Civilian shelter against nuclear attack; a study of the requirements for Tucson, Arizona

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Authors Schultz, Sterling Eugene, 1934-

Publisher The University of Arizona.

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Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/553978 CIVILIAN SHELTER AGAINST NUCLEAR ATTACK: : i '' -Mi . A STUDY OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR TUCSON, ARIZONA ... • ...! : c ‘''O rj.-o - v - v r ; :; .. : V: - ■

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. . L .

: ' ' ■ ■■■ v-, A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements .—

For the Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1962 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfill­ ment of requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknow­ ledgement of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in their judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.

SIGNEDy / ^ ^

a p p r o v a l by t h e s i s d i r e c t o r

This thesis has been approved on the date shown below

/ f , / f Andrew W. Ross fate Professor of Civil Engineering

ii ABSTRACT

A thorough and complete study was made of the civilian shelter requirements for Tucson, Arizona, in the event of nuclear attack. The study consisted of a evalua­ tion of the nuclear war threat to the United States and the related vulnerability of Tucson. The post-attack analysis verifies the need for protection against the ef­ fects of nuclear weapons. , . A conclusive solution was reached as to the most desirable shelter system for Tucson based on the population characteristics, the land uses, and the criteria governing the design of a shelter to resist weapon effects.

As a final conclusion, a shelter design was arrived at wherein compatibility between architectural, structural, ' • .■ i., ...■. . i ' : . sociological, economical, and habitability problems were satisfactorily carried to the point where only refinement

of detail is necessary. ;

’ 7.

7 i iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT BY AUTHOR ...... ii

ABSTRACT ...... iii

CHAPTER 1 FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM ...... 1

1.1 Scope of the Problem 1.2 The Nuclear War Threat to the United States 1.2.1 Development of the Threat . ; . ; . 1.2.2 Russian Weapon Systems ......

1.2.3 Probable Attack Against the U.S; . . O to to M 1.3 Civil Defense and the Future . . . • . . . 17 1.4 National Civil Defense Policy ...... 17 CHAPTER 2 VULNERABILITY OF TUCSON ; ...... 23

2.1 The Military Target Complex ...... 23 2.1.1 Davis-Monthan— -SAC Bomber Base . . . 23 2.1.2 Titan II Launching Sites . ; ; . . . 25 2.1.3 ADC 15th Fighter Interceptor Sqdn. . 26 211.4 SAGE Radar Station ...... 27 2.2 The Civil Target Complex . . i ; . . . ; . 2 7 2.2.1 Tucson Municipal Airport ...... 28 2.3 Targeting Probabilities . ; . ; . ; . . . 2 8 2.4 Target Analysis of Davis-Monthan AFB . . . 33 2.5 Target Analysis of Tucson Municipal Airport 41 2.6 Target Analysis of the Titan Sites . . . . 4 1 2.7 Aiming Errors ..... i ...... - . ; . 48 2.8 Nuclear Attack Summary . . . . ; ; . ; . . 49

CHAPTER 3 POST ATTACK ANALYSIS 50

3.1 Description of a Nuclear Explosion . . ; . 50 3.2 Purpose of Post Attack Analysis ...... 5 1 3.3 Direct Fireball and Crater Effects . . . . 55 3.4 Blast Effects ...... 57 3.4.1 Blast Wave Effects on Structures . . 57 3.4.2“ Blast Damage to Motor Equipment and Railroad Stock . . . . V .... . • 63 3.4.3 Blast Damage to Utilities . . . . . 64 3.4.4 Biological Blast Effects ...... 65

iv Page

3.5 Thermal Radiation ; ; ...... 3.5.1 Thermal Damage to Inanimate ' • 5 ’ 65 * Objects . •»»"•••« • » • • • • 65 3.5.2 Biological Thermal Effects . . i ; - 70 3.6 Nuclear Radiation Hazards . . . . . 71 . 3.6.1 Nuclear Radiation . 71 3.6.2 Effects of Nuclear Radiation on Inanimate Objects ; • 72 3.6.3 Biological Effects of Nuclear . Radiation ...... 72 3.6.4 Initial Nuclear Radiation . • • • 74 3.6.5 Residual Nuclear Radiation . • . • 76 3.7 Summary ...... • ...... 90

CHAPTER 4 TUCSON SHELTER SYSTEM ...... 91

4.1 The Fundamental Requirement ...... 91 4.2 Survival Alternatives ...... 92 4.3 Developing the Shelter System ...... 99 4.3.1 Existing Facilities Available . . 100 ' 4.3.2 Distribution of Persons and Land Use v . • ♦ ...... ' . . 102 4.3.3 Shelter Investment Versus Survivability ...... 105 4.3.4 Priority of Shelter Construction . 113 CHAPTER 5 NEIGHBORHOOD SHELTERS...... 114

5.1 Basic Protection and Operation Characteristics...... 114 5.2 The Neighborhood Concept of Shelter - Development ...... 115 5.3 Population Mobility and Shelter Location 117 5.3.1 Walking Distance...... 117 5.3.2 Reaction to Warning ...... 118 5.3.3 Maximum Walking Distance ..... 119 5.3.4 Queuing at the Shelter ...... 121 5.3.5 Discussion ...... 121 5.4 Location of Residential Shelters .... 121 5.5 Shelter Location Versus Design Hardness . 128 5.6 Alternate Shelter Systems Investigated . 128

CHAPTER 6 A NEIGHBORHOOD SHELTER DESIGN ...... 133

6.1 Bonillas Shelter District ...... # 133 6.2 Characteristics of Bonillas Shelter District ...... 134 6.3 Weapon Effects ...... I3* v Page

6.4 Shelter Site Characteristics ...... 138 6.5 Protection Characteristics of Bonillas Shelter ...... 139 6.5.1 Radiation Protection ...... 139 6.5.2 Blast Protection ...... 140 6.5.3 Fire Storm Protection ...... 140 6.6 Operational Characteristics ...... 141 6.6.1 Loading T i m e ...... 141 6.6.2 C a p a c i t y ...... 141 6.6.3 Period of Occupancy ...... 142 6.6.4 Habitability ...... 142 6.6.5 Sanitary Facilities ...... • • 143 6.6.6 Water System ...... 143 6.6.7 Electrical System ...... • 144 6.6.8 Communications and Instrumentations 145 6.7.-Shelter Group Concept . . . . . 145 6.7.1 Architectural Arrangement . • • • . 145 6.8 Structural Characteristics . . . . • . . . 146 6.8.1 Theory . . • • . . • ...... • 146 6.8.2 Structural Configuration . . . . • 146 6.8.3 The Basic Module ...... 147 - 6.8.4 Precast Concrete Construction . • . 148 6.8.5 Design for Ground Shock ...... 149 6.8.6 Entrance Door Design ; . . . • • 149 6.9 Cost Estimate ...... 149

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . 151

7.1 Conclusions ...... 151 7.2 Recommendations For Further Study . . • . 151

APPENDIX A ...... 152

APPENDIX B ......

REFERENCES ...... 164 ^ ' ' u ' CHAPTER 1 ^ 1 i: % %

' -'vri’-r:'!.: .«■;■ r 'c': ' .x:-/ c i x ' FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM ' ' ‘i w:; 'O'-: :: l: : :V : ; V , > . ' ,,, ::.vX; ; •;

1.1 SCOPE OF THE PR(BLEM ^ ^ ' h3 : uu u 1

: The use of nuclear power as a weapon of war represents one of the greatest challenges to survival that has ever confronted society. To date there is little hope that society's regulatory agencies can control this use; Until it can/ preservation of society may require inovations as protective civilian shelters. Adequate preparations will have a positive effect on the number of survivors and the spirit and dispatch with which the American people will set about the recovery task. 1 ■

To entertain the arguments for and against "fallout shelters" would not add any relevant information to this study. Because the issue is largely political, those who favor a shelter program, like those who object; most often adduce scientific arguments and appeal to the individual's sense of social responsibility. The fact remains— -the effects of nuclear weapons can be mitigated only by carrying out a substantial shelter program and associated protective . measures. ' v 1 - i_.; To a civil engineer, whose training is in the design­ ing and construction of public facilities, thej task of ■ , 2 providing civilian shelters presents,a unique and challeng­ ing civil engineering problem. The intention of this thesis is to determine the treat of nuclear attack to the citizens of Tucson and develop on sound engineering principles a -v -v workable solution to the problem. In light of the national policy on civilian defense, it is more than likely that engineers will be called upon to make just such a study as presented in this thesis. Technical publications on the design of structures and supporting components to resist the effects of nuclear weapons are numerous, but are not readily available. It is emphasized that the material contained herein has been collected from unclassified sources.: The majority of the information has been derived from texts, complilations, and reports prepared under Department of Defense contracts. :

i The approach to the problem will be to define the nature of the threat, determine Tucson's targets and thus the level of attack and its consequences, and present a plan for protective construction that will provide the maximum shelter per dollar invested. 1.2 THE NUCLEAR WAR THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES 1.2.1 Development of the Threat , Russia’s capabilities in the nuclear weapons and missiles field together with its avowed objective of world domination, present an unquestionable threat to the American civilization (1). When the leaders in the Kremlin are con­ 3 vinced that their nuclear weapons and delivery systems are capable of destroying America with acceptable damage in retaliation, they will not hesitate to‘use them (2). , - v if our nation possesses the three vital phases which constitute deterrents: superior offense,5 superior defense, and the will to survive nuclear war (passive defense) we may avoid a nuclear destruction. However, if the offensive and defensive power of the United States and the Soviet '

Union-are equal, and war becomes more protracted, the im­ portance of civilian defense becomes paramount to the outcome of a conflict. ' ' : ^ r

1 Recognizing the importance, the Soviet Union has implemented ah extensive civil defense program through training of the population and construction of survival shelters; Their shelter construction program of 1959 empha­ sized public shelters providing varying degrees of protection against blast, collapsing buildings, radiation and fire, as well as chemical and bacteriological agents. They are designed for relatively long term occupancy. Given suffi­ cient warning time the majority of * the Soviet population could be provided shelter (3)(4). Complete and total disarmament by'the peoples of the world is a noble goal^-someday man may finds way to live without the cataclysm of war. But this day cannot be seen on even" the most distant horizon. 4

1.2.2 Russian Weapon Systems

Russia's offensive aerospace force today consists of manned aircraft, intermediate-range ballistic missiles and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles.; - : 1

Russian bombers have ranges of 12,000 miles which enable them to fly from Russia to targets in the United

States and return without refueling. Recent releases credit

Russia with two super-sonic bombers comparable to our B-58 bomber. They are also conducting flight tests' of a long - range bomber capable of speeds three times that of sound.

bur greatest present danger lies in the Russian- ballistic missile weapons systems. Russia has a great number of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile bases and at least 20 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile'bases.

The IRBM’s can destroy all the United States over­ seas military bases around the perimeter of the! USSR and Red Satilites. The IRBM’s have ranges around'2,500 miles.

The ICBM1s have a 10,000 mile range and are capable of hitting any target in the United States from launching sites within the USSR. Traveling at speeds of about 18,000 miles per hour they can reach their targets in about 20 min­ utes. Their ICBM’s are equipped with powerful rocket motors capable of launching payloads of five tons and more. The

Vostok,' manned space capsule weighed 5 tons (5). With a weight-yield ratio of 1.5 tons per 5-megaton explosive 5 equivalent this would imply,that their nuclear warheads could be in the 15-megaton range (6). Recent analysis of the, Russian nuclear tests in 1961 indicate a much improved weight-yield ratio (7). Therefore it is reasonable to estimate that each ICBM is capable o f ,delivering in the neighborhood of a 20-megaton warhead from a Russian base to an American target. A NATO intelligence report estimates that Russia will have deployed some 200 ICBM's by the end of .1962 (8). Other estimates exceed this number by as much as 100 percent. ....

Statements have been made to the effect that the

Russians lack the technical and scientific knowledge neces­ sary for true electronic guidance of these missiles. The facts do not bear this out. On September 13, 1959, the Russians imbedded a 858 lb. spherical container on the face of the moon. In 1961 they photographed the moon from a vehicle that was guided into position and held steady while it photographed the backside of the moon. When the rocket came nearest to the earth after orbiting the moon, it trans­ mitted these pictures back to the earth. According to an announcement from Moscow, a missile fired from Siberia traveled nearly 8,000 miles and landed less than 1.25 miles from the precalculated target point (9). Data on Soviet ICBM accuracy under test conditions indicated a circular probable error (CEP) of less than two miles in the years 6 • ...... • .MV'V'. , : iw.- 1959-60. An operational circular probable error close to

i •- ■ < c ' V- Ml';,,.,;. : ■ f one mile must be assumed for the period of 1963 and there­ V after (id).

Missile accuracy can be expected to improve as more improved guidance systems become operational. For instance,

V ' ' . ' ' . ' • V - : - 1 : • 1 ; • ' :; ' i 'V ' i'; ' ' ' ' "• ’ General Electric designers report the development of a stabilizer control unit that will increase missile direc­ tional accuracy 100-fold. It is conceivable that Russia has the same capabilities in the light of their achievements.

...... Results from analyses of the Russian nuclear tests in 1961 indicate their weapon yields ranged from a few kilotons to 60 megatons. Of special interest was the small fission yield of the high yield tests (11). Khrushchev boasts that Russia is stockpiling nuclear weapons more powerful than 100 megatons each and warns that their Vostok spacecraft could deliver the super bombs to any point on the earth (12). _ ■ . T: r . - ■ .. - : : Z' v t-: The Soviets are estimated to have about 20 missile launching submarines of which 4 are nuclear powered. These submarines are equipped with short range ballistic missiles - . ' * - - ; . / ■ ■ • vVv m v / \ -x: in the 1,000 mile range. They present a major threat to seaboard cities and industrial complexes. - v * v ' ' V*-'1'1 ■ ,;t-. .. The Russians have made remarkable progress in chemical and biological warfare as indicated by their scientific publications. Large scale biological and chemical attacks 7 are as yet untried weapons, but their destructive power ' : • .«■ " - ' - . .. • . ‘ ; . '» ' •. ... ' - • is well established. Populations weakened by the effect of a nuclear attack would be extremely vulnerable to communi­ cable biological agents due to minimum medical facilities and reduced bodily resistance. A population sheltered against the effects of nuclear attack would be an ideal target for biological or chemical attack, if the ventila­ tion equipment had not been designed to remove toxicological airborne contamination (13).

1.2.3 . Probable Attacks Against the United States

It is assumed that Russia will attack the United

States first. In striking first the Soviets have to decide whether to strike at our military and industrial targets thus destroying our retalitory power and ability to wage war, or to strike at our cities in an attempt to inflict human destruction so great that America will stop function-

j ing as an effective society. Many hypothetical nuclear attacks on the United States have been studied by responsible agencies during the past several years, and an analysis of the material damage and probable casulties from blast, thermal, and radiation effects carried out.in considerable detail. The over-all results in terms of predicted casuali- ties for a given level of attack seem to agree reasonably well among the different studies. The particular targets 8

selected, weapon criteria, and assumed meteorological con­

ditions, cause the fallout patterns to vary widely from one

study to the next. The basic reasoning and logical develop- , ment for the input data for the postulated attacks analyzed

is not available in the unclassified literature.

The uncertainties of really knowing what targets

and weaponage the enemy would select if an attack were

launched are indeed very large. And conclusions based on

such studies, even a large number of them, must of necessity

be rather general and suggestive rather than specific and

definitive. However, meaningful priorities can be estab­ lished among the various military and industrial targets,-

and the size and number of weapons assigned to the different targets can be logically determined in light of: (1) the

desired damage, (2) the vulnerability of the target, and

(3) the probable accuracy of the delivery system.

A minimum attack would certainly include all high

priority military targets. There are some 110 military

installations with weapon systems capable of reaching and destroying Soviet military bases and industrial facilities.

Missile bases have the highest priority. At the present time there are 54 operational Atlas ICBM's. Present plans call for 800 Minuteman, 108 Titans, and 126 Atlas operational missile launching sites by 1965. By mid 1963, all 126 Atlas, most of the 108 Titans and 50 Minuteman ICBM*s will be operational (14). ,9 j. : r : . . ., Until the above missile sites are armed, our major

deterrent force consists of Strategic Air Command bombers.

The present,force of approximately 1,400 B-471s, 600 8-52*8,

and the initial squadrons of the B-58 are deployed over .

56 bases within the United States. These bases are con- - ' — ' ; ; i,. .. %. . ^ , .. / -: r. ; -. .. ' \ / rv = i sidered first priority, targets.

, The direct retalitory forces of the Air Defense

Command and the SAGE centers which direct their operations

are considered second priority targets. Major civilian

airports are included in this group since they are available

for use of military aircraft during wartime. /' ::'- ...... V .'. L : . 7 ,' - r,% . : .. y I - ..7 7..'7','. 7 , All other major Air Force tactical, supply, trans­

portation and research facilities are third priority targets ;since they can readily be used for alternate emergency ^ 1 ■ . ' ■- , ' ' ' '. * ‘ .' L ;. • i / . ... -f ' ■ landing fields and their resources would be vital to the • ■ ' ' -■ ■ ' : . - •' " . ' . ■ ■ . . ' ■ , ' - , .-. . . ; . ; ■ V . i: ' war effort.

. Since the Army*s role within the United States is

not one of retaliation or air defense, Army bases are not .. .. ' - , ' : j -. 7 ' 7 . -7' . . . 7 ,:7'7- 7; \ % considered as priority military targets. Chily the Navy*s largest naval bases which have

Polaris submarine and large carrier bomber compliments are of prime.retaliatory importance.

In all probability the Soviets would concentrate their ICBM fire power, with its low warning time and accuracy of about one mile circular probable error, on the 10 high priority missile sites and SAC bomber bases. Attacks against lower priority military targets could be delivered by either ICBM*8 or manned bombers.

Major factors likely to be considered by the Soviets in selecting industrial, governmental, and power resource targets in the United States are: (1) Immediate contribution to the offensive retaliatory capability and air defense;

(2) Resources for repairing damage to retaliatory capacity;

(3) Communication and control centers; (4) Transportation hubs; (5) National and state governmental centers; (7)

Important resources in respect to dependency of large areas and, (8) Civilian morale.

In a comprehensive study of attack patterns on the United States, Callahan and others have established reason­ able priority categories for civil targets which are worthy of notation for comparative purposes (15). Criteria for the four priority categories are:

First priority: 17 Metropolitan areas with greater

than $1,000,000,000 value added by manufacturing or greater than 1,000,000 population. Second priority: 27 Metropolitan areas with greater

than $300,000,000 value added by manufacturing and greater than 300,000 population. Third priority: 43 Metropolitan areas with greater than $200,000,000 value added by manufacturing and greater 11 than 125,000 population. i h - ^

, ' Fourth priority: .37 Metropolitan .areas or cities with greater than $140,000,000 value added by manufacturing, and; state, capitals with greater than $60,000,000 value added by manufacturing, and centers.for the manufacture , of important military products with greater than $50,000,000 value added by manufacturing, or are important centers for the manufacture of nuclear.weapons. p ,c ^ n

; , Because industrial facilities tend to be concentrated in or near the larger centers of populations and military bases tend to be located in or near communities, a combined attack :against industrial and military targets would cause major casualties among our civilian population. Therefore, the importance of civilian defense cannot be overstressed.

By the end of 1962; the USSR will have the capacity to destroy both civil and military targets (16).

