august 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 8

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents The Philippines’ Continued

FEATURE ARTICLE Success Against Extremists 1 The Philippines’ Continued Success By Peter Chalk Against Extremists By Peter Chalk

Reports 5 The Evolving Role of Uzbek-led Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan By Jeremy Binnie and Joanna Wright 7 Tribal Dynamics of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Insurgencies By Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend 11 A Review of Reconciliation Efforts in Afghanistan By Joanna Nathan 14 The Absence of Shi`a Suicide Attacks in Iraq By Babak Rahimi 17 Factors Affecting Stability in Northern Iraq By Ramzy Mardini 20 Training for Terror: The “Homegrown” Case of Jami`at al-Islam al-Sahih By Jeffrey B. Cozzens and William Rosenau Humvees with U.S. soldiers on board secure a bombing site in Jolo in the southern Philippines on July 7, 2009. - STR/AFP/Getty Images

24 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity he extremist environment This article will outline the domestic 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts in the Philippines continues security environment in the Philippines to improve. The main by examining the current state of three organizations that have main organizations: the Abu Sayyaf Ttraditionally been at the forefront of Group,1 the Moro Islamic Liberation national security concern are either Front (MILF)2 and the New People’s exhibiting a continued readiness Army (NPA).3 The article will then to engage in negotiations with the discuss the main parameters of U.S. government in Manila or are variously suffering from battlefield losses, criminalization or reductions in 1 The ASG is a self-styled Moro jihadist group that seeks About the CTC Sentinel the creation of an exclusive Islamic State of Mindanao The Combating Terrorism Center is an popular support. Although there has been an increase in kidnappings by (MIS). It has been tied to regional and international ter- independent educational and research rorist movements, including Jemaah Islamiya and al- institution based in the Department of Social the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), this is actually a sign of the group’s weakness Qa`ida. Sciences at the United States Military Academy, 2 The MILF is the largest Moro insurgent group in Mind- West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses and declining capabilities. Moreover, the United States and Australia remain anao. For much of its existence the movement sought the the Center’s global network of scholars and creation of an independent Muslim state in Mindanao, practitioners to understand and confront committed to underwriting assistance packages to the Armed Forces of the but moderated its demands to enhanced autonomy fol- contemporary threats posed by terrorism and lowing the death of Hashim Salamat—the MILF’s hard other forms of political violence. Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), both of which line founder—in 2003. The group is currently engaged in continue to make steady advances in the sporadic peace negotiations with Manila. 3 The NPA acts as the military arm of the Communist The views expressed in this report are those of struggle against violent extremism. the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, Party of the Philippines (CPP). Its stated aim is to replace the Department of the Army, or any other agency the existing Filipino political and economic structure of the U.S. Government. with a socialist system through a protracted strategy of people’s war.

1 august 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 8 and Australian security assistance to factors accounting for Bogota’s success latitude to engage in disruptive attacks the Philippines and identify some of the in infiltrating the highest echelons of than they otherwise might enjoy. main shortfalls that continue to hamper the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the overall effectiveness of Manila’s Colombia.9 As with the ASG, there are also signs of counterterrorism efforts. an increasing criminal element creeping Moro Islamic Liberation Front into the Front’s activities. The MILF’s Abu Sayyaf Group As of April 2009, the MILF’s overall current budget is estimated to be in the Despite occasional bombings and strength remained at levels on par vicinity of Ps107 million (approximately attacks against infrastructure, the with those of 2007-2008. According $2.2 million), of which Ps100.8 million ASG’s current threat level is the lowest to the AFP, the group could count on (approximately $2.1 million) comes from in years. As of April 2009, the group 11,600 members equipped with around extortion.13 As in the case of the ASG, was estimated to have no more than 100 7,700 weapons.10 The overwhelming it is more manageable to deal with an hardcore militants (and less than 350 majority of the MILF believe that a final economically-motivated group than one weapons) at its disposal, supplemented peace settlement and autonomous rule driven by strict ideological convictions. by at most 200 part-time militants in Mindanao is still possible; indeed, The MILF’s increase in criminal activity and maybe 30 foreign terrorists in June 2009 the Front’s political could work to the direct advantage of (predominantly Indonesians associated the AFP. with Jemaah Islamiya’s “pro-bombing” faction).4 According to sources in the “The ASG has been New People’s Army PNP, these members are split between reduced to isolated pockets In June 2009, the AFP estimated at least 18 separate cells across Sulu, the NPA’s combined strength to be Basilan and Zamboanga and lack any of militants scattered 4,874 guerrillas organized across sense of organizational, much less across the outlying islands approximately 60 fronts. This is the operational, cohesion.5 The ASG has yet lowest number of guerrillas since to select an amir (leader) that is accepted of Mindanao with no the mid-1980s.14 In addition, the by the entire group. Radullah Sahiron is apparent leader or unified organization is finding it difficult the closest person to such an individual. to procure advanced weaponry, He is old, however, and suffers from ideological agenda to tie which is greatly hindering its ability acute diabetes and commands the the group together.” to undertake concerted operations loyalty of only approximately 60% of against the military.15 Reflective of the group’s fighters.6 these dynamics, the majority of the communist campaign now takes the The ASG’s return to criminal enterprise, spokesman, Ghazali Jaafar, specifically form of political (as opposed to military) namely kidnapping for ransom, reflects described the peace process environment struggle, consuming as much as 90% of the relative decline of the group and its as “getting better,” confirmed that the movement’s overall resources.16 In capacity to perpetrate violence against the group accepted the government’s broad terms, the main priorities appear the state. Western analysts in Manila disarmament, demobilization and to be solidifying popular support, believe this reflects a diminution in reintegration policy and voiced hope generating income and de-legitimating the group’s ideological focus with the that negotiations would resume soon.11 the Philippine state (through the so- main aim now being purely financial called “oust Arroyo campaign”).17 in nature (allegedly to underwrite the The rejectionist faction within the campaigns and agendas of co-opted local MILF remains at 30%, or approximately Problematically for the NPA, however, politicians).7 The AFP and PNP both 3,400 of the group’s total membership. its political wings—the Communist view this development as “positive” It presents a challenge to any peace deal. Party of the Philippines (CPP, which in the sense that cadres motivated by The mainstream elements cooperating is illegal) and the National Democratic money are far easier to bribe and “turn” with the government, however, will Front (NDF, which is legal)—are than those who remain firm in their likely inhibit any splinter faction’s encountering significant challenges in religious convictions.8 Certainly this ability to disrupt a final settlement.12 attracting high-caliber recruits from has been the experience in Colombia Obviously the rejectionists will need traditional hubs such as the University and is considered to be one of the main to be monitored—3,400 militants of the Philippines (UP), Ateneo de could cause considerable instability— Manila and Delasalle. Academics in 4 Personal interviews, AFP officials, Manila, June 2009. although with the mainstream of the Manila believe these difficulties reflect 5 Personal interviews, PNP officials, Manila, June 2009. MILF cooperating, they will have less 6 Personal interviews, AFP officials, Zamboanga, Janu- 13 Personal interviews, AFP officials and Philippine ary 2008. See also Peter Chalk, Angel Rabasa, William 9 Personal interviews, Colombian police officials, Bo- analysts, Manila, June 2009. Rosenau and Leanne Piggott, The Evolving Terrorist gota, March 2009. 14 “Current NPA Strength Down to Lowest Level Since Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment (Santa Monica, 10 Personal interviews, AFP officials, Manila, June the ‘80s,” Philippine Star, June 28, 2009. CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), p. 52. 2009. 15 Personal interview, Philippine academic, June 2009. 7 Personal interview, Western official, Manila, June 11 “Mindanao: Peace Process Getting Better: MILF,” Sun 16 Personal interviews, PNP officials and Philippine aca- 2009. Star, March 9, 2009. demics, June 2009. 8 Personal interviews, AFP and PNP officials, Manila, 12 Personal interviews, AFP and PNP officials, Manila, 17 Personal interviews, PNP officials, Manila, June 2009. June 2009. June 2009. See also Chalk et al., pp. 40-42. See also Chalk et al., p. 86.

2 august 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 8 dramatic reductions in tuition assistance regards as a purely domestic issue—and well as between Moro and communist packages to the extent that it is now awareness that any such involvement militants (in areas where they operate only the middle and upper classes who would significantly complicate the in close proximity to each other). can afford to attend these institutions— ongoing peace process with the MILF. neither of which have a natural affinity Second, insufficient focus has been given to the communist message. As a result, Washington’s support to the AFP to improving civil local governance recruitment efforts have increasingly continues to be channeled through the comprehensively. This is a significant been focused on second- and third-tier Joint United States Military Assistance gap as perceptions of administrative universities, leading to an influx of Group (JUSMAG) and is primarily abuse are one of the main catalysts for cadres who are not as gifted in terms of aimed at supporting the Philippine’s joining the ASG (as well as the MILF effectively convincing local populations own initiatives to foster a holistic, and NPA). to support the CPP/NDF agenda. The all of government (AOG) approach to inevitable consequence has been a its counterterrorism strategies.21 The Third, the army remains the lead agency gradual but growing reduction in the general consensus is that these efforts in terms of counterterrorism. This is not communist base.18 have borne considerable dividends in only further stretching already limited not only balancing kinetic and non- resources, but it is forcing the military The AFP asserts that it is on track to kinetic responses to the ASG threat, to undertake roles for which they are achieve a strategic victory over the NPA but also institutionalizing responses not trained (a fact that has been very by 2010—meaning a 75% reduction in the that have been able to draw on the apparent in the failure to ensure the group’s current strength and influence. combined expertise of the governmental, sanctity of forensic evidence at crime Although independent commentators private sector, civil and military scenes). question the ability of the army to meet communities.22 this target on the basis of its current Finally, the balanced AOG approach tempo—at least 50 guerrilla fronts Through these endeavors, the AFP has to counterterrorism is not shared by would have to be fully dismantled in been able to win over large (but not all) all AFP senior officers, a number of less than a year—they believe that it segments of local populations in terrorist whom continue to insist on the primacy could be achieved by 2011.19 The larger “hot spots.” Furthermore, by employing of hard responses despite the adverse problem may be how to effectively Moro Muslims as the “eyes and ears” effect these can have in terms of winning reintegrate those who agree to enter of the security forces, the AFP has “hearts and minds.”24 into government-sponsored amnesty substantially augmented the scope of its programs and ensure that they have own surveillance efforts on the ground. Australian Security Assistance to the sufficient opportunity to support their Indeed, the Philippine model has been Philippines livelihood in a civilian context.20 With so successful that officials are now The bulk of Australia’s security the current global economic downturn looking at whether it could be replicated assistance has been directed toward the having a significant negative impact in other conflict zones. Although there police. The main emphasis has been on on the Philippines, Manila’s ability to are no active discussions yet, one place capacity building in critical areas such successfully support the transition of where it could have particular relevance as crime scene management, strategic NPA fighters, possibly at the same time is southern Thailand.23 reporting, intelligence collection, as having to manage a similar process forensic evidence gathering and with regard to the MILF, cannot be Despite the gains made in the AFP’s improvised explosive device “signature- taken for granted. counterterrorism strategy, several track” analysis. Australia’s Federal problems remain. First, comparatively Police has allocated roughly A$5.5 U.S. Security Assistance to the Philippines little effort has been devoted to million ($4.6 million) to these various In rough terms, most U.S. security aid developing an overall strategy that is endeavors since 2006, in addition to to the Philippines is allocated to the directed against militant groups as a helping establish a dedicated bomb data AFP while Australian support focuses whole. The emphasis has rather been center and integrated case management primarily on the PNP. In both cases, on intensifying local offensives in system.25 however, the majority of assistance particular areas. The utility of such an is directed toward facilitating the approach makes little sense given the There are definite indications that the campaign against the ASG. This army’s limited resources and the fact PNP is making progress in these areas. disposition reflects Manila’s general that degrees of tactical cooperation According to Western officials, the reluctance to accept external help in are believed to take place between the police force has developed an enhanced mitigating the NPA threat—which it ASG and renegade MILF commands, as ability to think strategically and is now benefiting from the input and direction 18 Personal interview, Philippine academic, Manila, June 21 For an in-depth look at the U.S.-Philippine security of some competent officers. Moreover, a 2009. assistance relationship, see Peter Chalk, “U.S. Security number of fairly innovative structural 19 Personal interviews, Philippine analysts and academ- Assistance to Philippines: A Success Story Against Ter- ideas have been forthcoming. One of the ics, Manila, June 2009. rorism,” CTC Sentinel 1:3 (2008). 20 Under the program, the government offers every 22 Personal interviews, AFP and Western officials, Ma- 24 Personal interviews, Philippine analysts and academ- NPA cadre who surrenders up to Ps50,000 ($1,040) for nila, June 2009. ics, Manila, June 2009. the return of their weapons and a single cash payment of 23 Personal interview, Western official, Manila, June 25 Personal interviews, Australian officials, Manila, June Ps20,000 ($415) to help support their livelihood. 2009. 2009 and Canberra, July 2009.

3 august 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 8 more notable comes from the current Conclusion Perhaps the biggest hurdle to the PNP director general who intends to The Philippine terrorist environment effective translation of counterterrorism make Mindanao the center of terrorism appears manageable. The ASG has been assistance into meaningful action lies intelligence collection and analysis. His reduced to isolated pockets of militants with the domestic environment of the concept envisages establishing satellite scattered across the outlying islands Philippines itself. Internal political data reporting stations that transmit of Mindanao with no apparent leader developments within the state are such raw intelligence to a dedicated hub or unified ideological agenda to tie the that sudden, unexpected shocks to the where it can be assessed, analyzed and group together. The MILF’s mainstream system are not only possible (indeed, disseminated back to the originating continues to insist that it is prepared the country is presently grappling with source. If enacted, this will avail an to engage Manila in peace talks, and and highly divided over the question of effective two-way information conduit there has been no substantial increase constitutional change29), but are also for counterterrorism intelligence and able to quickly and decisively unravel information. Australian officials laude reform attempts in the security sector. these efforts and generally believe they “The Philippine model has As one Western official remarked: “The are indicative of a bureaucratic cultural been so successful that Philippines is on a knife edge and I don’t context that is now highly receptive to think either Washington or Canberra institutional force development and officials are now looking fully appreciate how fragile the domestic progress.26 at whether it could be situation has become.”30 The continued success of security assistance programs One significant limiting factor in police replicated in other conflict cannot be considered a given under reform, however, is the issue of size. zones. Although there are these circumstances. Roughly 96% percent of the PNP’s budget is allocated on salaries. This leaves no active discussions yet, Dr. Peter Chalk is a senior Policy Analyst little money to underwrite substantive one place where it could with the RAND Corporation in Santa areas of police work such as forensics, Monica. He is Associate Editor of Studies investigative techniques and technological have particular relevance in Conflict and Terrorism and serves platforms. Australia would like to reduce is southern Thailand.” as an Adjunct Professor with the Post- this percentage ratio to around 80%, Graduate Naval School in Monterey and arguing that this would provide much the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies greater leeway for its own training and (APCSS) in Honolulu. He was a Professor support initiatives to take root.27 in the size of the so-called “renegade of Politics at the University of Queensland commands” despite periodic clashes in Brisbane, a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the In addition to the basic issue of with the military throughout 2009. Australian National University (ANU) in resources, Australian officials Finally, the NPA’s strength is at its Canberra and has experience with the UK identify several areas where the PNP’s lowest level since the 1980s, while its Armed Forces. counterterrorism effectiveness could be political wings—the CPP and NDF— usefully enhanced, namely: find it increasingly difficult to build a solid mass base. Complementing these a) Improving coordination of effort— positive developments are ongoing understanding how the actions of one improvements in the Philippine military agency will impact on the actions of and law enforcement communities, another; which despite various shortfalls appear b) Dealing with corruption and kickback, to be making progress operationally, which is endemic across the force; organizationally and doctrinally. c) Increasing the professionalism of the force, especially in terms of respect for Both the United States and Australia human rights; have been active in supplying security d) Reducing duplicity of effort; assistance to the Philippines, and there e) Developing appropriate legislative tools is little doubt that this support has for prosecuting terrorists.28 had a meaningful impact on the AFP and PNP. Future challenges will lie in

26 Personal interviews, Australian officials, Manila, June sustaining and fully institutionalizing 2009. the progress achieved thus far and 27 Personal interviews, Australian officials, Manila, June moving to mitigate enduring problems 29 Arroyo is presently seeking to change the Philippine 2009 and Canberra, July 2009. such as corruption. constitution, arguing, in part, that this is necessary to 28 Personal interviews, Australian officials, June 2009. meet Moro demands on ancestral domain—the main Although the country has an anti-terrorism law in sticking point hindering the current peace process with the guise of the Human Security Act (HSA, which was the MILF. Critics, however, charge that the real intention passed in 2008), the legislation has only been used once quently be found “not guilty,” liability and responsibility is to abrogate presidential term limits so that she can con- on account of the highly draconian penalties for alleged for financial compensation falls to the individual arrest- tinue in office after 2010. misuse of the statute. Of particular note is the provision ing officer(s) concerned rather than institutionally to the 30 Personal interview, Western official, Manila, June that should someone be detained under the HSA subse- PNP as an organization in its own right. 2009.

