Logistics and Support Q 12 Tsunami! Information Sharing F 7 from the Editor J by Merrick E

comingnex Homeland and more inissue40 Y L R E T R A U Q E C R O F T N I O J . . . t Interagency Lessonsfrom Afghanistan Spe Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff cial Op A Professional Military and Security Journal by National Defense University Press National Defense University Defense and Security erations inthe21 Washington, DC J F Cov 4 , plus 1 Q st Quarter2006of st

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JFQ

Y L R E T R A U Q E C R O F T N I O J QUARTER 2005 QUARTER 4 THIRTY-NINE, ISSUE

Score covers 1&4no greaterthan 3/16” fromthe bind J Interagency Dialogue Interagency Series— New Winners Contest Essay Strategic Chairman’s and Support and Logistics F Y L R E T R A U Q E C R O F T N I O J Q ARY AND SECURITY JOURNAL A N R U O J Y T I R U C E S D N A Y R TA I L I M L A N O I S S E F O R P A

Cov 1 Issue 39,4 th Quarter2005 Trim 83/8” x107/8”

3 pi 4 pi Without supplies, no army is brave. —Frederick the Great, 1747

Victory is the beautiful, bright-coloured flower. Transport is the stem without which it never could have blossomed. —Sir Winston Churchill, 1899

The war has been variously termed a war of production and a war of machines. Whatever else it is, so far as the United States is concerned, it is a war of logistics. —Fleet ADM Ernest J. King, USN, 1946

Good logistics is combat power. —LTG William G. Pagonis, USA, 1992 Without supplies, no army is brave. —Frederick the Great, 1747

Victory is the beautiful, bright-coloured flower. Transport is the stem without which it never could have blossomed. —Sir Winston Churchill, 1899

Good logistics is combat power. —LTG William G. Pagonis, USA, 1992 JFQ A Word from the

General Myers with U.S. Soldiers in Kabul, Afghanistan Combat Camera Squadron (D. Myles Cullen) Combat Camera Squadron st Chairman 1

s we progress through this fourth At the same time, I am tremendously im- year of sustained combat in the war pressed by the energy, dedication, and ingenuity on terror, I am continually aware of of all the men and women who have stepped up the enormous and varied demands to the task of fighting this high-stakes fight: Sol- Athis struggle places on our Armed Forces, our diers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, Coastguardsmen, Nation, and our allies. The violent extremists we civilians in the Department of Defense and across battle are a tough enemy. They are agile, adaptive, the Government, and our all-important allies. and unencumbered by any boundaries—territorial The men and women of the logistics community or moral. Winning this struggle demands that we are a prime example. transform how we work together across organizations, deploy, equip ourselves, train, and employ and adapt our doctrine. That is no small task for an organization of our size. (continued on page 4)

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 1 ■ CONTENTS

J F Q F O R U M 1 A Word from the Chairman by Richard B. Myers 10 Logistics and Support Q 12 Tsunami! Information Sharing F 7 From the Editor J by Merrick E. Krause in the Wake of Destruction by David J. Dorsett 8 From the Field and Fleet: Letters to the Editor 19 Health Service Support from the Sea Base by David A. Lane

25 Development of the Joint Logistician by Randall M. Mauldin

30 The Defense Readiness Reporting System: A New Tool for Force Management by Laura J. Junor

34 Strategic Gaming for the National Security Community by Margaret M. McCown

THE CHAIRMAN’S STRATEGIC ESSAY CONTEST WINNERS 41 Al Qaeda as Insurgency PHOTO CREDITS by Michael F. Morris The cover shows Marines loading up to escort convoy to Turaybil, Iraq (2d Force Service Support Group/Brian A. Jaques). The front inside cover features [top to bottom] USS 51 A Goldwater-Nichols Act Harry S. Truman and USS Monterey being replenished at sea for the U.S. Government: by USNS Arctic (U.S. Navy/Joe Burgess); Marines guiding high mobility multipurpose vehicle off high speed vessel Westpac Institutionalizing the Express in Thailand, Operation Unified Assistance (U.S. Marine Interagency Process Corps/Patrick J. Floto); Soldiers building A–22 container delivery system with humanitarian aid in Afghanistan by Martin J. Gorman (416th Air Expeditionary Group/Scott T. Sturkol); and HH–60 and Alexander Krongard helicopter being offloaded from C–5 at Kadena Air Base, Japan (18th Communications Squadron/Michael Pallazola). The table of contents depicts [left] tsunami victims helping unload relief supplies from Navy MH–60S in Sumatra, Indonesia, Operation Unified Assistance (Fleet Combat Camera Group, 59 Guantanamo Bay: Undermining Pacific/Alan D. Monyelle); [right] Marines providing security for engineers on the Global War on Terror the Iraq-Syria border (U.S. Marine Corps/Christopher G. Graham). The back inside cover shows C–17s making low level pass near Biggs Army Air Field during by Gerard P. Fogarty Composite Force Operations training (1st Combat Camera Squadron/Matthew Hannen). The back cover reveals [top] Soldiers filing off C–130 for Quick Reaction Force exercise in Texas (U.S. Air Force/Derrick C. Goode); [left to right] 68 America’s Strategic Imperative: Sailors conducting maritime security operations in Gulf of Aden, Operation A “Manhattan Project” Iraqi Freedom (Fleet Combat Camera Group, Atlantic/Robert McRill); Coast Guardsmen patrolling cruise ship pier in Juneau, Alaska (U.S. Coast Guard/Gail for Energy Skinner); Marines patrolling in Afghanistan for Taliban insurgents (22d Marine by John M. Amidon Expeditionary Unit/Keith A. Milks); and F–16 taking off from Shaw Air Force Base, Operation Noble Eagle (20th Communications Squadron/Keri S. Whitehead).

2 JFQ / issue thirty-nine ISSUE THIRTY–NINE

RECALL 78 Center of Gravity and Asymmetric Conflict: 97 Air Support of the Allied Factoring In Culture Landings in Sicily, by John W. Jandora Salerno, and Anzio by Matthew G. St. Clair 84 “Everybody Wanted Tanks”: Heavy Forces in INTERAGENCY DIALOGUE Operation Iraqi Freedom 108 Strategic Communication: by John Gordon IV and Bruce R. Pirnie A Mandate for the United States COMMENTARY by Jeffrey B. Jones 91 Cross-Functional Working Groups: Changing the OFF THE SHELF Way Staffs Are Organized 115 The Last Word: A Book Review by John S. Hurley by James Jay Carafano

116 Carnage and Culture: A Book Review by John Hillen

118 The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas: A Book Review by Jan M. van Tol

Joint Force Quarterly

Stephen J. Flanagan, PhD Calvin B. Kelley Timothy M. Sullivan Director, George C. Maerz Nassim A. Sultan Institute for National Strategic Studies Jeffrey D. Smotherman, PhD Interns Editor-in-Chief Lisa M. Yambrick Editorial Staff U.S. Government Printing Office Colonel Merrick E. Krause, USAF Creative Services Director of NDU Press Martin J. Peters, Jr. Design Editor Production Supervisor Colonel Debra Taylor, USA Deputy Director of NDU Press Managing Editor

Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense Editor, Joint Force Quarterly University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be National Defense University Press is the Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal reproduced or extracted without permission of the copyright pro- 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62, Room 212) designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and prietors. Joint Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever Fort Lesley J. McNair other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security material is quoted from or based on its content. Washington, DC 20319-5066 polity and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland secu- The last page of this issue contains information on Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325-4220 rity; and developments in training and joint professional military contributing to JFQ. Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325-4219 education to transform America’s military and security apparatus Quarterly online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more on upcom- Email: [email protected] to better meet tomorrow’s challenges while protecting freedom ing issues, an electronic archive of JFQ articles, and access to ISSN 1070-0692 4th Quarter, October 2005 today. NDU Press produces JFQ four times a year. The goal of NDU many other useful NDU Press publications. Constructive com- Press is to provide defense and interagency decisionmakers, allies, ments and contributions are important to us. Please direct The views expressed or implied are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect and the attentive public with attractive, balanced, and thoroughly editorial communications to the convenient electronic feedback the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of researched professional publications. form on the NDU Press Web site or write to: Defense, or the U.S. Government.

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY AND SECURITY JOURNAL

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 3 ■ A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

(continued from page 1) The Joint Staff J–4 is leading a broad, far- reaching effort called Joint Theater Logistics to Joint Logistics assess our logistics capabilities, identify shortfalls, The U.S. military’s logistic capability is un- and create truly integrated solutions. Improving matched in the world. Our ability to mobilize logistics capabilities depends not just on better forces, get to the fight, and sustain operations transportation and information systems, but also underpins the national defense strategy and the on doctrine, processes, training, education, and global basing strategy. Allies, interagency partners, leadership. and nongovernmental organizations rely on this Through Joint Theater Logistics and countless logistic support as well. So transforming logistics other initiatives, logistic experts throughout the is an integral and essential part of transforming Department of Defense have signed up to provide the Armed Forces. capabilities that are more responsive, integrated, adaptable, and networked, all with the aim of Joint Force Quarterly better supporting operational missions anywhere in the world. They have already accomplished a great deal. Several examples stand out: Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF Publisher ■ U.S. Transportation Command led a joint, interagency, coalition effort to provide the combatant ADVISORY COMMITTEE commands more efficient, coordinated logistic support ■ Lt Gen Michael M. Dunn, USAF National Defense University in theater by establishing Deployment Distribution Chairman Operations Centers. In U.S. Central Command, this ini- BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) ■ Office of the Chairman tiative has already saved millions of dollars in shipping Maj Gen John J. Catton, Jr., USAF ■ The Joint Staff costs and, more importantly, provides more responsive A. Denis Clift ■ Joint Military Intelligence College logistic support for operational commanders. U.S. Pa- ■ RADM Patrick W. Dunne, USN Naval Postgraduate School cific Command employed the concept in the aftermath Maj Gen Robert J. Elder, Jr., USAF ■ Air War College of the tsunami disaster, speeding the delivery of food, Col George E. Flemming, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College Brig Gen (S) Randal D. Fullhart, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College water, and medical supplies. MG David H. Huntoon, USA ■ U.S. Army War College ■ We have doubled the number of direct air deliv- RADM Richard D. Jaskot, USN ■ National War College ery hubs in Iraq and expanded intra-theater airlift to re- VADM Timothy J. Keating, USN ■ The Joint Staff duce the number of convoys traveling through high-risk Col Walter L. Niblock, USMC ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College zones. This is a clear case of joint logistics saving lives. MG Kenneth J. Quinlan, Jr., USA ■ Joint Forces Staff College ■ We have delivered to the warfighter thousands RADM Jacob L. Shuford, USN ■ Naval War College of armor kits for vehicles, the most leading-edge body ■ BG Volney J. Warner, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College armor, and brand new technology for countering im- MajGen Frances C. Wilson, USMC ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces provised explosives. The ability to adapt faster than the EDITORIAL BOARD enemy is key to success in this struggle. Stephen J. Flanagan ■ National Defense University Chairman These innovations are tied to the reality that

Richard K. Betts ■ Columbia University joint warfighting now goes beyond the services Col John M. Calvert, USAF ■ Joint Forces Staff College to include other Government agencies and allies. ■ Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies In logistics, as in everything the Armed Forces Eliot A. Cohen ■ The Johns Hopkins University COL Robert A. Doughty, USA ■ U.S. Military Academy do, transformation depends on smart, dedicated Aaron L. Friedberg ■ Princeton University people finding ways to cut across old stovepipes ■ Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces and integrate processes, organizations, and sys- Douglas N. Hime ■ Naval War College Mark H. Jacobsen ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College tems that once operated in isolation at worst, or Daniel T. Kuehl ■ Information Resources Management College were duct taped together at best. ■ Col Anne E. McGee, USAF Industrial College of the Armed Forces Thomas L. McNaugher ■ The RAND Corporation Kathleen Mahoney-Norris ■ Air Command and Staff College Chairman’s Essay Contest William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr. ■ Joint Military Intelligence College This type of broad, innovative thinking ■ John J. Mearsheimer The University of Chicago shines in this year’s winning essays of the Chair- LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) ■ Hudson Institute Col Thomas C. Skillman, USAF ■ Air War College man’s Essay Contest. In the first place essay, Ma- COL Robert E. Smith, USA ■ U.S. Army War College rine Lieutenant Colonel Michael Morris examines ■ LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) Harvard University how we categorize al Qaeda—as an insurgency Col Gary West, USAF ■ National War College or a terrorist organization. He considers how our understanding of al Qaeda’s extremist ideology should define the threat and shape the strategy A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY AND SECURITY JOURNAL for countering it. Understanding the threat at the

4 JFQ / issue thirty-nine M y e r s

Airmen unloading vehicles from C–5 at Bush Field, Georgia, Exercise Golden Medic 2005 U.S. Air Force (Efren Lopez) (Efren U.S. Air Force ideological level is key to the Nation’s strategy for strategic thinking we need as we prepare to meet the war on terrorism. The most important pillar future threats. of our strategy is creating a global environment Australian Army Colonel Gerard Fogarty that does not encourage young Muslim men and argues for closing the detention operations at women to resort to violent extremism. Guantanamo Bay, an issue that has been at the In the second place essay, an interagency center of much public debate. Because we face team—Martin Gorman from the Defense Intel- a brutally violent, agile, stateless enemy in this ligence Agency and Navy Commander Alexander conflict, we face new issues in handling those we Krongard—argues for legislation similar to the have captured. Above all, we continue to hold to Goldwater-Nichols Act to improve interagency the principle that America and its allies share— cooperation. They understand that the U.S. that we will treat each person humanely. military alone cannot win this struggle against I appreciate all who researched, studied, and violent extremists. If we are to bring all instru- debated these and other issues. I thank the faculty ments of power to bear effectively, as this conflict and staff of National Defense University and all demands, our efforts must be better integrated the military education programs for all they do across the Government. to mentor servicemen and women and encourage Air Force Colonel Mark Amidon argues for a the innovative thinking needed today. comprehensive project to develop a new energy policy. He takes a broad view of national security, Parting Words a long-range outlook, and a global perspective on Despite our successes in the logistics arena, energy—all of which are essential to the kind of throughout the Armed Forces, and across the

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 5 ■ A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

Government, we still have much to do. We need and effective in coordinating all instruments of to be more agile, more flexible, and faster in re- national power and those of our allies. Transfor- sponding to threats. We need to be more efficient mation is hard intellectual work, but it could not be more critical at this high-stakes time in the Nation’s history. We must continue the process General and Mrs. Myers leading motorcyclists in Rolling Thunder XVIII, Memorial Day, 2005 of transforming with the same outstanding level of energy, creativity, and sense of urgency I have witnessed over the last several years. I cannot fully express how honored I am to have represented more than 2 million servicemembers as Chairman for the last 4 years. When I put on the uniform 40 years ago, I never imagined I’d remain more than a few years. I stayed because I believe in our mission, and I can think of no better way to serve than surrounded by this team of dedicated, hardworking professionals. The men and women of the Armed Forces represent the very best of American values: integrity, compas- sion, commitment, and selflessness. It has been a privilege to serve beside each of you. After meeting you in the halls of the Penta- gon, at war colleges and other military education schools, and at bases and deployed locations around the world, I am fully confident that Amer- ica’s future is in good hands. I thank all of you for your service and your families for their patience and support. I wish you well as you carry on this noble work. JFQ

GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Combat Camera Squadron (D. Myles Cullen) Combat Camera Squadron st 1

Look for each issue of Joint Force Quarterly online on the NDU Press homepage: ndupress.ndu.edu also check for the latest in books, McNair Papers, Strategic Forums, Defense Horizons, a new series of Occasional Papers, and searchable indexes by author and subject for all NDU Press publications

6 JFQ / issue thirty-nine r

America’s instruments of national power, JFQ presents this series to promote discussion among From the Editor security professionals. The JFQ Forum theme in this issue is “Logis- tics and Support.” Over 2 millennia ago, Xeno- phon recorded a timeless comment by the Spar- hairman of the Joint tan leader Clearchus: “Without supplies neither a Chiefs of Staff, General general nor a soldier is good for anything.” Senior Richard Myers, bids military and civilian leaders alike recognize this farewell to Joint Force fundamental truth. CQuarterly readers in his column, Recently, I spoke with an Army Sergeant First “A Word from the Chairman.” Class returning from his second forward tour in General Myers’ tour as the 15th Iraq. He emphasized a few issues, crucial from his Chairman began with 9/11. He perspective on the ground, which the Joint Staff announced his priorities clearly fielded months earlier. Uparmored Humvees and on the first page of JFQ issue 29, new boots were at the top his list, as were 50-cali- January 2002: “winning the global ber rounds. His team considered fully uparmored war on terrorism, enhancing joint Humvees critical; most of his comrades thought warfighting capabilities, and trans- partial retrofits were worse than no armor at all. forming the Armed Forces.” And he related that troops still needed new boots In the past 4 years, General Myers has con- at their forward operating base by mid-tour; most tinued to focus intellectual debate on these pri- of his Soldiers relied on spouses to mail replace- orities while challenging the defense community ment boots. with new perspectives, such as the recognition of Macro-level logistic decisions can directly joint operations as the baseline, the importance influence the combat capability and survival of of battlespace management and information shar- individual Soldiers. Strategic decisions on basic ing, and the need for integrated operations, where transportation, body armor, and clothing impact the Armed Forces work closely with a broad range those executing at the tactical level in the field, of new interagency, international, and private and complicated systems require more and more sector partners. In addition, he directed JFQ to acquisition lead time. However, for the Sergeant, open its aperture and consider a broader range of killing brutal terrorists went hand in hand with security issues that cut across traditional stove- helping Iraqi villagers obtain clean water. The pipes and involve more than just the military quality of the entire mass of logistic decisions at instrument of national power. all levels, to this Soldier, might be characterized General Myers has helped to guide the Nation by the availability of good boots and enough 50- through one of the most treacherous periods in caliber rounds for his company. its history. His successor will face a familiar and With the distances, costs, and number of challenging strategic environment, but one with partners involved in post–Cold War defense, the promising democratic governments in Afghanistan logistic challenge of equipping and supplying and Iraq, significant integration among the Armed troops on multiple fronts across the globe has be- Forces and our allies, and many transformation come even more Byzantine. But history is consis- programs well under way. But dangers remain, tent—the Soldier on the line still depends on lay- particularly the continuing military and economic ers of support to complete the mission, whether it threats posed by rogue states and the potential of is to attack, defend, or provide humanitarian aid. terrorists using weapons of mass destruction. We welcome feedback and are pleased to con- As JFQ continues to address important se- sider for publication well-written research articles curity issues, the staff is pleased to provide some and essays on national security topics. Send an exciting new features. This issue marks the first email to [email protected] or see our Web site to find JFQ special feature highlighting the winning en- a simple feedback form and submission guidelines tries from the 24th Annual Chairman of the Joint at ndupress.ndu.edu. Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition. Also in this issue, the reader will find a new Merrick E. Krause, Colonel, USAF series: Interagency Dialogue. Recognizing that in- Director, National Defense University Press tegrated operations require better blending of Editor, Joint Force Quarterly

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 7 ■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

Letters to the Editor . . . panacea for solving the interagency coordination question: it is an organizational innovation for improving the ability of the Regional Combatant Commands to reach out to the other agencies, improve its “situational awareness” with respect to other departments, improve its ability to coordinate internally (an often overlooked matter: stovepipes exist within the RCCs), and better manage operations for which it has the lead—for example, wars and humanitarian operations. The trickier A Work in Progress question is how to improve interagency coordination To the Editor—Colonel Matthew F. Bogdanos, within the interagency community situations where the USMC, of the National Strategic Gaming Center is to RCC is a supporting player to another agency or only be congratulated for writing, and JFQ for printing, his one player in the larger U.S. Government interagency article entitled “Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First community, for instance in the war on terror in the Step” (Issue 37, 2d Quarter 2005). It is detailed, thought- Asia-Pacific area, and how to structure and use JIACGs ful, and enlightening. However, in the interest of his- for that purpose. torical accuracy and to encourage continued discussion I must also disagree with Colonel Bogda- on the subject of interagency coordination and the role nos in his statement that one major challenge fac- of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) ing JIACGs is the lack of a single, national- concept, I submit the following comments. level organization issuing guidance, managing 1) Central Command’s (CENTCOM’s) request to competing policies, and directing agency participation in the the Secretary of Defense in October 2001 to establish JIACGs. That organization exists and is called the Na- an interagency coordination cell was one of three from tional Security Council, as the author himself implies the Regional Combatant Commands (RCCs). Admiral later in his article by calling on the council to enforce Dennis Blair, USN (Ret.), then-Commander, U.S. Pacific interagency coordination. Command (PACOM), had been exploring the idea of an With these caveats in mind, Colonel Bogdanos’ interagency unit prior to 9/11. All of the regional com- article is recommended to all as an important contribu- batant commands then created JIACGs, albeit of very tion to the ongoing experiment in interagency coordi- different compositions. nation called the JIACG concept. For those interested in 2) The original idea for a JIACG (or as it was first the subject, I suggest they review the history and subse- named, JX) arose at the U.S. Joint Forces Command quent development of Presidential Decision Document (JFCOM) annual exercise in June-July 2001. JFCOM later 56, signed in 1977, on managing complex emergencies, expanded the concept and published its White Paper in U.S. Joint Forces Command White Paper “A Concept for March 2002. This White Paper contains the concept of a Improving U.S. Interagency Operational Planning and “small interagency coordination staff element,” which Coordination” and subsequent JFCOM documents, and Colonel Bogdanos so cavalierly dismisses. However, it the PACOM-authored article in JFQ issue 32, Autumn was then and remains today only one of the possible 2002, “The Global War on Terrorism: A Regional Ap- types of JIACGS, as is CENTCOM’s. The JIACG concept proach to Coordination.”

is still in development and many of us working in the — Ambassador (Ret.) Edward Marks field believe it should remain open-ended so as to be Contractor, Camber Corporation adapted to differing situations. PACOM’s area of re- State Department Consultant sponsibility, for instance, is substantially different from J3–JIACG–CT CENTCOM’s, and the CENTCOM model is manifestly U.S. Pacific Command inappropriate—in size, scope, and mission—for PACOM. 3) All of the regional combatant commands have organized JIACGs, each very different, and the learning curve is high and productive. Many observers and par- To the Editor—I have been on active duty in ticipants believe that there are important distinctions— the Air Force for almost 17 years. My family and I have each equally valid depending on the situation—between traveled all over the world and made sacrifices that no different possible types of JIACGs. The most important one but the military community can understand. It are those between “full spectrum JIACGs” and “subject wasn’t until I started working at the FSC (Family Sup- specific or focused JIACGs” such as those designated port Center) that I realized how much this organization to work on the war on terror. Another distinction is contributes to military retention every day. I wish Ms. between policy JIACGs and operation coordination Leyva would have talked to family members here at (functional) JIACGs. The JIACG role in campaign plan- Laughlin or any of the FSCs throughout the world that ning can vary: PACOM’s JIACG, for instance, was tasked have taken advantage of the many programs/events we to be the primary drafter for the Command’s Cam- provide to support our troops and their families. paign Plan for Combating Terrorism. Obviously there For example, periodically the bases hire a contrac- are conceivable variations on these themes, including tor to perform a community needs assessment to gauge combinations. The appropriate location and reporting the climate within the base community. Our last assess- responsibilities of a JIACG within an RCC will depend ment showed a dissatisfaction with local (Del Rio, TX) on the answer to these considerations. employment for spouses. We advocated/garnered funds In sum, the subject and the concept are much (an approximately $4K grant) from the AF Aid Society more open to discussion and exploration than Colonel and bought over 150 Staffcentrix Virtual Assistant kits Bogdanos’ article implies. The JIACG concept is not a to battle the spouse employment problem. The FSC

8 JFQ / issue thirty-nine FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET ■

sent a staff member to Staffcentrix training and began ■ She does not refer to the Air Force web site to train spouses on starting their own businesses over www.afcrossroads.com that has monitored chat rooms the Internet. for spouses and youth and military members to network In another example, the FSCs are mandated to pro- globally on all military life issues. The website has out- vide transition assistance to individuals who are within standing relocation support and links. 180 days of separation or retirement. We, like many ■ She speaks of hiring spouses to work in the Fam- other FSCs, have exceeded this function by adding a ily Support Centers because they know the lifestyle. As course that targets individuals within 4–5 years of retire- a 12-year Human Services professional in the civilian ment or over 180 days of separation. We bring in subject non-profit agency realm and in the Civil Service serving matter experts from the Veterans Administration, TRI- U.S. Air Force Family Support Centers, I know people CARE, financial institutions, and other organizations to closest to a problem or situation or lifestyle are not the provide assistance and advice during the transition from best people to provide objective, educated service. military to civilian life. ■ The author does not mention “Heart Link,” an Still another example: Our FSC started a VIN Etch- Air Force program in operation since 2001 that educates ing Program to protect/deter would-be thieves from new spouses on the military, accessing services, and un- choosing Laughlin AFB’s vehicles. The results have been derstanding mission requirements. spectacular; many personnel have saved 15–20 percent I would urge Ms. Leyva to contact some of the on their automobile insurance. Family Support Center personnel who have successfully One more example. Too often the base welcome implemented Virtual assistant training, small business videos located at the FSCs are outdated. We are currently seminars, resume classes, Federal job Info, job boards, developing a simple PowerPoint Relocation “Welcome customer service training, etc. to Laughlin Presentation” with Voice-over. This pre- I will be the first to say there are areas where Fam- sentation will provide up-to-date information and assist ily Support Centers need to improve their knowledge families during future relocations to not only Laughlin, and services. I am proud to serve my country by utiliz- but many other DOD bases. ing my professional education, training, and experience I hope I have given you enough information to to strengthen the military member and family’s life print some great stories of what the FSCs can do. I coping skills. think I can speak for many of the FSCs when I say that we will continue to challenge ourselves every day and — Vicki Jay Lokken, DAFC Community Readiness Consultant tell ourselves, we can do more! Family Support Center — MSgt Rufino Gonzalez, USAF Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota Superintendent, Family Support Center Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas The Commentary article by Ms. Leyva may have some controversial points, but the impact of families on recruiting MSgt Gonzalez has provided some useful examples of and retention—in America’s all volunteer force—cannot be his Family Support Center helping the military community denied. JFQ will certainly consider for publication research at Laughlin Air Force Base in creative ways. As he writes, on quality of life, retention, and readiness issues that directly however, we can do more. impact professional military and security studies.