The level of probable attacks directed against the

United States have varied from an. estimated 1,000 megatons (early 1960*s) to 20,000 megatons of explosive yield (late

1960 ’s) . . . / v. , : ' Callahan and others (17) have presented the basic, reasoning and logical development of the input data for their postulated attack. Therefore, this study is considered a credible estimate of the post attack situation. The < . attack was directed against the priority military and civil 12 targets referred to above with 5-megaton weapons for a , total level of 4,080 megatons (well within the USSR present

- , ; • *v ; capability). The casualties sustained by an unprotected population would number in the millions and more than three-fourths of our industrial capacity would be completely destroyed. Approximately 50 percent of the population of the continental United States lives in the target areas of the combined attack, and an additional 25 percent lives outside the immediate target areas but well within the downwind heavy fallout areas. An estimate of the number of persons in different categories relative to blast, fallout, and shelter requirements is shown in Table I,

Without a preplanned shelter program, all those persons in categories III and IV would be casualties > bringing the national total to 83 million, or 55 percent of the population, based on the 1950 census. - ^

Table II illustrates, for comparative purposes, the estimated effects of nuclear attack on the United States as compiled by the editors of McGraw-Hill Publishing Company from data furnished by the Office of Emergency Planning, Atomic Energy Commission, RAND Corporation, and Hearings of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (18). Two levels of attack were assumed: One at a level of 1,000 megatons, the other at a level of 10,000 megatons (soon to be within the USSR capability). Two patterns of attack were developed TABLE I ESTIMATE OF POPULATION IN DIFFERENT BLAST, FALLOUT, AND SHELTER CATEGORIES

No. of Cumulative Category Description of Area People Percent Percent

I Live outside heavy fallout areas 15,000,000 10 10 for any wind condition.

Live outside heavy fallout area 24,000,000 15 25 for the wind conditions at the time of the assumed attack.

II Live outside blast and thermal 28,000,000 20 45 damage areas in the northern part of the U.S. but within heavy fall­ out areas. This group could sur­ vive by using the existing fallout shelter capability in basements.

Ill Live outside blast and thermal 16,000,000 10 55 damage but within heavy fallout " areas where existing shelter is grossly inadequate. This group could survive if only a minimum shelter program were instituted. IV Live within target areas. A 67,000,000 45 100 major construction program for shelters incorporating blast protection. This program is estimated to cost several billion dollars.

13 TABLE II

EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES

1,000 Megatons

Industrial Fatalities As % Of Total Population Facilities Made Unusuable Without Shelter With Fallout Shelters

ATTACK ON 10% Blast and Blast and MILITARY Thermal 6% . Thermal 6% TARGETS Fallout 7% Fallout 1% ONLY Not Killed 87% Not Killed 93%

HALF MILITARY 40% Blast arid Blast arid AND HALF . Thermal 34% Thermal 34% CIVILIAN Fallout 5% Fallout 1% TARGETS Not Killed 61% Not Killed 65%

14 TABLE II

EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES

- 10,000 Megatons - . /

Industrial . Fatalities As % Of Total Population Facilities • Made Unusuable Without Shelter With Fallout Shelters

ATTACK ON 30% Blast and Blast and MILITARY Thermal 15% ^Thermal 15% TARGETS Fallout 57% Fallout 6% ONLY Not Killed 28% Not Killed 79% • :

HALF MILITARY 80% Blast and Blast and AND HALF Thermal 66% Thermal 66% CIVILIAN Fallout 23% Fallout 2% TARGETS Not Killed 11% Not Killed 32%

15 16 for each level, one concentrated on military targets, the other divided equally between military targets and cities.

The individual weapons were assumed to be 10 megatons.

Industrial facilities "made unusable" means destroyed or requiring major restoration before use after attack. Fatal­ ities "without shelters" assumes poorly instructed population with no shielding beyond ordinary hou#l#g; and "with fallout shelters" assumes informed, well disciplined population, fully equipped fallout shelters. No account is taken of the blast and fire protection afforded by the fallout shelters.

Fatality figures do not include deaths from secondary causes such as lack of medical treatment for injuries.

The important point for civil defense is not to get an agreement oh how many will die if no shelter program is instituted, but a realistic estimate of how many could be saved under various shelter programs requiring progressively greater levels of expenditure. Tables I and II portray such figures based on somewhat qualitative, but reasonable analyses of the post attack situation. Readily noticeable is the inadequacy of the "fallout shelter only" for protect­ ing over 50 percent of the population located in target areas.

Survival in these strategic locations is entirely dependent upon our energetically carrying out a construction program for shelters, incorporating protection from blast and other ‘ severe close-in effects. 17

1.8 CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE FUTURE ~ _

The science of-militaryr technology is anything.but static^ the future;opens up a whole spectrum,of new possibi­ lities of delivery systems, destructive means, and counter­ measures .. The United States is developing the optical maser weapons. : These weapons would use the extremely high-energy beams of electromagnetic radiation generated by optical masers, a "death ray" weapon. Russia- threatensito put weapons in space orbiting the earth and to strike soft targets with ultra-high yield weapons. , When these and other warfare systems come to pass, an;entirely different strategic con­ cept may be necessary. Today the ballistic missile can ;

destroy targets in the minimum of time. Other weapon systems

■ •• - • beyond, technologically speaking, such as armed satellites

and orbiting warheads would increase the time for attack ,

and too, they could be under constant surveillance for maximum alert against attack. When the anti-missile weapon system is perfected and both the United States and Russia

reach a balance of power, the nation best equipped to absorb

the blow will survive. In short— shelters will give the ' • i . United States this depth (19). : . 1.4 NATIONAL CIVIL DEFENSE POLICY ' ; Underlying the public concern, which waxes and wanes with the,changing international tensions, is the recognition by the President of the United States, principle.military and civilian leaders, and expert civil defense analysts of 18

the Importance of an effective civil defense program.

The course of civil defense in the United States began to take a dramatic new turn in May 1961 when President

John F . Kennedy personally addressed the Congress and the

American people on the vital importance of civil defense as national insurance. v

"It is insurance we trust will never be needed— but insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe." (20)

The President proposed a fallout shelter program which should:;; (1) be nationwide; (2) be long range; (3) identify existing fallout shelter capacity; and (4) provide shelter in new and existing structures.

By executive order (August 1, 1961), the President

transferred basic responsibility for civil defense from the former Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization to the

Department of Defense. With its remaining functions, OCDM was renamed Office of Emergency Planning.

Specifically, the Secretary of Defense is in charge

. . ... of development and execution of a program to minimize the

! ' ' ' effects of attack, including informing and educating industry and the public in methods of survival. This includes a

fallout shelter program, a warning and communications system, and a program;to assist state and local governments in such post-attack community services as health and sanitation. 19 - -/ maintenance of law and order, firefighting and control, de­ bris clearance, traffic control, and provision of water supplies.. :

The Director of the Office of Emergency Planning is responsible for planning continuity of state and local governments, the natural-disaster relief program, the de­ fense mobilization program, the strategic and critical materials stockpiling program.

Previously established policy calls for making , maximum use of existing federal departments. Typical civil defense responsibilities that are assigned to other agencies include:

. Department of Agriculture: Food stockpiling, rural fire control, protection of vegetation and animals against radiological, chemical and biological hazards.

, Department of Commerce: Restoring streets and highways; use of emergency shipping. ‘ 1 ' . ' '• r Federal Aviation Agency: Emergency use of civil . .. . t • air transport, civil airports and airways.

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare: Med­ ical stockpiling; care of refugees from attack, including location services. . , . Department of Interior: Emergency plans for power and petroleum. - , Department of Labor: Planning use of emergency manpower, except medical, in immediate post-attack period. 20

Post Office Department: Registration of individuals and families. • .o.-.- ■ : -■ j •• ■: ,

r r Housing and Home Finance Agency: Emergency housing and community services in the post-attack period. . ,

Interstate Commerce Commission: Plans for use of domestic service transportation in emergency. , v

i The New Civil Defense Program confines itself to fallout shelters. The program emphasizes the largest number of shelters to be obtained in the quickest time at the least cost. Consequently, it is directed to finding suitable fallout shelter space in existing structures, making im­ provements where appropriate, and stocking the shelters with emergency supplies. Federal funds will be spent for these purposes. Privately owned as well as public buildings will be surveyed, marked, and equipped. The program makes little mention of the previous family fallout shelter policy but instead is adopting a longer range program of federally supported school, public building, and community shelters. The fallout shelter program is directed toward providing radiation protection for those persons outside the target areas. If there were no shelter program as such, we might expect that in case of attack the people would take shelter where ever they could—-in basements or other building . . interiors. This random sheltering would have a limited '' protection value. The survey and marking program identifies 21 the best shelter space available. While the net contribution of the identification, marking and improvement of existing shelters can be better evaluated after the complete survey findings are in, it must be realized that the potentials, at best, are limited. ; •

A bill is now before Congress for a $700,000,000 incentive program to encourage community fallout shelters.

Structures intended for health, welfare or education use on a nonprofit basis would be eligible for a share of the

$700,000,000. The federal government would pay a maximum of $2.50 a square foot as an incentive to building structures that could be used as fallout shelters'. The government will stock private shelters with foody water, medical supplies, sanitation equipment; tools, and radiation instruments if they are built to accommodate fifty or more persons. The Secretary of Defense and his aides have assured

Congress that the present civil defense program is not the sum total and substance of their civil defense plans and ideas, but it would be unwise to make large money and pro­ gram commitments until a solid foundation of facts was laid through the national shelter survey (21). Thus it can be considered that the federal government is only beginning a program for national survival and recovery in case of attack.

In target areas, the problem of providing shelter protection against blast and other close-in effects of nuclear weapons 22

is under study for our government. Prototype blast shelters

have been designed and tested at the Nevada proving grounds

. under actual nuclear tests.

It is conceivable/ however, that the federal admin­

istration will be able to provide only target vulnerability

information, technical assistance, and financial aid on a

matching fund basis for those municipalities seeking pro­

tection in the target areas. This is because of the many

local variables affecting the design of blast shelters.

Some of the more critical variables which affect the shelter

design are: weapon yield and type of detonation; distance

from ground zero; meteorlogical conditions; target area

terrain; and subsurface conditions at the shelter site. With government encouragement and financial aid the

optimum shelter system for the United States will conceive-

ably consist of carefully planned underground shelters,

designed to resist the forces and effects most likely to

be produced at a given location, fully equipped, and stocked with food and other essentials for survival and recovery.

A civil defense system of this character will help to provide the population with a superior will to survive.

ti:-.. 1" ' Vi'. V :v :: . CHAPTER 2

VULNERABILITY OF TUCSON

2.1 THE MILITARY TARGET COMPLEX

The top priority military targets in the United

States have been determined by their contribution to the nation's existing and future over-all retaliatory and de­ fensive potential. Tucson has two such Priority 1 military targets which are: Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, the home of the 303rd Bombardment Wing of the Strategic Air Command and eighteen Titan II missile launching sites ringing

Tucson. An elaboration of the strategic mission and state of readiness of these military installations will be helpful in understanding their importance as first priority targets, and in understanding the nature of the probable attack directed against them.

2.1.1 Davis-Monthan— SAC Bomber Base

The task of the Strategic Air Command is to destroy the capability of the enemy to wage war. The 303rd Bombard­ ment Wing is an important part of the bomber force, deployed at some fifty SAC bases throughout the United States, capable of striking targets in the Soviet Union.

One third of the strategic bomber force is presently maintained on ground alert. These aircraft are in full combat

23 24 configuration with crews standing by available for immediate take-off. An alert area has been established near the end of the runway.to reduce this reaction time to a minimum.

The effectiveness of ground alert is further en­ hanced by the air-alert which provides a force of combat- - configured aircraft airborne at all times. Air alert can be maintained with up to 25 percent of the force continuously airborne. IL ... : ;v: .'-v ' : ^

%ssive measures to secure the manned bomber force have been undertaken:by dispersing small numbers of bombers at military and civilian bases throughout the North American continent (22). 1 ^ h . :

The dispersal program was undertaken to provide the capability to launch the alert force (ready aircraft and crews on the ground) within s' 15-minute warning period to expand the enemy's target system. : - . ... The Soviet Union must attack the SAC bomber bases in the first wave attack to have any hopes of destroying the bombers on the ground. By employing electronic detection countermeasures and decoys, they could reduce the warning time for SAC to less than 15 minutes and thus destroy a substantial number of our strategic aircraft before they could get airborne. : Davis-Monthan AFB will, from all indications,-remain a strategic target during the 1960 decade. The Air Force 25 plans to continue to modernize the manned bomber force at the same time ICBM’s and space systems will contribute positive effectiveness to the Strategic Air Command. The

B-47 is entering obsolescence but the improved B-52 models and the B-58 supersonic bombers are being added to the force.

The bombers with their improved penetration capability and targeting flexibility achieved by incorporating the air-to- surface and ballistic missiles, give them significant strike capabilities. Davis-Monthan AFB, a proven excellent heavy bombardment base, will most likely support these aircraft.

2.1.2 Titan II Launching Sites

Construction of all eighteen Titan II launching sites are scheduled for completion by November 1962. Each missile site consists of a launch silo, a launch control center, access portal and a blast lock, all underground and designed with a hardness exceeding 300 psi (23). The Titan II inter­ continental ballistic missile has a range exceeding 6,000 miles and circular probable error (accuracy) as low as two thirds of a mile (24). The eighteen sites should be operational by mid 1963 (25). Missiles in the launching silos would be on constant . V. -• i.. j/. - ■ ■ ' ' - : alert with fast reaction times of about one minute. The ICBM's would not be launched on warning alone, as the manned bombers are. Since the missile cannot be recalled once it has been launched, it would be too risky to fire it until 26 there is incontestable proof of aggression. Therefore, the missile sites would have to "ride-out” the initial attack.

This is the reasoning behind hardening the silos in deep underground installations, thus providing good protection or "hardening" against the effects of near-misses (26).

The basic objective in dispersing the missile force is to make each missile launch site a separate aiming point as far as the enemy is concerned. To insure maximum survival of the missile force when under attack, sophisticated de­ fense and firing tactics have been developed, based on statistical probabilities (27)(28). Hardening and dispersion of missile sites is then both practical and highly desir­ able as it aggravates an aggressor's problem of destroying all or most of our missiles before they can be launched against him.

With announced Air Force policy on firing the ICBM's after proof of aggression, the missile sites too must be hit in the first wave of attack. If not, the I CBM's will have left their silos minutes after this first wave.

2.1.3 ADC 15th Fighter Interceptor Squadron The 15th FIS is a unit of the Air Defense Command whose mission is to detect, identify and destroy all enemy weapons violating the boundaries of the United States. At­ tached to Davis-Monthan AFB the 15th is equipped with the F-101B Voodoo jet fighter interceptor which is nuclear armed. 27

The attack directed against Davis-Monthan AFB would include the destruction of the 15th FIS support facilities and air- ' ; x ; r . . ■ - ‘ ' '1 ' . ' craft not airborne. v

2.1.3 SAGE Radar Station . = < ' - ; ... ' : r " = " ...~ The 684th Radar Squadron 6AGE) atop Mt. Lemmon is a vital link in the Air Defense Command’s SAGE (semi-automatic ground environment) electronic computer system, to provide warnings of enemy attack. Information gathered from the detection equipment is compiled and processed automatically, then relayed to the regional command sector in Phoenix. The

684th is a master center with complete control capability.,

The radar site is considered to be a second or third priority " . r . . . . ------' - -..... military target and thus would possibly be destroyed sometime after the initial strike. The attack would not add any ap­ preciable effects to already severe consequences of attack on first priority targets. . .

2.2 THE CIVIL TARGET COMDEX

Tucson was the 54th largest city in the United States at the completion of the I960 census with a population of

212,892. Tucson is one of the two fastest growing cities . in the United States and is expected to double the 1960 > census figure by the year 1975 (29). By comparison with priority requirements in Chapter 1 it is not likely that Tucson would be attacked as a major civil target. The random bombing of Tucson as a population and industrial center, in 28 addition to the military target bombings is considered least

likely. The damage sustained by the attack on military tar­ gets will virtually destroy the major portion of the densely

populated portion of Tucson. An additional attack would not

add any demoralizing effect on the population of Tucson.

2.2.1 Tucson Muncipal Airport

The attractiveness of Tucson Muncipal Airport as a

target is based upon three main reasons. (1) The 12,000

footrrunway is capable of supporting heavy jet bombers of

the Strategic Air Command and would be an ideal base for

refueling aircraft and picking up weapons stored on the Poor-

man Gunnery Eange at Davis-Monthan AFB. (2) Meteorlogically

the weather in Tucson makes the selection of a base of opera­

tions in this area ideal. Tucson has the largest percentage

of possible sunshine of any city in the United States (30).

(3) The Air National Guard fighter interceptor squadron operates from Tucson Municipal Airport with the all weather

F-100 fighter. The close proximity of Davis-Monthan and Tucson Muni­ cipal Airport would not add appreciably to the weapons effects on Tucson, and the added insurance by allowing for possible

attack seems justified. 2.3 TARGETING PROBABILITIES In all probability the Soviet Union would concentrate an ICBM attack against the first priority targets in Tucson 29 to take advantage of the lowest possible warning time and assumed one mile circular probable error accuracy. The exact weapon yield and point of detonation cannot be precisely known, however, the size and number of weapons assigned to the target can be rationally determined in light of: (1) the desired level of target damage, (2) the degree to which the target has been hardened, (3) the accuracy of the delivery systey and (4) the desired confidence level of target de­ struction.

Current methods of target analysis are, of necessity, founded on numerous simplifying assumptions. One of these is the so-called "cookie-cutter" method (31) in which the lethal radius of a weapon, with respect to a target of known hardness, is defined as that range within which the produced weapon effects are sufficient to destroy the target. The basic assumptions in this analyses are that (a) any target within the lethal radius is destroyed, and that (b) no

target is destroyed outside this circle. A more elaborate analysis of the vulnerability and accumulative effects of repeated near misses on a target does not give a significantly

different probability of destruction than results from com­ putations based on the lethal radius approximations (32). In striking the major retaliatory forces of the United

States first, the Soviets would have hopes of eliminating or 30 reducing the counter forces sent against their targets. In all probability the desired confidence level for destruction of first priority targets would be at least 95 percent. Confidence is a mathematical probability relating the mutual positions of the true value of a parameter and its estimate. Confidence level for a probability of 95 percent means that in 95 percent of the cases the true value will lie within the calculated limits whereas 5 percent of the cases will lie outside these limits (33).

Weapon accuracy is customarily expressed in terms of the circular probable error, abbreviated CEP. The CEP is the radius of the circle within which half of the bombs would fall assuming a circular normal.density distribution function / for the scattering of the individual bombs about the intended ground zero location. The circular normal density distri­ bution is described by the relation (34): '

■ y a '?: 1: ' v , y \ :: . \V...... g

where g(r) =* the probability that a bomb drops a distance "r". from the intended ground

zero tl-:: O' = the standard deviation A' j: 1:, " ; ' :. ' ' - ■ ' - - V - ' ■ • and r = the distance from the intended ground zero. Now, the probability, p(r), that a bopb will drop within a 31 distance r of the desired aiming point is given by:

P(r) g(r)dr £_^ e”r ^2<5 dr

p(r) - l-e-r2/2°2 (2.2)

The radius, r0 , within which half of the bombs are expected to fall is the value of r for which p(r) ■ 1/2, or substituting into the equation (2.2):

.-r„2/2<52

from which, a » (0.849)ro * (0.849)(CEP) (2.3)

Substituting rQ from equation (2.3) into (2.2), we have the probability, p(r), that a single weapon with a lethal radius r will knock out a target:

Equation (2.4) assumes a point target. For an area target the lethal radius must include the target area radius. The

aiming problem is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 32

L = Lethal radius required to insure target cover age.

r = Radius within which there is the desired probability of the bomb hitting.

r^° Radius of target area within which an ab­ solute degree of de­ Worst Hit struction is desired. Location

Lethal Radius Aiming Problem Figure 2.1

y 33

Let P be the confidence level for destruction of any given target, then the number of weapons, n, that must be fired to achieve this level of confidence is given by the relation: .