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The Evolving Role of speculated that the two groups broke diplomatic buildings in Germany.5 The apart because the IJU’s Jalolov fell out statement said that it hoped the attacks Uzbek-led Fighters with IMU leader Tahir Yuldashev (also would force the closure of the airbase at in Afghanistan and known as Muhammad Tahir Farooq) Termez in southern Uzbekistan, which Pakistan over ideological issues after the fall the German military uses to support its of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. deployments in northern Afghanistan. By Jeremy Binnie and Joanna Wright Yuldashev wanted to transform the IMU Since then, however, the IJU has into a regional organization, changing primarily been involved in attacks in uzbek-led jihadist groups have become its name to the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan. important actors in the Afghanistan Turkistan, while Jalolov remained and Pakistan insurgencies. The Islamic focused on conducting attacks in The IJU’s Role in Afghanistan 2 Jihad Union (IJU) is increasingly Uzbekistan. Jalolov’s group remained Since 2008, the IJU has released involved in attacks in Afghanistan, unknown until it claimed responsibility statements and videos identifying likely coordinated with the Haqqani for suicide bombings in Tashkent, members of the group from various 3 network. The IJU releases regular Uzbekistan in March and July 2004. countries who have carried out suicide propaganda statements and videos Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov bombings in Afghanistan, including encouraging Central Asians and Turks also mentioned his name in connection Turks, Kurds and Azerbaijanis. One of to join the fighting. While the IJU’s one with the unrest in the country’s Andijan the more recent attacks was carried out 4 European terrorist plot in September Province in May 2005. by Abu Ismail Kurdi during the night 6 2007 may prove to be an anomaly, it of July 3-4, 2009 in Paktika Province. is actively trying to reestablish itself Despite this early domestic focus, This seems to correspond with an assault in Central Asia. Moreover, the Islamic the IJU has since eclipsed the IMU in on a base in Zerok district in northern Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), another terms of international notoriety, largely Paktika that involved a suicide vehicle- Uzbek-led terrorist group, is following due to its role in an alleged bombing borne improvised explosive device the IJU’s lead and is now releasing its conspiracy in Germany. In September (VBIED) and rocket fire that left 10 7 own propaganda and video statements 2007, German police arrested three men attackers and two U.S. soldiers dead. encouraging Muslims to join the fighting (two German converts to Islam and a in South Asia. Whereas the IJU is more German national of Turkish descent) and The IJU has coordinated attacks with focused on Afghanistan, the IMU has seized a large quantity of concentrated the Haqqani network, an Afghan-led concentrated its attacks on Pakistan’s hydrogen peroxide, a chemical that can faction that operates autonomously 8 security forces, likely coordinated with be used to make explosives. The three under the Taliban name. The two Baitullah Mehsud’s militant faction. suspects and a fourth defendant who groups have a close relationship. This was extradited from Turkey have been coordination was revealed by a March The Uzbek-led jihadist groups are useful charged with several crimes, including 3, 2008 suicide bombing. During allies for the Taliban. Many fighters are preparing bombings and belonging to a the attack, a suicide bomber drove a experienced combat veterans, and newer terrorist organization. The IJU did not VBIED to the Sabari district center recruits will also likely have some prior help the suspects’ defense when it issued in the eastern province of Khost. The training as conscripts in the Uzbek or a statement claiming responsibility bombing killed two U.S. soldiers and 9 other Central Asian militaries. The for the alleged plot, saying the plans two Afghans. It was initially claimed Uzbek-led fighters have little choice but were to attack the U.S. Air Force base by Zabihullah Mujahid, one of the two to remain loyal to their hosts, making at Ramstein—which plays a major Taliban spokesmen who act as conduits them more reliable allies than local role in supporting coalition forces in for all official communiqués from the tribal groupings. Afghanistan—as well as Uzbek and U.S. “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” The insurgent commander Sirajuddin This article will examine the emergence mani.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1203. The U.S. Haqqani, however, broke with this of the IJU and its escalating activities Department of the Treasury confirmed that Abu Yahya in Afghanistan, the role that the two Muhammad Fatih is Najmiddin Jalolov when it black- 5 “IJU Claims Responsibility for Foiled Attacks in Ger- Uzbek-led groups play in supporting listed him on February 18, 2008. The state-controlled many,” German Federal Ministry of Interior, September the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and Uzbek media identified Jalolov as an IMU member as 11, 2007. evidence that al-Qa`ida has facilitated early as October 2000. 6 The IJU statement can be found at www.sehadetza- this process. 2 There are references to the IMU adopting the name Is- mani.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=2154. lamic Movement of Turkistan from 2003, and the name 7 “U.S. Soldiers Killed in Afghanistan,” BBC, July 4, The IJU Emerges change was confirmed by a captured member of the 2009. The IJU splintered from the IMU group interviewed by Moskovskiye Novosti on November 8 Regarding the Haqqani network’s area of operations, in 2002 under the leadership of 25, 2005. The group, however, has since reverted to its see “Unravelling Haqqani’s Net,” Jane’s Terrorism and Najmiddin Jalolov (also known as original name. Security Monitor, June 30, 2009. Combined Joint Task Abu Yahya Muhammad Fatih).1 It is 3 These claims were issued in the name of the Islamic Ji- Force 82 issued a press release called “Coalition Forces had Group, which was proscribed as a terrorist group by Focus on Haqqani Network” on October 19, 2007 stating the United States in May 2005. It seems to have adopted that Sirajuddin had taken over from his father. The state- 1 Abu Yahya Muhammad Fatih confirmed in an inter- the name Islamic Jihad Union around this time. ment is no longer available online. view dated May 31, 2007 that the group was formed in 4 A transcript of Islam Karimov’s televised May 14, 2005 9 A U.S. military spokesperson confirmed the details of 2002. The interview can be found at www.sehadetza- speech can be found using BBC’s monitoring services. the attack to the authors.

5 august 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 8 protocol and telephoned Pakistani This embedding process was outlined publicly endorsed the IJU. Shaykh journalists to claim that he personally by Commander Abu Zer, the leader of a Sa`id Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid, al-Qa`ida’s masterminded the attack.10 A few Turkish group called Taifetul Mansura “general commander” for Afghanistan, days later, the IJU released a written (Victorious Sect). In an interview then released a statement on June statement to Turkish language jihadist published by the Elif Media, Abu Zer 10 appealing to Turks for financial websites that claimed credit for the said his group had been fighting in the support.17 bombing and identified its perpetrator North Caucasus for 15 years, but had as Cüneyt Ciftci (also known as Saad Abu moved to Afghanistan in early 2009 When pushed by an al-Jazira journalist Furkan), a German national of Turkish where it had been assigned ansar12 (local to explain al-Qa`ida’s support for the descent. The IJU claim was supported helpers) with whom to work.13 Another Taliban, Abu’l-Yazid said in a recent by the subsequent release of a video statement released by the same group interview: showing Ciftci cheerfully helping to in June announcing the death of two construct his VBIED, heaping bags onto of its members in Khost suggested that Last year’s operation in Khost was the back of a small truck to disguise the the Haqqani network is the ansar in reported in the media. It was an explosives. The video included footage question.14 While there is no evidence attack against the U.S. command of the explosion.11 of an explicit link between Taifetul headquarters at the Khost airport. Mansura and the IJU, Turkish volunteers God be praised, this was arranged The video propelled Ciftci into the are apparently being channeled toward by al-Qa`ida with the participation jihadist “hall of fame” and also shed the Haqqani network’s bases in North of our brother Taliban. This was light on the complexity of the Afghan Waziristan Agency in Pakistan, where one of the major operations in insurgency. All three of the ostensibly there are established contingents that which we participated. Many of rival claims were accurate. The attack speak their language.15 the martyrdom operations that was a joint operation by the IJU and took place in Khost, Kabul and the Haqqani network, and the Afghan There have been hints of al-Qa`ida’s other areas were planned by our Taliban claimed formal responsibility. involvement with the IJU-Haqqani brothers and we participated in Since then, with the exception of one alliance, and al-Qa`ida likely considers them.18 attack in Jalalabad, all the suicide the IJU’s connections to the Turkish bombings claimed by the IJU have jihadist community an asset. The This is almost certainly a reference to been carried out in the Haqqani development of operational links attacks on Forward Operating Base network’s sphere of influence in between the groups would allow al- Salerno, a major U.S. base near Khost eastern Afghanistan, demonstrating the Qa`ida to tap into new networks that city, on August 18-19, 2008.19 continuing close relationship between could be used to facilitate attacks in the IJU and the Haqqani network. Turkey and Europe, or allow the IJU Al-Qa`ida is clearly trying to associate to use al-Qa`ida’s expertise for its own itself with the perceived operational Turkish Connection and Al-Qa`ida’s Influence operations in Central Asia. success of the Haqqani network and The IJU’s growing international trying to capitalize on the IJU’s ability to prominence is underpinned by its The clearest example of al-Qa`ida’s mobilize the Turkish jihadist community. Turkish language propaganda drive connections to the IJU occurred when It seems plausible that al-Qa`ida has since 2007, which has made the group a al-Qa`ida leader Abu Yahya al-Libi played a role in networking between focus for Turkish jihadists. This public appeared alongside IJU leader Abu the Uzbeks, Turks and the Haqqani relations campaign is presumably the Yahya Muhammad Fatih in an IJU network, but there is insufficient open work of internet savvy Turkish speakers video dated May 28, 2009.16 This was source evidence to conclude that al- who translate and republish statements the first time an al-Qa`ida leader has Qa`ida was instrumental in developing from the IJU and other groups. The the IJU into a repository for non-Arab IJU and sympathetic websites such as 12 The word ansar is a reference to the citizens of Yath- fighters joining the Taliban. Sehadet Zamani (Martyrdom Time) rib/Medina who helped the Muslim exiles from Mecca, encourage Turks to join or support known as the muhajirin, during the hijra (622 AD). Con- the jihad and promote slain fighters as temporary jihadists use the words ansar for local forces 17 The Turkish translation of the Arabic statement can “martyrs” worthy of emulation. It is not and muhajirin for foreign fighters. be found at www.taifetulmansura.com/71811_Seyh-Ebu- clear how these Turkish cyber-jihadists 13 The interview can be found at www.elifmedya.word- Yezid’den-Mesaj-Var.html. teamed up with the IJU, but there is some press.com/2009/05/29/17/. 18 The interview was broadcast by al-Jazira on June 21, evidence that Turks who are arriving in 14 The statement can be found at www.elifmedya.word- 2009. the Pakistani tribal areas to fight with press.com/2009/06/22/zulum-son-buluncaya-kadar- 19 Personal interview, U.S. military intelligence source, the Taliban are being assigned to the savasacagiz/. FOB Salerno, Afghanistan, February 2009. For more de- Haqqani network. 15 It is not clear how this process is organized. Some tails of the attack, see “Unravelling Haqqani’s Net.” The likely arrrive in Peshawar where they are eventually di- incident was also mentioned in a document summarizing rected to Turkish speakers in North Waziristan. Others the interrogation of Bryant Neal Vinas, a U.S. al-Qa`ida are probably led in by facilitators. For example, see Paul recruit captured in Pakistan in November 2008. Vinas 10 Regarding the Taliban’s claims, see “Taliban Attack Cruickshank, “The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Ter- said it was planned by al-Qa`ida’s leaders and that it US Military Camp in Kost,” The News, March 4, 2008. rorist Pipeline,” CTC Sentinel 2:4 (2009). went badly. He identified one of the suicide bombers as 11 The video can be found at www.sehadetzamani.com/ 16 The video can be found at www.sehadetzamani.com/ a Turk, although the IJU does not seem to have claimed haber_detay.php?haber_id=1911. reklam_detay.php?id=79. him as one of its own.

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Separately, the IJU proved it is more faction and its allies have been engaged Tribal Dynamics of the than a Taliban proxy by carrying out in an escalating war with the Pakistani an attack in its homeland on May 26, state, during which the Uzbeks have Afghanistan and Pakistan 2009. Uzbek authorities confirmed earned a reputation as loyal and capable Insurgencies that a police checkpoint was attacked fighters. The IMU also operates in near Khanabad on the border with Afghanistan’s northern Zabul Province By Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend Kyrgyzstan early in the morning and and southern Ghazni Province.24 that a suicide bomber blew himself there is a renewed public appreciation up later that day in Andijan. The IJU Conclusion for the role of tribal allegiances and claimed responsibility for the incidents Both the IMU and IJU are competing tribal governance in the Afghanistan and in its May 28 video, thereby proving to showcase their international Pakistan insurgencies. This is indicated that it was still determined to carry memberships and their enthusiasm for by the U.S. government’s announcement out attacks in Uzbekistan that are carrying out suicide bombings. The of an inter-agency effort to study completely unrelated to the insurgency IJU apparently has permission to claim the insurgencies’ tribes, including a in Afghanistan. attacks independently of the established search for “reconcilable” elements.1 Taliban propaganda system: as the The behavior of most insurgent groups The IMU Avoids Being Overshadowed group’s hosts, the Haqqanis would be in along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border Like the IJU, the IMU now appears to be a position to end the IJU claims if they is conditioned by tribal identities, heightening publicity for its operations disproved of them. This is probably a allegiances and interests. Some fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In January, reflection of the perceived usefulness of are motivated by pan-tribal or global March and April of 2009, it released the propaganda campaign in recruiting religious sentiment. Most, however, are its own videos featuring Germans more volunteers to carry out similar strongly influenced by the interests and encouraging their fellow countrymen attacks, thereby ensuring a steady demands of their tribe. Tribal leaders to join them in Afghanistan.20 On July supply of ideologically committed are often forthright in explaining that 11, 2009, the IMU released an Uzbek- bombers. their decision to support or undermine language video claiming that one of the Taliban revolves around tribal its members carried out a suicide The IMU now seems to be pursuing a interests, not through belief in the bombing on April 4 in Miran Shah in similar strategy, and can be expected insurgency’s inherent virtue vis-à- Pakistan’s North Waziristan Agency. to claim more suicide bombings. It vis the Afghan government or foreign This corresponds to an incident that will probably claim bombings carried forces.2 Many young men are committed reportedly killed one Pakistani soldier out on behalf of the Pakistani Taliban to the insurgency by their elders, and seven civilians.21 This seems to be and targeting security forces, rather becoming indistinguishable in battle the first time that the IMU has explicitly than civilians, to ensure the attacks from other fighters who belong to the claimed a suicide bombing.22 That are widely perceived as legitimate. If it Taliban “proper” or to the Haqqani video identified militants from various continues to emulate the IJU, the IMU network. In theory, these tribal fighters countries, including China, Germany, will also look to return to action in could be separated from the insurgency Russia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Central Asia, thereby demonstrating to by persuading tribal leaders to withdraw its core audience that it can confront the them. The location of the suicide bombing regimes of the former Soviet republics. claimed by the IMU reflects the If attempts to employ tribes against targeting priorities of its host. While For al-Qa`ida’s part, it will continue insurgents are to succeed, the emphasis the IJU is likely embedded with the to associate itself with the IJU in an must be on Pashtun tribes. Although Haqqani network and has focused on attempt to gain access to the group’s other ethnicities participate in the Afghanistan, the IMU has been fighting network in Europe and Turkey and to insurgency, their role is in large part for Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah achieve propaganda gains from the IJU’s defined by their relationship to the Mehsud’s faction since April 2007 increased frequency of attacks. Pashtun tribes that saturate the region. when it was evicted from the Wana area This is true of groups such as the Uzbek of South Waziristan by rival Taliban Jeremy Binnie is the senior terrorism and fighters, whose fortunes and strength commander Maulvi Nazir.23 Baitullah’s insurgency analyst at IHS Jane’s. He is the have been heavily conditioned by the editor of Jane’s Terrorism & Security hospitality of their hosts, such as the 20 Links to the IMU video released in April can be found Monitor and an associate editor (terrorism Darikhel, Tojikhel and Yarghukhel at www.ansarnet.info/showthread.php?p=8113. and insurgency) of Jane’s Intelligence (sub-tribes of Ahmadzai Wazir in 3 21 “Eight Killed in Miranshah Suicide Bombing,” Daily Review. Pakistan’s Waziristan). Times, April 5, 2009. 22 Links to the video can be found at www.ansarnet. Joanna Wright is a journalist who spent eight 1 Bryan Bender, “US Probes Divisions within Taliban,” info/showthread.php?t=1998. months working on assignment for Janes in Boston Globe, May 24, 2009. 23 The alliance between Baitullah Mehsud and the Uz- Iraq and Afghanistan in 2008-2009. 2 See, for example, Darin J. Blatt et al., ‘Tribal Engage- bek jihadists has been well documented by the Pakistani ment in Afghanistan,” Special Warfare 22:1 (2009); Je- press and was further evidenced by footage of Hakimul- rome Starkey, “Tribal Leaders to Sabotage West’s As- lah Mehsud, a key lieutenant of Baitullah at the time, sault on Taliban,” Independent, December 4, 2008. driving a captured Humvee in the IMU’s “Soldiers of 24 Personal interview, U.S. military intelligence source, 3 Vern Liebl, “Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam Allah” video. FOB Sharana, Afghanistan, January 2009. and Taliban: A Short View,” Small Wars and Insurgencies

