G. Bankoff Selective memory and collective forgetting. Historiography and the Philippine centennial of 1898 In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, The PhilippinesHistorical and social studies 157 (2001), no: 3, Leiden, 539-560 This PDF-file was downloaded from http://www.kitlv-journals.nl Downloaded from Brill.com09/28/2021 07:08:04PM via free access GREG BANKOFF Selective Memory and Collective Forgetting Historiography and the Philippine Centennial of 1898 The fanfare and extravaganza with which the centennial of the Revolution of 1896-1898 was celebrated in the Philippines serves largely to obscure the sur- prising lack of unanimity concerning the significance of the occasion or even the purpose of the festivities. Philippine history, more especially the historio- graphy of its colonial period, poses some particular problems in serving as the basis from which to fashion an identity suitable to the modern citizens of a nation-state. These problems are not restricted to the Philippines, but the combination of features is certainly specific to the history of that nation and differentiates its historiography from that of others in the region. Attention has long been drawn to the unique geographical location and cultural experi- ence of the islands; indeed D.G.E. Hall even omitted the Philippines from the first edition of his seminal history of Southeast Asia (Hall 1955). But these observations on their own offer no insuperable obstacle to the creation of a national historiography. Far more significant is the lack of appropriate his- torical experiences whose symbolic value make of them suitable rallying points round which a counter-hegemonic and anti-colonial historiography can coalesce and flourish.1 The history of nations is always presented in the form of a narrative, the fulfilment of a project that stretches back over the centuries along which are moments of coming to self-awareness that prove to be decisive in the self- manifestation of national personality (Balibar 1991:86; Bhabha 1990:1). The origin or starting point from which this national history commences is imbued with special significance and, with the exception of those states which may wish to establish their validity on a radical break with the past (though even here the role of the distant past is often somewhat ambiguous- 1 Material for this article is drawn from Post-colonial national identity in the Philippines; Celebrating the centennial of Independence (Bankoff and Weekley forthcoming). Downloaded from Brill.com09/28/2021 07:08:04PM via free access 540 Greg Bankoff ly depicted),2 there is an attempt to demonstrate longevity, as if pedigree somehow confers upon a nation-state a greater degree of legitimacy. A clas- sical past, preferably one strewn with the monumental remains of an illustri- ous civilization, or an impressive citadel of more recent regal authority, is a useful referent.3 Thus Borobudur, Angkor Wat, Pagan or Ayuthia and Hue or Vientiane have been gainfully evoked as important symbols aiding in the construction of a modern sense of national identity in Indonesia, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam and Laos. In still other cases, religion or creed has proved to be just such a medium, as with Islam in Malaysia and Brunei or neo-Confucianism in Singapore. The 'problem' of Philippine history Philippine history, unfortunately, provides no such expedient agents: there are no indigenous monuments, citadels or palaces, nor even a suitable natur- alized creed.4 Worse, what relics of the past there are - some few dozen churches, forts or bridges - have their origin in the colonial period and, though built with native labour, were constructed at the instigation of the col- onizing power. Moreover, Filipinos are the only peoples of Southeast Asia to have mainly embraced the religion of their erstwhile overlords: over 80 per cent of Filipinos are Catholics, some 90 per cent Christian. A common religion shared between colonizer and colonized deprives a people of a useful me- dium through which to express nationalist sentiment (Renan 1990:10).5 As much by default, then, as by any sense of conviction, this leaves the Revolu- tion of 1896-1898 as the only really 'legitimizing principle' or 'foundational event in the history of the nation' (Ileto 1998:195,241), and one, too, that rais- es as many questions about the nature of that national identity as it seem- ingly provides answers for its citizens. Apart from the difficulties inherent in the interpretation of individual 2 The People's Republic of China has continued to venerate traditional heroic characters such as Ch'u Yuan, Han Kao-tso, Wu Tse-t'ien and even Confucius (Crozier 1977:4). 3 See, for example, Elizabeth Nissan's essay on the changing symbolic value of the sacred city of Anuradhapura in Sri Lankan historiography (Nissan 1997:23-41). 4 Eduardo Gonzalez, a fellow at the Institute for Popular Democracy, holds 'an accident of geography' that isolated the archipelago from the mainstream of Asian civilizations responsible for this state of affairs and maintains that the entire socio-cultural configuration of the Philippines was determined 'by a void of compelling dimension' (Gonzalez n.d.:3). 