P - l-(l-p)n (2.5)

where p = probability that one weapon will

knock out the target (i.e., land

within the specified overpressure

ring)* 2 Substituting (1-p) — e 0.692(r/rg) from equation

(2.4), and solving (2.5) for n, we have

The probability that a single weapon will miss the aiming point by a given radius, r , is given by:

2 .692 P(r) 1 g(r) dr e (2.7) r

2.4 TARGET ANALYSIS OF DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB

An attack having the element of surprise would de­ finitely be the hope of the enemy, thereby insuring the de­ struction of the bomber and fighter aircraft on the ground at Davis-Monthan AFB. But because the chances of complete 34 surprise attack are few, due to modern detection systems, the combat ready aircraft will be airborne before Davis-

Monthan AFB is hit. The ground-alert aircraft may not get airborne. A reasonable attack seems to be one that will deny the use of aircraft support facilities for regrouping and refueling of aircraft airborne at the time of attack, as well as destroy parked aircraft. The level of destruction would be such that virtually all the support facilities would have to be rebuilt before reuse.

The possible target components on Davis-Monthan AFB and the blast wave overpressure required for a desired level of destruction are listed in Table III.

The aiming problem associated with the destruction of target components on Davis-Monthan AFB is illustrated schematically in Figure 2.2. Unclassified sources of in­ formation were used to construct the aiming problem (36)(37). All the target components can be enclosed within a radius of 1 1/2 miles, with the exception of the weapon storage locations. The enemy would select the bomb yield and detonation (surface or air burst) for the destruction level desired. Table III shows that at 6 psi all aircraft, communication equipment, and most of the buildings bn the base would be severely damaged. To inflict severe damage on refueling installations, A/C support vehicles, and steel frame bangers would require 12 Psi overpressure. TABLE III

OVERPRESSURE VERSUS LEVEL DESTRUCTION FOR

POSSIBLE TARGET COMPONENTS (Ri DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB ': - b V •• - Possible Target ; , Overpressure (psi) Required For Component Desired Level of Damage (35)

!: : ' Severe Moderate Aircraft Parked on Apron 8 3 Hangers, Medium Industrial Steel Frame 8 • • 4 '

Refueling Equipment i and Other A/C Support Vehicles and Equipment 12 6 Alert Crew Building 15 10 Base Operations and Support Buildings, Wood Frame 4 2

Fuel Storage Tanks ... Aboveground 11 6 Communications Equip- ment 6 3

Weapons Storage Igloos 25 10 Runway (13,645* x 200*) Crater Plastic Zone

Severe damage is such that complete recons truction is quired prior to use. Moderate damage is such that major repairs are required before the object (or structure) caa be used for intended purpose. 36

OLD RUNWAYS

HANGERS a SUPPORT EQUIP.

72 Ml ABSOLUTE 6 PSI

PETROLEUM TANKS RUN W A Y ^ 13,645'X 200' v ALERT 4 < A /C

Davis-Monthan AFB Targeting Problem Figure 2.2 37

In view of the potential retaliatory force and the support facilities available for regrouping of forces after attack the enemy would want at least a 95 percent probability

of the base being destroyed. The radius of the circle with­

in which 95 percent of the bombs can be expected to fall is

computed from equation (2.2) and is given by:

R - 2.078 CEP

The lethal radius, L, of the bomb to enclose the 1 1/2 mile n c . u : ... 'v radius target area is determined by the relation:

L = 2.078 CEP + 1.5 Lethal radii for different circular probable errors and 95 percent probability are listed in Table IV.

The distances to the 12 psi and 6 psi overpressure,

contours for different yields depending on an air burst of

surface burst detonation are given in Table V.

Comparing values in Tables IV and V in light of current Russian missile accuracy of (1 1/2 miles CEP) and

estimated (1 mile CEP) for the period 1963 and.thereafter, a 5-megaton surface burst seems to be the most probable

weapon to be used against Davis-Monthan AFB. Aircraft re­

fueling and support equipment would be subjected to 12 psi overpressure for severe damage and 6 psi overpressure at the outer boundaries would assure severe damage to all parked aircraft at the bomber alert area and fighter interceptor area. The surface burst would assure a high level of radio- 38

TABLE IV v

WEAPON ACCURACY VERSUS RADII REQUIRED FOR AN

ATTACK ON DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB

CEP Lethal Radius Required

0.5 mile 3.04 miles 1.0 mile ^ ' 4.08 miles 1.5 miles 4.61 miles

; - TABLE V

WEAPON YIELD VERSUS LETHAL RADII FOR

SURFACE OR AIR BURST (38)

Lethal Radius in Miles

Surface Burst Air Burst Overpressure Overpressure Weapon Yield in 12 psi 6 psi 12 psi 6 psi M e g a t o n s ______

1 1.8 2.6 2.1 3.5 2 2.2 3.3 2.4 4.0 5 3.0 4.2 3.5 6.0 10 ; 3.8 5.7 4.3 7.8

t : N,--. 39

active contamination from stem fallout, preventing immediate

restoration of damage facilities.

The use of Davis-Monthan AFB could be denied to all

jet aircraft if the runway could be broken up to such a

degree as to require major reconstruction. The concrete

runway at Davis-Monthan AFB is 13,645 feet long by 200 feet wide and designed to support the heaviest bombers with

tire contact pressures of 200 psi. From an engineering

point of view it is believed that effective damage could be

inflicted on the runway only if the runway were within the

rupture zone of a surface burst of a nuclear weapon.

The results of computing the probability of rupturing the runway with different weapon yields and circular probable errors are shown in Table VI. These values were calculated

based on the requirement of placing the rupture zone over the runway.

It is highly probable that even near misses that would place the runway within the fireball radius would not

destroy the surfacing beyond use. Even at high overpressures

of 400 psi to 1,000 psi and temperatures above 10,000° K,

one need not expect serious thermal damage since the dura­ tion of heat is too short for serious heat conduction beyond the surface layers of the concrete. Some pitting and char­ ring even some evaporation of concrete would occur, but the

runway should not suffer real damage (39). 40

TABLE VI

NUMBER OF WEAPONS REQUIRED TO RUPTURE RUNWAY

Circular Probable Error

CEP = .5 CEP - 1.0

Confidence Level Confidence Level

Weapon 80% 95% 80% 95% Yield

5-Megaton 9 17 37 69

10-Megaton 6 11 23 43 41

The analysis of runway rupturing indicates that the marginal benefit to the enemy in meeting this criterion would not justify the large increase in number of weapons and degree of accuracy required.

There is the probability of multiple nuclear ex­ plosions at Davis-Monthan AFB in an attempt to destroy the weapon storage sites. However, the combination of igloo hardness exceeding 25 psi and their scattered locations would require individual installations to be considered as separate targets and the megatonnage required does not seem justified.

In summary, the most probable attack to be directed against Davis-Monthan AFB would be an ICBM with an accuracy of 1 mile CEP and a 5-megaton nuclear warhead armed for surface detonation.

2.5 TARGET ANALYSIS OF TUCSON MUNICIPAL AIRPORT

The weapon criteria for destroying the aircraft support facilities would be nearly identical to the results

of the Davis-Monthan AFB targeting analysis. The targeting problem is shown schematically in Figure 2.3 (40). The level of attack directed against Tucson Municipal Airport would probably be one 5-megaton surface burst. 2.6 TARGET ANALYSIS OF THE TITAN SITES

The eighteen Titan II launching sites virtually surround Tucson and are within a 50 mile radius. Their locations are shown on the map in Figure 2.4. Each site is a formidable fortress of steel and concrete, buried Tucson Municipal Airport Targeting Problem Figure 2.3 MEXICO

Titan II Missile Sites Figure 2.4 44 completely underground and designed "hard" against the severe effects of blast overpressure, air-induced and directly transmitted ground motions, radiation and electromagnetic effects. The entire complex has been shock-proofed to ride out the extreme ground displacements and accelerations of near misses (41). If the attack heaps earth and other debris over the silo door, it can be blasted open. Because of this special engineering it is believed that a Titan site can be destroyed only if it is within the crater lip radius of the bomb crater. A review of the cratering effects will clarify the reasoning.

Figure 2.5 shows that two zones of disturbance in the soil around the crater. The rupture zone wherein the soil has been violently ruptured, the other, the plastic zone wherein the soil has been permanently deformed but without visible rupture. Some of the material thrown out of the crater falls back to form a lip around the edge.

The limits of the rupture zone represent the closest distance to a cratering explosion at which it is feasible to construct a resistant structure (42). Due to the detri­ mental effects of the material thrown out of the crater it is not considered practicable to design the missile launch­ ing structures to resist the effects within the radius of the crater lip or within approximately twice the crater radius. Therefore, this is the criterion upon which the

i 45

PLASTIC ZONE DIAMETER = 3.0 X CRATER DIA,

LIP DIA.= 2.0 X CRATER DIA. RUPTURE 3.0 X CRATER DIA. I CRATER DIA. i LIP */4 HEIGHT CRATER HEIGHT

MISSILE SITE

Titan II Site Targeting Problem Figure 2.5 46 firing problem is based. A weapon with a lethal radius equal to twice the crater diameter formed would be required

to knock out a Titan site. The lethal radii of the 5, 10, ------— and 20-megaton weapons are respectively: 2,300 feet, 2,800

feet, and 3,600 feet (43).

The number of weapons required to destroy a Titan site are listed in Table VII. An attack of such a level to assure a 95 percent probability of target "kill" at CEP of

1 mile and even 1/2 mile seems unlikely. Settling for a

confidence level of 80 percent and a CEP of 1/2 mile, two

10-megaton weapons per site would be required. One 20-megaton weapon and a CEP of 1/2 mile has a 75 percent probability

of a "kill". The lip height of crater debris for a 20-megaton

explosion would exceed 65 feet, an excessive amount for even a blast opening.

The United States Air Force has estimated that an enemy would have to fire some twenty missiles at a single

Minuteman site (Titan sites are equally hardened)to have a

90 percent chance of destroying one (44). The weapon size was not stated but the order of magnitude is verified by

the calculations. Missile site "hardening" may be a blessing in disguise to Tucsonians. By mid 1963 the 108 Titans, 126 Atlas, and 50 Minuteman missile launching sites across the United States are to be operational and by 1965 the balance of the Minute- TABLE VII

NUMBER OF WEAPONS REQUIRED TO DESTROY ONE TITAN

SITE LETHAL RADIUS ASSUMED TO BE CRATER LIP RADIUS

. . Weapon Yield 5-Megaton 10-Megaton 20-Megaton

1 Mile 1/2 Mile 1 Mile 1/2 Mile 1 Mile 1/2 Mile Confidence CEP CEP CEP CEP CEP CEP Level

95% 23 6 16 4 10 3

80% 12 3 9 2 5 1

47 48 man will be operational for a total land based ICBM force exceeding 1,000. With such numbers and hardness the Russians must have a superior delivery system to assure destruction of the missiles in their silos. The possibility of not attacking the sites becomes a reality if the Soviets develop a superior missile interception system.

In summary, for civil defense planning purposes in

Tucson, a 20-megaton attack against each site seems advis­ able and within present Russian capabilities; the consequences are too great to risk the other alternative. 2.7 AIMING ERRORS

The likelihood that stray missiles from the salvo aimed at the Titan sites would land in Tucson is slight. The probability of a radial error greater than the specified amounts for circular probable errors of 1 mile and 1/2 mile are tabulated in Table VIII. The stray-missile problem for the attack on Titans is non-existant.

TABLE VIII

PROBABILITY OF A STRAY MISSILE

Radial Error (Miles) CEP 1/2 1 2 ____3 15 1 Mile 84% 50% 6% 0 .2% 1/2 Mile 50% 6% 49

For the attack against Davis-Monthan AFB and Tucson

Muncipal Airport the hazard is non-existant beyond a 3 mile radius of the assumed ground zero control towers.

Fatalistic arguments that shelters will be hit by stray missiles "anyhow" are not substantiated by the prob­ ability calculation.

2.8 NUCLEAR ATTACK SUMMARY

The Tucson shelter study will be based on the fol­ lowing most probable attack pattern:

A 5-megaton surface burst on Davis-Monthan AFB.

Ground zero, the point of hypothetical bomb de­

tonation will be taken as the control tower.

A 5-megaton surface burst on Tucson Municipal

Airport. Ground zero will be taken as the control tower.

A 20-megaton surface burst on each of the eighteen

Titan sites. Having set the weapon criteria the effects of the nuclear attack on Tucson can be determined. : ■ • l. :■ r';' 3 -; ; . pi,:- . : vr , ;

POST ATTACK ANALYSIS

3.1 DESCRIPTION OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION

At the time of detonation, a tremendous amount of

energy is released in a very short time and small space.

This rapid release of energy heats the.bomb material and ,.t

surrounding air to temperatures of several hundred thousand

degrees, forming a luminous sphere of hot gases called the

"fireball". A shock wave is formed by the explosion of the

air heated by the nuclear detonation. At rather close dis­

tance to the burst the shock wave is extremely strong and energizes the air to conditions such that it is radiant and

the fireball continues to grow in size. About 35 percent of the total energy of the explosion is given off as radiant thermal energy in essentially the same way that the sun

..radiates : ... : ...... In a short time, the blast wave no longer renders the

air luminous, and the blast wave breaks away from the fire­ ball and continues to move outward as a hemisphere for a surface burst. Fifty percent of the total bomb energy is contained in the blast wave. Another 5 percent of the total energy is given off within the first minute as prompt nuclear 51 radiation. The remaining 10 percent of the total energy is released from the radioactive fission products over long periods of time.

As the fireball rises after the explosion, the gases cool quickly and condense to the familiar radioactive cloud.

When the weapon is burst at or near the surface, a large amount of material is pulled up into the column and cloud, ' ' and some is vaporized along with the radioactive fission fragments. As the vapors cool and condense, many of the soil particles either capture some of the radioactive fission products inside of them or the fission products adhere to

their surface. The heavier particles fall back to earth very rapidly, but the lighter ones are carried up in the cloud, and then carried by the winds in the upper atmosphere, where they fall back slowly to earth for several hundred miles from ground zero to form local fallout. i In. the case of multi-megaton surface bursts as scheduled for Tucson, approximately 80 percent of the fission products fall back to the ground to form the local fallout pattern.

The remaining 20 percent of the fission products from a surface burst are very small in size and for the large yields

they remain high in the stratosphere for lengthy periods of time and return to the earth*s surface as widespread contam­ ination. : - 3.2 PURPOSE OF POST ATTACK ANALYSIS The degree of success in planning a means of protec­ tion from the awful realities of nuclear war are directly dependent upon an analysis of the post attack situation.

Decisions in developing certain design criteria for pro­

tective construction and in preparing a recovery plan will

in part depend upon the reliability of predicting the sur-

viability of structures and utility systems, the lingering

effectsvof nuclear radiation; and the probable casualties

to be sustained. ..

The most probable nuclear attack against Tucson*s

targets as determined in Chapter 2 is:

One 5-megaton surface burst on Davis-Monthan AFB.

One 5-megaton surface burst on Tucson Municipal

Airport.?;' ■" .V ■" . ' ; ' ' ? ' . - "J " . , ' . - . ■' ' ' , One 20-megaton surface burst on each of the eighteen Titan 11 sites.

The combined effects of nuclear weapons on Tucson are : - v. ■■■ . - . " ' - • '■ , • ? \ . plotted as overlays on Tucson city maps in Figures 3.1 and

3.2 (45). For the purpose of plotting the range versus weapon effects, ground zero was assumed to be any point lying on the 95 percent probability contour. This radius is 2.0 miles ' .' '/ I : ■' ■ •••■-' ■ : -' : • ■ : . for a circular probable error of one mile. The weapon effects ’ ' .; . V Z • contours will be used to estimate the post attack property damage sustained and the number of persons injured or killed. These contours should not,be used for establishing shelter ^ x - ^ . ^ ^ \ .. .. y""" ' y. design criteria; an applicable technique is presented in Chapter 5. : '' ■ " ; v'''r' _ m m m B Q B m m m oTewpresuwe wpa ------„„v 1 , 1 0 6 1 Clf T • cewnf T ylL FIAWMIWO »iFt.

a m . fAtf■ • e m c f o e —• leele #L ni^M I • •»»•••

TO TA L B»OC»Q5LATBOD3 City off Tocsoii - 2'53<0,C>30 Urban Aroa - 233,888' y 377 # @ @ 0 0 0 B Q E J m m V JcaBTJtPcary’ 1,13 ^ & "3 €IIV • COWHft y|k 91AMMIMO *#H A.M. PAMtl ®,IS€,°e ,-SI • eel# ■ h e e w • * Mil#* VH^,

%

''ill*

483

x)e,$t r u c t i o n 1550

W4 ^ 0I % 1970 = 1673 ■£5feS=' P j -,o.; X\A>U '2243 NUc

i ^1749

1050 o %

930 1641 1513 X 0 ^ \ Car F T y 14 y Z ' r ^ ^ J025 / % \ iT \ '2Z\500* m* 43 / tP

:C 7 T 61 i 436 i 100 6 7

-R m '/p i »

>0 ^ 462 j 200 , cqouw

id pu' <% \ i| si % 95% pnoB^BtClTV C OUHT< in Total Mousing BJnuSo CITY OF TUCSON 69,564 URBAN AREA 77,237 'V

Figure 3.2 54 55

The surface detonation of 5 and 20-megaton weapons would create an intensely hazardous environment formed by effects of fireball and crater formation, air blast, thermal radiation, initial nuclear radiation and residual "fallout" radiation.

. . - . ■ V 3.3 DIRECT FIREBALL AND CRATER EFFECTS

The 5-megaton weapons detonated on Davis-Monthan AFB and Tucson Municipal Airport would blast out a crater in the ground about 2,200 feet in diameter and approximately

180 feet deep. Around the crater would be two zones of disturbance in the soil. One, the rupture zone wherein the soil has been violently ruptured, the other, the plastic zone wherein the soil has been permanently deformed but with­ out visible rupture. Some of the material thrown out of the crater falls back to form a lip around the edge. No ordinary structure or its occupants would survive within these zones about the crater. The fireball from the de­ tonation of the 5-megaton weapons would be over 2.5 miles in diameter with temperatures ranging from several millions degrees Fahrenheit at the crater to nearly one thousand degrees Fahrenheit at its extreme outer bounds. Associated with the high temperatures is the formation of the. air blast shock wave and winds moving outward at speeds exceeding three times the speed of sound. Immediately following the positive outward blast and winds, the negative phase sets in. 56 in which winds reverse and blow towards ground zero. These winds fade right into the air circulation set up by the low density fireball rising at 400 feet per second. Crater debris and surrounding materials are carried aloft over

60,000 feet to become the vehicle for the radiologically lethal fission products known as fallout. Roughly the 5 square miles covered by the fireball would be complete de­ vastation as result, of a bath in extreme, fireball tempera- tures and its even less hospitable associated effects. Ap­ proximately 15,000 persons could lose their lives due to this one effect.

The 20-megaton weapons, surface, detonated at the Titan sites, would create craters of roughly, 3,600 feet in diameter and 260 feet deep. The maximum fireball radius would reach out to 1.7 miles. The associated phenomena would - be as for the;5-megaton weapons.. A potentially worse fallout condition may exist,since greater quantities of earth would be sucked.up into the.rising radioactive cloud to mix with the fission products to later fall back to earth as high radiation emitters. . , A formidable post attack reality is that every high­ way joining Tucson with other nearby communities will be severed. Referring to Figure 2.4 it is readily seen that most of the Titan sites are within about 1,000 to 2,000 feet from the major highways. Ironically the railroads are within destructive range. A 20-megaton crater and its 57 intensely contaminated lip extends for a radius of approxi­ mately 2,200 feet. Thus the intensely contaminated lip and additional highly radioactive stem fallout will form an intolerably contaminated halo around each site which is certain to destroy all escape routes (46). !

3 ;4 - BLAST EFFECTS : .