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This article focuses on the intersection confrontation between the Durrani’s The result is that a government of tribalism and insurgency. It provides Hamid Karzai and the Ghilzai’s Mullah dominated by Tajiks and Durranis is a history of the three major Pashtun Muhammad Omar is a continuation of facing off against a Ghilzai-led Taliban confederations in Afghanistan and the confederations’ traditional roles as that has incorporated significant Pakistan; examines how the Haqqani rulers and insurgents, respectively. numbers of Durrani fighters.11 To the network and global jihadists have extent that the power bases of the exploited Pashtun tribalism; and Fighting between tribes and sub-tribes of Durrani in government depend on rural identifies how tribal militias have the same confederation is one indication constituencies in provinces such as recently been used to combat the Taliban that the confederation level of analysis Helmand and Farah, they must balance in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. has never been adequate.8 A notable official interests with maintaining shift in the current phase of insurgency, tribal satisfaction in anti-government Drifting to the Durrani for example, has been the groundswell areas. Moreover, within this mix are Approximately two-thirds of Afghan of Durrani fighters beneath the Ghilzai- the Karlanri tribes, providing major Pashtuns belong to the Ghilzai and dominated Afghan Taliban leadership. ethnic bridges between the Afghan and Durrani confederations.4 The tribes Distinguishing cause and effect is Pakistani Taliban by virtue of straddling of the smaller Karlanri confederation difficult, but the increasing prominence insurgent strongholds in southeastern live in Afghanistan’s eastern and of Durrani fighters and commanders Afghanistan and the tribal areas of southeastern provinces,5 providing the Pakistan. strongest kinship bridges into Pakistan. “The Haqqanis’ reliance Ghilzai and Durrani tribes, however, The Zadran and the Haqqani Network are numerically dominant in most of on Zadran territory is not The Haqqani network is an excellent Afghanistan. As a general rule, tribal a fatal vulnerability, but it example of how global jihadists and allegiances and systems of governance Taliban fighters have been able to are stronger among the mountainous does offer the possibility exploit Pashtun nationalism. Jalaluddin tribes of the Ghilzai and among the of constraining their and Sirajuddin Haqqani are prominent Karlanri, while Durrani governance members of the Pashtun Zadran tribe, rests more on cross-tribal structures of operational capability.” and a great deal of their political capital feudal land ownership.6 was amassed by Jalaluddin in fighting the Soviets. Former U.S. Congressman A broad historical view of the Pashtun Charlie Wilson famously called tribes would depict the Durrani tribes correlates with the geographical Jalaluddin “goodness personified”12 as political leaders and the Ghilzai spread of the insurgency through and he received a disproportionate as providing the fighters.7 From Durrani areas in Helmand, Nimroz, share of U.S. money.13 The Haqqanis Afghanistan’s founding to the Taliban’s Farah and Herat provinces. Durrani have also been effective in attracting ascendancy, all of Afghanistan’s rulers are being recruited at lower-levels and Arab donations due to their tactical have been from Durrani tribes with the their traditional leaders are becoming efficiency and assisted by Jalaluddin’s exception of the ill-fated Mohammad insurgent leaders, with varying degrees marital and linguistic connection to Noor Taraki (and a brief interlude of of integration into the Taliban “proper.” the Gulf states.14 The present strength nine months in 1929). For some, the Some intra-insurgency tensions appear to be the result of locally-empowered to mention their own enrichment; and 2) tribal leaders– Durrani Taliban commanders disliking 18:3 (2007): pp. 492-510. with whom the Taliban have varying degrees of integra- the rotation of senior Ghilzai Taliban 4 A 1996 estimate suggested that Durrani tribes com- tion–resented efforts to send money out of their com- commanders into “their” territory.9 prised 29% of Afghan Pashtuns and the Ghilzai 35%. The munities (for the same reason they resist government Notably, in 2008 such tensions included estimate appeared in “Afghanistan: A Country Study,” taxation that appears to redistribute revenue out of the disagreement over tax revenue, with Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, villages). Personal interviews, ISAF personnel, May 24, a specific concern for drug-derived 1997. 2009. David Mansfield also refers to increasingly antag- money.10 5 Tribes of the Karlanri confederation are demographi- onistic relations over taxation between insurgents and cally strong in Afghanistan’s Paktia, Paktika, Logar, the population: “it was suggested that this…was a result Khost, Nangarhar and Kunar provinces. 8 The “confederation level of analysis” refers to the no- of many of their fighters in Helmand and Kandahar not 6 The strength of tribal governance derives from eco- tion that the conflict is mainly between Durrani and being from the local area.” See “Sustaining the Decline?” nomic, demographic and political circumstances. The Ghilzai. As stated by the International Crisis Group, Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit of the UK Gov- Karlanri, for example, tend to inhabit isolated commu- “animosities between particular Durrani tribes far ex- ernment, May 2009. nities with small land-holdings and an overwhelming ceed any ill feeling between Durrani and Ghilzai.” See 11 This evolution has often been described as “neo-Tal- dominance of a single tribe in each village. See Thomas International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: The Problem iban.” H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of Pashtun Alienation,” August 5, 2003. 12 George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War (New York: Grove of Fire,” International Security 32:4 (2008); Thomas J. 9 Personal interviews, ISAF intelligence officials, May Press, 2007). Barfield, “Weapons of the Not so Weak in Afghanistan,” 11, 2009. 13 “Interview: Steve Coll,” PBS Frontline, October 3, in Hinterlands, Frontiers, Cities and States: Transactions 10 In previous years, little opium tax actually made it 2006; Anand Gopal, “The Most Deadly US Foe in Af- and Identities, Yale University, February 23, 2007; David up to the senior leadership. In 2008, there appeared to ghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, May 31, 2009. B. Edwards, Before Taliban (Berkeley, CA: University of be a concerted effort to move more revenue to the higher 14 “Haqqani Network,” Institute for the Study of War, California Press, 2002). levels. This caused tension for two reasons: 1) low-level available at www.understandingwar.org/themenode/ 7 Barfield. commanders use drug tax for subsistence purposes, not haqqani-network.

8 august 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 8 of the Haqqani network owes much districts in Khost, Paktika and Paktia most realistic accomplishment would to Jalaluddin’s fighting prowess, in Afghanistan19 gives it an effective be to increase the reluctance of Zadran accompanying fundraising skills and base for operations in Afghanistan. The community leaders to allow direct the power these skills gave Jalaluddin Haqqanis have consistently pledged access to and through their villages in the Zadran tribe. their allegiance to the Taliban, but by the Haqqani network. As in other United Nations and ISAF sources agree “pro-insurgent” areas, some Zadran Much of the Zadran population live in that the Haqqanis have demonstrated communities would prove willing to Afghanistan’s Spera (Khost), Zadran greater imagination, intent and cooperate with the government when (Paktia) and Gayan (Paktika) districts, capability for complex attacks than enjoying an ongoing security presence which have long histories of resisting regular Taliban commanders.20 While and constructive engagement to foreign influence.15 The arrival of difficult to confirm, the Haqqanis have support self-policing and immediate international forces in 2001 energized also been credited for driving the growth reconstruction benefits. a struggle for control over the Zadran of suicide bombings in Afghanistan.21 between the Haqqanis and Padcha Khan Lashkars and Arbakees Zadran, a warlord with his power- The Haqqanis’ continuing effectiveness The Afghanistan and Pakistan base in Khost Province. The latter draws on and reinforces their long- governments have also tried to leverage was hardly pro-government, but he standing relationship with al-Qa`ida’s tribal networks to support their positioned himself as anti-Taliban and leaders. Historically, this was objectives. Both countries have armed utilized foreign assistance.16 In that demonstrated in Usama bin Ladin’s and supported anti-insurgent tribes sense, Padcha Khan was an old-style choice of Haqqani territory for al- to combat the Taliban, the Haqqani leader who placed tribal power and Qa`ida’s first significant training camps network and al-Qa`ida. In FATA, this independence over external allegiances in Afghanistan.22 Currently, Western has taken the form of lashkars, tribal and interests.17 Since 2002, the Haqqanis’ and Afghan intelligence officials assess militias formed either within one tribe reversion to jihadist-aligned resistance that al-Qa`ida places greater trust and or through an alliance of several tribes has leveraged Jalaluddin’s continuing accompanying funding in the Haqqani following a jirga decision. fame and obtained protection from the network to execute complex attacks.23 Zadran in much of their territory. By The Mamond tribes and the Salarzai contrast, Padcha Khan has entered the The Haqqanis’ reliance on Zadran tribe (a small sub tribe of the Tarkani Wolesi Jirga (Afghanistan’s upper house territory is not a fatal vulnerability, but it Pashtuns who live in two valleys of of parliament) and his power-base has does offer the possibility of constraining Bajaur Agency) have raised their narrowed, a move supported by Hamid their operational capability. Jalaluddin’s own lashkars and can be legitimately Karzai in an effort to neutralize his anti- apparent implacability and Sirajuddin’s considered anti-Taliban/al-Qa`ida.26 government appeal.18 By cooperating turn toward greater radicalism24 make The price has been high and scores of with the Karzai government, Padcha it highly unlikely that Zadran areas can tribal elders have been assassinated Khan has allowed the Haqqanis and, by be pacified through engagement with since the start of the movement. For extension, al-Qa`ida and the Taliban to the Haqqanis. A better strategy would example, in November 2008 four become the Zadran’s main option for work from the ground up, particularly “elders” of the Mamond tribe and resisting international and government in Paktia, where leaders combine several Mamond lashkar members were influence. affection for Jalaluddin with an often killed after a suicide bomber detonated stronger concern for the local welfare at a tribesman’s house in Bajaur.27 Other The Haqqani network’s solid control of of their tribe.25 In the short-term, the tribes that reportedly raised lashkars Miran Shah in Pakistan and most Zadran are the Orakzai of Orakzai Agency in 28 19 UN assessment of district-level control, provided in a FATA. This has naturally created 15 A CIA assessment in 1980 noted Paktia as an area of briefing to the author in May 2009. tensions between the Orakzai and more strength for the insurgency, drawing on “the most tra- 20 Personal interviews, UN and ISAF officials, Kabul, militant tribes such as the Mehsud in 29 ditionally minded” tribes. See CIA Directorate of Intel- June 2009. South Waziristan. ligence, “The Soviets and the Tribes of Southwest Asia,” 21 Gopal; Haqqani Network; Jonathon Burch, “Q+A: Af- CIA Declassification Release, September 23, 1980. ghanistan – Who are the Haqqanis?” Reuters, March 23, 16 Michael Hirsh and Scott Johnson, “A Defiant Warlord 2009. communities. In the words of one village elder in Herat Threatens to Sink the New Afghan Leader,” Newsweek, 22 Marc W. Herold, “The Failing Campaign,” Frontline Province, speaking to the author on July 16, 2009, “they February 13, 2002; Michael V. Bhatia, “Paktya Province: 19:3 (2002). [Taliban leaders] have respect for being good fighters, but Sources of Order and Disorder,” in Michael V. Bhatia and 23 This appears to be a generalized trust, however, in- fighting does not always bring us bread.” In southeastern Mark Sedra eds., Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict(London: stead of one requiring consultations with al-Qa`ida on Afghanistan, Darin Blatt and colleagues suggested that Routledge, 2008). targets and tactics. Personal interviews, UNAMA, ISAF “all the tribes are concerned mostly with providing for 17 At one point, Padcha Khan was fighting Tani tribal and ANDS officials, Kabul, May-June 2009. their immediate future.” See Blatt. leaders, resisting the government’s writ and attempting 24 Haqqani Network; Burch; Imtiaz Ali, “The Haqqani 26 It should be noted, however, that individuals belong- to undermine Haqqani’s influence over the Zadran. See Network and Cross-Border Terrorism in Afghanistan,” ing to these same tribes have joined the Taliban. Illene R. Prusher, Scott Baldauf and Edward Girardet, Terrorism Monitor 6:6 (2008). 27 Dawn, November 18-24, 2008. “Afghan Power Brokers,” Christian Science Monitor, June 25 Personal interviews, UNAMA officials, May 2009. 28 Shaheen Buneri, “Pashtun Tribes Rise Against Tali- 10, 2002. While the Haqqanis receive widespread respect as war- ban In Pakistan Tribal Area,” AHN, July 19, 2008. 18 Personal interview, Western intelligence official, Ka- riors, this does not necessarily translate into obedience 29 Shazadi Beg, “The Ideological Battle: Insight from bul, June 16, 2009. from tribal leaders who must answer directly to their Pakistan,” Perspectives on Terrorism 2:10 (2008).

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Overall, however, these efforts have southeast. The arbakees (like the lashkars) pressured by jihadists and the not resulted in any significant losses do not exist permanently in every international community alike. Both for the Taliban. In fact, until the recent district, but are an ad hoc and reactive antagonists have a long-term interest forays by the Pakistani military against force. The arbakee is also used by the in undermining tribalism, but both also the Taliban, the Taliban encountered jirga as a law enforcement tool, which have an interest in using tribalism to relatively little tribal resistance as they makes the jirga in this region far more support immediate military aims. quickly and brutally established their powerful than in southern and eastern hold across FATA and the NWFP. The Afghanistan where this tradition does For the governments of Afghanistan tribes in FATA are quite scattered and not exist.34 and Pakistan and their international little unity exists, particularly against supporters, this implies a difficult a Taliban movement recruiting from The capacities of Afghan military and trade-off. Immediate military interests almost every tribe (excluding Shi`a law enforcement are minimal in Loya in bargaining with tribes require Turis). This failure was most obvious Paktia and they often count on the subordination of interests in issues in North and South Waziristan when support of arbakees. The tribal elders such as human rights and good identify those citizens who will be used governance. Notably, as the arbakee to support the police to ensure effective tradition illustrates, a resort to tribally- “As Afghanistan’s and interventions. According to the Tribal mediated security structures implies Pakistan’s insurgent Liaison Office, a European-funded a continuing devolution by the central NGO, government of its core responsibilities. conflicts drag on, the This may be functional in the short- stress on tribal structures Despite the fact that each term, but will likely leave unchanged arbakee has a clear leader (amir), the uneasy relationship between will continue, pressured accountability goes back to the relatively progressive governments by jihadists and the tribal council (jirga or shura) that and conservative tribal traditions—an called upon the arbakee, which uneasiness that proved fertile ground international community in turn is accountable to the for jihadism in the first place. alike.” community. Furthermore, arbakees only function within the territory Hayder Mili is an independent researcher. of the tribe they represent. Their He has published analytical and academic fighters are volunteers from within articles on terrorism, the drug trade and the lashkars of 2003 and 2007 were the community and are paid by law enforcement responses. He holds effectively impotent.30 Nevertheless, the the community. This emphasizes master’s degrees in Strategic Studies and lashkars have had some positive effects again that their loyalty is with International Relations from the Sorbonne in pressuring the Taliban; for example, their communities and not an University in Paris. He is currently based Taliban spokesman Maulvi Omar’s individual leader.35 in Central Asia. August 2009 arrest was credited to the work of a lashkar in Mohmand Agency.31 One important demonstration of the Jacob Townsend is an independent analyst government’s reliance on arbakees was focused on insurgency and transnational Another region where Pashtun the continuous funding until at least organized crime. He has worked with the tribal militias have been utilized is 2007 for 40-60 arbakee members in each United Nations in Central Asia, South in southeastern Afghanistan’s Loya district in the southeast, including a Asia and the Asia-Pacific. He is currently Paktia, the area encompassing Paktika, sizeable expansion of force numbers to based in Kabul. Khost and Paktia provinces.32 In this secure the 2004-2005 elections.36 region the Afghan equivalent of lashkars exists. Apparently an institution limited Conclusion to Loya Paktia,33 the arbakee (guardians) As Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s are the traditional tribal security of the insurgent conflicts drag on, the stress on tribal structures will continue, 30 Mukhtar A. Khan “The Role of Tribal Lashkars in Winning Pakistan’s War on Terror,” Terrorism Focus 34 Karokhail. 5:40 (2008). 35 Karokhail. This cooperation between tribal levees 31 Noor Mohmand, “TTP Mouthpiece Nabbed,” Nation, and Afghanistan’s “proper military” has a long tradition. August 19, 2009. Indeed, the 1929 rebellion was catalyzed by the govern- 32 Masood Karokhail, “Integration of Traditional Struc- ment’s attempt to change the system and recruit the army tures into the State Building Process: Lessons from the on a national basis, cutting through the role of tribal lead- Tribal Liaison Office in Loya Paktia,” Tribal Liaison Of- ers in organizing self-defense. The ANA is considered a fice, 2006, available at www.tlo-afghanistan.org/filead- relative success partly because it is recruited and rotated min/pdf/SchAfgahnEn.pdf. nationally, yet few Pashtuns in the ANA come from the 33 In Paktia specifically, the tribal structures were pre- areas in which arbakees are common. served and have emerged more or less intact from com- 36 B. Schetter et al., “Beyond Warlordism: The Local munist rule and years of conflict. This includes a func- Security Architecture in Afghanistan,” Internationalie tioning system of traditional justice. Politik und Gesellschaft 2 (2007).

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A Review of Reconciliation and political system, and a focus on than 30 supporters in the lower house strengthening broader governance (of 249 seats). Many other “former” Efforts in Afghanistan activities to cut off potential community members of Hizb-i-Islami, a grouping support for the insurgency rather than always dominated by professionals By Joanna Nathan rewards for violent actors. and technocrats, took powerful positions in the administration. These to achieve stability in Afghanistan, The Early Years: Lack of Coherence examples highlight the complex web there is a growing emphasis on political In 2001, the treatment of individuals of overlapping identities and shifting solutions with insurgents. The reality, associated with the Taliban regime allegiances that has characterized the however, is that such efforts so far have proved remarkably arbitrary. In many post-2001 government. been fragmented and often contradictory. cases, the use of airpower or arbitrary There remains no agreement within the detentions was the result of information Amidst a highly personalized, patronage- Afghan government and international provided to U.S. forces by new allies based system, the administration community, or between them, on what seeking to settle old scores, the very has jealously guarded its primacy in the concept is, who it is aimed at, and randomness (and/or inaccuracy) of “reconciliation” efforts, but has failed to most importantly its place within action contributing to early alienation.2 provide a serious strategic approach to wider stabilization strategies. Amidst Taliban camp cooks were reported to more equitable and responsive systems. an increasingly violent insurgency, be on trial while a former international Instead, there has been continued public the temptation has been to attempt spokesman went to Yale.3 Some former rhetoric offering succor to the Taliban’s local or grand bargains with insurgent Taliban leaders were detained at top leadership and attempts at opaque leaders. Even if desirable, this strategy Guantanamo Bay, while others worked behind-the-scenes deal-making with is unrealistic because amorphous anti- for the government with no transparent individuals. The disjointed programs— government elements show no desire criteria for such decisions. such as the Allegiance Program and for such deals. It further dangerously “Takhim e-Solh”—often seem largely distracts from enduring political There was never a legal bar on regime aimed at capturing donor funding or solutions—aimed at the Afghan people members taking public roles. For entrenching favored networks rather rather than at insurgents—of ensuring example, a former Taliban deputy than strengthening government better governance and more equitable minister and a former envoy of institutions and tackling sources of representation. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a former Taliban alienation.5 rival whose faction of Hizb-i-Islami has This article offers a short summary joined the insurgency in a loose alliance) Members of the international community of post-2001 “reconciliation” and were appointed to the Senate. In the have also not acted cohesively. They “outreach” efforts. It examines how 2005 National Assembly elections, have undertaken a series of unilateral, since 2001 the international community at least two former regime members bilateral and multilateral efforts despite and Afghan government have failed were elected to the lower house.4 Soon the theoretical lead of the United Nations to pursue a coherent policy even in afterward, a group of Hizb-i-Islami Assistance Mission in Afghanistan deciding which strata of the Taliban claiming to have split with Hekmatyar (UNAMA). The latter holds a specific should be targeted, isolated or engaged. registered as a political party (Hizb- mandate to Furthermore, reconciliation efforts i-Islami Afghanistan), boasting more have for the most part been narrowly provide good offices to support, premised on a paradigm of amnesty 2 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: The Prob- if requested by the Afghan and surrender rather than true peace- lem of Pashtun Alienation,” August 5, 2003; Martine government, the implementation of building. Moreover, operating distinctly Van Bijlert, “Unruly Commanders and Violent Power Afghan-led reconciliation programs, from wider nation-building programs, Struggles: Taliban Networks in Uruzgan,” in Antonio within the framework of the Afghan they have failed to tackle underlying Giustozzi, De-Coding the New Taliban: Insights from the Constitution with full respect for dynamics.1 Given that the insurgents are Afghan Field (London: Hurst and Co., forthcoming). Van the implementation of measures widely perceived to have the strategic Bijlert provides a detailed account of one province— introduced by the Security Council momentum, having a demobilization 6 Uruzgan—and how such events helped drive some com- in its resolution 1267 (1999). program for fighters as a centerpiece manders (back) into the arms of militants. of such efforts is redundant at best. 3 “Guantanamo Prisoner says Taliban Forced him to be Political solutions must not be treated a Cook,” Associated Press, August 11, 2005; Chip Brown, 5 For more on the current political set-up, see Martine as a quick exit strategy when the aim is “The Freshman,” New York Times, February 26, 2006. In Van Bijlert, “Between Discipline and Discretion: Policies ongoing stability. Success will require a this case, the suspect was apparently accused before the Surrounding Senior Subnational Appointments,” Af- far greater commitment to coordination U.S. military tribunal of being an assistant cook. ghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), May by all players, a nuanced understanding 4 The winners were Zabul commander Mullah Salam 2009; Antonio Giustozzi and Dominique Orsini, “Cen- of the complex nature of the insurgency Rocketi and the former Taliban Bamiyan governor Mo- tre-Periphery Relations in Afghanistan: Badakhshan be- hammad Islam Mohammadi (later murdered). Among tween Patrimonialism and Institution Building,” Central 1 Regional issues will not be included in this article for those who stood but lost out were former Taliban foreign Asian Survey, March 2009. For an account of how com- reasons of space and focus. Indeed, while realigning ex- minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, former deputy inte- munity exclusion can feed directly into the conflict, see ternal equations is essential to long-term stability, this rior minister Mullah Khaksar (also later murdered) and Graeme Smith, “Inspiring Tale of Triumph over Taliban has too often been used as an excuse to distract from nec- head of the Taliban vice and virtue department, Maw- Not All it Seems,” Globe and Mail, September 23, 2006. essary internal measures. lawi Qalamuddin. 6 See UN Security Council Resolution 1868 (2009).

