United States Opinion from Munich to the Blitzkreig Barbara Evans

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Winter 1967 United States opinion from Munich to the Blitzkreig Barbara Evans

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UNITED STATES OFI!JIOi~ mo:: L::mrcrr TO' T:lE ELITZKriEIG

Barbara Evans January 16, 1967 Outline

Introduotion

I. The flbdd before Munioh. A. Revisonism. B. Isolationism. c. Roosevelt. II. Fall, 1939. A. Munich. B. Pogroms. III. Winter, 1938-1939. A. Roosevelt's new polloy. B. Isolationist reaotion. c. Publio reaction. N. Spring, 1939. A. Rape of Czeohoslovalda. l. Government reaction. a. Public reaction. B. Saturday Surprise. 1. Goverru1111nt intention. 2. Public reaction. v. Summer, 1939. A. Neutriil.ity legislation. B. Public mood. VIo. War, 1939. A. Gerlnan-Soviet pact. l. Government reaction. 2. Public reaction.

B. War. 1. Roosevelt. a. Reaction b. Attitude toward Europe. 2. Public reaction.

a. War. b. U.S. non-involvement. Introduction

Jl Q...4-CL ra "' I "._J) In the late nineteen-thirties 11 isolationism11 1M•l:· I- tiDt American a.t- titude~toward Europe. Basically, the term, used to describe that period, v.thi~ ~ .. c..,..~t...& refers to the belie.ts"Jt.hat the United States should h~ve no part in foreign q~arrels. T'nis paper will attempt to analyzo the feelings of the majority of Americans. Many ffiOn counselled non-involvement tor many reasons, and e:xtre~~sts ranged from thd Catholic priest, Father Coughlin, a man with definite pro-German sympathies, to Charles A. Lindberg, who thought that Hitler could not be beaten. Attention here will not be directed at theso extre:nely small fringe groups, but at the "average" American, as far as his thoughts can be known, and at the political leaders of the period, as far as they allow th6ir thoughts to be known. Heither will an attempt be r:i.a.de to de5cribe geographical variations in tho stren!!th of ieolation:i.sm, for tne polls do not reveal significant differences in reactions to events. They show that the !-iiddle and +~Ls ~~; lo.ro .. Far West tended to be slightly stronger in their adherence to tlole ee.n-i'- ' #, , -?~t.. ~s than were the East nnd South, and ~ observation is s~pported by the fact that isolationist leaders in Congress represented the former areas. The data, however, are not sufficient to permit any further gen- eralizat.ion. Chapter 1 The Mood Before Munich

Isolationism came to a peak in the turmoil of the thirties. both at hom$ and abroad. The emotional shock of the Depression coupled with the aggressive activittes of new despots in Europe and Asia convinced Am.erican' that they should concentrate on rdconetructing their own demoralized country. As the decade wore on the conviction grew that strong legal b.1r:::-iers should be erected to keep the United State~ freo of all foreign entn.nglemants. On May l, 193t Congref:a, led by its more extreme isolationist elements, passed the Neutrality Act. It decreed that, when war broke out abroad, the President should declare that hostilities existed, and upon his declaration a battery of restrictions would go into effect. In addition to outlawing all trade in munitions, the bill prohibited non-military ccmmerce with belligerents on any basis other than "cash and carry."

Section 3 said that no one would be allowed to deal in the bonds of or extend any credit to these countries. Even voluntary contributions were prohibited. In addition, the President could forbid the entry of any warship of a belligerent into United States ports, and no Americans~ ninety days after the initial proclame.tion, would be allowed to travel l on vessels of the warring countries. Behind this act stood the belief that the United States should have

' . no foreign responsibilities outside the Western Hemisphere. According to the revisionist interpretation of World War I then popular, guilt tor starting the conflict lay equally on the sho~tlders of all combat.ah~.. 3 2

The ide~ was carried even further, and some Americans claimed that Europe '.-ms incapable of solving her proble:ns pencefully, citing as evi-

dence t~1~ saber-rattling of :Utler and H1.lssolini. A ·writer summed up the comnon opinion by saying, "War occurs in Europe about every thirty 2 years a:ld it has done so since about the beginning of time. 11

Why, then, had the United States, a peace-loving nation, fought for the Allies? Three forces had played on her for three different reasons.

Preside:it Wilson and his highest aides were warmongers. Britain and France had invested heavily in this country and thus roused the capita- listic affections of big business. Combining with the manufacturers, o_,QJ)

One essential point in revisionist theory was that the crusade had been fruitless. American troops had won the war for the Allies, but they had lost the fight for ideals. At the Versailles Conference Clemenceau and Lloyd George revealed that the Central Powers had no monopoly on a desire f~r conquest. The vindictive settle:nent imposed there on Germany had as its purpose the gratification of French and British greed. In their lust for land, they disregarded the well-being of the conquered and, therefore, directly created the conditions which were to produce

Hitler.

Americans believed they had something to learn from their World ';;ar I experience. They had sent troops to die for the Allies, and the Allies had proved no more dedicated to making the world safe for democracy than were the Central Powers. The country al~o remembered the horror of the world's first experience with mechanized warfare, and the mass violence seemed even worse, because it had been pointless. Senator Gerald P.

Nye, usually an extre:nist, sum.~ed up public feeline when he said, early in 1939, "I r:iake bold to asse~that 20 years ago we were led like lambs to the slaughter into the most cruel and ~erciless and useless war the 3 world has ever witnessed."

American foreign policy, therefore, should pursue a course consis- tent with Washington's pronounce:nents against entangling alliances. The President must stand for the ideals of democracy, he should preach those ideals to the world, but he must never go beyond verbal encouragement, and he should stay aloof from even peaceful settlements of foreign 4 quarrels.

Revisionism appealed to A.~erica in the thirties, because it re- fleeted other basic beliefs then held. The country had entered World

War I by voluntary choice, for it had not been ph~~jcally menaced. War twenty years later would be a repeat of the first, with airplanes and strategic bombing, but it would remain in Europe. If the country wanted to stay at peace, therefore, the oceans wo~ld protect her from attack, just as they always had. "~+; ..::>~ ..... And the oo:w:ltry would stay at peace. As Senator Atthur H. Van- denburg said, " •••We are not, we cannot be, the world's protector or the 5 world's policeman." As long as the United States could import the necessary raw materials, she could re~ain aloof from the perpetual foreign quarrels and solve her own problems, which included a depression still unconquered. The first reaction of a child of the Atomic Age to such apparent blindness is, "You cannot wish an a'._".gressor away. 11 Unfortunately this lesson had to be taught by Hitler not onlJ• to America, but also to Eng- land and France. In 193g, United States public opinion was shocked and alarmed by the ruthlessness of Nazism, whicn the people saw as the most

SS ()C\..,+-1 u :' powerfQl form of oppression the world had yet produced, but the coantr, was n~t aware of the danger it posed. k~erican)considered Hitler a madman who had victimized the German people, but they hoped, as did the rest ~f the world, that he could be reasoned with. Few men realized the lengt.1s to which he was willing to go, nor did they know how far Germ.any would follow him. When the events of 1938-1939 gave a clear indication of his megalomania, Americans grew even more afraid of war. The fear was n~t, however, that the country would be attacked, but that she would once again be duped into renewing her crusade for democracy, a crusade that no one could pursue without disaste~.

Joining these beliefs was another which the cynical may say ex- plains all of isolationism. Americans thought Britain and France, lead- ing the smaller, free European countries, could defeat the Axis, if war finally came. On September 13, 1938, a Gallup Poll reported that 86% f I 0 D those questioned had faith in the victory of the democracies. One year later, when Poland lay in ruins from the blitzkreig, 71% answered the 7 same question the same way.

To place too much emphasis on the importance of this belief, however, is to ignore the facts. Hitler conquered all of Europe and ·;:e bo~cW.. ""En~i I\ a'd:e se :SPitaia to rt1:el.5re before the United States entere~ the war, and if, The ide~ was carried even turther, and some Americans claimed that Europe was incapable of solving her proble:ns peacefully, citing as evidence t:1e saber-rattling or Hitler and Mussolini. A writer swruned up the comnon opinion by saying, "War occurs in Europe about every thirty . 2 years a11d it has done so since about the boginning of time." Why, then, had the United States, a peace-loving nation, fought for the Allies? Three torcea had played on her tor three different reaaons.

Prc£id.e;1t Wilson and hif' highef>t aides were warmongers. Britain and

Fran::e had invested he~vily in this country ~:nd t~,,_t: r.)used the capita listic affectione of big business. Combining with the manufacturers, the President addes his battle cries to theirs and to those or tho pro- paganda fiowing from Britain. As a rar.ult of this collusion, the Ameri- can people were led to believe that they were embarking on a great crusade. One essential point in revisionist theory was that the crusade had been fruitless. American troops had won the war for the Allies, but they had lost the fight tor ideals. At the Versailles Conference Clemenceau and Lloyi George raven.led that the Contx•nl Powars had no monopoly on a desire f~r conquest. The vindictive settlo~ent imposed tnere on Germany had az its purpose the gratification of French and British greed. In their lust tor land, they disregarded the well-being of the conquered and, therefore, directly created tho conditions which were to produce Hitler.

Americans believed they had something to learn from their World r.-;ar I experienoe. They had sent troops to die for the Allies, and the Allies had proved no more dedicated to making the world safe for de~ocracy than were the Central Powers. The country al~;o remembered the horror of the world's first experience with mechanized warfare, and tne mass violence seemed even worse, because it had been pointl.,ss. Senator Gerald P.

Nye, usually an extra:nint, s~~ed up public feeling when he said, early in 1939 1 "I r:iake bold to asset"hhat 20 years ago we were led like lambs to the slaughter into the rnost cruel and ;nerciltJss and useless war the 3 world has ever witnessed."

American foreign policy, therefore, should pursue a course consis- tent with Washington's prono:mce:nents against untaneling alliance"• The

President mu3t stand for the ideals of de:11ocracy, he should preach those

.igeale to the world, but he must never go beyond verbal encouragement, and he should stny aloof from even peaceful settlements of foreign 4 quarrels.