—Editor, JFQ —Editor, JFQ

To the Editor—I am appalled. My major concerns with “Transforming the ‘Retention Sector” by Meredith Leyva (JFQ issue 38, 3d Quarter 2005) are: ■ She uses Employee Assistance Program (EAP) ref- erences in line with Family Support Center operations.

he NDU Press staff will use this information block to inform readers Another prominent first in this issue is the premiere of the Inter- New in Tof particularly noteworthy features or new items in each issue of agency Dialogue series. Although JFQ has published articles on subjects Joint Force Quarterly. of interest to a broad interagency community as well as essays by authors This issue is replete with firsts. The first is the topic of the forum, employed by various Government agencies, there has been insufficient “Logistics and Support.” This is a subject never before emphasized in a emphasis on information sharing among agencies in creating and execut- JFQ forum. The theme cuts across service, interagency, and international ing the Nation’s security policy and strategy. The Interagency Dialogue JFQ stovepipes. Readers will find a wide variety of useful subjects, from indus- series will feature articles written by and for the interagency community try, to tsunami relief, to acquisition, to strategic gaming. every quarter. Its goal is to foster interagency understanding and situ- Winners of the 2005 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic ational awareness and to elevate the debate over blending instruments of Essay Contest are showcased in this issue for the first time. The goal of national power in the defense of America, its interests, and its allies. publishing the winning essays in a special feature is to enhance debate The JFQ staff welcomes feedback on these new features. Please on strategic security issues while giving wider access to some of the best send an email to [email protected] or see our Web site to find a simple research by senior officers and civilians in the U.S. Armed Forces joint feedback form at ndupress.ndu.edu. JFQ professional military education system.

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 9 ■

22d Marine Expeditionary Unit is resupplied on the march in Afghanistan, Operation Rio Bravo Forum

Logistics and Support

t is no secret among professional nontechnological to high-tech—from military officers and senior lead- weather and solar activity disrupting ers across the spectrum of Amer- transportation, navigation, and com- ica’s Federal agencies that de- munications to suicide bombers, snip- Iploying and supporting operations are ers, and bandits targeting convoys and among the most challenging of all the distribution points. tasks required to employ any instru- Logistics is certainly not a mod- ment of national power—particularly ern invention, and supply lines are the military instrument. Challenges are not modern contrivances. Hannibal environmental and manmade, from marched elephants from Africa over

10 JFQ / issue thirty-nine

of achieving) reliable supply lines on terror. These rapid but distant ex- through hard experience in the French tended actions occur during a period of and Indian War and the Revolution. revolutionary military transformation, In 1776–1777, the Continental Army continual acquisition of new systems, was well stocked with some supplies, and unprecedented threats posed by such as gunpowder, but had tremen- Islamic extremists armed with readily dous shortages in uniforms, blankets, available weapons capable of creating and footwear. Supplies for both the global economic chaos and huge loss American militia and the British troops of innocent life. The necessity of and were imported from Europe, but the problems associated with logistics and Americans were forced to run a block- support of troops have always been— ade by the most powerful naval force and always will be—factors for com- of the era. One observer noted in late manders and statesmen. And today, Forum 1776, as the Army was driven back by logistic and interoperability issues advancing British redcoats, “If the War complicate operations for first respond- is continued thro the Winter, the Brit- ers, allies, and the U.S. military alike. ish troops will be scared at the sight of Thus, the Joint Force Quarterly staff our Men, for as they had never fought designed this premiere “Logistics and with Naked Men.”1 Support” Forum to introduce a broad After winning the battle for inde- spectrum of strategic issues relating to pendence, President Washington made a Department of Defense, interagency, his famous first annual address on Janu- and international audience that relies ary 8, 1790, calling upon Congress early on but does not always consciously in his administration to adequately consider the necessity of support—the fund and supply a military for the fledg- shaft that supports the tip of the spear. ling United States of America in order Although less experienced profession- to maintain its hard-won liberty: als might take the shaft for granted, all understand that without it, the spear To be prepared for war is one of the most is much less effective as a weapon effectual means of preserving peace. or tool. M.E. Krause

A free people ought not only to be armed, but disciplined; to which end a uni- NOTES form and well digested plan is requisite: And their safety and interest require that 1 David Hackett Fisher, Washington’s they should promote such manufactories, Crossing (New York: Oxford University Press, as tend to render them independent of 2004), 154–157; Margaret Morris: Her Jour- nal with Biographical Sketch and Notes, ed., others, for essential, particularly for mili- John W. Jackson, (Philadelphia, 1949), 55; tary supplies. Thomas Anburey, Travels Through the Inte- rior Parts of America, 2 vols. (Boston, 1923), The proper establishment of the Troops 1:102. which may be deemed indispensable, will 2 George Washington, First Annual be entitled to mature consideration. In the Message to Congress, New York City, Janu- arrangements which may be made respect-

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Keith A. Milks) ary 8, 1790; available at

22 ing it, it will be of importance to conciliate virginia.edu/documents/union/state1. the comfortable support of the Officers and html>. Transcriptions of Washington’s mes- the Alps and fought a war of attrition Soldiers with a due regard to economy.2 sage are adapted by the George Washington for years, living off the Roman coun- Papers Web site from The Papers of George Washington, Presidential Series, ed., Dorothy tryside. Conquistador supply lines Today, America’s military supports Twohig, vol. 4 (Charlottesville, VA: Univer- stretched from South America to Spain, humanitarian operations in Africa and, sity Press of Virginia, 1993), 543–549. across rain forests and oceans. And recently, international tsunami relief in Britain’s sea lines extended to far-flung the Pacific while deterring an invasion but powerful colonial garrisons in by North Korea and conducting simul- Hong Kong, India, and North America. taneous combat operations in Iraq and President George Washington rec- Afghanistan, among other interagency ognized the need for (and difficulty and international efforts in the war

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 11 Tsunami! Information Sharing in the Wake of Destruction Forum By DAVID J. DORSETT

Crew from USS Bonhomme n December 26, 2004, an ian disaster by initiating Operation Richard unloading relief earthquake of 9.0 mag- Unified Assistance. The command de- supplies in Sumatra, Indonesia, nitude jolted the Banda ployed 25 ships, 45 fixed-wing aircraft, Operation Unified Assistance Aceh region on Indonesia’s 57 helicopters, and 16,000 personnel OSumatra Island. The quake generated to assist stricken countries. This force a tsunami that exploded across the delivered over 16 million pounds of Indian Ocean at 500 miles per hour. supplies and flew helicopter operations The tidal surge brought death and de- totaling over 4,000 hours. It also em- struction to Banda Aceh and India’s ployed a unique command and con- Nicobar Islands 16 minutes after the trol structure. Commander, PACOM, quake. Within 90 minutes, the tsunami initially designated the command- engulfed Sri Lanka’s coastal areas, and ing general of 3d Marine Expedition- within 7 hours its waves crashed into ary Force as commander of Joint Task the far shores of Somalia. The ensuing Force–536. Within days, it became ap- catastrophe seized the attention of the parent that a traditional military com- world. Over 295,000 people died and 5 mand structure was not optimal for this million were left homeless. nontraditional mission. The ensuing U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) operation involved over 90 nongov- rapidly responded to this humanitar- ernmental organizations (NGOs) and military forces from 18 nations. Though Rear Admiral David “Jack” Dorsett, USN, was the Director for Intelligence, created as a traditional joint task force, U.S. Pacific Command, during the tsunami relief operations and is now the PACOM modified JTF–536 after other Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff. countries such as Australia, Singapore,

12 JFQ / issue thirty-nine D o r s e t t

forces to become more agile, adaptable, tablished and has the ability to man- and responsive to emerging crises. age intelligence operations. Since this was a nontraditional crisis with lim- Early Challenges ited intelligence collection available Operation Unified Assistance was within the combined operating area, unique on many levels. Diplomatic it required several days before the CSF and cultural hurdles had to be over- was prepared to take over. In the income before aid could be delivered to terim, the JICPAC Contingencies Cell Indonesia. Suspicion of Western mili- performed superbly by managing the tary forces quickly receded as Indo- finite intelligence collection resources, nesians saw the sheer magnitude of coalescing disparate information to aid and the genuine concern of other create situational awareness for all in- nations for their welfare. terested parties. At the height of the Forum The damage and loss of life were operation, over 100 JICPAC operational extreme by any standard. The area of intelligence specialists were involved. operation covered the entire Indian The JICPAC Contingencies Cell Ocean, with the most severe destruc- commenced nonstop intelligence option in remote parts of Indonesia’s erations within hours of the disaster. It developed intelligence collec- the tsunami presented exceptional tion and production require- challenges, the first of which was ments. National intelligence to acquire information to assess the agency representatives embedded in the contingency team extent of the catastrophe reached back to their agencies for additional support. This Aceh region. Although the PACOM interagency partnership between the intelligence team played an important theater intelligence center and national role in the early planning and inter- intelligence agencies ultimately resulted vention of military and humanitarian in the highly successful delivery of in- actors, the tsunami presented excep- formation to forward-deployed forces. U.S. Navy (Bart A. Bauer) tional challenges, the first of which Human intelligence and counter- Russia, France, and Malaysia joined it. was to acquire information to assess intelligence requirements increased as At this point JTF–536, as a sole U.S. the extent of the catastrophe. the U.S. military relief operations foot- endeavor, became Combined Support Weather, outdated geospatial print grew in Aceh. Of critical concern Force (CSF)–536. encyclopedic data, lack of boots on the was the need to discover the activities The PACOM mission during Uni- ground, and the sheer magnitude of of terrorist groups and radical factions. fied Assistance was to support the U.S. the devastation hampered early efforts The JICPAC Transnational Threats Op- Agency for International Development to assess the damage. Fortunately, 4 erational Intelligence Cell, which is re- (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster As- months prior to the tsunami, the Joint sponsible for analysis of terrorist activi- sistance, other national forces, and Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) ties in the theater, also worked around international organizations in provid- created the Contingencies Operational the clock to assess threats and provide ing disaster relief to the governments Intelligence Cell as a fully manned, force protection reporting to U.S. forces. of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and all-source operational intelligence capa- Personnel from JICPAC also deployed other affected nations to minimize loss bility specifically structured to respond to the region to work with host nation of life and human suffering. This article quickly to emerging crises within military forces and U.S. commanders to examines the need to embed national the theater. ensure comprehensive synchronization agency representatives within theater During the initial days, the and flow of threat information. intelligence commands to facilitate PACOM intelligence staff, supported Despite the JICPAC focus, it took passing of timely and accurate informa- by JICPAC, retained operational in- several weeks rather than hours or days tion from the agencies to the operating telligence planning, tasking, analysis, to attain a reliable picture of the situa- forces. Although it focuses on informa- and reporting responsibilities. Doctrine tion on the ground. For example, tration-sharing, which was critical to the calls for the transfer of many of these ditional damage assessment methods overall operation, this piece presents a duties to the JTF (in this case, CSF) using airborne imagery failed to pres- successful model of transforming U.S. intelligence staff once it has been es- ent the true nature of the destruction.

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 13 ■ INFORMATION SHARING IN THE WAKE OF DESTRUCTION

Relief supplies for tsunami victims being unloaded in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, as part of Combined Support Force–536 Forum

Combat Camera Squadron (Jeromy K. Cross) (Jeromy Combat Camera Squadron st 1

Although “order of battle” descriptions developing a solid understanding of classified reporting from host nations, were provided of the damage in towns conditions on the ground. These small NGOs, and non-Defense U.S. agencies, and along roads, the PACOM com- offices and detachments were quickly provided a wealth of knowledge. In mander commented during a visit to inundated with requests for assistance particular, USAID, the Office of Fed- Banda Aceh that the real extent of the from the host nations and spent much eral Disaster Assistance, and the United devastation could only be understood of their initial time in capital cities Nations Joint Logistics Center main- by seeing the damage firsthand. working with their counterparts and tained outstanding home pages that in communication with PACOM head- provided timely, reliable information Information Sources quarters, the Combined Support Force on the extent of damage and the status Operation Unified Assistance pre- commander, and U.S. national agen- of humanitarian relief activities. USAID sented unusual challenges for the intel- cies. They faced the dilemma of ei- Disaster Assistance Response Teams in- ligence team, specifically with sources. ther assessing damage or assisting in cluded advisers, water and sanitation Traditional outlets of information the transit of follow-on U.S. personnel experts, and field and information of- to host nations to provide hu- ficers. Teams were located in each of boots on the ground early in a manitarian support. As a result, the affected countries and provided humanitarian disaster are critical to PACOM deployed additional key on-the-ground insights on condi- personnel to affected nations tions. The Center of Excellence in Di- developing situational awareness to assist U.S. Embassy military saster Management and Humanitarian personnel mere days after the Assistance also maintained a world- (military human, airborne imagery, tsunami. The lesson is clear: boots on class home page. The expertise and and technical) had limited value in il- the ground early in a humanitarian contacts of this latter organization luminating the situation. New sources disaster are critical to developing situ- (a DOD-supported center in Hawaii) had to be acquired and exploited. For ational awareness. proved crucial for PACOM throughout example, the handful of U.S. military Two nontraditional sources of in- Unified Assistance. representatives in affected nations was formation—open source and commer- Commercial imagery was also a insufficient to perform their array of cial imagery—were critical to Operation linchpin. The importance of sharing crisis responsibilities, which included Unified Assistance. Open source, un- imagery with host nations, NGOs, and

14 JFQ / issue thirty-nine D o r s e t t

other international aid organizations allow wide release, facilitate maximum the limits of the commercial imagery was vital. Although the United States distribution of threat data, and share support infrastructure, revealing short- and allied nations flew reconnaissance other details with those trying to ease falls in the tasking and requirements aircraft to assess the damage, some of the suffering. These disclosures im- management process. For example, the best early assessments were pro- proved trust and collaboration across the end-to-end process from tasking, vided by commercial imagery orga- civil-military and international lines through collection, to exploitation and nizations. In particular, Digital Globe and enhanced humanitarian assistance dissemination took about 5 days. Ad- furnished comprehensive imagery cov- accordingly. ditional effort is needed to refine pro- erage of the devastated areas in Banda As the operation progressed, the cesses and shorten timelines. Aceh within days of the disaster. These number of nations involved and the The command also discovered first-rate products were unclassified United Nations/NGO footprint contin- shortfalls in the dissemination infra- and were quickly shared with host na- ued to grow. PACOM found itself in the structure that inhibited the electronic tions and NGOs. unfamiliar territory of a predominantly distribution of large file formats associ- Forum Although commercial imagery was unclassified environment, with 95 per- ated with geospatial products. Intelli- vital to the intelligence operation, U.S. cent of the data used by the intelligence gence teams often had to send JPG files P–3 reconnaissance aircraft and heli- professionals used being unclassified. on classified networks to regional U.S. copters using cameras deployed early Intelligence professionals worked Embassies. The Embassy teams had to to provide detailed photography of key closely with the PACOM chief informa- download the information and dis- ports, towns, and lines of communication officer to develop an unclassified seminate hard copy materials to host tion. Not only was this unclassified tsunami Web page. As the operation nations. Certain large format geospatial and releasable intelligence valuable in continued, the command’s Asia-Pacific products had to be printed at PACOM ascertaining damage, but it also helped Area Network unclassified commercial and express-mailed or hand-carried early efforts by selected nations to plan Web site became a primary source for to affected countries because host na- reconstruction of their coastal regions. NGOs, vital for involving nontradi- tions, U.S. Embassies, and deployed tional security partners, who are essen- U.S. ships and operating bases lacked Information Flow and tial in humanitarian assistance opera- adequate printing capabilities. One Cooperative Activities tions that cover a broad area and cross key product had to be hand-carried to Significant advances in bilateral national borders. Jakarta for a high-level meeting hosted communications with allied nations The unique nature of Unified As- by the government of Indonesia on the have emerged in recent years, enabling sistance created extensive and urgent issue of long-term reconstruction of increased speed of delivery of informa- requirements for commercial satellite the Aceh region. This geospatial prod- tion to other nations participating in imagery. With the help of the National uct provided details on damaged lines these largely unclassified military op- Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and its of communications, which greatly erations. Yet many difficulties remain imagery and geospatial analysts em- enhanced the government’s ability to in disclosure of information, as not all bedded within JICPAC, PACOM sup- assess damage and direct reconstruc- participating nations practice the same ported operational forces, allies, and tion. In addition, during operational level of information sharing with the affected nations. The command pushed intelligence briefings at command United States. Therefore, in any international, interagency disaster relief operation, considerable effort must be applied to coordinating the flow of information among all participants. Fortunately, the many successes during this operation have helped overcome perceptions that intelligence support for disaster relief has not been commensurate with customer needs. For example, during Unified Assistance, intelligence products were developed at the lowest possible classification to

International forces meet in U Tapao, Thailand, to receive information on Combat Camera Squadron (Sarayuth Pinthong) Combat Camera Squadron

Operation Unified Assistance st 1

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 15 ■ INFORMATION SHARING IN THE WAKE OF DESTRUCTION Forum

Combat Camera Squadron (John M. Foster) Combat Camera Squadron st 1 Army engineer in Meulabah, Indonesia, as part of Combined Support Force–536, one of over 18,000 U.S. servicemembers working with international militaries and nongovernmental organizations to aid tsunami victims

headquarters, current intelligence prod- ligence Center and theater operating vector-borne illnesses. It also deployed ucts were also provided to regional Con- forces. JICPAC Operational Intelligence liaison personnel on short notice to the sul Generals to facilitate international Cells established constant, collabora- PACOM area of operations. One officer dialogue and improve the momentum tive information sharing with the CSF, deployed to U Tapao, Thailand, in di- of humanitarian relief. which benefited all participating agen- rect support of the Combined Support cies and nations. The past paradigm of Force, another officer was embedded in Partnerships producing intelligence on a daily basis the command surgeon general’s office. Operation Unified Assistance con- is grossly inadequate for today’s opera- These medical intelligence profession- firmed the value of the strategic part- tional requirements. Constant dialogue als coordinated with the U.S. Centers nerships established among the gov- and exchange of data by email and for Disease Control and Prevention ernments and international agencies in video teleconference are the current and Department of Agriculture and the theater, U.S. intelligence agencies, media for providing near real-time ensured consistent flow of informa- and the operational forces. intelligence. tion across agencies, commands, allied Combined Support Force (CSF). Part- Armed Forces Medical Intelligence nations, and NGOs. AFMIC assisted nerships were critical to leveraging fi- Center (AFMIC). AFMIC established Pacific Command with assessing infec- nite intelligence resources throughout round-the-clock communications tious disease and environmental health the DOD/national intelligence com- between its operations center and risks in the disaster areas and the status munity and avoiding duplication. JICPAC contingencies cells to rapidly of medical facilities. It also generated Foremost was the symbiotic relation- provide medical intelligence regarding over 100 products, to include assess- ship between the theater Joint Intel- the spread of infectious disease and ments of bed-down sites for deploying

16 JFQ / issue thirty-nine D o r s e t t

forces and Web sites that served as one- provided to host nations and NGOs Defense Attaché Offices. Defense at- stop resources for medical intelligence. consisted of commercial satellite imag- tachés provided brilliant responsiveness National Geospatial-Intelligence ery to show the scope of damage and and engagement with allies in Indone- Agency (NGA). The embedded NGA assist PACOM in assessing priorities sia, Thailand, India, and Sri Lanka. At team, operating at JICPAC and within for emergency relief. Maps of affected the outset of the relief effort, offices in areas were updated daily. affected countries were passing infor- strategic partnerships were critical to Archive commercial and mation to PACOM to assist in situation leveraging finite intelligence resources national technical means awareness and host nation military co- imagery was overlaid with ordination. At the height of the crisis, and avoiding duplication the latest updates to de- 18 nations had military forces either termine coastal changes. on the ground or at sea. Several nations PACOM headquarters, was vital in co- Another product use was finding safe were on the scene prior to the arrival ordinating engagement and deliver- helicopter landing zones and sites for of U.S. forces. The Indian and Pakistani Forum ing commercial imagery and geospatial displaced person camps. Unified As- navies provided almost immediate help products daily throughout the opera- sistance showed the need to embed to Sri Lanka. In addition, a transiting tion. NGA output helped the command national agency representatives with Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force assess the damage. As much infor- theater intelligence commands to coor- task group supported victims in Thai- mation as possible was shared with dinate timely, responsive provision of land. U.S. Defense attachés and Em- other government organizations, such information from the agencies to the bassy country teams coordinated early as USAID. The bulk of the products operating forces. interaction with these regional partners Non-U.S. Participants in Military Operations

Ships x30 Helos x30 C-130 x1 India Fixed Wing x22 Ships x5 Forensic Team x1 AN-32 x7 C-130 x2 U Tapao MI-8/17 x6 Ships x2 DVI Team x1 Helos x3 Helos x3 C-130 x1 Fixed Wing x2 Med Team Fixed Wing x1 ETD: TBD Eng Team MP Team x1 Medical Team x2 HH-60 x2 Field Hospital LST Field Hospital Eng Team x2 ETA: Jan 27 Med Team ALT x2 LST to SL 211 pax Sri Lanka ETD: TBD Khao Lak C-130 x1 FFG (depart 17 Jan) Ship x1 Ship x1 ETD: TBD ARS Med Team C-130 x2 Enroute Field Hospital LST Colombo Helos x2 Helos x2 Field Hospital Helos x1 Med Team CH-47 x3 Eng Team Aceh Eng Team HH-60 x2 DART Team C-130 x1 Med Team x1 ROWPU x4 Medan Ships x2 Hospital Ship C-130 x5 ETA: Jan 25 Med Team Helos x2 Meulaboh CH-47 x4 Eng Team Super Puma x4 LPA–CJTF 629 C-130 x2 Helos x2 K.L. Ship Ships x2 Helos x4 Helo Ships x2 Male Helos x8 C-130 x2 Helos x3 LST x2 Ships x2 ETA: TBD Eng Team Med Team C-130 x6 Med Team Hospital Ship B-707 x1 Ships x4 UH-1 x4 Helos x3 Fixed wing x3 Indonesia Med Team x4

AUS BRN DEU IND MYS Australia Brunei Darussalam Germany India Malaysia AUT CAN FRA JPN NZL PRC Austria Canada France Japan New Zealand China BGD CHE GBR KOR PAK SGP Bangladesh Switzerland Great Britain South Korea Pakistan Singapore

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 17 ■ INFORMATION SHARING IN THE WAKE OF DESTRUCTION

to deconflict American operations. As to adapt and respond with agility. The permitted end-to-end synchronization a result of the extensive tasking on at- operation validated concepts and ini- of theater intelligence reconnaissance tachés, it was important to instill disci- tiatives that have been implemented in operations and was fully integrated with pline in communicating with Defense PACOM in recent months. the command’s Joint Operations Center, Attaché Offices so as not to overwhelm Operational Intelligence Cell. Fore- the JICPAC Contingencies Support Cell, their relatively small staffs with duplica- most among the new concepts was the and the combined support force com- tive information and requirements. The establishment of the Contingencies Sup- mander’s intelligence staff. The center, solution was creation of a dedicated, port Operational Intelligence Cell within located at command headquarters, was round-the-clock Support Element Cell JICPAC. This all-source operational in- electronically linked to other commands to act as the single point of contact for telligence cell was formed into a holistic and agencies to permit near-instanta- PACOM, the country teams, and part- structure to integrate analysis, collec- neous awareness and management of ner nation militaries. tion, information management, intel- theater and national ISR resources. PACOM Center of Excellence in Di- ligence campaign planning, targeting Linked with the JICPAC Opera- Forum saster Management and Humanitarian As- development, intelligence operations, tional Intelligence Cells, the ISR Battle sistance. The Center of Excellence pro- and production. The cell is composed Management Center shared a com- vided a crucial capability not resident of foreign disclosure and dissemina- mon operating picture and allowed in the intelligence structure: a stand- tion experts, intelligence planners, and collection managers to monitor na- ing organization of professionals net- analysts of every discipline and repre- tional and tactical ISR missions, adjust worked with the necessary information senting, for example, imagery, ground, collection requirements, and provide resources and capable of compiling in- and political functions. Within hours near real-time feedback to the CSF and formation from NGOs, the United Na- the combatant commander. The tions, and open sources to describe the the success of Unified Assistance PACOM Collection Management situation on the ground. This was a key was due, in part, to the ability of Board conducted daily video tele- enabler in Unified Assistance and will be the U.S. Intelligence Community conferences with the Combined a center of gravity for future PACOM Support Force and components humanitarian assistance and disaster re- to adapt and respond to ensure synchronized collection lief operations. Experts from the center operations. The need for a dedi- deployed to the three countries hard- of the tsunami, JICPAC commenced cated ISR Battle Management Center est hit—Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Indo- round-the-clock intelligence operations was revalidated and is now entrenched nesia—and provided on-site reporting to ascertain details on the magnitude of in theater operational doctrine. This and coordination. The center’s Web destruction, establish situational aware- center will become the focal point for site provided insights not attainable ness for the theater commander and engagement with the joint force com- by traditional intelligence collection his operational forces, and lay the foun- ponent commander for ISR when that and exploitation. dation for international and interagency national management entity achieves Foreign partnerships. Together, information sharing. The Contingen- initial operational capability. PACOM and its foreign partners were cies Support Cell synchronized intel- able to seek innovative, secure, and ligence functions and provided “one- It is critical that U.S. intelligence practical solutions to myriad problems. stop shopping” for Combined Support teams learn the lessons of Operation This cooperation did not come with- Force operational units that required Unified Assistance. We must be continu- out challenges. The command had to intelligence associated with disaster ously alert to nontraditional missions embrace the military contributions relief. Equipped with advanced intel- requiring unique intelligence sup- of other nations and coordinate with ligence, surveillance, and reconnais- port. We must continue to strengthen nontraditional partners, which was ac- sance (ISR) management and analytic partnerships across the national intel- complished by leveraging experience tools and processes (for example, trend ligence community with both allies built through multinational training analysis, battlespace visualization, and nongovernmental organizations. and exercise programs. Expanding, data/content marking, collaboration, We must place national agency rep- maintaining, and improving regional multilevel security), the cell established resentatives in theater intelligence relationships are vital to dominating a solid understanding of the most dev- commands to ensure that information the battlespace. astated areas. is passed quickly from the agencies ISR Battle Management Center. to the operating forces. In sum, we New Operating Concepts The ISR Battle Management Center must continue to transform our intel- The success of Operation Unified in PACOM provided a focal point for ligence organizations so they become Assistance was due, in part, to the abil- monitoring and managing ISR assets more agile, adaptable, and responsive ity of the U.S. Intelligence Community employed in Unified Assistance. This cell to emerging crises. JFQ