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In fact, Resolution 1267,7 which The 2005 Allegiance Program and Program quickly backtracked, President Karzai institutes a travel ban, asset freeze and Takhim e-Solh has publicly repeated such offers.16 arms embargo on listed members of An early specific Taliban “reconciliation” the Taliban, has remained cut off from effort by the U.S. military was the In practice, however, the main focus of efforts on the ground. Originally created Allegiance program launched in 2005. both programs was grassroots fighters in response to al-Qa`ida-directed One of the few open source references and the release of detainees, with PTS bombings in Africa and the Taliban’s by then chief of staff of Combined claiming some 4,599 “reconciled” refusal to hand over the suspects, it is Forces Command-Afghanistan, Colonel individuals by September 2007.17 Since now unclear whether it is supposed to David Lamm, stated that after briefing monthly individual “reconciliations” are be a fixed list of past regime members the ambassador and gaining Afghan the main yardstick of progress, there has under continuing sanction or, as the government approval, been a strict focus on the short-term; a current 1267 committee chair wants, small-scale UN survey apparently found “a dynamic list that addresses the the command rapidly developed a evolution of the threat posed by Al- reconciliation program for former Qaida and Taliban.”8 Taliban, and began a release “Both the Allegiance and program of 80 former Taliban PTS programs suffered an Currently it is neither, with many each month from U.S. detention member states not ensuring enforcement facilities, again involving the absence of monitoring and nor aiding its update. Hekmatyar was Afghan government in a central follow-through.” listed in 2003, but there has been role.12 only minimal change to the Taliban entries. Of the major powers, only A contemporaneous newspaper report Russia has demonstrated a definite quoted Lamm as saying that he expected that 50% of “reconcilees” were not policy—blocking the removal of any most of the Taliban’s rank and file, genuine fighters.18 This supports tales names, even the dead. Today, the list whom he estimated to number a few from the southern and eastern insurgent of 142 individuals associated with the thousand, to take up the amnesty offer heartlands of returning refugees and Taliban is disconnected from both the by summer.13 others being induced or threatened to current fight and the current political sign up to boost numbers.19 framework.9 Abdul Hakim Monib, who Its Afghan government successor, acted as Uruzgan governor in 2006- launched the same year in close Indeed, PTS’ multimillion dollar budget, 2007,10 and others who have long worked coordination with the U.S. military, was provided by various Western countries, with the government remain on the list Program Takhim e-Solh (Strengthening has been the source of continuing while a new generation of fighters is Peace, commonly known as PTS) headed allegations of malfeasance. Internal largely absent. By October 2007, only by Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, a religious British correspondence wryly observed two listed individuals were in the top elder and leader of President Hamid the opening of a bank account for one 12 wanted insurgent figures on separate Karzai’s wartime faction.14 Mujaddedi of the program’s 11 provincial offices: lists developed by international and was quoted stating there was no bar “Whilst this in normal terms this would Afghan security agencies and only 19 to the inclusion of even Mullah Omar not be seen as an achievement, in the among the 58 considered current “key and Hekmatyar for reconciliation: case of this project i[t] should be viewed leaders.”11 “our terms are if they lay down their as a considerable one.”20 weapons, respect the constitution and 7 For more information, see “Security Council Com- obey the government, we don’t have commission has also secured the release of hundreds 15 mittee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) big conditions for them.” While he of Afghan prisoners from jails and detention centers in Concerning al-Qaeda and the Taliban and Associated Afghanistan and abroad. Those who had reconciled and Individuals and Entities,” available at www.un.org/sc/ iban and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed denounced violence lead a peaceful life today.” See “Biog- committees/1267/index.shtml. to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, raphy of Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi,” available at 8 “Statement by the Chairman of the [1267] Committee available at daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ www.mojaddedi.org. Delivered at Briefing to Member States,” United Na- N08/341/88/PDF/N0834188.pdf?OpenElement. 16 Ron Synovitz, “Karzai Confirms Amnesty Offer is for tions, July 1, 2009, available at www.un.org/sc/commit- 12 Colonel David Lamm, “Success in Afghanistan Means all Willing Afghans,” Radio Free Europe, May 10, 2005. tees/1267/latest.shtml. Fighting Several Wars At Once,” Armed Forces Journal, 17 “Information Relating to British Financial Help to 9 The list was always fairly ad hoc, focused on those who November 2005. Afghan Government in Negotiations with the Taliban,” held administrative rather than military positions in the 13 Victoria Burnett, “US Extends an Olive Branch to Tali- Foreign and Commonwealth Office, July 8, 2008, p. 1. regime. For instance, Mullah Dadullah, who destroyed ban ‘Moderates,’” Boston Globe, January 2, 2005. 18 Ibid., p. 13. the Bamiyan Buddhas and massacred local Hazara com- 14 Both programs are discussed in Carlotta Gall, “The 19 Personal interviews, civilians, Jalalabad and Kanda- munities, became the Taliban’s southern commander af- Taliban’s Rocky Road Back to Afghan Reconciliation,” har, 2007 and 2008. ter 2001, yet he was never included on the list. New York Times, March 21, 2005. 20 It continues: “Initially when the PTS Commission 10 See, for instance, Colum Lynch, “UN, US actions 15 “Amnesty Offer to Taliban Leader,” BBC, May 9, was established in May 2005 a bank account was opened Sometimes at Odds over Afghan Policy,” Washington 2005. While the PTS program does not have an official but donors instead preferred to provide funding in case Post, July 5, 2007. website, the online biography of Mujaddedi states: “Since in U.S. dollars. This has resulted in many problems with 11 “Letter Dated 13 May 2008 from the Chairman of the its establishment, the commission has had remarkable accountability and transparency.” See “Information Re- Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to success in convincing thousands of Taliban supporters lating to British Financial Help to Afghan Government in Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning al-Qaeda and the Tal- and their allies to lay down their arms. In addition the Negotiations with the Taliban,” p. 8.

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Both the Allegiance and PTS programs operation, to heal the wounds most violent Taliban commanders suffered an absence of monitoring and pain of the victims and to in order to “win the peace.”24 and follow-through. Long-standing reintegrate citizens into a peaceful conspiracy theories in southern life in society. Finally, the most recent grassroots effort Afghanistan that the Taliban are outreach, the 2008 Afghanistan Social working with the Americans appear to In seeking a more cohesive approach Outreach Program (ASOP), similarly have been fueled by English-language across all eras of violence, an obvious lies outside broader governance identification cards, provided to at least focus would be common standards of efforts. ASOP, launched in Wardak and some reconcilees, presumably useful vetting. Currently, even as it is widely Helmand provinces, appoints district in case of returning to the battlefield.21 agreed that impunity and a lack of councils to Otherwise, given the prevailing security justice contribute to the insurgency, situation there has been little real the only standard for deal-making with ensure stability and security incentive, with around 1,500 afghanis insurgents appears to be potential “co- through addressing the gap (about $30) on offer to individuals to optability.” between people and the State give up arms. Senior PTS staff have and to strengthen traditional been keen to extend this to housing, cars Such complete impunity was explicitly leadership roles and relations and salaries, although how this could be stated in the 2007 Amnesty Resolution to the government and help achieved without pushing more people by the Afghan parliament, driven largely prevent the destruction posed by to take up arms in the hope of such by those members who as (former) insurgents.25 rewards and alienating those who have warlords and commanders feared for chosen not to is unexplained.22 their own fate. Extraordinarily, this ASOP, however, is not part of the held out full, ongoing amnesty to overarching governance framework of Conflicting Programs, Lack of Links the Independent Directorate of Local To mitigate against such perverse those individuals and groups Governance (IDLG), despite being incentives and the perception of special who are still in armed opposition overseen by the very same agency.26 rewards, it is crucial that such programs with the Islamic Republic of be linked with wider disarmament Afghanistan and who will end Nationwide constitutionally-mandated efforts. For example, Mujaddedi’s their opposition after this charter district council elections, which could PTS has been entirely autonomous of is in effect, join the national allow representative local voices to be the Disarmament and Reintegration reconciliation process and respect heard and provide legitimate outlets Commission (DRC) headed by Vice and observe the Constitution and for opposition, are currently scheduled President Karim Khalili. The latter other laws of the country.23 for 2011, although few of the necessary offers community development projects preparations appear to be underway. In in districts where (non-insurgent) Fighters could simply continue the contrast, these parallel ASOP councils, “illegal armed groups” are deemed to battle until they felt it was not in their appointed by the district governors have disarmed, although in reality is all interests, secure in the knowledge that “temporarily” in “priority” provinces,27 but moribund. This is largely because there would be no consequences. While appear a continuation of top-down of the reluctance by other groups to there was widespread international patronage rather than true outreach. disarm in the face of the insurgency— condemnation of the National Assembly, Afghan respondents to an assessment of yet another reason for harmonization. in reality this remains the conceptual the program in Wardak also questioned framework for such efforts. As stated the wisdom of starting such projects in Reconciliation efforts for insurgents by one analyst, the most violent areas, pointing out that have also been largely premised on a “the gap between people and the state is militarized/security agenda, developing the worst of all worlds would be widespread and it is not only limited to separately from transitional justice to not only employ violent and insecure areas of the country.” They urged initiatives emerging from a human rights predatory commanders to wage the that the initial focus be “to rescue the perspective. For instance, the wide- war on terror, but also to welcome semi- and relatively secure areas from reaching but largely overlooked Peace, back—without conditions—the falling into the hands of insurgents.”28 Reconciliation and Justice Action Plan launched in December 2006 actually 23 See Amnesty Resolution, Article 3 (ii). The exact sta- 24 Van Bijlert, “Unruly Commanders.” has reconciliation as its fourth pillar. It tus of this bill/resolution remains unclear, with the Af- 25 “Assessment Report on Afghanistan Social Outreach is stated that ghan government stating in a May 2009 submission for Program,” The Asia Foundation, November 10, 2008. the United Nations Human Rights Council: “Although 26 See “Draft Subnational Governance Policy,” Islamic as a first step, the transitional the National Assembly approved the National Recon- Republic of Afghanistan, May 20, 2009. justice strategy aims to realize ciliation Bill, the President did not sign the bill. The bill 27 The assessment notes: “In two such instances even peace and national reconciliation, has caused some misunderstandings and as a result this the very high ranking government officials (ministers or to restore co-existence and co- program was not implemented in 2008.” See “National higher) were involved in recommending the Community Report Submitted in Accordance with paragraph 15(A) Council members. Based on the political sensitivity of 21 Personal interviews, civilians, Kandahar and Lashkar of the Annex to the Human Rights Council Resolution the issue and the nature of the report they have not been Gah, 2006 and 2007. 5/1,” (Universal Periodic Review), United Nations Hu- named here.” See “Assessment Report on Afghanistan 22 Personal interviews, senior PTS officials, Kabul and man Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Social Outreach Program.” regional offices, 2007 and 2008. Periodic Review, (A/HRC/WG.6/5/AFG/1), p. 10. 28 Ibid.

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What the people are highlighting is The Absence of Shi`a Given the dearth of evidence regarding the broader issue that the insurgency suicide attacks by Shi`a militants in is being treated as the disease rather Suicide Attacks in Iraq Iraq, this article examines possible than as a symptom of wider malaise. reasons for the strategic logic of Shi`a Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic, multi- By Babak Rahimi abstinence from suicide operations. regional state that has been in an Such preliminary analysis provides almost perpetual state of conflict it is widely recognized that the reflection on why Shi`a Iraqi militants driven by, and exacerbating, multiple rise of suicide attacks in Iraq since have refrained from the use of suicide fissures and fractures for more than the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 has attacks against a perceived internal three decades. The current focus is too been predominately a Salafi-jihadi enemy (Sunnis or other rival Shi`a) or much on reacting to violence where it phenomenon.1 While some suicide a foreign occupying force (the United manifests itself rather than tackling the attacks are also strategically used by States). underlying conditions. other insurgent factions (both Islamist and nationalist Iraqi groups), most of Understanding the Lack of Shi`a Suicide It is often stated that in fighting an the known perpetrators are non-Iraqis Attacks insurgency military efforts must who are globally recruited or voluntarily Unlike Sunni Islam, Shi`a theology focus on protecting the population come from neighboring countries (such is famous for promoting a cult of and not the insurgents. The same as Saudi Arabia) or other parts of the martyrdom—a discursive-mythical logic of concentrating outreach world.2 Despite a decline of attacks paradigm that is symbolically rooted in and empowerment efforts on local since 2008—partly due to the U.S.- the multifaceted narrative of the self- communities rather than violent actors led “troop surge” and the bolstering of sacrifice of the Prophet Muhammad’s has yet to be applied to so-called political the state armed forces—Iraq remains a beloved grandson, Husayn, who is approaches. breeding ground for suicide operations. believed to have died a “noble” death These operations are organized by at the plains of Karbala at the hands of Joanna Nathan has been based in Kabul either Sunni Iraqi groups (Islamists the “evil” army of Caliph Yazid in 680 since 2003 working first for the Institute and nationalists) who use such military AD. When Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) and tactics against U.S. and Iraqi forces, or Army battled against the United States then as senior analyst for the International the global jihadist groups such as al- and, later, Iraqi forces between summer Crisis Group (ICG). She has focused on Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) that mainly target 2004 and spring 2008, “martyrdom security sector reform and the state of the the Shi`a civilian population to weaken operations,” known for their Shi`a insurgency. Ms. Nathan has just started a the Shi`a-dominated government in Lebanese origins, played no role in the Master of Public Policy at the Woodrow Baghdad by deliberately creating a militia’s anti-occupation campaigns. Wilson School at Princeton University. sectarian or communal conflict.3 In Moreover, various militant Mahdist The views expressed in this article are her the context of the U.S.-led occupation groups—some of which are offshoots of own. and the ensuing sectarian violence, the Mahdi Army—vying for power over however, one question has remained the Shi`a leadership between 2006 and largely ignored by analysts: Why has 2008 abstained from the use of suicide Iraq not experienced suicide violence attacks against other more powerful on the part of the Shi`a? Shi`a militias such as the Badr Brigade or the Shi`a-dominated Iraqi armed forces. There are four explanations for the lack of Shi`a suicide attacks in Iraq. 1 On the globalization of al-Qa`ida-led suicide attacks, see Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom: First, the pivotal element of Shi`a Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks militias’ strategy of confronting (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008). Baghdad and U.S. forces has remained 2 For a quantitative study of suicide attacks in Iraq be- and continues to be political. While tween 2003 and 2006, see Mohammed M. Hafez, “Sui- forging alliances of convenience through cide Terrorism in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment of the party politics based in Baghdad, Shi`a Quantitative Data and Documentary Evidence,” Studies militias have largely avoided military in Conflict and Terrorism 29:6 (2006). For a more updat- confrontation and, therefore, relied ed study, see Brian Fishman, Bombers, Bank Accounts & heavily on the political wing of their Bleedout (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, factions to advance their position within 2008). the state apparatus and the larger Iraqi 3 Although the wave of suicide attacks has recently shift- society. With the fall of the Sunni-led ed toward the Kurdistan region, especially the city of Mo- Ba`athist regime and the subsequent sul, many Shi`a-dominated urban regions have remained rise of Shi`a politics since 2003, the main target of al-Qa`ida in Iraq. Sadr City in Baghdad the militia branches of the political and the shrine city of Samarra, a target of two major at- organizations have usually played an tacks in 2006 and later in 2008, have played a critical auxiliary role of reinforcing the political role in the sectarian conflict in the post-war period. status of the movement in Baghdad and