Revisionism appealed to Araerica in tne t.hh·ties, be:ca.use it re- fiected other basic belief's then held. The country haci. en~crad, ·;.Jorld

War I by voluntary cnoice, for it had not been p~uicNJ.y menaced. War twenty years later wo\lld be a. repeat of the first, with airpla.nes and strategic lJombing, bl.lt it would remain in Ehrope. If the country ".·:anted to stay at peace., theref,,re, the oceans wo-.ll.d protect her i'rom attack., just as they always had. ~+·,o" An1 the ae·:tR~r.T would. stay at peace. As Senator Ai:thur H. Van- denburg said, " •••We are not, we c&nnot be, the world's protector or the 5 world's policeman." As long as the United States could import the necessary raw materials, she could re~Jlin aloof from the perpetual foreign quarrels and solve her own problems, which included a depression still unconquered. 1

The first reaction of a child of the Atomic Age to such apparent

blindness is, 11 You cannot wish an aggressor away." Unfortunately this

lesson had to be taught by Hitler not only to America, but also to Eng-

land and Fran~e. In 1933, United States public opinion ~as ~~ocketi and

alar:ned by tha ruthlessness of Uazism, whicn tile people saw a5 the most 't"'\o...4-i o" powerful form of oppression the world had ;rl!Jt produced, but tho • 11 "•b~

was n3t m:are of tho daz:ger it ~:>setl. Amoricaryconsidered tiitler a

madman 1·1ho had victi:rl.zecl tne Geri:l

rest :>f the world, that he could be reasoned with. fow men realized the

lengtas to which he was willing to go, nor did they know now far Germany

would follow nim. When the events of 1938-1939 gava a clear indicntic-n of his megalomania, A.'llericans grew even more afraid of war. Tue foar was not, however, that the country would be attacked, but that she would onae again be duped into renewing her crU.l!ade for democracy, a cru-

sade t.nat no one could pursue \dthout ~t.. Joining these beliefs was another which the cynical may say ex- plains all of isolat.ionis:n. Americans thougnt Britain and France, lead-

ing tl1e smaller, free European countries, could defeat the Axis, if war

finally cam~. On ~eptember 13, 1933, a Gallup Poll rq:.orted tb~t 8G% 0 £ 6 those questioned had fuith in the vict.ory of the dcwocracies. On·~ year later., waen Poland lay in rllins from the blitzkreig, 71% answered t.he 7 same question the same way. To place too much emphasis on the importance of this belief, how-

ever, is to ignore the facts. Hitler conquered sll of Europe and'!'El bo ...... ~w .Qaaed Britain ta Ptteel:e before the iJnited States entered the war, and if, in 1941, anyone cherished the illusion th~t England could 3top the J\xis

from European do::Unation, 1 t was a belief based on na inability to read

the ne\rspapers. And yet the country dlci not intervc::ne, for isolationism was mo:re thar:. ju3t the opinion that Germany co:.111 bo beaten.

The government which l~d the country shared many of these beliefs.

Througrtout the following pages references to political decisions in Wash-

ineton will na.inly concern Roosevelt's attitudes. Willia..'Il Langer and

Everett Gleason, in,~ Challenge !g Isoln.:t.ion:l9J7-1940, conri.f.m the,

popular idea that th~ President was as indep~ndent iR'forsign policy as

he wnR in d~mestia. For r.dvice l1e tarned. to Cordell Hull, the .::acre- tary of State, Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State, Secretary of tho Treasury Henry Horgenthau,Jr., Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring, and 8 Secret~ry of the Navy Claude A. Swanson. ; ,... ·.\.\'\.i ~ Hull and Welles, the most important men ~~ study, seem to have varied in Roosevelt's attentions, for ne was more pDrsonally drawn to

the latter and tended to snow tfti:e""",~ favoritism, a fact which infuriated Hull. Whatever the personality clashes, the President did depend on 9 his Secretary of State, and the two did share co~ill~n goals and methods. Tr1ese goals and ::1ethods inspired at the time considerable contro-

versy. A popular myth, propounded most vocally by extreme isolationists, V'lo- ... ~a.-""' ... ,.....&) relate3 that Roosevelt consciously ~ this country into war. This conspiracy theory echoes revisionist wishful thinking about Wilson, and it has little empirical backing. 'l'he President left no diary; he was abra.ys an enig!natic figure; so one searching !or his motives must be content with memoirs of first hand observers and with the record of the foreign policy he p~rsued.

·,·:r1en fie took office in 1933 :1e obviuusly concentratc:d on tl1e aew

Deal. Later, w:1.en isolationist frenzy produced the ;foutralit;;· Act, there 10 is no evidence that he tried to block it. Roosevelt was fresh fro:n a landslide election; r1e later considereJ Lh

'foe evidence points to the fact that the President shared the i solationist views of his country1nen until Llie ne\'iS fro;,, Zurope convinced him that he ha.d been wrong. Ovi:;r tL<::: course of 1933-1939 !1c: apparently never seriously considered sending J..rnerican truops auroa

This paper will be an at tempt to understand how the COi.rntry reacted to the events of the year that plunged Zurope into war. All who read must be cautioned against thinking in terms of facts alone. Isolationism was a mixture of rationality and emotion, and one simply cannot say the country weighed what it saw as the evidence and came to the conclusion that it need not become involved. The mood of the late thirties blended with political reality an intense fear of war, a. disillusion:nent with

E'.lrope, and a faith that the 0ni~eJ Sta.tes would be all right if left alone. To disregard the complexities of thto.: era's thought is to do a disservice to the poeple who lived it. Chapter 2 Fall, 1938

The Munich Crisis began with methods of intimidation that were to become familiar to A.~ericans in the course of the next yenr. Hitler ranted about Czech atrocities against Germans in the Sudetenland, called for annexation of that territory on the gounds that it rightfully be- longed to his country, fomented terrorism by Nazis there, and massed troops on the border. When war ~eemed inevitable, Neville Chamberlain1 decided to intervene, flying to Godesburg on September 22, The mseting with Hitler was stormy, as the Gerrr~n dictator refused to make conces- 1 sions and de.'D.anded evacuation of the frJ.detenland by September 28. The British Prime :·:iiuster ;naneged to convince him to set back the date to the first or October and then returned to London to confer with his cabinet. Meanwhile, England sent a message to the State Decartment asking Roosevelt for a state:nent approving Chamberlain• •s peace efforts. The President and his aides agreed that no such announcement would be made, for it wo:.ild enable Britain to shift,, partial responsibility "for any 2 settlement on the United States. The next few days saw the situation in Europe grow more desperate, and finally Roosevelt felt that he should take some action. Accordingly, a letter to Hitler was drafted, despite the disapproval of Hull. The SecretarJ of State thought force alone would change the dictator's mind, that an appeal coQld only inflate his already magnified opinion of his own power, and that as a result the United States would be branded an 3 appeaser. Pierrepont Moffat, Chief of the Division of European Affairs, had recorded in his diary as early as September 17 that top officials in The State Department feared Chamberlaine intended to sell Czechoslovakia 4 to buy peace.

~'hen the situation reached the crisis stage on September 26 1 Roose- ~t."4 \4 t, 5 velt'" letter •re:e eeft'b. He urged negotiation, but deleted from the State Department version of the message an offer of Ur.ited States• aid 6 in reaching a settlement. Instead, the President stressed American non- involvement, writing, "The United States has no political entanglements. It is caught in no mesh of hatred. Elements of all Europe have formed 7 its civilization."

Hitler's reply repeated his u~ual claims that Germany had been robbed in 1919. Sudeten Germans were being discriminated against, and no one could blame Germany if such atrocities forc6d her to go to war 8 for her people.

On the night of September 26, th~ dictator renewed his violent de-

nunciations in the Sportzplatz in Berlin. Again, Roosevelt sent a ::ies-

sage proposing negotiation, and Hull cabelled United Stc..tes diploraats to

encourage the governments with which they dealt to urge peaceful set- 9 tle;nent. E;urope and ~r.'.lt::rica were terrified at the threat of wc.r, but,

then, on 3e~tember 29, France, Great Brit~in, Italy, and Ger~any, confer- ,..-----.._ ring without the c~~reached an agreement to partition tte tiny country. Hull exJ)ressed the official United States government reaction in a press conference the next day. "As to immediate peace results.• l ., they 11 they !}he terms of the settlemenfil afford a universal sense of relief1 10 he said. He made no comment on those terms themselves. Jnlike the State Department, Roosevelt initially welcomed Ml1nich as 11 the first of r.iany negotiated settlements. He could not have cherished that nope long. On October 3, William c. Bullitt, ambassador to Paris, dispatched to Hµll : . ·Q. record or a conversation with Edouard Dala~~" •' "-'- f"Q... ~o > president of the French Council of Ministers,. "Dala.diejf. •• realizes fully that ~he meeting in Munich was an immense diplomatic defeat for France and England and recognizes that unless Frnnce can recover a united na- tional spirit to confront the future a fetal situation will nrise within 12 the n~t year." Confirming this opinion of the settlement, Secretary of the Interior Hnrold L. Ickes wrote in his diary on October 9, "There is a vowing impreseion that the Czechoslovak solution was a totally 13 disgr'!ceful thing •••• " Press reaction to the Munich crisis was as uncertain as was that in Washington. Few observers fully grasped the true nature of Hitler's aggressiveness, no one was certain what he wanted, and many clung to the comforting thought that his declarations of protecting Germans were

'J', genuine. l!!u! and Newsweek expressed the hope that the meeting had set 14 a pre:edent for future neeotiation of differences, : . .>:~·~-+tour other . ,/ major periodicals predicted that Hitler•s appetite hac been whette~ not 15 sated.

~ 4-. i.kt,. the press, the A.'llerican people reacted ambivalently toward the crisis. The great majority thought Germany's claims were unjusti- fied, but many also felt Britain and France took the right course in chosing appeasement. The same poll which yielded these results reported that 60% or those· contacted felt there was now a greater possibility or . 16 war, and, t., ct-..;i..\:is later, the number had ollrr.bed to 74%. As for United Stutes policy_, few wnntad Roosevelt to cdticize Hit- 17 ler ~nd Mussolini during the crisi~. The vnst ;:najority thought the o-:>untry should st!\y out or Europenn quarrels, and only about one thlrd

of those anr:wering pollcters in late o~+a.bc.r pla.c:.11d confidence ln the Preddent's nbilit:; to avoid war wit.heat tho guarantees of stronger 18 neutrality legislation. A significant poll reported t:1at. t:"le m.lj1Jrity

of Americans felt that. if n. ::iajor European war came, t:1a JnH.ed Stat.es 19 woi11d b~ drawn into it. The people had be~ri badly fri3i1te~13d. by Hit-

ler• s militancy and they saw the d11n,~er of 1917 loc>:n.ing again •.

Roosevelt., watching Europe sim:nar through October, was beginning

to alter his concept of the American role in •o..... ·~onfrontation with

Germany. On October ll)he called for $300.,0001 000 more to be spent on 20 defensq,in that fiscal year, and in a speoc:h the next day he strao~ed r 21 the need for preparedness.

The~1 on October 19/ Ambassador Joseph Kennedy announced ill London ) . that he thought the dictatorships and the democracie2 shoQld ranko a con- oerted effort to work together for world peace. Reporters in the United States and abroad clamored to know if the speech had indicated a change . 22 in foreign policy, and Roosevelt was forced to go on radio a week later to calm their fears. Once again stressing the need for adequate defense, the President made it abundantly clear that he planned no rapproachment 23 with the Nazis. "There can,be no peace," he said_, "if the reign or law 24 is to be replaced by a recurrent sanctification or sheer force." In November violence burst out again in Europe, this time producing the strongest anti:-German reaction in the United States to date. A Po ~~ l \ t.cO llsh Jew in Paris ·filled a German diplomat, and, on November 9 and 101 ., ~ "H·~~\ ':\ ..:--s4.dJ Germany GXplod~d in bloody po:;romri and '/\legislation which deprived the

Jews of their few remaining rights.

