Putin's Grand Strategy
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Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents S. Frederick Starr Svante E. Cornell Editors Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents Editors S. Frederick Starr Svante E. Cornell © Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program – A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 Institute for Security and Development Policy, V. Finnbodavägen 2, Stockholm-Nacka 13130, Sweden www.silkroadstudies.org “Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents” is a Monograph published by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies Program. Monographs provide comprehensive analyses of key issues presented by leading experts. The Joint Center is a transatlantic independent and non-profit research and policy center. It has offices in Washington and Stockholm and is affiliated with the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University and the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy. It is the first institution of its kind in Europe and North America, serving a large and diverse community of analysts, scholars, policy-watchers, business leaders, and journalists. The Joint Center is at the forefront of research on issues of conflict, security, and development in the region. Through its ap- plied research, publications, research cooperation, public lectures, and seminars, it func- tions as a focal point for academic, policy, and public discussion regarding the region. The opinions and conclusions expressed in this study are those of the authors only, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Joint Center or its sponsors. Cover pictures: Putin and binoculars, Alexei Nikolsky of Associated Press, used with permission. Three presidents, Viktor Drachev, Creative Commons. Putin and map, Reuters, used with permission. © Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2014 ISBN: 978-91-86635-82-4 Printed in Singapore Distributed in North America by: The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel. +1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785 E-mail: [email protected] Distributed in Europe by: The Silk Road Studies Program Institute for Security and Development Policy V. Finnbodavägen 2, SE-13130 Stockholm-Nacka E-mail: [email protected] Editorial correspondence should be addressed to either of the addresses above (preferably by e-mail.) Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 5 S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell 2. The Intellectual Origins of the Eurasian Union Project ..................................... 14 Stephen Blank 3. The Customs Union and Eurasian Union: A Primer .......................................... 29 Richard Weitz 4. The CSTO: Military Dimension of the Russian Reintegration Effort ........... 40 Pavel Baev 5. The Economics of the Customs Union and Eurasian Union ............................ 49 Richard Pomfret 6. Tactics and Instruments in Putin’s Grand Strategy ............................................ 59 S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell 7. Kazakhstan and Belarus: Buyer’s Remorse? ......................................................... 82 John C. K. Daly 8. Armenia: Joining under the Gun ........................................................................... 98 Armen Grigoryan 9. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: Next in Line ............................................................. 110 Johan Engvall 10. Ukraine: Door Closed? .......................................................................................... 122 James Sherr 11. Georgia and Moldova: Staying the Course ......................................................... 133 Mamuka Tsereteli 12. Azerbaijan: Going It Alone .................................................................................. 145 Svante E. Cornell 13. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan: Staying Away ................................................. 156 S. Frederick Starr 14. Challenges from the East: China ........................................................................ 166 Slavomír Horák 15. The European Union: Eastern Partnership vs. Eurasian Union ..................... 179 Svante E. Cornell 16. Out of Focus: The U.S. Response to Putinism................................................... 191 S. Frederick Starr Author Bios ................................................................................................................ 200 1 Introduction S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell Even before Vladimir Putin’s designation as president-elect of the Russian Fed- eration it was clear that he had very different views of his country and its fu- ture than his predecessor and patron, Boris Yeltsin. His KGB background and his ruthless early military actions in Chechnya suggested to some, but certainly not all, Russian and western commentators that he viewed the preservation and advancement of the Russian state itself, and not merely of the citizens of Rus- sia, as the purpose and end of policy. Rising world oil and gas prices and the swelling inflow of funds to the treasury resulting from those increases enabled him to do just enough for the people to convince a majority of the Russian public that the two ends were compatible and that whatever promoted the state promoted society as well. Only gradually did Putin’s single-minded focus on restoring what he defined as the geographical integrity and honor of the Russian state become evident. And it took yet more time for the world at large to understand how far he was will- ing to go in pursuit of that end. The inability or reluctance of western and other policymakers, intelligence services, and independent foreign affairs experts to grasp this dedication on Putin’s part ranks as an analytic failure of the first rank. Meanwhile, Putin seized the initiative in his military attack on Georgia in 2008, in his multi-dimensional but non-military assault on Kyrgyzstan in 2010, and then in his invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea and other territories in 2014. Each of these initiatives, and many others that lacked a clear military compo- nent, constituted a direct assault on an international system built upon territo- 6 Frederick S. Starr and Svante E. Cornell rial integrity and accepted notions of sovereignty. For a variety of reasons, some arising from good will and others from blunt business interests, the West chose to deal with each of these events individually. Those who insisted on “connecting the dots” were accused of suffering from a hangover from the Cold War and a yearning for a return to the bi-polar politics of yore. In any case, the many Russians and foreign analysts who hypothesized that all these diverse initiatives on Putin’s part arose from a single strategy failed to make their case in a convincing manner. Nonetheless, events between the invasion of Georgia and the armed seizure of Ukrainian territory in 2014 forced policy makers and international affairs spe- cialists worldwide to acknowledge the possibility that the Russian Republic un- der Vladimir Putin has reorganized its entire foreign and domestic policy in order to pursue a single objective, namely, the establishment of a new kind of union comprised of former Soviet republics and headed by Russia itself. Even some of those in Europe and America who in 2008 had failed or refused to see that Russia’s invasion of Georgia was not merely a response to that small coun- try’s seeming to thumb its nose at the Kremlin, but an important building block in Putin’s much larger geopolitical edifice. In the end, Putin himself dispelled all doubts on this matter when he attempted first to prop up what he took to be a pro-Moscow government in Kiev, then seized Crimea, and finally invaded Ukraine, first with a motley but well equipped band of irregulars, and then with regular Russian army forces. Most discussions of Russia’s new course have focused on Putin’s stated inten- tion to redress the consequences of the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, an event which he called, in an address to the Russian Parliament in 2005, “the major ge- opolitical disaster of the century.” Some have taken note of his oft-stated dream of a new union of republics that could be built on the same territory as the U.S.S.R., beginning with economic ties and then deepening the “integration” to include politics, security, and culture. The sources of the disconnect to date between the West’s perception of Putin’s increasingly aggressive military actions and its disinclination or inability to link them directly to any larger strategic goal are not hard to find. To take Putin seriously challenges the assumption that a new Europe could be built mainly on Introduction 7 soft power. In America it meant laying aside the optimistic notion that post- Soviet Russia would be a partner rather than adversary. The disconnect can also be traced in part to a paradoxical aspect of Putin’s own approach. He may no longer be a Marxist but in some ways he remains a determinist. He expands grandly on how the “integration” process on former Soviet territories is driven by History itself; he asserts that it is advanced by deep economic and social forces similar to those that built the European Union, and that it is hence inevi- table. But at the end of the day, he shows himself to be a doubter. Hence