Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst
BI-WEEKLY BRIEFING VOL. 15 NO. 22 13 NOVEMBER 2013 Contents
Analytical Articles
WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR UZBEKISTAN AND CHINA TO BE STRATEGIC PARTNERS? 3 Farkhod Tolipov
TTP-PAKISTAN DIALOGUE: THE POST-HAKIMULLAH SCENARIO 7 Rizwan Zeb
RUSSIA ADVANCES ITS POSITIONS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS 11 Armen Grigoryan
MOSCOW’S APPOINTMENT OF GOVERNORS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS 15 Valeriy Dzutsev
Field Reports
GEORGIA TO HAVE NEW PRESIDENT, PM, AND INTERIOR MINISTER 19 Archil Zhorzholiani
AZERBAIJAN PREPARES FOR SHAH DENIZ 2 21 Mina Muradova
ARMENIA’S ANM PARTY REVIVES 23 Haroutiun Khachatrian
GEORGIA BETTER POSITIONED THAN UKRAINE AHEAD OF VILNIUS EAP SUMMIT 24 Alexander Beck THE CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS ANALYST
Editor: Svante E. Cornell
Associate Editor: Niklas Nilsson
Assistant Editor, News Digest: Alima Bissenova
Chairman, Editorial Board: S. Frederick Starr
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is an English-language journal devoted to analysis of the current issues facing Central Asia and the Caucasus. It serves to link the business, governmental, journalistic and scholarly communities and is the global voice of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. The Editor of the Analyst solicits most articles and field reports, however authors are encouraged to suggest topics for future issues or submit articles and field reports for consideration. Such articles and field reports cannot have been previously published in any form, must be written in English, and must correspond precisely to the format and style of articles and field reports published in The Analyst, described below. The Analyst aims to provide our industrious and engaged audience with a singular and reliable assessment of events and trends in the region written in an analytical tone rather than a polemical one. Analyst articles reflect the fact that we have a diverse international audience. While this should not affect what authors write about or their conclusions, this does affect the tone of articles. Analyst articles focus on a newsworthy topic, engage central issues of the latest breaking news from the region and are backed by solid evidence. Articles should normally be based on local language news sources. Each 1,100-1,500 word analytical article must provide relevant, precise and authoritative background information. It also must offer a sober and analytical judgment of the issue as well as a clinical evaluation of the importance of the event. Authors must cite facts of controversial nature to the Editor who may contact other experts to confirm claims. Since Analyst articles are based on solid evidence, rather than rumors or conjecture, they prove to be reliable sources of information on the region. By offering balanced and objective analysis while keeping clear of inflammatory rhetoric, The Analyst does more to inform our international readership on all sides of the issues. The Editor reserves the right to edit the article to conform to the editorial policy and specifications of The Analyst and to reject the article should it not be acceptable to our editorial committee for publication. On acceptance and publication of the edited version of the article, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of The Johns Hopkins University-The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies will issue an honorarium to the author. It is up to the individual author to provide the correct paperwork to the Institute that makes the issuing of an honorarium possible. The copyright for the article or field report will reside with the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. However, the author may use all or part of the contracted article in any book or article in any media subsequently written by the author, provided that a copyright notice appears giving reference to the contracted article’s first publication by the "Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies."
Submission Guidelines: Analytical Articles require a three to four sentence Key Issue introduction to the article based on a news hook. Rather than a general, overarching analysis, the article must offer considered and careful judgment supported with concrete examples. The ideal length of analytical articles is between 1,100 and 1,500 words. The articles are structured as follows: KEY ISSUE: A short 75-word statement of your conclusions about the issue or news event on which the article focuses. BACKGROUND: 300-450 words of analysis about what has led up to the event or issue and why this issue is critical to the region. Include background information about the views and experiences of the local population. IMPLICATIONS: 300-450 words of analysis of the ramifications of this event or issue, including where applicable, implications for the local people’s future. CONCLUSIONS: 100-200 words that strongly state your conclusions about the impact of the event or issue.
Field Reports focus on a particular news event and what local people think about the event. Field Reports address the implications the event or activity analyzed for peoples’ lives and their communities. Field Reports do not have the rigid structure of Analytical Articles, and are shorter in length, averaging ca. 700-800 words.
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Svante E. Cornell Research Director; Editor, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University 1619 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, USA. Tel. +1-202-663-5922; 1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 3
WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR UZBEKISTAN AND CHINA TO BE STRATEGIC PARTNERS? Farkhod Tolipov
New Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Uzbekistan during his tour to Central Asia in September this year. The visit took place ahead of the September summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Bishkek, and was initially perceived as an ordinary diplomatic good-will gesture towards the Central Asian states in connection with Jinping’s first SCO summit. However, in the aftermath of that tour, China surprised many observers with its strategic bounty: China signed large contracts and agreements with the states of the region. Was this primarily a strategic breakthrough of China or the Central Asians’?