The President's reaction wa3 more thi~ time than n proteoting letter. At a pres9 conference November 15, he announced the recall or Am- -\.o G-¢ "'" r--.o.. f'I 1.-\. 2 '5 basaarlor~H11gh R. l'iilson for consultation. Mr. Wilson never returned to Berlin.

Press ~.nd public were equally horrified by the atroc:tties. The

pogro11s, they felt, had been del.iberately planned and exocuted by the

Hazis on tho oost obvio·1s of ;iretexts. The ~ Renubl.1.c wrote,, "Not

since the end or the Great Wn.r hna Gerr.12.ny been a~ hated in the United 26 StatGn ns she is todny for her current treatment of the Jews."

t.mb~ssad.or Hans !:!. Dieckhoff 1 lry.ter recalled in retaliation for

Roose'felt' s ac"!:.i.on, re::"Jrted to Berlin th1t those A-:ierlc'\."ln who had been

unco::i':l.itted tn their ~ttitude towar1 Germ~ny bef?~e we~e now definitely 27 ~nti-..:.'Jer:n'ln. With s:t~ok~d a•1rprize he wrote 1 "Yesterday in nn: old Pro- test.ant church in lfansach:1setts they went eo far !ls. to have a llabbi \!iCJ preach for the fir~t ti~e, departing from a 300-year-old tradition, in order to sho\·1 that in a situ~tion like the present they stand l;>y the 28' Jews. 11

Anti-German sentiment di4 not mean a change in isolationist senti~ ment, ho\\"9ver. The people still felt Europe was not their battleground.

Changes were coming, but t~ey were mail'll.y in Washington. Chapter 3 \·iinter, l 9.3S-.39

It may have b~en the pogroms that finally convinced Roosevelt that

he must return to the concept of collective security; probably all the

reasons for his decision will never be kn~lm. Certainly pre3sura wa.s put

o:i him by hl.s advise?-5. As early as September 31 cabinet members favored \ ~l aid to the democracies in eve~wcy po:rnible oh•Jrt or war.

In ifovember William 6:lllltt returne1 fr,;,,.... "P~r\S. for cons'.llta- ti.on and joined hie colle<:.gues in urging ::iov'3s to allow occ-nomic !\id to

Brit.sin and Fr~nce. Tne ambassador felt Europe wo:..ild be at wt.r in the

near future, which meant that even if the Unitod ;;t.'.\tes co'.lld stay ou.t,

s~e ·"''Ould be auriouely hurt by the effect on ,,;orld trade. Britain and

France nuet be supported, for they were the only buffers protecting her 2 from Gerir.any. Hull, as !1revio·1oly stated, also considered Hitler a

greater in·:mace ttrnn did :!toosevelt, ."nd he, to,>, felt all mon.suret; pas-

sible 5~o~ud bo taken to !Jr~vent ·..;a:".

Thus f;-."!' the Pre:;ident had n.Jt t~

n) longer stay coapletely aloof, he bo3an to for~ulato a pl~n to deal

wtth Hitler, for it, was obvious to him by then that words were not

enough. Jn Novembor 10, he ·.. 1rote in a private ldtter, 11 0ur British

friends must begin to fish or cut bait. The dictator threat from Europo

is a good deal aloser to the United States and tne America~ Continent -\-lr\. t\_.,\'\ 4 ~it was before." Roosevelt chose to return the country to the system of collective security which she had abandoned in the mid-thirties. The President would continUB to use all his powers of persuasion to maintain peace in europe, but if such efforts failed, America must be ready to stand be ni.nd Britain and Franoe economically. Roosevelt still believed that the 5 clemocracies could defeat the Axis if they were properly supplied.

During the last two months of 1938, the President cia..1.>)~G:.& a pro +o 'SCLl\d) -+-Co~,..~ w \...\ ~ "'""o.__\~ ~\ \ gramA~for a bulld-up in the sise of the armed forces and in arms production for hemispheric defense. His goas appear:)to have been three- 6 fold: (1) he wanted the United States to be prepared for any eventuality;

~2) he wanted to have munitions to sell to the democracies; (3) he wa.i- ted Hitler to be assured that American aid would be more than mere moral support. Three obstacles to the realization of his goals confronted the Presi- dent. First there were the pBople, second, the extreme isolationists in Congress, and thirs, the Neutrality Act. The presence of the arms em bargo and the absence of the cash and carry provision (It was due to ex pire May 1.) would block any atte:npt to aid Britain and France if they went to war. To have these sections of the Act changed, Roosevelt would have to break down the resistance both on and off Capitol Hill.

On January 41 he delivered the'State of the Union Message!' to Con gress, and in it 'ht. ·c:.o..Uedl for reviews ot existing neutrality legis- 7 a lation and of the means tor hemispheric defense. 11 ••• The l«>rld has grown so small," the President said, " ••• that no nation can be safe ••• so long as any other powerful nation refuses to settle its grievances 9 at the council table." Definite proposals followt!d in other ziessages sent to Congress in

January. The first called for preparations for i1er.listiheric de.f t!nse in

the form of stronger air forces, stockpiles of i te;;is rer~uirint:; a long

ti:ne to manufacture and of scare goods v;hic:1 had to be imported, im- prove:nents in coastal defenses, and better fortifications to prott:lct the 10 11 Canal Zone. The second requested appropriations to expand the l.ir Force.

In response to these proposals, isolativnists sprang to their feet, bitterly protesting any change in neutrality legislation. Then came two incidents whicn they could, and did use, to h:igh advc:ntd.ge. lin January 23, a bomber on a tr<.iining mission crashed in California, and the nev;s got to the press that a French official had bt:en on board. Isolationists all wer the coJ.ntry scree.med their objections to such a securit.y violo.tion and forced Roosevt:lt to ad1ait four days later t..ilat rie liad secretly authorized the sale of ple:.nes to Fr&:1;e.

The President then ca:l_led the :~u tar~· Affairs Co:~..:ni ttee to the ·,foite

House to soothe its -r~f..fled feathers. After the :r1et:ting tb.f.f-.,story leakt:d to the press t:-.at Roosevelt had said, 11 The American frontier is on the 12 Rhine." Again t!'-.e isolE.tionists seethed, and Senator ;.;ye led t:-,e chorus of opposition by refusing to attend the :-:ilite.ry J.ffairs Cor:i:nittt:::e mt.::etings 13 until their procedure \'las raade public.

·;:-nether the peo;:ile ree.cted as violently e:.s Con~rees is doubt.t::u.l, but t'."le President felt he had to anewer his critics; so, on February J, he. called a press conference to restate his postioi:i. Roosevelt denied flatly that he had ever made the sta ter:1ent about the .:1.hi.ne, labelling the story 14 a "deliberate lie." The govern:nent stood for four principles in foreign policy: (1) free -world tra;de; (2) no entangling alliances; (J) Jisarrr;ament; t.4..a freedom. He had not, nor wo:..lid he ever, depart fro;;i the traditional 15 position of the ~nited State$. The announcement was designed to calm the public, not to appease Congress, for Roonevelt rarely conferred with Congressionnl leaders on

foreign policy. He seems to have thought, ~~th conniderablc justificn-

tion, that little could bo gained by trying to plncate the extreme iso- lationiats, and moGt of his appeals for support of Britnin and France 16 were directed at the people.

The press reacted to these incidftnts with apprehension. They saw the ?resident's moves as attempts to frighten Hitler, as well as mea sures to insure adequate defense. Defense was important, but few felt the dictator would pay much attention to United States• action, and all concurred in believing that he was not satisfied, but only waiting. Public reaction was much the same. From the three month vantage point, most Americans still saw l'.unioh as the best that could have been

done with a bad situation. A poll reported that 49.2% of those ques~

tioned blamed the crisis on Hitler's lust for power and 24% on Germa:ny•a 17 ~ need for raw materials. The majority thought, as it had in September,(a•L O,.;ii; C..~p+ that if there should be a European war the United States would be drawn f" · "4 lS in. Another poll revealed that 56% or those contacted felt the democracies, including America, should stop Hitler from taking any more ter- 19 ritory, but then Hitler had not moved for three months. Unlike the more violent isolationists in Congress, most of the American people agreed with Roosevelt's rearmament proposals, 86% sup :ZD porting a larger navy, 82% a larger army, and 90% a larger air force. A majority, although smaller, also favored the sale of planes to France 21 on a cash and carry basis. Americans in January, 1939, a period of relative ceJ.CT, temporarily forgot the stories of tho devilish munitions maker::; and bec:ir:e more pro-Allies as they grew more anti-,A1xis.

The old fears were still there, howevor, and Roosevelt knew it.

Ickes records in his diary a lunch conversation l:ith the Pre3idont,

January 28. Roosevelt said that if iiitlcr gained control of the s:nnll.

S-:.iropea."1 countries only, he could .otill endanger the United Sta.tea economically. ickee, ~re of an interventionist that the Chief Executive, replied that the people should be told. "He \liooseveltj said that it woald be absolutely impossible for him or for me to go on the air and talk to the World [si~ as we were talking. The peoplo simply would not 22 believe him." Chnpter 4. Spring, 19.39

ThrouGhout Februnry the isolntionictc continued to scre3r.l in Con- gress nnd ln the r.cwa ncdic., but Roocevelt ignor~d thc:-:1 and concentrated on reports from nbro~d. In lntc Jnnunry rumors came that Hitler would 1 move by the end of tho next month agoinst ifostern Europe, but suboo- quently the news grew m:>re cheerful. Anthony J, Biddlu, ambnsnador to

Pol~.nd, wrote thn.t that ecvement .felt tho d.i..ctntor would t.urn h:tB at- 2 tention to the colonies lost in the Pence of Veronillos. Kennedy's d11Jpatches reported that Chnrr.berlain/ thought Hitler w:mld tRke no action, that n Russo-German pact wa::; unlikely, and thnt any crisis which aro!3e 3 could be dealt with peacefully. Even the dispatches sent from Berlin / 4 by Attache Trilillan Smith were optimistic.

One note of M1at should havo bean tal~en a.a a warning did come to Oi 1.,_~~ ...' l""Q..~ Washington. Prentiss Gilbert, chargl'(in Ger:nany, wrote on February 24 that nny and all action depended on Hitlor'e will, which was notoriously 5 h!ird to predict. Soon thereafter, the dictator proved the correctness or the Acerican'a estimation and shattered government optimism.