5 Christianity played a somewhat analogous role in East Timor under Portuguese colonial- ism, but then Catholicism provided an important nationalist referent during the Indonesian occupation of the country 1975-1999. Pat Smythe argues that after 400 years of Portuguese colo- nial rule less than 30 per cent of the population were formally registered as Catholic, while 90 per cent of the people presently declare that affiliation (Smythe 1998:153-4). Downloaded from Brill.com09/28/2021 07:08:04PM via free access Selective Memory and Collective Forgetting 541 actions or particular historical incidents, the problem posed by the Revolution is that it does not signify a radical enough break with the past, not independence but merely a change in colonial regimes. As a consequence, the periodization of Philippine history is frequently divided along cultural lines: an indigenous period followed by a Spanish and then an American one before a different nomenclature is employed. This preoccupation with the cultural distinctiveness of the colonial administrations serves somewhat to obscure the ethnic tensions within the archipelago and confers a false sense of unity upon its peoples. Rather than emphasizing the diversity of the his- torical experience, the focus is on the evolution of the state and manifesta- tions of modernity, both of which are irrevocably associated with colonial rule, despite evidence that such was not the case for significant cultural and ethnic communities within the Philippines. Moreover, as the conception of modernity is increasingly constructed around notions of democracy and cap- italist competitiveness derived from North American cultural norms, Span- ish colonialism has become typecast and contrasted unfavourably with that of the United States. The advent of US domination is explained not only as a result of the decline and decadence of Spain but also as a necessary social, cultural and economic step in the preparation of Filipinos for true nation- hood. That is, while the Spanish period is irredeemably associated with colo- nial oppression, the years of American occupation are much more ambigu- ously portrayed, often being equated with modernization. And then there are the events of the Revolution itself, fraught with all kinds of compromises, betrayals and questionable decisions that make of it at times a less than epic struggle and its course far from glorious. Nor does history throw up an all-encompassing national figure to whom the attributes of a founding father can unequivocally be attributed. Jose Rizal most closely approximates this role, but his attitude towards the revolutionary struggle was ambiguous and his image has been somewhat compromised, whether fairly or unfairly, by the taint of US colonizers, who found in the figure of the reformist doctor a suitable exemplar upon which to fix the aspirations of a newly vanquished people. The other main contenders, Andres Bonifacio and Emilio Aguinaldo, are equally problematic: the former, despite his un- doubted idealism, proved incompetent, and the latter, despite his compet- ence, proved too pragmatic and is held responsible for the execution of Bonifacio and the signing of the truce of Biak-na-bato.6 The acrimonious 6 Bonifacio was court-martialed and sentenced to death on the charge of sedition in May 1897. Though the sentence was subsequently commuted to indefinite exile and imprisonment, he and his brother were nonetheless executed on 10 May. The truce of Biak-na-bato was signed in November 1897 in which the Spanish paid the sum of 400,000 pesos in return for the surren- der of rebel arms and the exile of Aguinaldo and other members of the Revolutionary Commit- tee to Hong Kong. Downloaded from Brill.com09/28/2021 07:08:04PM via free access 542 Greg Bankojf debate in recent years over the validity of the historical evidence and the nature of their respective characters discounts either from serving as a unify- ing national role model (Ileto 1998:203-37; Churchill 1997; May 1997). Then there is the question of participation among the different ethnic groups of the archipelago: not every Filipino can derive his descent from forefathers who fought in the Revolution. Significant national minorities, Muslims in the south, the tribal peoples of the Cordillera and ethnic Chinese, did not really participate in the events of 1896-1898. A modern state appar- atus that seeks to normalize its people into an undifferentiated body of citi- zens by imbuing specific historical events with nationalist symbolism may unwittingly call attention to notions of difference based on ethnic, regional or religious origins that have often served as the foundations upon which colo- nial rule was established. Such symbols, in fact, may only reinforce contem- porary struggles for separate identities (Chatterjee 1993:33) and may even lead to the construction of counter-ethnicities and to demands for counter- states based on counter-nationalisms (Appadurai 1993:415).