kyrgyzstan's strategic met. But despite of all these partner and that joining the Customs developments, opposition politicians Union is a right step that will help his and experts continue to express their country tackle a number of economic concern over Kyrgyzstan’s and social challenges. Talking to membership. For them, the Customs Russian journalists, Otorbaev stated Union is primarily a political project that Kyrgyzstan’s products, except for and a part of Moscow’s continuous its gold, are mainly being exported to effort to strengthen its influence over the Customs Union member states, i.e. the former Soviet Republics or in its Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and zone of “privileged interest,” as that it would therefore be wrong to Medvedev once described it. close the borders to those countries. In During his Moscow visit, Otorbaev his turn, the Russian Prime Minister also met with key representatives of the welcomed his Kyrgyz colleague and Russian business community and held expressed Moscow’s readiness to be talks with Gazprom CEO Miller, flexible and if necessary, further whose company has recently purchased negotiate Kyrgyzstan’s terms of entry the KyrgyzGaz Natural Gas into the Union. Corporation for US$ 1. Miller ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!07!May!2014! 25! reconfirmed his Company's full owned by a foreign government in responsibility for the timely supply of return for promises of investment, gas to Kyrgyzstan. Besides its business modernization, and development of activities in the country, Gazprom natural resources. According to intends to engage actively in supporting Bishkek-based political analyst Marat and implementing social programs in Kazakpaev, “to abstain from these all the country’s regions. In turn, developments Kyrgyzstan should Otorbaev expressed his government’s improve its investment climate and full support for Gazprom and all other attract private foreign investors. The international companies willing to fact that both Gazprom and Rosneft are invest and do business in Kyrgyzstan. state owned companies and are It should also be mentioned that purchasing our country’s strategic Russia’s state oil company Rosneft assets gives a political connotation to recently refused to purchase a majority the situation. This is not business, but stake in Manas International Airport. politics,” stated Kazakpaev. Shortly before this announcement, Kyrgyzstan’s United Opposition Movement held its first rally and heavily criticized the government's deals with foreign companies to sell the country’s strategically important assets. In his address to the population, President Atambayev blamed the opposition for damaging Kyrgyzstan’s investment climate and stated that the country has no other choice. “Those screaming that no shares can be given to Rosneft, they in fact want to put an end to the future of Manas,” said Atambayev. Indeed, with the U.S. shortly leaving the Airbase, the Kyrgyz government is preoccupied with replacing the financial loss, which is according to all estimates a substantial share of the country’s budget. Otorbaev’s visit to Moscow is yet another effort to assure that Kyrgyzstan is a safe place for Russian investments. Kyrgyz experts and analysts express varying opinions of selling the country’s strategic assets to companies