18 JFQ / issue thirty-nine Health Service Support from the Sea Base

By DAVID A. LANE Forum

Hospital ship USNS Mercy en route to Papua New Guinea to provide medical care for tsunami victims U.S. Navy (Dennis C. Cantrell)

ea basing has been called a and airheads have been secured and outside the theater. The HSS infrastruc- “critical future joint military adequately defended.2 The lack of a lo- ture is therefore structured with five capability for the United gistic beachhead and the small logistic echelons of care which Joint Publica- States” because it offers a footprint inherent with sea basing and tion 4–02, Doctrine for Health Service Smobile, reliable, and secure environ- STOM present major challenges to pro- Support in Joint Operations, lists as: ment from which to operate when suit- viding health services support (HSS), 1. self-aid, buddy aid, and emer- able fixed bases are not available, pro- particularly combat care. This article gency lifesaving skills viding the joint task force commander argues that these challenges could pre- 2. physician-directed resuscitation, with unprecedented offensive power clude military medicine from provid- stabilization, emergency procedures, and operational independence.1 The ing combatant commanders and sub- and forward resuscitative surgery main conceptual difference between ordinate joint task force commanders 3. advanced resuscitative care re- sea basing and current amphibious with adequate casualty care in the field quiring hospitalization, including sur- doctrine is that the former exploits the and at the sea base during expedition- gery, postoperative management, and advantages of rapid movement directly ary operations with high casualty rates. initial restorative procedures from the sea base to the objective (for 4. rehabilitative and recovery example, ship-to-objective-maneu- Health Services Support Primer therapies vers, or STOM) without the need for Joint doctrine provides that bat- 5. definitive care, including the a buildup of combat power, materiel, tlefield casualties flow through five full range of acute, convalescent, re- and reinforcements on a shore beach- phases of treatment: first responder, storative, and rehabilitative services. head, with the sea base itself providing forward resuscitative surgery, theater support and sustainment until ports hospitalization, en route care, and care From an operational commander’s perspective, tactical mobility decreases Captain David A. Lane, USN, is group surgeon with Third Force Service Support substantially as HSS capability increases Group, Marine Forces Pacific. from level 1 to level 5. Level 1 care, for

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 19 ■ HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT FROM THE SEA BASE

example, is provided at mobile battal- tion has its roots in the clinical prac- Evolving joint medical doctrine ion aid stations ashore and in sick bays tices and evacuation methods of World specifies that essential care will be re- aboard most ships, while level 2 care is War II. Moreover, a casualty’s length of stricted to “resuscitative care and en provided at transportable (not mobile) stay at a given level is determined more route care as well as care to either re- medical/surgical companies ashore and by the combatant commander’s theater turn the patient to duty (within the aboard designated large-deck casualty evacuation policies and the availability theater evacuation policy) or begin receiving and treatment ships (CRTSs). of evacuation resources than by clinical initial treatment required for optimi- Massive fleet and field hospitals, deep factors or bed capacity. zation of outcome and/or stabiliza- draft T–AH class hospital ships, and During Operation Iraqi Freedom, for tion to ensure the patient can tolerate fixed base medical treatment facilities example, the theater evacuation policy evacuation to the next level of care.”6 (MTFs) in the communications zone was 1 week, even though there was In effect, this doctrine will trade the have level 3 capabilities. By doctrine ample bed capacity in the combat and excess capacity of the current system and practice, level 4 and 5 capabilities communications zones to care for pa- for rapid stabilization and increased Forum are normally available only at mili- tients longer. Casualties were light, and reliance on aeromedical evacuation. tary and civilian medical centers in the the system had considerable excess ca- One unintended consequence will be continental United States (CONUS). pacity. Over 90 percent of patients evac- “stabilized—but not necessarily stable— In contrast to decreased mobility, uated to MTFs in the communications patients being evacuated” outside the the patient-holding capacity and logis- zone were further evacuated to CONUS theater for definitive treatment.7 tic footprint of HSS increase as casual- on the next available evacuation flight, This change in HSS doctrine will ties advance through the levels of care. with no apparent direction from the require casualty care innovations—in- A battalion aid station is an integral combatant commander to return any of cluding some that are, at best, under part of the unit it supports and is staffed the wounded to combat duty. development. The innovations will with one or two medical officers and a need to be implemented along the team of hospital corpsmen or medics. It A Smaller Logistic Footprint entire casualty care continuum, from can be set up in moments and is imme- Sea-based operations and opera- the point of wounding to MTFs in the diately capable of providing emergency tional maneuver from the sea will re- United States. The remainder of this ar- care. But because it has no holding ca- quire a smaller, more mobile logistic ticle critically examines three innova- pacity, patients must be returned to footprint ashore. In turn, expeditionary tions that will serve as vital operational duty or evacuated to a higher echelon medical assets will have to be smaller, nodes in the delivery of HSS: forward of care. A surgical company, on the more agile, and “able to operate from resuscitative surgery, evacuation of ca- other hand, takes about a day to set up, austere sites at sea or on shore and to sualties to and from the sea base, and can perform initial resuscitative surger- smoothly transition between the two.”5 in-theater care. In response to these requirements, the deployable fleet or field planners envision that medical Forward Resuscitative Surgery hospital takes a week to construct personnel will provide only essen- For reporting purposes, Joint Pub- and is larger than a football field tial care in theater, using specially lication 4–02 categorizes casualties ac- trained nonphysician medical cording to type and status. The major personnel (for example, hospital headings include: killed in action (KIA), ies and administer blood products, and corpsmen and medics) at the site of in- died of wound(s) received in action has a holding capacity of 50 to 60 pa- jury or wounding, followed by forward (DOW), wounded in action (WIA), and tients.3 At the other end of the spectrum resuscitative surgery as close as practi- disease and nonbattle injury (DNBI). is the deployable fleet or field hospital. cal to the battlefield, followed by rapid Casualties are considered KIA if they It takes a week or more to construct the evacuation out of the theater for more are “killed outright” or die “as a result 250-bed variant, which is larger than definitive care. of wounds . . . before reaching a medi- a football field and has more than 550 Additional HSS footprint reduc- cal treatment facility.” Since 90 percent medical and support personnel. It can tions could be achieved by placing an of battlefield deaths are classified as provide major surgeries, postoperative Army rotary wing air ambulance de- KIA, most due to uncontrolled hemor- care, and intensive/critical care for rela- tachment under the tactical control of rhage, minimizing the time to treat- tively large numbers of casualties.4 each future medical battalion to pro- ment is critical. A delay of minutes in Although advances in HSS have vide dedicated aeromedical evacuation receiving care can mean the difference generally kept pace with advances in support because, in a sense, a large between life and death. medicine, the current continuum that number of beds ashore during sea- First responders and level 1 aid moves a patient from the point of based operations reflects inadequate stations cannot provide adequate care wounding to a final medical disposi- patient movement capacity. for most wounded patients with active

20 JFQ / issue thirty-nine L a n e

bleeding. These patients need immedi- Patient is carried to UH–60 ate surgery. This statement is more con- for treatment in Baghdad, troversial than it appears. At least one Operation Iraqi Freedom published report reviewed survival data from more than 10,000 casualties from recent wars and concluded that many patients “even with severe injuries do not necessarily require surgery” for many days or even weeks to survive.8 Until recently, Marine Corps surgical companies, elements of a medical battalion staffed by Navy medical personnel, were the only source of or- Forum ganic expeditionary medical support for Marine forces above the battalion aid station level and the most forward- deployed source of level 2 surgical capabilities. Because they have limited holding capacity and are vital links in the medical evacuation chain, Ma- rine Corps doctrine states that these companies should be located close to an airfield that can evacuate casualties using fixed-wing aircraft. While this doctrinal policy may be necessary to prevent saturation of a unit’s bed capacity and ensure adequate force protection, it is counter to both optimal medical management, as noted above, and the emerging doctrine of health service support for sea basing U.S. Marine Corps (Tasha M. Fontaine) U.S. Marine Corps (Tasha and STOM. Naval Medicine’s Forward Resusci- that the proximity of forward surgery because they lack a significant patient tative Surgery System (FRSS) and simi- systems or teams to the FEBA (often holding capacity of their own. Unlike lar Army units called Forward Surgical within 5 kilometers) and rapid evacu- the Army, the Marines have opted not Teams (FSTs) have been deployed to ation from the point of wounding to to use dedicated air ambulances, relying take essential level 2 surgical care as the FRSS (typically 30 minutes) were instead on airlifts of opportunity. The close to the forward edge of the battle not enough to prevent the death of existing methods have been sufficient area (FEBA) as possible. The greatest many severely wounded casualties.9 arguably because deployed surgical challenge, however, is keeping it close Nonetheless, the mere presence of the companies and fleet and field hospitals despite the rapid tactical advances of FRSS or FST near the front lines prob- have had excess bed capacity that could expeditionary maneuver warfare ele- ably boosts warfighter morale, an effect accommodate substantial delays in pa- ments. Six FRSS teams provided trauma that should not be overlooked, even if tient evacuation. In the absence of dedi- care for the Marines during the major the clinical impact is marginal and the cated air ambulances, the joint force combat operations phase of Iraqi Free- casualty numbers are too small to be air component commander or Marine dom, and the Army deployed about extrapolated to future conflicts. aviation combat element commander three FSTs per combat division. Out- The FRSS and FSTs are not a health will need to decide whether to divert come data from clinical experience is services panacea, however, even if the scarce aviation resources for medical statistically inconclusive compared concept eventually proves to be medi- evacuation or have a substantial num- with earlier conflicts, including Moga- cally efficacious. If these small mobile ber of the “stabilized—but not necessarily dishu in October 1993, and older, more teams totally replace surgical compa- stable—patients” die awaiting evacu- robust data from Vietnam. In both So- nies as the most forward level 2 surgical ation. On the other hand, the logistic malia and in Iraq, for example, the asset, they will need robust support from footprint could actually get bigger than KIA rate was 18 percent, suggesting dedicated air and ground ambulances today’s HSS package if the FRSS and

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 21 ■ HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT FROM THE SEA BASE

sister programs are fully implemented Despite the system’s name, the While the anecdotes from Iraqi and the organic level 2 holding capacity ERCS medical team will not be trained Freedom represent real success stories, is retained in its present form. or equipped to provide en route care two critical patients and otherwise and, in fact, will only perform “clinical light casualties from a month of com- En Route Care interventions per pre-approved pro- bat provide insufficient data to deter- Expeditionary forces employing tocols . . . necessary to prevent clini- mine whether the ERCS concept can ship-to-objective tactics can operate cal degradation while in transit.”13 In support sustained expeditionary sea- hundreds of miles from the sea base, contrast, the Air Force can deploy a based operations. How stable a “sta- making en route care back to the base de facto airborne intensive care unit bilized” patient really is has not been an area of concern. Much has already and Critical Care Air Transport Teams adequately tested. Nor has the need been learned from Operation Enduring (CCATTs) for long-haul, intertheater/ arisen to deny or substantially delay Freedom, which approximated the HSS strategic aeromedical evacuations. aeromedical evacuation due to a lack and logistic considerations of sea bas- Full operational capability of the of airlifts of opportunity. The post–Iraqi Forum ing. In his post-operation testimony to ERCS is 60 sets, including specialized Freedom report on FRSS unit activities the Senate Armed Services Committee, training for 48 ERCS medical teams. recorded that the mean delay for an the Central Command Surgeon cited A similar prototype system was em- airlift from a FRSS was 8 hours. Survival ployed during Operation rates could suffer if casualty rates were if small mobile teams replace surgical Iraqi Freedom to evacuate higher or airlift delays longer. companies as the most forward level 2 34 casualties (28 Iraqis and 6 Marines) from for- Sea-Based Hospital Care surgical asset, they will need dedicated ward FRSS units.14 Two se- After battlefield casualties have air and ground ambulances verely wounded patients, been stabilized for transport and a sys- in particular, partially tem put in place to transport them, the life-saving value of enhanced en validated the ERCS concept. They were their survival will depend on having route critical care capabilities and pre- intubated, mechanically ventilated, a ready, capable receiving platform, dicted it would serve as a template for medically paralyzed, and chemically traditionally a deployed fleet or field future operations.10 sedated during the 350-mile transport hospital (or hospital ship) with level 3 In this regard, for Operations En- from Baghdad to Kuwait City using a capabilities, followed by onward evac- during Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and for combination of rotary- and fixed-wing uation to level 4 and 5 MTFs in the future sea-based operations, the Marines aircraft and ground ambulances. continental United States. To support have assembled a “modular system that includes medical equipment, medical treatment protocols, and consumable supplies necessary for the medical management of two critically injured/ill, but stabilized, casualties during transport onboard [aircraft] from elements ashore” to the sea base.11 The concept of operations for this tactical en route care system is to place it in the aviation combat element for staging at forward operating bases (and/or the sea base):

when needed, aircrew and a team of medical personnel (flight surgeon, flight nurse, and hospital corpsman) will install the en route care system (ERCS) in an available aircraft within 10 minutes and transit to the site of the casualty needing urgent transport. The ERCS and medical personnel are then expected to provide care for two stabilized casualties for up to a 2- National Guardsman at contingency aeromedical hour transit to the appropriate receiving staging facility for evacuation to Landstuhl, Communications Squadron (Rob Jensen) Communications Squadron

th Germany, for follow-on treatment 12

MTF, most likely aboard the sea base. 347

22 JFQ / issue thirty-nine L a n e

that clearing the sea base of casualties will require a long-range, medium or heavy lift, sea-based aircraft, and lack thereof has been identified as a critical obstacle to sea base success by the De- fense Science Board, along with inadequate at-sea cargo handling (patient handling) capabilities under realistic sea conditions.16 The difficulties with maintaining throughput may become insurmountable when caring for chemical, biological, or nuclear casualties, or when, as in recent wars, large numbers Forum of noncombatant and enemy casualties are treated in U.S. MTFs.

Counterpoints The three health service support Army surgeons in Kandahar, Afghanistan, nodes discussed here—forward resusci-

Operation Enduring Freedom Combat Camera (Johnny R. Aragon) Signal Company, th tative surgery, en route care, and sea- 55 based level 3 care—have the potential sea-based operations, however, empha- diology, blood banking, telemedicine, to enhance the health services support sis will shift from hospitals ashore to medical logistic, and mortuary services military medicine provides combatant an organic sea-based level 3 capability in support of expeditionary land forces. commanders by substantially improv- on the sea base itself, which will, per- Moreover, the deployed expeditionary ing combat casualty care. haps, present the biggest operational strike group will retain level 2 capabili- Although the FRSS teams of Op- challenge with regard to sea-based ties in its assault ships. In a worst-case eration Iraqi Freedom did not provide combat health services support. scenario, however, in which logistic dramatically greater clinical outcomes, The key logistic piece of sea bas- footprint constraints preclude a sub- their concept of operations has valid- ing is the Future Maritime Preposition- stantial HSS presence ashore, these sea- ity—putting advanced life-saving care ing Force [MPF(F)] with its subordinate based hospital beds in the MPSRON and as close to the point of wounding as Maritime Prepositioning Squadron possible. In Iraqi Freedom, the (MPSRON), which will support, sus- the Future Maritime Prepositioning FRSS and FSTs with their gov- tain, reconstitute, and redeploy the Squadron will be forward deployed erning doctrine and tactical sea base and the joint force from an employment were new to U.S. and preloaded to support the full advanced logistic base hypothetically commanders. Consequently, located 2,000 nautical miles away. The spectrum of sea-based operations their clinical impact may Future MPSRON—composed of six to not have been as significant eight deep-draft, high-capacity ships of the strike group could be the only inpa- as envisioned. Clinical outcomes may a new class—will be forward deployed tient casualty holding capacity available improve, however, as warfighters, logis- to a theater and specifically preloaded to the combatant commander for up to ticians, and health care providers gain to support the full spectrum of sea- 2,000 nautical miles. experience with the concept and apply based operations. Some scenarios call Three hundred beds afloat may lessons learned. In addition, the sta- for multiple MPSRONs. Each squadron sound adequate given the low numbers tistical power of analysis will increase will include two ships equipped and of casualties in recent operations, but as the number of casualties treated by staffed to serve as level 3 casualty re- continued low casualties cannot be as- FRSS units grow and their impact on ceiving and treatment ships (CRTS).15 sumed. It is more alarming that an ac- KIA and DOW rates becomes more fully The medical treatment facility in ceptable platform, proposal, or concept understood at the clinical, tactical, and each CRTS is projected to have six op- does not yet exist to evacuate patients operational levels. erating rooms and 121 hospital beds, from the sea base to the advanced lo- While the military health system including 38 intensive care unit beds gistic base. The shore-based system was has demonstrated the ability to put ad- and 83 hospital ward beds. In addition stressed during Operation Iraqi Free- vanced medical capabilities virtually to level 3 hospital care, the ships will dom, even with the low numbers of anywhere needed and in the harshest also provide laboratory, pharmacy, ra- casualties. Recent wargaming suggests environments, providing adequate en

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 23 ■ HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT FROM THE SEA BASE

route care remains difficult at best. But from a sea base. FRSS units, ERCS equip- Board, August 2003), vii–viii; Vern Clark, “Sea Power 21 Series—Part I: Projecting De- forward medical units cannot function ment sets and personnel, and level 3 cisive Joint Capabilities,” U.S. Naval Institute in a vacuum, and severely injured or ill hospital care aboard MPSRON ships are Proceedings (October 2002). patients must eventually be moved to examples of these strategies. To best ex- 2 Defense Science Board, 16–22. MTFs with adequate and/or specialized ploit the opportunities they offer while 3 Blood products are specifically men- resources. The Marine Corps ERCS and mitigating their risks, Navy Medicine tioned as a metric of logistic complexity. They must be kept continuously refriger- Air Force CCATTs appear to be steps and its equivalent medical departments ated, in which case they have a limited shelf toward state-of-the-art care during en in the Army and Air Force will need life, or frozen, so they require special han- route phases of casualty management. to maintain level 2 surgical capability dling during reconstitution and thawing. Issues need to be addressed, however, and a holding capacity ashore. In other Blood products are a critical component of especially the limited availability of words, some version of today’s medical/ level 2 HSS and are rapidly consumed when caring for battlefield casualties. ERCS equipment and shortage of dedi- surgical battalion must be adapted for 4 Depending on their configuration, cated aeromedical evacuation platforms future use to provide inpatient casualty

Forum fleet hospitals have the capacity to hold

and personnel in order for these innova- care and holding even in the era of sea- 116, 250, or 500 patients. The 116-bed ver- tions to become the ultimate solution. based operations, because U.S. inability sion is more correctly called an expedition- to assure rapid evacu- ary medical facility. 5 Navy Warfare Development Com- maintaining bidirectional throughput at ation when and where mand and Marine Corps Combat Develop- the sea base to clear it of casualties while needed is the Achil- ment Command, “Concept of Naval Force les heel of all three st sustaining the force ashore is perhaps the Health Protection for the 21 Century” (New- innovations on the port, RI: draft dated November 6, 2003), 2. biggest challenge to the sea-basing model horizon. The medical 6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Force Health Protection in the 21st Century Capstone” battalion of the future (Washington, DC: draft July 3, 2003), 42. However, the fact that the ERCS con- and its service equivalents will need to 7 Ibid., 28–32. Emphasis added. cept is being driven by line warfighters be smaller, lighter, and more modular- 8 R.M. Coupland, “Epidemiologic Ap- who recognize it as a vital unmet need ized to better support maneuver forces, proach to Surgical Management of the Ca- for conducting extended-range STOM but this should be readily achievable sualties of War,” British Medical Journal (June 25, 1994), 1,693–1,697. bodes well for this program. using available, advanced commercial 9 In Vietnam, 75–80 percent of KIAs As mentioned, sea-based opera- technologies and transformed evalua- died within 5 minutes of wounding. To tions have been labeled a critical fu- tion and procurement processes. make a significant intervention within this ture military capability. Unfortunately, Dedicated medical airlift sup- narrow timeframe would require that first maintaining bidirectional throughput port—when combined with the ap- responders be able to immediately intervene with high volume fluid and blood product at the sea base to simultaneously clear it propriate reengineering of the medi- replacement or with surgery. of casualties while sustaining the com- cal battalion to judiciously reduce its 10 Ronald A. Maul, “Statement of Com- bat force ashore is perhaps the biggest capacity, weight, and footprint—will mand Surgeon, U.S. Central Command,” challenge to the sea-basing model, in enhance casualty care for future war- Senate Armed Services Committee Subcom- general, and to sea-based HSS. This ob- riors wounded on the battlefield and mittee on Personnel, Hearings on Medical Support of Forces Participating in Operation stacle is common to all potential users have synergistic effects with the in- Enduring Freedom, 107th Cong., 2d sess., of future sea bases, allowing military novations described here. The key will March 13, 2002, 2. medicine to benefit from the concerted be to maintain a buffer—or capacity 11 K.J. Glueck, Jr., to Chief of Naval effort of the entire Department of De- safety valve—until newer technolo- Operations (N931D), “Training for the En fense toward solving this future logistic gies come on line, such as a heavy lift Route Care System,” Marine Corps Combat Development Command letter 1500/C39, quagmire. Several platforms are already vehicle for moving the wounded from October 8, 2002, Quantico, VA. being studied to help clear the sea base the hospital at sea to a more capable 12 Marine Corps Combat Development MTF, for example, including evacuation facility. These adaptations to present Command, “Draft Operational Require- connector ships and high-speed ves- plans for sea-based operations will en- ments Document for the En Route Care sels. Moreover, much attention is being sure that military medicine remains System,” March 17, 2003, Quantico, VA. 13 Ibid. directed toward a heavy lift, sea-based the expeditionary maneuver element’s 14 Corley E. Puckett, “USMC En Route aircraft because the success of all sea- medical force in readiness. JFQ Care System,” brief preceding En Route Care based logistic sustainment innovation Wargame, Navy Warfare Development Com- relies on its development. mand, Newport, RI, March 9, 2004. NOTES Military medicine is working on in- 15 Navy Warfare Development Com- mand and Marine Corps Combat Develop- novative strategies to meet the mission 1 Defense Science Board, Final Report ment Command, “Draft MPF(F) Concept of of providing health service support and of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea Operations,” Newport, RI, March 8, 2004. casualty care to joint forces operating Basing (Washington, DC: Defense Science 16 Defense Science Board, 91–94.

24 JFQ / issue thirty-nine ■

Airman uploading armored Humvee onto C–130E for delivery to Iraq Forum Communications Squadron (Alfred A. Gerloff) (Alfred Communications Squadron th 375

planners into the real-time information used by operators, leading to uncoordi- Development of nated and ineffective logistic planning. Although logistic systems have evolved over the years, logisticians must be edu- the Joint Logistician cated and professionally developed to manipulate the various logistic systems the Armed Forces use and to take ad- By RANDALL M. MAULDIN vantage of corporate business practices.

ince the war on terror began the weaknesses of the enemy and uses Problems in Iraq on September 11, 2001, the speed as a primary weapon. Throughout Considering the movement of Armed Forces have deployed this operation, units moved faster than material to Iraq before major combat around the world, conduct- planners could anticipate, so critical operations began, logistic systems used Sing operations in Afghanistan, Africa, preparation lagged behind the troops; during Operation Iraqi Freedom have the Balkans, Iraq, the Philippines, and thus, an operational pause was required been effective. Logisticians moved 1.2 South Korea. Operation Iraqi Freedom, to allow supplies to catch up. In addi- million tons of equipment over 8,000 in particular, has tested the concept tion to rapid tempo, combat informa- miles and drove over 2,000 trucks a of maneuver warfare, which focuses on tion systems failed to integrate logistic day to transport supplies from Kuwait to northern Iraq. Additionally, these Captain Randall M. Mauldin, USMC, is a supply officer for the School of Infantry at systems provided over 2.1 million gal- Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. lons of water to 307,000 troops and

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 25 ■ DEVELOPMENT OF THE JOINT LOGISTICIAN

“delivered enough meals-ready-to-eat Current Training rent joint and interagency needs. For to feed the population of Spokane, The Focused Logistics Campaign example, the Army sponsors a 2-week Washington, for over a year.”1 But Plan, developed by the Department of course called Logistics Support of Joint these successes have been overshad- Defense (DOD), calls for cooperation Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia, in ad- owed by the realities of supporting a between logisticians and operators on dition to the Combined Logistics Cap- large organization that stretched the an equal basis in joint warfighting. The tain’s Career course, which provides logistic system to the limit and ex- plan recognizes that this cooperation cross-functional training. The Marine posed many deficiencies: is critical to meet present and future Corps University sponsors cross-func- commitments, which require efficiency tional courses to company and field ■ a large backlog of supplies throughout the supply chain and effectiveness as well as a timely grade logisticians with courses in tacti- ■ wasted funds paid to owners of the response. The results of focused logis- cal logistics operations and advanced containers holding the nonmoving supplies tics are faster deployments, properly logistics operations. Both services have ■ a $1.2 billion discrepancy between sized combat service support units, re- sought education from civilian univer- Forum material received and material shipped duced cost, more responsive support, sities as well, with the Marine Corps ■ cannibalization of vehicles because parts were not available more accurate and timely logistic in- Logistics Education Program at Penn- ■ amassing excess supplies without formation, and a more reliable and sylvania State and the Army’s LogTech documentation user-friendly system. Although focused program at the University of North ■ circumventing the supply system logistics increases confidence in the Carolina. These examples, however, ■ duplicated requests for material support element and reduces sustain- illustrate a continuation of stovepiped, ■ poor physical security for material. ment requirements, current training service-specific training and education Lieutenant General Claude V. and education of logisticians in the that fails to integrate the services in Christianson, USA, Deputy Chief of Armed Forces remain service-specific logistic efforts. Staff, G–4, identified reasons for these and specialized in functional areas. deficiencies before Congress in 2004: The Joint Logistics Warfighting Integration Initiative (JLWI) was enacted in fiscal Today’s capabilities for maneuver, ■ communication between the supply year 1998 to: strike, logistics, and protection will become depots and troops on the ground were insufficient to ensure seamless operation dominant maneuver, precision engage- ■ the distribution system within the conduct a review of the organizations and ment, focused logistics, and full dimen- theater was redundant and unconnected functions associated with . . . acquisition sional protection. The joint force, because ■ logistic units were not organized to activities and of the personnel required of its flexibility and responsiveness, will run distribution centers on the ground to carry out those functions. In his report remain the key to operational success in ■ moving material from the U.S. to overseas theaters required containers back to Congress in response to [JLWI], the future. ■ management system suited conflict the Secretary of Defense committed to — Joint Vision 2020 operations instead of peacetime operations changing the logistics focus of DOD from ■ operational units did not adhere managing supplies (i.e., buying and man- Recent operations capitalized on to supply policy and procedures, which aging inventory) to managing suppliers the different attributes provided by disrupts any system and demonstrates poor discipline. and fundamentally reengineering DOD the joint force and commanded by a product support practices.2 regional combatant commander. The The deficiencies and the reasons joint task force (JTF) may include an air for them indicate a lack of communica- As a result, several efforts to im- component from the Air Force, ground tion, a difference in logistic concepts prove joint logistics have been under- component from the Marine Corps, according to service, and the inability taken by removing legacy systems, and special operations component of the services to merge logistics ef- developing cross-service information from the Army. Mission requirements forts to streamline the supply chain. systems, and implementing new busi- and available forces would determine These issues could be addressed through ness processes. Despite many advances the components used. Once part of a education and development of joint in technology and implementation of JTF, the components rely on the JTF logisticians, with a focus on working better practices, the Armed Forces still commander to provide logistic sup- in a joint logistic theater instead of in require better education and training port, which typically includes service- individual stovepipes for each service. of logisticians to manipulate and ex- specific support systems, a sister ser- Before developing an approach to edu- ploit the systems and processes to pro- vice system, or logistic capabilities of cating and developing joint logisticians, vide a coordinated effort. joint, interagency, and multinational it is important to review how services In addition to specific plans and activities. An information system does train logisticians and to consider the policies, training occurs within the ser- not exist to support joint logistic op- shortcomings of this system. vices, though it is inadequate for cur- erations to provide accurate, real-time