14 august 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 8 within the Shi`a community—although military operation can be perceived supplying weapons to Shi`a insurgents. competition between factions has, to be morally justified in the context Unlike in the 1980s when the IRGC periodically, led to major outbreaks of of changing circumstances. In this supported Hizb Allah’s martyrdom violence since 2004. Moqtada al-Sadr’s sense, major high-ranking clerics such operations against Israel, Tehran has militia, largely entrenched within the as Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Qom- instead relied heavily on the patronage Shi`a community, and Abdul Aziz al- based cleric Ayatollah Kadhim Haeri, of a number of Shi`a political factions— Hakim’s Badr Brigade have used their the successor to Ayatollah Sadeq al- especially the Islamic Supreme Council Sadr, Moqtada’s father, have refrained of Iraq (ISCI) and the Sadrists—to “Suicide attacks are not from sanctioning suicide operations diminish Washington’s influence in for various theological and pragmatic Baghdad. necessarily a consequence reasons. Unlike Lebanon in the 1980s, of territorial occupation.” when clerics provided legitimization for The fourth and final reason for the “self-martyrdom” operations against absence of Shi`a suicide operations Israeli forces, Najaf and to a certain involves what Marcel Hénaff calls the extent Qom have instead focused on the symbolic logic of “the production of respective military organizations to political process while steering clear a spectacular image.”6 The images of advance their political position with of sectarian conflict and seeking to suicide strikes on civilians in major their constituencies, rather than enhance Shi`a influence through voting urban areas of the country have created challenging the central state through ballots rather than suicide bombs.5 a highly negative perception of these insurgent activities. military tactics among the greater Shi`a This stands in sharp contrast to the Iraqi population since 2003. Mainly Lesser known militant groups, such as Sunni clerical establishment, which associated with the Salafi-jihadists, the Mahdist groups based in Karbala has provided legitimization for suicide and other southern cities, have played bombings in Palestine, Iraq and other a peripheral role in Shi`a politics. This regional conflicts through the idiom “Unlike Sunni Islam, is primarily because of the clerical of defending property, honor and the relative hierarchical establishment’s dominant influence the religious identity of the Muslim over the popular culture of the Shi`a community against an invading infidel system of clerical authority community, which has successfully force—although variation in their among the Shi`a enjoys limited the growth of the cult of the theological discourse of violence also Mahdi and its related apocalyptic exists. Among the leading Sunni clerics considerable sway over a tendencies toward warfare. Najaf has who have supported suicide operations, believer’s correct response also contained the growth of splinter especially in Iraq, are Grand Shaykh Mahdi Army factions, especially since Mohammad Sayyed Tantawi of al-Azhar to problems of daily life, al-Sadr has come under increasing University in Cairo and Imam Mahdi al- including how a certain influence of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani Sumayadi, a high-ranking Iraqi cleric, since 2007.4 who have justified this form of violence military operation can be as a necessary means of confronting perceived to be morally Second, the Najaf-based clerical foreign occupation. establishment has and continues to play justified in the context of a critical role in de-legitimizing suicide Third, Iran may have also played a role changing circumstances.” operations in post-Ba`athist Iraq. Unlike in preventing Shi`a suicide attacks in Sunni Islam, the relative hierarchical Iraq. This is largely because Shi`a-led system of clerical authority among the suicide attacks would bring unnecessary Shi`a enjoys considerable sway over a attention to Iranian influence in Iraq, suicide attacks are shunned by Shi`a believer’s correct response to problems possibly undermining Tehran’s interest militants who seek to promote a more of daily life, including how a certain to advance its influence in Baghdad “civilized” self-image of their Shi`a where Shi`a parties are most dominant. community for the broader global 4 The relationship between the two has been one of In many ways, the official Iranian stance audience—one juxtaposed to the brutality asymmetrical partnership, in which Ayatollah Ali al- on Sunni-led suicide attacks has been in displayed by the Sunni insurgency. As a Sistani plays the superior partner, guiding the younger lockstep with the Shi`a-led government Mahdi militant explained, and less experienced Moqtada al-Sadr in his quest for in Baghdad, namely identifying such becoming a legitimate leader of the Shi`a Iraqi commu- attacks as “terrorism.” As a result, it We don’t do these acts [suicide nity. In doing so, al-Sistani has tried to tame al-Sadr by is likely that the Iranian Revolutionary attacks] because they create a bringing him into the mainstream Najaf establishment to Guard Corps’ (IRGC) active military negative image for our cause. It form a united Shi`a front against extremist Sunnis and backing of Shi`a militias has been is like the fatwa against the self- the United States since late 2006. In return, al-Sadr, who limited to training in low-intensity injurious latam (self-mortification lacks religious credentials, has been using al-Sistani’s warfare, with a particular focus on rites during the Muharram support to legitimize his religious authority and expand rituals in commemoration of the his influence in southern Iraq. The relationship has been 5 For the case of Lebanon, see Martin Kramer, “Sacrifice mutually opportunistic but also pragmatic, since the two and ‘Self-Martyrdom’ in Shi’ite Lebanon,” Terrorism and 6 Marcel Hénaff, “Global Terror, Global Vengeance?” Shi`a figures have not been able to ignore each other. Political Violence 3:3 (1991). Substance 37:115 (2008).

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martyrdom of Imam Hussain); A second preliminary finding is that By and large, what the absence of Shi`a these actions make us like animals local politics and shifting alliances in suicide attacks brings to light is not (haiwan) or like the Sunnis.7 the context of a competitive political merely the significance of strategic landscape play an important role in the ways by which actors, organizations In this statement, the Islamic ruling emergence and thus also the absence of and elites can select or choose not against latam highlights the clerical suicide attacks. Contrary to the Hizb to conduct suicide operations in the influence over ethical behavior in the Allah-Amal conflict in Lebanon during shifting context of local politics, but course of warfare. Such rejection of the 1980s, when suicide attacks were how symbols and ideologies can be suicide attacks, however, has less to used as a way for the factions to outbid reconstructed to promote particular do with a complex theological doctrine each other to gain more popularity and behaviors at a given moment. The two and more with a pragmatic attempt to legitimacy within the Shi`a community, key factors to understand in this context preserve the face of “civility” for the the Iraqi case of Sadr-ISCI rivalry has are “situation” and “agency,” not only Shi`a Iraqi community. In such a public hardly given way to the emergence of on an individual level, but also on relations strategy, more conventional suicide military campaigns. This is collective-institutional levels. Indeed, forms of asymmetrical warfare have, primarily because the nature of Sadr- future comparative studies examining accordingly, given militias strategic ISCI competition within local Iraqi the relationship between Sunni and depth in the heart of the Shi`a Iraqi politics differs greatly from that of Shi`a manifestations of suicide attacks community, which translates into a their Lebanese counterpart: while Iraqi (or lack thereof) are likely to prove a legitimacy factor. This is especially true militias already held relative political fruitful area of research. for a younger generation inspired by the power within the Iraqi state in the post- story of Husayn’s martyrdom in regular war period, the two Lebanese groups Dr. Babak Rahimi, who earned his BA at warfare at the battlefield of Karbala. lacked political authority due to a UCSD, received a Ph.D. from the European weak state and the highly marginalized University Institute, Florence, Italy, Conclusions and then-minority status of the Shi`a in October 2004. Dr. Rahimi has also On an analytical-theoretical level, an community within Lebanese society. studied at the University of Nottingham, in-depth study of the dearth of Shi`a where he obtained an M.A. in Ancient and suicide attacks in Iraq would require A third aspect is the role of religious Medieval Philosophy, and London School a multidimensional approach across doctrine. Ideas matter insofar as they of Economics and Political Science, where individual, organizational, cultural can be strategically interpreted by he was a Visiting Fellow at the Department and structural levels of analysis.8 In individuals, groups or elites in response of Anthropology, 2000-2001. He was a this short study, however, three broad to shifting conditions on the ground. Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, conclusions can be drawn. The key is the discursive process of Washington, D.C., where he conducted interpretation and how an idea or a research on the institutional contribution First, suicide attacks are not necessarily tradition can be reconstructed to justify of Shi’i political organizations in the a consequence of territorial occupation— action (suicide attack) for a particular creation of a vibrant civil society in post- although such military operations objective in a given moment. By avoiding Ba`athist Iraq. Dr. Rahimi’s current continue to play a significant role in the certain discursive arguments in favor of research project is on the religious cultural anti-government and anti-occupation suicide attacks within the framework of life of the Iranian port-city of Busher, activities of a number of non-al-Qa`ida classical Shi`a traditions of martyrdom, southern Iran. Sunni insurgencies.9 Depending on Shi`a clerics, along with various non- the strategy of insurgent groups and clerical leaders of Shi`a militias, have their changing relations with the state, successfully prevented the Muharram suicide attacks can also be a liability for a narratives of self-sacrifice to attain a militant faction seeking to legitimate its suicidal military significance. Unlike political authority through an electoral the Iranian martyrdom operations by process of a transitional democratic the Basiji militias during the Iran- state. Iraq war, largely inspired by the story of Husayn’s martyrdom in Karbala narrated by mid-ranking clerics in the early years of the 1979 revolution, Shi`a Iraqis have focused more on the 7 Personal interview, Mahdi militant, Najaf, August 4, narrative of Muharram in the medium 2005. of ritual commemorations of Ashura, 8 See Ami Pedahzur, Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The with its performances made legal after Globalization of Martyrdom (New York: Routledge, 2006); 2003. Whereas in the Iranian case the Mohammed M. Hafez, “Rationality, Culture, and Struc- narrative of Muharram was externally ture in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary reenacted in a perceived military Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study,” Stud- battlefield against the Ba`athist army, ies in Conflict and Terrorism 29:2 (2006). the Shi`a Iraqi case has shown how noble 9 This claim ultimately undermines Robert Pape’s fa- sacrifice can be symbolically internalized mous argument that suicide terrorism is mainly a strate- through ritual action performed in the gic response to foreign occupation. communal public spaces.

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Factors Affecting Stability government by demonstrating that they for Multi-National Force-Iraq called hold a grim likelihood for success is the city the “strategic center of gravity” in Northern Iraq less credible absent U.S. forces. For this for AQI.8 Months later, in a new reason, insurgents are testing the ISF on Mosul offensive directly commanded By Ramzy Mardini its capability, resolve, and credibility as by al-Maliki called “Lion’s Roar,” the a fair and non-sectarian institution. lack of resistance among insurgents iraq entered a new security disappointed some commanders who environment after June 30, 2009, This litmus test is most likely to were expecting a decisive Alamo-style when U.S. combat forces exited Iraqi occur in Mosul, the capital of Ninawa battle.9 cities in accordance with the first of Province. In its current political and two withdrawal deadlines stipulated security context, the city is best situated Today, AQI and affiliated terrorist in the Status of Forces Agreement for insurgents to make early gains in groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq, (SOFA). Signed in December 2008 by propagating momentum. Geographically still possess a strategic and operational President George W. Bush and Iraqi located 250 miles north of Baghdad capacity to wage daily attacks in Mosul.10 Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, the along the Tigris River, Mosul is Iraq’s Although the daily frequency of attacks SOFA concedes that December 31, 2011 second largest city with a population in Mosul dropped slightly from 2.43 will be the deadline for the complete of 1.8 million.2 Described as an ethnic attacks in June 2009 to 2.35 attacks in withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. tinderbox, the city is approximately July 2009, the corresponding monthly President Barack Obama, however, has 70% Sunni Arab and 25% Kurd. The death tolls have increased from 58 to signaled his intention to withdraw U.S. remaining population is composed 79.11 This can be attributed to AQI’s combat forces by August 2010. of Shi`a, Turcoman, Yezidis, and motive of executing more high-profile Christians.3 The city’s large Sunni Arab attacks since June 30.12 On August 7, for Iraqi Security Force (ISF)-capability population makes it an attractive base example, a suicide bomber in a vehicle has improved remarkably since for recruiting Sunni insurgents. Before killed 38 people in front of a Shi`a the 2007 implementation of the Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, for mosque just outside the city.13 A second U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. example, Mosul was home to a sizeable attack near Mosul in Khazna village Nevertheless, successfully pacifying Ba`athist presence, with some estimates brought the total number of killed and Iraq without the ground presence of suggesting that as many as 300,000 injured to 400 in the Mosul-area in a U.S. forces is contingent on a number of inhabitants were willing to contribute 10-day period.14 Speaking to Pentagon factors, not all related to ISF-readiness. to military, security, and intelligence reporters via satellite at the time, Army This article highlights an array of efforts under Saddam Hussein.4 Major General Robert Caslen suggested critical factors that are likely to shape that the increased violence in Mosul the new security challenges facing In 2008, as much of Iraq reached an was a sign that AQI had reconstituted Iraq: the current unstable political improved level of stability, Mosul its capability in the city: and security environment in Mosul, continued to witness a high level of rising Arab-Kurdish tensions over violence. On January 23, 2008, for What has increased, however, is disputed territories and the possible example, a massive 20,000-pound the capability (of al-Qaeda and its politicization of the upcoming January bomb killed and wounded more than allies) to conduct the high-profile 1 2010 parliamentary elections. 300 people.5 The next day, during attacks…So you see an increase in inspections of the bombing site, a suicide the numbers of casualties post- Continued Violence in Mosul bomber killed Ninawa’s police chief.6 As 30 June.15 The withdrawal and relocation of a result, al-Maliki sent additional Iraqi U.S. combat forces outside of Iraq’s forces to the city in January 2008 to 8 William Selby, “Coalition Focuses on Clearing Mosul cities represents a major change in the engage in a “decisive” battle against the Terrorist Networks,” American Forces Press Service, country’s security environment. With 7 remnants of al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI). March 4, 2008. a less proficient ISF patrolling Iraq’s Al-Maliki’s “decisive” battle, however, 9 As one report indicated, “the lack of significant resis- streets, “deterrence by denial” is less achieved questionable success against tance among the hardened fighters who had been operat- of an effective strategy; dissuading AQI and other terrorist elements. ing in Mosul suggested the insurgency was offering Ma- insurgents from challenging the In March 2008, the chief of special liki and his American backers a message of their own: we operations and intelligence information fight on our terms, not yours.” See Mark Kukis, “Maliki’s 1 Iraq has other major problems, including power short- Mosul Offensive,” Time Magazine, May 16, 2008. ages, unemployment, corruption, crime, and the many 10 Jane Arraf, “Stabilizing Iraq: Why Mosul is a Special political disagreements, such as on a national oil law. The 2 Eric Hamilton, “The Fight For Mosul,” Institute for the Case,” Christian Science Monitor, June 24, 2009. factors stated here, however, are considered most criti- Study of War, April 2008. 11 For statistics, see “Mosul Remains As Violent As cal for affecting Iraq’s new security environment because 3 Ibid. Ever,” Ground Truth, August 11, 2009. of their influence in potentially contributing toward na- 4 Eric Hamilton, “The Fight for Mosul,” Institute for the 12 This was the reasoning offered by U.S. Major Gen- tionwide destabilization and Iraqi death rates. One major Study of War, June 2008. eral Robert Caslen. See “Al Qaeda Shows Resilience in security factor not discussed in this article is the slow 5 Ibid. N.Iraq-US Commander,” Reuters, August 11, 2009. government integration of the Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi 6 Sam Dagher, “Al Qaeda Goes North: Police Chief Killed 13 Qassim Khidhir, “Talks Between Kurds and Hadba security and civil sectors. For recent reporting on the lat- in Mosul,” Christian Science Monitor, January 25, 2008. End Unsuccessfully,” Kurdish Globe, August 14, 2009. ter issue, see “Slow Sunni Integration a Risk to Iraq Secu- 7 Joshua Partlow, “Maliki Sending Troops to Mosul,” 14 Ibid. rity – US,” Reuters, July 31, 2009. Washington Post, January 26, 2008. 15 Ibid.

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It is likely that insurgents have altered Through a legal procedure of in Baghdad and perhaps a return of their methods and adapted to the U.S. normalization, census and referendum, sectarian fighting.”22 After a January 22, counterinsurgency posture. Open urban residents will determine whether 2009 military move by al-Maliki to send warfare has become less of an advantage the area under dispute will be under the army’s 12th division north toward for insurgents because the switch toward the Kurdistan Regional Government Kirkuk, many Kurds viewed it as an population-protection has motivated (KRG) in Arbil or remain under the operation to militarily encircle and cut local Iraqis to collaborate and share authority of the federal government in off the city from being influenced by information with the U.S. military. Baghdad. The oil-rich city of Kirkuk the surrounding Kurdish provinces.23 In response, political assassinations is at the heart of the dispute. Yet al- By February 2009, fearful rhetoric might become a more attractive tool for suggested the possibility of an Arab- insurgents in undermining opponents, “A power-sharing Kurdish civil war.24 The debate over instead of battlefield engagements with Article 140 would not be as problematic the goal of taking and holding territory.16 agreement between Kurds if the disputes were over an issue other Suicide attacks have also increased and Arabs in Mosul and than territory. According to one report, since the United States withdrew from the Kurds claim somewhere between Iraq’s cities.17 in the Ninawa provincial 30-40 disputed territories inside Iraq.25 government is crucial to To date, not one has been resolved. Only by demonstrating quick and decisive victories and denying the enemy the stability of northern Growing tensions in Mosul between success in Mosul can the ISF deter the Iraq.” Kurds and Sunni Arabs is another major sprout of insurgents elsewhere. If the concern.26 As Philip Zelikow, former ISF does not quickly establish itself as counselor of the State Department, a capable and non-sectarian institution, stated in February 2009: perceptions about its weakness could Maliki has purposefully delayed the solidify and gain momentum in the implementation of Article 140 while As important as Anbar is in the minds of insurgents throughout Iraq. maneuvering to escape his political “Sunni story,” Mosul may turn dependency on the Kurds by courting out to be much more significant Rising Ethnic Tensions in the North Sunni Arab nationalists and southern for the future. The United A second major factor affecting stability Shi`a tribes.21 States could find itself caught in Iraq is continued ethnic tensions in the middle between Kurdish between Arabs and Kurds. In late July Today, Kurdish leverage over al-Maliki is friends, local Sunni nationalists, 2009, the commander of U.S. forces in waning. They fear that U.S. withdrawal and a central government in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, told reporters will permit al-Maliki to behave more Baghdad that might be tempted that tensions between Arabs and Kurds assertively in marginalizing them, even to win Sunni friends by “dealing” is the “No. 1 driver of instability” in by violent means. As Dr. Fuad Hussein, forcefully with the Kurds.27 Iraq.18 The conflict is concentrated over chief of staff to KRG President Massoud the issue of “disputed territories,” to Barzani, asserted: “If the problems Violence in Mosul has increased since which UN Representative to Iraq Staffan which exist now cannot be resolved the provincial elections of January 31, de Mistura claimed had “infected almost in one or two years, the withdrawal of 2009. The results of the elections in every aspect of the political scene.”19 The the American army will lead to unrest Ninawa Province shifted the balance of Kurds demand the political execution of power away from the Kurdish parties Article 140, a constitutional provision ber of Kurdish inhabitants in areas deemed of strategic toward the majority Sunni Arabs, the seeking the reversal of past Ba`athist and economic value. Beginning in 1963 and commencing latter of whom had largely boycotted “Arabization” campaigns committed in again in 1974 and 1984, hundreds of thousands of Kurds the previous provincial elections in 20 northern Iraq. were systematically deported or killed and replaced with January 2005. The winning Arab outside Arab families. The Kurdish language and other nationalist coalition, al-Hadba, has 16 See the story on the recent political assassination of forms of Kurdish culture were outlawed and replaced refused to appoint Kurds to any cabinet Harith al-Ubaydi, head of the Sunni parliamentary bloc, with Arabic. the Iraqi Accord Front: Rod Nordland and Abeer Mo- 21 In August 2007, al-Maliki’s government was saved 22 Eli Lake, “Kurds Anxious Over U.S. Withdrawal,” hammed, “Sunni Lawmaker Assassinated in Iraq,” New from political paralysis by the formation of a Quartet Washington Times, April 17, 2009. York Times, June 12, 2009. For information on the rise Alliance, which involved along with al-Maliki’s Dawa 23 Ramzy Mardini, “Rising Arab-Kurdish Tensions Over of assassinations in Iraq, see Arraf. Also see Fatih Ab- Party the two main Kurdish parties and the Shi`a Is- Kirkuk Will Complicate U.S. Withdrawal From Iraq,” dulsalam, “Assassinations Become Trademark of Iraq’s lamic Supreme Council of Iraq. For al-Maliki’s political Terrorism Focus 6:6 (2009). New Political Epoch,” Azzaman, June 14, 2009. maneuvering to escape his dependency on the Quartet 24 Rahmat al-Salaam, “Kurdish Officials Warn of- Po 17 Omar al-Mansouri, “Suicide Bombers’ Comeback Un- Alliance, see Anthony Shadid, “New Alliances in Iraq tential Kurd-Arab War,” Asharq Alawsat, February 19, nerves Iraqi Government,” Azzaman, August 14, 2009. Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, March 20, 2009. 18 Anne Gearan, “Gates: Kurd-Arab Friction Top Prob- 2009; Scott Weiner, “Maliki Makes a Play for the South- 25 “Article 140 Must be Adhered To, Say Kurdish Of- lem in Iraq,” Associated Press, July 29, 2009. ern Tribes,” Institute for the Study of War, November 6, ficials,”Kurdish Globe, December 4, 2008. 19 Staffan de Mistura, “Challenges on Iraq’s Election 2008; Jeremy Domergue and Marisa Cochrane, “Balanc- 26 “Kurdish-Sunni Tensions In Nineveh,” Entrepreneur, Day,” Washington Post, January 31, 2009. ing Maliki: Shifting Coalitions in Iraqi Politics and the May 25, 2009. 20 The Ba`athist Arabization campaigns were policies Rise of the Iraqi Parliament,” Institute for the Study of 27 Philip Zelikow, “The New Strategic Situation in Iraq,” adopted by the Baghdad government to reduce the num- War, June 2009. Foreign Policy, February 9, 2009.