BACKGROUND: China established intergovernmental committee on diplomatic relations with Uzbekistan cooperation in the trade-economic, and other Central Asian countries in investment, security, cultural- 1992. Since then, China has steadily humanitarian, energy, transport, and expanded its “Go West” policy aimed at scientific-technical spheres. consolidating its presence in Central Uzbekistan supplies Chinese markets Asia. The record of Uzbekistan-China with cotton fiber, mineral fertilizers, relations illustrates an ambitious and natural gas, non-ferrous metals and comprehensive Chinese plan for other goods. One of the prioritized engaging neighboring countries to its areas of cooperation is in the energy west. Relationships between these sphere; two gas pipelines are already states have unavoidably affected the operating and plans exist for overall geopolitical transformation of constructing two more in the nearest the region since the demise of the future. China is one of the biggest Soviet superpower. investors in Uzbekistan’s economy at This record reflects China’s rising US$ 6.5 billion, and 488 Chinese profile in Uzbekistan’s international companies currently function in and regional policy and vice versa. Uzbekistan. During Uzbekistan’s President Islam China is Uzbekistan’s third trade Karimov’s official visit to China in June partner after Russia and the European 2012, the two states signed a Union; about 13 percent of Declaration on Strategic Partnership, Uzbekistan’s trade goes to China. But thereby elevating their relations. In Uzbekistan is obviously a minor trade October 2011 in Beijing, Uzbekistan partner for China – less than 0.1 and China had established an percent of China’s foreign trade is with Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 4
multilateral cooperation frameworks such as e.g. the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan and the SPECA project of the EU. However, Uzbekistan’s membership in the SCO seems stable and the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) was set up in Tashkent. China-Uzbekistan cooperation in the
above mentioned areas is intended to Uzbekistan. Hence, the economic be long-term and comprehensive. The relationship between Uzbekistan and question remains, however, what China is asymmetric. Moreover, only 9 geopolitical implications this strategic percent of the total Chinese trade with partnership will have. Central Asia is with Uzbekistan, while IMPLICATIONS: Since Kazakhstan is China’s main trade independence, Uzbekistan has gotten partner in the region at 70 percent. involved in different strategic Still, the two states have interacted partnerships. It signed strategic actively within multilateral fora such partnership agreements with the U.S., as the UN and the SCO. Interestingly, Russia, China, India, Japan and the EU, China and Uzbekistan have expressed documents whose contents differ in their understanding of each other’s their main emphasis. The China- sensitive problems such as Taiwan and Uzbekistan strategic partnership, in Tibet and trans-border river waters in particular, does not imply mutual Central Asia. Uzbekistan has supported security commitments as does the PRC on issues of territorial Uzbekistan’s agreements with the U.S. integrity and fighting the “three evils” and Russia. Tashkent and Beijing – terrorism, extremism and indeed emphasize the developmental separatism. Beijing expressed support dimension of strategic partnership. for Uzbekistan’s position on the During Xi Jinping’s visit to Tashkent in rational use of the water flow of September this year, 31 documents regional rivers, in relation to hydro- were signed on the realization of energy projects that could damage the projects amounting to a total of US$ 15 ecological balance. billion, implying that the total size of Also interesting is that the SCO agreements between the two countries remains the only has reached US$ 20 billion. In addition, international/regional organization to Uzbekistan and China signed 14 which Uzbekistan has retained a agreements on joint hi-tech steady commitment – it is a member production in an industrial area on since 2001. Tashkent has abandoned Uzbekistan’s territory, with direct organizations such as the CSTO, EAEC investments from the PRC. The park (EurAsEC), GUUAM, and CACO, and was created at the initiative of the has isolated itself from other Chinese leadership in March this year Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 5 in the form of the Special Industrial of “creative involvement,” which will Zone “Jizzakh” where the production lead to a Chinese breakthrough into of mobile telephones, construction Central Asia. Therefore, China seems materials and other products to be securing stronger bonds in what commenced in June this year. could be termed an emerging In September, the sides recalled the “Uzbekistan 2.0.” special character and high level of At the same time, it is symptomatic their cooperation: among other things, that while Tashkent has constantly and they also signed a Treaty on clearly expressed its support for Friendship and Cooperation and a Beijing in its foreign policy and Joint Declaration “On Further especially in its internal affairs, Development and Deepening Bilateral including e.g. the Taiwan question, Relations of Strategic Partnership.” Beijing has not been as clear in its The declaration stresses the sides’ support for Uzbekistan’s interests in commitment to firmly support each regional and international affairs. For other’s chosen path of development China, the SCO provides it with conducive with internal conditions, geopolitical leverage in the region as and support each other’s international well as a platform for sending certain cooperation initiatives. The messages to the West. For Uzbekistan declaration stated that they would not the SCO is not so much a multilateral joint any alliances or blocks which forum, but rather another platform for would damage the sovereignty, Uzbek-Chinese bilateral engagement. security and territorial integrity of the Tashkent seems to construct its other side. Uzbekistan once again strategic ties with Beijing, directly or confirmed its support of the policy of a within the SCO, largely in the context “single China” and that Taiwan is an of explicit and implicit balancing inalienable part of China, and its between three great powers – the U.S., opposition to any form of Russia and China. “independence of Taiwan”. CONCLUSIONS: During the Soviet It is perhaps not accidental that China time, the Central Asian republics were demonstrated such a generous policy heavily dependent on Russia. After the at the peak of the international breakup of the USSR, the newly financial crisis. This “bounty” coincides independent states are concerned with a rise in the political temperature about recreating such dependence on in Uzbekistan, which is expected to China. In most of studies of post-Soviet hold transformative parliamentary Central Asia, Uzbekistan has been elections in exactly one year and described as a state that does not presidential elections three months border Russia and therefore is not as later. Analysts argue that Xi Jinping dependent on this great power as is, symbolizes the so-called China 3.0 for example, Kazakhstan. However, (China 2.0 being Deng Xiaoping’s Uzbekistan’s dependence on Russia ruling period and China 1.0 Mao has endured throughout the post- Zedong’s). China 3.0 pushes a strategy Soviet period. The same observation Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 6 can be made regarding Uzbekistan’s establish a new type of foreign increasing dependence on China, relations that can “satisfy the Chinese which it also does not border. public and at the same time reassure Tashkent has in recent years tended to people of all nations.” It remains to be isolate itself from multilateral and seen whether the Chinese public is especially regional frameworks of satisfied, but the people of Central Asia cooperation and opted for bilateral is yet far from reassured, not only by relations. This option, however, carries China but by other great powers as the risk that Tashkent will not be able well. to isolate itself from the geopolitical AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Farkhod Tolipov influence of great powers, including holds a PhD in Political Science and is that of China, and may end up in a new Director of the Education and form of “multiple dependence” unless Research Institution “Bilim Karvoni” in it looks to regional integration as the Tashkent, Uzbekistan. most viable option. China’s former President Hu Jintao once said that China should try to Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 7
TTP-PAKISTAN DIALOGUE: THE POST- HAKIMULLAH SCENARIO
Rizwan Zeb
After the death of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader Hakimullah Mehsud in a U.S. drone attack and the appointment of the hardliner and staunchly anti- Pakistan Mullah Fazlullah, prospects for Pakistan’s dialogue process with the TTP seem bleak. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif nevertheless pledged to continue the peace talks. At the heart of this decision is the confusion that after more than a decade, Pakistan’s political leadership is still debating whether this is its war and whether they should talk to its own people. This position indicates a clear lack of understanding of the jihadist mindset, and of the realities and challenges that Pakistan is facing.