On March 13, Berlin newspapers once more carried stories of Czech atrocities against Germans, The same day Bullitt reported that Hitler planned to move first on Czechoslovakia and then on Rwnania, and that 6 Brita.in and France were doing nothing, Raymond H. Geist, the new charge'~~«-~ in Berlin, confirmed this dismal !orecast, writing the same day that an 7 attack on the diS!'Ilembered neighbor was definite. That day Czech President Emil Hacha met with Hitler. He was con- pletely helpless before the d•ctator,' . German troops crossed the border, an~ on March l~ Hitler entered Prague. a Roosevelt was furious. He had not trusted the Austrian before, but neither had he expected aggression to be so blatant, so swift, and so easy. Sumner Welles levelled a stinging attack on the final rape or Czechoslovakia two days later, saying, "It is manifest that acts of wan- ton lawlessness and or arbitrary force are threatening world peace and 9 the very structure or modern vivillzation.11

~~~, Roosevelt had been debating since February whether he should return Ambassador Wilson to Berlin. The strain in relations with Germany had seemed to be easing, but the Presi dent feared the effect the action :night have on American public opin ion and on Hitler's estimation or United States• resolve to aid Britain 10 and France. By March 13 he had decided to send Wilson back, tor the ~~~~~ ll diplomat was anxious to go. On .?I.arch l~f\all such plans were cancelled. l~H.. -t""O,_._"tS) \,.., \-"' -Motta~ also speculated that Roosevelt was considering a complete diplomatic break with Germany. He rejected, however, suggestions from Bullitt that he soundly renounce Hitler's action and go personally to 12 Congress to call for repeal of the Neutrality Act. At a cabinet meeting the seventeenth, Roosevelt presented his program or reprisals. The United States government would refuse to recognize the protectorate Hitler had set up in Prague. Countervailing duties would finally be levied against Germany in retaliation for taJCes it had already put on American goods, and the special privileges which had been 13 granted to impi;>rts fro~ Czechoslovakia were revoked.

The press, as outraged as the government at Hitl~r's actiun, declared that the dictator had finally revealed his true nature. Some periodicals expressed surprise, some said it was to be expected, but all

agreed that any pretense of righting the wrongs done to German minorities was ridiculous. The march into Czechoslovakia should teach all who watched that Germany was capable of unlimited rapacity and treachery. Among most Americans, the reaction was the same. The German dhargb d' affaires in lfashington, Hans Thomsen, reported that the f;i.lblic felt Hit- ler was never again to be trusted and that his desires for conquest were 14 not yet sated. In the minds of most men, the dictator had come to re- present an enemy of every value they cherished. 0" k 14. ,..c.L.,. l -; Yet still the aloofness remained. ~ielles telephoned Bullitt/\ and, when summing up the American attitude toward the aggression, reflected, "It is a reaction to sor:1ething horrifying and shoc!dng, but not per- 15 sonally connected •••• "

An incident in late February illustrates the strength~of ant.:i:.:Qer- ,msn feeling in America when the ifazis acted closer to ho:ne. On ·,:ashington's birthday a rally of 20,000 members of the German~Arr.eric~n Dund was held at Hadison Square Garden. Police stood guard in l.:.rge numbers, but, even so, violent demonstrations against the ffibclting occurred in the streets surrounding the auditorium. The German consul general in Hew

York, Borchers, wrote to Berlin that A~ericans saw the bund as an attempt to weaken the country from within, and he urged his government to 16 dissociate itself from the organization. Throughout the year now under consideration, the Nazi organization drew little attention in press and polls; so one can assume the people generally disregarded iL. J.. rall;.,- on ',-iasl1ington 1 s birthday, however, garbed in all the respectibility of trauitional Americo.n patriotism, was a~parently more than ~-Jew Yorkers could tolerate. When. vit:·.\ring Bitler from a safe distance, their hatred of him could b1::: detached, but ifazi activity in their own country disgusted, inc-.;nsed, and perh.:..ps tlV<:::u frightened thern.

:fows from Europe in tile wet::ks follm'iini:; the seizure of Czechoslo- vakia contin'..led to dominate the front pages. On !·Iarch 23, Lithuania, under pressure, ceded the seaport of :-:emel to Ger;11any. A week la ttir

Britain and France announced unqualified support of Poland. On April 7, r.:ussolini marched on :..1bania.

The reports pouring into the State Depart•Hent wtlre even more alarming. Geist wrot.e from Eerlln that no om: could prt::c.iict 1-1;1=.1t wou:::..u ila}J- p.:ln next. The Germ~ms hac.l a sense of mission, lie felt., wi1ich rnd.c.ie t.l1cir aggressiveness ff.ore than just a drive for lC1nd. T111::: ut::xt H1oves vwulc.l Le 17 eastward, and no a:uount of appease;at:::nt would have an;y bt::n1:::flcial 1:::fft::ct.

Roosevelt. decided d.t this point to make anot.;1er attempt at talking

Hitler into p1:::ace. ':ii1en he told null of :1is plan to send a :icuss in conference only trade and disarmament, two issues about which she had 20 always been willing to talk. The offer, regardless of Roosevelt's statements to the contrary, was a departure from the withdrawal of the last four years, but Ameri- cans, possibly welcoming any attempt to re~toro calm, reacted favorably, 21 although few thought it would have any effect. Then the7 waited tor the reply'.

Mussolini 1 s answer came in a speech denouncing Roosevelt on April 20. Little attention was paid to him, however, for everyone knew his German master would give the real Axis answer. Bullitt reported that Hitler was angry that Roosevelt had f:elt called upon to meddle in Europe, but that he thought he must make some 22 reply to such a direct challenge. It came in the Reichstag speech of April 28. The Austrian was in a devastatingly sarcastic mood, and, after reiterating f:oz>.tibc t

crous fashion, and then prefaced each robuttal with a clipped, 11 Answer1 11 which convulsed the Nazis before him.

Europe could settle its problems bott~r, he said, if those not in-

volved would stay at home and tend to their own affairs. Tho unit~d Stntes was calling for an international conference, and yet Hitler re

meobered that, at the international conference at Ve~sailles, America had done nothing to prevent the rape of Germany. In reply to the Presi- dent's list of countries not to be attacked, the Austrian said he had

contacted all of them nnd none felt threatened, but if they requested a

guarantee of safety, he would certainly be more than nappy to give it. Drawing the speech to a close, Hitler, always an actor par excel- lence, said ha'I!bly, "Mr. Roosevelt! I fully understand that the v•st- ness of your nation and the immense wealth of your country allows you to ~, . -gee! responsible for the history of the whole world •••• I, sir, am 23 placed in a much more modest and smaller sphere." He then, modestly, 24 painted a picture or hie role ae savior of Germany. Roosevelt was probably tu.rious, but there was nothing he could do. His offer had been ridiculed out of existence. Perhaps he found comfort

in the fact that his punpose of laying blame on the Axis for any war to

come ~~uld be fulfilled and that his message had placed the United States 25 firmly in the position of opposing all future aggression. Public reaction to the Reichstag speech was divided. Moderates thoueht it closed the door on any chance of peace; some isolationists saw a glimmer of hope in what they thought was a requeat for definite 26 peace proposals. Those ieolationists who were not so optimistic felt the dictator's intransigence was even more reason for etaying uninvol- 27 ved.

~·f.eanwhile;ths attitude toward nid to Europe had been changing. As the country became more anti-Ger.:nan, it gl'ew more willing to give eco- 28 nomic help to the democr!l.oies. When e.i;ked to list the most pre~dng problems before the United States, however, those polled n~~ed, in or der 0£ importance: (1) ata.y5.ng out of war; (2) solving unemployment; 29 (3) recovery for businens. The old fear of being drawn in was still paramount, and the people had little faith in the ?reoident'a actions' 30 .having any effect on Europe. Dy the end of April, some hope that Europe would be able to solve her own problems began to,~grow, an optimism which would increase with the co:ning of summer. 1'hroughout the year in question, proepecte £eemed brighter when Hitler lapsed into relative inactivity, as he did in those montha. Men could more easily remember the horror of war tnan the terror in Germany. Chapter 5 Summer, 1939

T'ne summer or 1939 in Europe was an endless diplomatic maze or frantic activity over Danzig; in the United Stntes it was marked by pee- simism in Washington and optimism in the rest of the country. Information pouring into the capital gave Roosevelt and his advisers

!.n accurate view of the situation abroad, for, in addition to able work by the diplomatic service's regular channels, there were leaks in the 1 Jerman Foreign Office which supplied valuable reports. In rrl.d-May the feeling prevailed that war was lees likely; Britain anti France were 2 building alliances and Germany had economic troubles. Then came the old familiar pattern or Nazi-arranged uprisings of Germans, this time in the free port of Danzig, as Hitler renewed his demands for occupation ot that city and access to it through the Polish Corridor. Soon diplomats began p~edicting a m:>ve before the end of the su.amer.

By P.ay Roosevelt had long since abandoned any faith in appeasement, 1 and Britain and France finally seemed determined to stand firm; so the .President turned his attention to revision of the Neutrality Act in the hope that such action would assure Hitler of American ability and intention to aid the Allies. Although at that time non-violent solutions still seemed possible, the Chief Executive felt any steps that would further increase the probability of peace must be taken. On May 1, the cash and carry provision had expired. Roosevelt had entrusted renewal of it and revision of the Act to Senator Key Pittman, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, but he had been bungling the 3 task since March, and in early 1-!ay he reported that passage was unlikely. The President, therefore, chose Sol Bloom, chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, to introduce a new, even stroneer bill there. It

