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Instructions to Military Officials by the Deputy Leader of Islamic Emirate, Honorable Khalifa Sirajuddin Haqqani (HA)

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Instructions to Military Officials by the Deputy Leader of Islamic Emirate, Honorable Khalifa Sirajuddin Haqqani (HA) () () Essential Reading Instructions to Military Officials by the Deputy Leader of Islamic Emirate, Honorable Khalifa Sirajuddin Haqqani (HA) (https://alemarahenglish.net/? p=47146) How can we have a stable, strong and prosperous Afghanistan? (https://alemarahenglish.net/? p=47146) June 20, 2021 (https://alemarahenglish.net/? p=47129) I want to convey some instructions regarding the ongoing series of victories. None wish to die for corrupt admin any longer Be Humble and Allah the Almighty will increase his blessings upon you even more. (https://alemarahenglish.net/? p=47129) In the current sensitive situation and continuous series of conquests, district and provincial June 19, 2021 governors should pay attention to the instructions of esteemed Amir ul-Momineen, Maulvi Sahib and the officials of the Military Commission as they counsel you to not act cruel or be arrogant. The situation is such that, it is a testing period for us. Everything done in practice is (https://alemarahenglish.net/? being observed. p=46905) Statement of Islamic Emirate regarding stay of some foreign The situation was military and jihadi, but now you are entering a civilian situation. Therefore, forces in Afghanistan all civilian and military officials must pay close attention to the instructions of leaders. (https://alemarahenglish.net/? The current situation will evolve from a military to civilian. Behave well with the general public and pay attention to civilian and official documents and properties in offices, and make sure they are not lost. Try hard not to violate the rights of people. Colleagues should make sure to take every decision in accordance with Sharia. The scholars p=46905) who are with us in the units and groups should carefully monitor the treasury and spoils. June 12, 2021 Whoever voluntarily joins the Emirate, his belongings do not go to the general treasury and cannot be appropriated by us. Only equipment that we seize in times of war considered as spoils and taken by us. Our colleagues must take every step very carefully. We do not take revenge from those who join us from the ranks of the enemy and we do not resort to vengeance because these are not Islamic principles. Reassure others through the brother who have joined us and reassure them with the help tribal elders that we have no intention of revenge. (https://alemarahenglish.net/? You must show them respect and not create problems for them. p=46897) Troop amalgamation – a sign of As for those officials who choose the path of war and do not surrender, you must turn to trust in the Emirate (https://alemarahenglish.net/? military officials for guidance about them. p=46897) June 12, 2021 The political process that has been continuing on the side for the past 14 months has been very meaningful. In the future, our comrades must also tread carefully with activities that can harm Islamic and national values. The former order was a military and jihadi order, now we are entering a system. That’s why it is best to keep in mind the military, defense and civilian plans for the areas where Mujahideen enter. (https://alemarahenglish.net/? As a lot of tragic events have occurred and the situation is urgent, emotions of comrades must p=46874) be kept in check. Instead of being overwhelmed by emotions, tolerance and forbearance must War Crimes (May 2021) be adopted. (https://alemarahenglish.net/? p=46874) National institutions and public property and documents must be well safeguarded. June 11, 2021 Our governance setup in the past was born out of necessity but now more than ever, officials have to focus on their responsibilities for the civilian population and to recognize their duties. Every district governor must retain officials for security, intelligence and municipality work. Articles and Opinions Good governance is the need of the hour and must be taken into account by our colleagues. To compensate even a small mistake is a tall order. Today, the spoils of war have increased. Colleagues must differentiate between what constitutes as war spoils and what is for the general treasury. God forbid our actions bring about the displeasure of Allah Almighty. May Allah the Almighty grant all Mujahideen His Divine Help. (https://alemarahenglish.net/? This is a very sensitive phase. There is no need to rush. There will be good in whatever plan p=47242) and action is taken, God willing. Insight into the recent advancements on the ground (https://alemarahenglish.net/? If we are needed in an region, we will come there to your help you, God willing. p=47242) June 23, 2021 (https://alemarahenglish.net/? p=46968) The unmasking of Democracy (https://alemarahenglish.net/? p=46968) June 14, 2021 (https://alemarahenglish.net/? p=46714) How officials are costing troops morale and legitimacy..!? (https://alemarahenglish.net/? p=46714) June 7, 2021 (https://alemarahenglish.net/? p=46711) Guardians of Afghanistan (https://alemarahenglish.net/? p=46711) June 7, 2021 (https://alemarahenglish.net/? p=46019) Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansoor (RH) – A man who steered the Emirate out of turbulent times (https://alemarahenglish.net/? p=46019) May 22, 2021 Commissions Official website of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
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