26 JFQ / issue thirty-nine M a u l d i n

information for planning or procure- ing, training, and equipping forces to but such training would benefit each ment. For example, the Marine Corps defend the Nation and support national service. Army and Marine Corps ca- must submit a supply request to a objectives.”4 Each service has a separate reer-level schools allow students from chain that extends back to the United logistic doctrine, but cross-functional, other services to attend in an attempt States even though an Army unit in interservice, and perhaps interagency to broaden experiences, but a bolder the same area of operation or an alter- training needs further emphasis. approach is needed. Integrated train- nate source of supply could supply the Logisticians often believe they ing throughout DOD will establish a same material without having to reach were not adequately trained and had foundation for streamlined logistic pro- back to the states. to learn cross-functional logistics in a cesses, because supply-chain managers deployed environment. Training should will have a common foundation. Joint Logistics move along a pyramid-like continuum In addition to education in mod- The development of integrated that provides skills at the beginning ern business practices, logisticians re- training will enable all logisticians of a career, then provides more educa- quire a leadership style that is influen- Forum throughout the Armed Forces to operate tion as personnel become senior. The tial, assertive, and credible so they can from the same base of knowledge. For continuum must include officers, en- be effective in a joint environment with example, J. Reggie Hall compares the listed, and civilians from all services to different cultures. Transformational training of Air Force logisticians to the provide a foundation from which to leadership will be the most effective for other services to determine how best conduct operations. For example, com- the modern supply chain, where leaders to train future logisticians to operate pany grade officers and junior govern- manage processes from the center and ment service workers focus on balance the needs of the supply chain successes have been overshadowed learning techniques, tactics, to accomplish organizational objectives by the realities of supporting a large and procedures required to through inspiration. The foundation of manage material at the tacticl such leadership is an understanding of organization that stretched the level, and field grade officers organizations, cultures, and individu- logistic system to the limit and senior government service als, which allows those in charge to workes develop a foundation motivate people to perform to high in fully integrated environments. The grounded in theory, operations, and standards. Transformational leaders will basis of training within the services is strategy. Additionally, logistic training enable joint logistics to work through- doctrine, which contains “fundamental needs to remain flexible to capitalize out DOD because they can influence principles by which the military forces on the best and latest practices. others to accomplish the mission re- or elements guide their actions.”3 Doc- To integrate the education of the gardless of service culture bias. trine develops warfighting tactics, tech- different services, combined training of In addition to education, training, niques, and procedures applied with logisticians is needed at all levels. Hall and leadership, a cultural shift must cognizance from lessons learned and identifies the need to create interser- emerge that encourages officers to ex- “provides the framework for organiz- vice training for Air Force logisticians, pand their knowledge into unfamiliar areas that will make them more effective as logisticians and more competitive for Soldiers offload equipment at Pyongtaek Port, promotion. The archaic practices of trial Korea, Exercise Foal Eagle 2005 by fire and on-the-job training are no longer acceptable for professional development of combat arms officers in the areas of aviation, infantry, artillery, and armor, nor should they be acceptable for officers who provide the supplies and material the combat occupations use to accomplish national objectives. Therefore, logistic training needs to be formalized to include cross-functional training, service-specific requirements, and joint-service needs.

The Transformed Logistician The future challenges of joint lo-

Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific (John J. Pistone) Fleet Combat Camera Group, gistics require a new type of officer to

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 27 ■ DEVELOPMENT OF THE JOINT LOGISTICIAN

Proposed Training and Education for Logisticians can then move to a position that is vulnerable to the enemy in coastal areas and eliminate the need to establish a Key: logistic footprint ashore before com- ALOC - Advanced Logistics Ofﬁcer Course O–5/6 CSS - Combat Service Support GS14/15 E–8/9 mencing offensive operations. Since 2 SLOC: E E - Enterprise-to-Enterprise Logistics CWO–5 LogTech: operations already consist of joint GCSS-MC - Global Combat Support-Marine Corps *MCLEP; LogTech - Logistics Technician Supply Claim Management Theater-Level forces, logisticians need to establish MAGTF - Marine Airground Task Force Dist and SCM MCLEP - Marines Corps Logistics Education Program a common understanding of logistics SCM - Supply Chain Management and common language to cross cultural SLOC - Senior Logistics Operations Course TLOC - Tactical Logistics Ofﬁcer Course Intro to Joint CSS Ops: boundaries and exploit the most ad- O–4 CSS MAGTF Planning GS13 *ALOC; *TLOC; E–6/7 vantageous logistic solution, regardless CWO–4 MCLEP; *LogTech of the owning service. Mgmt and Analysis of Dist. and SC Other initiatives to improve lo- Forum Education gistics include electronic commerce, Training O–3 Intro MAGTF Ops; Functional Mgmt performance-based contracting, distri- GS11/12 TLOC; *MCLEP; E–4/5 Theory and CSS Ops; CWO–2/3 Advanced Concepts of bution process ownership, and proven Dist and SCM 201 Dist and SCM solutions from the corporate world. For example, the Defense Logistics Agency CSS Ops 101; Fundamentals of: E2 Log; O–1/2 Fundamental and GCSS-MC OA; Distribution; (DLA) developed E-Mall to provide one- GS9/10 Functional Area Mgmt; Financial Mgmt; E–1/2/3 WO–1 Intro to Systems Intro to IT Systems stop shopping for over 17 million line Dist and SCM Theory and Application Dist and SCM 101 items via the Internet. The benefits of E-Mall include faster delivery with a transaction cost of $11, compared to lead, manage, and control people and tion, and increasing reliance on e-com- $146 for hand-processed orders and $25 processes. Supply-chain management is merce require logisticians to be enablers for government purchasing card orders. defined as “those activities associated who accomplish the mission through E-Mall permits logisticians to procure with moving goods from the raw-mate- facilitation and integration of processes material from any vendor in the sys- rial stage to the end user; this includes to obtain and distribute material. For tem, no matter what their service. sourcing and procurement, produc- example, supply officers must acquire Performance-based contracts were tion scheduling, order processing, in- material by manipulating various pro- used to support the Navy’s more than ventory management, transportation, cesses within DOD, which include pro- 9,000 flying missions over Afghanistan warehousing, and customer service,” cedures from their own services, other during the first phase of the war on according to James W. Hopp, who ana- services, DOD, and civilian vendors. terror in March 2002. A critical part lyzed the requirements for future sup- for the jets was tires, which were ply officers by comparing Air Force integrated training will enable all manufactured by Michelin but needs to those of private industry.5 He logisticians throughout the Armed delivered by a private logistic found that military logisticians are sim- company, Lockheed Martin Naval Forces to operate from the same ilar to civilian supply-chain managers, Electronics and Surveillance Sys- because many servicemembers’ duties base of knowledge tems. The contract required that include supply, maintenance, and dis- Lockheed deliver tires on time tribution, with the added responsibility Leadership will be essential to negotiate for 95 percent of all requisitions. Fail- of combat duties. Civilian supply-chain these processes to meet service needs ure to meet this metric affected profits, managers must understand business while maintaining rapport with sup- which provided the Navy leverage to functions, purchasing, sourcing, pro- pliers and transporters. Transformation enforce contract standards. duction, marketing, sales, promotions, of the Armed Forces focuses on using A joint initiative assigned U.S. and customers. The Armed Forces have technology and advancing current ser- Transportation Command as the DOD no position that incorporates all these vice doctrines. New concepts include distribution process owner. Accord- functions, but they do have separated joint sea-based capabilities, high-speed ingly, the command has the author- positions that manage one or two. To support vessels, floating forward stag- ity and accountability for Defense develop joint logisticians, the military ing bases, and maritime prepositioned distribution and integrates structure must take note of Hopp’s suggestion to force-future ships. These initiatives will and people to form a Deployment create supply-chain managers instead enable joint forces to meet their equip- and Distribution Operations Center of specialists in each functional area. ment in the area of operations at a safe (DDOC), which was sent to U.S. Cen- Jointness, interagency coopera- distance over the horizon. The force tral Command to serve under a single

28 JFQ / issue thirty-nine M a u l d i n

commander to support operations in tural barriers between the services. The education to focus on logistic concepts the Middle East and Asia. The group DDOC demonstrates how a single or- across functional areas and services, consists of personnel from the Defense ganization can combine infrastructure analyzing and adapting business prac- Logistics Agency, Army Surface Deploy- and personnel from different services tices, and developing transformational ment and Distribution Command, Air to be an effective unit for worldwide leadership. Initiatives must focus on support. Analyzing busi- consolidating logistic efforts across cul- initiatives to improve logistics include ness practices helps iden- tural boundaries and promote an effi- tify systems and processes cient process. Logisticians from the four electronic commerce, performance- used by the business world, branches need education and training based contracting, distribution process which consistently tries to to capitalize on these initiatives and ownership, and proven solutions from improve efficiency while break down cultural barriers to improve decreasing costs. Although support throughout the Department the corporate world the military services are not of Defense. JFQ Forum focused on profits, they are Force Air Mobility Command, Navy focused on efficiency to accomplish the NOTES Military Sealift Command, Army Joint mission within the financial constraints Munitions Command, and the services’ established by Congress. 1 Claude V. Christianson, congres- respective logistic commands. This sional testimony to the House Armed group has streamlined the DOD logis- The challenges of joint logistics Services Committee, “Future of Military Logistics,” 2004. tic process with fiscal improvements, will increasingly require officers who 2 Paul Balash III, “Joint Logistics War- electronic-to-electronic distribution ar- can lead, manage, and control people fighting Initiative: A Catalyst for Change,” chitecture, direct vendor delivery pro- and processes. Operations through- Marine Corps Gazette (December 2001), 49. cesses, and time-definite delivery. out the globe during the war on terror 3 J. Reggie Hall, “Expeditionary Air- Corporate solutions contribute to have strained resources and tested the power: The Need for an Integrated Logistics School,” Air Force Journal of Logistics (Spring military logistics because they allow capabilities of logisticians. In addition, 2001), 18. the services to benefit without going reduced budgets and an emphasis on 4 Ibid. through debugging. For example, the fiscal responsibility have forced the 5 James W. Hopp, “The Supply Officer Air Force adopted a corporate concept, services to operate as a joint force. of the Future,” Air Force Journal of Logistics Advance Planning and Scheduling Transforming logisticians must comple- (Fall 2000), 21. 6 Maryann Kaczmarek et al., “Ad- Pathfinder, to: ment the overall transformation of the vanced Planning and Scheduling,” Air Force Armed Forces. Logistic personnel must Journal of Logistics (Fall 2002), 21. provide an automated, alerts-based ca- undergo reengineering of training and pability to identify, examine, and resolve logistics system constraints by exception Airman moving relief supplies to Navy (parts availability, physical capacity, and helicopters at Sultan Iskandar Muda Air Force financial restrictions) before they impact Base, Indonesia, Operation Unified Assistance production and establish a mechanism for sharing information and supporting collaborative planning capabilities across the extended supply chain (for example, DLA and original equipment manufacturers).6

This program identified vulnerabilities in the Air Force supply chain and proved a valid replacement for military software. The modules in the program allow flexibility in planning, collaboration, and execution of logistics. The joint initiative also discussed consolidated logistic efforts across cultural boundaries and allowed for efficient logistic processes. Logisticians from all services will have to exploit

these initiatives and break down cul- M. Burns) U.S. Navy (Travis

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 29 Forum

M–1A Abrams tanks, Exercise Ready Crucible, Germany U.S. Army (Richard Bumgardner) U.S. Army (Richard The Defense Readiness Reporting System A New Tool for Force Management

By LAURA J. JUNOR

en years ago, the growing Iraq and Afghanistan makes it chal- formally announced plans to create the U.S. involvement in Bosnia lenging to find units that are both Defense Readiness Reporting System engendered discussions on suitable and available for deployment. (DRRS), with the promise that it would how the Department of De- It also underscores the importance of promote a real change in how DOD Tfense (DOD) measures the ability of the understanding residual force capability thinks about, plans for, and assesses the Armed Forces to execute a broad range should another crisis occur. ability of the Armed Forces to conduct of missions. Many recognized that The new environment requires operations. Today, the system is evolv- readiness reporting systems needed to both a thorough understanding of what ing to meet the need of force provid- reflect a continuum of possible op- military forces can do and the ability ers such as U.S. Joint Forces Command erations. Today this question takes on to adapt quickly to emerging require- (JFCOM) to identify units that have, new significance as DOD wrestles with ments. The pressure of current opera- or can quickly develop, the capabili- both the enormity and uncertainty of tions is forcing unprecedented changes ties requested by theater commanders. the present operational environment. along these lines. In the spring of 2002, The DRRS is designed to track detailed The sustained demand for forces in the Office of the Secretary of Defense information on what forces, and even individuals, can do on a near-real-time Laura J. Junor is Defense Readiness Reporting System director and scientific basis. When complete, DRRS will be a adviser for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Readiness Programming and network of applications that provides Assessment Division. force managers at all levels the tools

30 JFQ / issue thirty-nine J u n o r

and information to respond to emerg- as small as a five-man security detach- manage training and now being used ing crises and the ability to assess the ment. Without a system like DRRS, the to establish a common language of risks of conducting such operations. command would have to query scores tasks, conditions, and standards to The DRRS is a major transforma- of isolated databases throughout DOD describe capabilities essential to the tion, moving the focus of force manag- for a comprehensive picture of who completion of almost any stated mis- ers from reporting unit readiness to can do what. sion. DRRS uses METs as a vehicle for managing force capabilities. Specifi- The need to identify residual ca- assessing the capability of all DOD or- cally, it represents a shift from: pability is as pressing as the need to ganizations, at all operational levels, to source existing operations. With so conduct assigned missions. ■ resources to capabilities—inputs to outputs many forces either currently or recently Under this framework, a capabil- ■ deficiencies to their implications deployed, force managers must know ity is the ability of any organization ■ units to combined forces what is left in case another emergency to perform a given task to the stan- ■ front-line units to all units contrib- develops. They must understand what dards either prescribed by parent or- uting to front-line operations. Forum those forces can do, the limits of flex- ganizations or dictated by operational Force Management Challenge ibility, and what those factors mean in needs. Monitoring that ability is espe- Today’s force managers understand terms of operational risk. cially important for organizations con- that uncertainty is unavoidable but not ducting missions outside of those they unmanageable. The question is not just Defining Capability were previously trained and equipped what forces are ready for, but how well The key to managing forces is unfor. Managers can track progress not they can adapt to meet current needs. derstanding what capabilities DOD has only in developing new capabilities, The approach is very different from and how they can be tailored and com- but also the potential atrophy of the the rigid structuring of the Cold War bined to respond to operational needs. original capabilities. era. Consider that some of the capabili- During the Cold War, units tended to The DRRS also allows force man- ties in highest demand today are truck be sourced (provided) to operational agers to trace inventories of individuals drivers and civil engineers. Not only commanders along fairly rigid ideas in high-demand occupations such as did these occupational specialties not of capability. Today, the pressure to law enforcement and civil engineer- make force managers’ radar screens 4 sustain operations at high levels and ing or who possess rare skills such as possibly over years requires speaking Farsi. This information sup- the question is not just what forces are sourcing flexibility. In ports the MET information described ready for, but how well they can adapt some occupational areas, above and is therefore helpful in iden- the majority of units and tifying organizations that could reason- years ago, but they were often targets individuals have been deployed at least ably provide needed abilities. For some for outsourcing. To meet these needs, once, and some are preparing for third skills, demand is severe enough to war- DOD adopted a flexible approach of tours in theater. To ease the stress, rant searches for individuals who could adapting units with similar skill sets DOD is looking more broadly for units be deployed immediately. and tailored their training to meet the that are capable of relieving forces in theater commander’s requirements. theater. As a result, units are often re- Understanding Capability The point is not to highlight force quired and trained to conduct missions The detailed information on what planning deficiencies, but to suggest very different from those they were de- individuals and organizations can do— the folly of thinking that planning can signed for. Army artillery units trained from capability entities up to combat- be done with perfect foresight. to relieve Army security forces are an ant commanders—resides in the En- In June 2004, the Secretary of example of sourcing flexibility within hanced Status of Resources and Training Defense tasked JFCOM to provide op- a service, while Navy masters-at-arms System (ESORTS). The goal of any readi- erational commanders the capabilities trained to relieve Army units guarding ness reporting or assessment system is they need. This responsibility means detainees are a case of flexibility across to reveal whether forces can perform the command must have current in- service lines. This adaptibility means their assigned missions. Historically, formation on the location, status, and that DOD has larger capability pools DOD has inferred that ability from the availability of capability entities—any from which to draw forces. status of unit resources. That is how the combination of personnel and equip- The DRRS uses two complemen- Global Status of Resources and Training ment that provides a recognized opera- tary approaches to identifying ca- System (GSORTS) has been used. But tional capability, regardless of size or pability for JFCOM and other force such input-based assessment does not parent organization—throughout the managers. The first is identifying mis- yield direct information on what these Department. Capability entities can sion-essential tasks (METs), a concept forces can actually do. ESORTS provides be as large as a carrier strike group or the Army created two decades ago to a more complete readiness assessment

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 31 ■ THE DEFENSE READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM

system by directly measuring outputs— USS Shoup and USS Shiloh conducting the ability to conduct a task or mission readiness training with Japanese naval forces to the prescribed standard—along with in support of U.S. Navy Fleet Response Plan inputs. The system is designed to come much closer to the goal of understanding “ready for what?” ESORTS is a secure, Web-based information system describing the status of organizations that contribute to the warfighting system. It is built around explicit measures of performance relative to assigned standards, resources, and force sustainment. Forum The system provides:

■ An evolution of the traditional input view. ESORTS contains an empirical description of the quantity and quality of resources

for all units in the warfighting system. Units U.S. Navy (Justin R. Blake) that now report in the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) will find that uals assigned to each reporting organi- reporting system in the past; under ESORTS metrics look much like the infor- zation. Users can view this information ESORTS, they will report information mation used to assign the SORTS scores of C1 (highest) through C4 (lowest). in aggregate, or drill down to the indi- relevant to their mission—the support ■ Mission assessments. ESORTS provides vidual level. Similar data are provided of the warfighter. The capabilities of a vehicle for each organization from indi- for other resource measures. these support organizations should be vidual units to combined forces to report on The system also contains infor- reflected in DRRS because they hold its ability to achieve the performance stan- mation on whether individuals meet important data on assets or services dards of its mission-essential tasks under the conditions of the assignments. Commanders medical, legal, and administrative de- that are available to sustain operations. can compare their unit’s actual performance ployment criteria. It contains records One of the goals guiding devel- for each measure with the established crite- of past theater deployments (and mobi- opment of the Defense Readiness Re- ria. With this information and the resource lizations in the case of Reserve forces). porting System is to take advantage data discussed above, they can assess the or- This information helps ensure depart- of modern information technology ganization’s ability to accomplish individual tasks and the task list as a whole. mental compliance with existing rules to reduce the reporting burden of op- governing how often military members erational units. Because DRRS aims to ESORTS is being developed as a can be recalled for the same operation. take full advantage of existing informa- combined effort of the services, defense ESORTS requires information from tion systems, it will not require a unit agencies, Joint Staff, and combatant each level of the operational hierarchy, to enter data for ESORTS that it has commanders. Its products (metrics de- not just the basic tactical-level units. already entered in another system. It scribing various aspects of DOD health For example, Navy aircraft squadrons will take what it needs from those ex- and capability, both inputs and out- isting data sources, puts, objective and evaluative) will be detailed information on what individuals and allowing units directly reported throughout the De- organizations can do resides in the Enhanced to double-check partment and used to support contin- the information Status of Resources and Training System gency sourcing and adaptive planning. and write in comments. This re- The Inputs: Building on SORTS would report as they always have, but lieves the units and serves as a built-in ESORTS begins with the same the battle group and any joint task test for accuracy. The DRRS, like many basic information that underlies force, standing or ad hoc, would give databases throughout DOD, will be GSORTS. However, it more explicitly an accounting as well. These higher- accessible on a secure Web site to facili- uses and disseminates detailed mea- level forces will report on the com- tate reporting and use of these data. sures of the quality and quantity of bined readiness and capabilities of their resources such as personnel, training, component units and on the command Output Measurement ordnance, major weapons systems, and staff that runs that combined unit. The most common way to answer supplies. For example, it lists the rank, Support entities and the Defense the question of whether an organi- skills, and certifications for all individ- agencies have not used this type of zation is capable of doing something

32 JFQ / issue thirty-nine J u n o r

is to avoid the matter entirely and comparable units). Having higher eche- sure that the Armed Forces not only address the easier question of how lons base their status on lower echelon can conduct the operations they regu- many resources the organization has. reports should improve the integrity of larly plan for, such as those comprising Answering the first question requires the National Military Strategy, but the synthesis of complex, sometimes commanders must judge whether also that they can respond to se- intangible factors that cannot be rep- they can perform a particular task vere and unanticipated crises. The licated by a canned algorithm. That is Department does not have the op- why task and mission assessments in today—yes or no tion of turning down missions, DRRS are the professional judgments and that makes preparing for and of commanding officers and are not individual assessments. Higher levels assessing the risks of tomorrow’s force algorithmically derived. If leaders are would naturally reconcile information requirements a matter of exploring appointed on the premise that they are from subordinate commands in form- margins and alternatives. qualified to create a fit, capable force, ing a coherent organizational report. Currently, the DRRS contains ap- Forum they should be qualified to assess the Seeming inconsistencies between plications that support contingency capability of that force, and those as- mission assessments and resource ac- sourcing. These provide managers a sessments should have value. counting data may reflect important is- nascent ability to find forces and indi- In simple terms, to assess a task sues, such as resource stress or negative viduals to meet user-specified require- or mission, commanders must judge synergies that tend to be difficult to ments. The applications can be used whether they can perform a particular observe and document. The combina- not only to identify forces that are im- task today—yes or no. The overall as- tion of commanders’ assessments and mediately qualified and able to support sessment for the mission those tasks resource data in ESORTS will identify operations, but also to provide informa- comprise is also yes or no. These evalu- specific deficiencies that could be tion on forces that are nearly qualified ations will enable force managers to masked if resources were merely moni- in terms of their current resource status quickly address the status of organi- tored in aggregated bundles, such as or their possession of similar skills or zations for use in a variety of opera- equipment and personnel. capabilities. Force providers such as tional environments and assist them in JFCOM are guiding the development of choosing which units can be deployed Crisis Planning and these applications. quickly or need immediate training Contingency Sourcing or resources for follow-on mission ESORTS answers the question of Future reporting systems will requirements. whether forces are capable of conduct- contain applications that support risk Unfortunately, there will be a fair ing assigned missions and tasks, but assessments and the adaptive plan- degree of inconsistency in the assess- history tells us that no plan is executed ning process. These applications will ments—an inescapable characteristic without major revision. Current events provide the means to match available of evaluative judgments. Some assess- add the lesson that the ability to adapt units to plans, monitor unit capabili- ments will be higher or lower than forces quickly is the best strategy for ties, conduct risk analyses, and revise anticipated (based, say, on seemingly managing uncertainty. DOD must en- plans—all within days or weeks rather than months or years, the current standard. In other words, these applications Airmen refuel F–15s at Eielson Air Force Base, will allow force managers to query the joint/combined training Exercise Cope Thunder 05–1 forces (and their corresponding capabilities) that have not been consumed by current operations and see how far they go toward meeting the demands of additional operations. Managers will also have the ability to adapt current plans to suit emerging conditions or accommodate a capability deficiency. The common attributes of these applications are that they begin with the current capability profiles furnished through ESORTS and provide the means to evaluate these profiles against alternative demand scenarios Communications Squadron (Joshua Strang) Communications Squadron th

354 in a matter of days. JFQ

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 33 ■

Exercises and games reinforce NDU course objectives Forum

National Strategic Gaming Center Strategic Gaming for the National Security Community

By MARGARET M. M C COWN

Tuesday was a busy day: North Korea tested a nuclear weapon, a biohazard incident shut down I–70 across Kansas and Colorado, and religious strife threatened the stability of the Pan Sahel oil region in West Africa. Wednesday brought an altogether different set of problems.

hat frenzied action the larger NDU community, the Gam- novel is the above ing Center conducts exercises for the scenario from? While colleges and components of National fiction, it is not in the Defense University, the interagency Wlocal bookstore; rather, it is a glimpse community, Office of the Secretary of of the National Strategic Gaming Cen- Defense, Joint Staff, combatant com- ter (NSGC). Located within the Insti- mands, and Members of Congress. tute for National Strategic Studies at Wargaming and the gaming the National Defense University (NDU) of policy problems have been around a in Washington, DC, the NSGC designs long time, and while their forms have and conducts strategic simulation exer- changed with the problems of the day, cises for diverse audiences. In support the games’ basic benefit remains the of the teaching and policy objectives of same: they provide a self-contained

Margaret M. McCown is a research and policy analyst with the Strategic Policy Forum at the National Strategic Gaming Center, National Defense University.