called for repeal of the ar:ns etcl>a.rgo and rene-.:al of cash and carry, but it also gave the president the power to name an aggressor in a conflict 4 and levy sanctions accordingly. The bill was reported out of col':'Jilittee 5 favorably, but the vote was purely along party lines. The real .fight

lay on the House tloor.

Hull then wrote a letter to Pitt~an and Bloom stRtine E 1Vernment

'rhu United States was now too big -for .'' - reasons for asking for the changoo. o...c;;..""Hv +- ~...,

snid the Secretary, must be :nnximum aecurity coupled with attitudes and 6 actions which would discourage war. In a conversation with Senate Republican leader Charles L. McNary before the introduction of the Bloom Bill, Hull asked his estimation of the chances for repeal of the arms em.b&rgo. The seasoned politician re-

plied, " ••• I guess you will be in for considerable trouble if you press

repeal •••• .:Oo~e people feel pretty strongly, and =ioot of the rest don't 7 want to do anything now. 11 McNary' a analysis proved correct not only of the embargo, but of oash and carry as ·well.

One pleasant incident drew attention away from Cor1gresoional h3g-

gling in early June. King George VI and ~uenn Zlizabeth, after a visit to Canada, came to Washington. Ure. Roosevelt \'Tote that the President considered England America's "first line of defense," so that he planned 8 the trip to rally public suppobt. The presence of royalty in the White House caused considerable consternation over protocol; Bullitt even sent the First Lady a detailed, secret memorandum recording the proper 9 way to receive a king and queen. Despite much strain for the profes- si.onal worriers and an unusually severe heat wave, the visit was a euc- cess, and the royal couple captivated everyone. Kr~ ~""" .. L" The isolationists in the House reclaimed the stage~George and~liza- beth vacated, and if they were not as charming, they were considerably more vocal, as they rose to protest each major section of the Bloom Bill. The arms embargo and non-renewal of cash and carry were necessary, they felt, to protect this country from foreign involvement. The opposition pointed out that refusal to sell would directly aid the Axis, since Bri tain, controlling the seas, would be the only country capable of buying rrom the United States. Representative Hamilton Fish replied that neu- 10 trality meant:.playing no part in a war. If the United States acted to "'-t-1 p . -hwlp. the Allies by repealing the embargo, it would be "endeavoring to 11 take sides before war is declared." Supporters of Roosevelt's position tried to point out the inconsis tency of the isolationist position by saying that trade in other commo- dities was as necessary to maintain an army as munitions, and yet the objection was just to dealing in munitions. Fish answered that anyone who wanted to engage in commerce with belligerents would do so at his own risk, with the government taking no aotion when his goods were des- 12 troyed at sea.

Perhaps the II¥lSt bitterly protested point of the bill was the new passage which er.ipowered Roosevelt to name and then levy sanctions against an aggressor. The isolationists freely admitted that they did not truet the Chief Executive; Representative George H. Tinkham branded 13 the Bloom proposnls 11 a bill for war at the pleasure of the president."

~le and his colleagues felt Roosevelt had dangerounly interventionist

viewe, and if he we:-e given s~c::i power he Wullld, by labellins one nation cJ f'rttvh responsible for a war, prepare the way for the United States to be ~a in on the ot!1er side of the quarrel,

In resistance to the bill., all the old, fa.tlliar arguments were brought out, and in final defense so:ne men even voiced assurances that.

peace would la.st. R~presentative ;ar1 T, Curtis, after damning the rawrl.tlons makers as warcont;ers, said cal.ml.y, "T'ne people or ",hose coun- t.rie::; are all good people. It iu the people i·:ho .~sht the w.:irs, not ~ the govern:nenta. 11

R~pres~ntativo Edouard ?J.H. Izac :r..i:nmed up ieolationist reasons for " oppooi:ig any ohange in exiJting neatrallty legislation by saying, "You must uctually put an iron ring around the ':iestern He:nisphere a.nd keep ev~rybody out of there, but it cannot bo dono according to international )$. law. 11

T'no Bloom Bill passed J;.iue 301 but it had been Emaf3culated by am- mencblu~ts which deleted the renowal of cash and carry, denied Roosevelt's l.r.6 power to name an aggressor, and restored the nrma e:nbargo. It did not even reach the floor of t~e Senate, for it was shelved July 13 by the 11: Foreign Relati~ns Conrnittee on a vote of 12 to 11.

The isolationists• reasons for r~jecti.::..; th~ bill were a :nixture of their old foars, partizans!up, distrust o! the President, and a genuine feeling that there would b3 no war before Jan~ary. The majority of

Congress remained largely apat~etic and allowed the minority to have its way. and Roosevelt hi~self bunglad his role.

Tne President did not pllsri for passage wi t.!1 his typical fervor until it was too late, because, sorr.e feel, he was afraid of showlng t.l1e 13 world how strong isolationist sentiment really was. .After the bill had died, as reports from i::urope becn.m8 :.. v~ •.; and more alarming, he refused to give up the fight. Dllllitt wrot..e in ln.Le June that a ci'isis ,,.;as likely as soon a.s the Ger!f,an ar.7JY finished it 1aanuvers in July. German 19 troops had already begun infiltrating Danzig. Anthony J. Biddle dis- oatched fro~ Foland on July 12 the re.Dort that a peaceful settlement . 20 was doubtful.

On July 141 Roosevolt ::;cnt a oessage to Gong!·e::;s urging pa.~rn:ige, and tour days lnter ho cmlled Soruitorit.l. loaders to the \ihite House to convince tha.l'. to chang;:, their vote. Senator ':lillia.m .s. Borah proceeded to infuriate Hill, reportedly-bringing tears of rage to his eyes, by ~ay- 22 ing tnat his dOi.lrCilO in Zuropv did not pred.ict war. m.o:ioirs al.moot ton ydars later, the Secretary was stlll angry at thia elur on the work or the diplomatic service, and ha said sarcautically 23 that Bora.'1 • s source was a minor pross ser.o.:.c..: in London. Hull closed the chapter uith these v-.-orcis:

Trying to wln over the ~solationist.s was for wo a nerve-racking and back-breaking experience. As I looked at. the isolationists ••• , they ramin ded me of the somnambulist who walks within an inon of a tho~sand-foot precipice without bat ting an eye. 24

On July 21, Roosevelt held a press Conference, and, when the quea- tion of neutrality legislation was raised, the Presidont sa.id that the Senate must take the bllin:.e for not acting. Europe would go to war in the irr~':lediate future; to shelve the bill had been to declare to hi::1 tnat 25 it was inevitable.

Roosevelt and Hull thought that Hitler would be encouraged by' the

refusal to act, both because Brita.in and France could not buy from the

United States and because the country had shown an unwillineness to

stand behind them. Samuel I. Rosenman, a close associate of the Pres-

dent's for many years, wrote, "~lthough he denied it specifically, I

know from what he said frequently that he did feel a great deal of bit-

terness at the frustration of one of his last and best hopes for ,:.-.e.:i.ce. 11

iihether this r1ope in the power of iunerican actions over Germany was

justified is doubtful. iiull wrote that diplorr,a.ts told him rejection or 2.7 the act would encourage :IiLler. "dilliam L. Si1irer, correspondo.nt in

Berlin, conv<::rsely said t.hot he m~ver he.ti any indication that s\.U11JHer tLat 211 3err:i.a.n officic.ls paid any attention to tht: Unit.ed .Jtates.

derson, British ambassador, J.ot::::i not even mention the event in his record 29 of his mission. ~vi

made his plan:; when the Sew:..te refused to act. In i·:a.y i1e had told a

group of his generals that the cletermination to ::iecure iJanzii; wuulc.l mean

\;ar, out tirn.t it was a risk wi1ich must be taken to fulfill Gerr11any' s 30 Lebensrau.rn.

In late :-:ay German Charg~ d' affa.ir<::s Thomsen, esti:natine ;..merica' s attitudes and military strength, wrote ti1cit t!1e country did not want to fight abroad, but that Roosevelt was trying to stir up the people. Al-

though he habitally oversta:..ed the President's power and bis natrer..i of

Germany, he rightly felt that no IJ.ilitary aid could be sent to Eur9pe for 31 32 some time. T'nomsen ha.d held this view since at least !·:arch, and he main- 33 ta.ined it through the rest of the sum~er. S:1ch reports probably encouraged nitle ar morP than any Gon£res~ional stuooornoss, f he paid attention to the ~ni~ed ~tates at all:)

Pre~s reaction to the rejection of the neutrnlity ler,islation varied.

Some periodicals thoURht it bad; eo~e said it rrnde no difference. They correctly judged that the reasons for shelvin~ were portizanr.hip, distrust of Roosevelt, enc irolntiorism, with the latter bein~ the most fre- ouently named. Unlike the Con~ressmen, the journnlistr. thou~ht the pro- s~ect~ for pence in Eurone were ~owinG rliYlr.!er by the dny.

The neople, however, 21nw hone i.n the future. In Janu~ry, 41._'f; of those polled thour,ht there would be a Eur~pean war within the year.

With the Czech cr1sis the fieure roce to 51%, but by t':'.\y 1 t h:1d dro:pped 34 to J~, and July S~W rt down to 2J~. Still, a lnrre rr.ajority h~d confidence in the abi 11ty of Br:f.tP.in, Friince, ~ RilSsia to defeat the Axis, 35 if nee~ sary. The Allies hed ftnqlly t~~en a firm ~tand, ~nd the people felt Hitler wo~ld now thin'c twice before provoking war. After all, he had been quiet for four mont~e. Chapter 6 War, 1939