BACKGROUND: When President Baitullah was killed in a drone attack Musharraf abandoned the Taliban in and Hakimullah Mehsud, a confidant of Afghanistan and decided to side with Baitullah and TTP commander for the U.S. in the war on terror, he was Khyber, Kurram and Orakzai became expecting a domestic backlash the Amir (leader). Over the years, TTP especially from the religious parties conducted terrorist attacks in Pakistan and the madrassa network in Pakistan. resulting in more than 40,000 deaths. The initial reaction was vocal yet TTP finances its activities with ransom limited. The Red Mosque clerics who money, bank robberies, forced taxes had close links with Al-Qaida and the and drug trade. It fights factional wars Taliban initiated a movement to with other militants groups and has convert Pakistan into an Islamic killed a number of militant leaders. emirate and the state crushed the Muslim Khan, alias Shah Khalid, and rebellion. This event was used by the Haji Namdar are cases in point. A militants based in the tribal areas number of TTP members belong to under the leadership of Baitullah mainland Pakistani groups and Mehsud to unite under the banner of splinters or breakaway factions from the TTP in South Waziristan in Kashmiri groups and are known as the December 2007. Punjabi Taliban. Islamabad has It is widely believed that TTP was a attempted to negotiate peace with the branch of the Taliban of Afghanistan TTP in the past: peace agreements in and Baituallah Mehsud on a number of Shakai 2004, Sararogha 2005, North occasions claimed that he has the full Waziristan 2006, and Swat 2008 all support of Mullah Omar, something failed. the Afghan Taliban have repeatedly The Muslim League under Sharif and denied. TTP is mainly a Mehsud Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf have dominated militia. In August 2009, been major critics of this war, claiming Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 8
church during a Sunday service, which was among the deadliest attacks on Christians in the country’s history. A number of voices were raised about the viability of dialogue if the attacks did not stop. Khan, on the other hand, accused Islamabad of cold feet and announced that his party will start negotiations with TTP, if the center
does not. The timing of the strike that it is not Pakistan’s war but that it against Mehsud overshadowed the has been imposed on it by the U.S.. whole debate regarding his death, Sharif called an All Parties conference Pakistan-U.S. relations, and the in September in which the Pakistani possibility of a peace process between political leadership unanimously Islamabad and TTP. decided to initiate a dialogue with the Khan alleged that the U.S. had TTP. No concrete progress has yet deliberately chosen this time for the been made in this regard, while attack in order to prevent peace in Mehsud’s death on November 1 and Pakistan. Pakistan’s interior minister the appointment of Fazlullah as the voiced a similar opinion during a TTP’s new chief likely implies that the speech in the parliament. He stated dialogue process has failed even before that the process between Islamabad it started. The political leadership, and TTP was moving ahead and a including the government and delegation was about to leave to meet opposition parties, stated that the Mehsud and other TTP leaders when drone attack was intentionally the strike took place. According to him, conducted at this time to sabotage the the Americans destroyed the whole peace process. peace process. IMPLICATIONS: Although Sharif’s However, TTP sources denied any administration has publicized its progress whatsoever and any dialogue with TTP extensively, there is knowledge of a delegation from hardly any indication that the process Islamabad. After intense debate, TTP moved beyond statements. TTP chose Fazalullah, aka Mullah Radio, responded guardedly and set a who had been hiding in Afghanistan number of preconditions for talks: the since the successful Swat operation release of all TTP prisoners, a and who was behind General withdrawal of Pakistan’s Army from Sanaullah’s murder, as their new the tribal areas, and an end to drone leader. attacks. At the same time, TTP refused This development holds three to stop its own attacks. On September important implications: First, TTP will 15, TTP killed the Malakand division take a tough stance in the days ahead commander, Major General Sanaullah as the Fazlullah faction was staunchly Niazi, followed by an attack on a against any dialogue; second, TTP is Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 9 moving away from its Mehsud identity. outcomes, how to achieve them, and However, whether this is an how far it is willing to go is not a recipe organizational reorientation or just a for success. reaction to Mehsud's death is yet to be At present, it seems that Islamabad has seen; third, TTP is experiencing much homework to do before internal divisions, reconfirming the embarking on this path, although it previously known competition remains highly uncertain whether a between the Sajna group and the dialogue will actually happen. This Fazlullah group. policy will have domestic Fazlullah’s appointment is a clear (sectarianism, influence of religious signal to Islamabad that no dialogue is parties), regional (India, Afghanistan, possible. However, Islamabad still Central Asia, Iran) and global (U.S., believes that it can engage in NATO) implications for Islamabad. successful and meaningful dialogue How much of work has been done to with TTP and has indicated its address these implications remains intention to go ahead with the talks. unknown. The primary reason for this is the lack CONCLUSIONS: Although Islamabad of understanding and consensus in still intends to go ahead with its policy Pakistan over its war on terror. After of dialogue with TTP, the appointment almost 12 years, Pakistanis are still not of Mullah Fazlullah, who escaped to sure about their involvement in this Afghanistan after the Swat operation, war. as the new TTP leader is a clear signal Sharif, Khan, and the great majority of that TTP will take a tough position Pakistan’s opinion makers continue to against Pakistan in the days ahead. believe that this is not their war and Islamabad needs to understand that a that it was imposed on them by the dialogue process is a two-way street U.S. when it attacked and occupied influenced by a number of factors, of Afghanistan. Regarding TTP, they which the timing of the dialogue and believe it is a reaction against the ripeness of the issue for resolution Pakistan’s support for the U.S. against is most important. Local, regional and the Taliban in Afghanistan. As regards international dynamics and those elements in TTP and other environments also play an important groups who attack the state and its role. Islamabad needs to have a clear citizens, they are described as foreign understanding of the jihadist mindset agents on the payroll of Israel’s and formulate a comprehensive Mossad, India’s RAW, and the CIA. This antiterrorism policy before deciding belief indicates a complete lack of the course. Without such preparations, understanding of the jihadist mindset. there is no point in talking to TTP. While Islamabad’s desire to engage in AUTHOR’S BIO: Rizwan Zeb is an dialogue is not problematic per se, associate editor of the Journal of Asian doing it without a clear understanding Security and International Affairs (to of the aims and objectives of the other be launched in 2014 by Sage) and is side as well as its own desired based at the Center for Muslim States Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 10 and Societies, University of Western Australia. He recently guest edited a special issue of the Journal of South Asian Development on “Afghanistan and the Region: Post 2014”. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 11
RUSSIA ADVANCES ITS POSITIONS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
Armen Grigoryan
Russia continues to limit Armenia’s capability to make independent political decisions and is planning to increase its military presence in Armenia. Shortly, Azerbaijan and Georgia will face stronger pressure and Russia’s efforts to create a new union of the former Soviet republics will intensify. As Russia is unable to advance its goals through “soft power,” offering no attractive model of governance, democratic political culture, or serious economic benefits, it will increasingly rely on “hard power.” Regional policies devised by the U.S. and EU are becoming insufficient as regional dynamics change and new threats emerge.