18 august 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 8 positions even though the Kurdish anti-Kurdish front to “deny Iraqi Kurds Today, al-Maliki has staked his 2010 party carried one-third of the vote.28 In a say in the forthcoming parliamentary electoral prospects on two performance response, Kurdish officials, including elections.”36 goals in the eyes of the Iraqi public: 1) Ninawa mayors, have withdrawn from stabilizing and providing security to their posts in boycott.29 The Kurds have In attempting to lower the heightened facilitate reconstruction and economic refused to recognize the authority of the tensions in northern Iraq, on August 17 growth; and 2) solidifying his status as newly-elected Sunni governor Atheel General Odierno proposed a tripartite the national leader by ending the U.S. al-Nujaifi over all of Ninawa.30 They deployment of U.S., ISF, and peshmerga occupation. Iraq’s former precarious are concerned about his connections to forces to disputed areas in Ninawa.37 environment, however, had placed these powerful Arab tribes, members of the Holding insurgents accountable for the two goals in zero-sum terms: security Ba`ath Party, and allegedly insurgents.31 upsurge in violence, Odierno blamed was only maintained when U.S. forces Some areas within the province are under AQI for exploiting the discord between remained engaged in Iraqi neighborhoods the control of peshmerga (Kurdish militia) Arabs and Kurds. The deployment was while patrolling the streets. The current forces because Kurds have labeled them described to be short-lived and directed decrease in violence inside Iraq has “disputed” territories under Article 140. toward protecting the local population allowed al-Maliki to rapidly consolidate Yet al-Nujaifi has denied them the right and serving as a trust and “confidence- and centralize his power at the expense to administer those areas, claiming in a building measure” between the ISF of parties advocating federalism, such February 2009 interview: and peshmerga.38 The proposal, later to as the two main Kurdish parties—the be discussed in high level meetings in Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the The existence of disputed areas September, comes at the backdrop of a Kurdistan Democratic Party—and the in the province does not imply January 2010 national referendum to Shi`a Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq that the Kurdish Region can put be held on the continued U.S. presence (ISCI) headed by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim.41 them under its control until a stipulated in the SOFA, essentially Al-Maliki’s first place finish in nine out resolution is reached. These areas making the redeployment of U.S. forces in of the 14 provinces that took part in the should be under one authority, Ninawa a complicated balancing act.39 January 2009 provincial elections have that of Ninawa Province, which instilled deep concern among Kurds is controlled by the central The Unstable Shadow of Elections and some Sunni and Shi`a parties over authority in the capital city of Another source of instability is their waning ability to check al-Maliki’s Baghdad.32 the current period leading to the growing strength.42 parliamentary elections in January In May 2009, Kurdish forces prevented 2010. The domestic challenge presented One concern amidst increasing violence the governor from entering Bashiqa, by this circumstance is two-fold: 1) in Mosul and elsewhere is that al-Maliki a town northeast of Mosul that was the risk that securitization might be may be hesitant to call for the assistance administered by Kurds. Al-Nujaifi politicized by al-Maliki’s government; of U.S. troops stationed outside Iraqi claimed the Kurds had issued a “shoot to and 2) the possibility that violence is kill” order on him if he were to enter the used among political factions in hopes ing al-Maliki’s political goals in the past. In August 2008, 33 area. A similar episode occurred when of undermining the other’s electoral al-Maliki gave direct orders for the Iraqi Army to enter Kurdish forces stopped the Ninawa prospects. Unfortunately, both have the disputed city of Khanaqin, forcing out peshmerga forc- 40 police chief from crossing a bridge occurred in the past. es from the area and raiding offices belonging to Kurdish 34 into a disputed territory. A statement political parties. Kurdish observers viewed the maneu- released by the KRG blamed the al- 36 Jareer Mohammed, “Arabs Form Anti-Kurdish Bloc ver as an attempt to marginalize Kurdish influence in Hadba leadership for the recent deaths in Iraq’s Mosul,” Azzaman, August 10, 2009. Diyala Province ahead of the 2009 provincial elections. of 2,000 Kurds in Ninawa, claiming that 37 According to an Associated Press report, Odierno For al-Maliki’s suspicious and political use of the army, they were “adopting a policy of national, “said the deployment of the U.S.-Iraqi-Kurdish pro- in particular before the 2009 provincial elections, see sectarian and religious cleansing in tection forces would start in Ninevah province, which “Kirkuk and Khanaqin on Alert,” Kurdish Globe, January 35 Ninawa.” According to Azzaman, an includes the volatile city of Mosul, and then extend to 22, 2009. For more information on the standoff between Iraqi news source, Arab parties in Kirkuk and to Diyala province north of the capital.” See the government and the Kurds in Khanaqin, see Ramzy Ninawa have decided to form a joint Kim Gamel, “U.S. Iraq Boss Wants Troops in Disputed Mardini, “Iraqi Military Operation in Diyala Province Land,” Associated Press, August 18, 2009. Risks Renewal of Kurdish-Arab Conflict,” Terrorism Fo- 28 Quil Lawrence, “Arab-Kurd Conflict Deepens in Mo- 38 Liz Sly, “U.S. Troops May be Sent to Iraq’s Arab- cus 5:33 (2008). sul,” National Public Radio, July 2, 2009. Kurdish ‘Trigger Line,’” Los Angeles Times, August 18, 41 Al-Hakim’s interest in federalism is based on the de- 29 Ibid. 2009. sire to form a semi-autonomous Shi`a region, similar to 30 Sam Dagher, “Tensions Stoked Between Iraqi Kurds 39 Odierno has not stipulated the number of U.S. sol- that of the Kurdish region, consisting of nine southern and Sunnis,” New York Times, May 18, 2009. diers to be deployed in the new proposal. If the Iraqi peo- Shi`a provinces. 31 Ibid. ple do not approve the SOFA in a referendum held on the 42 Iraq has a total of 18 provinces, but only 14 partici- 32 Adel Kamal, “New Ninawa Governor Rejects Kurd- same day as the January 2010 parliamentary elections, pated in the January 2009 provincial elections. The three ish Allaince,” Niqash, February 24, 2009. U.S. soldiers will be forced to leave a year earlier than the provinces belonging to the semi-autonomous Kurdish 33 Dagher. December 31, 2011 deadline agreed to in the SOFA. For region conducted their own provincial elections on July 34 Ibid. recent reporting on the referendum, see Ernesto Lon- 25, 2009. Because of the political sensitivities surround- 35 “KRG Blames Hadbaa for Murder of Kurds, Displace- doño, “Iraq May Hold Vote On U.S. Withdrawal,” Wash- ing the disputed city of Kirkuk, its province had not com- ment of Christians in Mosul,” Aswat al-Iraq, August 14, ington Post, August 18, 2009. menced provincial elections. The national parliament has 2009. 40 The use of the Iraqi Army has been suspected of serv- yet to come to agreement on an election law for Kirkuk.

19 august 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 8 cities. Hoping to stay consistent with The critical factor, however, toward Training for Terror: his campaign message of achieving satiating the power gap inherited in the both security and sovereignty, such a new security environment is not only The “Homegrown” Case of situation forces the prime minister to the capability and readiness of the ISF, Jami`at al-Islam al-Sahih make an unattractive trade-off: security but their integrity as a national and versus credibility. As suggested by one unitary institution dedicated toward By Jeffrey B. Cozzens and William Rosenau U.S. military officer, “The last thing the protection of all Iraqis. The local we want is to see this area fail because population’s collaboration and trust no major terrorist attacks have taken of some question of Arab pride in not in the ISF is critical for continuing place in the United States since being able to ask for our help.”43 a successful counterinsurgency September 11, 2001, but the country has campaign. Yet political developments in not been immune from terrorist plots Reports already indicate that al- Mosul, rising Arab-Kurdish tensions, involving jihadist activists.1 During Maliki will leave his political bloc—the and conflicting interests—both foreign the past eight years, authorities have Shi`a United Iraqi Alliance, which is and domestic—toward the upcoming prosecuted so-called “homegrown” dominated by the federalism-advocate parliamentary elections risk politicizing U.S. terrorists—U.S. citizens or ISCI—in hopes of establishing a national ISF missions by suggesting them as residents with few, if any, meaningful coalition with Sunni Arab tribes and a means for achieving political ends. operational ties to terrorists abroad—in Shi`a parties devoted to a strong Such prospects will permeate mistrust California, New Jersey, New York, and central government.44 A broad-based between the different ethnic segments elsewhere.2 Most recently, in July 2009 alliance in the new 2010 parliament of the population and the government. six U.S. citizens and one U.S. resident will decrease the chance of the Council This could cause a security dilemma were indicted in North Carolina on of Representatives removing al- leading back to sectarian violence. charges that they were supporting and Maliki from power if he seeks further participating in violent jihad in the centralization. To alleviate the influence such factors Middle East, southeastern Europe, and could have, the United States must South Asia.3 Parties from all major ethnic groupings play the central mediating role. In may come to believe that with the particular, a power-sharing agreement Although all of these cases were widely exiting of all U.S. combat forces in between Kurds and Arabs in Mosul and reported, there has been little systematic August 2010, elections earlier that in the Ninawa provincial government is attention to some of the most salient year may become the last credible crucial to the stability of northern Iraq. issues surrounding homegrown U.S. chance at balancing al-Maliki. The Even if a provincial power-sharing violent extremism. Today, paradoxically, consequences that may result from the agreement is accomplished, however, more is known about violent extremism elections offer an enormous incentive northern Iraq is unlikely to remain overseas than about the phenomena in for challengers threatened by Baghdad’s stable if the problems surrounding the United States. Gaps in knowledge drift to a strong central government to Article 140 remain unresolved. In about U.S.-based jihadist terrorism undermine the prime minister. Without general, bringing about reconciliation are particularly large in three areas: the U.S. active in patrolling Iraqi cities, between the contentious parties is the training, target selection and tactics. electoral politics may revert back to only guarantee of long-term stability To date, the most significant research Iraq’s violent politics when politicians absent the presence of U.S. forces. on this inter-related set of issues has engaged one another via militias on the focused on European jihadists.4 To help urban battlefield. Ramzy Mardini is an analyst on international security affairs. He currently 1 This article defines jihadist activism as high-risk be- Conclusion writes on Iraq affairs at The Jamestown haviors involved with supporting or plotting violence Although violence has decreased Foundation, a foreign policy think tank in motivated by a militant Islamist worldview. For more, significantly since the 2006-2007 highs, Washington, D.C. Mr. Mardini has served see Jeffrey B. Cozzens, “The Culture of Global Jihad: Iraq remains a fragile state riddled with at the State Department’s Bureau of Near Character, Future Challenges, and Recommendations,” poor institutions and intense subgroup Eastern Affairs, the Executive Office of The Future Actions Series (London: International Centre identities. The security environment is the President, and the Center for Strategic for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, no longer characterized by the constant Studies in Amman, Jordan. He holds an 2008). presence of the “American pacifier.” M.A. in international relations from the 2 This definition is drawn from Edward J. Valla and Today, the prospect for stability in University of Chicago. Gregory Comcowich, “Domestic Terrorism: Forgotten, Mosul and elsewhere are determined by But Not Gone,” in Jeffrey N. Norwitz ed., Armed Groups: an array of volatile factors. Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism, and Counter- insurgency (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2008), 43 Arthur MacMillan, “US Army Commanders Say Pull- p. 173. The authors recognize the difficulties inherent out From Mosul Mired in Confusion,” Agence France- when applying this term to global jihadist activists, but Presse, June 18, 2009. the term is widely accepted in the above context. 44 For recent reporting, see Ammar Karim, “Iraq PM Set 3 Campbell Robertson, “Arrests in Terror Case Bewilder to Break with Shiite Coalition in January Polls,” Agence Associates,” New York Times, July 29, 2009. France-Presse, August 13, 2009. For further reading 4 See, for example, Petter Nesser, “How Did Europe’s about al-Maliki’s strategy for a national coalition, see Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes?” Shadid; Weiner; Domergue and Cochrane. Terrorism and Political Violence 20:2 (2008).

20 august 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 8 fill these gaps, this article considers confluence of terrorism and criminality tiered movement structure, devising the case of Jami`at al-Islam al-Sahih in the United States. The plotters were recruitment strategies, and practicing (Assembly of Authentic Islam, or JIS), apprehended after they dropped a cell operational security.10 a group that plotted to strike Jewish- phone at the scene of their last robbery, American, Israeli, and U.S. military leading authorities to their apartment. Two documents were at the center of targets in and around Los Angeles, At the apartment, police discovered JIS indoctrination efforts: the rambling, likely in September and October 2005.5 jihadist paraphernalia, including largely theological “JIS Protocol,” which While not terribly sophisticated in posters of Usama bin Ladin, evidence James authored in 1997, and the 2002 organizational or operational terms— of online targeting of the proposed addendum to this original document there was not the meticulous planning or attack sites, and several documents that called the “Jama’at Ul-Islami As Sahih the employment of explosives associated outlined their operational plan. The Tutorial Protocol for Prisoners.”11 with al-Qa`ida-inspired terrorism, for plotters all had sworn oaths of loyalty example—U.S. law enforcement officials to Kevin James and maintained sporadic consider the JIS conspiracy the post- contact with him in prison, primarily “U.S. law enforcement 9/11 homegrown jihadist plot that came using letters smuggled out of prison, as officials consider the closest to reaching violent fruition.6 7 well as face-to-face meetings. JIS conspiracy the post- Research into homegrown U.S. terrorism JIS’ small-arms training in preparation 9/11 homegrown jihadist is often hindered by the inaccessibility for the attack was conducted in a park of court records and other primary near Los Angeles, and it appears to be plot that came closest to sources. With JIS, however, primary limited to a single day on July 4, 2005. reaching violent fruition.” sources are relatively rich and available, This involved Samana, Patterson, making it possible for researchers to and Washington firing a shotgun, a develop a more textured understanding semi-automatic rifle, and performing than is generally the case. Using court calisthenics and martial arts in the Martial arts training was also part of the documents and media sources, this park. The limited session in the park is curriculum for the 15 or so committed article examines the two phases of best understood as the second and final JIS members,12 and took place before or JIS training, how these phases helped phase of a training program that began after Muslim prayer services—allegedly shape the group’s target selection and years earlier in prison. even when the prison chaplain was finally how training influenced the present.13 Besides his writings and cell’s operational art. Phase 1: Forging the JIS “Method” demonstrated religious piety, James’ The first training period, which ran false claim that he was a veteran of The JIS Conspiracy from 1997-2005, included several dozen Sudanese jihadist training camps likely Inspired by Kevin James, an imprisoned inmates incarcerated at Sacramento’s furthered his role as the charismatic militant convert to Islam turned spiritual New Folsom County Prison. This phase leader within the group; it also enabled leader, two fellow African-American included a JIS indoctrination program,8 him and his deputies, such as his New converts, Levar Washington and which consisted of learning Arabic, Folsom cell mate, Peter Martinez, to Gregory Patterson, and one Pakistani becoming familiar with the “Hadith frame and promote the JIS worldview national, Hammad Samana (a U.S. of Jibreel,” relying heavily on texts more effectively.14 resident), plotted a set of attacks using written by a cleric named Jamaal al- firearms. The cell discussed acquiring Din Zarabozo,9 identifying enemies, At the time, James, a former 76th Street and using standoff explosives—typically reading literature “required” by Kevin Crip from Gardena, CA who rejected his devices that can be activated from a James, developing an organized and father’s Nation of Islam leanings, also distance using remote detonators—but became aware of Levar Washington’s members dismissed this mode as too 7 The U.S. Department of Justice’s March 2009 overview difficult. The conspirators robbed a of the plot is available at losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/ 10 Ibid.; Also see also Mark S. Hamm, Terrorist Recruit- dozen gas stations to finance the plot— pressrel09/la030609ausa.htm. ment in American Correctional Institutions: An Exploratory perhaps the most overt example of the 8 Evidence of a phased curriculum is available at “Jama’at Study of Non-Traditional Faith Groups, U.S. Department Ul-Islami As-Sahih Tutorial Protocol for Prisoners,” of Justice Commissioned Report #220957, December 5 See remarks by FBI Director Robert S. Mueller at www. NEFA Foundation, December 14, 2007. 2007. fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller042606.htm. 9 Shaykh Jamaal al-Din Zarabozo’s “He Came to Teach 11 The JIS Protocol and the 2002 addendum, the “Jama’at 6 The JIS cell “was closer to going operational than any You Your Religion” is an English-language commentary Ul-Islami As-Sahih Tutorial Protocol for Prisoners,” we have seen post-911,” according to a senior Los Angeles on the hadith of Gabriel that was noted as a “must read” is available at nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/ Police Department official quoted in “Two Plead Guilty in the “JIS Protocol.” Zarabozo, a European convert to Is- FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_James_JISManifesto.pdf. to Domestic Terrorism Charges of Conspiring to Attack lam living in the United States, is a California-educated 12 At the time of writing, it does not appear that any in- Military Facilities,” Reuters, December 14, 2007. Abdul- economist turned popular cleric. He has been a frequent dividuals besides James, Washington, Patterson, and hakim Mujahid Muhammad’s admitted shooting of two target of the Saudi religious establishment for his inde- Samana will face charges in connection with the plot. As soldiers in Arkansas on June 20, 2009 might prove to be pendent fatawa and willingness to engage more creden- Mark Hamm notes, however, as of late 2007 there re- the first U.S.-based jihadist strike since the 9/11 attacks. tialed scholars in debate. It is unlikely that Zarabozo mained “about a dozen hard core (JIS) members” in the Muhammad, however, is apparently linked to Yemeni knew anything about JIS. For more, see Olivier Roy, California prison system. extremists, and so does not fit squarely into the “home- Globalized Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 13 Hamm, p. 44. grown” category. 2004), pp. 163-164. 14 Ibid., p. 42.