Roosevelt and Hull knew Europe was far from peace. As the possibility or war loomed larger, the President focused his attention on the alliance negotiations between Britain, France, and the USSR. He did not like Stalin, but he was tolerant of him and he considered his aid 1 necessary if the Allies were to stop Hitler; so in late July he again took the course or written persuaatbn·;; ... A top secret message was cabled to Paris and carried from there to Ambassador Lawrence Steinhardt in Moscow by courier. Roosevelt urged

Stalin to unite with Britain and France, but declared that he could do nothing about the terms or an alliance. 'lbe sending of the letter was 2 to be kept secret. Steinhardt wrote back to Hull that Moscow's leader was mainly con- cerned about the rising menace or Japan. If Hitler turned on Russia, he would have to go through Poland and Rumania tirst, and, Stalin reasoned, 3 such action would bring a declaration of war from Britain and France. Meanwhile, gloomy reports poured into Washington r1•om abroad.

Pierrepont Moffat predicted on August 2 that Ge~ would move by the 4 &'o-~\n..s end or the month. Alexander c. Kirk, oharg,1'4-n Berlin, "'Tote six days later that Hitler would act by mid-September, and the Americ§n echoed the confusion ot diplomats forced to deal with a government completely s dominated by such an enigmatic, volatile man. With Hitler applying pressure to Poland in the manner by now so familiar, Roosevelt prepared for war. Lan:ge1 end Gleason :f'eei rie acted

P, &. r ~~ S A. ~CL I'\ ""-\ l'\C.. slowly, the~ revealing -hW"'reluctanoe to admit that little hope was 6 left. On August 4, the War Resources Board was set up to administer neutrality, and $10,0001 000 became available to build stockpiles. Two days· later Welles instructed Biddle to tell Jo sir Beck, Polish foreign minister, that Poland must not make the first l'lX>Ve, lest she be 7 branded an aggressor. Bullitt reported on August 11 that French lea- 8 ders felt that a "crisis [could come] in any 24 hours." For the last two weeks of the month the wires to Washington screamed warnings"'from Europe. Kirk reported in a handwritten message that Hitler 9 was not r.onvinced that Britain and France would stand firm; Daladier 10 told Bullitt the attack would come in eight days; Bullitt wrote that 11 ~he French !or the first time saw no hope. Then, August 24, the non-aggression pact between Russia and Ger many was signed. Roosevelt, rushing back to Washington from a fishing trip oft Canada, hoped that Spain, Italy, and Japan would bo disillu- 12 sioned, but he also teared the appeasing tendencies of the Allies.

Opinion in the State Bepartment varied over the full effect of Germany's 13 diplomatic triumpp, but no one f alt cheerful. Once again messages were sent, this time to Hitler, Victor Emmanuel, the king of Italy, and Ignace Moszicld., president of Poland. Roosevelt proposed negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration, with his role that 14 or intermediary. Moffat wrote in his diary that everyone knew the at- ,, tempt was doomed, but that the message had to be sent. ,, ••• Any chance sould be taken and above all ••• the record should be abundantly clear," lS he said. Two days earlier, on August 22, he had set the odds !or 16 peace at 7S to 25.

The country was stunned by the announcement or the pact. For years Nazis had screamed foul epithets at communismJ now they united with it and the two g1ante ot Europe joined in a manmoth war machine. The press cried that the announcement marktld a disaster. War seemed inevitable. The public reacted with the same shocked contueion, as no one seemed to know what would happen. The old hatred of Communism flared up again. Everyone felt the dictatore had proved their natural trea che17' and had given the United States even greater reaeon for doing its 17 utmost to avoid entanglement.

On August 25, Roosevelt held a cabinet meeting to announce the emer gency measuree he had taken. The Treasury Department would require clearance tor all toreighnships in American ports. It war came, ha would urge the departments ot State and Justice to delay the neutrality dec laration, au that as JDJlah arms and equipment as possible could be got 18 to Britain and France. In a press conterence the same day, Roosevelt said war was not certain, but his optimism must have been based more on 19 hope than tacts.

The ?resident and the State De~~r~ment correctly thought that there wo•.ild be no rapproachment this time, because Poland seemed determined to stand firm, assured that Britain and France would be forced to support her. So desperate was Chamberlain that he told Kennedy to suggest to

Tne ~nited States that it put pressure on the Poles to back down, but 20 t:ashington scornfully rejected the idea. The last day or the month Hitler sent his reply to the President's peace message, and its complete denial of any German g1.rl.lt for the crisis :21 snuffed out hope that A.~erica co~ld help avert war. Moffat swnmed up feeling in Washington when he wrote, fhe ~last two days ~ugust 26 and 2i} have given me the feeling of sitting in a house where somebody is dying upstairs. There is relatively little to do and yet the suspense con- 22 tinues unabated."

The next press conference at the White House convened to hear Roose- velt announce the invasion of Poland on September 1. In anBWer to the question or whether the United States could stay out of war, the Presi- 23 dent said, " ••• I not only sincerely hope so, but I believe we can. 11

Two tlays later he repeated ttds assurance in a "fireeide chat'; ~ 1 adding to the original draft of the speech his opinion that Americans could not 24 be expected to rer.iain neutral in thought as well ae in deed. War had only strengthened his resolve to rally American support for the Allies.

On September 8 the Presitlent declared the neutrality of the United ~ 0 t"\ ,+c.._., b c.r t 3 States. Congress was ce1led into special session,to repeal"° the arms embargo, which the !:J.8jority now consented to do, and the bill became law on Noverr.ber 4.

cv..c..a.. _, 'ai-~ Roosevelt's reacto.& 1 to the end of ea y;eM" ef it1:!"8f'ean blandex s nm:s~ save ~••R a ~·ill'• o' sorrow and foreboding. He had spent that year trying to convince leaders abroad to confer over their differences, and all the effort had been wasted.

Once again attention must be turned to the idea that Roosevelt ~ pA:rt.t\4- I 1 ._s \ a..+c.. o..~ plannecl for United States intervention. ,._f. 1 September,, :b&nge!'-&nd-Gl:e&-

'eoft fe~l he honestly thought the ~...+1~ could stay 011t of actual con- 25 nict, while supplying Britain and France economically. Hull says, although writing trom a vnhtage point or almost ten years, that he and the 26 .\2..o ~L r-\- Preside~lt always worked to avoid entanglement. ·Roget"t- !Jherwood,, one ot Roosevelt's ghost writers, advances the thesis that the Chief Executive's

reaction to the outbreak of the war was an underestimation or German

power a~d a fenr or appeaserr.ent by the Allies that would allow Hitler to ream, rally the support or his people and partners, and play on iso- 2!7 lationist sentiment in the \-lest. Mrs. Roosevelt writes that her husband never thought war was inescapable and that he continually said he 28 hoped that, if it came, the United States could stay out.

If these close observero nre wrong,, if Roosovelt really h~rbored

a desire to eend American troops abroad,, the fact remains that from Sep- tember,, 1939 to December, 1941, all he af>ked for wns economic aid to +o +~t- A- l \ l u lo l ..... + the Allies. T·~G.... L\:!i.~0"1. .1&. t...lust..r:/\ did not ento~ the war until she.-vaa attacked.

Press and public reaction to the invasion or Poland are easier to see. The press thought Britain and France would be the winners or a war fought in trenches. A stalemate would develop, with Britain controlling.the seas and France holding Germany at the Maginot Line. No one understood Hitler's blitzkreig or foresaw the brillance of his un- 29 conventi~nal tactics.

~s;for the United States,, it could stay out, and the preGs agreed on the o~urse the country should take. The neutrality laws should be enforced, after having :Ce stored cash and carry. The government should act to prevent the growth or belligerent credit here. Above all, Amari- cans must remember World War I, and they must trµly want to remain tm- 30 involved. The people shared these views, They blamed Hitler fully for pro voking the war, and thought Britain and France had been right in stand-

ing firm. On August 17, on~ 12% of those questioned wanted the Allies 31 to give in. In mid-September, 73% answering pollsters believed Eng- 32 land and France should stand by Poland. On& ~onth later, with that 33 country in ruins, 79% polled thought the Allies ehould remain at war.

The year since l'.unich had taught Americans that appeasement would not work. Like the press, the people believed Germany would lose. In early October, 64% of those polled favored Britain and France; two weeks later the tigure had risen to 71.%. Of those answering in such a manner, 62% 34 said they were very confident of an Allied victory. America could stay out if she wanted, but she must make a concerted ""'",-()""' ~"+ "'-~~ -~~s;-4- errort to do so. Orie-observep wrote, 11We are as'a~il.ation undoubtedly suffering trom a psychosis, a .tear that. we shall be trapped into war in 35 wpite or ourselves." The polls revealed that Amerioane still felt the 36 entrance into World War I had been a mistake, The majority believed Roosevelt should remain aloof from the crisis and concentrate on keeping 37 the country uninvolved. As tor the policy he should pursue, a Roper poll reported that opinion was divided. Only 37.5% of those queationed supported the re-

o. "J) C 0 ""-f l C..~ ,....._ ; l ~, ~'-r- ~~l f\(;) ·"' -- t I\. •.. H) \ :,,) t. ~- newaJ. of caish and carryr · · .. · - "'fhe next largest number (29.9%) felt the coWltry should not even rein

state tho defunct measure. Few (14.7%) supported entrance into the war if the Allies faced defeat, and even fewer (8.9%) proposed supplying .3B Britain, France, and Poland, ~hile refusing to sell to Germs.ny.