3.4.1 Blast Wave Effects on Structures

The loading on aboveground structures resulting . from the air blast produced by an air or surface burst may be considered to consist of a diffraction phase and a drag phase. :

The diffraction phase of the loading is the term given to the initial phase of the bias* loading on a structure when the reflected pressures associated with the air blast are acting on the structure. The time required for the blast wave to surround the structure completely and the presence of large reflected pressures on the front wall cause net lateral loads to be exerted on the structure as a whole in the direction of travel of the blast wave. The local and differential forces which act on the structure during the initial stages are defined as the diffraction phase loading. Diffraction loading is most important on multi-story buildings with small window area and wall bear­ ing structures such as apartment houses and dwelling houses. 58

The drag phase of the loading is the term given to

the second phase of the loading on a structure due to the

mass and velocity of the air particles in the blast wave

after the envelopment of the structure by the wave front

and the reflection effects have decayed. This phase of the

loading is most important on open structural frameworks and

on structures having small dimensions such as stacks, poles,

chimneys, radio and television towers, and truss bridges. ' : . . r -:: . . ' V '. ' :: ' : • C - ' ■ . The dynamic or drag pressure is usually lower than the static

overpressure, but the drag loading may last considerably

longer than the static pressure loading, and it usually

works on the part of the structure remaining after the static overpressure has done its damage. .

> * A design pressure of 30 pounds per square foot cor­ responding to a gust velocity of 95 miles per hour is recom­

mended for a low building in an exposed or isolated location.

For comparison, the maximum wind velocity corresponding to

the peak overpressure and peak dynamic pressure accompanying

the blast wave from a 5-megaton nuclear explosion is listed in Table IX. In both the defraction and drag loading phases the degree of damage proves to be chiefly dependent upon the magnitude of the peak overpressure, which decreases in severity with increasing radial distance from ground zero as indicated by Tables IX and X. Thus the blast pressures 59

TABLE IX

OVERPRESSURE,.DYNAMIC PRESSURE, AND WIND VELOCITY

VERSUS DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO

FOR 5-MEGATON SURFACE BURST

Distance From Peak Peak Dynamic ,Peak Correspond­ Ground Zero Overpressure Pressure ing Wind Velocity

(miles) - (psi) (psi) (mph)

1 150 270 - r 11,800

1 1/2 j 45 110 2,190 2 27 . r- 18 ; 885

3 i * 12 2.6 336

4 7 1.1 221

5 . (;= 5 0.7 174 9 * 2 0.1 66 • . ' " ; ; - ; - * i ■ '» •» ' ••1 • i ' : :

' . . ..

TABLE X

PEAK OVERPRESSURE AND PEAK DYNAMIC PRESSURE

VERSUS DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO FOR A 20-MEGATON SURFACE BURST

Distance From Ground Peak Overpressure Zero

(miles) (psi)

1,000

■ 1.5 200

2.0 90

3.0 32

5.0 " 12 ‘

6.0 8

10.0 5

15.0 1.8

20.0 1.5 61 in Tucson as result of explosions at the Titan sites would not create overpressures exceeding:2 pounds per square inch.

Table X lists the peak overpressures versus distance from ground zero for a 20-megaton surface burst on.the Titan

S i t e s . ;• : : : .... %

By referring to Figure 2.4, itdis apparent that the overpressures created in Tucson urban area as result of bursts at the Titan sites would not exceed the overpressure caused by the 5-megaton bursts within Tucson. Thus, the blast effects of the 5-megaton weapons are investigated.

The great destructive effect of the blast wave would totally destroy wood frame and brick-wall residential houses o f ;conventional construction at overpressures of 5 psi. For the most part all dwelling units within 5 miles of ground zero would be totally destroyed. The same type dwelling units located out to the 2 psi overpressure contour would sustain moderate damage and with repairs and shoring could be made habitable again. Therefore, it is evident that nearly 75 percent of the Tucson's residential housing units would be completely destroyed and the remaining from a state of near complete destruction to those requiring some repairs before being livable again; See Figure 3.1 where the probable blast overpressures have been superimposed over a map showing the Tucson Urban area housing units.; Commercial and administrative type structures are 62 usually designed of more substantial construction, thus the effects of the blast wave on them is less severe than ordinary residential structures. The fact, that the com- mercial and administrative structures in Tucson are re- quired by building code to resist minor earthquake effects adds to their resistance. Comparison with damage inflicted ' . : ...... ' .. » - - ' ' ' ^ on similiar structures at Hiroshima and Nagasaki indicates that damage to multi-story reinforced-concrete frome build­ ings at 7 psi overpressure would be so severe that complete reconstruction would be required prior to reuse. At an overpressure of 5 psi the buildings would be moderately damaged. Steel frame, light panel wall multi-story (office type) structures would receive moderate to severe damage at 8 psi overpressure. Referring again,to Figure 3.1 the central business district of Tucson lies within the 5 to 7 psi overpressure contours. The level of destruction can be expected to range between collapse of some buildings, severe and moderate damage to others. An effect known as blast ■ . . , . . ... ' • - : -■ ■ ■..■ ■ - - - - - ■ shielding occurs within city building complexes when build­ ings are spaced apart distances of the same order of magnitude or less than the building height (47). A net reduction in the diffraction pressures were of the order of 35 percent of the peak value. However, reduction of drag phase loading has not been determined. The shielding effect may account r:-. '--- . - - ' - - ' ------for less severe damage in dense structure areas. 63

Heavy wall-bearing structures of brick,1 typical of the older University of Arizona buildings, multi-story apartment houses, schools and hospitals, would be collapsed at 9 psi overpressure, and severely damaged at 5 psi. From

Figure 3.1 it is "evident that the majority of this type of construction located in the Central Business District and

University area would receive severe damage.

The reinforced-concrete, steel frame, and heavy wall-bearing structures just reviewed comprise roughly 90 percent of those buildings that have basements in Tucson and could be used for fallout protection (4#). Their use­ fulness as shelters is questionable since most of their superstructure will collapse to the basement level or sustain severe damage decreasing their attenuation value.

The blast also contributes to the fire hazard in structures by overturning stoves, breaking electrical cir­ cuits , rupturing gas lines, and by exposing flammable parts to small fires. Blast fires can be expected to occur out to beyond 10 miles from ground zero. 3.4.2 Blast Damage to Motor Equipment and Railroad Stock Automobiles) trucks, bulldozers and graders within 5 1/2 miles would require major repairs before being opera­ tional. This implies that they would be useless as means of transport after attack since repair facilities would have been destroyed in the blast too. Beyond the 6 mile range the 64 widespread destruction of buildings and power lines would set up almost insurmountable barriers to vehicular move- :

Railroad rolling stock would be blown from the tracks, and severely damaged out to 6 miles.. ,

Tucsonians would have to rely upon transportation , vehicles from external sources for any type of mechanized post attack evacuation.from the city.

3.4.3 Blast Damage to Utilities . - .. ,

Aboveground utility power lines, telephone and tele­ graph lines, radio and television transmitting towers, are vulnerable to drag forces during passage of the winds.

Utility poles would be snapped off out to the radial distance of 6 miles from ground zero and transmitting towers would be left inoperative out to a distance of 8 miles.

Underground water, gas, and electrical distrubution lines and sewerage collection systems would be damaged as a result of permanent or„transient strains within the soil.

Failures occur at structural discontinuities, such as at: lateral connections and entrances to buildings. Brittle conduits are more sensitive to differential displacements. The outer limits of failure of connections can be expected at about 1 1/4 miles from ground zero. .. - - . - . . The major cause of loss of water and natural gas pressure would result from breakage of pipes inside and.at 65 entrances to buildings damaged by the airblast.

The sewage treatment plant located at approximately

10 miles from ground zero would suffer relatively moderate damage to aboveground structures. However, the radiation level would prevent manual operation of the plant after attack; the plant would merely pass untreated sewage through theysystem to the Santa,Cruz River outfall.

■ - ; '• : ... : ' 3.4.4 Biological Blast Effects - :•

The tentative criteria for primary, secondary and tertiary blast effects representing those conditions thought.to be near the human casualty threshold are sum­ marized in Table XI (49). The data in Table XI represent the best estimates for condition in which human casualties will approach a minimum for the 5-megaton surface burst in Tucson.

From Table XI and Figure 3.1 it is evident that large numbers of persons in Tucson are likely to be injured as a result of being crushed or buried under collapsing buildings or hit by flying fragments of building materials. 3,5 THERMAL RADIATION

3.5.1 Thermal Damage to Inanimate Objects

’ • .-! :■ / Thermal radiation is probably second in importance in producing damage to inanimate objects. When combustible: i ' - . materials receive sufficient radiant energy within a short

! ' :: • period of time they will ignite.; Thus in the presence of " : :. - TABLE XI

THRESHOLD CRITERIA ESTIMATED TO BE NEAR CONDITIONS AT WHICH CASUALTIES

WILL APPROACH A MINIMUM OR BE ABSENT FOR A 5-MEGATON SURFACE BURST

Blast Effect : Criteria Adopted as Indicated Range

Primary Lung damage 15 psi incident and maximal 3 Miles overpressure 6 psi incident reflecting to 5 Miles 15 psi maximal Eardrum rupture 5 psi incident and maximal 5 Miles overpressure j - - i 2.5 psi incident reflecting to 8 Miles 5 psi maximal

Secondary Penetration into 115 ft/sec for a 10 gm glass 8 Miles ; abdomen missile • Nonpenetrative 10 ft/sec for a 10 lb masonry 8 Miles skull fracture missile ':

Tertiary Skull fracture 10 ft/sec for 160. lb man J 11 Miles from impact : ' • : :. ■ c;

66 67 kindling fuels a nuclear detonation would result in wide spread fires.

Thermal radiation is emitted from the incandescent

fireball in a first maximum peak followed by a minimum within -: "--y. r,;::; ' - i ..r: - . : n - hza'::\ ; a time less than one-tenth of a second. A second maximum c:: vx:-.-'-.a--' peak occurs at around two seconds. The second pulse lasts

for about 15 seconds as the ascending fireball acts as a dangerous thermal radiator.

The integrated total thermal energy delivered per . ; ; - ! unit area is listed in Table XII as a function of weapon yield and distance from ground zero for surface bursts of 5 and 20-megaton weapons respectively.

. Numerous fires would quickly develop at various - v : : locations out to about 7 miles from ground zero. The thermal

energy received at this distance, with a 5-megaton surface

burst, would be about 12 calories per square centimeter which is the threshold for igniting unsound wood, curtins, uphol- stry, paper, rubbish, deciduous leaves, dry brush, and grass.

In the area between 7 and 10 miles from ground zero, there would be many additional ignitions from the blast and thermal effects. In general, the blast effects would rupture gas lines, cause electrical short circuits, upset stoves and other open flame operations, and cause structural damage which would make the building more vulnerable to rapid burning and cover the fire break area with combustible debris. 68

TABLE XII

TOTAL THERMAL ENERGY RECEIVED VERSUS DISTANCE FROM

GROUND ZERO FOR SURFACE BURSTS, 10 MILE VISIBILITY

Distance From Total.Thermal Energy Ground Zero (Calories per square centimeter) ,' - s: . . . - • - ; Miles_____ 5-Megaton______20-Megaton

1.5 490 1,000

2.0 240 1,000

3.0 95 400

4.0 45 200

5.0 26 120

-• 6.0 ::V 18 70 7.0 13 48

8.0 9 35

9.0 ' " 7 25

10.0 5 20

15.0 2 7.5 : : ' 20.0 3.5 69

- The formation of significant fires, capable of spreading, is directly related to the building density

(ratio of roof area to total ground area) of the area.

The maximum building density of residential area in Tucson

is less than. 25 percent and the probability of fire spread approximately 50 percent. The building density in a central business district is greater than 50 percent but the type

of construction is more fire resistant and the thermal energy

received is less than 12 calories per square centimeter,

therefore, the probability of fire spread is about 50 percent.

When in a 3 mile radius of ground zero, primary fires

ignited by the intense thermal radiation of approximately

100 calories per square centimeter would ignite most of the

common flamable building materials. Within this region

intense fires can be expected as a severe blast would com­ pletely litter the area with debris.

The thermal energy received in fringe areas is

governed by the 20-megaton bursts on the Titan sites. The

probability exists of simultaneous detonation at 2 of the

3 nearest sites. Hence the total thermal load would be

doubled (50). Generally, the desert vegetation is not capable of spreading fires into the city from any of the eighteen out­ lying Titan sites (51). 70

3.5.2 Biological Thermal Effects; .

; . Two thermal radiation effects become of human importance: the prompt thermal flash burns of skin and the secondary effects of the burning environment which develops soon after the burst.

Medical diagnosis usually recognizes three grades of thermal.injury: first, second, and third degree burns in ascending order of severity. The first degree burn corres­ ponds with a modern sunburn. The second degree burn is deeper and more severe and is characterized by the . formation of blisters. The third degree burn involves com­ plete destruction of. the whole skin thickness. - ■

: The severity of flash burns produced on unprotected skin (generally the face, hands and legs) will be directly proportional to the distance from ground zero. Third degree flash burns can be expected for all persons in Tucson out to a radius.of 10 miles from ground zero of the 5-megaton surface bursts. Areas beyond the 10 mile range will receive sufficient thermal energy from the bursts at the Titan sites to cause third degree burns. People indoors or in shelters would not receive flash burns since any opaque substance will afford protection. , :

The survivors of the prompt thermal radiation must 1 c o p e with the hazard of receiving burns from secondary fires. 71

Severe burn casualties from secondary fires usually will outnumber the flash burned casualties.

Another hazard of the prompt thermal radiation is flash blindness and retinal burns to the eyes of those who look toward the fireball. Flash blindness is a momentary and reversible biologic effect causing depletion of vision for a limited amount of time. Retinal burns are irreversible damage in that a hole is burned in the retina of the eye.

There is a high probability of these injuries in Tucson with the some twenty nuclear explosions all around the city.

The unwarned urban population of Tucson caught out­ doors during nuclear attack would suffer severe burn casual­

ties and the situation takes on overwhelming proportions. * . ' : ■ - 7 ' - - - . : ' . ■ J - ■ \, From a medical point of view, the treatment of severe thermal injury on areas in excess of 25 percent of the whole body represents a grave medical problem even in a modern hospital and under the best of circumstances.

3.6 NUCLEAR RADIATION HAZARDS

3.6.1 Nuclear Radiation

The detonation of a nuclear weapon is accompanied by

the emission of nuclear radiation consisting of neutrons, gamma rays, beta particles, and alpha particles. The neutrons, which are subatomic particles of neutral charge, are released in the fission and fussion reactions and are produced essen­ tially in the first half second after detonation. Gamma rays 72

.which are high-energy electro magnetic radiations (like

X-rays), are emitted from the fireball as initial radiation from fission products and from the capture of neutrons in bomb fragments and other materials as.residual radiation.

Beta particles, composed of high-speed electrons emitted by the radioactive fission products and alpha particles,

identified as the nuclei of helium atoms, originate in the unfissioned residues of plutonium of uranium. Both the neutrons and the gamma rays have a long range in air and

are very penetrating. Beta particles have a very short

range in air and relatively little penetration capabilities.

Alpha particles have an even shorter range in air and are

stopped,by almost any type of barrier. 3.6.2 Effects of Nuclear Radiation on Inanimate Objects

t In general nuclear radiations do not have an effect

on structures. Upon irradiation certain metals and non- - metals have been observed to change their physical properties.

Some of these effects are detrimental, others beneficial (52)•

The electromagnetic radiations from megaton nuclear

explosions have a serious effect on electronic devices. ' ' - • . . , ' - ■ • • ' 1 V These effects could destroy a great variety of electrical

and electronic components rendering them ineffective. 3.6.3 Biological Effects of Nuclear Radiation , Nuclear radiation can produce a variety of harmful effects in living tissue which may be acute or delayed

- 73 depending upon the total amount of radiation absorbed and 1 the period of time within which it is received. When rad­ iation is received within a short time (one or two days), the effect is considered to be acute and, under most condi­ tions, is essentially independent of the dose rate. When dosage is received over a long period of time, either con­ tinuously or in repeated increments, partial recovery takes place. Under these conditions of exposure; larger total doses can be tolerated insofar as early effects are con­ cerned. -jz «. : l w : . iv".':-:- " l , A : •: v ,

Gamma radiation dosage is measured in terms of a unit called the roentgen (r) which is a standard measure of the ionization caused by gamma fays in their passage through matter and hence of the injury which is caused to a body of living organisms.

Neutron radiation dosage, for the purpose of assess­

ing radiation hazard, is measured in roentgen equivalent- mammal (rem) which is the amount of energy absorbed in ' mammalin tissue which is biologically equivalent in mammals

to one roentgen of gamma or X-rays...... Beta emitters can damage human tissue when taken into the body and in addition can cause serious burns if they come in contact with the skin. Alpha particles are a hazard

only if their emitters are taken into the body by inhalation, ingestion or, under limited circumstances through breaks in

the skin. 74

Ultimate body damage resulting from nuclear radiation is in summarization of the several separate radiation effects involved; namely, initial gamma, neutron, and re­ sidual gamma radiation. Thus, roentgens of gamma radi­ ation received must be added to the roentgen equivalent dosage for man (rem) of neutron radiation received in order to obtain the total dose. The effects of different amounts of radiation received are shown in Table XIII (53).

Later effects occur many months or years after the onset of over-exposure and include leukemia, life shortening, cataracts, sterility, cancer, and a variety of developmental defects. Late effects may develop in a person who has re- covered from acute radiation sickness or in a person who : : :• ■. ■ o ' - ■ : . has never been sick in spite of protracted over-exposure.

3.6.4 Initial Nuclear Radiation : . • r ,'V . Initial radiation is the neutron and gamma radiation which is derived directly from the initial fission and fussion reactions of the detonation. It is delivered within approximately the first half minute following detonation and its significant effects are confined to a radius of a few miles from ground zero. This hazard in Tucson will be extreme within a radius of approximately 2 miles of ground zero from the 5-megaton bursts on Davis-Monthan AFB and Tucson Municipal Airport. Initial radiation hazard from the Titan attack is completely 75

TABLE XIII

ACUTE EFFECTS ON HUMAN BEINGS OF NUCLEAR

BADIATION PENETRATING THE WHOLE BODY'

Dose in " ' ' '''^' ' ’ ' ' -c - r ' • 1,Week, Effects (rem) ______~ ~ ______

150 No acute effects, possible serious long­ term hazard•

150-250 Nausea and vomiting within 24 hours, normal incapacitation after 2 days. 250-350 Nausea and’vomiting in under 4 hours. Some . mortality will occur 2 to 4 weeks. Sympton- free period 48 hours to 2 weeks. 350-600 Nausea and vomiting under 2 hours. Mortality certain in 2 to 4 weeks. Incapacitation prolonged. 600 Nausea and vomiting almost immediately. Mor- , , tality in 1 week. ' 76 negligible in view of the comparatively short absorption length for even in most energetic gamma radiation. Table

XIV compares the initial radiation dosage and distance from ground zero for a 5 and 20-megaton surface burst.

The gamma and neutron dosage received by persons near ground zero depends upon the nature and thickness of the material shielding them. The gamma rays are more readily stopped by the heavier elements. A rough idea of what shielding effect various common building materials have on the gamma rays can be seen from the thickness required to reduce the dosage by 50 percent. To this effect, it takes

6 inches of concrete, 24 inches of wood or 1 1/2 inches of steel to reduce the initial gamma dose to half its initial v*lue. ./ ; : : s V ’ : . c ■ Shielding for the neutron radiation is not entirely dependent upon the density of the materials and hence, is more complex.

: From the scaling laws for radiation shielding, it is conceivable that persons even within ordinary structures in Tucson will receive a lethal initial dose out to 1.8 miles from ground zero. 3.6.5 Residual Nuclear Radiation The last effect of nuclear weapons to be considered is also chronologically the last to occur but is by far the most serious hazard to the survivors of the more immediate effects. ' TABLE XIV r;- ? INITIAL RADIATIONS VERSUS DISTANCE FROM GROUND

ZERO FOR A 5-MEGATON AND A 20-MEGATON SURFACE BURSTS

Distance From Total Initial Gamma. Total Neutron Radiation Weapon ' Ground Zero Radiation In Roentgens In Roentgen Equivalent Yield (Miles) (r) Mammal (rem)

5-MT 1.0 r 100,000 600,000 1.5 6,000 10,000 2.0 350 ... 200 2.5 35 10 3.0 ' • 5 , :• " . ' 2 - “ 3.5 ' ; 1 : ' : - ' : o v ; . . . 20-MT 1.0 10,000,000 2,250,000 *' :■ 1.5 1,250,000 45,000 2.0 240,000 800 f." 3.0 10,500 : 10 4.0 1,500 1 : . 5.0 500 o .. , : ; . '■ • V

-• • ' >■> :. "' ; ..- r '.v •• ::

77 78

Residual radiation applies to the nuclear radiation emitted by the fission products, unfissioned residues, and from neutron-induced radioactive elements.