BACKGROUND: At the Eurasian Armenia would not be able to become Economic Council meeting in Minsk on a CU member unless the dispute with October 24, Armenia’s President Serzh Azerbaijan is solved. Sargsyan signed a memorandum about A few days before the summit, Russian further cooperation between Armenia sources indicated the intention to and the EEC. The memorandum modernize eighteen MIG-29 fighters includes a clause obliging Armenia to deployed at the Russian military base abstain from any statement or action in Armenia. The planes have so far contrary to the interests of the been used as part of the CIS joint air Customs Union. At the same time, defense but, according to air force base Customs Union members have not commander Col. Alexander Petrov, assumed any obligation to abstain they will become capable not only to from actions contrary to Armenia’s intercept airborne targets but to attack interests, and Russia and Belarus are targets on the ground as well. It is also the main arms suppliers to Armenia’s planned to deploy battle helicopters rival, Azerbaijan. and airborne troops, enabling the base In addition, Belarus’s President personnel to engage not only in Alexander Lukashenka stated that defensive but also in offensive Armenia must resolve its territorial operations. dispute with Azerbaijan, and that CU In turn, commander of the Gyumri members will take Azerbaijan’s base Col. Andrey Ruzinsky stated that position into account. Azerbaijan if Azerbaijan’s leaders decide to strongly opposes the possibility of self- restore jurisdiction over Nagorno- proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh to Karabakh by force, the Russian benefit from a free trade agreement. military may engage in accordance After the summit in Minsk, Russian with Russia’s obligations stipulated by state television also mentioned that the Collective Security Treaty Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 12
obligation towards the CU adopted by President Sargsyan, strengthen the perception that CU membership is just a pretext, and Russia is planning to annex Armenia de facto. IMPLICATIONS: Since Russia considers the South Caucasus a zone of vital interest, another meeting between the presidents of Armenia
and Azerbaijan should not be expected Organization agreements. Such a to bring a breakthrough in the statement by a military commander is negotiation process, unless Azerbaijan rather ambiguous, while Russia’s indicates readiness to consider joining political leaders abstain from openly the CU. Some Azerbaijani experts have stating whether Russia would engage noticed that Lukashenka’s statements in case of a large-scale fight between were an invitation to Baku. Col. Armenia and Azerbaijan and usually Ruzinsky’s statement may also claim that the military base’s mission perhaps be viewed in that context. At is to defend the “external borders of the same time, the statement the CIS,” i.e. the borders with Turkey supported Russia’s apologists in and Iran. Armenia whose main argument in As the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk favor of the patron-client relationship Group visited Baku on November 4, with Russia is security understood as President Aliyev agreed to meet with keeping the status quo in the Sargsyan for the first time since the relationships with Azerbaijan and extradition of Ramil Safarov from Turkey. Hungary. Notably, Azerbaijani officials The growing potential of the Russian demanded an explanation concerning military base in Armenia can be Col. Ruzinsky’s statement from considered a message to Azerbaijan as Russian co-chair Igor Popov. well. Previously, the Armenian Meanwhile, in recent weeks one of government opposed the possibility of main highways connecting Armenia deploying peacekeeping troops in with Georgia was closed on several Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas occasions because of gunfire from the although Russian policymakers Azerbaijani side. repeatedly suggested the desirability Skepticism concerning Russian of such a mission. Now, after security guarantees is steadily growing abandoning relations with the EU in Armenia, as Russia continues to under Russian pressure, Sargsyan’s supply large quantities of heavy administration may potentially yield to weapons to Azerbaijan. Belarus’s and Russia’s further demands, and potentially also Kazakhstan’s ultimately continuing tension on the reservations concerning Customs line of contact may serve as a pretext Union membership, and the unilateral Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 13 for realizing one of Russia’s long-term verdicts of the European Court of ambitions. Human Rights, etc.) suggest that a high On the other hand, it should be oil price and internal stability are more remembered that the Russian base in important for Vladimir Putin than the Armenia, together with bases in the international community’s opinion. North Caucasus, Abkhazia, and South The next few months could be critical Ossetia, is subordinated to Russia’s for the stability and security of the Yug (South) military district whose South Caucasus. If Ukraine signs the main target is Georgia. The increasing Association Agreement with the military presence in the region European Union in November as together with Russia’s provocative planned and therefore reduces the behavior concerning the demarcation chances for success of the Customs of South Ossetia’s border and expelling Union and the projected Eurasian Georgians from their homes suggests Union, the Russian leadership may that Georgia remains under constant decide to use its tools in the South threat. Caucasus as soon as possible. Considering Russia’s strategic goal to It is probable that Putin will visit reintegrate the former Soviet Yerevan in early December; although republics, as well as the vital neither Armenian nor Russian significance of oil revenues for Russia’s authorities have confirmed that such a economy – profits from hydrocarbons visit will be organized, a group of trade constitute more than half of Russian Federal Security Service Russia’s budget revenues and are operatives is already in Yerevan, expected to decline – different checking the conditions and scenarios involving Azerbaijan or supervising the available security Georgia become more likely. These measures. A decision about further could include promises to weaken actions in the region could be made Armenia’s position on the Nagorno- during Putin’s visit or soon afterwards. Karabakh issue if Azerbaijan agrees to On the other hand, Ukraine might participate in Russia’s integration theoretically fail to sign the EU plans or, conversely, stronger pressure Association Agreement, making or even military provocations against Russia’s planning less urgent. Still, Azerbaijan that would ultimately boost possible actions aimed at subjugating the oil price. Although such actions the South Caucasus would only be would be harmful to Russia’s postponed by a few months. international image, the experience of Besides, public discontent in Armenia 2004-2008, when the oil price was is growing concerning not only the loss high, and current features of Moscow’s of opportunity for a closer relationship behavior (strong anti-Western with the EU but also poor economic propaganda, “trade wars,” oppressive conditions, a growing tax burden, a actions against the opposition, Internet projected 50 percent increase of public censorship, limitations of the freedom transportation cost, and other of speech, mock trials, neglect of the economic and social factors. The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 14 government may thus introduce more conflict escalation and long-term oppressive measures, such as bans on dependence of the regional states on demonstrations, electronic Russia, meaning instability, surveillance, Internet censorship, etc. backwardness, social degradation, and CONCLUSIONS: It is becoming increasing emigration. The increasingly clear that Putin’s regime deteriorating situation would also does not consider former Soviet harm the U.S. and EU security and republics full-fledged sovereign states economic interests. The next few deserving respect but rather applies a months may be critical and available modernized version of the Brezhnev policy options need to be considered doctrine. And although Armenia can be carefully, requiring an accord between seen as the weakest link, most of the the U.S. and EU. other post-Soviet countries also cannot AUTHOR’S BIO: Armen Grigoryan is withstand Russian pressure alone. an Armenian political scientist. His However, only a few policymakers research interests include post- from the region have been able to communist transition, EU relations assess the situation in the way with Eastern Partnership countries, Georgia’s President Mikheil transatlantic relations, energy security, Saakashvili did in his address at the and conflict transformation. He is the 68th session of the UN General author of several book chapters, Assembly. conference reports and analytical So far, the situation in the South articles. Caucasus has not been one of the main priorities for the U.S. and the EU. However, neglecting the existing and newly emerging threats may result in Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 15
MOSCOW’S APPOINTMENT OF GOVERNORS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS
Valeriy Dzutsev
One by one, the North Caucasian republics are declining direct elections of governors, instead sticking to the appointment procedure by the President of Russia. Moscow appears to be orchestrating the process to ensure that completely loyal governors are in place in the restive region. Their loyalty, however, comes at the price of greater volatility and lower predictability in the region. Moscow’s policies in the North Caucasus illuminate the crisis of the highly centralized system of governance in Russia. Ironically, regions of Russia that are most adversely affected by the lack of a participatory political system are further deprived of popular voting mechanisms.