Deopite the fact that polls are a deceptive form of evidence, they do indicate opinions, and in conjunction with press and governmental reac- tione, theed surveys substantiate the thesis upon which thio paper has !. been built. Although more opposed 1~ Hitler than they had been a year tmrller, although, a!ter the initial war scare coolod, nDre \dlling to aid Britain and Franc~, Americans in the fall of 19J9 were i;till basically isolationist. The old feeling that war was fruitleos rernn.ined, and with it the fear that somohow Ahe United Stateo wo:tl.d be forced once again to tight a European war for the benefit or Europeans. CA.4' H. ok. ~::>-.rk.. Franklin Rooaovolt called his wifeflP,t 5 a~m., September 1, to teU her of the invasion, and her reaction was peobably the ca.;nc as that or l..VO lt-4- many Americans, even if few would admit it. She weked. two friends, and the three ladies ant together in tho early morning •

• • • a sense of impending disaster wao on us. The thing w~ had feared had finally come, and we seemed t.o know that sooner or later we would be dragged into the vortex with all the European countries •••• I had a feeling that ••• thero wae not much chance for any part of the world to es cape it, though in the r:ieantime we hoped for some miracle_. 39

Mrs. Roose~elt wa:; right. America would not escape the war against which her husband had fought and into which Europe had blundered. Hit ler would destroy the re:nnanta of Pax Brittanxa, forcing the United

States to lead th~ tree world, for isolationism, an earneot desire to be left al.one, could not survive the death of the old order. Appendix, Bibliography, Footnotes REACTION 1Q l·:UNICH SETTLE:·ZNT Best !-'.a'\azine Date Against possible Atlantic Monthly Nov. no mention Christian C~n~urz Oct. 12 x Current History Nov. x Harper's Nov. x Nation Oct. 8 x Newsweek Oct. 10 x Ne_w Repuhl i o Oct. 12 x Time Oct. 10 x

RLt\CTI~N 1Q POGROMS Violently ?foderately Magazine Date against against Atlantic Monthly Dec. no mention Christian Century Nov. 23 x Current History Dec. no mention Harner's Dec. no nention Nation Nov. 19 x Newsweek Nov. 21 x ~ Republic Nov. 23 x -Time Nov. 21 x MOOD ..lli JANUARY

Y.a~azine Date Apprehensive Hopeflll; .Atlantic Monthl1- survey of month x Christian Century II II II x Current Hi st,ory II II II x ija_rner 1 s II II x (no major article) Nation "II II II x Newsweek II II II x New R~p_Qbl._1._c II II II x '.rime II II II x

REACTION .!Q. REAR~.AHENT

Magazine Date Necessary Unnecessary

Atlantic Monthly Jan.&Feb. no m~ntion Christian Qenturz Jan. 18 x Current History Feb. x Haroer 1 s Feb. nc :nentio~ Nation Jan. 7 · to exten x l{~ Republic Jan. 11 .-\fa. wants it. x Newsweek Jan. 9 x Time Jan. 23 x REACTION !Q SEIZ:JRE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA*

:-~gazine Date Surprized Not At_lant1-c Mon_th).y April no mention .Christian Century Mch. 29 x Current History April x Haroer's April no mention Nation Mch. 25 x Newsweek Mch. 27 x New Republic Mch, 22 x ~ Mch. 27 x *All agreed that Hitler had showed true colors.

REACTION TO REICHSTAG SPE:ECH

No Magazine Date Shows chance of oeace chance Atlantic Monthly May no mention Qhristian Century !J.ay 10 x Current History_ Hay no mention Harper's l{ay no mention Nation May 6 x Newsweek. May 8 x New Republic ?·:ay 10 x ~ Hay 8 x REACTION .!Q REJECTION QE N""=.lJTR.ALITY IZGISLATION

~l.P..P'azine Date Good No difference Bed

Atlantic Y~nthly Aug. no mention Christian Century July 26 x Current History Aug. x Harper's Aug. no mention Nation July 22 x ~~ R~liC- July 19 x Newsweek July 24 x Time July 17 x

RLASO~JS -FOR l-SJZCTIOH Distrust !faP"a.7.ine Date Partizanshiu Ioolationis:n of R.

Atlantic ~.o.nt.lzly_ A:.ig. no mention Christian Q_~f!.~ury July 26 x x Current H__~ Aug. x Harper's Aug. no mention tiation July 22 x Nett R~J!hl,ic July 19 x x Hewswoek July 2J.., x x ,. Time July 17 x x A RZACTION 1Q GSRMA!~-!JSSR PACT

Ma.gnzine Dnte SurJ:?rize Expected

~lli±iili 1-bnthly Oct. x Christian Centur~ Aug. 30 x _Current History Oct. no mention Harper's Oct. no mention Nation Aug. 26 x New5Week Aug. 28 x ~~ aepublic Aug. 30 x Tke Aug. 28 x

Magazine Date Disaster No effect Atlantic Honthly Oct. x Christian Century Aug. 30 x Current History Oct. no mention Harper's Oct. no mention J~ation Aug. 26 x Newsweek Aug. 28 x ~Republic Aug. 30 x Ti:ne- Au~. 28 x ------~

P..EACTIO!~ TO ~

1·~ai:rnzi no Date Allies win A. lose

~tlantic.. ?~nthly_ Nov. x 9hristian Century Sept. 1.3 x Current History Oct. x Haroer 1 s ~foy. uncertain Nation Sept. 9 x (not certain) Newsweek Sept. 11 x New Repub1 ic Sept. 6 uncertain Til:le Sept. ll x

1'.agazine Date u.s. in U.S. out Atlantic Monthly Nov. x Ch~=SL'tian Century Sept. 13 x Current History Oct. x Harper's Nov. x Nation Sept. 9 X(ir Alliea lose) Mewsweck Sept. 11 x ~ Republic Sept. 6 x Time Sept. 11 uncertain ,------

The following article~were used to gather the information presented in the preceding appendices. ....

Jt.unich ·

1. 11 A Month's H~stary in the i1Iaking, 11 Current History, XXXXIX (Hovem ber, 193B),~ll-12. 2. Atlantic l.:Onthly, CLXII (November, 1938)';._

:fo mention.

3. 11 Bri tain' s 'Peace i'ii th Honor 1 : T~pered by Re serva ti on~;". _·Newsweelf, XII~(October 10, 1933), pp. 13-lto.

4. "4 Chiefs, One Peace," Time, XXXII (Cc:tober 10, 193B), pp. 15-17.

5. "Europe After ?·:unich, 11 Christian Century, LV (October 12, 1933), pp. 1224-1226. 6. Harner' s :it.agazine, CLXXVII (November, 1933).

No mention.

7. "Nemesis Postponed, 11 Hew Renublic, LXXXXVI (October 12, 19.33), pp. 255-257.

1 B. !The Shape of Things, II The ifation, CXXXXVII (Oct.obtir a, 1938), pp. 337-341.

Pogroms

1. Atlantic !fonthl;z, CI.XII (December, 193B).

No mention.

2. Current History, XXXXIX (December, 1933).

no mention.

3. Harner' s Hagazine, cr.xxrlIII (December, 1933).

~lo oention.

4. "Let the Jews Co:r..e In! 11 :ifow Renublic, LAXXXVII (November 23, 193B), 60. 2

5. 11 Pogro:ns Givl:3 Reich a Weapon for Spread of Anti-Semitism, 11 Newsweek, XII (November 21, 1938), pp. 17-18.

5. 11 Terror in Germany, 11 Christian Century, LV (November 2.3, 1938), pp. 1422-1423. 7. "Those Individuals, 11 Time, XXXII (November 21, 1938), pp. 18-19.

~. 1rtiar Against the Jews, 11 The Nation, CXXXXVII (November 19, 1938), pp. 324-.325.

Mood in January

1. Atlantic IIonthlv, CLX.III, (February, 1938).

2. Christian Century, LVI (January 4, 11, 18, 25, 1939). 3. Current History, XXXXIX {February, 1939).

4. Harner' s Ifagazine, CLXXVIII (February, 1939).

5. The Nation, C.XX.XXVIII (January 7, l~, 21, 28, 1939).

6. New Republic, LXXXXVII (January 4, 11, 18, 25, 1939).

?. Newsweek, Xl1.I.(January 2, 9, 16, 23, )O, 1939). 3. Time, XXXIII (JAnuary 2, 9, 16, 23, 30, 1939).

Rearmament

1. .'!A Honth' s History in the haking, 11 Current History, XXXXIX (Eebruary, 19.39), pp. 11-12~

2. "Army and !favy, 11 Time, XXXIII (January 23, 19.39), pp. 7-S.

3. Atlantic Monthly, CLXIII (February, 1939).

~o mention. 1

4. Bruce Bliven, 11!-!r. Roosevelt's Undeclared ~far, 11 New Reoublic, LXXAXVII (January 11, 1939), pp. 221-282. 5. Haroer's'z,:a_gazine, CLXXVIII (February, 19.39).

No mention. 6. "Invitation to a Holy War, 11 Christian Century, LVI (January 18, 1939), PP• 78-80. 7. "Swift Rearming Gives U.S. Leadership of Democracies," Newsweek, XIII (January 9, 1939), pp. 11-14. . ·. 8. "The Shape of Things," The .Nation, CX.XXXVIII (January 7, 1939), 22.

Czechoslovakia

1. Atlantic !-~onthly, CLXIII (April, 1939).

I\o mention.

2. 11.Exit Czechoslovakia, 11 New Republic, Ll~VIII (l·:a.rch 22, 1939), 177. ' 3. Harper's Kagazine, CLXXVIII (April, 1939).

No mention.

4. "History in the i·~aking, 11 Current History, L (April, 1939), pp. 13-14.

5. "Nazi Caesar, 11 Newsweek, XIII (1-!arch 27, 1939), pp. 19-21.

6. 11 Neutrality Legislation Gains Hew Importance," Christian Century, LVI (!·!arch 29, 1939), 403.

7. "Surprise? Surprise?" Time, XXXIII (!{arch 27, 1939), pp. 16-17.

8. Oswa.la: Garrison Villard, "Issues and !-:en, 11 The Nation, CXXX.1.'VIII (?farch 25, 1939), 350.

Reichstag Speech

1. Atlantic !·:Onthly, CLX.III (!·:a.y, 1939).

No mention.

2. Current !Ii story, L (!.:a.y, 1939).

No mention.

3. Harper's !-~agazine, CLXXVIII (!1ay, 1939).

No mention.

4. ''Hitler ~nswers," New Reoublic, Ll~X 0·1ay 10, 1939), pp. 4-5. 5: "Hitler's Inning," Tima, XXXIII (:fay 8, 1939), pp. lS-19. , o. "Hitler Says :fo," The ~fation, CXXM-VIII O·~y 6, 1939), pp. 516-517.

7. "Hithir Speech Stiffens Isolation," ~:ewsweek, XIII (r·~y 8, 1939), pp. 11-12 ••

11 The Door is Open, 11 Christian Century, LVI (l·ill.y 10, 1939), pp. 593- 600.

Neutrality Legislation

1. Atlantic !·:Onthly, Ct:CTV (August, 1939).

No mention.

2. "Bloom's Rise," Newsweek, XIV (July 24, 1939), pp. 15-16.

3. Har-;,er' s !·1agazine, CLXX.IX (August, 1939).

:fo mention.

4. 11 :-Iistory in the ?·~king," Current History, L (August, 1939), pp. 7-8.

5. 11 now to be lfoutral," Time, XXXDT (July 17, 1939), pp. 17-19.

6. "Next Steps in Neutrality, 11 Christian Century, L'.J'I (July 2b, 1939), pp. 918-919.

7. "Roosevelt, Stalin, and rfoutrality," i-:ew Reoublic, LXXXXIX (July 19, 1939), pp. 292-293.

8. "The Shape of Things," The ifation, CXXAXIX (July 22, 1939), pp. 85-8u.

German·- Soviet Pact

1. Current History, LI (October, 1939).

No mention.

2. Walter Duranty, 11Rwnania o?i the Bal tics iJext? 11 Atlantic !.:Onthly, CLXIV (October, 1939), pp. 502-511.

3. Echoes of an Earthquake," :lew Reoublic, C (August 30. 1939), S5.

4. Harper's :-~agazine, CLXAIX (October, 1939). /Jo """'l-n1-luf"· 5. 11 Hitler and Stalin Clasp Hands, 11 Christian .:Century, LVI (August 30, 1939), 1035.

6. !'Nightmare," ~, XXXI'.J (August 28, 1939), 20.

7. 11 Red Star and Swastika,"~ :-Jation, CXX.XXIX (August 26, 1939), pp. 211-212.

S. "Sudden German-Soviet Deal Leaves Europe Tllllnderstruck, ·~ I:ewswt.:ek, XIV (August 28, 1939), .PP· 16-lS.

9. 11 Two Billion Pawns," New Ren;iblic, C (August 30, 1939), S5. -War 1. Richard Aldington, "For Arrnistace Day, 1939;" Atlantic !!onthly, CLXIV ( ffovember, 193 9), pp. 6g4-686.

2. "America's Role in War," !~ew Reoublic, C (September 6, 1939), pp. 116- 117.

3. "America Stirred by New War but Set on Staying Neutral, 11 Newsweek, XIV (September 11, 1939), pp. 25-27.

4. James Warner Bellah, "Bombing Cities Won't Win the War, 11 Haroer's 1·:ti.gazine, CLXXIX (Novermber, 1939), pp. 65B-663.