The associated phenomena and residual radiation effects for the 5-megaton weapon will be discussed first.

When the weapon is detonated at the surface, the rising fireball sets up a low density hole in the hot region.

This several thousand foot diameter low density sphere is forced upward by the denser air around it. The toroidal circula­ tion is such that the velocities in the stem that flows up through the rising cloud would carry aloft some 50 million cubic yards of earth. During the time of the initial cloud rise much of the cratered debris is aloft on various trajec­ tories, and much of this material will be excavated at pressures below that needed to pulverize or vaporize the rock or soil, some of it would be lofted in essentially its original sizes and shapes (54).

The cloud continues to rise and forms the familiar mushroom shape— with its rounded top, concave bottom, and thick stem extending to the ground. Approximately 10 minutes after the burst the cloud appears to stabilize at a mid­ altitude of 76 kft (thousands of feet). Here the cloud extends from the 60 kft level to the 90 kft level and has an over-all diameter of 40 miles with a radioactive portion approximately 28 miles in diameter (55). The stem of the cloud extends out to a diameter of approximately 6 miles (56). 79

After stabilization, the gravitational and ineteorldgical

forces start to dominate the behavior of the particles.

The vertical distribution of fission products in

the mushroom-cloud are approximately 10 percent in the stem,

and the remaining 90 percent distributed in a constant-mass-

mixing-ratio throughout the stratospheric cloud. The con­

stancy of the mixing-ratio of air and fission products

implies a rapid exponential decrease of contamination from

cloud base to top. Due to the Characteristics of the con-

stant-mass-mixing-ratioof particles most of the debris

would be at the 60 kft level (57). ; The radioactive fission

products become attached to the debris in the mushroom-cloud

arid later fall back to the earth’s surface; the materials so deposited being called "fallout". Close-in fallout is

the radioactive material deposited within a few hundred miles

of ground zero, and which is down within some 10 to 20 hours.

Close-in fallout is to be distinguished from worldwide fallout which may persist for years following a large detonation.

: The Tucson office of the United States Weather Bureau

has been participating with forty other weather reporting

stations across the United States in charting the meteor- logical data important to fallout climatology every 24 hours. Thus, in event of nuclear attack against the United States the composite wind data for predicting fallout patterns -

would be current and accurate. These upper air soundings 80 determine the wind speed and directive in the 5,000 to 80,000 foot layers of the atmosphere. *

Data for five standard reporting levels, 10, 20,'40,

60, and 80 thousand feet (kft) level for Tucson, were tabu­ lated in a variety of ways to obtain statistics relevant to evaluating the local fallout pattern (58). Conclusions of

McDonald1s extensive analysis are: (1) The use of only the

60 kft level wind characteristics will give very reliable over-all estimates of fallout climatology for Tucson; (2)

With the exception of the two months of July and August, the fallout drift directions lay in the 90—degree sector centered on the 90° azimuth (due east), i.e., the sector from 45° to 135° azimuth. The ifuly-August fallout drift direction is to the 300° azimuth; a shift which is most pronounced at the 80 kft level; (3) One hour descent time from 60 kft is associated with a particle radius of about

250 microns (density 2.5 gm/cm^); (4) With winds at the

90th percentile level, a radial drift distance of 75 miles could be covered in an hour; and (5) With winds at the median percentile level, a radial drift distance of 33 miles could be covered in an hour.

The 5-megaton surface bursts on Davis-Monthan AFB and Tucson Municipal Airport would begin delivering the radioactive particles, via fallout, to the city of Tucson and surrounding countryside within ah hour or less, at which 81 time the contaminated dusts would be emitting alpha and beta particles and the extremely lethal and penetrating gamma radiation. ,Since the alpha and beta particles have a short life and,cannot penetrate the skin, their effects will be neglected and only the external gamma doses and dose rates

assiciated with a given level of fallout contamination will be evaluated.

For the purpose of simplifying the calculation and representation of radioactive dose rate of exposure, at a given time and location, the dose rate at one hour after the burst is used as reference. It is, in principle, the dose rate referred back to what it would have been at one hour after the explosion, if the fallout had been complete at that time. - , . -r :

; Recalling that most of the debris is at 60 kft level and the fact that this level is,also the most characteristic for predicting drift, a reasonable fallout area can be predicted. The radioactive particle that would fall from

60 kft to the land:surface in one hour descent time is a 3 particle with a radius of 250 microns (density 2.5 gm/cm ) (59). In the mushroom-cloud itself about 10:percent of all the fission products are attached to particles of radius in excess of 250 microns. Assuming that 50 percent of the bomb's total energy is derived from fissionable material the

5-megaton weapon would produce an equivalent fission fallout of 4.1 KT/mi^ in the cloud; 10 percent of which is attached 82 to particles of radius greater than 250 microns at the 60 kft level.Hence, the fallout field created by the mushroom- cloud one hour after burst would be 28 miles in diameter, o contaminated to an equivalent of 0.4 KT/mi , and centered approximately 75 miles east of ground zero for the 90 per­ cent ile wind speed and 33 miles east of ground zero for the median wind speed. The latter case would possibly contaminate the city. " ■ : ■ - - ■ q The units KT/mi refer to the concentration (or sur­ face density) of radioactivity on the surface at any given point which would exist if the radioactivity due to one kiloton equivalent of fission yield is spread uniformly over , a one square mile area. It is directly proportional to the amount of fission product activity per square mile, through the relation 1.45 x 10 fissions « 1 KT.

An additional hazard is created by the stem fallout.

The stem, 6 miles in diameter contains 10 percent of the fission products. The fallout field from the stem would cover about 28 square miles and have a surface density of radioactive contamination of 9 KT/mi^. To evaluate the hazard presented by the radioactive 1 ; ■ • - fallout it is necessary to state a schedule of external gamma dose and dose rate associated with a given concentra- tlon of fallout contamination. It is in connection with both the decay rate and the initial dose rate at one hour 83 following detonation that the latest information differs from that given in the 1957 edition of the Effects of Nuclear

Weapons. r y The one hour reference dose rate now accepted is 2 2,750 r/hr per KT/mi- for weapons in the megaton range. For times up to 100 days the relation is accurate to within

± 25 percent. For,times greater than 100 days the power law overestimates the dose rate, by as much as a factor of nine.

For times over 100. days the pure or 9??** fission product ; '• •: * i' j curve is used to approximate the dose rate (60). Values of

>'• :: : , o ' . ' the actual dose received for a one KF/mi concentration of radioactivity, for which the H+l hour dose rate is 2,750 r/hr, are given for certain time intervals in Table XV. These results are probably as valid as one can give theoretically

- • t . ... - ", ■ at this time for the decay of fallout debris (61). It has not yet been determined what information will be included in the forthcoming new edition of the Effects of Nuclear Weapons, or how it will differ from the material presented here. In trying to predict dose rate with accuracy one need only to realize that fission yield in a nuclear weapon may range from less than 5 percent to 100 percent of the total energy yield and therefore, a great range of variations in the quantity and character of the radioactivity created per kiloton of total yield. Terrain effects will act to decrease the dose rate. The actual dose rate above a rough terrain 84

J. r r o ' ■; ; r ' ;/ ' • ■; ’ ^ -; .* ' £ . ; o #v:

■\ r.’ ; - •> •:v"c t j ;;

v - .. c cC:.; , TABLE XV

Dose relative to H+-1 hour dose rate received during the following time intervals: vc C; 'V Dose , Time Interval r v-.-n Roentgens Per KT/mi"

1 - 6 hr . 3,905 1,P45 _ - JcI? h?: 1,100 . . 2nd day 825 3rd day 275 ... ' " . 4 th day . 220 5th day ' ':" - ■ '' ■ ■ - 138 ' . . r: 6th day , 138 : V V : 7th day 1 -. t • '» • /. - * c- - j. . ...» ’ >.<' 1st week 8,060 2nd week ...... 523 3rd week , . ... , 311. 4th week 5th week v . V- _ 149 6th week 107 7th week . 91 1st month 9,100 2nd month ...... 468 3rd month 206 4th month . : .. ■ *■. • - * 124g g.. -;• "VC" 5th month 69 , 6th month '■ ■: c- ■ j. b.. v : v c',/ 7th month 8th month • 41 9th month " ■ ■ ■ ■ • ...... 33 - 10th month v: o.-..' ■ . rv v1 . xvv.i.;. ^ i ‘ 11th month 12th month 14 1st year C O \ C : ». V 10,230 2nd year 3rd year li 4th year 8.3 5th year 6.9 85 will be on the order of 2/3 the theoretical dose rate above a smooth infinite plane. Weathering effects in temperate climates are not appreciable. The dose rates in Table XVI represent upper limits. -

The minimum fallout from the combined bursts on

Davis-Monthan AFB and Tucson -Municipal Airport would contami- 2 nate a 6 mile diameter about each target to a level of 9 KT/mi •

The one hour dose rate would be roughly 25,000 r/hr, a sizable level of radioactive contamination. Conservative shelter planning should provide,this level of protection by assuming

the- stem to pass over the shelter. The fallout that could possibly be expected from the stratospheric cloud due to a wind speed less than the mean 33 miles per hour,would con-

taminate the city to a level of 0.8 KT/mi2 for a value of

3 ,100 roentgens from the first to the sixth hour after attack,

roughly 7 times the lethal human dose.

Following the attack on the eighteen Titan sites ring­ ing Tucson, the absolute minimum fallout over Tucson would be

20,000 roentgens per hour and a possible maximum of 200,000

roentgens per hour for the one hour referrence dose rate (62).

These estimates of the fallout radiation hazard are results of a thorough analysis completed by Dr. James E. McDonald,

Meteorologist, Institute of Atmospheric Physics at the University of Arizona. The extreme intensity of contamination is a result 86

TABLE XVI

RESIDUAL RADIATION DOSE RATES AT VARIOUS TIMES

AFTER ATTACK ON THE TITAN SITES : _i 23 ; :" 2 (Dose Rate « 2,750t * r/hr per KT/mi )

Radiation Dose Bate In Roentgens/Hour

Time After 20,000 r/hr at (Me 200,000 r/hr at Onee Attack Hour Reference Rate Hour Reference Rateo

1 hour 20,000 200,000 - .. f ■ ■: , 24 hours 400 4,000 .

1 week 36.3 363 .: i < 2 weeks 16.0 . 160 .. . - ■ a- ; . 4 weeks 6.6 66 6 weeks 4.1 « 2 months 2.9 29

3 months 1.8 18

4 months 1.2 12 87 of the interaction effects set in motion by the nearly simultaneous detonation of 20 megatons at each site. The explosion of 360 megatons would release enormous amounts of energy which would derange the local air flow pattern and create thermally convergent circulations focusing the fallout effects on the Tucson area. This analysis has been confirmed by authorities in Washington.

Neglecting the possible convergent effect, an approxi­ mation of the level of contamination can be predicted on the results of an idealized fallout pattern.

In the program of nuclear test explosions in Nevada and the Pacific, the contamination in the vicinity of the bursts has been studied with great detail. As a result,

idealized contour dimensions for various one hour (reference) dose rates can be predicted with some accuracy. They indicate

the average and are only representative values for planning purposes (63).

Table XVII has been constructed to show the approxi­ mate radiation dose rate contours on the ground at reference

time of one hour after a 20-megaton surface burst. The basic

table values were obtained from the idealized pattern for a one-megaton surface burst (64) corrected for an initial dose

rate of 2,750 r/hr. Figure 3.3 shows clearly that fallout contour patterns would overlap Tucson for the most frequent drift directions TABLE XVII APPROXIMATE RESIDUAL RADIATION DOSE RATE CONTOURS ON GROUND

ONE HOUR AFTER A 20-MEGATON SURFACE BURST

(Scaling Wind of 30 Miles per Hour)

Dose Rate Radius of Ground Displacement of Downwind Crosswind (Roentgens Zero Circle Center of Ground Distance Distance Per Hour) (Miles) Zero Circle (Miles) (Miles) (Miles) #0 17,800 H "x 2.1 77.5 6.5

4,800 3.8 2.9 114.3 14.2 :r • ' 1,780 7.6 3.6 247.0 24.7 : i;- x- >: ■ x 480 V'1 30.0 4.9 403.0 47.6 •1 •• , x ' : - . • X , -

88 89

4 8 0 r / hr © r,780 Vhr 4 ,8 0 0 V h / 7 © z / /• / z^O © //>///,7'eoo^>Z 17 800 r/k z y//" / / / -^ X ucson / ^ z / (i«'* X v--Z © V © © \ / NORTH V 0 1 , s y SECTOR OF PEAK DRIFT FREQUENCY

Fallout Contours On The Ground One Hour After A 20-Megaton Surface Burst On One Titan Site Figure 3.3 90 o between 45° and 130 azimuth. The approximation substantiates the minimum one hour reference dose rate of 20,000 roentgens per hour, or expressed as the density of contamination, a level of 7.3 KT/mi2 .

Using the dosage values cited earlier in Table XV the real significance of fallout problems is shown. Dur­ ing the 6th month persons exposed for the full 30 days would receive 480 roentgens of gamma radiation, a lethal human dose.

As shown by Table XVI at the end of 2 to 4 weeks the hourly dose rate would allow exposure for short periods at well spaced intervals. 3.7 SUMMARY

Having these facts before us, shelters in Tucson make sense— and in fact become imperative to survival. ; CHAPTER 4

. , • • . • • • • « T ; • ! y " : ^ • ", x • ' TUCSON SHELTER SYSTEM

4.1 THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT .

Consideration of; the post attack situation In Tucson

has emphasized that shelters are peremptory for survival.

The combination of a maximum 15 minute warning time and the

profound effects of blast, fire, and nuclear radiation

leave no alternative but to take shelter prior to the nuclear explosions, ".v .■ ■ • ; .

Weapon blast, thermal, and initial radiation hazards

decrease in severity with distance from ground zero and will

have to be considered individually in the design of each shelter. But the fundamental requirement for all shelters is the protection against the severe radiological hazard

created by the heavy deposit of fallout on Tucson. l

Consider the heavy fallout deposit of 20,000 r/hr at H+l hour. The radiation dose in the first year to unprotected

persons would be approximately 75,000 roentgens. The dose

during the second subsequent year would be about 330 roent­ gens and 80 roentgens during the third year. - Of this .75,000

roentgen dose, approximately 64,000 roentgens or 85 percent of the total dose is delivered during the first 2 weeks after

attack. This suggests that if persons were in shelters that 91 completely attenuated the gamma radiation, much of the fall­ out threat would be eliminated. However, after the second week the dose rate outside is still at 16 r/hr. At this rate a lethal dose would be accumulated in a little over one day. Persons would have to remain sheltered for about

3 1/2 months for the radioactive fission products to decay naturally until a dose rate of 1.2 r/hr would be emitted.

At this time (after 4 months) persons could emerge for one hour*s exposure daily. A protracted exposure of up to 1.5 r/day over a year would not result in any human disability

(66) . Table XV indicates a sheltering, time of a year (af ter reducing the rate 50 percent for terrain and other effects) before the radiation dose rate of 1.5 r/day would be reached. 4.2 SURVIVAL ALTERNATIVES

If the only requirement were to develop safe living areas for the population, one alternative would be to remain in shelters continuously until radiation hazards had naturally

decayed below a significant level.

A continuous sheltering period exceeding 3 months poses severe psychological and logistical problems that could

be overcome only by the most elaborate and costly shelters (67) (68)(69). Tucsonians* continuous shelter stay could be ■ - ... . . • ; . , ' ' ' five times this for the case of the most severe fallout.

Another alternative appears to be evacuation of the population after about a four to six weeks shelter stay. 93

Recalling the fact that every highway joining Tucson with other communities would probably be impassable, the modes of transportation remaining are air and rail. Since all local aircraft and rail equipment would be destroyed in the local attack, assistance would have to come from other locations.

The problem of evacuating 250,000 people by air would re­ quire roughly 800 trips by the largest transport aircraft available or some 1,000 rail cars. From Figure 2.4 it can be seen that the railroads connecting Tucson pass relatively close to most of the missile sites and therefore, they may also be impassable. If these modes of transportation were available, Tucsonians could move to areas in the state that had not experienced significant levels of fallout. Publish­ ed examples of potential attacks on the United States show that there would be areas in Arizona essentially fallout free (70)(71).

Since most of these areas are in sparsely inhabited regions the task of providing minimal housing and other necessities would appear to demand major efforts.

In any eVent, neither the continuous shelter stay nor the evacuation alternative is very satisfying, because they pose tremendous logistical problems in themselves and do not re-establish the economic system or the distribution of food and utilities. To recover and control our destiny after attack, our surviving industrial, commercial and gov­ 94 ernmental facilities as well as living areas must be made safe for occupancy and use by radiological decontamination.

The shelter system that incorporates countermeasures for nuclear weapon effects and a decontamination capability, is the best alternative for Tucson. In this system, shelters would be occupied during the first weeks of acute fallout radiation, followed by the operational recovery phase for the decontamination of vital areas containing essential facilities and enlarging the living shelter area by reduc­ ing to safe levels the radiation hazards.

The emergency phase is initiated by the alert that an attack is imminent. No functions are to be performed in the shelter other than those involved in living. All occupants will remain in the shelter until the radiation hazard is at a level which would allow intermittent ingress and egress for the purpose of decontaminating the immediate area around the shelter.

Recommendations on maximum permissible exposures to personnel in emergencies and decontamination procedures are shown in Table XVIII (72). During the recovery phase, shelter personnel will conduct necessary monitoring surveys and decontamination operations. Since radioactive material cannot be destroyed, decontamination involves the transfer of the source of con­ tamination from a location where it is a hazard to one in 95

t , . 1 * - f • • * ' ' ^ * V- . ■ •* » ' v * *< r " •' - * * ' ' • „

TABLE XVIII ■ '■ v • EMERGENCY PERMISSIBLE EXPOSURES

A. Acute period, zero hour plus two days

First day ^ 25r 1 ^ Second day lOr ■■ ' . ■ : ■ ^ Total 35r ' ./.r.-;,

B. - Intermediate period, third, forth, and fifth days

3.3 r/day 10r Total 45r

C. Later period, sixth through 56th day 0.1 r/day 5r • • - - ' - * ■ - - - Total 50r " 'tV ' D. After 56th day : « . ' ; " ' : : •. . • -

! 0.3 r/week ' :

V * 96 which it can do little or no harm. Equipment for decontam- : 3 ' - ' ' ■ : - ' - ' ■ . '' . ' ination are bulldozers, road graters, scrapers, plows, fire hoses, steam cleaning rigs, sprinkler trucks, brooms and brushes. •' ... ' '

The effectiveness of decontamination can be illustrated by the following: Complete removal of the contaminated sur­ face from a circle 100 feet in diameter will reduce the dose rate in its center to about 1/4 of its original value. One- third of the total dose received at any point comes from a circle surrounding that point 25 feet in diameter. One-half of the total dose comes from a circle 50 feet in diameter and

.3/4 of the total dose from a circle 200 feet in diameter.

The remainder comes from the entire portion outside of the

200 foot circle. If a strip 250 feet wide is cleared by a bulldozer pushing the contaminated soil to the sides, the dose rate in the middle will be reduced to about 1/10 of the value before clearing (73)(74).