BACKGROUND: On November 3, the Kremlin reintroduced direct popular parliament of North Ossetia passed a elections in 2012. Soon after Vladimir legislative package that replaced direct Putin was reelected president in the elections of the republic’s governor same year, a clause was added to the with an appointment procedure by the new law, allowing regional Russian President. The republic joined governments to replace a direct the cohort of other North Caucasian popular vote with appointment by the republics, such as Ingushetia and head of state. Dagestan, that rejected direct elections So far, only North Caucasian republics of governors in favor of appointments. have opted for the appointment The governor of another North procedure of the governor. Even Caucasian republic, Karachai- though formally regions themselves Cherkessia, has also signaled the choose their form of governance, there desirability of appointment in the are strong signs that it is in fact the region. Russian experts say that all Kremlin that orders the North North Caucasian republics will Caucasus regions to reject direct eventually have appointed governors. governor elections. During Direct elections of governors in Russia parliamentary hearings in North were abolished in 2004, following the Ossetia in November, at least two hostage crisis in a Beslan school in deputies of the regional parliament North Ossetia. President Putin at the made clear to the newspaper time explained the move by the Kommersant that the decision to dubious argument of enhancing the designate the appointment of governor state’s ability to combat terrorism. was made in Moscow. Following massive protests after Russian leaders also confirmed their alleged fraud in the December 2011 involvement in the decision-making parliamentary elections in Russia, the process in the North Caucasian Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 16
prompted Moscow to seek appointing regional governors, instead of allowing for popular elections. But again, North Ossetia is predominantly a non-Muslim region with little record of separatist aspirations. IMPLICATIONS: The protest republics on several occasions. At a potential in North Ossetia was cited as youth forum in the North Caucasus in one of the highest in the region. In the August, three weeks prior to the elections to the local parliament in reappointment of the existing October 2012, the ruling United Russia governors of Ingushetia and Dagestan, nearly suffered an electoral defeat as Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev an alternative party of Patriots of stated “I reckon that elections should Russia took 26 percent of the votes. be held everywhere [in all Russian The unpredictability of possible regions]. However, when the political election results is one of the main culture is still somewhat different, we causes for the government’s refusal to can have a transition period for that.” allow direct elections in the North Medvedev’s words outraged Caucasus. Russian expert Viktor Ingushetia’s opposition that Chernous told Rosbalt news agency complained to Putin about the that the “federal government limited inappropriate division of Russian itself to the ‘social contract’ with those citizens into people with the “right” clans that are already in power in the culture and the “wrong” culture. North Caucasian Federal District.” In September, President Putin himself Reliance on existing clans is probably endorsed the decision of officials in only part of the explanation for Ingushetia and Dagestan to reject Moscow’s policies in the region. direct elections, explaining that the Dispatching Ramazan Abdulatipov, a features of these regions, such as Moscow politician of Dagestani origin, “multi-religious, multi-ethnic and to Dagestan as the governor of the special ethnic composition” prevented region in January 2013 was hailed as a them from having effective democratic decisive break with the previous rule. While Dagestan may fit such a tradition that allowed local clans to description, Ingushetia is a small thrive and corrupt the system. Even region with a population of about half though Abdulatipov seemed far a million that is nearly 100 percent removed from the Dagestani clans, ethnic Ingush and Muslim, and North Dagestani observers noticed that the Ossetia is overwhelmingly ethnic new leader of the republic tended to Ossetian and Christian. Hence, Putin’s favor his relatives. For example, explanation was apparently a Abdulatipov’s son Jamal received the euphemism for something else. Some position of the deputy mayor of the analysts cited Islamic extremism and large Dagestani city of Kaspiysk. separatism in the North Caucasus that Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 17
Moscow’s rationale for holding on to each year. Participatory political the appointment procedure in the processes would have mitigated the North Caucasus appears tied to the ongoing conflict, but Moscow seems to lack of control over the region or fear be unabated by the security risks, as of losing it. The leaders of Ingushetia, fear of separatism trumps all other North Ossetia and Karachaevo- concerns of the Russian government. Cherkessia enjoy abysmal popularity The paranoia apparently is so high that among the local population. However, anyone who is not handpicked by Moscow seems happy with all of them, Moscow is considered to be a so it allows the old political elites to potentially unreliable leader who reincarnate themselves. might steer the region away from In Dagestan, on the contrary, Moscow Russia’s influence. Ironically, while was not happy with the previous Moscow succeeds in appointing the leaders and that is why Abdulatipov leaders it wants in the North Caucasus, was dispatched to the republic in the situation in the region is still January 2013. The appointment developing in a direction unfavorable procedure later in September ensured to the central government. The best that Abdulatipov stayed in charge. indicator of the failure of Moscow’s Moscow’s miscalculation is, however, policies is that more than a decade that a higher level of control over the after the second Chechen war, the regional governor does not necessarily Russian government still fears translate into higher control over the separatism in the North Caucasus and region itself. Abdulatipov’s example now not only in Chechnya, but in all or was particularly telling as many nearly all republics of the region. analysts pointed out that he could not CONCLUSIONS: Moscow’s intention build his own working team and to establish greater control over the therefore had to rely on the veterans of North Caucasian republics resulted in Dagestani politics. Some of them, such a treatment of the region that is as Deputy Prime Minister Gaji ostensibly differential from the rest of Makhachev have a quite controversial Russia. While trying to ensure its grip background. Makhachev was over the region with assumed sentenced to prison terms several separatist aspirations, Moscow itself times and has a reputation of strong instills boundaries between the North links to the criminal world. Caucasian periphery and Russia’s In the period after the abolishment of mainland territory. As the Russian regional governor elections in 2004, political class has recognized the the situation in the majority of the harmfulness of excessive North Caucasus regions has clearly centralization and moved to deteriorated. While Chechnya has reintroduce participatory politics at become much less volatile, Ingushetia, the regional level, the fear of Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria have separatism has kept the North destabilized. Approximately 700 Caucasus out of the wave of modest people die in the conflict in the region political liberalization. Lack of political Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 18 reforms is likely to have further Jamestown Foundation and Doctoral detrimental impact on the restive Student in Political Science at Arizona region and result in its ever deeper State University. differentiation from the rest of Russian Federation. AUTHOR’S BIO: Valeriy Dzutsev is a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 19