21 august 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 8 potential utility as a “soldier.” Given ultimate, “kinetic” end of James’ A later document, “Notoriety Moves,” Washington’s impending parole earlier ideological and organizational also authored by James, built on “Blue (scheduled for November 2004), eager writings.19 This document also provides Print 2005” by mentioning potential JIS embrace of the JIS curriculum, and a window into the intentions of the targets: the Nation of Islam; followers parallel biography—that of a street- cell, as it bridges JIS’ unique jihadist of Warith D. Muhammad; Muslims wise gang member turned Sunni Islamic ideology20 and operational methods. who “trash” the four schools of Islam convert like most of the JIS members— Likely written with Washington in and qualified Sunni scholarship; James judged Washington suitable for mind, James exhorted the JIS recruits Shi`a Muslims and Iran; Muslims who the task of building an operational cell support and/or join the U.S. military; outside of prison.15 James influenced “JIS was focused on Muslims who are employed by “non- Washington to the degree that the Islamic governmental institutions… latter allegedly swore bay`at (an oath of striking political, military, blatantly in opposition to the laws and allegiance) to James as his “shaykh.”16 religion of Islam”; and Jewish and non- Like other JIS members, it is believed and religious targets, which Jewish supporters of “an Israeli state.”22 that Washington also agreed to the have received relatively An unknown amount of this curriculum “90 day reporting rule,” in which all was also provided to Patterson and members were required to make contact less official attention than Samana, who, in James’ opinion, became with James every three months.17 U.S. critical infrastructure, “true believers.”

Washington then began to recruit outside such as electrical and Phase 2: Operational Training and Attack of prison for what would develop into transportation systems.” Preparation the JIS plot. Washington met Samana The second training phase ran from May and Patterson—by all accounts trusting through June 2005, when the three- and naïve individuals without criminal man cell of Washington, Patterson, and histories from decent families—at an to learn Arabic; recruit other members Samana robbed gas stations to finance Inglewood, CA mosque in May 2005. (felony free, ideally), who would in turn the JIS plot. Washington, the operational Only Patterson’s recent conversion to receive training in Islam and the “JIS leader, was a former “Rolling 60s” gang Islam and Samana’s status as a Muslim Protocol”; conduct “covert” operations; member who likely imparted a modest immigrant to the West would have and acquire firearms and explosives amount of operational knowledge to the suggested personal vulnerabilities to training. Additionally, James instructed others, as they did not have criminal recruitment into terrorism. Indeed, by JIS recruits to “become legitimate,” backgrounds. During his sentencing, the end of May all three were sharing a which entailed obtaining a driver’s Washington told the court that gas run-down apartment in south-central license, marriage, school or regular stations were targeted because oil was Los Angeles, discussing the Iraq war employment, avoiding any overt signs a political symbol of U.S. oppression and Guantanamo Bay, and what needed of extremism in dress or behavior. in the Muslim world.23 This phase, in to be done in Islam’s defense.18 As in Moreover, recruits were to adhere which Patterson and Samana committed other Western cases, the importance strictly to guidelines for living in Dar al- the bulk of the robberies, helped the two of socially reinforced attitudes, values Harb (Abode of War).21 non-convicts develop a modest measure and beliefs; charismatic leadership; of operational experience already group interpretations of geopolitics; possessed by Washington. Perhaps and adventurous attempts to re- 19 “Blue Print 2005.” more importantly, the robberies shape individual identities appear 20 Although JIS emphasizes the methodology of violent demonstrated the devotion of the new foundational to the cell’s turn to violent jihad to combat “heretical” strains of Islam such as the JIS members—Samana and Patterson— activism. Nation of Islam, 50%-ers, and the Shi`a, and lists the and bolstered their intent to commit the U.S. military and Jews among its targets, there are subtle planned acts of terrorism. The end of the first training phase is ideological differences separating it from “mainstream” marked by James’ 2004 publication global jihadism as practiced by al-Qa`ida. First, as indi- Target Selection of the “Blue Print 2005,” a training cated by the Protocol’s content and its suggested reading The intended targets of the proposed pamphlet that should be seen as the list, JIS is strongly Shafi’i and promotes Sufismtawas ( - September 11, 2005 JIS operation were suf). The broader Salafist trend de-emphasizes overt re- listed in “Modes of Attack,” a document 15 Ibid., p. 41; Also see Rob Harris, “Kevin James and the liance upon single schools of Sunni jurisprudence and written by Samana and recovered in the JIS Conspiracy,” PBS Frontline, October 10, 2006. generally considers Sufism an innovation. Second, the cell’s apartment. The proposed targets, 16 “Man Who Formed Terrorist Group That Plotted At- JIS manifesto labels jihad fard kifayah (a collective obliga- all within a 20-mile radius of Patterson’s tacks on Military and Jewish Facilities Sentenced to 16 tion), rather than fard `ayn (an individual obligation), the and Washington’s apartment, included Years in Federal Prison,” U.S. Department of Justice, latter of which is al-Qa`ida’s view. Contrary to perhaps an El Al ticket counter at Los Angeles Central District of California, March 6, 2009. the central jihadist position articulated in the modern International Airport, the Israeli 17 See Kevin James, “Blue Print 2005,” available at nefa- era by the Palestinian theoretician Abdullah Azzam, this foundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_ view implicitly disregards the individual’s “duty” of de- 22 Kevin James, “Notoriety Moves,” available at nefa- James_Blueprint2005.pdf. fending Islam where it is besieged. This topic warrants foundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_ 18 Hamm, pp. 45-46. Hamm’s account provides a robust deeper analysis, as does the study of ideological currents James_ClaimResponsibility.pdf. narrative of the cell’s radicalization and recruitment pro- within North American Islamic extremism generally. 23 H.G. Reza, “Man Sentenced To 22 Years in L.A.-Area cesses. 21 Ibid. Terror Plot,” Los Angeles Times, June 25, 2008.

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Consulate on Wilshire Boulevard, 16 U.S. Prolonged Interaction Among the Conspirators writings, this can be attributed in part Army recruitment centers and offices This interaction involved discussions to the criminal pasts—and thus possible in and around Los Angeles, and a U.S. about violent jihad, mistreatment of interest in self-preservation—of some of military base in Manhattan Beach.24 The Muslims, and the Iraq war. In the view of the conspirators. In other “strains” of prison and post-prison indoctrination JIS cell members, the abuses of detainees the global jihadist movement, martyrdom and training phases appear to have at Guantanamo Bay, U.S. military attacks in jihad is believed to provide atonement shaped this target set. The data suggest on Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan, even for criminals—a neglected theme in these targeting catalysts included: and U.S. policies toward the Muslim this case which emphasizes the importance world more generally required that the of James’ writings and leadership in the The JIS Manifesto and Other “Required” United States suffer for its actions. In selection of non-suicide methods. Readings his December 2007 plea agreement These documents identify the U.S. with federal prosecutors, James said It is also clear that logistical and military and emblems of the State of the JIS plot was motivated by the wish organizational variables during the Israel as enemies of Muslims. They to retaliate “for the policies of the training phases influenced the selection are viewed as corrupting, persecuting United States and Israeli governments of tactics. Difficulty in acquiring influences that “authentic” Sunni toward Muslims throughout the world.” explosives, the cell’s lack of expertise Muslims must combat, and impediments Levar Washington, according to the and training in their handling, and the to the establishment of Islamic law. August 2005 FBI affidavit, argued that considerable ease of acquiring and using Accordingly, JIS was to “sit back, something had to “be done to punish firearms made small-arms the weapons build and attack…Western forces of the the United States,” and Samana, his of choice, furthering the decision to rule US and their Kufr (unbelieving) [sic] co-conspirator, agreed.26 The natural out other, more exotic tactics. Samana’s society.” Serbia, Britain, and Russia are outgrowth was the target list, which was testimony in the affidavit filed by FBI also identified as targets of JIS. also approved by the imprisoned James Special Agent James Clinton Judd through “kites”—letters smuggled from supports this view, as he detailed plans The “Hothouse” Prison Atmosphere prison.27 to assault U.S. military targets with a This almost certainly reinforced the JIS semi-automatic rifle and a shotgun.29 literature that “legitimized” the target Tactics Moreover, these tactics would not selection. It is also noteworthy that How did the training phases help likely result in the initial martyrdom James urged the study of Arabic and determine how attacks would be of the cell, and would eventually allow promoted the notion that membership conducted? First, James’ “Blueprint for James’ “Notoriety Moves” publicity in the global Islamic community (the 2005” established a baseline plan plan to take effect. umma) supersedes individual identity. for waging a limited insurgency that By adopting the language and suffering would be devised around operational It appears that the JIS “curriculum,” the of the umma, the local context took on a security, the use of standoff improvised cell’s lack of tactical training, and the global significance for JIS, and the Los explosive devices (IEDs), and firearm conspirators’ apparent disinclination Angeles targets aligned with those of assaults upon selected human targets. toward martyrdom operations at the the global jihadist movement. Later documents such as “Notoriety outset led them to make the operational Moves” and “Modes of Attack” echo choices they did. Firearms—the Gas Station Robberies this assessment. The cell’s behavior and preferred weapons of amateur thugs— For the JIS cell members, robbing gas planning appeared to follow this logic would likely kill many soldiers and stations served two purposes. The despite its failure to acquire explosives. Jewish Americans and would potentially robberies were expected to generate afford the cell another day to fight. revenues for JIS operations. Moreover, The influence of these documents the acts were conceptualized as jihad (and James’ leadership) in the cell’s Conclusion itself. Patterson, according to a Federal choice of tactics is evident, especially The JIS case is instructive on a number Bureau of Investigation affidavit filed its de-emphasis on immediate suicide of levels. First, it suggests a strong in August 2005, claimed that the gas attacks. Although at least two members correlation between terrorists’ training station hold-ups “were part of a jihad of the operational JIS cell took oaths curriculum, authoritative ideological against the U.S., particularly against of loyalty to James “until victory or framing (in James’ case) and target American oil companies who are martyrdom”—and Patterson admitted selection in the United States—a linkage stealing from ‘our countries,’” that is, to authorities that his ultimate goal that should be explored in subsequent Muslim lands.25 was to “die for Allah in jihad”—like research on other terrorist plots. James’ documents, where there are only limited references to martyrdom, Second, it is clear that JIS was focused the culture of the cell was not built on striking political, military, and around suicide methodologies.28 Very religious targets, which have received 24 See Samana’s “Modes of Attack” at nefafoundation. different from many al-Qa`ida-linked relatively less official attention than org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Washington_ U.S. critical infrastructure, such as TargetList.pdf. 26 Ibid., p. 9. electrical and transportation systems. 25 Quoted in “The L.A. Plot to Attack U.S. Military, Is- 27 Hamm, p. 42. raeli Government, and Jewish Targets,” NEFA Founda- 28 U.S.A. v. Samana, (C.D. CA.), No. 05-16662M, 29 “The L.A. Plot to Attack U.S. Military, Israeli Govern- tion, January 2008. affidavit filed August 2, 2005. ment, and Jewish Targets.”

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Third, the case demonstrates that JIS—a Recent Highlights in and attributed the crash to a “technical group with no explosives expertise or fault.” – AFP, July 3 experience—sought to maximize its Terrorist Activity operational potential by using what July 3, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Suspected was at hand and what was familiar, July 1, 2009 (UNITED STATES): The U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles launched namely robbery and firearms. This U.S. Treasury Department imposed missiles at Tehrik-i-Taliban positions might also help explain why other U.S.- sanctions on an al-Qa`ida supporter in South Waziristan Agency, killing at based jihadist cells without tangible and three leaders of Lashkar-i-Tayyiba least six people. – Washington Post, July 3 connections to, or significant online (LeT). The al-Qa`ida supporter was liaison with, foreign extremists were identified as Fazeel-A-Tul Shaykh Abu July 3-4, 2009 (MALI): Malian soldiers similarly inclined to choose firearms Mohammed Ameen al-Peshawari. The and suspected al-Qa`ida in the Islamic over explosives. three LeT leaders were identified as Arif Maghreb militants engaged in two gun Qasmani, Mohammed Yahya Mujahid battles that left 20 soldiers missing Finally, although there is no evidence and Nasir Javaid. – AFP, July 1 near Tessalit in northern Mali. Malian that JIS attempted to forge international military sources were unsure whether ties, James’ writings make passing July 1, 2009 (PAKISTAN): According the 20 missing soldiers were dead or references to working with “Islamic to a new poll, most Pakistanis consider taken as hostages. – Reuters, July 6 movements” committed to the the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qa`ida purification of Sunni Islam worldwide as critical threats to the country. The July 4, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Two and struggling against the global forces WorldPublicOpinion.org poll found U.S. soldiers were killed after Taliban opposing it. Cooperation with foreign that 81 percent of respondents consider militants launched a multipronged jihadist networks could have bolstered Islamist militants and local Taliban as attack on a U.S. base in Zerok district the capabilities of the cell and pushed critical threats to Pakistan. The poll in southeastern Paktika Province. The JIS to consider suicide methods against also found, however, that “the U.S. is attack involved small-arms fire and an a wider target set. resented just as much as before, despite attempted truck bombing. The militants the U.S. having a new president.” The also reportedly used a mortar round Jeffrey B. Cozzens is a Washington, poll found that 62% of respondents had that contained white phosphorous. D.C., based doctoral candidate at the low or no confidence that President Some reports placed the number of Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Barack Obama would do the “right militants at 100. Approximately 30 of Political Violence at the University of St. thing” in world affairs. – Reuters, July 1 the militants were killed after troops Andrews (Scotland). He served in the State called in airstrikes. – Reuters, July 4; Los Department’s counterterrorism office (S/ July 2, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): The U.S. Angeles Times, July 5 CT) in 2002. military announced that a U.S. soldier was captured by Taliban insurgents July 4, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Gunmen Dr. William Rosenau is a political scientist in eastern Afghanistan. According to abducted 16 mine-clearing personnel in the RAND Corporation’s Washington reports, the soldier was then “sold” working for the United Nations as they office, and an adjunct professor in the to the clan led by insurgent warlord traveled between Paktia and Khost Security Studies Program at Georgetown Sirajuddin Haqqani. Three Afghan provinces. – AP, July 5 University. During 2001-2002, he served soldiers were also captured. The U.S. as a policy adviser in S/CT. The views soldier went missing on June 30. – CNN, July 6, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A expressed in this article are those of the July 2; The Australian, July 3 suicide car bombing at Kandahar airport authors. killed two people. – CNN, July 6 July 2, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber on a motorcycle exploded next to July 6, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A a bus carrying workers from Pakistan’s roadside bomb exploded in Kunduz main nuclear facility in Rawalpindi, Province, killing four U.S. soldiers and wounding 29 people. – Minneapolis Star two Afghan civilians. – New York Times, Tribune, July 2 July 6

July 3, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A July 6, 2009 (EGYPT): An Egyptian suspected improvised explosive device newspaper reported that authorities killed two U.S. soldiers in Paktika foiled an al-Qa`ida-affiliated plot to Province. – AFP, July 3 target gas lines running between Israel and Egypt. Egyptian security forces July 3, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A Pakistani reportedly arrested three Belgians, a military helicopter crashed on the border Frenchman, a Briton, two Palestinian between Orakzai and Khyber agencies brothers and five Egyptian nationals. of the Federally Administered Tribal The men were all arrested in northern Areas, killing 26 security personnel. Sinai. They reportedly had in their The Taliban later claimed credit for possession anti-tank rockets, car bombs downing the helicopter, although the and other weapons. – UPI, July 6 Pakistani military rejected those claims