The effectiveness of countermeasures against radio­ logical contamination is expressed in terms of a residual number. This residual number is the decimal fraction of the radiation intensity that remains after countermeasures have been applied. Tables XVIX and XX show the relative effect­ iveness of various radiological countermeasures that can be taken in the reclamation of buildings and paved areas (75). TABLE XVIX

METHODS, EQUIPMENT, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF DECONTAMINATION ■ e •• : - ; - Firehosing or Firehosing Plus Hot Liquid Motorized Flushing Scrubbing : Cleaning Principle of Water under pressure strikes Same as firehosing A mixture of hot water Operation contaminated surface; adher­ except that loosen­ and detergent, forced ing contaminating particles ing of particles is through a nozzle strikes of dirt are mechanically assisted by action / the contaminated sur­ loosened and washed away of brushes and de­ face, producing a scour­ into drainage channel. tergent. ing, cleaning and wash­ V : ing action. Applicability All paved areas. Exterior Same as for fire- - Structures, exterior and of structures. hosing. Low pres- : some interior. Machinery sure for some inte­ paved areas-limited use, riors of structures. special cases. Equipment Fire Hose, plus booster Fire Hose (1 1/2", » Injector Unit, Lance and pumps. (1 1/2",6,000 gal/hr 5,000 gal/hr at 60 ; Nozzle, Steam, Water and at 80 psi.) psi.) Brushes, sho­ Detergent. vels and detergents. Effectiveness Depends on surface and Depends on surface Depends on surface and standard dose rate. Resi­ and standard dose i standard dose rate. Resi dual number varies from rate. Residual num­ dual number varies from 0.17 to 0.004. ber varies from 0.06 to 0.001. 0.13 to 0.003. Personnel 4 men per 1 1/2'* hose. 4 men per 1 1/2" 3 men per lance. On tar- 2 men per motorized street hose. 2 men per and-gravel roofing, one flusher. hose for scrubbing. additional man to shovel windrowed gravel.

97 98

TABLE XX

EFFECTIVENESS OF RADIOLOGICAL

DECONTAMINATION BY SOIL REMOVAL

Residual Number Soil Removal T e c h n i q u e ______After One Pass

Filling (6 in. depth) 0.15

Grading, motor grader (2-4 in. cut) 0.15

Scraper, motorized (2-6 inv cut) 0.07

Plowing, (8-10 in. deep) 0.15

Grading, with 2-4 in. cut and plowing at 8-10 in. depth 0.02 99

It is readily seen that at high radiation dose rates, decontamination is very effective. Initially, decontamination by shelter crews would be an emergency measure and would consist primarily of rapid, partial removal of contamination.

The objective would be to make contaminated areas and equip­ ment radiologically safe for use. For instance, decontamin­ ation procedures might be required before engineering crews responsible for restoring utilities could start operation.

4.3 DEVELOPING THE SHELTER SYSTEM

The decision that a comprehensive shelter system must be undertaken for the survival of Tucsonians should be guided by the following principles which will insure that the resulting plan is adequate for Tucson: (1) The shelter network should make maximum use of facilities now in existence.

(2) The plan must evolve from a true understanding of the role of the shelter system. The network of shelters and other emergency facilities are primarily a public service— they must accommodate the locations of persons from place to place in the community. The location of shelters is directly influenced by land use. (3) The shelter plan must be limited

to what is economically feasible. The result should be that

. , - r . . .»V': : - ...... ■ ' :■ ...... ■ ‘ ' • '■ the shelter network is unified in serving the community.

(4) The plan must be initiated immediately. (5) The plan must be flexible to permit modifications based on a continu­ ing review and reappraisal of Russian weapon systems and 100 ability to wage war. ,

4.3.1 Existing Facilities Available

A Fallout Shelter Survey for the City of Tucson was conducted by the State of Arizona, Office of Civil and De­ fense Mobilization for the purpose of: (1) Analyzing all structures in the city to determine the existing protection against fallout radiation. (2) To determine the number of persons that could be sheltered in each structure. (3) To estimate the possible shielding improvements that could be made at reasonable costs to both above and below ground areas, in order to increase the category of protection and number of spaces. (4) Estimating the total cost of improv­ ing existing structures. ,i: ■

Shelter spaces were categorized according to the degree of protection afforded from fallout radiation. At­ tenuation categories were: ; ;

A - 1,000 or greater ^ B - 250 to 1,000 C - 50 to 250 D — 10 to 50 «". E — 2 to 10 • (76) . Based on the minimum fallout hazard estimated for Tucson at 20,000 r/hr: at one hour, the absolute minimum shelter attenuation is 1,000 r/hr. With a protection level of 1,000 the accumulated dose in a shelter for one month would be 70 roentgens. This would not leave a sufficient margin of additional radiation accumulation for the decon- 101 tamination period. A minimum shelter attenuation factor in

Tucson should be 10,000 and recommended 100,000.

The survey found only 5,000 existing category A, spaces. A space is defined as 10 square feet of shelter area. These shelter A spaces for the most part were con­ centrated in the central business district and the University of Arizona campus. The significance of these shelter spaces is considered of minimum value since structures in these areas will be subjected to overpressures of 5 psi, and may sustain severe damage reducing their attenuation value and even collapse of the superstructure into the basement shelter area. A more thorough engineering analysis would be required to say that these shelter spaces would be useful after the attack envisioned against Tucson. Nevertheless, the state . ' , ' . . ■ •• - ■ ■■ ■ ■■ • - ■ • civil defense authorities are proposing to stock these shelters with food and water within the next sixty days.

The author has undertaken a study to determine the - " . . : . ; C : - ' ■ ■'■ ■■■ ' • ■ ■ '.... ' quantity and quality of family fallout shelters installed in

Tucson. The findings of this study show that there are ap­ proximately only 75 family fallout shelters and 1 twenty- person community shelter for the combined Tucson and Pima county area. Of this aggregate total only 20 percent have fallout attenuation factors greater than 1,000 and only 10 percent had blast resistance considered adequate for their 102 individual location. As a result of lack of information on the probable weapon effects for Tucson, several conscientious citizens have shelters which will require additional modi­ fications to make them adequate for Tucson1s needs. Most of the family fallout shelters are equipped for a two week sheltering stay which again has been shown to be grossly

inadequate.

The possibility exists that some of the structures

in the central business district and the University of Arizona

campus and in the fringe areas, could be modified to bring shelter spaces up to standards for Tucson. The concept of multiple purpose use should be in­

corporated into shelter designs where ever possible. Some

of the possible multiple peacetime uses of shelters could

be underground parking garages, community centers, schools,

branch library*, neighborhood fire and utility stations, and etc. The modification of existing buildings to make

them serve as adequate shelters is particularly attractive

because it allows an immediate multiple purpose use. The demand for multiple use structures in residential areas is

particularly limited in view of the large required space for

the shelter need.

4.3.2 Distribution of Persons and Land Use . : vl . Residential development is the largest single land

use in the Tucson urban area. The predominate areas are 103 northeast, east> and southeast of the central business district extending to distances ranging up to 15 miles from downtown. The total population in the urban area is ap­ proximately 270,000.

Population densities exceeding seven persons per acre of land are distributed widely throughout the urbanized area. Peak densities exceeding fifteen persons per acre occur northwest, northeast, and south of the central business district and all are within 2 miles of the heart of downtown.

It has been shown that the whole family will be together at their residence for more than 70 percent of the time (77). With families spending nearly 70 percent of - their time together, the most urgent need for shelters is in the residential areas. y

Several significant characteristics of the population movement to and from the residential areas will be important in determining where people are located when not at home.

Three-fourths of all of the trips within the Tucson urban area are either originating from the home or are destined to the home. Personal travel is usually a single purpose round trip: home to work and back home, home to shopping and return, and so on. Work purposes outrank all others in the production of trips originating at home. On the average week day almost one-fourth of the urban area population leaves home to go 104 to work (78). Thirty-five percent of Tucson’s total work force reports to within a one mile radius of the central business district. Three other work locations are signifi- cant, they are: Hughes'Aircraft Company, Davis-Monthan AFB, and the University of Arizona. Thus the second most im­ portant place for shelter construction is at the place of work. ' ' ''

Shopping trips represent just over 13 percent of all personal trips on week days, while social or recreational travel is only slightly lower in volume. The most frequent shopping trip is to the central business district. Shopping trips to the neighborhood centers are next in importance.

Of particular interest in civil defense planning is that shopping trips to the central business district are most often in the morning and early afternoon while trips to neighborhood centers are heaviest in the late afternoon and continue at a high level until 8 p.m. Shelters in the central business district will have to accommodate both working and shopping persons * Shopping center populations are in the order of 3,000 persons during the peak hours.

The third most important location for shelters in Tucson would be at shopping centers.

The proposed shelter system for Tucson should include an emergency control center to serve as a control point for all shelters in the system, an alternative seat of government 105 for the city and county, and central control for municipal fire, police, engineering, and utility personnel. Space requirements would be relatively large, requiring space for communications equipment, administrative offices, de­ contamination facilities, and living spaces.

There are, of course, many possible variations in population distribution, but the pattern in Tucson agrees closely with those found to exist with other cities through­ out the country. The important point is that there is a logical basis for locating shelters in residential areas, places of work and shopping centers.

4.3.3 Shelter Investment Versus Survivability

The basic problem in setting up the shelter program is to provide the greatest possible protection for any given shelter investment. The probability of survival in

Tucson without shelter is virtually non-existent and thus the return on shelter investment in Tucson could conceivably be 100 percent. It will be shown that to provide shelter with 100 percent return would.be financially unobtainable and statistically .impossible.

, At no particular point in Tucson is the return for shelters built greater than for any other point but the severity of weapon effects would require various levels of shelter resistance. Thus the density of population and their location for the greatest percentage of time has a direct bearing on priority schedule for construction of shelters. The priority construction in residential areas

is again substantiated. , ;

For a shelter program to be "sellable" it must

extend equal opportunities of survivability to each citizen

' ’■ ' ■■ ■ . insofar as possible. The entire shelter program is built

around what is most probable and what is least unlikely—

from the target selection, weapon effects, population

. • ■ - ; ' ■ ■. , ; mobility and shelter survivability. The value and the

conservativeness of the entire analysis depends upon the

intelligence and care with which it is carried out.

The hardness (resistance to destruction by weapon

effects) of shelter to be constructed at each site depends

upon the probability of the shelter sustaining a given weapon effect from the assumed attack and the total amount

of funds available for the shelter program. The relation

between weapon effects and the probability of shelter sur- / / , : ■ \\ \ - vival can most readily be approached by recalling that a

Gaussian (normal) distribution of hits about an aiming point

was used in the target analysis.0 The reader is referred to

Section 2.3. The distribution is shown graphically in Figure 4.1. The cells in the.interior of the Figure are cells

of equal probability; that is the probability (0.001) of a hit in cell A is the same as the probability in cell B.

The outerm ost ce lls have lesser probability values as i n d i - 107

Graphical Solution For Determining The Probability That A Shelter Would Sustain Given Overpressures Figure 4.1 108 cated. The scale of the diagram is in CEP's and hence, may be used for any delivery system for which the CEP is known.

The relation between weapon effects and the prob­ ability of the shelter sustaining a given weapon effect can best be illustrated by the following example:

Assumed weapon: 5-Megaton surface burst on Davis-

Monthan AFB.

CEP: 1 Mile.

Distance of shelter from assumed aiming point:

3 1/4 miles.

Desired: The probability of sustaining different

levels of overpressure.

In the CEP units of Figure 4.1 the distance between the aiming point and the shelter is plotted. The circles of radii of overpressures associated with a 5-megaton burst on Davis-Monthan AFB are drawn as an overlay on the cells of equal probability with the shelter as center. The cells of probability within a given circle represent the probability of a hit which will apply that pressure to the shelter. Thus, the probability of sustaining an overpressure of 100 psi or more is:

3 cells 0.001 0.003000

4 1/2 cells 0.00025 0.001125

2 cells 0.00010 0.000200

Total 0.004325 109 i.e., a shelter designed for 100 psi has a 99.57 percent of survival. Similarly, the probabilities associated with other overpressure values may be found:

Probability of Probability of Sustaining Not Sustaining Overpressure Overpressure Overpressure

50 psi 0.01248 0.9875

60 psi 0.00985 0.9902

i 100 psi 0.004325 0.9957

150 psi 0.00245 0.9975

200 psi 0.001113 0.9988

These data are plotted in Figure 4.2. It is seen from the curve that for small increases in survival probability the shelter hardness increases rapidly and 100 percent is statistically unobtainable.

For a 50 percent increase in shelter hardness, there is approximately a 20 to 25 percent increase in shelter construction cost based on comparing existing shelter de­ signs. For example see Table XXIII, Chapter 5. Hardness must consider not only the blast effects but also the thermal and initial nuclear radiation weapon effects.

Table XXI shows the relation between shelter design hardness for a 99.0 percent survival probability and the radial distance from the target aiming point, while Table XXII shows the shelter hardness required for a 99.9 percent survival probability. Within the 75 psi overpressure contour Probability Of Not Sustaining Given Overpressures GivenSustaining OfNotProbability 200 200 RS.I. OVERPRESSURE .850.9902 0.9875 RBBLT O NT SUSTAINING NOT OF PROBABILITY Figure 4.2 Figure 0.9957 .950. 8 8 9 .9 0 0.9975

111

TABLE XXI

MINIMUM DISTANCE BETWEEN AIMING POINT AND SHELTER FOR

A 99.0 PERCENT PROBABILITY OF NOT SUSTAINING A

GIVEN OVERPRESSURE

Overpressure Radii Distance From Aiming ______. Point

300 psi 2.5 Miles - * - - • 200 psi 2.6 Miles

150 psi 2.75 Miles

100 psi 2.95 Miles

75 psi 3.10 Miles

50 psi 3.3 Miles 25 psi 4.0 Miles - ; . - ■■ . - 10 psi 5.1 Miles 5 psi 7.0 Miles TABLE XXII

MINIMUM DISTANCE BETWEEN AIMING POINT AND SHELTER FOR

A 99.9 PERCENT PROBABILITY OF NOT SUSTAINING A

GIVEN OVERPRESSURE

Radii Distance From Overpressure Aiming Point

500 psi 3.0 Miles

300 psi 3.2 Miles

200 psi 3.3 Miles

150 psi 3.4 Miles

100 psi 3.6 Miles

75 psi 3.7 Miles 50 psi 4.0 Miles

25 psi 4.6 Miles 10 psi 5.8 Miles

5 psi 7.0 Miles7.0 Miles 113 the difference in required hardness is extremely pronounced.

From this discussion, it would be credible to consider constructing all shelters to a hardness associated with a 99.0 percent survival probability. This allows a reduction of shelter hardness design of approximately 50 percent and a reduction in shelter program costs of 20 per­ cent. This seems reasonable in light of the other uncer­ tainties. Absolute safety resulting from over conservatism may lead to such an exorbitant cost that very few protective structures can be built. Safety is required, but not at the expense of possibily no protection. 4.3.4 Priority of Shelter Construction

Priority shelter construction should begin with the control center and also in residential areas. The following sections will develop the criteria for a design of a neighbor hood shelter in a typical residential area. CHAPTER 5 ■ > : ^

NEIGHBORHOOD SHELTERS

5.1 BASIC PROTECTION AND OPERATION CHARACTERISTICS

Because of the large size and potential destruction capacity of the nuclear weapons likely to be directed against

Tucson1s targets, it is only necessary to consider buried protective structures. At a given horizontal distance from the point of detonation, a buried structure requires less blast resistance than does a surface structure. This dif­ ference in required blast resistance is usually so great that the underground structure is more economical in spite of possible additional complexities in construction.

Limitation of radiation dose in a shelter to nonM, lethal amounts is not sufficient. The exposure in the opera­ tional recovery phase must be allowed for. This exposure would depend mainly on the effectiveness of decontamination procedure and operational measures employed in the control of personnel during this recovery period. One may conclude that shelters- should be designed so that virtually no radia­ tion exposure would occur in the emergency phase. An expo­ sure in the order of 5 to 10 roentgens is considered a negligible risk (79). A shelter residual number of 10- 115 is required in Tucson. The dose at the end of the emergency phase would be approximately 7 roentgens. Protection against radiation is usually most economically obtained by increasing the depth of earth cover over a buried structure.

In developing the shelter at various locations, consideration should be given to the fact that the unit cost per person sheltered is closely dependent upon the number of persons per shelter. - r , . - . - -- Table XXIII shows the most recent cost comparison

■ ' - ' released by the Department of Defense, Office of Civil De­ fense.

The survey of local family shelters indicates a unit price of $800 per person for blast resistance of 30 psi.

And for just fallout protection a unit price of $400 per person sheltered.

Due consideration should be given to this reduction in cost by construction group shelters in Tucson where the loading time and other operational characteristics will allow this type.

5.2 THE NEIGHBORHOOD CONCEPT OF SHELTER DEVELOPMENT

The aim of the neighborhood unit concept is multi­ purpose : (1) To collect sufficient numbers of persons per shelter to carry out the assignment of decontamination es­ sential to survival in the Tucson post-attack environment. 116

TABLE XXIII

COST VERSUS SHELTER HARDNESS AND CAPACITY

Cost Per Person At Indicated Pressure Level Population Per Shelter 5 psi 25 psi 50 psi

1,000 $162 $204 $257

500 $183 $230 $280

100 $421 $565 $682

-V v... '

., ; v. 117

(2) To protect the integrity of developed residen­ tial areas. 0 " ' ' ' ;; - ' ■ : - -

(3) To take advantage of the reduced cost per per­ son sheltered by serving larger population groups.

(4) To reduce the widespread feeling of isolation, abandonment, and consequent demoralization likely to develop in small, scattered shelter units.

(5) To collect a greater spread of skills for shelter management and survival.

(6) To reduce the task of communication between control center and among shelters.

(7) The very act of planning, building, and equip­ ping neighborhood shelters emphasizes the need for mutually cooperative behavior and combats the tendency for individual­ ism of behavior— -a tendency that poses the greatest control and administrative problems in a post-disaster period.

5.3 POPULATION M(»ILITY AND SHELTER LOCATION There are four basic considerations controlling the size of the area served by the shelter: (a) the distances persons can travel in a given length of time, (b) queuing that could occur at the shelter entrances, (c) the availability of land for shelter construction, and(4) medical and psy­ chological problems associated with shelter size.

5.3.1 Walking Distance Essential statistics concerning personnel movement 118 capabilities were found to be few. A study prepared by

Alexander and others (80), developed on limited data is

considered as authoritative as available. In the referenced

study, 125 arbitrary walking speed measurements were made

of people walking in a central business district. All cases were unaware they were being clocked and were not partici­

pating in a civil defense exercise. Speeds ranged from 165

feet per minute to 360 feet per minute.

The author conducted a series of tests on walking

speeds in a residential area of Tucson. The results of this study showed that a family, carrying one child and with a

2 1/2 year old child walking, could travel at a speed of

260 feet per minute. This was a constant but unhurried pace

over a distance of 1/2 mile. When families carried their

children and walked at maximum speed they could cover the 1/2 mile distance in 6 1/2 minutes for an average speed of 400 feet per minute. This rate of speed was not considered

too taxing. It is the author’s conclusion that a population

trained in moving to a shelter, knowing that an attack was

imminent and that they had only an allotted time to cover the

distance to the shelter could travel at an average speed of

350 feet per minute.

5.3.2 Reaction to Warning The times in which persons react to the warning and

leave their residences for shelter were assumed to constitute 119 a normal distribution. The least favorable situation in a residential area would be a night attack. The mean reaction time was found to be 5 minutes with 95 percent of the cases studied between 3 and 7 minutes (81).

5.3.3 Maximum Walking Distance

For a 15-minute warning time, allowing one minute as a safety margin and 5 minutes for reaction, the available walking time would be 9 minutes. The maximum distances that could be walked in 9 minutes. The maximum distances that could be walked in 9 minutes at 350 feet per minute would be 0.596 miles or 3,150 feet. !

