POLICY Notes
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POLICY NOTES The Washington Institute for Near East Policy • Number 12 • June 2012 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen n January 2011, The Washington Institute presented an in-depth assessment of political and strategic trends in Turkey’s relationship with the United States and NATO. At the Itime, the focus was necessarily on discord, disappointment, and growing concern: in the wake of a disastrous 2010, with memories of the Gaza flotilla incident and Turkish dissent on Iran sanctions still fresh, the horizon was clouded and turbulent. The intervening year and a half has brought a dra- defense as a way of reaffirming both Turkey’s role matic turnaround, however. Three major factors— as the alliance’s southern political anchor and the the increasing clash between Iranian and Turkish notion that common threats should be met with regional interests, Ankara’s disillusionment with the common action by democratic states (Iranian mis- Assad regime in Syria, and the NATO campaign in siles having replaced Russian tanks as the threat in Libya—have created a more promising landscape question). Another key priority will be using that for Turkey’s return to a strategic posture generally anchor position to support democratic tendencies aligned with the United States. To be sure, the shift in Arab countries undergoing uprisings. A third seen over the past year has not removed all major will be using the momentum from Ankara’s posi- irritants in Turkey’s Western relationships; Prime tive shift to prevent crises related to the political Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s strongman ten- nexus of energy, territory, and identity currently dencies are an example. Broadly speaking, though, enveloping Turkey, Israel, Cyprus, and the Euro- any strategic assessment of Turkey from the U.S. pean Union. This priority takes on growing impor- and NATO perspective must recognize the major, tance at a time when Cyprus is assuming the rotat- positive changes over the past eighteen months. ing EU presidency. Against the backdrop of the In a relationship marked over the past decade May 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, challenging more by crisis management than by opportunity, global and regional conditions demand vigorous the United States now has important policy open- U.S. efforts to build on the Turkey-NATO momen- ings with Turkey. The top priority should be lever- tum and ensure that strategic synergy between the aging Ankara’s commitment to NATO on missile two remains durable and effective. Richard Outzen, a foreign area officer in the U.S. Army, has served in a variety of command, staff, and liaison positions, including tours in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Turkey, and Germany. His research focuses on Middle East and Central Asian strategic affairs, language and culture, and civil-military relations. POLICY NOTES Historical Perspective the border, decreasing the number of forces available to threaten central Europe. Despite To understand the recent crisis and recovery in occasional student protests, U.S. and NATO Turkey’s relations with the West, one must bear in military forces in Turkey have essentially total mind the volatile nature of those relations in gen- freedom of movement. Turkey hosts these eral. Put in proper historical context, the disen- forces at roughly twenty-six installations, chantment of 2010 and renewed commitment of including intelligence-gathering sites, air bases, 2012 are by no means anomalous: missile launch detection facilities, naval sup- 1947–1952: Washington recognizes Ankara’s port facilities for the Sixth Fleet, and custodial critical role in stemming Soviet expansionism as units for a variety of nuclear weapons (see map the Cold War dawns and makes Turkey a focal for the geographic distribution of these sites). point of Marshall Plan aid. The Joint American In addition, Ankara hosts the headquarters of Mission for Military Aid to Turkey ( JAMMAT, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), later JUSMMAT) is formed to direct major con- the West’s security cooperation framework for struction, equipping, and training programs. The the area from Turkey to Iran and Pakistan. This United States funds and builds new airbases at all changes with the greatest rupture in mod- Diyarbakir, Eskisehir, and Adana (Incirlik), and ern Turkish-Western relations, the 1974 Cyprus upgrades about a dozen other major ground and crisis. Following Turkey’s occupation of north- air bases. By 1952, Turkey accedes to NATO and ern Cyprus, the United States embargoes fur- becomes a major contributor of combat troops ther arms sales or military support to Ankara. 