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July 6, 2009 (MALI): Malian President July 8, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Suspected July 9, 2009 (IRAQ): Two roadside Amadou Toumani Toure announced a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles fired six bombs targeted a police patrol near “total struggle against al-Qa`ida.” His missiles at Pakistani Taliban targets in a market in a Shi`a area of northern statement comes after an incident on South Waziristan Agency. There were Baghdad, killing nine people. – Washington July 3 and July 4 in which 20 Malian no immediate casualty counts. – Reuters, Post, July 10 soldiers went missing during clashes July 8 with al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb. July 9, 2009 (LIBYA): The Libyan – AFP, July 7 July 8, 2009 (BANGLADESH): Security Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) released forces in Bangladesh shot and wounded a statement reversing a 2007 decision to July 7, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban a would-be suicide bomber, who was merge with al-Qa`ida’s movement. The fighters attacked government buildings suspected of being a member of Jamaatul group criticized al-Qa`ida’s “targeting in Barg Matal district in Nuristan Mujahidin Bangladesh. The militant of civilians” and “indiscriminate Province. During the fighting, eight took two people hostage at a government bombings.” The group’s statement police were killed and another eight building and exchanged gunfire with said that the 2007 decision to join kidnapped. Officials said that 21 Taliban security officers. A bomb was attached with al-Qa`ida was made without the fighters were also killed. – Reuters, July 8 to his body, although it did not explode. “agreement of the majority” of its ruling – Reuters, July 8 council. – Telegraph, July 9 July 7, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suspected U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle destroyed July 8, 2009 (MALI): Al-Qa`ida in the July 9, 2009 (EGYPT): Egyptian a compound in the Zangara area of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released an authorities announced the arrests of 25 South Waziristan Agency, killing 16 online statement claiming that it had people accused of plotting attacks on oil foreign and local militants. The target killed 28 Malian soldiers during a July 3 pipelines and ships in the Suez Canal. was described as a former office for and July 4 clash with security personnel. Authorities said the group had ties Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of Tehrik- AQIM also said it took three soldiers to al-Qa`ida and consisted of mostly i-Taliban Pakistan. – AFP, July 7 captive. The Malian military denounced Egyptian engineers and technicians, the claim as propaganda. – Reuters, July 8; although their leader was a Palestinian. July 7, 2009 (PAKISTAN): An anti- AFP, July 8 – AP, July 9 Taliban tribal elder, Malik Zardad Khan, was kidnapped and murdered in Khyber July 9, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): July 9, 2009 (SOMALIA): A new Agency of the Federally Administered Explosives on a timber truck killed audiotape from Abu Mansur al-Amriki, Tribal Areas. Malik Zardad Khan was at least 24 people in Logar Province. an American who left the United States forming a lashkar (tribal militia) to Sixteen of the dead were children. to join Somalia’s al-Shabab militant combat the Taliban. – AFP, July 8 According to reports, residents found group, appeared on Islamist web the timber truck overturned on the road forums. Al-Amriki criticized President July 7, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): A bomb with a punctured tire. When authorities Barack Obama, stating that “let this exploded in a commercial area of Jolo arrived to clear the truck from the road, not come as a surprise to those who Island in the southern Philippines, it exploded. Some officials believe that are mesmerized by Obama’s speech in killing six people. Two hours later, a the truck bomb may have been intended Cairo, our positions…have not changed car bomb exploded next to a parked for use in Kabul, which is located 30 in the least.” He further said that military jeep in Illigan city, also in the miles north on the highway. – BBC, July 9; President Obama’s speech came “not southern Philippines, wounding seven Washington Post, July 10; New York Times, July 9 because he loves the Muslims he lived people. A third bomb was found at the with in Indonesia as a boy, but rather Mount Carmel Catholic cathedral on July 9, 2009 (IRAQ): Two suicide it is because the only way to defeat the Jolo Island, although it was defused and bombers executed a coordinated attack Muslims is by distracting them with did not cause any damage. Authorities in Tal Afar, Ninawa Province, and killed this temporary life.” – Fox News, July 9 blamed the attacks on the Abu Sayyaf 34 civilians. The first bomber entered Group, although it was not clear if the the home of a counterterrorism officer July 10, 2009 (UNITED STATES): group claimed responsibility for the and blew himself up, causing the house Mohammed Abdullah Warsame, a bombings. – The Age, July 7; AFP, July 6 to collapse. When neighbors gathered at 35-year-old Minneapolis man of Somali the scene, the second bomber detonated descent, received a 92-month prison July 8, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A Pakistani his explosives among the crowd. Both sentence in federal court on one count Army spokesman announced that the bombers were reportedly disguised in of conspiring to provide material military had “credible” information police uniforms. – Washington Post, July 10 support to al-Qa`ida. According to that Pakistani Taliban leader Maulana UPI, “Court documents reveal that Fazlullah, who commands fighters in July 9, 2009 (IRAQ): An improvised Warsame traveled from Pakistan to al- the Swat Valley, had been wounded road mine exploded near a market Qaida terrorist camps in Afghanistan in during an offensive against the group. in Baghdad’s Sadr City. One minute 2000 to undergo weapons and martial On July 22, however, Pakistani Taliban later, another mine was detonated arts training.” He allegedly met Usama spokesman Muslim Khan said that approximately 100 yards away. The two bin Ladin and other al-Qa`ida leaders. Maulana Fazlullah was alive and blasts killed seven people. – Washington – UPI, July 10 unharmed. – al-Jazira, July 9; Reuters, July 8; Post, July 10 Reuters, July 23

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July 10, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani having ties to al-Qa`ida. – AFP, July 13; July 15, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber Taliban militants attacked a security Guardian, July 13 driving a minibus targeted Iraqi security checkpoint near Khar in Bajaur forces in Ramadi, Anbar Province. One Agency of the Federally Administered July 13, 2009 (JORDAN): A military court policeman and five civilians were killed. Tribal Areas, killing three local tribal sentenced Mohammed Ahmed Youssef – AP, July 16 policemen. – BBC, July 10 al-Jaghbeer to death for his involvement in the killing of U.S. diplomat Laurence July 16, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): July 10, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Suspected Foley in October 2002. The sentencing Afghan Taliban commander Mawlavi U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles bombed marked al-Jaghbeer’s third re-trial. He Sangin said that his forces are holding a communications center for Pakistani is said to have ties to al-Qa`ida. – al- a missing U.S. soldier, who disappeared Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, Jazira, July 14 in Paktika Province on June 30. Sangin killing at least three people. The center said that the “soldier is fine and safe is located in the Painda Khel region of July 14, 2009 (SOMALIA): Two French and our leadership council will decide South Waziristan Agency. – AP, July 10 security advisers were kidnapped from about his fate.” – Reuters, July 16 their hotel in Mogadishu. The men were July 12, 2009 (NORTH AFRICA): Al- involved in training Somalia’s new July 16, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) presidential guard. Various reports suicide bomber rammed a car into a released Werner Greiner, a Swiss stated that the men were posing as police convoy in Nimroz Province, national who had been held by the journalists as a cover for their mission. killing three policemen. – AFP, July 16 group since January 22, 2009. Greiner— Approximately 10 armed men—with who was abducted in Niger but held some reports identifying them as July 16, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A UN in Mali—was the last of six Western “disgruntled government soldiers”— refugee agency official was shot to death hostages to be released by the group. driving a truck arrived at the Sahafi Hotel during a failed kidnapping attempt near One of the hostages, Briton Edwin Dyer, in Mogadishu and went directly to the Peshawar, in northwest Pakistan. Four was executed in May. – BBC, July 12 Frenchmen’s rooms, bringing them out of armed men tried to abduct the Pakistani the hotel at gunpoint. Later reports stated official, who was shot in the chest July 12, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): Abu that after negotiations broke down, the several times. A security guard was also Sayyaf Group militants finally released men were handed over to the opposition killed during the incident. – BBC, July 16 Eugenio Vagni, an Italian foreign aid groups Hisbul Islamiyya and al-Shabab, worker who was taken hostage in with each group holding one hostage. July 17, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suspected the southern Philippines on January Later, however, both hostages ended U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle killed four 15, 2009. Vagni, who worked for the up in the hands of al-Shabab. - New York alleged militants in North Waziristan International Committee for the Red Times, July 14; Telegraph, July 14; ABC News, July Agency. – BBC, July 17 Cross (ICRC), was the last of three 16; BBC, July 18 abducted ICRC workers to be released. July 17, 2009 (INDONESIA): Two bombs The other two workers were released on July 14, 2009 (THAILAND): The Thai ripped through the JW Marriott and April 2 and April 18. – GMANews.tv, July government extended emergency rule Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta, killing at 12 for three months in its troubled southern least seven people. The two hotels were provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and approximately 50 meters apart, and July 13, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Rajab Yala. – AFP, July 14 the attacks were coordinated as they Khan, the district police chief of Jalriz occurred within five minutes of each in Wardak Province, was killed just July 15, 2009 (GLOBAL): A new audio other. Both of the blasts were the work south of Kabul when a roadside bomb message attributed to al-Qa`ida second- of suicide bombers. Police later said that destroyed his vehicle. Three of his in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri they believe the architect of the attack bodyguards were also killed in the blast. appeared on Islamist web forums. to be Noordin Mohamed Top, an alleged – AFP, July 12 In the message, al-Zawahiri urges terrorist tied to Jemaah Islamiya. – USA “every Muslim in Pakistan to rise up Today, July 16; Wall Street Journal, July 24 July 13, 2009 (YEMEN): A Yemeni to fight” the Americans. According to court sentenced six suspected al-Qa`ida al-Zawahiri, “the Americans are today July 17, 2009 (THAILAND): A car bomb militants to death for their role in a occupying Afghanistan and Pakistan.” killed a special task force deputy chief series of deadly attacks on government He also claims that the United States is and his aide in southern Thailand’s Yala and Western targets in Yemen. Another trying to “break up this nuclear-capable Province. – Bangkok Post, July 18 10 defendants, including a Saudi and country [Pakistan] and transform it into four Syrians, received sentences ranging tiny fragments, loyal to and dependent July 17, 2009 (KYRGYZSTAN): Domestic from eight to 15 years in jail on the same on the neo-crusaders.” – al-Jazira, July 15; media in Kyrgyzstan reported that security charges. The group was convicted of Guardian, July 15 forces arrested 18 people accused of carrying out the January 2008 attack coordinating a logistics supply network for that killed two Belgian female tourists, July 15, 2009 (IRAQ): An improvised Taliban fighters in nearby Afghanistan. a March 2008 attack that targeted the explosive device blew up at the entrance The group included citizens of Uzbekistan, U.S. Embassy in Sana`a, and a rocket of a funeral tent in a predominately Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The men attack on a compound housing U.S. oil Shi`a district of Baghdad, killing five apparently used to fight alongside the workers. The men were all accused of people. – New York Times, July 15 Taliban. – Reuters, July 18

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July 17, 2009 (MAURITANIA): Police and could be the government’s best hope in a U.S. missile strike earlier in 2009. in Mauritania arrested two suspects in of beating al-Qaeda in the region.” The The intelligence official told NPR that the June killing of American teacher BBC report further stated that “under they were “80 to 85 percent” certain Christopher Ervin Leggett. One of the the deal special units of fighters from that Sa`ad bin Ladin was dead. – Reuters, men was wearing an explosives belt at the [Tuareg] Alliance for Democracy July 23 the time of arrest. Both were accused of and Change are to be sent to the desert having ties to al-Qa`ida in the Islamic to tackle al-Qaeda.” – BBC, July 20 July 25, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): At Maghreb. – AP, July 24 least six suicide bombers tried to attack July 21, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Five the main police station in Khost, but July 18, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A U.S. Taliban suicide bombers attacked were killed in a gun battle with security soldier captured by the Afghan Taliban government centers in Gardez, Paktia forces. A seventh militant was killed on June 30 appeared in an insurgent Province. The complex attack targeted after detonating his explosives in a vehicle video posted on Islamist websites. The the provincial governor’s compound, outside an old military hospital in the Pentagon confirmed that the man in the the intelligence department and the city. At least 17 people were wounded in video is the captured U.S. soldier. The police department. Five bombers and the overall attack. – BBC, July 25 U.S. Defense Department has identified five Afghan security forces were killed. the soldier as Pfc. Bowe R. Bergdahl. – CBS News, July 21 July 25, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): The – AP, July 18; AP, July 19 Afghan government forged a cease-fire July 21, 2009 (IRAQ): Two improvised deal with Taliban insurgents in remote July 18, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A explosive devices were detonated Badghis Province, which is located suicide bomber driving a car filled with seconds apart near a sidewalk in near the border with Turkmenistan. explosives rammed into an Afghan army Baghdad’s Sadr City, killing four people. Afghanistan’s presidential spokesman vehicle in Zabul Province, killing three Hours later, another bomb exploded at was described as saying that the Afghan soldiers. – AFP, July 18 a crowded sheep market in Sadr City, government wanted to “make similar killing three people. – New York Times, July deals with the Taliban in other parts of July 18, 2009 (SOMALIA): A senior 21 the country in a bid to improve security member of al-Shabab announced that for the August 20 presidential election.” two French military advisers held July 21, 2009 (IRAQ): Two bombs – Reuters, July 27 captive by the group will be tried exploded at a popular market in northern according to Shari`a, which carries a Baghdad’s Husseiniya neighborhood, July 26, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber possible death penalty. The men are killing five people. – New York Times, July killed at least four people outside a charged with spying and working for 21 funeral tent near Falluja. The funeral the enemies of Islam. – Voice of America, was being held for a police officer who July 18 July 22, 2009 (UNITED STATES): was killed in another bomb attack. According to newly unsealed court – Reuters, July 26 July 19, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): papers, Bryant Neal Vinas, a 26-year- A suicide bomber killed two police old U.S. citizen from Long Island, was July 26, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Officials officers and a civilian during an attack charged with giving al-Qa`ida details announced the arrest of Sufi Muhammad, on a police post at the Torkham border about the New York City transit system a radical cleric who brokered a failed crossing, which connects Afghanistan and the Long Island Railroad, in peace deal in the Swat Valley. He was and Pakistan. – Reuters, July 19 addition to firing rockets at U.S. troops arrested for encouraging terrorism and in Afghanistan. Vinas was also accused violence. Sufi Muhammad is also the July 19, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): A of receiving military training from al- father-in-law of Taliban leader Maulana spokesman for the Armed Forces of Qa`ida in 2008. He pleaded guilty on Fazlullah. – BBC, July 26 the Philippines (AFP) announced that January 28 in a closed hearing. Vinas the AFP plans to defeat the Abu Sayyaf remains in the custody of the Federal July 26, 2009 (RUSSIA): A suicide Group (ASG) by the end of 2009. The Bureau of Investigation. – Reuters, July 22 bomber in Russia’s Chechnya republic spokesman said that the ASG has been killed six people outside a theater in weakened to only 300 members: “Their July 22, 2009 (LEBANON): The Grozny. The bomber detonated his ranks have gone down and while they Lebanese army recently arrested 10 explosives when he was stopped by have some new recruits, it is mostly people accused of plotting attacks police before he could enter the concert young boys lured by the promise of against United Nations peacekeepers hall. – Voice of America, July 26 monetary rewards and the bearing of in southern Lebanon. The suspects arms.” – AFP, July 19 are accused of belonging to a terrorist July 26-27, 2009 (NIGERIA): Islamist cell with connections to al-Qa`ida. militants and authorities clashed in July 20, 2009 (MALI): The main group – Australian Broadcasting Corporation, July 22 northern Nigeria, resulting in the of Tuareg ex-rebels in Mali agreed to deaths of more than 100 people. Much assist the Malian military in combating July 23, 2009 (GLOBAL): A report of the violence occurred after militants al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb in U.S. National Public Radio (NPR), belonging to an Islamist fringe group, (AQIM). According to the BBC, “The citing U.S. intelligence sources, said known as Boko Haram, attacked Tuareg know how to operate in the that one of Usama bin Ladin’s sons, police stations. Most of the dead were desert perhaps better than anyone else Sa`ad bin Ladin, was possibly killed militants. – BBC, July 27

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July 27, 2009 (UNITED STATES): U.S. July 29, 2009 (ALGERIA): Militants CTC Sentinel Staff national Ahmed Omar Abu Ali was attacked a convoy of Algerian soldiers sentenced to life in prison for conspiring in Tipaza Province, killing 14 of them. Editor-in-Chief with al-Qa`ida in a plot to assassinate – Reuters, July 29 Erich Marquardt then-President George W. Bush. Abu Senior Editor, CTC Ali was previously sentenced to 30 years July 29, 2009 (INDONESIA): An for the plot in 2006, but that sentence internet message appeared on Islamist Editorial Board was overturned by an appeals court for web forums claiming responsibility COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. being too lenient. Abu Ali was arrested for the July 17 suicide bombings at the Department Head in 2003 by authorities in Saudi Arabia JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels Department of Social Sciences (West Point) before being extradited to the United in Jakarta. The message was from “al- States. – AFP, July 27 Qa`ida Indonesia” and was purportedly COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. signed by Noordin Mohammed Top, a Deputy Department Head July 28, 2009 (GLOBAL): U.S. Special key Jemaah Islamiya-linked terrorist Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Envoy to Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke leader in Southeast Asia. Authorities told European Union officials in Brussels and analysts could not confirm the LTC Reid Sawyer that Taliban militants are receiving authenticity of the message. – AP, July 29; Director, CTC more funding from sympathizers CNN, July 29 abroad—mostly from the Persian Gulf— Christopher Heffelfinger than from Afghanistan’s illegal drug July 30, 2009 (IRAQ): A bomb exploded FBI Fellow, CTC trade. Holbrooke said the United States inside the headquarters of the Sunni is creating an interdepartmental task Reform and Development Party in force to address the issue. – AP, July 28 Diyala Province, killing eight people. – Voice of America, July 30 July 28, 2009 (UNITED STATES): Salah Contact Osman Ahmed, a Minnesota Somali man, July 30, 2009 (YEMEN): Al-Qa`ida Combating Terrorism Center pleaded guilty to one count of providing militants ambushed an army truck in U.S. Military Academy material support to terrorists. Ahmed Yemen’s Marib Province, killing two 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall went to Somalia in December 2007 with Yemeni soldiers and seizing military West Point, NY 10996 the intention to fight against Ethiopian ammunition and equipment. Authorities Phone: (845) 667-6383 troops. He said that he began attending then stormed the militants’ hideout and Email: [email protected] secret meetings in Minneapolis in killed A’ed Saleh al-Shabwani, one of Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ October 2007, and he knew that the the militant leaders. A soldier was also group was connected to al-Shabab, a killed in the fighting. – AFP, July 31 * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 U.S. designated terrorist organization. Ahmed faces up to 15 years in prison as July 30, 2009 (NIGERIA): Mohammed part of his plea deal. – AP, July 28 Yusuf, the leader of a group known as the “Nigerian Taliban,” died in police July 28, 2009 (MOROCCO): Abdelkader custody. Yusuf and his Boko Haram Belliraj was sentenced to life in prison for sect are blamed for the violence that support planning terrorist attacks in Morocco, engulfed northern Nigeria in late July. The Combating Terrorism Center would robberies in Europe, arms trafficking Police claim Yusuf was shot after he like to express its gratitude to its financial and large-scale money laundering. tried to escape from custody. – AP, July supporters, for without their support and Belliraj, who is a dual Moroccan-Belgian 31 shared vision of the Center products like national, was charged with 34 co- the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If defendants. The group has been called July 31, 2009 (IRAQ): Five Shi`a you are interested in learning more about the “Belliraj Cell.” – AP, July 28 mosques across Baghdad were struck how to support the Combating Terrorism by bombs, killing at least 28 people. Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. July 29, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani – Reuters, July 31 edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at Taliban gunmen entered the home of West Point’s Association of Graduates at a pro-government militia leader and 845-446-1553. shot him to death. The leader, Khalilur Rehman, was confronted by more than 50 Taliban fighters at his home in Shangla District in the North-West Frontier Province. He was the leader of a lashkar (tribal militia) that had provided logistics support to groups fighting The views expressed in this report are those of against the Taliban. – AFP, July 29 the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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