Maximum efficiency and placement of shelters on a rectangular grid system of streets would be diamond shaped and intersect the streets at 45 degrees. It can be demon­ strated geometrically that the distances to the shelter from all intersections of the shelter district boundary with the streets are equal and may be represented by one-half .the diagonal of a square (82). The diamond shelter district may not apply to areas having systems of streets basically dif- ferent from the rectangular grid. ; v;: . : :

Depending on the level of protection desired in the shelter program, the percentage of effectiveness of the shelter district in terms of accessibility to the population can be read directly from Figure 5.1 as a function of the district size (83). The author feels that these percentages are too conservative, however, it may be desirous for the 15 Minute Warning Time and 1 Minute Safety Margin Safety1 Minute and Time MinuteWarning15 In Residential Shelter Districts of Various Sizes Variousof Districts Shelter InResidential ecnae fPplto be toShelterReach PopulationAble of Percentages

PERCENTAGE ABLE TO REACH SHELTER AIU WLIG ITNE, YARDS , DISTANCE WALKING MAXIMUM 20 0 60 0 1 1200 10 0 0 600 600 400 200 0 iue 5.1 Figure

121 civil defense authorities of Tucson to investigate this item further. If the percentages in Figure 5.1 prove to be realistic, it would be necessary that the maximum walking distance not exceed 450 yards for 99 percent of the people to reach the shelter. 5.3.4 Queuing at the Shelter

The number of entrance units needed critically de­ pends on the characteristic of the distribution of the arrivals. See Figure 5.2 for the relations between shelter capacity and entrance units (84). 5.3.5 Discussion

As has been shown, tha ability of the population to move from residences to shelters is a major consideration in shelter spacing, but it is not the only factor to be considered. One of the most critical considerations is that of warning time. Fifteen minutes is a good estimate of the time available when the installation of the NBAR system is completed. Tucson shelter system would require modifications if current warning time changes. Other considerations affecting a shelter system are upper and lower limits bn the capacity of the shelters. Such limits may be set by engineering factors, cost consideration, availability of land, and/or anticipated group behavior of the shelter inhabitants.

5.4 LOCATION OF RESIDENTIAL SHELTERS

The logical locations to begin placing shelters would 122

NO -QUEUE EN RANGE

MINIMUM ENTRAMC

SHELTER CAPACITY, THOUS OF PERSONS

Relation Between Shelter Entrance Units And Residential Shelter Capacity 1 Entrance Unit = 22 inch width Figure 5.2 123 be on public land (schools, parks, public buildings) supple­ mented by quasi-public land (churches, hospitals). Certain

.areas may still require the leasing or purchase of private land for shelter locations. This will more than likely be necessary in the central business district. The public and quasi-public lands in Tucson are rather uniformly distributed and oriented in service to a neighborhood rather than the entire population. These localized public lands are effi­ ciently placed for shelter locations. Beyond the corporate limits of the city where most of Tucson's future growth will occur, public land ownership is extensive. The availability of these lands for public development should allow for the most efficient shelter construction by incorporating shelters into the design of public buildings, thereby getting maxi­ mum multiple purpose use.

From a land use map of Tucson (85), public or quasi­ public land is available in every square mile of land use except in the fringe areas. Since 1955 the City of Tucson has developed square mile land tracts as neighborhood units.

An elementary school is usually centrally located, junior high and high schools are more widely dispersed. Other public or quasi-public land within the neighborhood limit may include parks, churches, government service agencies

(fire or police stations, post offices, branch libraries, etc.). Public and quasi-public uses represent the third largest land use in the urban area (86). 124

' ' • ■ ■ ■ : . ! Developing a shelter system on the neighborhood unit

: ' . . " : makes sense— with a maximum walking distance of 0.596 miles

to a shelter and using the most efficient shape for a shelter

district a large percentage of the residential area lies '

within the pattern. Supplementing these locations with

neighborhood shelters on other public lands about 85 percent

of the area can be covered (omitting the sparsely populated

surburban and acreage homesites in fringe areas). The typi­

cal network of neighborhood shelter districts is shown in

Figure 5.3. For areas where shelter districts do not meet,

a unique system of walking tube extensions to the center

of the area from neighborhood shelters would provide these

persons with an immediate access to safety and a short under­

ground walk to the neighborhood shelter. In some areas

this may not serve the best interests; tb#n a neighborhood shelter could be installed under the street. School sites

make up the majority of the shelter locations. Where practi­

cable, based upon walking distances, the shelter district

boundaries should coincide with the school boundaries. The

elementary school boundaries for a portion of School District No. 1 are shown in Figure 5.4.

Population densities exceeding 7 persons per acre are widely distributed. The residential area enclosed by the "Neighborhood Shelter District" is approximately 456

acres, thus an average shelter population of 3,200 persons 125

i k

'■] 1 loRTH

1....i

l- ] : 1

... ) IT. fSCHOOLS SCALE: I" = 5/j0 MU

TYPICAL NETWORK OF NEIGHBORHOOD

SHELTER DISTRICTS Figure 5.3 126

r^aaaMW.g-.aaeaa

b o oth L metfmtwen (of*J ? \i/ieed 5 ,m’J\ ,i»

(nttd 6 rm;) 00 if LINKS

(bulla I? room ho Of 01 |of tffe /S)

EXISTING ELEMENTARYSCHOOL BOUNDARIES FOR A PORTION OF TUCSON SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1

Figure 5.4 127 can be expected. Peak density areas of 15 persons per acre will have to provide shelteraecoiamodations for 6,800 persons.

It may be more advantageous to locate shelters closer together and;reduce these peak populations; however, if the facilities and management for 6,800 people are provided there is no reason why these shelter populations would not be satisfac­ tory (87). : ...... , , Other inherent advantages of locating the "Neighborhood

Shelters” at school sites are: -

(1) The integrity of the residential population is maintained. .

(2) The school is a permanently established organi­ zation with responsible leaders and orderly procedure. (3) Students in elementary, junior high, and senior high schools comprise nearly 20 percent of the population of Tucson. A sizable percent of the population can be sheltered almost immediately, if the attack occurred during school hours.

(4) Sufficient land area with a minimum of surface and subsurface obstructions is available at each school site.

(Ten to fifteen acres per elementary school site). (5) School grounds are under constant surveillance of a caretaker twenty-four hours a day and police patrol is more frequent around school zones, thus the shelter would be protected from vandalism (the shelter must be readily entered by its very nature). - . v ; (6) Shelters could provide additional space for school needs and neighborhood functions. However, such a large building area as provided by a shelter is not usually required in an established residential area.

5.5 SHELTER LOCATION VERSUS DESIGN HARDNESS

Each shelter in the Tucson shelter system can be de­ signed for a 99.9 percent probability of - surviving weapon effects. The distance from the aiming point and the corres­ ponding shelter design hardness to resist given blast wave overpressures are plotted as an overlay on the Tucson School

Site Map in Figure 5.5. As shown previously, a considerable savings in shelter cost can be realized if a lesser survivability is accepted in the design of shelters. Each’shelter in the Tucson shelter system can be designed for a 99.0 percent probability of sur­ viving weapon effects. The distance from the aiming point and the corresponding shelter design hardness to resist given blast wave overpressures are plotted as an overlay on the Tucson

School Site Map in Figure 5.6. ■. - i : 5.6 ALTERNATE SHELTER SYSTEMS INVESTIGATED

A plan of locating shelters at intervals permitting a maximum walking distance of 450 yards would assure that

99 percent of the population could reach the shelters. De-

.... ■- ' , - velopment of this plan would require shelters at about every three blocks and each shelter would serve approximately 83 SCHOOL SITE STATUS - TUCSOIJ REGION

C-OfO"*® ;f<

_c-

D A VI S MONThAN 5 P.*a. 5

-•TUCSON ^ MUNICIPAL A I * PONT

X A V | E R

Shelter Hardness Required For A 99.9 Percent

Probability Of Surviving Blast Overpressures

Figure 5.5 129 SCHOOL SITE STATUS - TUCSON REGION

.G v*8 ix^

Zfnmen' negMl DAVIS MONT MAN

Q tvvii'»« v

TUCSON MUNICIPAL A I P PORT cvs‘ * A V I e p I N o I ^ N

Shelter Hardness Required For A 99.0 Percent

Probability Ot Surviving Blast Overpressures

Figure 5.6 ? 130 131 square acres. The average shelter population would be 580 persons. The only public land available at this frequent interval is to use street and alley right-of-ways. Many problems are associated with installing these shelters under streets, such as interference with underground utilities, replacement cost of streets, shelter entrances and appurten­ ances extending above ground would require special protection, and the inconvenience of disrupting traffic and utility systems. The logistic and maintenance support of approxi­ mately 400 of this type of shelter throughout Tucson would make the program impractical. The police force alone required for protection of these shelters is estimated to require an additional eight men working full time (88). An alarm system with fail-safe features could be installed reducing the police force required.

A continuous tubesystem consisting of an 8 foot dia­ meter Armco culvert buried under 5 feet of earth cover was

investigated. This shelter system, installed at one mile

intervals would require approximately 100 miles of tubes to serve the greater metropolian area of Tucson^ Access walking distance would not be improved. The maximum walking distance would exceed the 3,150 foot limit established for the "Neigh­

borhood Shelter System". The 8 foot diameter tubes would provide sleeping space for only 1,600 persons per mile and

t 132 with population density at approximately 6,600 persons per square mile, additional shelter space would be required.

The estimated cost for this shelter system is $400,000 per mile. Over and above this the additional shelters would be

required. The 8 foot diameter tube has extremely good blast

resistant properties. The use of this tube for connecting population areas immediate to the boundaries of Davis-Monthan

AFB is considered a feasible method to circumvent the build­

ing of shelters in regions of extreme overpressures. For

example, the population served by a shelter located on

Corbett Elementary School grounds would require a hardness exceeding 300 psi. A tube could be extended from Corbett

school for a one mile distance connecting it to a shelter

designed for only 60 psi.

^ ’ I. ‘ ' CHAPTER 6 1 rr

A NEIGHBORHOOD SHELTER DESIGN

From the proposed shelter districts a residential area considered representative was selected for a proto- type shelter design. , . ; , r 6.1 BONILLAS SHELTER DISTRICT The shelter shall be located on the school grounds of Ignacio Bonillas Elementary School as shown in Figure

6.1 The school district boundaries were selected as shelter district boundaries since both boundaries are compatible.

Street configuration and family togetherness were major fac­ tors in determining the modification to the idealized shelter district boundaries. The maximum walking distance of 3,150 feet is exceeded for those persons living on Calls Jabeli and in the northeast and southwest corners of the school district. Where shelter districts overlap, such as Line- weaver and Bonillas, the school district would become the boundary. Once the shelter boundaries are established they should remain fixed to prevent confusion and establish an

orderly procedure in reaching the shelter. Also the shelter

capacity would remain relatively constant.

The Swanway Plaza Shopping Center at Broadway and 134

Swan Road was not Included in the Bonillas shelter district.

The peak population of the shopping center between 4 and 8 p.m is 2,940 persons <89). The Rincon High shelter district could absorb this peak population load more readily than

' ' -- Bonillas, see Figure 6.1. 6.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF BONILLAS SHELTER DISTRICT

The population and neighborhood characteristics that are essential to the design of the shelter are tabulated

in Table XXIV (90)(91).

6.3 WEAPON EFFECTS

Bonillas Shelter is located 3.25 miles from the assumed aiming point on Davis-Monthan AFB. The 5-megaton burst on Davis-Monthan AFB determines the blast, mass-fire

hazard, and initial nuclear radiation effects the shelter must resist.

The probability that overpressures at Bonillas

Shelter will not exceed certain levels is:

Probability That Overpressure Overpressure Will Not Be Exceeded

200 psi 99.88%

150 psi 99.75%

100 psi 99.57%

60 psi 99.02%

50 psi 98.75%

Survivability:

Select a 99.0 percent of survival probability for 135

Bonillas Shelter District Figure 6.1 136

t a b l e x x i v , . . BONILLAS SHELTER DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS

Total Population 4,333

2 years and under ‘ 255

3 to 19 years 1,553

20 to 39 years 1,090

40 to 59 years 1,020

60 and over 415

Bonillas School Active Enrollment 734

Dwelling Units 3,384

Persons per Dwelling Unit 2.36

Pupils per Dwelling Unit 0.62

Single Family Dwelling Units 3,191

Duplex Dwelling Units 193

Dwelling Units Renter Occupied 25% 137 the design of shelter hardness.

Peak Overpressure: Pso * 60 psi Duration of Positive Phase of the Blast Wave: t+ ■ 2.5 seconds Rise Time of Initial Peak Overpressure: t^ = 0

Velocity of Propagation of the Blast Wave (92):

0 « 1 .iso/l'/ + -TTHTTr

C u -2,400 fps

Ground Motion (93) :

a. The peak vertical earth stress (pressure)

will not be significantly attenuated to a

soil depth of 5 feet, therefore, Pm= 60 psi. b. The peak vertical acceleration in earth for <

various depths are:

Depth Peak Vertical Acceleration (g)y t

5* 12

10' 7

15' 5

c. The peak horizontal acceleration at the

ground surface: (g) — 33 n The peak transient vertical displacement in

the earth for various depths are 138

1 1 Peak Transient Vertical ' Depth Displ.c.m.nt (D)v :v?

0 i-nn; n . grt n >. :i n : .• " L n*: n 1 • :; ... \ : T;\ , ‘ 5* : '

10 • 1''3/4 ## - - "" C , -

15» r' - : 2 2' ^2/4^" ' " " '" " '' "' : * : - ' '■ -»

d. Direct ground waves will probably not

effect the structure at the PL * 60 psi : i vv: ■ I.'.:. : m .1 • • , r! r 'T overpressure intensity. , , : ; . = i - Initial Gamma Radiation Dose: 30,000 roentgens

Initial Neutron Radiation Dose: 800 rem .

Residual Gamma Radiation Dose Rate: 200,000 p/hr at one-

hour reference dose rate. ; . . . Thermal Energy:

The thermal energy received at the shelter location would be approximately 700 calories per square centimeter. U . V'.; v' .... >1.. .• - ; , In the neighborhood surrounding Bonillas Shelter, nearly - . . - % - :. c - v i i ■■■:.. all combustible materials would be ignited. The homes, substantially of masonry construction would collapse and heavy fires would probably rage throughout the area. ■ .... . ' .■ .. , ... .. * ' -. ■ : . V. 1 > , ■; : • t 6.4 SHELTER SITE CHARACTERISTICS

Surface Obstructions — A ball diamond backstop would have to be relocated. . ; ■: v •' .t: . .v . m - :i.:. n 1 : r :. i- nv. ^:-n Subsurface Obstructions - There are no apparent sub- v. i: . ; ■ . ■ :r xcn ;.. ^ :;r: -:u a - surface obstructions. . i , i n ; -1 ■■ .- . - ’= " ' n ■ " ;■ n . n i r i nines'” i-’/i r ’i- r 139

Soil Conditions - A check against specifications and engineering drawings for construction of Bonillas school

indicates poorly graded gravel-sand-clay mixture comparable

to the A-2 Public Roads Classification. Some caliche exists at scattered locations. The value as a foundation is con­ sidered excellent. Soil drainage characteristics are good.

Drainageway - A runoff water drainageway is located

75 feet north of the school property Tine. Past histories

of water runoff indicate very small flows even in heavy and long-term rainfalls. The possibility of shelter flood­

ing appears td be remote. ‘

Ground Water - The ground water level is 150 feet

below the surface. ' 6.5 PROTECTION CHARACTERISTICS OF BONILLAS SHELTER

6.5.1 Radiation Protection Bonillas Shelter has a residual gamma radiation

shielding factor of 100,000 (a residual number of 0.00001).

For the radiation dose rate level of 200,000 r/hr at H+l

hour, the gamma radiation dose accumulated during the shelter

stay of two months would be 7.5 roentgens. The initial gamma

and neutron radiation is attenuated below any significant

level. •v'v : ' '

An additional requirement for radiation protection

stems from the potential ingress of contaminated air through

ventilation systems and openings. Air purification and con­

taminated dust would be removed by air filters on the inlet 140 to the ventilation units. The design of these protective filters shall be. in accordance with recommendations by the

Chemical Corps, Engineering Command, U. S. Army (94).

,6.5.2 Blast Protection ...... : . . . The structure is designed to resist a peak over­ pressure o f .60 psi. Blast closures would be provided in the ventilation system and door seals installed at the entrance to prevent leakage of high pressure into the shelter. Fur­ ther study is necessary to determine the design and.the particular specifications for these blast features. For certain conditions, where a large internal shelter volume exists and inlet areas are small (such as in this shelter design)^ blast valves and door seals may not be necessary (95)

, . It has been shown.that a properly designed elasto- plastic structure is capable of surviving the cumulative effects of repeated blast which may occur from the attack oh Davis-Monthan AFB and Tucson Municipal Airport (96).

6.5.3 Fire Storm Protection

Although the shelter is not considered to be located

in an area where mass fires are expected, the effects of many fires in the neighborhood may act to suck oxygen out of the shelter and to introduce toxic combustion products

through the ventilation system. To prevent this, the shelter

must be capable of being closed off from the outside atmos­ phere for a period of 12 hours (97). 141

6.6 ' OPERATIONAL; CHARACTERISTICS ;

6.6.1 Loading Time The shelter entrance of 12 feet was designed on the basis of the minimum opening from Figure 5.2. Queuing at the entrance would occur and amount to approximately 25 per­ cent of the shelter population. The interior hallway system is designed to allow free and rapid movement to the far end of the shelter, thus preventing congestion immediately inside the entrance. The ramp entrance allows persons in wheel chairs access with a minimum of help. From Figure 5.2 the minimum entrance units is eight for a shelter district population of 4,500 persons. On the basis of 60 persons per minute through a 22 inch opening the loading time would be 9 minutes. The accumulated queue for a minimum entrance is quite large, involving approximately

25 percent of the shelter population; the shelter entrance was designed for 10 entrance units.

6.6.2 Capacity ,

The shelter is designed to accommodate 4,500 persons.

The total floor area is 50,400 square feet and the gross volume

is 631,000 cubic feet. Space within the shelter was pro­ portioned on the basis of seven individual groups. The capa­

city of 4,500 persons allows for a gross floor area of 11

square feet per person and a gross volume of 156 cubic feet

of space per person sheltered. This includes spaces for all

shelter uses. Consideration was given to the morale and 142 comfort of the shelter occupants and every attempt has been made to make the shelter livable.

6.6.3 Period of Occupancy :

A period of continuous occupancy of two months was taken as the performance requirement. The actual required period of occupancy would be controlled by the radiological situation after fallout. Decontamination procedures could be initiated as soon as the dose rate would allow short intervals of exposure. .

6.6.4 Habitability :

Habitability has to do with the maintenance of suit­ able environmental conditions within the shelter during the period of occupancy. Temperature, humidity, air purity, and air movement must be maintained at levels consistent with human endurance, at the least, and human comfort, at the most. The ventilation system is designed to provide 26 cubic feet of air per minute per person. Effective cooling would be accomplished by evaporative cooling. At the rate of 26 CFM per person, a complete air change in the shelter would be accomplished every five minutes. The design of the ventila­ tion system is based upon supplying each of the seven shelter groups with individual cooling units. The distribution system would insure controlled zone distribution of air and have the added feature of multiple units in event of a ventilation unit failure. 143

EvStporatlne cooling should be nearly, as efficient as

refrigeration, except during a possible rainy period in the month of August. Both the initial equipment cost and the

operating costs of a refrigeration system would be four

times that of the evaporative cooling ventilation system.

The ventilation air is delivered at the ceiling to

the center of each living module and is exhausted from each

room through six outlets at the floor level through ducts

provided in the precast piers.

6.6.5 Sanitary Facilities ■ )

Separate toilet rooms are provided for men and women

in the shelter. One toilet is supplied for every 70 people.

The collection system for sinks, washers, and toilets is

gravity flow to a dry well lift station. Toilets are water

flush fixtures. The waste lines are installed in ducts in the floor.

