November 2015 EESRI

Armen Grigoryan COMMENT

Russia Seeks Further Expansion of Military and Political Influence in

The goal of a new joint air defense system in the Caucasus region would be containment of NATO — including Turkey and the Alliance’s aspirant Georgia.

Note: This piece was originally published by the Jamestown Foundation in the Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 12 issue 210, November 18, 2015, and reprinted here with permission of the author.

On November 9, ’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Plans to modernize the equipment of the Russian 102nd Sergei Lavrov traveled to Armenia. The visit was agreed military base in Armenia were first revealed two years upon shortly before. The next day, President Vladimir ago. At that point, Russian sources openly referred to Putin ordered the government of Russia to start negoti- “preparations for engagement against a potential adver- ations with Armenia on establishing a joint regional air sary’s rear” (see EDM, April 2). And in November 2014, defense system (Pravo.gov.ru, November 11). Prelimi- suggestions were also made that Russia would need di- nary consultations concerning the issue were conducted rect access to Armenia within one or two years in order during Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan’s snap visit to fully utilize the potential of the 102nd military base, so to , on September 7, as well as during a Collec- the Georgian government would have to take Moscow’s tive Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit in Ta- strategic goals into consideration (see EDM, December jikistan, in mid-September. 11, 2014).

Few details about the planned treaty are available. How- Russian President views the North At- ever, according to Armenian Deputy Defense Minister lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a potential ad- Davit Tonoyan, it will extend Russia’s air defense pro- versary and has thus been pushing a military build-up tection to Armenia’s airspace. Future regional security along Russia’s periphery and in territories occupied by incidents, he pointed out, might involve not only Rus- Moscow, particularly Crimea, (see EDM, March 19). The sian forces deployed at the base in Armenia but also planned military expansion in Armenia may also be fol- units belonging to Russia’s Southern Military District lowing a similar logic. The head of the Moscow-based (Lragir.am, November 12). Russian air force units based Center for Military Forecast, Anatoly Tsiganok, told the in the North Caucasus cannot reach Armenian airspace Armenian newspaper 168 Zham (168 Hours) that the without flying over a third country. But no information new joint air defense system’s goal would be contain- has surfaced to date about plans to engage other regional ment of NATO—including Turkey and NATO aspirant neighbors in negotiations on that issue, if the planned Georgia—as the Alliance is a source of threat from the Russo-Armenian agreement comes into force. Still, it is Russian point of view. Tsiganok also praised Azerbaijan possible to suggest that military overflight rights may be- for, unlike Georgia (sic), not allowing a permanent pres- come a pretext for additional Russian pressure on Geor- ence for the North Atlantic Alliance on its territory, and gia. for “drifting away from the NATO in the last two years” (168.am, November 12).

www.eesri.org EESRI COMMENT November 2015

Despite its hostile rhetoric and continued occupation of turn the South Caucasus country into a potential target parts of Georgian territory, Russia is, at the same time, for the Islamic State or other militant groups fighting in attempting to expand its economic influence in Georgia. Syria (Lragir.am, November 11). Following the recent The recent offer to increase Russian natural gas exports downing of a Russian commercial airliner over the Si- to Georgia is particularly worthy of attention. The Geor- nai Peninsula (see EDM, November 5), such a warning gian Ministry of Energy has claimed that, in a few years, seems particularly relevant. And indeed, today’s Rus- the supplies of gas purchased from Azerbaijan might be sia, compared to the during its war in Af- insufficient to cover Georgia’s needs, and now Russia’s ghanistan, is less capable of sufficiently securing its own Gazprom is trying to enlarge its currently minimal share border or—more importantly from Yerevan’s perspec- of the Georgian market. Negotiations between Georgia’s tive—of effectively protecting its satellites from possible Energy Minister Kakha Kaladze and Gazprom’s CEO terrorist attacks. Expanding on this argument, David Aleksei Miller have not produced any results so far, yet Shahnazaryan, the lead analyst of the Regional Stud- they are causing tensions in Georgia’s relations with ies Center, further warned that Russia is not willing to Azerbaijan, as well as unsettling Georgia’s domestic poli- protect Armenia’s interests and, if Moscow is unable to tics (see EDM, November 9). Aside from Russia’s under- break its international isolation, it would in fact prefer to standable inclination to increase its influence over Geor- promote a further isolation of Yerevan (Aravot.am, No- gia by economic means, Moscow’s attempt to lure Tbilisi vember 10). into a deal with Gazprom may also indicate a determi- nation to prevent supplies of Iranian gas from reaching In summary, over the coming months, Russia can be ex- Georgia, after the lifting of sanctions on the Islamic Re- pected to act more assertively in the South Caucasus—a public. In particular, Russia may be trying to convince region Moscow considers within its zone of “privileged the Georgian government that there is no alternative to interest.” And in light of last week’s (November 13) cooperation with Gazprom. Moreover, Russia can be ex- deadly string of coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris, pected to act assertively to prevent any possibility of gas Moscow has redoubled its efforts to convince the Unit- being allowed to transit between the Persian Gulf and ed States, the European Union and NATO of the need the Black Sea coast via Armenia and Georgia (see EDM, to accept Russia as an indispensable partner in the September 1). fight against terrorism. In Russia’s view, this kind of arrangement would deserve and require the relaxation Regarding Russia’s military presence in Armenia, it may of Western sanctions and a more sympathetic stance by be noted that while the Armenian government continues the West on Russian actions to protect its interests in its to act submissively and accepts Moscow’s demands, the “near abroad.” Early evidence suggests Russia is already ongoing developments are disturbing for independent seeing some success in this diplomatic push (TASS, No- Armenian experts. For one thing, the agenda of Foreign vember 15, 18). If Russia’s rapprochement with the West Minister Lavrov’s recent visit to Yerevan may have in- truly takes off, it could free Moscow to further manipu- cluded talks on the possible involvement of the 102nd late the Karabakh conflict resolution process and to ap- military base in delivering supplies for the Russian op- ply a more assertive “carrot and stick” approach toward eration in Syria. Stepan Grigoryan, the head of the Ye- Georgia. And beyond the South Caucasus, Russia could revan-based Analytical Center on Globalization and be more likely to try to further destabilize the situation in Regional Cooperation, has argued that the Armenian Moldova and Ukraine as well. government should not agree to any kind of involvement in the Syrian war, because doing so might needlessly

About the author: Armen GRIGORYAN, Armenian political scientist. His research interests include post-communist transition, EU relations with Eastern Partnership countries, transatlantic relations, energy security, and conflict transformation.

East European Security Research Initiative (EESRI) is a discussion, analytical and information-sharing international platform aimed at uniting efforts of the experts and researches from various countries to find effective ways for strengthening security in the Eastern Europe as the most vulnerable region of the contemporary Europe. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the EESRI. © East European Security Research Initiative Foundation, 2015

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