GEORGIA TO HAVE NEW PRESIDENT, PM, AND INTERIOR MINISTER Archil Zhorzholiani
On November 2, outgoing Prime Whereas the election result proved Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, upon his the public support for the coalition pre-term resignation decision, and its leader, Prime Minister nominated incumbent Interior Ivanishvili, it also revealed GD’s Minister Irakli Gharibashvili as his overstated anticipation of the UNM’s successor, shortly after Georgia political bankruptcy. The former elected a new president. ruling party maintains the status of In the October 27 presidential the country’s major opposition force elections, the candidate of the ruling while pro-Russian radicals like Georgian Dream (GD) coalition Giorgi Burjanadze and Koba Davitashvili – Margvelashvili achieved an outright the head of the Party of the People win over David Bakradze – the who gained 0.6 percent of the votes – nominee of the major opposition party could mobilize little popular support. United National Movement (UNM). In addition, the recent presidential Margvelashvili gained 62.12 percent elections had an extremely low against Bakradze’s 21.72 percent while turnout at less than 47 percent, Nino Burjanadze, the former perhaps an illustration of public parliamentary speaker and the leader disillusionment and political apathy of democratic Movement - United suggesting that a sizable share of the Georgia party, secured a third place electorate may feel unable to influence with 10.19 percent of the votes. the course of political events. Observers from the OSCE’s Office for After the presidential elections, Democratic Institutions and Human Georgia will to enact constitutional Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE amendments, adopted in 2010. These Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), will come into force after the new the Parliamentary Assembly of the president is sworn in on November 17 Council of Europe (PACE), the and will shift the balance of power in European Parliament and the NATO favor of the parliament and the PM. Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) Consequently, Georgia will become a claimed that recent elections parliamentary republic with demonstrated the obvious progress expanded authority for the PM and the country attained in terms of diminished powers for the president. strengthening democracy and The president will no longer have the European standards as well as the lead in domestic and foreign policy image of Georgia as the most and can appoint or dismiss the chief of democratic country in the region. staff of the armed forces as well as key military commanders only with Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 20 agreement of the government. The of investments. The UNM also insisted same goes for signing international that 28-year-old Alexandre treaties, while most legal acts issued Tchikaidze, named by Gharibashvili as by the president will require a candidate to replace him as interior authorization from the PM. minister, is an associate of The post of PM thus obtains enormous Garibashvili’s father in law, Tamaz political clout. In transitional Tamazashvili. democracies where personalities Tchikaidze, who is less known to the rather than parties are the main public, joined the Ministry in 2008 as political actors, it is of utmost an assistant detective. After importance who will take the Gharibashvili secured the post of the influential office. interior ministry, Tchikaidze initially 31-year-old Gharibashvili is a long- was promoted to chief of police in time close associate of multi- Kakheti and later as chief of the Tbilisi billionaire PM Ivanishvili. Although police department. his academic background is What is really obvious in Georgia’s noteworthy – Gharibashvili studied post-election environment is that key international relations at Tbilisi State political positions are to be taken by University and Political Science at non-political figures. Both Pantheon-Sorbonne University (“Paris Margvelashvili and Gharibashvili 1”), his work experience has largely ascended to power thanks to been limited to companies affiliated Ivanishvili and would hardly be able with Ivanishvili. to maintain either the unity of GD or Since 2005, Gharibashvili has been influence over it without his Ivanishvili’s assistant at JSC “Cartu patronage. Unsurprisingly, this Group.” After a few years, he was situation triggers speculations that promoted to director of Georgian Ivanishvili plans to rule Georgia from Dream Ltd and later entered politics behind the scenes, with all the levers along with Ivanishvili. After the of power in his hands – a majority in October 2012 parliamentary elections, the legislative body and two loyal Gharibashvili took the post of interior persons in the executive branch. minister. PM Ivanishvili assessed him Consequently, he will neither have to as a “very practical” and “honest” face public criticism, nor take political person” who “managed to do a responsibility in the case of miracle in one year,” transforming the government failure. previously untrustworthy police system into a European one. The UNM sharply criticized Ivanishvili's decision, accusing Gharibashvili of nepotism and inability to deal with the challenges the country is facing in terms of the economy, unemployment and scarcity Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 21
AZERBAIJAN PREPARES FOR SHAH DENIZ 2 Mina Muradova
Azerbaijan is moving from words to stage 2 is a unique project not only in action in delivering gas resources from the Caspian Sea region, its depth (up to the Caspian Sea to European markets. 6.9 kilometers) is nearly double that of President Ilham Aliyev has taken the the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field, development of the Southern Gas which produced 77 percent of the Corridor under his own supervision. A country’s oil last year.” State Commission chaired by First In October, the BP-led consortium Vice-Premier Eyub Yagubov has been developing the Shah Deniz field established by a presidential decree concluded 25-year agreements to and will be responsible for supply European markets with gas, coordinating all issues related to the offering an alternative supply source Shah Deniz project on a government to Russia’s Gazprom. Nine companies level, as well as the implementation of will purchase over 10 billion cubic the South Caucasus Pipeline Expansion meters (bcm) a year of gas in Italy, Project, the Trans-Anatolian gas Greece and Bulgaria. These contracts, pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans worth more than US$ 100 billion at Adriatic pipeline (TAP). today’s prices, represent the most The main objective of the commission valuable set of gas sales agreements is to protect Azerbaijan’s interests in ever signed by BP. The buyers who these projects and to provide a