The sewage lift station is designed as a dry well

pumping station. Provision is made for discharging sewage

into the existing city sewer and emergency discharge into

the drainageway. Provision can be made to discharge the

waste,water from the decontamination rooms directly to the 1 ' - •• • ■■ - . . i- • ' - - ■ ' ■ drainageway.

6.6.6 Water System

A well is absolutely necessary to supply the large

quantity of water required for decontamination. As a result. 144 ample water is available for human consumption, bathing, operation of the sanitary system and operation of the evaporative cooling system. The fact that a well is ab­ solutely necessary for decontamination allows many conven- i fences normally considered too costly in other shelter programs.

The water table is currently at 150 feet. The well depth should be approximately 300 feet and 12 inches in diameter9 8 ) .

The maximum rate of water demand would be when operating one decontamination hose at 100 gallons per minute and a general service demand of 125 gallons per minute.

The pump should have a capacity of 280 gallons per minute pumping against the head of 360 feet. A 40 horsepower motor would be required for the pump. The well could be possibly be used as a booster station in the Tucson water distribution system and thus serve a benificial use during peacetime.

Hot and cold water is distributed to the kitchens and bathrooms and cold water is extended into the bunk areas.

The distribution lines would be installed in the utility trench in the floor slab.

6.6.7 Electrical System

Normal electric power would be provided by connection to the public utility system. Emergency power would be provided by a diesel-engine-driven generator. Air intake to, 145 ; and exhaust gases from, the engine would be conducted through pipes to the outside atmosphere.

Lighting is provided by both fluorescent and in­ candescent fixtures, the type selected being the one most suitable for the proper illumination for each of the dif­ ferent areas within the shelter. Lighting fixtures supplying illumination during the

emergency period would be part of the normal lighting pat­

tern. Switching arrangements should permit reduced illum­

ination during the emergency period.

Circuit panels should be of the bolted circuit

breaker type to eliminate the need for storing spare fuses.

6.6.8 Communications and Instrumentations

A telephone and radio receiver communications system

is coordinated with the control center. Inter-communications

between shelters can be provided by field telephone systems.

The shelter should be instrumented with a monitoring

system for continuous reading of radiation intensity above

ground. Portable radiation counters would be used by the i decontamination personnel for recording the radiation level.

6.7 SHELTER GROUP CONCEPT

6.7.1 Architectural Arrangement

The architectural arrangement develops maximum use of

floor space and divides the shelter population into individual

groups of manageable size from the standpoint of control 146 ; and logistic support. The need for group concept was re- 1 cognized after a thorough study and evaluation of material on the subject of psychological and social adjustments in a shelter. Large numbers of persons can be accommodated in one structure by dividing the number of people into small groups whereby the circulating of people and materials are kept to a minimum.

The shelter is composed of seven groups of approxi­ mately 600 pedple. The sleeping and living accommodations surround a nucleus composed of the kitchensand bathrooms.

Each group is independent from the other groups. The only cross-traffic necessary is to reach the medical facilities, central library, supply distribution centers and work areas.

The management of the shelter is simplified by a system of individual group management monitored by the shelter*s central control.

6.8 STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

6.8.1 Theory

The shelter was designed for dynamic behavior using an ultimate strength theory and theoretical blast loadings consistent with a peak incident shock of 60 psi of a megaton range weapon. The design method recommended by J . L. Merritt and N. M. Newmark (99) was used.

6.8.2 Structural Configuration

- ' ; The proto—type shelter developed in this study is 147 the result of a preliminary investigation of several suit­ able configurations. Preliminary analyses were carried out for a one-way reinforced rectangular structure, a flat slab roof and wall structure, a shear wall rectangu­ lar structure supporting a steel membrane roof of square configuration, and the circular wall supporting a spherical cap membrane• The latter structure is developed herein.

Appendix A discusses the assumptions used in the structural design and includes the design calculations.

Other criteria governing the selection of the structural configuration for the proto-type shelter were:

(1) A shelter designed on a module basis would permit the construction of any shelter size by merely adding the number of module units required for the desired floor space,

(2) The design lends itself to mass production because the module concept allows prefabrication of a few basic components which are utilized repeatedly throughout the structure. (3) The design utilizes each structural material in its optimum strength configuration. (4) The room arrangement is considered ideal for shelter utilization and habitability.

Appendix B contains the engineering drawings for

Bonillas Neighborhood Shelter.

6.8.3 The Basic Module The fundamental unit is a reinforced concrete cylinder 148

30 feet in diameter set upright and capped with a spherical steel membrane of 3/8 inch steel. The steel spherical cap carries the roof load by membrane action of uniform tensile stress throughout with no bending. Thus using steel in pure tension behavior. The membrane stress is transferred to a reinforced concrete compression ring which supports the steel membrane. The reinforced concrete ring is subjected

to high compressive forces but here the concrete is used • •- ' . ' ' • 'I • ' in its strongest configuration, a compression member. The vertical forces are carried to the ground by a continuous

circular wall foundation.

The module units are independent and do not rely upon the strength of the adjacent unit to provide a reaction

or to contribute to the support of external forces. Parti­

cular advantage to this independent action is that the

entire structure would not collapse if for some reason one

unit should fail. Large structures are subjected to un-

symetrical loading due to the transient nature of the blast

wave.

6.8.4 Precast Concrete Construction

The proto-type shelter design lends itself readily

to precast construction methods. The entire structure can

be constructed from one basic shape. The precast concrete

piers can be set into place and the spherical roof caps

field welded into place. 149

6.8.5 Design for Ground Shock The ground shock will be of sufficient severity that all equipment supports would be designed to reduce the acceleration forces to an acceptable value. Motorized equipment and other large devices would require shock and vibration isolators and flexible conduit connections to compensate for equipment displacement. All lighting fixtures would be pendent mounted on cushion type fixture hangers.

Fluorescent fixtures would be fitted with special locking devices to prevent dislodgment of lamps and louvers.

6.8.6 Entrance Door Design

The 12 foot door proposed for installation would be designed similiar to a 29 foot door that successfully withstood nuclear tests in Nevada. The door would be mounted on a wheel and track arrangement which would permit the door to be rolled shut under the action of gravity and opened by powered arrangement(100)» Other door arrange- ments were investigated but were not found to be satisfactory.

A corrugated steel circular arch with a 10 foot radius is used as a connecting passage between the entrance and the shelter proper. The arch would be constructed of lapped steel plates of 0.15 inch thickness (101).

6 .9 COST ESTIMATE

A specific multiple purpose use for Bonillas Shelter does not exist, as is typical for most of the shelter locations 150 throughout the city. Since the only purpose of the struc­ ture then is for protection in event of nuclear attact, it was designed to meet this need most efficiently. The unique shape and special fabrication techniques would cause the structure to be extremely uneconomical if only one shelter were built, but this basic module can be used for constructing all shelters in Tucson. If all shelters were built using these modules, approximately 4,000 would be required for the shelter program. Therefore, it is apparent that special techniques and equipment would no longer be of prime significance. Preliminary cost comparisons indicate

the possibility of this structure being economical even for

one shelter. CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of this study the following conclusions are drawn:

(1) The construction of civilian shelters is neces­ sary to provide protection against the nuclear weapon effects as a result of the most probable attack against Davis-Monthan

AFB, Tucson Municipal Airport and the Titan Sites.

(2) The most desirable shelter system for Tucson is to construct shelters in residential areas, places of work, and in shopping locations.

(3) Priority construction should begin in residential areas.

(4) A neighborhood shelter was satisfactorily de­ signed to meet Tucson requirements in residential areas.

(5) A module structural unit was developed which could be utilized in the construction of all shelters.

7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

(1) It is recommended that a thorough analytical

investigation be made into the elastic and plastic response

151 151 of a thin spherical shell cap subjected to internal pressure, to verify the assumptions in this study.

(2) It is recommended that a structural model be built of the neighborhood shelter and tested under simulated nuclear blast environments. (3) It is also recommended that the refinement of design details be carried to completion. Appendix A

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1 . Raymond L. Gartholf. Soviet Strategy In The Nuclear Age. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958.

2. Major Alexander P. De Seversky. America: TooYoung To Die. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1961, p. 29.

3. Leon Goure. ’’Soviet Civil Defense”, Symposium On Human Problems In The Utilization Of Fallout Shelters. Edited by George W. Baker and John d. Rohrer. National •t. Academy of Sciences, 1960, p. 101.

4. New Civil Defense Program. Ninth Report By The Committee On Government Operations, 0.8. Government Printing Office, September 21, 1961, pp. 75-77.

5. J. S.Butz, Jr. "What Are The Lessons Of Vostok?”, Air Force Magazine, Yol. 45, No. 3, March 1962, p. 37.

6. Ralph E. Lapp. "Missile Warheads", Biological And En­ vironmental Effects Of Nuclear War. Hearings Before The Special Subcommittee On Radiation Of The Joint Com­ mittee On Atomic Energy, U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1959, p. 224.

7. "Nuclear Blast Effects Pose New Threat", Aviation Week and Space Technology, Yol. 76, No. 12, March 19, 1962, pp. 26-27.

8. "Soviet ICBM Force To Hit 200 By 1963— NATO Says", Missiles and Rockets, Yol. 9, No. 25, December 18, 1961, p. 10.

9. Major Alexander P. De Seversky, op. cit., pp. 161-163.

10. Ralph. E. Lapp. "Fallout Associated With Attacks On . ICBM Bases", Civil Defense. Hearings Before A Subcom­ mittee Of The Committee On Government Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1960, pp. 241-242.

11. George C. Wilson. "Atmospheric Testing Awaits Soviet Action", Aviation Week And Space Technology, Yol. 76, No. 2, January 8, 1962, pp. 23-24. 164 165

12. MKhrushchev Boasts Stockpile Includes 100 MT-Plus Bombs”, Missiles_and Rockets, Vol. 9, No. 25, December 18, 1961, p. 10.

13. Protection Against Chemical And Biological Agents And Radiological Fallout. Corps of Engineers - ti.S. Army, BM 1110-345-461, January 19, 1961.

14. "Final U.S. ICBM Master For '61”, Missiles and Rockets, Vol. 9, No. 25, December 18,1961, p. 9.

15. E. D. Callahan and others. The Probable Fallout Threat Over The Continental United States. Technical Opera- tions, Inc., December 1, i960, ASTlA - AD256072L, p. 25.

16. Herman Kahn. On Thermonuclear War. Princeton Univer­ sity Press, 1960, pp. 453-522. '

17. E. D. Callahan and others, op. cit., p. 62.

18. Nuclear Attack And Industrial Survival. McGraw-Hill . * PublishingCo.,Inc., Edited by McGraw-Hill, 1962.

19. Major Alexander P. De Seversky, op. cit., pp. 176-199.

20. New Civil Defense Program, p; 3.

21. ibid.; P; 27^ ;

22. Major General Hewitt T. Vheless. "The Deterrent Offen­ sive Force”, Air Intelligence Training Bulletin, Vol. 13 No. 10, December 1961, pp. l-ld. ~ •

23. "Titan II To Give USAF Well-Protected Fast Reaction Strike Force”, Aviation Week And Space Technology, Vol.75, No. 13, September 25, 1961, pp. 138-141.

24. Ibid., p. 138. : : ■ ^

25. ”AF Group Prepares, Equips ICBM Sites", Aviation Week And Space Technology, Vol. 75, No. 13, September 25, 1961, pp; 150-159.

26. Major General Hewitt T. Wheless, op. cit., p. 7.

27. Joel S. Greenberg. Defense Of Retaliatory Force. Air Force Canterbury Press, June l96l, AStlA - AD260587. -

28. Paul Weidlinger. Structures Under Repeated Blast Loadings. The RAND Corporation, March 3, 1961, ASTIA - AD259327. 166

29. Population Study. Tucson City-County Planning Depart- ment, January i960, p. 20. ;

30. Arizona Statistical Review. Vallpy National Bank, • 17th Annual Edition, September 1961, p. 39. ' '■ Vi i" v: : ■ : / ■■ , - 31. Lt. Col. K. F. Gantz. The PSAF Report On The ICBM, Appendix II by Colonel R. 0. Bowers, Doubleday, 1958.

32. Paul Weidlinger, op. cit., p. 27. : J ? r:

33. Ivor Bazovsky. Reliability Theory And Practice. Prentice Hall, Inc., 1961, p. 227. 34. Richard B. Dow. Fundamentals Of Advanced Missiles. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958, p. 224. 35. The Iffoots Of Nuclear Weapons. Edited by Samuel Glasstone. United States Atomic Energy Commission, Juno 1957, pp. 121-195. .a^V-v fii Ja, : . . 'a a, a 36. Flight Information Publication Terminal. (High Altitude) Southwest United States. U.S. Air Force - U.S. Navy, January 1, 1962, p. 73. 37. The Davis-Monthan AFB Guide. Community Newspapers, 1962.

38. Design Of Structures To Resist The Effects Of Nuclear Weapons - Weapon Effects. Corps of Engineers - U.S. Army,114-1110-345-413,"July 1, 1959, pp. 17-18.

39. Harold L. Brode. Weapons Effects For Protective Design. The RAND Corporation, March 31, I960. . ;

40. Flight Information Publication Terminal, p. 265. a;, a^aa a . . • - : : v , a V. , 41. R. Harlam* "Shock Isolation At Hard Bases," Shock Vib­ ration And Associated Environments Part III. Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 1960, pp. 175-181.“

42. Design Of Structures To ResistaThe Effects Of Atomic Weapons. Corps of Engineers, tf.S. Army, EM HlO-345- 4137 July lj 1959, p. 113. •

43. Ibid:,p. 114. : ^

44. Donald Hall. "The Minuteman Missile", Journal Of The Structural Division. Proceedings of.the American Society of civil Engineers,a¥ol. 32., No. 4, April 1962, P• 39. . 1 - ■- ’ - ; ■ - i . '• ■ . 167

45. City Of Tucson Maps. City-County Planning Department, Tucson, Arizona, C4-59-1, RS & FS. .

46. Dr. James E. McDonald. "An Analysis Of Civil Defense Hazards Being Created By.Emplacement Of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Near Tucson", Journal of the Arizona Academy of Science, Vol.2, No. 1, August 1961.

. 47. A. B. Willoughby and others. Blast Shielding In Com- pjexes. Broadview Research Corporation, August 1958, ASTlA - AD144535, pp. 32-34.

48. Fallout Shelter Survey Of Tucson, Arizona• The City of Tucson and The State of Arizona, CDM-0561-35, December 1960.

49. Clayton S. White, M.D. "Biological Blast Effects", Biological And Environaental^Effects Of Nuclear War. Hearings Before The Special Subcommittee On Radiation Of The Joint Committee On Atomic Energy, U.S. Govern­ ment Printing Office, June 1959, pp. 311-361.

50. Dr. James E. McDonald, op. cit., p. 14. '

51. Ibid., p . 13«

52. Howard C. Jelinek. Development Of A Technology For Radiation Effects In~ Certain Solids! University of Arizona Printing Press, 1962.

53. Exposure To Radiation^In An Emergency. National Com- mittee On Radiation, Protection and Measurements, January 1962, p. 70.

54. Harold,L. Erode, pp. cit., p. 33.

55. W. W . Kellogg and others. "Close-in Fallout", Journal Of Meteorology, Vol. 14. 1957, pp. 1-8.

56. Harold L . Brode, op. cit., p. 34.

57. W. W. Kellogg and others, op. cit., p. 6.

58. Dr. James E. McDonald, op. cit., pp. 9-13.

59. Ibid., pp. 3-19.

60. Civil Defense. Hearings Before A Subcommittee Of The Committee On Government Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1960, pp. 517-573. 168

61. Ibid., pp. 522-570.

62. Dr. James E. McDonald, op. cit., p. 10.

63. The Effects Of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 409-421.

64. Ibid., p. 417.

65. Ibid., p. 403. 66. Exposure To Radiation In An Emergency, p. 87. 67. Symposium On Human Problems In The Utilization Of Fallout Shelters. Edited by George W. Baker and John H. Kohrer, National Academy of Sciences, 1960. : ■ . 1 . ; : - ■ ' ; : ' 68. Psychological And Social Adjustment In A Simulated ghelter. American Institute For Research, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960.

69. Proceedings Of The Meeting On Environmental Engineer ing In Protective Shelters. National Academy of Sciences, February 1960. 70. "Probability of Fallout Debris Deposition", Civil Defense Technical Bulletin* Federal Civil Defense Administration, May 1658. 71. E. D. Callahan and others, op. cit., p. 163.

72. Radiological Decontamination. Los Angeles Office of Civil Defense, October 1960, p . 53.

73. Nuclear Defense Measures. U.S. Army Chemical Corps School, Fort McClellan, Ala., Special Text 3-155, June 1959, p. 92.

74. Radiological Decontamination, p. 27.

75. ABC Warfare Defense Ashore. U.S. Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks, NAVDOCKS-TP-PL-2, April 1960, pp. 4-58.

76. Fallout Shelter Survey Of Tucson; Arizona, p. 6.

77. Dr. Thomas L. Martin, Jr. The Effects Of Nuclear . Weapons On Tucson. The University of Arizona Press, October 1961, p. 1. > -

78. Tucson Area Transportation Study 1960. Tucson City County Planning Department, Vol. 1, 1961, p. 37. 169

79. W. E. Strope and others. Specifications And Costs Of ■ A Standarized Series Of Fallout Shelters. U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, October 1959, ASTIA-, AD230153, p. 10.

80. Michael N. Alexander and others^ Effect Of Population Mobility On The Location Of Communal Shelters. October 1937, ASTIA - AD204O9O. , "

81. Ibid., p. 10. :

82. Investigation And Design Of Air Raid Shelters. Lehigh University Institute of Research, October 19&1, ASTIA - AD824487, p. 98. -

83. Michael N. Alexander, op. cit., p. 15.

84. Investigation And Design Of Air Raid Shelters, pp. 26-28.

85. Tucson Area Transportation Study 1960, p. 25.

86. General Land Use Plan. Tucson City-County Planning De­ partment^ 1960.

87. Donald N. Michael. "Some Procedures For Managing Large Fallout Shelters”, Symposium On Human Problems In The Utilization Of Fallout Shelters, National Academy of Science, 1960, pp. 181-192.

88. Captain John B. Breglia, Executive Officer, Pdlice De­ partment, City of Tucson.

89. Tucson Area Transportation Study, Data.

90. School Plan 1962-65 Tucson School District No. 1 . Tucson City-County Planning Department, pp. 10-20,

91. Guide To Census Tracts - Tucson Standard Metropolitan Area I960. Tucson City-County Planning Department, May 1961.

92. J. L. Merritt and N. W. Newmark. Design Of Underground Structures To Resist Nuclear Blast, Volume II. Univer­ sity of Illinois, 1958, p. 76.

93. Personnel Shelters And Protective Construction. U.S. Department of Navy, NAVDOCKS P-81, pp. A63-A71. 94. Protection Of Structures From Chemical, Biological And Radiological CBK Contamination. Chemical Corps, En- gineering Command, U.S. Army, ASTIA - AD218210,June 1959. 170

95. W. R. Elswick. Pressure Response Within An Enclosure Subject To A Blast Wave. The RAn!D Corporation, March 1, 1961.

96. Paul Weidlinger, op. cit., p. 27.

97. J . S. Muraoka. The Effect Of Oxygen Depletion And Fire Gases On Occupants Of Shelters! U.S. Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, July 18, 1961, ASTIA - AD259835.

98. City^of Tucson Water Utility 1960-1961 Annual Statisti­ cal Report. City ol Tucson Water Department, November IS, 1961, p. 67.

99. J. L. Merritt and N. M. Newmark. The Design Of Under- Ground Structures To Resist Nuclear Blast. University of Illinois Press, April 1958, ASTlA - At)243003. 100. K. Cohen and E. Laing. Response Of Dual-Purpose Rein- forced-Concrete Mass Shelter, Operation Plumbbob, Nevada Test Site, November 8, 1957, ASTIA - AD148154.

101. Engineer Troop Protective Construction (Nuclear Warfare). tf.S. Army, Army Technical Manual 5-311, August 1961, p. 84.

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