5. Raymond Clapper, 11 America and Neutrality," Ourrent History, U (Octo ber, 1939), pp. 39-42, continued 63. o.~. 11 Eurone' s Foes Unleash Forces After Slow Start of !fow War, 11 Newsweek, XIV (September 11, 1939), pp. 10-14.

1. Louis Fischer, "Europe Goes to ifar, 11 The Natior; CXXXXIX (September 9 1939), pp. 262-263.

8. Carl Joachim Friedrich, "Lord Halifax," Atlantic l·:onthly, CLXIV ((fovember, 1939), pp. 610-620.

2. Thomas M. Johnson, "As the War Begins," Current History, LI (Octo ber, 1939), pp. 30-35. '1 J 10. 11 l{easures Short of War," The Nation, CXAXX.IX (September.A 1939), pp. 260-261.

11. 11!-riscalculation,-" Newsweek, XIV (Septe~ber!11, 1939), pp. 15-18.

12. "Preface to War," ~,;o:xrv (September 11, 1939), pp. 13-15. , .2

13. 11 J.S. and Neutrality, 11 Current-i-!istory, U (October, 1939), 6.

14. "Well Said, ~-:r. Presidentt" Christian Century, VlI (Septemb~r 13, 1939), pp. 1095-1096. Footnotes

Chapter 1

1. Allen (;'. Dulles and Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Can A.nerica .Stay .fulli tral? (r~ew York, [1939)), pp. 177-191.

2. James Warner Bellah, "Bombing Cities ~'Ion' t ~Hn the iin.r," Harner' s !-:'agazine, CLXXIX (Nove:nber, 1939), 658. 3. Congressional Record: Proceedin3s and Debates of the 76th Congress,_ First Session (Washington, 1939 , part 2, 2193. 4. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation 1937-1940 (New York, [}.952]), 15. 5. Congressional Record, part 2, 1923. o.I Public Ooinion 1S35-1946, Hadley Cantril and l{ildred Strunk, eds. (Princeton, 1951 , October lJ, 1938, 1185. 7. Ibid., October 24, 1939, 1185.

B. Langer and Gleason, ~ Challenge ~ Isolation, pp. 6-8. 9. Ibid., 8. 10. Ibid., 16.

Chanter 2 1. Alan Bullock, Hitler,}! Study in Tyranny, rev. ed. (New York,IJ96ij), pp. 401-402. 2. Julius W. Pratt, Cordell Hull. (Robert H. Ferrell and Sa.'Iluel F. Bemis, eds., ~ American Secretaries of State and Their Diolomacy, AII, .New York, 1964), II, 295. 3. Ibid., 297. 4. Jay Pierrepont i·:offat, The i·;orfat Paoers, lfancy Harvison Hooker, ed. (Cambridge, 1956), 205.

5. Franklin D. Roosevelt~ The Public Paners and Addresses of Franklin.!2.:_ Roosevelt, compiled. and colla.ted by Samuel I. Roserunan "tTiew York, 1941), VII, 532. , o. Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, American ·{mite Paner; The S~ory of American Dinlomacy and~ Second\:Or1a1 ·.far (:~ew York, 1940 , 9.

Roosevelt, Public Pa~ers, VII; 531.

S. Ibid., pp. 532-535. 9•. United States Department of State, Peace a.nd 1·:ar, United States Foreign Policyi. 1931-1941 (Washington, 1943), 426. 10. Ibid., 430.

11. Langer and· Gleason, ~ Challenge to Isolation, 35.

12. Department of State, Foreign Relations of~ wnited States: Diolo matic Papers, J.21!1 (Washington, 1955), I, 712. 13. 1µ,irold)L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Ha.rold b Ickes (ifow York, .._1954] , II, 483.

14. "4 Chiefs, One Peace, 11 ~' XXAII (October 10, 1938), 17; "Britain's 'Peace \~ith Honor:i: Tempered by Reservation;>~ 11 ::Newsweek, XII (Octo ber 10, 1938), 16. 15. See appendix. In the future, when reference is made to the opin ions of the press, it will be made to the author's survey of the reactions of The Atlantic ifonthlv, Christian Century, Current liis .tory, Harner' s Hagazine, The ifation, ~ Reoublic, New ::;week, and . Time. Spe~ific acticles will be footnoteJ. The results of this survey are tabulated in the ap;~endix. 16. Cantril and Strunk, Public Ooinion, October 1, 1933, 1165, 7n1. 17. Ibid., September 23, 1938, 163. 18. Ibid., October 2, 1938, 966.

19. Ibid., Septen~er 23, 1938, 96S. 20. Pratt, Cordell Hull, II, 301. 21. Roosevelt, Public Paoers, VII, 542. 22. Pratt, Cordell Hull, II, 301. 23. Roosevelt, Public Papers, VII, pp. 563-566. 24. Ibid., 564. 25. Ibid., 597. L>< )C. xx "'t l 26. 11Let the Jews Come Int" New Renublic, S (November 23, 1938), 60.

27. Documents .2!l German Foreign Policy, 191S-1945, Series D (Washing ton, 1951), IV, 639. 28. Ibid., 641.

Chapter 3

1'. Ickes, ~ Secret Diarx, II, 481.

2. Langer and Gleason,~ Challenge~ Isolation, 37. 3. Ibid., 39.

4. Franklin D.• Rooseveltt F .D.R.: His Personal Letters, e. Elliot Roosevel~_(New York, 195cf)), IV, 826. aJL 5. Langer and Gleason, The Challenge..!& Isolation, 39. 6. Eleanor Roosevelt, ~ 1. Remember (New York, U949)), 208. 7. Roosevelt, Public Paners, VIII, J. 8. Ibid., 4.

9~: 'Ibid., 2. 10. Ibid., pp. 71-73. 11. Ibid. , 103. 12. Ibid., 113. 13. Congressional Record, part 1, 1010. 14. Roosevelt, Public Papers, VIII, 113. 15. Ibid., 111.

16. Langer and Gleason, ~ Challenge to Isolation, 6. '=t _ ..)o...n."""'-A-~.l ~ ~ / 17. Catril and Strunk, Public Opinion,1'.1074.1~ -~.,_,_h 1-\..A..~ l C\ "3~ \ 18. Ibid. 781. \.t . J ,A, . 19. Ibid. 20. Francis Sill Wickware, '"'l'lhat We Think About Foreign Affairs, 11 Har per's Hagazine, ?19"(September, 1939), 406. ".·· C:. L "X'><= l )' 21. Langer and Gleason, The Challenge !Q Isolation, 50.

22. Ickes, The Secret Diary, II, 571.

Chapter 4

1. ~ Dinlomatic Paners, 1939, I, 4. 2. Ibid., 14. 3. Ibid., 17. 4. Ibid., 24.

5. ~' 23. 6. Ibid., 37.

7. Ibid., JS.

S. Ickes, The Secret Diary, II, 597~

9. U.S. Department of State, Peace and War, 455.

10. !{of.fat, The Moffat Papers, 229.

11. Ibid., ·z3i.

12. Ibid._. lJ. Icle'~s;·.:.Tlle:.Si!:c"r.et. Diary;• II, 597. - \ 14. Documents .sm German Foreign Policy, Series D, VI, 35.

15. U.S. Diolomatic Paners, 1939, I, 41.

16. Documents .sm German Foreign Policy, Series D, IV, pp. 675-6~.

17. ~ Dinlor.iatic Paoers, 1939, I, pp. lOS-llO. l~. Cordell Hull, The I·iemoirs of Cordell Hull. (:;ew York, 1948), II, 620.

19. Roosevelt, Public Papers, VIII, pp. 201-205.

2~. Ibid., pp. 208-217. 21. Cantril and Strunk, Public Oninion, April 19, 1939, 1082; Ibi

23. Adolph Hitler, "Germany 1 s Po siti on Today, 11 Vital SEeeche s, V (~·1ay 15, 1939), 479. . 24. Ibid., pp. 464-480. 25. Pratt, Cordell Hull, II, 310.

26. 11 T'ne Door Is Open," Christian Century, LVI (May 10, 1939), pp. 59S- 6oo. 27. "Hitler Speech Stiffens Isolation, 11 iiewsweek, llII (Hay S, 1939), ll.

28 •. Hull, !·~emoirs, II, 643.

29. Wickware, rri;hat We Think About Foreign Affairs, 11 riaroer 1 s i.agaziud, CLXXIX, 406.

JO. Cantril and Strunk, f~blic Ooinion, April 19, 1939, 949,

Chant.er 5

1. Langer, and Gleason, ~ Challenge .!& Isola ti on, 124. 2. Ickes, The Secret Di.ary, II, 534; Ibid., 635.

J. ?ratt, Cordell null,~F~I, 312.

4. Langer and Gleason, The C:1alleni!e ~ Isolatiog, 1.38.

5. Ibid., 141.

6. U.S. Department-of State, Peace and ~ar, pp. 461-464.

7. Alsop and Kintner, American 'tlhi te Paoer, 42.

8. Eleanor Roosevelt, T'nis 1 Remember, 183.

9. Ibid., 184. , 10. Congressional Record, part 7, 7984.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., 77C4. 13. Ibid., 7928.

14. Ibid., part S, 8154.

15. ill£:., 8234. 16. Langer and Gleason, The Challenge .!&. Isolation, 142.

17. Ibid., 143.

1'3. Ibid., 81.

19 •. ~ Diplomatic Papers, 1939, I, 195.

20. Ibid., 197.

21. Roosevelt, P~blic Papers, VIII, 3Sl.

22. Pratt, Cordell Hull, II, 314-315.

23. Hull, Memoirs, II, 653.

24. Ibid., 666.

25. Roosevelt, Public Paners, VIII, pp. 390-393.

26. Samuel :t Rosenman, \forking iath Roosevelt (New Yor~,[}.952]), 1S5.

27. Hull, 1-:emoirs, II, 653.

28. WituA?t}l-. Shir~r, Berlin Diary: The Journal of 2: Foreign Corres nondant, · 1934-1%1 (New York; 1941)," pp. 219-220.

Sir !fovile Henderson, Failure 21 ~ Hission: Berlin 1937-1939 (Hew York, [1945)), pp. 235-257.

30. Bullock, Hitler, 455.

31. •-.Dobi!llents .2!1 German Foreign Policy, Series D, '.II., pp. 526-533.

32. Ibid., pp. 129-135.

33. Ibid., VII, pp. 275-276. ) 34. Cantril and Strunk, Public Oninion, January 10, March 21, i•;ay 2, July 17, 1939, 781.

35. Ibid;, !·1ay 26, 1939, 1185. 1

.Jhapter 6 1. Langer and Gleason, .The Challenge to Isolation, 126.

2.· Ibid., pp. 160-161. 3. Ibid., 162 .•. 4. U.S. Dinlomatic Paners, 1939, I, 202. 5. Ibid., 205. 6. Langer and Gleason, The Challenge _!& Isolation, 131. 7. U.S. Dinlomatic Papers, 1939, I, 211. a. Ibid., 212. 9. Ibid., 226. 10. Ibid., 350. ll. Ibid., 356. 12. Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolition, 188. 13. Moffat, The. Noffat Papers, 251. J.4. Roosevelt, Public Paoers, VIII, 444. 15. Moffat, The Moffat Papers, 253.

16. Ibid. .2.. S- I 1 17. Langer and Gleason, The Challenge 12 Isolation, pp. 191-192. lS. Ickes, The Secret Diary, II, 702. 19. Roosevelt, Public Papers, VIII, 452. 20. Pratt, Cordell Hull, SII, 317.

21. Documents ...sm German Foeeign Policy, Series D, VII, 473. - 22. Moffat, The Moffat Papers, 255. 23. Roosevelt, Public Paners, VIII, 457. 24. Roseman, Working With Roosevelt, 1B9 •.

25. Langer and Gleason~ The Challen~ 12 Isolation, 202. B

26. Hull, 1·1emoirs, II, 667. 27. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hookins; An Intimate History (New York, [j_948]), 126.

28. Eleanor Roosevelt, This l Remember, 207.

See "Background for War, 11 Time, JJ:JJ..V (August 2S, 1939), pp. 26-35. Also, Thomas !-1. Johnson, "As the War Begins, II Current nistory, LI (October, 1939), pp. 30-35. A survey of the estimation of mili tary preparation in Europe was also made of the issues mentioned in the tabulation of the reaction to the o~tbreak of the war •

JO. . See "Well Said, !-~. President!" Christian Century, LVI (Sept.ember 13 1939), pp. 1C95-109o. Also, Ray¢ond Clapper, 1!America and Neutra lity,'' Current.. HiStory, L'IT (October, 1939), pp. 39-42. Also, Allen i·1. Dulles and Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Can America Stay i~elltr&.l? (New York, Q. 939] ) • - 31. Cantril and Strunk, Public Ooinion, August 17, 1939, llu5; Ibid. 32. Ibid., September 11, 1939. 33. Ibid., October 10, 1939. 34. Ibid., October 3, 1939, 1185. ' Raymond Clapper, "America and ifoutrality, 11 Current History, LI (October, 1939), 41. . 36. Cantril and Strunk, Public Opinion, October, 1939, 201. 37. Ibid., October 10, 1939, 760. JS. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hookins, 127. 39. Eleanor Roosevelt, This .f Remember, 207. Bibliography

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Sherwood, Robert E.. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History. New . York: Harper and Brothers, [[94~.

~ &>....~ 1d 'l · e-o" UL-r-v-. cu:Q U) ~ ~ 61.o ~~ -h c_., (f o ( \' ~,