1 to the UN force fighting in Korea. In retaliation, Turkey shuts down U.S. mili- 1964–1967: The first serious deterioration in tary facilities, veers toward nonaligned status, Ankara’s relations with Washington and NATO and enters a period of growing political crisis. occurs over violence between Turkish and Greek Ankara does not fully resume military coopera- communities on Cyprus. President Lyndon tion with Washington and NATO until after 3 Johnson writes a letter threatening not to sup- the coup of 1980. port Turkey in any Cyprus-related clash with 1990–1991: Turkey’s commitment to NATO the Soviets, and warning that Turkey cannot and the United States resurges in the 1980s— use NATO-provided equipment or resources an American-Turkish Council is formed in for any operation involving the island. By 1968, 1981, and a robust agenda of bilateral and alli- Turkish students are holding anti-American and ance exercises and support operations is back in anti-NATO protests, and some rioting occurs. place by mid-decade.4 The time seems ripe for This negative trend is reinforced by diplomatic an enterprising Turkish leader to take the next tension over the opium poppy trade. In the lat- step of fully placing the country in the West- ter part of the decade, Turkey tries to reduce its ern policy mainstream, and Turgut Ozal does Western alignment and improve ties with the just that in 1990, gambling that full support of Soviet Union and nonaligned nations.2 Operation Desert Storm will reap economic and 1974–1975: As the Soviets grow more asser- diplomatic gains commensurate with the risk he tive in the Eastern Mediterranean in the early will incur. In response, NATO steps up to Tur- 1970s, Ankara comes to recognize the shared key’s side, conducting airborne early warning Turkish-U.S.-NATO interest in maintaining (Operation Anchor Guard) and air defense (Ace robust deterrent capabilities on Turkish soil. Guard) efforts on Ankara’s behalf.5 Ozal earns By 1974, experts estimate that NATO forces warm personal thanks from President George in Turkey were forcing the Soviets to sta- H. W. Bush, who comes to consider him a close tion twenty-four ground divisions on or near personal friend and Turkey a great ally. 2 www.washingtoninstitute.org Bulgaria Black Sea Luleburgaz Tarzaburun Bartin Sinop Ortakoy Corlu Istanbul Samsun Kargapazari Izmit Pazar Persembe Karamursel Merzifon Belbasi Canakkale Murted Erzurum Balekisir Sivas Eskisehir Ankara Cigli Elmadag Sarkisla Iran NATO Headquarters Cakmak Malatya Izmir Erhac Diyarbakir Pirinclik Adana Mardin Yumurtalik Incirlik Mediterranean Sea Syria Iraq Cyprus U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE SITE NATO RADAR EARLY WARNING & TRACKING STATION U.S. MISSILE & NUCLEAR TEST MONITORING SITE U.S. COMMUNICATIONS STATION NATO AIR BASE Past and Present NATO Installations in Turkey POLICY NOTES 1998–2003: Events over the next decade do Turkish parliament’s refusal to authorize ground not pan out as Ozal had hoped, and Turkey is and air combat operations from its soil marked a left holding the bag. As the 1990s unfold, the stark breach with the fifty-year pattern of U.S.- country suffers escalating terrorist violence in the Turkish relations. This was not simply a mes- southeast, economic damage that contributes to sage about lingering unhappiness from a difficult a major crisis in 1994, a domestically unpopu- decade—it was the definitive end of an era in Tur- lar legacy operation in northern Iraq, increased key’s commitment to security collectivism with the political polarization, and an apparent decrease West under Washington’s lead. The failed parlia- in Western interest and support amid troubled mentary resolution (or tezkere) chilled U.S.-Turkish times.6 Ozal does not live to see the worst of it, military and diplomatic relations for the better part but many Turks remember 1991, rather than 2003, of a decade. Turkey would go on to provide modest as the year the wheels came off the relationship.7 support in Iraq (e.g., restricted overflight access and transit for noncombat supplies via ground convoy), It is not difficult to see why Turks in the 1990s but its abstention greatly complicated the Ameri- might have developed serious buyer’s remorse for can-led war effort. The ugly twin sister to the legis- previous support of the United States and NATO. lative fiasco was the Sulaymaniyah incident of July In addition to balking at “out of NATO area” oper- 2003, in which U.S. soldiers detained, blindfolded, ations near Turkey’s volatile southern and eastern and handcuffed Turkish special forces conducting a borders in the wake of the Gulf War, the alliance’s longstanding liaison and intelligence mission under European members increasingly dismissed Tur- joint agreement with regional Kurdish authorities. key’s security concerns altogether. Much of Europe The incident was deeply embarrassing for the Turks, refused to treat the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) sparking widespread outrage and causing a precipi- as a terrorist organization, with several giving sub- tous drop in support for the United States and the stantial tacit support to the group.8 And in February West among the Turkish public.12 2003, as another invasion of Iraq loomed, Europe explicitly rejected Turkish appeals under Article IV In short, Turkey’s relationship with the West has of the NATO treaty for protection against possible long been—and remains—a cyclical process.