34 JFQ / issue thirty-nine M c C o w n

analytical environment in which play- and played in the NSGC often look knowledgeable but diverse players in ers explore the constraints that form much like a classroom, albeit one full an environment promoting communi- current strategic problems, examine is- of diverse and experienced students. cation, information sharing, and cross- sues arising under them, and compare In these games, also called table top pollination of ideas. possible solutions. In short, political- exercises or free form games, a set of military games allow players—policy- constraints that limit players’ choices Elements of Games makers, civil servants, and warfighters— and shape the strategic environment is Any exercise is shaped by a num- to examine their assumptions about a written into a qualitative and descrip- ber of elements that influence its de- problem and its solutions. In the cur- tive scenario. Players are directed to sign and the form it ultimately takes: rent strategic environment, this is a react to challenges that arise under the the aim, the audience, the level of anal- vital service, for an unexamined as- scenario as play advances over moves. ysis, and the problem situation being sumption can be a critical vulnerability. Players gather around a table and studied jointly guide the construction This article considers the relation- are introduced to a problem situation, of an exercise. They determine the sce- Forum ship between audience, objective, and which game designers convey through nario crafted for a game and what the game design while introducing the such means as a background paper, best form will be, whether a seminar mission and activities of the NSGC. It simulated report of breaking news, or exercise, field event, computer game, begins by proposing a common defini- mock briefing. They are instructed to or formal model. tion of games, including wargames; suggest solutions, debate alternatives, Two aims exist in varying de- identifies the constitutive elements and finally settle on a recommended grees in all games: an analytical and that compose all games; and asserts the course of action. Typically, some kind an educational purpose. Some games relevance of these elements to game of subsequent announcement, such as focus almost exclusively on analyzing design. It then explores how these prin- a simulated news report, will introduce problem situations and weighing avail- ciples of game design are evident in the new issues, advancing play to a new able choice-sets, while others are more exercises constructed by the Gaming move in the game and the next stage educational, teaching about a situa- Center and argues why such exercises in an unfolding situation. In so-called tion or training responses to one often are important to contemporary civilian path games, events in later moves are both aims are present. For example, and military decisionmakers. contingent on players’ prior choices. the NSGC’s high-level participants fre- Most often, however, moves reflect the quently report finding these exercises What Are Games? advancement of time. By pressing play- useful not only for walking through a At the most abstract level, all ers during discussion to address the problem, but also for obtaining input games—whether played with cards, implications of previous choices for from other senior players. Game design at a computer, or in a military-politi- is closely related to the aim of cal planning session—share a focus all games share a focus on strategic the exercise. Where analytical on strategic interaction under a series interaction under a series of needs drive development, the of specified constraints. They stipu- tendency is for the game to be late a set of “rules of the game” that specified constraints specified as formally and par- describe a given analytical situation simoniously as possible, giving and demand that participants make remaining decisions and these deci- designers the greatest precision in de- choices about their best decisions sub- sions’ relative payoffs, designers can in- riving solution sets or collecting em- ject to those constraints, often tak- corporate a sense of consequentiality to pirical data. Where educational aims ing into account the likely responses games that progress in a linear fashion. predominate, an understanding of of actual or implicit opponents. Be- Seminar exercises are now em- experiential learning and its role in yond these shared elements, designers ployed extensively for gaming politi- training inform game design. Seminar have developed a range of methods for cal-military strategic dilemmas and games tend to do both: although they transforming these analytical problems are useful for audiences ranging from neither present nor are based on for- into exercises. The forms that these secondary school students to flag of- mal models, scenarios are constructed exercises take range from seminar dis- ficers. They can be designed to educate with enough attention to the abstract cussions, to field events, to computer players about a problem and the con- constraints and questions shaping a games. Exercises at the Gaming Center straints shaping decisions about it, or strategic situation that they are useful are mainly conducted as seminar-based they can facilitate expert discussion at beyond simply dramatizing history or problem environments—the structure a high level of sophistication. Seminar current events to players. best suited to participants’ needs and games can serve as an especially ef- The audience is critical to the the problems being gamed. fective experiential learning tool, but design of games; the experience and The seminar games designed they can also be used to gather highly needs of participants greatly affect the

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 35 ■ STRATEGIC GAMING

to game design. At the strategic them. Constraints can be understood level, a military planner considers to be any factors that affect the choices military and political objectives and of players or that otherwise set down challenges at the national and in- in the rules of the game. They can be ternational level. In this context, resource limitations players must take strategic is simply a higher level into account, geopolitical facts of life, of aggregation than operational or domestic political processes, or coali- tactical analyses. The more theo- tions that should be maintained. How retical encompassing game sense precisely the constraints must be speci- of strategic is evident in all three fied impacts the form of a game. military levels of analysis. Actors can range from individuals There is a tendency for stra- to aggregate bodies such as countries or tegic in the military-analytical organizations. In exercises, actors are Forum sense to be at least partly defined not necessarily exhaustively accounted by the potential solutions to a for by the game participants, but rather problem, such as the DOD Dic- are the agents present in the game sce- tionary of Military and Associated nario who are determined to be tak- Terms, which understands the ing actions that influence the strategic strategic level of war as the “level environment. In many military exer- . . . at which a nation . . . de- cises, players taking the perspective of termines national or multina- U.S. actors are called the blue team and aim of the game and the form it should tional (alliance or coalition) security ob- their opponents are the red team. In take. Moreover, players can be assets to jectives and . . . uses national resources red teaming exercises, players take the each other. High-level participants may to accomplish these objectives.” perspective of U.S. adversaries to test come to an event hoping to learn more These national resources are gen- American responses and policies. Other about a subject, but typically they also erally understood to be the diplomatic, types of exercises have players taking bring considerable personal expertise, informational, military, and economic both red and blue roles. In most NSGC which is of interest to other partici- (DIME) means of influence a country seminar exercises, players are assigned or group of countries can bring roles as U.S. actors, whether they are the experience and needs of to bear. Although there are real individual decisionmakers or organiza- analytical difficulties with defin- tions, and focus on the blue team per- participants affect the aim of the ing a problem by its presupposed spective of strategic challenges. game and the form it should take solution, this approach does highlight the value in gaming strategic Game Design pants and which good game design can challenges. While it might seem that Game design begins with speci- bring out. An advantage of NSGC semi- such a broad focus is difficult to en- fying the aim, audience, level of nar games is that they allow for a less- capsulate in a game because problems analysis, and problem situation and structured discussion than more strictly must be stated at such a high level then formulating a structure for the scripted exercises, making them an ef- of generality, it is an inescapable fact game. Designers identify the con- fective means of gathering and evaluat- that most of today’s political-military straints and actors, which define the ing information. Where the audience is challenges play out at this level. The choices players can make throughout. highly multidisciplinary, games may be increasing political and military use of They then decide how many moves designed to obtain and pool informa- solutions employing a combination of or decisions played will advance. tion in the most efficient manner. DIME assets or demanding joint and In games, moves are synonymous with Thus far in this article, the term interagency coordination point to why decisions; at the end of each period, strategic has been used in the theoretical it is useful to evaluate these plans in at least implicitly, players must make game sense, meaning a choice situation the context of a game before trying a choice. Game aims, coupled with in which an actor makes decisions seek- them in the field. these factors, inform the game form ing to maximize his benefits, subject to As in any game, the problem situ- selected, which is a major choice in the a set of constraints and typically antici- ations considered in strategic exercises design process. pating other players’ likely responses. and presented to participants are jointly Once all the elements of a prob- In contrast, in the military-analytical defined by the constraints elaborated lem situation are determined, designers context, strategic refers to a level of in the game and the set of actors con- must craft an artificial environment in analysis, an issue that is also relevant sidered to be making decisions under which these dynamics play out. Game

36 JFQ / issue thirty-nine M c C o w n

forms vary in terms of how precisely tive teaching to ensure that the desired game objective was to introduce stu- the number of players, constraints, and concepts are conveyed. dents to the challenges of formulating moves are specified. Computer simu- security policy, given the diversity of lations, on one hand, are extremely Exercises at NSGC existing U.S. military commitments specific; there may be a large number The Gaming Center comprises and global security concerns. Students of players and possible moves, and, in three divisions, which design and played the role of members of Federal combination, they may constitute a conduct strategic simulation exercises departments represented on the Na- large though finite number of choices. for rather diverse audiences, includ- tional Security Council and were told Likewise, actual field exercises tend to ing NDU students, flag officers, senior that they had been appointed by the be constrained in terms of time; they executive branch officials and Mem- President to serve on a Policy Coor- operate in real-time, and the conse- bers of Congress. The diversity of the dinating Committee (PCC) and make quences of actions, while immediately participants, problems, and scenarios recommendations about several on- apparent, are not easily speeded up. in Gaming Center exercises highlights going, simultaneous national security Forum Games taking the form of seminar ex- the range and flexibility of the seminar threats. Over the first 3 days, students game form. The three branches of discussed strategic options with regard seminar exercises take advantage the center are introduced below to three states posing different threats. of the strengths of a highly with a brief description of recent They were to consider logistic and re- exercises that concretely illustrate source constraints and political and interdisciplinary audience the Center’s work and how the military challenges. On the fourth day, main elements of games are in- the committee presented a briefing, ercises, as those designed by the NSGC, stantiated in actual design choices. making strategic prioritizations and build a rich contextual environment In particular, the influence of fac- recommendations to actual members and typically use changes in time to tors such as audience and problem of the National Security Council. advance play, so they are not restricted space on the form of games at NSGC In the capstone exercise, the prob- to executing the game in real-time. is examined. lem space was principally shaped by They are structured by the sets of actors constraints such as the simultaneity and constraints that form the problem Strategic Military and of the problems, finite resources, the space in the game and that govern Academic Support Division immediacy of threats, and the various player choices throughout but can The Strategic Military and Aca- nonproliferation and regional security also state them more qualitatively and demic Support Division provides gam- challenges specific to each day’s sce- less precisely. ing, exercise, and curriculum support nario. There were numerous relevant Seminar exercises relax some of to NDU colleges and components. Stra- actors populating the problem space, the restrictions that structure other tegic-level seminar exercises form a types of games, which offers both edu- core component of several classes cational and analytical advantages (al- at NDU, and the NSGC has de- though greater scope comes at the cost veloped an extensive repertoire of of analytical precision). The exercises games on relevant issues. These not only accommodate but also take games have an explicitly educa- advantage of the strengths of a highly tional goal of prompting students interdisciplinary audience. They allow to integrate and make active use designers to build detailed scenarios of the information they master with the understanding that different in individual classes and in their participants will draw information and studies as a whole. The games conclusions from different parts of the must be designed not only to en- scenario and introduce these elements hance participants’ knowledge into the discussion. They provide an directly, but also to draw out effective environment for analyzing that knowledge that their col- both coordination challenges and such leagues bring to the classroom problems as identifying constraints from their career experience. and their implications for different ac- In the spring of 2005, the tors. Where more educational goals NSGC executed the year-end are intended, games can be designed capstone exercise for the Na- to provide more comprehensive back- tional War College’s National ground and guided discussions and ac- Military Strategy course. The

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 37 ■ STRATEGIC GAMING

including adversarial states and trans- cedures through protracted national actors, other regional third discussion. In this way, exer- party countries and organizations, and cises not only identify where U.S. civilian and military actors, includ- better coordination would be ing the members of the PCC. The game, desirable, but they also iden- therefore, truly depicted strategic-level tify partner offices for players challenges. Designers used a variety of and point to assets not im- media to introduce scenarios, including mediately apparent within the video injects, on-line materials, and players’ organizations. computer slides. The seminar format A recent example of this was especially effective because it al- work is a game focusing on lowed designers to link coherently the government transition in Cuba otherwise disparate problem scenarios that was conducted for the De- Forum and convey the game’s focus on the partment of State’s Office of Co- multiple, conflicting priorities of an ordination, Reconstruction and enormous battlespace. Development. The game sought Students can exploit several educa- to test, challenge, and evaluate tional features of such exercises: apply- current American policy and ing knowledge gained from the course, policymakers’ assumptions about learning from the experience their col- events following a posited political change in Cuba. Over one of the most popular games 30 participants attended a 2-day, branch, bringing together Members posited a release of anthrax in the multistage game, which focused of Congress, senior executive branch on the dynamic, strategic, po- officials, and military leaders for stra- San Diego metropolitan area litical, and military changes in tegic-level crisis simulations. Designed Cuba subsequent to a change in to enhance understanding of crisis de- leagues bring to the seminar table, and government. Participants included se- cisionmaking in an interagency set- thinking through U.S. policy options, nior officials from the Departments ting, the forums allow exploration of given the strategic constraints identi- of State, Treasury, Commerce, and emerging national security issues and fied in the exercise. Many, moreover, Defense; the U.S. Agency for Interna- the capabilities and limitations of in- will apply these insights directly as they tional Development; and congressio- struments of national power in dealing return to duty following graduation. nal staff and local universities. The with these challenges. exercise concluded with a formal “hot One of the most popular games, Interagency Support—Security wash” session in which players pre- a bioterrorism exercise called Scarlet Strategy and Policy Division sented policy recommendations to a Shield, was revised and executed in The Gaming Center is also in- panel of experts simulating Cabinet- early 2005 and illustrates the types of volved in designing and conducting level decisionmakers. Players’ highly events SPF conducts. Participants in- exercises that support interagency positive evaluations of the exercise cluded Senators and senior executive planning and response to complex cri- focused on its utility in highlighting branch officials from the Departments ses. The Security Strategy and Policy coordination and planning needs. It of Defense, Homeland Security, and Division provides exercises for the helped identify a wider range of po- Health and Human Services. Deputy executive branch’s strategic decision- tential outcomes that would need to Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz making community in the Washington be planned for as well as variations opened the exercise, which posited a area as well as the regional combatant in responses to the crisis, both Cuban release of anthrax in the San Diego command Joint Interagency Coordina- and American. metropolitan area. tion Groups through the Interagency As play advanced, participants Transformation, Education, and After Congressional Support— were asked to make policy recommen- Action Review program. The strate- The Strategic Policy Forum dations about dealing with the Califor- gic seminar game form is well suited The Gaming Center is also home nia attacks as further cases appeared in to such issues; these games bring to- to the Strategic Policy Forum (SPF). the Midwest and intelligence reports gether a wide-ranging group from the Initiated by the Secretary of Defense, indicated the possibility of attacks in interagency community, allowing par- the forum conducts seminar exercises Washington, DC. Constraints such as ticipants to explore coordination needs centered on international and home- the logistic exigencies of managing and solutions and troubleshoot pro- land security issues for the legislative multiple dispersed incidents, dealing

38 JFQ / issue thirty-nine M c C o w n

with an unprecedented public health lowed me to better understand that participants but also constitutes a use- crisis on a number of fronts, and co- decisionmaking process and to explore ful analytical environment in which ordinating the work of several agen- response actions and consequences.” to identify and weigh policy options cies and levels of government were Representative Frank Lucas (R–OK) as- and needs. This is the goal of good built into the scenario. All of these serted, “these simulations are invaluable game design. constraints shaped the strategic en- to helping Members of Congress see the Game design that reflects the in- vironment in which players could big picture of our Nation’s defense and terplay between such elements as aims, make recommendations. A seminar economy after another possible terrorist audience, and problem situation is vital game structure is useful for such policy attack. . . . We can use that knowledge to determining how useful games are problems because players must engage when we’re making decisions on what to participants. For the participants for with the multiple demands and goals resources are needed in defense of our whom the NSGC builds exercises (often that exist simultaneously in any strate- homeland.” The emphasis on the coor- diverse and experienced players) and gic scenario. Specialists tend to assign the situations that Forum disproportionate importance to issues a useful analytical environment in which to are being simulated closest to their area of expertise, but a identify and weigh policy options and needs (complex political- game setting requires them to identify military problems) the range of issues and constraints that is the goal of good game design the strategic semi- concurrently shape a strategic environ- nar exercises con- ment and to articulate prioritizations dination benefits is clear, but the util- structed by the Gaming Center seek and integrated solutions. To foster ity of exercises as an environment in to match form to needs. They produce open discussion, SPF exercises are con- which to brainstorm policy solutions, tightly crafted but flexible scenarios, ducted as nonattribution events. solicit high-level expert feedback, and describing the constraints and actors On occasion, members of Congress test notional solutions competitively is that constitute a problem situation. have made public comments about the also implied. Participants assert that these exercises utility of the games. Their feedback and The seminar discussion form of constitute helpful policy tools. press releases note that exercises can the exercises provides the structure Current discussions of warfare highlight previously unseen dimen- that facilitates these outcomes; clearly recognize a dynamic international sions to problems, assist coordination crafted scenarios, rich in contextual environment, featuring a battlespace between agencies, and help identify detail, but not so overworked as to crossing global geographic and cultural and explore potential consequences. make scenario-events seem improb- boundaries and demanding integrated Members of Congress have specifically able, are months in the making in the operations with new partners. Policy- attributed several of these benefits to SPF. But cleanly constructed scenarios, makers and warfighters are creating SPF events. For example, Representative structured by sets of pre-identified con- new solutions to new problems, often Rick Larsen (D–WA) observed, “In any straints and game goals and augmented on the fly and with good results. These national security crisis, dozens of agen- by carefully researched detail, create an problems are not entirely unforesee- cies have to make quick, coordinated environment for discussion that facili- able, however. The opportunity to decisions. Today’s crisis simulation al- tates not only learning on the part of gather in a seminar room and evaluate tomorrow’s strategic challenges, which High school students in the National Youth Leadership Forum engage in simulations at the Gaming Center sprawl across borders, issues, areas, and peoples, enables proactive decisionmaking. It helps individuals and organizations identify solutions, think through consequences, and head off problems before they become crises.

Quality game design and the relevance of the problem being gamed determine how useful exercises are to participants. The National Strategic Gaming Center unites both in the exercises it builds and executes, underpin- ning its standing as a premier national gaming center. JFQ National Strategic Gaming Center

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 39 The Chairman’s Strategic Essay Contest

ational Defense University Press meant to assist the Chairman with the research topics, and the joint, inter- Nis pleased to announce the win- tasks of stimulating critical thinking agency, and international spread of ners of the 24th Annual Chairman of among security professionals as well as winners was tremendous: the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay making the research more accessible to st Contest, held May 18–19, 2005, at the a wider readership while publicly hon- 1 place Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Mor- National Defense University (NDU) oring the winners and their faculty ris, USMC, Al Qaeda as Insurgency campus, Fort Lesley J. McNair, supporters. Furthermore, NDU (Army War College) Washington, DC. The purpose Press will consider all semi- 2d place of this competition is to stim- finalist research papers for Martin J. Gorman, Defense Intelli- ulate strategic thinking and publication in future issues gence Agency, and Commander Al- promote well-written research of JFQ. This year, all partici- exander Krongard, USN, A Goldwa- and a broader security debate pants will receive a certifi- ter-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government: among professionals. Students cate of participation signed Institutionalizing the Interagency Process (National War College) from all services, interagency by NDU President, Lieutenant students, and international fellows General Michael Dunn, USAF, and 3d place (tie) attending senior U.S. service or joint finalists will receive a certificate signed ■ Colonel Gerard P. Fogarty, Aus- professional military education col- by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of tralian Army, Guantanamo Bay: Undermining the Global War on Terror leges are eligible to compete. Staff, General Richard Myers. Winners (Army War College) This presentation of the winners also receive monetary gifts provided ■ Lieutenant Colonel John M. Ami- marks a first in both the 24-year his- by the NDU Foundation. don, USAF, America’s Strategic Impera- tory of the contest and the 12-year The 2005 contest saw a 25 per- tive: A “Manhattan Project” for Energy history of Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ). cent increase in the number of es- (Air War College) Henceforth, the winning essays will be says judged, making this year’s event As in past competitions, each mil- published in a “special feature” section among the most competitive in its his- itary senior-level school—Air, Army, in each 4th quarter issue of JFQ. The tory. The nominated essays represented Marine Corps, Naval, and National War publication of the winning essays is a wide spectrum of security education Colleges, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces—selected its best student essays for the contest. Some 2005 CJCS Strategic Essay Contest Distinguished Judges service colleges made the decision to Dr. Chris Bassford—National War College accept intermediate and advanced ser- Professor Charles C. Chadbourn III—Naval War College Dr. Alan Gropman—Industrial College of the Armed Forces vice school essays. Each senior col- LtCol Steven Hansen, USAF—Air War College lege also provided 2 judges to evaluate Col Kevin Keith, USAF—National War College the entries at the 2-day finals, held in Dr. Milt Kovner—Industrial College of the Armed Forces NDU’s Marshall Hall. NDU Press orga- Dr. Larry D. Miller—U.S. Army War College nized and conducted the contest with Dr. James A. Mowbray—Air War College support from the NDU Foundation. Professor Paul Romanski—Naval War College NDU Press hopes this year’s con- Dr. Joseph L. Strange—Marine Corps War College Dr. Jon Sumida—Marine Corps University test and publication of the winning COL Robert H. Taylor, USA (Ret.)—U.S. Army War College essays in JFQ will continue to inspire senior-level students, faculty, and others CJCS Essay Contest Team – National Defense University to think and write about major national Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF—Director, NDU Press; Editor, JFQ security issues. The success of this year’s COL Debra Taylor, USA—Deputy Director, NDU Press; Managing Editor contest would not have been possible Mr. George C. Maerz—Supervisory Editor, CJCS Essay Contest Project Officer without the support and cooperation Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ms. Lisa M. Yambrick—Editorial Staff TSgt Ayanna Woods, USAF—Office Manager of the students and faculty at the U.S. Armed Forces senior war colleges. To See more on the 25th Annual Chairman’s learn more, visit the NDU Press Web Strategic Essay Contest at ndupress.ndu.edu site at ndupress.ndu.edu.

40 JFQ / issue thirty-ninethirty-nine M o r r i s

Marines clearing a house while searching for weapons caches and insurgents in the Thar Thar Lake area of Iraq Marine Division Combat Camera (Robert R. Attebury) d 2 Al Qaeda as Insurgency

By MICHAEL F. MORRIS

he National Strategy for ace as one of transnational terrorism. Homeland Security desig- Recently, however, some analysts have nates al Qaeda as “Amer- begun to challenge that conclusion. ica’s most immediate and They argue that al Qaeda represents a Tserious threat.” Conventional wisdom, new type of insurgency.1 Assessing the reflected in news media, public opin- nature of the enemy is a critical first ion, and government studies such as step in crafting effective strategy. In the National Strategy for Combating Ter- the case of al Qaeda, one must answer rorism, characterizes the al Qaeda men- three important questions to clarify the

Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Morris, USMC, wrote this article while a student at the U.S. Army War College.

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 41 ■ CHAIRMAN’S ESSAY CONTEST WINNERS

extent of the danger and further hone definition of terrorism focuses on the olutionary, goals, but their violence America’s strategic response. First, does targets (civilians or noncombatants) of replaces rather than complements a the movement actually represent an violence rather than on its legal nature political program. insurgency? If so, are there indeed new or intended objective.3 Still, the UN If definitions offer only a partial elements that make al Qaeda different and DOD definitions both sidestep the aid in discriminating between terror- than previous insurgencies? Finally, notion of state-sponsored terrorism. ism and insurgency, organizational what implications do these answers The DOD definition cites only unlaw- traits have traditionally provided an- have for the current war against Osama ful violence (thereby making the term other means. Insurgencies normally bin Laden’s movement? The analysis state terrorism an oxymoron), whereas field fighting forces that are orders that follows suggests that al Qaeda rep- the UN definition excludes state-spon- of magnitude larger than those of ter- resents an emerging form of global Is- sored terrorism and deals with state rorist organizations. Typically, insur- lamic insurgency, the inchoate strategy gents organize their of which undermines its potential to the distinction between terrorism and forces in military achieve its revolutionary goals. None- insurgency is not merely theoretical, as the fashion as squads, theless, not unlike previous failed in- platoons, and com- surgencies, it possesses both durability appropriate responses are very different panies. Terrorist and an immense capacity for destruc- units are usually tion. These characteristics mandate a violence against civilians as bona fide smaller and comprised of isolated counterrevolutionary response at the war crimes or crimes against humanity teams not organized into a formal strategic level that aims not only to under the Geneva Convention. More military chain of command. Insurgent destroy the organization but also to importantly for a strategist trying to forces are often more overt as well, discredit its ideological underpinnings. characterize the nature of the threat, especially in the sanctuaries or zones neither definition conveys exactly they dominate. Terrorist organizations, Terrorism or Insurgency what distinguishes the violence of ter- which tend toward extreme secrecy The distinction between terrorism rorism from that of insurgency. and compartmented cells to facilitate and insurgency is not merely theoreti- Definitions of insurgency have sim- security, seldom replicate an insurgen- cal, as the appropriate responses to ilar difficulties. DOD defines the term cy’s political structure. the two phenomena are very different. as “an organized movement aimed at One characteristic that does not Before addressing preferred strategies the overthrow of a constituted gov- distinguish terrorism from insurgency to counter each, one should establish ernment through use of subversion is the use of terror tactics. Terrorists how they are alike and how they differ. and armed conflict.”4 Terrorist orga- and insurgents may employ exactly Unfortunately, existing definitions do nizations with revolutionary aspira- the same methods and utilize force more to cloud than clarify the issues. tions seem to meet that criterion, and or the threat thereof to coerce their Neither academic nor government thus the insurgent definition fails to target audiences and further the orga- experts agree on a suitable definition help analysts differentiate one from nizational agenda. Both groups may for terrorism. another. Bard O’Neill comes closer to threaten, injure, or kill civilians or gov- The Department of Defense (DOD) distinguishing the two phenomena by ernment employees using an array of Dictionary of Military and Associated including an overtly political compo- similar means. Thus, the use of terror Terms definition focuses on the type of nent in his definition of insurgency: in itself does not equate to terrorism; violence employed (unlawful) toward the former is merely a tactical tool of specified ends (political, religious, or A struggle between a nonruling group the latter. Lawrence Freedman suggests ideological).2 This characterization fails and the ruling authorities in which the that the terror of terrorists equates to to address the argument from moral nonruling group consciously uses political “strategic” terrorism, because it is the relativity that “one man’s terrorist is resources (e.g., organizational expertise, primary means by which they pur- another man’s freedom fighter.” In propaganda, and demonstrations) and sue their agenda. However, the terror essence, this objection to a suitable violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain that insurgents employ is more tactical definition submits that while violence the basis of legitimacy of one or more as- since it is but one of several violent may be “unlawful” in accordance with pects of politics.5 tools such groups wield.6 This parsing a victim’s statutes, the cause served by underscores the point that a variety those committing the acts may repre- Thus, insurgencies combine vio- of agents, including states, insurgents, sent a positive good in the eyes of neu- lence with political programs in pur- and criminals, as well as terrorists, may tral observers. To escape this dilemma, suit of revolutionary purposes in a way employ the same techniques of terror. the recently recommended (but not that terrorism cannot duplicate. Ter- Given the challenges of defini- yet approved) United Nations (UN) rorists may pursue political, even rev- tion and the shared use of the same