smooth have agreed to buy the gas are: Axpo implementation process. The “South Trading AG, Bulgargaz EAD, DEPA Caucasus pipeline has political and Public Gas Corporation of Greece S.A., economic importance for the country Enel Trade SpA, E.ON Global thanks to its capacity to deliver gas not Commodities SE, Gas Natural only from Shah Deniz, but also from Aprovisionamientos SDG SA, GDF SUEZ other gas fields of Azerbaijan,” the S.A., Hera Trading Srl and Shell Energy decree reads. Europe Limited. Ilham Shaban, head of the Baku-based “These agreements mark the biggest Center for Oil Studies, termed the Shah gas sales in the history of Azerbaijan. Deniz 2 project a first path leading They also mark the beginning of direct Azerbaijan to Europe and opening for links between Azerbaijan’s huge gas other projects in the future: “I see a resources and the European markets ... new epoch, new technologies, new I am sure that this cooperation will projects by 2025 … and even Shah bring benefits to consumers across Deniz stage 3 is possible, when deeper Europe and will play an important role fields will be developed ... Shah-Deniz in strengthening European energy Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 22 security,” said Rovnag Abdullayev, Bulgaria and the Ionian Adriatic President of Azerbaijan’s State Oil Pipeline which will connect with key Company (SOCAR). western Balkan countries. TAP is also The Shah Deniz Stage 2 project will likely to have an effect on Western add another 16 bcm per year of gas Europe and may help reduce the gas production to the approximately 9 bcm prices more generally through annually from Shah Deniz Stage 1. increased competition, Tungland Shah Deniz is expected to provide 10 noted. bcm of gas per year for Europe and 6 Once in Italy, TAP will plug into the bcm for Turkey. Shah Deniz Stage 2 gas Snam Rete gas network from where will be delivered through more than gas can then be supplied to 3,500 kilometers of pipelines through Switzerland, France, Austria, Germany, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Greece, Belgium and the UK through various Bulgaria, Albania, and under the pipeline systems – some of them Adriatic Sea to Italy. The TANAP will operated by TAP’s new shareholder transport gas across Turkey and then Fluxys. the TAP will transport gas from the “We firmly believe that TAP will be a Turkish-Greek border to Italy. game changer for the European energy When Shah Deniz comes online, which industry. It will open up a new is expected during 2019, TAP will be corridor from the south-east, creating ready to ship the initial 10 bcm per a route for new and additional supplies year. “As additional resources come to follow. In so doing, it will start the on-stream, the pipeline has been process of improving Europe’s designed to be able to easily expand by diversity and security of supply and just adding extra compression, to over helping to secure a more liquid market 20 bcm – double the capacity, and all at for gas and support an increasingly an incremental cost. Of course the competitive energy sector,” Tungland reserves in Azerbaijan alone, not to stated. mention the wider Caspian, are very Shaban expects that Shah Deniz Stage likely to be far greater and that is one 2 will demand a huge investment, as of the reasons why TAP and the entire according to his estimation “nearly 30 Southern Gas Corridor are so billion U.S. dollars will be needed for important. TAP is a project which will gas production and construction of be the first to open up a new energy necessary infrastructure to deliver route in Europe,” TAP’s managing Azerbaijani gas to the European director Kjetil Tungland told the border.” However, Shaban still believes Report Company. that all these projects will be profitable Tungland termed called TAP “a game- and beneficial. “The project will changer” on Europe’s energy market. definitely bring good money, it is In south-east Europe in particular, TAP commercially justified. Three billion will facilitate gas deliveries to various U.S. dollars have already been spent regional pipelines – both existing and for the project’s development.” planned – such as connections with Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 23
The gas sales agreements will enter of BP in Azerbaijan, expressed his into force following the final confidence that a final investment investment decision on the Shah Deniz decision will be made by the end of the Stage 2 project which is targeted for year. late this year. Al Cook, Vice President
ARMENIA’S ANM PARTY REVIVES Haroutiun Khachatrian
The old Armenian National Movement necessary institutions, and moreover party has been declared alive against fought a war over Nagorno-Karabakh. the wishes of its leader, Armenia’s first After President Ter-Petrosian’s President Levon Ter-Petrosian, resignation in 1998, ANM became one expressed another view. On October of the forces of the weak and 26, the event “Founding Congress of fragmented Armenian opposition but Armenian National Movement party” managed to survive. In 2012 and 2013, took place in Yerevan. Some 200 ANM was declared dissolved and a delegates representing five provinces new party was created under Ter- (marzes) of Armenia declared, despite Petrosian’s leadership, named earlier statements to the contrary, that Armenian National Congress (ANC) the old ANM party (HHSh in its and declared the heir of the ANM. ANC Armenian abbreviation) has not been also has a 7–member faction in the dissolved, and that their party is the National Assembly although most of its only heir of the previous ANM. members are not members of the ANC Members of the congress are now busy party. creating local party bodies, party The revival of ANM can be considered registration, and other moves another setback for Ter-Petrosian after envisaged by the Armenian legislation. his defeat against his main rival Serzh In contrast to most of the existing Sargsyan in the 2008 presidential Armenian parties, the new party is said elections, representing a failure of his to have no leader. plan to create a strong and united The organization named ANM was opposition bloc after the elections. The originally created in 1988 and was new party was created by a group of reorganized into a party in the 1990s, former ANM leaders, who are when it constituted the ruling party experienced politicians and do not during the early stages establishing share Ter-Petrosian’s approaches. In Armenian independent statehood particular, Ararat Zurabian (no when the country lacked most of the relation to the ANC’s current leader Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 24