42 JFQ / issue thirty-nine M o r r i s

tactical repertoire, it is hardly surpris- ism. Instead, it offers another means to underscores its commitment to both ing that the terms terrorism and insur- distinguish terrorism from insurgency. politics and violence as a mechanism gency frequently appear synonymously. Specifically, this theory posits that the for change: The Department of State register of ter- degree of linkage remaining between a rorist organizations lists small, covert, given radical group and its parent so- Islamic governments have never been, and cellular groups such as Abu Nidal and cial movement determines what Wievi- will never be, established through peaceful Greece’s “Revolutionary Organization orka refers to as pure terrorism. There is solutions and cooperative councils. They of 17 November;” it also lists larger or- a connection between this notion and are established as they [always] have ganizations with shadow governments the broader political nature of insur- been, by pen and gun, by word and bullet, in established zones, strong political gency, though it is not an angle Wievi- by tongue and teeth.9 components, and well-defined military orka himself examines. Organizations hierarchies, such as the Revolutionary that have not yet inverted and that Finally, the terror tactics employed Armed Forces of Colombia and the maintain connections to a significant in pursuit of al Qaeda’s ideological New People’s Army in the Philippines. segment of society represent not just goals qualify it for either insurgent or Most analysts would characterize these social antimovements but potential terrorist status. organizations as insurgencies, although insurgencies.8 In terms of traditional characteris- they employ strong doses of terror on tics of classic terrorist and insurgent or- both opponents and the surrounding The Terrorism-Insurgency Scale ganizations, al Qaeda turns in a mixed populace. Not surprisingly, al Qaeda is Using the three analytical lenses— score. It is relatively small (perhaps 100 on the State Department list of 37 for- definitions, organizational traits, and hard-core adherents), but in Afghani- eign terrorist organizations. To deter- Wieviorka’s inversion theory—where stan it did train approximately 18,000 mine if it belongs there, this article will does al Qaeda fall on the terrorism-in- fighters, who have subsequently dis- employ a third analytical framework surgency scale? Certainly it meets the persed around the world in some 60 to supplement the insights offered by component tests of the various terror- countries.10 Of this small army (which existing definitions and traditional or- ism definitions: unlawful (a nonstate is larger than 61 of the world’s 161 ganizational characteristics. actor); political/religious/ideological in armies), perhaps 3,000 are true al In the 1980s, the French soci- intent (fatwas calling for the removal Qaeda troops, as opposed to mere ben- ologist Michel Wieviorka conducted of Islamic regimes guilty of religious eficiaries of al Qaeda tactical training.11 research that determined that terror- heresies), and targeting civilians (for The small, relatively cellular structure ists are estranged from both the social instance, the World Trade Center at- of the hard core suggests a terrorist movements that spawned them and tacks). It also comprises “an organized organization, while the scope and scale the societies they oppose. He uses the movement aimed at the overthrow of of its dedicated, deployed militants term social antimovement to describe a constituted government through use indicates a significant, if somewhat the intermediate stage between legiti- of subversion and armed conflict” in dispersed, insurgency. When al Qaeda mate social movements and terrorism. accordance with the DOD insurgency enjoyed political space in which to Antimovements may employ violence, definition. In terms of exhibiting a po- operate unhindered in Afghanistan, it but they maintain some association litical component, some have called al conducted its business in a relatively with the parent social movement. It Qaeda an armed political party and the overt manner as insurgencies usually is only when that linkage dissolves, a extremist wing of a political religion. do. Under duress since 9/11, it has re- process Wieviorka calls inversion, that The group’s political works include gressed to a more covert style in accor- a militant becomes a terrorist. The vio- propaganda efforts such as the issu- dance with terrorist protocol. lence of terrorist actors is no longer ance of fatwas, protection and projec- Wieviorka’s precepts suggest that purposeful—in pursuit of a rational tion of Salafist religious infrastructure, al Qaeda has not yet inverted and political goal—but replaces the par- and mobilization of grassroots sup- transitioned to pure terrorism. Osama ent social movement’s ideology. This bin Laden’s organization conclusion underscores a frequent con- some have called al Qaeda an armed stemmed from the politi- tention in the literature on political political party and the extremist wing cal tradition of the Muslim violence, that terrorism is the domain Brotherhood, which prom- of organizations, where the strategic of a political religion ised an Islamic alternative to repertoire of violence conflates means capitalist and Marxist mod- and ends.7 port through cooperation with Islamist els of development. Normally, social Wieviorka’s construct does not parties as well as orchestration of fa- movements such as that represented provide a means upon which one can vorable media coverage in the Islamic by the Muslim Brotherhood could hang a consensus definition of terror- press. The al Qaeda training manual compete effectively in an environment

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 43 ■ CHAIRMAN’S ESSAY CONTEST WINNERS

Insurgents fighting U.S. troops in Fallujah, Iraq AP/Wide Photo (Abdul Kadir Sadi) World

of democratic elections. In a Muslim lace among which he and his follow- a utopian dream promising a power- landscape devoid of free elections, how- ers hide has delivered neither him nor ful yet thoroughly isolated Islamic ever, alternate ideological competitors his chief lieutenants despite the offer world. Such traits are symptomatic of either die out or become subversive to of large rewards, and the relative lack a social antimovement. Pure terror- continue the political fight. Al Qaeda of condemnation of the group’s ac- ism, on the other hand, might exhibit represents a version of the latter. While tivities by Islamic clerics suggest that the same radical goals and appalling the group’s methodology of martyrdom al Qaeda has not severed its connection acts but would result in far broader (reflecting the radical ideology of bin with significant segments of its social condemnation of al Qaeda’s agenda Laden’s Palestinian spiritual mentor constituency. than has occurred so far throughout Abdallah Azzam) is apocalyptic from This grassroots support indicates the Muslim world. Analysts who con- a Western perspective, it is in accord an organization still in the social anti- clude that bin Laden is winning the with at least a version of the Islamic re- movement phase rather than a terrorist war of ideas between the radical and ligious tradition of jihad. Thus, it is not group divorced from the population it moderate Islamic religious traditions claims to represent. Al Qaeda further reinforce the counterintuitive only a war of ideas can confront and has radically disengaged itself determination that al Qaeda is not yet defeat ideologies politically (perhaps inevitable a terrorist organization. Such evidence given the autocratic nature indicates a growing linkage between of the regimes it opposes), is the purveyors of violence and the pol- a complete departure from its own so- hyper-aggressive toward those it per- ity they claim to represent. Purposeful cietal norms. Moreover such factors as ceives as responsible for its political political violence committed on behalf bin Laden’s popularity throughout the weakness (Jews, Americans, and apos- of a sizable segment of society suggests Muslim world, the fact that the popu- tate Muslim leaders), and advocates insurgency. Importantly, the judgment

44 JFQ / issue thirty-nine M o r r i s

that al Qaeda has not descended into war of ideas can confront and defeat coerce America to withdraw from the terrorism is not to sanction the group’s ideologies. An integrated counterin- Middle East and abandon sponsorship horrific conduct or render support for surgency (COIN) program that enables of Israel,13 although some argue that its its political objectives. Instead, it rep- the targeted government to offer more long-term objective encompasses noth- resents an effort to assess its current appealing opportunities than the insur- ing less than the destruction of the status, accurately portray its nature, gents’ (doubtless utopian) vision must United States and the West. and thereby help determine how best peel away popular support. Finally, a While it is important to classify to combat it. successful approach must identify and an insurgency’s type and understand Combating terrorism and insur- systematically neutralize the insur- its goals, the operative question is how gency requires different strategies. Both gent strategy’s operational elements. the movement uses the means at its pose significant threats to the United Al Qaeda represents not terrorism, but disposal to achieve desired ends—in States. Terrorists, in an age of trans- an insurgency featuring a Salafist the- other words, what strategy does it em- national cooperation and access to ology that sanctifies terror and appeals ploy? It is not enough to have a guid- weapons of mass destruction, have the to significant portions of Muslim being ideology and a susceptible body means to unleash catastrophic attacks lievers. The next section will explore politic with significant, and potentially on modern societies that dwarf even whether the nascent insurgency has exploitable, grievances against the ex- the blows of 9/11. But terrorism, how- the strategic wherewithal to enact rev- isting government. In the operational ever powerful in a destructive sense, olutionary change. realm, something must connect the remains the province of the politically two. Without this linkage, ideologies weak. Terrorists are physically and A Policy-Strategy Mismatch may produce terrorists and grievances psychologically removed from broad Islamic insurgency is not a new may spawn rebellions. But it is only popular support. Because they remain phenomenon. Nevertheless, histori- when ideology and grievances combine isolated from the social movements cally it has not been successful. More- that insurgencies result. Understanding from which they sprang and their po- over, as Lawrence Freedman notes, how strategy effects that combination litical goals become more and more revolutions that rely on terror as the provides insight into the best ways to primary means of counter a particular insurgency. Cur- bin Laden’s attempts to communicate directly political violence rent doctrine identifies two basic insur- court strategic gent strategies: mass mobilization (best with and threaten the American people failure.12 Does al illustrated by Mao Tse-tung’s people’s illustrate an effort to address his enemy’s Qaeda’s meth- war construct) and armed action (fea- political vulnerabilities odology promise turing either rural-based foco or urban a different out- warfare-oriented styles).14 come? The move- Al Qaeda exhibits a blend of divorced from reality over time, it is ment’s goals are revolutionary; they both insurgent strategies. Primarily, neither necessary nor possible to nego- envision remaking society such that bin Laden’s movement employs the tiate with them. They are a blight, like religious faith is foundational, social urban warfare version of the armed crime, that cannot be eliminated but stratification is enforced, and the gov- action strategy. Certainly most of the that states must control to limit their ernment is autocratic and controlled group’s activities have been military impact on society. Of course, states by clerics. The Islamist governments of rather than political in nature. It has must hunt terrorists possessing the Iran, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and not sought to use rural-based military means and will to conduct catastrophic the leadership in Sudan illustrate ap- forces to court recruits and wage a attacks not only with national and in- proaches to the ideal. Al Qaeda intends systematic campaign of destruction ternational police resources, but also to establish like regimes in lieu of apos- against target governments. Instead, al with all the diplomatic, informational, tate Muslim governments such as those Qaeda has employed violence against military, and economic instruments of of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The new both government and civilian targets national power. Salafist administrations would strictly to create instability and undermine the However, states must handle in- enforce sharia law and block the mili- confidence and political will of its en- surgents differently, because they rep- tary and cultural inroads of the West. emies. Small, covert teams employing resent both a political and a military Al Qaeda’s political objective, then, creative suicide techniques planned challenge. Insurgents combine an ideo- remains unlimited vis-à-vis targeted and executed its attacks against the logically motivated leadership with Islamic regimes. It seeks to overthrow USS Cole, the Khobar Tower barracks an unsatisfied citizenry (the so-called their form of government. With regard in Saudi Arabia, and the World Trade “grievance guerrillas”) in order to chal- to the United States, the group’s po- Center and Pentagon. lenge existing governments. Only a litical objectives are more limited: to The movement has not adopted a

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mass mobilization strategy, but it does warfare. Such a strategy is in conso- that illustrates such a parallel hierar- employ some of Mao’s key concepts. nance with a protracted war timeline, if chy is a virtual counterstate known as The Chinese Communist Party’s care- not the ponderous methodology of its the da’wa.17 Grassroots social programs fully managed mass line finds its analog Maoist antecedent. Urban warfare seeks comprise this alternate society, which is in the Islamic madrassas, mosques, and only to disrupt, not to build a con- designed to prove the efficacy of funda- media outlets. These forums publicize ventional force capable of challenging mentalist policies and gradually build a bin Laden’s philosophy, echo the peo- government forces in pitched battles. mass base that will eventually translate ple’s complaints, and conjoin the ideol- It subverts targeted governments in into political power. The da’wa includes ogy and grievances in a perfect storm preparation for the day when military associations of middle-class profession- of revolutionary fervor. Islamic madras- action may remove a greatly weakened als, Islamic welfare agencies, schools sas, mosques, and media also provide regime. Regardless of which military and student groups, nongovernmen- a suitable venue for aspects of political strategy al Qaeda employs, it is appar- tal humanitarian assistance organiza- warfare. Bin Laden’s attempts to com- tions, clinics, and mosques. municate directly with and threaten in addition to the strategic intent of These venues advance po- the American people have been nei- influencing enemy policy, attacks also litical ideas and sometimes ther sophisticated nor effective, but instigate mass protests. they do illustrate an effort to address serve to mobilize the Muslim world Though this overt nucleus his enemy’s political vulnerabilities. of a parallel government Al Qaeda has also proven quite willing ent that bin Laden has the long view has developed in nations such as Egypt, to cooperate, in a virtual united front, of history necessary to persevere in a Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, it has not with a long list of otherwise dubious al- protracted war. His religious faith is un- yet attained the revolutionary capacity lies, including Shi’ite Hizballah, secular perturbed by short-term setbacks or the exhibited by Maoist people’s war co- Ba’thist officials, and Chinese crimi- lack of immediate progress in unseat- vert infrastructure. Opposition parties nal syndicates. International support is ing target governments. Even death such as the Muslim Brotherhood have important. Since the displacement of in combat is seen as motivational for not been able to leverage this latent Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban party, pri- those warriors who follow in the foot- source of organizational strength into mary assistance comes from countries steps of the martyred mujahideen. a successful challenge to sitting govern- such as Iran and Syria as well as a host While al Qaeda does not use the ments. Theodore Gurr observes that the of like-minded state and regional insur- same mobilization techniques Mao’s existence of options for dissent like the gencies and terrorist organizations. strategy employed, it nonetheless ben- da’wa sometimes bleed off revolution- Mao’s prescription for protracted efits from similar operational effects ary energy and make successful insur- war is also in keeping with al Qaeda’s achieved in a different way. The pur- rection less likely rather than facilitat- brand of Islamic revolutionary war. The pose of covert infrastructure is to op- ing its advance.18 The da’wa’s capacity mujahideen employed long-term guer- erationalize control of human terrain. as a conduit for Maoist-style political rilla warfare in Afghanistan to drive out The shadow government provides or mobilization is nonetheless striking. the Soviets; bin Laden looks to repli- controls education, tax collection, civil The strategy of al Qaeda is thus cate that success in a similar protracted and military recruiting services, public a blending of the more familiar mass campaign against America. In addition works, economic infrastructure devel- mobilization and armed action strate- to the small unit attacks characteris- opment and operation, police func- gies. Some of the factors that made tic of traditional guerrilla warfare, the tions, and legal adjudication. While Mao’s people’s war strategy effective are larger operations conducted by thou- there is no evidence of an al Qaeda present in al Qaeda’s twist on “making sands of al Qaeda-trained soldiers in equivalent to a communist-style co- revolution.” The religious foundation Afghanistan against the Russians (and vert infrastructure as seen in China, of al Qaeda’s ideology and the devout later the Northern Alliance) indicate Malaya, or Vietnam, the radical Islamic nature of the societies it seeks to coopt that bin Laden does not oppose amass- religious movement has developed create a novel dynamic with a poten- ing and employing more conventional a construct that militant ideologues tially new way of connecting means to military power if time, resources, and could subvert and employ to attain the ends. So far this potential is unrealized. political space permit. For example, his same ends. O’Neill notes that religious In the modern era, radical Muslims May 2001 communiqué calls for the institutions may replicate the paral- have applied the coercive social con- formation of a 10,000-man army to lel hierarchies of covert infrastructure trol consistent with bin Laden’s brand liberate Saudi Arabia.15 and that religious inducement is more of Islam only following the seizure of When denied the opportunity to compelling to potential recruits than political power. In Iran, Afghanistan, fight conventionally, al Qaeda is will- secular ideology.16 and Sudan, the da’wa did not serve as a ing to fall back on more limited urban The militant Islamist construct virtual counterstate as shadow govern-

46 JFQ / issue thirty-nine M o r r i s

ments did in Maoist people’s wars. But the constrained military means creates unique challenges inherent in battling in the future, al Qaeda may not have a fatal policy-strategy mismatch that the first global insurgent movement. to replicate Mao’s secular infrastruc- dooms its insurgency to failure.19 Some of the traditional COIN prescrip- ture because alternate mechanisms of Thus far, this article has estab- tions are difficult to apply to a netted, control are already resident in the tar- lished that al Qaeda’s connection to transnational movement like al Qaeda. get societies. The challenge for Islamic the people in a number of Islamic For example, “clear and hold” tactics insurgents is to transition the da’wa’s countries means that its methodology do not work when the opponent dis- capacity for social influence into one is not terrorism but a kind of insur- perses across 60 nations around the of alternate political control. gency. The strategy of that insurgency, globe. Similarly, sanctuary is no longer Whether or not such an evolu- combining a variety of forms and styles a state or even a regional problem; with tion proves feasible, al Qaeda’s armed in pursuit of both limited and unlim- a global threat it becomes an interna- action approach seeks to achieve its ited political goals, demonstrates the tional issue. The scope of the challenge limited political objectives versus ability to disrupt on a massive level, increases vastly when potential spon- the United States through a military but with less likelihood of actually en- sors include not only nations such as strategy of erosion. That is, additional acting revolutionary change. The final Iran, Sudan, and Syria, but also regions strikes of sufficient magnitude could question is how to modify existing in turmoil such as Chechnya and failed induce America to reconsider its policy policies to better address the peculiar states such as Somalia. options in the Middle East. In addition nature of the emerging al Qaeda threat. Unlike extant COIN doctrine, the to the strategic intent of influencing National Strategy for Combating Terror- enemy policy, these attacks also serve Counterrevolutionary ism does not recognize the insurgent to mobilize the Muslim world; gener- Implications nature of the threat. Instead the docu- ate recruits, money, and prestige; dem- The insurgent nature of the al ment characterizes al Qaeda as a mul- onstrate the global capacity to disrupt; Qaeda threat suggests that the United tinational terrorist network. Nonethe- and provide a forum for a kind of “per- States and its allies must counter the less, the methodology laid out in the formance violence” that symbolically enemy’s ideology, strategy, and the strategy incorporates a variety of COIN underscores the righteousness of its grievances he seeks to manipulate. techniques to include winning the war cause. Failure to harness a more potent The Army’s October 2004 Interim of ideas, eliminating sanctuaries, inter- political component with its military Counterinsurgency Operations Field dicting external support, and dimin- erosion option, however, means that Manual, FMI 3–07.22, mentions all of ishing underlying conditions. Interest- al Qaeda is less likely to overthrow these aspects of the struggle. Though ingly, the National War College student targeted Islamic regimes. The unlim- the manual recognizes al Qaeda as an report that inspired much of the war ited political objective associated with insurgency, it does not speak to the on terror strategy paper concluded that al Qaeda represented an evolution of terrorism that the authors dubbed Vehicle loaded with explosives pansurgency, defined as “an organized being destroyed by Marines in Karabilah, Iraq, Operation Spear movement of nonstate actors aimed at the overthrow of values, cultures, or societies on a global level through the use of subversion and armed conflict, with the ultimate goal of establishing a new world order.”20 That conclusion was the most important idea in the study that did not make it into the National Security Council-approved war on terror strategy paper. Doubtless the council preferred the illegitimacy inherent in the terrorist label rather than the ambiguity associated with an insurgent status. Greater emphasis on COIN methodology, however, would have improved the national counterterrorism strategy’s prescriptions for addressing Marine Division Combat Camera (Jason D. Becksted) d

2 al Qaeda’s ideology, strategy, and ex-

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ploitation of grievances. Addressing lation, but it does not identify a defeat of civil war, and the West is poorly grievances is essentially a tactical mechanism. Against mass mobiliza- positioned to referee it or encourage response. The current strategy rightly tion-style insurgencies, destruction of its end. The contest is not the venue indicates that championing market- the covert infrastructure is the pre- of an information operation writ large. based economies, good governance, ferred defeat mechanism. Al Qaeda Rather it is the age-old debate on reli- and the rule of law mitigates the condi- exerts far less control over a targeted gion’s role in governance. Each people tions that enemies exploit to recruit population because its strategy estab- must make its own choice; Madison insurgents. But experience in Haiti, lishes no shadow government, but the Avenue marketing and Western-style Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq indi- organization remains much more elu- politics are neither necessary nor suf- cates the overwhelming resource chal- sive as a result. Sir Robert Thompson ficient to sway the result. Instead, a lenges inherent in such nationbuild- recognized the dilemma posed by in- sophisticated form of political warfare ing. “Draining the swamp” as a means surgencies without infrastructure, not- must support and encourage moderate of removing grievances based on pov- ing that either organization or causes governments that champion tolerant erty, lack of education, poor medical are the vital factors behind insurgen- forms of the Islamic faith while op- care, and culturally induced violence cies; whichever factor pertains dictates posing religious fascism. The National is a generational investment and is fis- the appropriate strategic response.22 Security and Combating Terrorism strate- cally prohibitive even on a state level, If Maoist people’s war features or- gies mention but do not stress this war much less regional. Thus, the most ef- ganizational strength, then the Ameri- of ideas. It deserves more emphasis and fective means to resolve grievances is can Revolution illustrates insurgency attention because failure in this arena not through development or repair of motivated by an idea. The colonies will render moot even the destruction shattered infrastructure, but via reform possessed a degree of local government, of al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden’s move- of the targeted state’s political process. but they lacked the kind of pervasive ment is merely representative of the Broadened opportunity to participate organizational control that would en- threat posed by Salafist theology. Other in the sine qua non of politics—the sure that citizens had to support the groups, though less well known, harbor decisions about who gets what—un- revolutionary movement. Instead, similar political objectives and the con- dermines radical Islamic movements’ the glue that held the insurgency to- flict will continue until the underlying protected status in much of the Muslim gether was the popular idea of politi- ideas are rejected by the Muslim umma. world as virtually the only available cal independence. Similarly, al Qaeda’s The threat posed by radical Islam today option through which to express dis- strength lies in the appeal of its Salaf- resembles that posed in 1917 by com- ist/Wahhabian philoso- munism—a bad idea poised to justify al Qaeda exerts far less control over a phy, suggesting that it the spread of totalitarianism. targeted population because its strategy has no structural center The strategic challenge is to dis- of gravity at the opera- credit a fascist religious ideology before establishes no shadow government tional level. This verdict victim states experience a century of reflects the amorphous social, economic and political oppres- sent. Al Qaeda is a religiously inspired strategy the group has employed thus sion and recognize too late that Wah- revolutionary movement, but funda- far and reflects its lack of success in habism is simply another failed philos- mentally it is political.21 Thus, com- either toppling Islamic governments ophy of government. Key to meeting petitors offering different solutions for or causing the West to withdraw from that challenge is to recognize threats extant social, economic, and political the Middle East. But it also underscores as they are rather than as one wishes grievances threaten the movement’s the tremendous potential energy pos- them to be. The present National Se- political potential the most. In a largely sessed by a movement whose ideas curity Strategy fails this charge when it nondemocratic Islamic world, how- powerfully appeal to a sizable minority claims the enemy is terrorism rather ever, a move to greater electoral par- throughout the Muslim world. than the ideology that justifies the ter- ticipation is as revolutionary as the ror. This analysis confuses the symp- theocratic vision peddled by bin Laden The Strategic Challenge tom for the disease. The real problem and consequently remains a diplomatic Such an assessment dictates a dif- is a religiously inspired political ideol- hurdle of the highest order. ferent kind of response at the strategic ogy whose specified endstate is global At the operational level, the war level. The conflict is between compet- hegemony. Al Qaeda exemplifies this on terror strategy identifies a number ing visions of Islam. Moderate Islam is ideology and represents an emerging of useful diplomatic, informational, willing and able to accommodate mod- danger that demands a clear policy military, and economic instruments ernism; radical Islam insists that the response. Such a policy should promul- for use against al Qaeda. The paper religion return to the halcyon days of gate a comprehensive new doctrine endorses a military strategy of annihi- the 7th and 8th centuries. This is a kind encompassing the following elements.

48 JFQ / issue thirty-nine M o r r i s

Image from Al-Arabiya television of hooded gunmen threatening attacks coerced America to alter its poli- to behead a Turkish hostage cies in the Middle East. The resulting unless the United States releases contest of wills is classically asymmet- all Iraqi prisoners ric. Long-term success for the United States will require support for true po- recognizes and leverages litical reform among autocratic Islamic local conditions. More- governments—a revolutionary cause over, insurgency is only in itself. This path, though potentially one way to enact social destabilizing in the short term, holds and/or political change. more promise in the long run when Revolutions also occur radical Islamic insurgents are forced to peacefully (as the Shah compete with more moderate political of Iran learned in 1979), rivals in the marketplace of ideas. via coup (as Lenin dem- AP/Wide Photo World onstrated in 1917), or by A clear policy that identifies Salaf- The United States will: the ballot box (with the prospect of ist ideology as the problem and enun- “one man, one vote, one time” should ciates America’s opposition to the poli- ■ oppose those nations whose governments embrace Salafist jihadist ideology23 a totalitarian party win). tics of jihad is essential. Victory also ■ seek to contain the spread of Salafist Al Qaeda is the most deadly of the demands delegitimizing the radical jihadist ideology more than 100 Islamic militant groups Wahhabian strain of Islam that consid- ■ hold accountable those nations that formed over the past 25 years. The ers killing civilians not just a useful host, sponsor, or support Salafist jihadist danger it poses flows from its willing- tactic but also a religious imperative. groups ■ support allies (or nations whose sur- ness to employ weapons of mass effect, This goal, though beyond the means of vival is considered vital to U.S. security) its global reach, its focus on targeting a non-Muslim country to effect inde- if Salafist jihadist nations or movements America, and most importantly its rev- pendently, is the crux of the issue. The threaten their sovereignty. olutionary and expansionist ideology. rise of Islamic fascism, championed A doctrine such as this, not unlike The size of bin Laden’s organization, by groups such as al Qaeda, is the cen- Cold War-era anticommunist policies, its political goals, and its enduring re- tral strategic problem of the age. Only clarifies the national position, while en- lationship with a fundamentalist Is- victory in the simmering campaign abling political leaders to protect Amer- lamic social movement provide strong against the emerging global Islamic ican interests by selectively supporting evidence that it is not a terrorist group insurgency will prevent that challenge authoritarian allies and/or encouraging but an insurgency. Armed action is its from evolving into a much longer and political reform. This choice, reflecting primary strategy, but there are aspects more brutal clash of civilizations. JFQ the persistent foreign policy tension be- of mass mobilization techniques that tween idealism and realpolitik, remains serve to strengthen its organizational NOTES the essence of effective diplomacy. impact and resiliency. Elements unique Choosing wisely between idealism to its methodology include transna- 1 According to this school, much of and realism is vital because the militant tional networking and a multiethnic what Ian Lesser et al. characterize as a new Islamic threat that al Qaeda represents constituency. Together these factors form of terrorism in their study Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, is not monolithic. Branches of al Qaeda comprise an evolving style of spiritu- 1999) is in fact a new version of insurgency. as well as similar organizations may be ally-based insurgency that differs from See, for example: Anonymous, Through Our different in important ways. In the early the Maoist people’s war model that Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical days of the Cold War, the West thought underwrites most COIN doctrine. Islam, and the Future of America (Washing- the communist threat was monolithic, The disparate nature of the ton, DC: Brassey’s, 2002), xvii, 24, 279; Paul Rich, “Al Qaeda and the Radical Islamic but time and experience proved that it threat—in essence a global but some- Challenge to Western Strategy,” Small Wars was not. Neither is the Salafist threat. what leisurely-paced guerrilla war— & Insurgencies 14, no. 1 (Spring 2003), 46; All politics are local, even the politics makes it difficult to focus an effective Thomas R. Mockaitis, “Winning Hearts and of religion. COIN strategists must there- strategic response. But al Qaeda’s or- Minds in the War on Terrorism,” Small Wars fore evaluate each case on its own mer- ganizational and strategic choices also & Insurgencies 14, no. 1 (Spring 2003), 21, 37; James Risen, “Evolving Nature of Al its. While Islamic militants may cooper- make it difficult for the movement to Qaeda is Misunderstood, Critic Says,” The ate in a global fashion, the program concentrate power in ways that achieve New York Times, November 8, 2004, A18; they craft to topple a particular govern- its political ends. Thus far no targeted Kimbra L. Fishel, “Challenging the Hege- ment requires independent analysis and Islamic government has fallen to al mon: Al Qaeda’s Elevation of Asymmetric a counterrevolutionary strategy that Qaeda-inspired violence, nor have its Insurgent Warfare onto the Global Arena,”

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Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement author is indebted to Thomas A. Marks for the first mandate of its charter—security for 11(Winter 2002), 286, 290; John P. Sulli- the insights that application of Wievorka’s its citizens—may lead the citizenry to side van and Robert J. Bunker, “Multi-Lateral theory provide to differentiating terrorism with the insurgents. This strategy is clearly Counter-Insurgency Networks,” Low Inten- and insurgency. at work in contemporary Iraq. See O’Neill, sity Conflict & Law Enforcement 11 (Winter 9 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: 45–47; Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical 2002), 353, 364, 366; Rohan Gunaratna, Global Network of Terror (New York: Colum- and Critical Study (Boston: Little, Brown and “The Genealogy of Al Qaeda,” Gaiko Forum bia University Press, 2002), 5. Company, 1976), 343–352. 14 (Fall 2004), 16; Michael Vlahos, Terror’s 10 Bruce Hoffman, “The Changing Face 15 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Mask: Insurgency within Islam (Laurel, MD: of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terror- Shadow of Terror (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Johns Hopkins University Applied Phys- ism,“ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27 (No- Ltd., 2003), 128. For al Qaeda’s apprecia- ics Laboratory, 2002), 1–28. Only the last vember-December 2004), 552; Burke,10. tion of the merits of conventional fight- of these studies attempts to establish why 11 Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda, 8. ing, see Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama the threat constitutes insurgency instead 12 Freedman et al., 65. Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of of terrorism. The others simply assert that 13 Earl H. Tilford, “The War on Terror: America, 104–105. insurgency is the issue and then prescribe World War IV,” ROA National Security Report 16 O’Neill, 77, 93. various remedies. (Washington, DC: October 2004), 37–44. 17 Da’wa is not to be confused with 2 Terrorism is “the calculated use of 14 Each style exhibits strengths that the Islamic al-Da’wa political party in Iraq unlawful violence or threat of unlawful vio- make it dangerous and weaknesses that (a descendant of an Iranian-backed Shiite lence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce leave it vulnerable. Mass mobilization is best revolutionary movement founded in 1958). or to intimidate governments or societies in exemplified by the people’s war waged by Rather it is what Emmanuel Sivan calls “‘re- the pursuit of goals that are generally politi- Mao Tse-Tung’s Chinese Communist Party. Islamization from below,’ the long-term cal, religious, or ideological.” Mao’s experience and writings provided, infiltration into society’s every nook and 3 The recommended UN definition in essence, a blueprint for insurgency that cranny as a way to gain eventual political reads: “any action, in addition to actions has been the most successful and thus most control.” See Emmanuel Sivan, “Why Radi- already specified by the existing conven- widely copied strategy. People’s war empha- cal Muslims Aren’t Taking Over Govern- tions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva sizes politics over military considerations. ments,” in Revolutionaries and Reformers: Conventions and Security Council resolu- Accordingly, Mao’s strategy is designed to Contemporary Islamist Movements in the tion 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause build strength in a gradual fashion rather Middle East (Albany, NY: State University of death or serious bodily harm to civilians or than seize power in a lightning strike. Mao’s New York Press, 2003), 4. non-combatants, when the purpose of such thoughts on his strategy may be found in 18 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Military Writing of (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, a population, or to compel a Government Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Language 1970), 354–355. or an international organization to do or Press, 1967). General overviews of Maoist 19 Brad McAlister concludes that al to abstain from doing any act.” United Na- strategy are available in John Ellis, From the Qaeda will fail for another reason: the inher- tions, A More Secure World: Our Shared Re- Barrel of a Gun: A History of Guerrilla, Revolu- ent inefficiencies of its chosen networked sponsibility, Report of the Secretary General’s tionary and Counter-Insurgency Warfare, from organizational construct. Specifically, he High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and the Romans to the Present (London: Greenhill posits that the group’s size and complexity Change (New York: United Nations, 2004), Books, 1995), 177–199, and O’Neill, 34–41. are disadvantages rather than virtues as usu- 51–52. The armed action option subordinates polit- ally assumed. See Brad McAllister, “Al Qaeda 4 Department of Defense, Dictionary of ical to military considerations. Mobilization and the Innovative Firm: Demythologizing Military and Associated Terms, 207. of the population and patient development the Network,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 5 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terror- of covert infrastructure do not play critical 27 (July-August 2004), 297–319. ism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare roles in this strategy. Subcategories of this 20 National War College Student Task (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1990), 13. approach include rural-based foco insurgen- Force on Combating Terrorism, Combating 6 Lawrence Freedman et al., “Terrorism cies and urban warfare insurgencies. Foco in- Terrorism in a Globalized World (Washington, and Strategy,” in Terrorism and International surgencies are marked by a relatively small DC: National War College, 2002), 10. Order (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul force that commences guerrilla operations 21 Thomas A. Marks, “Ideology of In- Ltd., 1986), 58. and recruits members through the success of surgency: New Ethnic Focus or Old Cold 7 Michel Wieviorka, The Making its military strikes. See O’Neill, 41–45; Regis War Distortions?” Small Wars & Insurgencies of Terrorism, trans. David Gordon White Debray, Revolution in the Revolution? Armed 15, no. 1 (Spring 2004), 125. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America 22 Robert Thompson, Revolutionary War 1988), 3–41, 61–77. Wieviorka conducted a (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), in World Strategy, 1945–1969 (New York: Ta- comparative analysis of four sets of terrorist 106. Foco strategies have not been particu- plinger Publishing Company, 1970), 8–9. groups. He determined that the relationship larly successful outside of Cuba; they lack 23 “Salafist jihadists” is the term em- between a terrorist and his parent social the staying power that mass mobilization ployed by General John Abizaid, USA, to movement has been destroyed. The social provides and have no reserve manpower to describe the generic militant Islamic threat movement’s radicalized terrorist descendant tap following catastrophic setbacks. Finally, which al Qaeda exemplifies. See David Ig- has abandoned his roots and the people the urban warfare variation of the armed natius, “Achieving Real Victory Could Take whose message he claimed to champion. action strategy features raids, bombings, as- Decades,” The Washington Post, December Over time, the violence of terrorism tends sassinations, and sabotage against political 26, 2004, B1. to become more nihilistic and its perpetra- and economic targets in the target country’s tors less lucid. leading cities. The goal is to create chaos 8 Wievorka, in fact, uses the term and discredit the government in the eyes insurgency interchangeably with the term of its people. The population’s loss of confi- terrorism in his sociological analysis. The dence in the government’s ability to provide

50 JFQ / issue thirty-nine U.S. Soldiers escort a USAID developer to assess a well in Afghanistan

Our political system is too cumbersome to deal effectively with decisionmaking on the complex problems of the modern world. This problem may be irresolvable, but over the very long run, [it] could overwhelm everything else. — Robert Rubin, 19931

However the specific problems are labeled, we believe they are symptoms of the Government’s broader inability to adapt how it manages problems to the new challenges of the 21st century. — The 9/11 Commission Report, 20042 Signal Company (Thomas Bray) th 55 A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government Institutionalizing the Interagency Process

By MARTIN J. GORMAN a n d ALEXANDER KRONGARD

y enhancing the author- the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked whether ity of the Chairman of the we needed a Goldwater-Nichols–like Joint Chiefs of Staff and the change for the interagency process. unified combatant com- “Might we, at the national level, ask Bmands, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols our Cabinet-level individuals to give Department of Defense Reorganiza- up some of their day-to-day preroga- tion Act created a major impetus for tives and authority in a way that they the military to operate more efficiently will pick up in spades at the National and effectively. There have been broad Security Council level?”3 He proposed discussions about similar legislation a “lead agency concept,” in which the for the Federal Government over the President would designate a department last year. In September 2004, General or agency that “would have the author- Peter Pace, USMC, Vice Chairman of ity to tell folks in the Government in various agencies to get this job done.” Martin J. Gorman, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Commander Alexander Unfortunately, a Government- Krongard, USN, wrote this article while attending the National War College. wide Goldwater-Nichols Act that

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relies on the lead agency concept challenges to national security, America without merit, obscures much more would most likely fail in the absence clings to a ponderous and stovepiped elementary flaws in the national secu- of “joint” organizations throughout decisionmaking process that makes pol- rity structure. These flaws in essence the Federal Government similar to the icy difficult to develop and even more require passage of a 2005 National Se- military’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) difficult to implement. In short, when curity Act that combines an updated and the combatant commands that the Government confronts conflated 1947 National Security Act and a Gov- predated the 1986 act. In the absence or melded problems that are beyond ernment-wide Goldwater-Nichols Act. the capacity of any This legislation would institutionalize rather than seeking to unify knowledge single department the interagency process by mandating and expertise, the Government as currently or agency to solve, it major structural and cultural changes rarely develops com- to streamline the decisionmaking hi- structured does the opposite prehensive policies; erarchy and establish new methods instead, it poorly co- and organizations that develop policy of organizations that operate jointly ordinates its actions, badly integrates options, implement strategies, and in- and high-ranking government officials its strategies, and fails to synchronize tegrate Government actions. dedicated to jointness, the lead agency policy implementation. concept would fall prey to the paro- Previous reform proposals from A Conflation of Problems chial power of the various departments the National Commissions on the In- The pessimistic observations in and agencies, which in the end can telligence Capabilities of the United the epigraphs above, written in 1993 choose to cooperate or not. States Regarding Weapons of Mass De- and 2004, still ring true in examin- This article argues that a funda- struction, on Terrorist Attacks upon the ing the national security structure and mental mismatch exists between the United States, on National Security/21st process. Globalization, technological international threat environment and Century, and on the Roles and Capa- advances, and even American inter- the current national security structure bilities of the U.S. Intelligence Com- national preeminence have caused and that the lack of national-level joint munity essentially retained the current problems to meld and fuse together— interagency organizations undermines structure of the executive branch. Un- sometimes purposefully, other times the ability of the United States to de- like these proposals, this article ex- by chance. While past problems were velop appropriate policies and imple- amines transformation of the overall complex, today, due to globalization, ment comprehensive strategies. At a national security system. In particular, the communications revolution, and time when threats and problems are the decades-long focus on intelligence the ease of travel, there is an element merging to develop deep, long-lasting reform, while well-intentioned and not of time compression that allows for this complexity and conflation to in- U.S. Department of Homeland Security crease much faster. In addition, be- unmanned aerial vehicle operating under yond the speed at which conflation Arizona Border Control Initiative, June 2004 occurs, the consequences of failing to address these problems both quickly and comprehensively are more severe. In today’s international environment, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the potential for economic disruption, the possibility of massive migration, and the rise of cyber threats raise the stakes of the Government’s inability to make decisions effectively. This phenomenon of problem conflation is illustrated by Stephen Hum- phreys. While outlining the interrelated problems of economic stagnation, weakness in the international arena, political instability, and ideological confusion in the Middle East, Humphreys holds that “each of these problems has its own his-

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Gerald L. Nino) Protection U.S. Customs and Border tory and to a considerable degree can be

52 JFQ / issue thirty-nine Gorman and Krongard

analyzed separately. But it is perfectly America’s al Qaeda policy wasn’t concentrating analysis on this inter- clear that each is thoroughly implicated working because our Afghanistan policy secting area represents a first step in in all the others and that no one of wasn’t working. And our Afghanistan addressing conflated problems. Unfor- them can be solved in isolation.”4 policy wasn’t working because our Paki- tunately, rather than seeking to unify Three headline issues of today— stan policy wasn’t working. We recognized knowledge and expertise, the Govern- global terrorism, the insurgency in that America’s counterterrorism policy had ment as currently structured does the Iraq, and the Southeast Asian tsu- to be connected to our regional strategies opposite, continuing to divide knowl- nami—reveal the impact of the confla- and to our overall foreign policy.6 edge into component parts by first de- tion principle: constructing national security issues Despite the events of September and then parceling most of the parts to ■ The threat of global terrorism goes beyond the ethno-nationalist definitions 11, creation of the Department of individual departments and agencies. used in the 1980s. As the United States Homeland Security, reports from both Even before allocating problems, it is looks beyond 9/11, it is the linkages of other the WMD and 9/11 Commissions, clear that some portions of these prob- problems to global terrorism that reveal its and the recently enacted Intelligence lems do not neatly parallel the national complexity: proliferation, technology, cor- Reform and Terrorism Prevention security structure and, therefore, are ruption, and illegal migration join to cause a security problem unheralded in American Act, the United States remains poorly not addressed as part of an integrated history. prepared to respond to such complex and comprehensive strategy. ■ Iraq was once viewed as a problem security challenges. An example of this phenomenon stemming from a brutal rogue dictator who is opium production in Afghanistan. needed to be overthrown, with America’s A Mismatch Between Because this issue was not clearly a de- highest priority being the capture of Sad- dam Hussein and his top 54 leaders. Today, Structure and Threats fense, diplomatic, or law enforcement the situation has become much different America has fundamentally mis- matter, it fell between the cracks of and increasingly problematic. The linkages matched its national security structure U.S. departments and agencies. Hence, of historic ethnic rivalries, religious animos- to today’s conflated problems. The mis- it was not addressed in the initial year ity, regional competition, and global terror- match is illustrated by biologist E.O. of Operation Enduring Freedom. As a ism create a problem of deep, long-lasting complexity that challenges the fortitude Wilson, who wrote that humans gen- result, despite the threat the opium and capabilities of the mightiest nation in erally divide knowledge into compo- industry represents to political stabil- the world. nent parts, using the example of envi- ity in Afghanistan, production rose ■ Even the December 2004 tsunami ronmental policy, ethics, biology, and twenty-fold since the fall of the Tal- in Southeast Asia cannot be seen as an ex- social science. While each subject is iban in December 2001 and accounts clusively humanitarian tragedy. While the disaster affected many countries, the United closely connected, each also has “its for 40 to 60 percent of Afghanistan’s States paid particular attention to Indo- own practitioners, language, modes of economic output.9 Yet increased insta- nesia, to include deploying the Abraham analysis, and standards of validation,” bility in Afghanistan or the failure of Lincoln carrier group off its coast to aid in which results in confusion when people the Hamid Karzai government would disaster relief. A nation whose populace attempt to pass knowledge or inference be a major setback for American for- strongly dislikes U.S. policies on the global 7 war on terror (GWOT) and Iraq, Indonesia from one subject area to another. eign policy goals and national security. is the largest Muslim country. The American Wilson postulated a center point Nevertheless, once component parts of response to the tsunami thus went beyond where the four quadrants meet, where national security problems are parceled straightforward provision of disaster aid to most real world problems exist, and out, the responsible departments and highlight the larger problems of Indone- where fundamental analysis is most agencies devise separate solutions to sian attitudes toward America, international perceptions of American attitudes toward needed. He indicated that the most their assigned portions. Muslims, and ultimately the implications of fundamental need in analysis in this This stovepiped decisionmaking these problems for global Islamic terrorism. intersection of various subjects is imag- results in a piecemeal U.S. response Indeed, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell ination—eerily foreshadowing com- to most international issues. Under openly spoke about this connection when plaints of the 9/11 reports about a lack the current arrangement, these inde- he noted that U.S. aid for tsunami-stricken countries could demonstrate that “America of imagination in the Government ap- pendent solutions vary in sequence is not an anti-Islamic, anti-Muslim nation.”5 proach to terrorism.8 According to Wil- and intensity and sometimes conflict. son, only with imagination can one After surviving the intradepartmental Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s move between these disparate topics process, these separate solutions enter then-National Security Adviser, de- and develop soundly based policies. the interagency process and eventually scribed the challenges the United States If Wilson’s quadrants are relabeled make their way to the highest levels faced in devising integrated strategies economics, diplomacy, military, informa- of government. Called “policy hill” to these conflated problems in her tes- tion, intelligence, law enforcement, or any by Robert Cutler, President Dwight timony to the 9/11 Commission: other national security–related field, Eisenhower’s National Security Adviser,

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this process means that only at the dermine America’s ability to respond nity, a fatal flaw if the United States is highest level do actual integration, to complex, long-term threats, such as to seriously address the mismatch be- coordination, and synchronization terrorism and other security, economic, tween structure/process and threat. The occur. In testimony before the 9/11 environmental, and demographic recent WMD report, following the 9/11 Commission, Secretary Powell, Secre- problems that will increasingly merge. Commission lead, also recommended tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Where once the United States could de- creation of a National Counterprolifer- Condoleezza Rice testified that it took construct problems and make distinc- ation Center, but again focused solely over 7 months to formulate a coher- tions between their component parts, on the Intelligence Community. ent, regionally based counterterrorism it must now look for unifying threads. Rather than retaining the intelli- strategy that was originally scheduled Only then is it possible to weave strate- gence focus and remaining dependent to be briefed to the Principals Com- gies to deal with such issues. on the current primacy of the depart- mittee the week of September 11. This ments and agencies, this paper pro- delay occurred despite realization of Back to Fundamentals poses a new national security structure the urgency for a coordinated, multi- While the 9/11 Commission report that makes interagency coordination faceted strategy to confront the immi- clearly identified problems throughout and integration a daily event. Any pro- nent threat posed by al Qaeda. the Government that handicapped the posal that would seriously address the An additional problem is the effort to prevent the terrorist attacks, it mismatch between conflated threats governmental culture that rewards ultimately failed to address these prob- and current stovepiped structures must parochialism through promotion and lems thoroughly because of its focus push integrated strategy development opportunity, stovepipes divergent ex- primarily on the Intelligence Commu- to lower levels of the executive branch pertise, and wastes resources by pro- nity and the counterterrorism effort. rather than leaving it at the highest ducing unnecessary redundancies. The The Intelligence Community is sorely levels, such as the Principals Commit- interagency battles that rage today in need of reform, but its reform must tee or the National Security Council. within the national security commu- start with the broader national security In addition, such a structure must take nity often focus more on bureaucratic apparatus. As with the 9/11 Commis- an interagency approach to oversee- self-interest and resource allocation sion, the Intelligence Reform and Ter- ing implementation of U.S. policy and than on strategies to combat threats rorism Prevention Act did not address strategy rather than relying on the to national security. Security person- the broader problems in the national various departments and agencies to nel thus operate in a system where security structure and process, but fo- manage their separate pieces. By del- cooperation and integration are often cused on the Intelligence Community egating strategy development to lower not championed and where career de- in isolation. levels and taking an interagency ap- velopment is focused on intradepart- The 9/11 report recommendations proach to overseeing implementation, mental proficiency rather than more and legislation are not, however, with- the Government could become more comprehensive or substantive exper- out merit. In chapter 13, the commis- effective in responding to complex, tise. A byproduct of this culture has sion gives a glimpse into the solution long-term threats. To accomplish this, been the Government’s inability to to this strategic mismatch between the national security structure should attract high-level personnel. Polls indi- threat and structure. While much of be rebuilt as follows: the attention has the Intelligence Community is sorely in need focused on estab- ■ The United States should create na- lishment of the Na- tional-level, joint interagency issue–focused of reform, but that reform must start with organizations that bring together the rele- tional Counterter- the broader national intelligence apparatus vant policy, military, intelligence, and other rorism Center and parts of the Government (such as law en- creation of a Direc- forcement agencies and the Departments of cate that a whole segment of America’s tor of National Intelligence, the 9/11 Treasury, Commerce, and Customs Service). most intelligent and capable citizens Commission actually highlighted a These structures would collocate personnel for specific issues under one organization see Government service as unappealing broader and more insightful approach and one senior leader, prioritize interagency and that the September 11 attacks did to national security reform and restruc- cooperation, integrate comprehensive policy not change this attitude. turing. The 9/11 report proposed the options, monitor corresponding strategies, Although the current national se- establishment of comprehensive na- and focus resources, particularly expertise. curity structure and culture have re- tional centers focused “for example, ■ The primacy of the current departments and agencies involved in national mained effective for many decades, on counterproliferation, crime, and security should be lowered. These organiza- they cannot compete with today’s narcotics, and China.”12 Unfortunately, tions would assume a role similar to the more creative, sinister, and capable en- the commission still stovepiped such military services and become responsible emies. Structural and cultural flaws un- centers into the Intelligence Commu- for training and equipping the personnel

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Japanese Minister of Defense speaking about diplomacy and deterrence in responding to weapons of mass destruction in the Asia-Pacific region at conference in Singapore

on developing comprehensive and integrated national-level foreign policy and military planning. The military also provides models of organizing and operating jointly. Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF–South) provides a model of an interagency construct that fuses military, law enforcement, and intelligence operations into a unified organization under one leader. It has the additional benefit of having strong links to allies

Combat Camera Squadron (Cherie A. Thurlby) Combat Camera Squadron in the fight against narcotics. The in- st 1 teragency composition of JIATF–South seconded to the interagency bodies. Their the Government has always operated is apparent by its membership, which personnel would rotate between their home as an interagency group under the au- includes the Departments of Defense, organizations and the new organizations thority of a single, high-level individual Transportation (Coast Guard), and Trea- just as military officers serve within their own services and also in joint organizations. appointed by the President and con- sury, along with the Customs Service, ■ In the new structure, the National firmed by the Senate: the U.S. Embassy Drug Enforcement Administration, Fed- Security Adviser should concentrate on pro- overseas. The chief of mission heads eral Bureau of Investigation, Defense viding separate and independent advice the mission’s country team of U.S. Gov- Intelligence Agency, Naval Criminal to the President. As currently structured, ernment personnel. Responsibilities of Investigative Service, and National the adviser has the two often-incompatible roles of supporting the President and being chiefs of mission at post also include: Security Agency. In addition, Britain, an honest broker among the competing France, and the Netherlands provide ■ speaking with one voice on U.S. pol- interests of the departments and agencies. icy and ensuring mission staff do likewise ships, aircraft, and liaison officers, and Under this proposal, the National Security while providing the President and Secretary the Netherlands commands one of its Adviser would play the former role in the of State expert guidance and frank counsel task groups. Since 1999, Argentina, interagency process. ■ ■ A permanent executive or govern- directing and coordinating all execu- Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and ing board, comprised of the senior leader- tive branch offices and personnel Venezuela also have assigned liaison ■ cooperating with the legislative and ship (under secretaries and above) from judicial branches so foreign policy goals are officers to JIATF–East. The result is a the departments and agencies, should be advanced. fully integrated, international task force established. It would be similar to how the organized to capitalize on the various service chiefs sit on JCS while retaining their service roles. This board would allow Meanwhile, the country team agencies and countries involved and for better policy formulation and strategy consists of the heads of the principal with fused intelligence and operations. implementation by the executive branch— sections of the Embassy and the heads In the end, however, Embassies moving away from unity of effort in man- of all other Government agency offices and JIATFs illustrate that the proposed aging the Intelligence Community toward in the mission. This includes the tra- interagency organizations rest on a unity of effort in managing the national security structure. ditional foreign affairs elements, such long American tradition of approaching as State, Commerce, Agriculture, the complex problems in an integrated and National Interagency Central Intelligence Agency, and all comprehensive way. The lack of similar Organizations: A Tradition other Government elements, such as interagency structures at the national While this proposal may sound the Agency for International Devel- level is the vital piece missing from this extreme, it would simply apply to opment, military assistance groups, tradition. This proposal blends the con- Washington bureaucracies the same and Peace Corps. In essence, the pro- cept of Embassies, which are primarily organizational principles the Federal posed organizations would become policy-focused, and JIATFs, which are Government applies to itself elsewhere. the Washington-based equivalent to primarily execution-focused, into issue- While many think of jointness exclu- country teams, fusing all the relevant oriented organizations in Washington. sively as a military concept, it can in players in a topic area into a single Such organizations would provide a fact be considered an American tradi- organization under a high-level leader. powerful, synergistic force combin- tion. One of the oldest institutions in This organization would then focus ing the relevant expertise, integrated