Levon Zurabian) was the chairman of as Armenia’s foreign minister and the ANM board for most of the period representative at the United Nations, when the party was in opposition. said he was not convinced that Russia Zurabian is famous due to the fact that would be successful in forming a real as the only opposition candidate, he Custom Union and in creating a managed to be elected Mayor of a Eurasian Union. Yerevan district in the early 2000s Members of the new ANM believe that (elections were at the time held in the the Deep and Comprehensive Free in districts and not in the whole city). Trade Agreement to be initialed in Zurabian and other members of the Vilnius in late November is a way for board, a 14-member body that was Armenia to move towards European elected at the congress, of the new standards. ANC has not yet clarified its ANM believe that the ANM created in position on this issue, but it seems to 1988 had right-wing ideology. The agree with the authorities, at least new party is said to be a real right- partially, that joining the Customs wing organization, whereas its leaders Union will enhance the country’s claim that ANC has shifted to a left- security. Clashes between ANM and wing ideology. ANC are possible in the near future on As for the issue currently most actively these and other matters. It has discussed in Armenia, the new party previously been difficult to imagine a strongly favors Armenia’s integration struggle between Ter-Petrosian and with Europe and criticizes the ANM, but the appearance of any new Armenian leadership for its September party in Armenia’s political opposition 3 statement on Armenia’s decision to inevitably leads to a struggle. It is also join the Russia-led Custom Union, possible that ANM may choose to align which endangers the country’s with other right-wing parties. perspective of signing an Association Agreement with the EU. Alexander
Arzumanian, also a Board member of the new ANM who has formerly served
GEORGIA BETTER POSITIONED THAN UKRAINE AHEAD OF VILNIUS EAP SUMMIT Alexander Beck
On November 28-29, six post-Soviet Ukraine with the EU’s high officials to republics will convene in Vilnius for discuss the current state and future the Eastern Partnership Summit. The objectives of these six potential EU “Vilnius Summit” will bring together states. Two countries in particular – leaders from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine – hope to sign Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and trade agreements with the EU, which Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 25 they trust will further their ambitions ambitions realized at Vilnius, stating at to one day enter into the European a press conference on October 28 that Union. Both nations, however, enter “we assign paramount importance to the Vilnius Summit under significantly the Vilnius summit because we expect differing political situations, despite a confirmation and recognition of our their similar recent political histories. European choice by the partners The political trajectory of both nations, there.” If the country continues on its moreover, suggests that Georgia is Western-centric path, especially if the more likely to sign an economic ruling administration refrains from agreement with the EU than Ukraine jailing Saakashvili, it can approach the this November. Vilnius Summit confident of signing a Georgia has recently been celebrating trade agreement with the EU. free, fair, and peaceful democratic Unlike Georgia, the Ukrainian Orange elections, held last month, which Revolution in 2004 has had little to no witnessed the Georgian Dream party’s effect on the democratic legitimacy of Giorgi Margvelashvili oust the former the nation’s current government, and it administration’s United National has come under increasing scrutiny, Movement party from the presidential both domestically and internationally, office. While some political tensions for some of its policies and practices. remain in the country – primarily While Ukraine initially witnessed surrounding the possible arrest of improvements in a variety of former president, Mikheil Saakashvili, democratic indicators, conditions in over allegations regarding his the nation have since declined: involvement in the deaths of Prime corruption has increased since 2004, Minister Zurab Zhvania and the deputy the country’s democratic legitimacy mayor of the Kvemo Kartli region in has deteriorated, and Freedom House 2005 – international commentators downgraded Ukraine’s freedom status and national governments alike have from “free” to “partly free” in 2011. praised the election as recognition of One issue in particular which has the former Soviet republic’s continued drawn widespread criticism from strides towards democracy since its Western observers is the continued Rose Revolution of 2003. imprisonment of one of the main According to the Freedom House’s Ukrainian opposition party’s leaders, democracy ratings, since its Rose Yulia Tymoshenko. The EU, among Revolution in 2003 Georgia has rooted numerous other international out much corruption throughout organizations, considers her national government, continued its imprisonment politically motivated, progress towards legitimate calling it “justice being applied democratic governance, and pursued a selectively under political motivation.” consistently pro-EU, pro-NATO foreign Ukraine’s capacity to sign the policy. President Margvelashvili hopes Association Agreement with the EU, by to have his country’s long-term many accounts, hinges on democratic progress and European Tymoshenko’s release. President Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 November 2013 26
Viktor Yanukovych, however, remains Ultimately, despite the imperfect steadfast in his resolve to keep his political records of both Georgia and opponent under his control – seen by Ukraine, it is in the best interest of many as a tactic to prevent both these states and the EU to Tymoshenko from running in continue strengthening their bonds for Ukraine’s 2015 presidential election – the foreseeable future. For the states, and his continued inability to reach an stronger economic ties with the EU, as agreement to secure her release may well as the possibility of reformation of ultimately cripple his nation’s ability to political structures demanded in the integrate with the EU. EU’s acquis communautaire, promise While the future of Georgia and lasting prosperity and stability. Ukraine’s relationship with the EU is Despite economic sanctions and as of yet unclear, the outcome of the possible hikes in energy prices from Vilnius Summit will certainly bear Russia, Georgians and Ukrainians alike significant implications for nations would reap long-term benefits from across Europe. Both Georgia and association – and possible integration Ukraine currently sit at critical – with the EU. geopolitical positions between the For the EU, signing economic Western European-led EU and the agreements with these two states Russian-dominated “Customs Union” would effectively wrest the (CU). Each nation’s decision to join one transitional democracies from Russia’s of these two economic unions will sphere of influence, and promote align the state with either Western Western ideals throughout Eastern Europe or the coalition of former Europe. The Vilnius Summit, then, will Soviet states. prove a defining event for the future of Russia’s posturing ahead of the key political alignments in the region. summit – banning the largest It is now up to the reigning Ukrainian confectionary exporter and administrations in Georgia and a variety of Moldovan liquors, Ukraine to remain strident in their threatening to ban exports of commitment to democracy, and avoid Belarusian and Lithuanian milk, practicing selective justice for short- making official visits to Azerbaijan and term political motives. Georgia Armenia, and erecting barbed wire remains politically well-situated to fences along the administrative have its European ambitions realized boundary lines of South Ossetia in at the Vilnius Summit. Ukraine, Georgia – suggests it is trying to however, must find a solution to the intimidate its neighbors into imprisonment of Tymoshenko before reconsidering their flirtations with the it can sign the Association Agreement EU. Georgian-Russian relations, with the EU. however, have recovered somewhat of late, and the two nations remain important trading partners.