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intelligence, and necessary policy and diction of the services be assigned to the minister. This is not to say such a position operational authorities to approach na- combatant commands, with the exception should not be established. Perhaps in the tional security problems holistically of those assigned to perform the mission of modern world, a prime minister–like Federal the military departments position would call greater attention to the and to leverage these disparate groups ■ mandated that the services provide workings of the government and the devel- to develop, propose, and implement their best personnel to the Joint Staff. opment and implementation of strategies in integrated, comprehensive strategies such a complex international environment. on a daily basis at levels lower than the In essence, Goldwater-Nichols le- In addition, this proposal—which makes the National Security Council. gally strengthened the role of existing executive director a Presidential appoint- ment versus someone from Congress—may organizations such as the Joint Staff obviate the Founding Fathers’ concerns. Reform Models and combatant commands, lowered ■ In addition, given that the original Significant transformational reform the primacy of others such as the mili- role of the National Security Adviser as coun- is never easy. As mentioned earlier, the tary services, and provided incentives selor to the President and honest broker in two best models are the 1947 National such as promotions to those who sup- the interagency would be divided between two positions under this concept, Congress Security Act and the 1986 Goldwater- ported the strengthened organizations. should consider granting the executive di- Nichols Act. Both confronted many rector some level of executive privilege to structural and cultural problems similar Congress: A Key Ally for Change protect the private discussions among the to today’s and faced strident, long-term, Besides providing evidence from President, the adviser, and himself. While parochial opposition from within the history that significant structural and uncommon in positions confirmed by the Senate, limited executive privilege would Government itself. cultural changes can be implemented allow for free discussion on national security A review of the impact of the in the Government, the 1947 and 1986 issues among these three principals. 1947 and 1986 acts reveals that this acts also show the necessity for Presi- ■ Separate and appropriate funding of proposed reform should be considered dential leadership. The President must the new interagency organizations is criti- seriously. The National Security Act re- articulate both the threats to the Nation cal. Congress would need to create a system to authorize and appropriate the budgets vamped the national security structure, and a vision of how to respond. Equally to make these organizations both success- creating the: important, these models show the need ful and relatively independent of the cur- for executive-legislative cooperation for rent departments and agencies. As such, the ■ National Security Council and staff any proposal to change the national role of the interagency organization leaders ■ Department of Defense security system. Obviously, Congress requires clarification, and careful consider- ■ Air Force ation must be given to what authorities are ■ Central Intelligence Agency. would enact any legislation, appropri- granted to the leadership, whether they are ate the funding for new organizations, confirmed by the Senate, and how they in- Taking a different approach, Gold- and oversee implementation. Together, teract with the departments and agencies. water-Nichols systematically changed the President and Congress could care- ■ Congress must consider establishing the roles and authorities of existing fully plan and carry out the above pro- and funding a process that bundles together education, interagency rotations, and proposal in phases over an motions over the course of a career in na- while many think of jointness exclusively extended time. For ex- tional security. Much like career military as a military concept, it can be considered ample, they could start officers, national security personnel should with an expanded Na- attend professional education and be as- an American tradition tional Counterterror- signed inside interagency organizations and outside their departments or agencies. In ism Center, followed particular, promotion for certain types of ca- institutions while developing incen- by a National Counterproliferaton Cen- reers should be based on meeting these ob- tives and disincentives to alter how the ter and perhaps a National Asia Center. jectives. In support of this cultural change, military acts and operates. As such, it: While the role of Congress cannot be a professional education infrastructure for minimized, five issues stand out for national security professionals must be created—equivalent to the military’s profes- ■ empowered the Chairman of the congressional involvement: sional military education system. Joint Chiefs of Staff by making him the ■ Finally, Congress must examine how principal military adviser to the President, ■ Most importantly, Congress must to adapt itself to the changes proposed here the National Security Council, and the Sec- deliberate carefully over the creation of an and improve its appropriate oversight of retary of Defense executive/governing board and the role of national security so as to be more efficient ■ clarified that the operational chain its Presidentially appointed executive direc- and effective. While this paper has exam- of command runs from the President to the tor. The Founding Fathers purposely opted ined the 1947 and 1986 acts as models of Secretary of Defense to the combatant com- not to have a prime minister in the Federal change, the authors are equally aware that manders system, believing that one derived from the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which ■ centralized operational authority Congress would give the legislature too created the Department of Homeland Secu- through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs much power over the executive. Depend- rity, and the Intelligence Reform and Terror- as opposed to the service chiefs ing on how the role is defined, the execu- ism Prevention Act, which created the Direc- ■ required that forces under the juris- tive director could closely resemble a prime tor of National Intelligence, might represent

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models of less successful reform, particularly in the executive is a leading character implementation of integrated strate- in regard to congressional involvement and in the definition of good government. gies. The second is an executive/govern- oversight. In both cases, pertinent questions It is essential to the protection of the ing board led by an executive director were left undebated and unanswered, and community against foreign attacks.”15 with powers to develop policy, inte- the burden of legislative oversight of the executive branch increased unnecessarily. Given the President’s multiple roles grate interagency efforts, and monitor For example, according to a joint task force in national security, domestic affairs, implementation of Presidentially ap- of the Center for Strategic and International economic issues, and party politics, he proved strategies on a day-to-day basis. Studies and Business Executives for National cannot retain constant focus on na- This approach would improve national Security, 79 congressional committees and tional security as originally envisioned security by: subcommittees have some amount of jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland in the Constitution. Thus, the proposal Security.14 outlined leverages the long experience ■ Improving the development of policy. of the State Department in integrating The new interagency organizations should provide the President, in a timelier and Is It Worth It? policy and experience of the military in more comprehensive manner, with better At one time, this article was titled planning and operating jointly to help policy options, tailored to complex and “Constant Focus: Institutionalizing the Presidency recapture the energy the conflated threats. the Interagency Process,” reflecting Founding Fathers intended. ■ Enhancing implementation of strategy. the authors’ view that the current na- This article argues that two things The creation of the new executive/governing board and a Presidentially appointed tional security structure undercuts the must happen to regain this energy. The executive director should allow the execu- President’s ability to respond quickly first is legislation mandating structural tive branch to better implement national and cultural change: a 2005 strategy. the 1947 and 1986 acts show the need National Security Act that ■ Developing a culture of interagency equates to a combined up- cooperation. Accompanying the structural for executive-legislative cooperation changes would be a more gradual cultural dated 1947 National Secu- for any proposal to change the transformation that, over time, creates stra- rity Act and an interagency tegic practitioners, a cadre of professionals national security system version of the 1986 Gold- who combine divergent expertise on the water-Nichols Act. This military, economic, diplomatic, informa- and effectively to international threats. legislation would institutionalize the tion, and cultural aspects of national security that currently resides in separate stove- The Founding Fathers saw an energetic interagency process through new orga- piped organizations. President as essential to the security nizations and reward jointness by selec- ■ Achieving better balance between the of the new Nation. In Federalist Paper tively promoting those who participate military and the other instruments of power. 70, Alexander Hamilton wrote, “Energy in interagency policy development and Since the Cold War, America’s use of its military has dominated the national security system, particularly given the military’s geographic organization into regional combatant commands that cut across nation- state boundaries. Other departments lack such broad reach and equivalent resources, causing overreliance on the Armed Forces to achieve policy goals when other instruments might have been more appropriate. The creation of these new Federal interagency organizations and the executive governing board would provide a similar regional and global structure that could better harness and direct all national power and balance the Nation’s use of its diplomatic, military, informational, and economic instruments. ■ Building a partnership between intelligence producers and policymakers. The implementation of this proposal would improve the cooperation between intelligence producers, policymakers, the military, and other Government officials in devising stronger national security policy and strategy by integrating the pertinent components from Defense officials taking questions from the 9/11 across the Intelligence Community into Commission on Capitol Hill, March 23, 2004 the appropriate national-level interagency Combat Camera Squadron (Jerry Morrison) Combat Camera Squadron st

1 organizations.

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Sailors stack bales of cocaine aboard USS Crommelin seized during a drug interdiction mission with a U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment U.S. Navy (Eric Weber)

8 Finally, given the reality of future NOTES The 9/11 Commission Report, 339–348. 9 budgetary and fiscal constraints, the Andrew North, BBC News, “Quandary of Afghan Opium Production,” available at new organization provides a frame- 1 Robert E. Rubin and Jacob Weisberg, and “U.N. Warning to Britain on tire national security apparatus. Once Wall Street to Washington (New York: Ran- Heroin,” March 2, 2005, http://news.bbc. expertise is collocated and a new cadre dom House, 2003), 147. co.uk/hi/uk-news/4309729.stm7. 2 The National Commission on Terror- 10 of strategic practitioners is developed, Rice. ist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 11 the need to replicate roles across de- Donald Rumsfeld, transcript of testi- Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton, mony to the 9/11 Commission, Centre for partments and agencies will be reduced 2004), 353. Research on Globalization, 9/11 Commission 3 and resource sharing will be enhanced. Peter Pace, Remarks to the Marine Hearings, part II, available at . 2004, available at . available at . rity strategy, it is ultimately a model ory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled 14 CSIS–BENS Task Force on Congres- applicable to the wider effort sup- Age (Los Angeles: University of California sional Oversight of the Department of Press, 1999), 261. porting homeland security and to the Homeland Security, “Untangling the Web: 5 Alan Sipress and Glenn Kessler, “A overall structure of the Government, Congressional Oversight and the Depart- Clear Line Between Life and Death,” The ment of Homeland Security,” December 10, including its domestic and economic Washington Post, January 5, 2005. 2004, available at . of Rice’s May 19, 2004, statement to the 15 The Federalist Papers, no. 70, avail- 9/11 Commission, available at . script/index.html>. 7 E.O. Wilson, Consilience, the Unity of Knowledge (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 9.

58 JFQ / issue thirty-nine Security forces moving detainees to permanent housing at Camp Delta from Camp X-Ray U.S. Navy (Shawn P. Eklund) U.S. Navy (Shawn P.

The basic proposition here is that somebody who comes into the United States of America illegally, who conducts a terrorist operation killing thousands of innocent Americans, men, women, and chil- dren, is not a lawful combatant. They don’t deserve to be treated as a prisoner of war. They don’t deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen going through the normal judicial process . . . they will have a fair trial, but it’ll be under the procedures of a military tribunal. . . . We think [it] guarantees that we’ll have the kind of treatment of these individuals that we believe they deserve. —Vice President Dick Cheney, November 14, 20011 Guantanamo Bay Undermining the Global War on Terror

By GERARD P. FOGARTY

rosecution of the war on elicit worldwide commentary and, terror has resulted in the most recently, the interest of the Su- detention of some 650 citi- preme Court. While the administra- zens from over 40 coun- tion’s position has a number of promi- Ptries at military facilities on the U.S. nent defenders, much international naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. expert opinion, some sharply critical, Although the Bush administration has has weighed in on the other side. Jus- held firm to the position outlined by tice Richard Goldstone, for example, Vice President Cheney in 2001, the stated in a BBC interview in late 2003 legality of this position continues to that “a future American President will

Colonel Gerard P. Fogarty, Australian Army, wrote this article as a student at the U.S. Army War College.

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what it terms “the war between the Soldier standing guard at United States and al Qaeda” and there- Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay fore establishes the rules for detention of enemy combatants.3 Congress has not formally declared war; instead, the President has authorized the detention, treatment, and trial of noncitizens under a military order derived from the constitutional authority vested in him as the President and Commander in Chief. To protect the Nation, and for the effective conduct of military operations to prevent further terrorist attacks, the administration states that it is necessary to detain certain individuals to prevent them from continuing to fight and, subsequently, to try those who violate the laws of war. A report prepared by defense lawyers for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2003 appears to substan- tiate the selection of Guantanamo as the preferred detention location. The report cited the long-held view of the legal “advantages” Guantanamo offers the administration because it falls outside the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.4 The advantages lie principally U.S. Navy (David P. Coleman) U.S. Navy (David P. in removing the rights of detainees have to apologize for Guantanamo.”2 cies in Guantanamo are having on to question the legality of their de- The question of how to deal with the the war on terror and concludes with tention in U.S. courts and to facilitate detainees in the ongoing war on ter- recommendations for an alternative permissive interrogation techniques ror is, however, an extremely difficult approach that would regain the initia- that would otherwise be constrained issue that has generated deep rifts even tive for the administration. It seeks to by statute. The report was the out- within the administration. Follow- recapture much-needed international come of a working group of execu- ing 9/11, the administration invoked legitimacy, creating greater diplomatic tive branch lawyers appointed by the extraordinary wartime powers to es- space within which opportunities to General Counsel of the Department of tablish a new system of military jus- harness broader international support Defense to address, inter alia, the legal tice that would match a very different and involvement in the war on terror constraints on the interrogation of type of conflict. As the administration can be pursued. detained persons.5 sought to apply those powers, it be- Some critics have linked the per- came mired in problems it is still strug- Why Detain at missiveness of the legal interpretation gling to solve. Guantanamo Bay? for interrogation at Guantanamo that This essay assesses the competing The United States and its coali- underpinned Rumsfeld’s approval of positions on the legal status of the de- tion partners remain at war against al 24 interrogation techniques, includ- tainees. First, it outlines why Guanta- Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan ing “significantly increasing the fear namo was chosen as a location for de- and around the world. Since Osama bin level in a detainee,” to abuses at Abu tainee operations. It then outlines the Laden declared war on the United States Ghraib in 2003.6 The administration position on the prisoner of war (POW) in 1996, al Qaeda and its partners have has denied such a link despite the De- status of the detainees and competing launched repeated attacks that have partment of Defense (DOD) investiga- views on the due process protections killed thousands of innocent Americans tion into Abu Ghraib, which revealed that should be provided those charged and hundreds of civilians from other that some of the techniques authorized with war crimes. It then discusses the countries. The administration states for “unlawful combatants” in Guanta- wider effects the administration’s poli- that the law of armed conflict governs namo Bay were used in Iraq.7 Seymour

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Hersh’s Chain of Command: The Road fighting for a state and that there has nual Detainee Administrative Review, from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib, which attri- never been a recognized right to make which determines the need to continue butes the abuse in that prison to interwar on the part of private groups.12 to hold the unlawful combatant. Fol- rogation policies in Guantanamo, con- The administration has not dif- lowing this review, a board will decide tinues to fuel the debate. Hersh’s theory ferentiated between al Qaeda and the whether to release, transfer, or continue resonates with an increasingly critical Taliban in its position that they are un- to detain the individual.13 As of Novem- domestic and international audience lawful combatants. Additionally, it has ber 2, 2004, a total of 295 Combatant and lends credence to the claims of stated since 2002 that no doubt exists Status Review Tribunals had been con- torture by the International Committee as to their status and that, under the ducted. Only one detainee was deter- of the Red Cross8 and four former Brit- law of armed conflict, the detainees can mined not to be an enemy combatant ish detainees who have sued Secretary be held at Guantanamo until the con- and was released. But once again, the Rumsfeld and ten others in the military clusion of the war on terror and with- procedures have attracted the atten- chain of command for mistreatment out the full-dress procedure of crimi- tion of the U.S. Courts. A Federal dis- at Guantanamo.9 nal trials. Detainees, therefore, have trict court judge ruled on November 8, The administration unsuccessfully been held since January 2002 without 2004, that the detainees must be treated argued before the Supreme Court in charges, access to lawyers, or, until the as POWs unless a special tribunal de- June 2004 that Guantanamo lies out- Supreme Court intervened, the right to scribed in Article 5 of the Third Geneva side the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. The challenge their detention. Convention determines they are not. Supreme Court ruled that U.S. law ex- The administration announced in The judge ruled that the Combatant tends to aliens detained by the military June 2004 the release of 26 detain- Status Review Tribunals do not satisfy outside sovereign national borders.10 ees following an internal legal review the Geneva Conventions and cannot This finding impacts on all detention conducted by Pentagon lawyers in deny POW status.14 facilities, including Guantanamo and Guantanamo Bay that determined the The administration has stated those in Afghanistan and elsewhere. individuals had been wrongly held for that, despite its determination that the the past 2 years. The timing was unfor- detainees are unlawful combatants, it Lawful or Unlawful tunate since it immediately preceded has treated them humanely at all times Combatants? the Supreme Court hearing at which and provided privileges similar to The official U.S. position is that the administration argued that cases those the Geneva Conventions grant the detainees do not meet the crite- were being properly reviewed. Critics to POWs. The principal difference is ria of lawful combatants as outlined in jumped on this fact, suspecting that the more permissible interrogation and the 1949 Geneva Conventions and are the administration was releasing some a reduced entitlement to due process therefore “unlawful combatants” not individuals to demonstrate to the court afforded to the unlawful combatant. entitled to POW status. They are not that it was reviewing the individual POW status under the Geneva Conven- being treated as common criminals to status of detainees. More recently, the tions prohibits various methods of in- be tried in civil courts, as were previous administration announced that it has terrogation, many of which have been terrorists in the United States, because authorized by the admin- criminal law is too weak a weapon. In- the administration states that the law istration for Guantanamo, stead, they are being treated as mem- of armed conflict governs the rules for and demands a higher level bers of a military force, either al Qaeda of due process protection or the Taliban, and as combatants in an detention of enemy combatants than planned for detainees armed conflict against the United States. charged with war crimes. Secretary Rumsfeld has advised that: commenced reviews for all detainees POW status demands the same due before an administrative tribunal. process protections, for example, that the detainees are not being labeled as While the intent of the internal review a U.S. Soldier would receive under a prisoners of war because they did not en- conducted in early 2004 may be debat- court-martial proceeding. gage in warfare according to the precepts able, the individual cases of all detain- In the days following the Pres- of the Geneva Convention—they hide ees are being reviewed as a result of the ident’s determination that the Ge- weapons, do not wear uniforms, and try June 2004 Supreme Court ruling. neva Conventions would not apply to to blur the line between combatant and The format for these reviews was detainees in the war on terror, Secretary noncombatant.11 unveiled in September 2004. The first, of State Colin Powell, supported by One of Rumsfeld’s legal advisers, called a Combatant Status Review Tribu- Secretary Rumsfeld and the Chairman Ruth Wedgewood, adds that the de- nal, is intended to determine whether of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General tainees are not covered by the Geneva each detainee meets the criteria of an Richard Myers, asked the President to Conventions because they are not enemy combatant. Second is the an- reconsider applying POW status to the

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Taliban fighters.15 A wide range of crit- if the al Qaeda members do not qualify U.S. citizens and are designed to pro- ics believed that since the fighters were as members of the Taliban armed forces tect the individual rights of the accused members of the regular armed forces of or of its integral militia, they may still while also safeguarding classified and the de facto government of Afghani- qualify for POW status under the Ge- sensitive information used as evidence stan, they met the Geneva criteria for neva Conventions if they were part in the proceedings. The administration of an independent states that the commissions are recog- the difference between how an unlawful militia and meet the nized by the Geneva Conventions and criteria. Regardless, as have been used by many countries. combatant and a POW must be treated critics point out, the However, when Egypt used this form lies in more permissible interrogation and Geneva Conventions of tribunal in 2000, it was rebuked in reduced entitlement to due process and U.S. military regu- the U.S. State Department yearly report lations that precede on human rights abuses. Presented to 9/11 require findings Congress, the report stated that this POW status. Secretary Powell was par- by a competent tribunal. As discussed, type of military court deprived hun- ticularly concerned about the increased tribunals have only recently begun but dreds of civilian defendants of their risk for troops in Afghanistan and in have been ruled by a Federal district constitutional rights.18 future conflicts if the administration court judge as insufficient to deny The administration’s system disavowed the conventions. Among POW status. of justice for detainees charged with other things, POW status would entitle war crimes was crafted by a group of detainees to humane treatment during Due Process Protections lawyers who in September 2001 held interrogation and different procedural The administration believes that posts at the White House, the Justice and evidentiary rights from those es- civic ideals should not frustrate an ef- Department, and other agencies. The tablished for illegal combatants. fective defense in the war on terror. work commenced just over a week Secretary Powell’s view about To overcome the limitations of crimi- after 9/11 under the direction of the the POW status of Taliban fighters is nal law, for example, and in keeping Vice President and was coordinated shared by many U.S. and international with the detainees’ status as unlawful by the White House counsel, Alberto experts,16 including the United Na- combatants, it has established Military Gonzales. The idea of using Military tions.17 These critics also argue that any Commissions—a type of military tri- Commissions had been investigated a al Qaeda detainees who were acting as bunal not used since World War II for decade earlier for trying suspects in the militia or volunteer corps members spies, saboteurs, and war criminals—to bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over that formed part of the Taliban armed try designated detainees. These com- Lockerbie, Scotland. The interagency forces are also eligible. Moreover, even missions are applicable only to non- group investigated four options: Mili- tary Commissions, criminal trials, military courts-martial, and tribunals with Camp X-Ray, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba both civilian and military members like the Nuremburg trials. By October 2001, the White House lawyers had grown impatient with the “dithering” of the interagency group and took over the effort. At this stage all options were reportedly abandoned, and planning for Military Commissions moved forward more quickly, but whole agencies, including DOD, were com- pletely left out.19 The legal basis for the administration’s approach was laid out on November 6 in a confidential memorandum from the Attorney General’s office to White House counsel Gon- zales. Attorney General John Ashcroft had refused congressional requests for a copy, but its contents were leaked by The New York Times. The memorandum

U.S. Air Force (Greg Kobashigawa) (Greg U.S. Air Force said that the President, as Commander

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Military Commissions courtroom at Guantanamo Bay Fleet Combat Camera Group, Atlantic (Christopher Mobley) Fleet Combat Camera Group,

in Chief, has “inherent authority” retary of State finding out the details the rules for the commissions, it be- to establish Military Commissions after the order was issued.21 came obvious that he had settled on a without congressional authorization In World War II, when the United compromise. Although he granted de- and could apply international law se- States last used Military Commissions, fendants a presumption of innocence lectively. In particular, the memoran- the tribunals were fashioned generally and set “beyond a reasonable doubt” as dum outlined the legal precedent under on the prevailing standard of military the standard for proving guilt, Rums- which due process rights do not apply justice. Following 9/11, however, the feld did not allow judicial review of to Military Commissions.20 administration believed a paradigm convictions by civilian courts. The administration moved quickly shift was needed to deal with terror- On July 3, 2003, the administra- after receiving the Attorney General’s ism. The Presidential Military Order tion designated six detainees for the advice, releasing the Presidential Mili- outlined the revised approach, which first commissions. Two were British. tary Order on Detention, Treatment, enabled a lower standard of proof, News of their prosecution became and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the expanded secrecy provisions, permit- public in the United Kingdom just War Against Terrorism on November ted a more liberal application of the as Prime Minister Tony Blair began a 13, 2001. Rear Admiral Donald J. Guter, death penalty, and denied judicial re- major public relations campaign to the Navy Judge Advocate General at the view of convictions. It announced that gain support for the Iraq war. Under time, commented that many Pentagon the exact rules were to be established pressure from Parliament, he declared experts on military justice were kept in later by Secretary Rumsfeld. Criticism, that any tribunals involving British the dark until the day before the order some of which came from inside the citizens would follow “proper interna- was issued. Moreover, their hastily pre- administration, was immediate. It was tional law.”22 Blair was under increas- pared amendments did not appear with reported that the respective judge ad- ing pressure from his Parliament to the final document. Senior staff from vocates general within the Pentagon secure custody of nine British being the National Security Council and the supported the use of commissions but held at Guantanamo. Negotiations in- State Department were also excluded argued strongly that the system would volving the British Attorney General, from the final discussions, with the not be fair without amendment. When Peter Goldsmith, and officials from the National Security Adviser and the Sec- Secretary Rumsfeld finally published administration were initiated quickly

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to find a process for trying the two Court ruling on Guantanamo is an states that Guantanamo detainees have British detainees designated to go be- example of the system working, with also provided information on individu- fore Military Commissions. Lord Gold- the judiciary deciding that the Execu- als connected to al Qaeda’s efforts to smith would not budge from a demand tive does not have the authority to acquire weapons of mass destruction, that civilian courts review verdicts.23 suspend the detainees’ habeas corpus front companies and accounts support- The administration argued that the rights. Many believe the proposed ing the organization, acquisition of change would render the commissions commissions provide unfettered and surface-to-air missiles and improvised unworkable. During a state visit to Brit- unchallengeable power to the Execu- explosives devices, tactics and training, ain in late November 2003, President tive, which contravenes the most basic and travel routes to reach the United Bush agreed to shelve the cases of the law principles of independence and States via South America.26 impartiality. Since the Detaining enemy combatants dur- following 9/11, the administration saw no commissions began, ing conflict is not punishment but a se- reason it could not depart materially from the most ardent crit- curity and military necessity. The infor- ics have been the mation obtained is enabling the United current standards of military justice uniformed lawyers States and its partners to be more effec- assigned to the defen- tive in planning and conducting coun- two British suspects for the foreseeable dants. These lawyers have succeeded terterrorist missions. It is also assisting future. It appears that most detainees in halting the first of the commissions, in the development of countermeasures will not face a commission and will gaining a Federal district court judge’s to disrupt terrorist activities and focus- either be released when they no longer ruling on November 9, 2004, that once ing information collection on al Qaeda pose a threat or remain interned for again curtails the Executive’s attempts financing and network operatives. Per- the duration of the war on terror. to implement its “forward-leaning” haps the greatest operational benefit The administration’s intent to try system of justice. The ruling, which from interrogating Guantanamo de- selected detainees by Military Commis- stated that President Bush had both tainees, however, lies in the expanded sions has received widespread criticism. overstepped his constitutional bounds understanding of jihadist motivation, Spain, for example, has announced that and improperly brushed aside the Ge- selection, and training processes. This it will not extradite terrorist suspects to neva Conventions in establishing Mili- information is essential to identifying the United States if they are to face tary Commissions, throws the future of the root causes of terrorism, which is the tribunals. In essence, the opposing the commissions into doubt.25 The ad- arguably the key to winning the con- view characterizes the commissions as ministration is appealing the decision. flict. The issue for the administration providing second-class justice. Amnesty is whether the benefits are worth the International has been vocal in its criti- Consequences of cascading problems that the detainee cism and has received extensive sup- Administration Actions operations have generated. port from a wide range of scholars and For the past 3 years, the adminis- Undermining U.S. influence and ef- organizations. The critics argue that tration has focused publicly on the op- fectiveness. In March 2004, the Pew Re- the commissions are discriminatory erational benefits that detainee opera- search Center reported that U.S. pres- because they do not apply to U.S. nations in Guantanamo have generated tige throughout the world was at its tionals, they allow a lower standard of while downplaying the cascading prob- lowest level in history.27 This report evidence than is admissible in ordinary lems it has faced: angry allies, a tarnish- was published before the Abu Ghraib courts, they offer no right of appeal to ing of America’s image, and declining incident. The Pew findings are sup- an independent and impartial court, cooperation in the war on terror. ported by other international opinion and they lack independence from the Operational benefits. The adminis- surveys. The U.S. Council on Foreign Executive. The Army Lawyer, a Depart- tration believes the interrogation of the Relations found in 2003 that an im- ment of the Army periodical, published detainees has improved the security of portant way for the administration to an article that added weight to this the United States and coalition part- reduce rising anti-Americanism is to view, noting that the commissions are ners by expanding their understanding “improve its capacity to listen to for- a departure from long-standing military of al Qaeda and its affiliates. Interroga- eign publics.”28 The international com- practice and fail to provide the fairness tion has revealed al Qaeda leadership munity, along with individual rights and due process expected in trials con- structures, operatives, funding mecha- groups and academics in the United ducted by the United States.24 nisms, communication methods, train- States, believe the administration The Constitution is designed to ing and selection programs, travel is ignoring international law in its provide a system of checks and bal- patterns, support infrastructures, and treatment of the detainees. Critics ances to prohibit, inter alia, unfettered plans for attacking the United States have referred to Guantanamo as the power by the Executive. The Supreme and other nations. The administration American Gulag.

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The Military Commissions em- “The United States has repeatedly faced Australian and British detainees violates powered under President Bush’s mili- foes in its past that, at the time they the principles that the coalition of the tary order are the exact types of trials emerged, posed threats of a nature un- willing aims to uphold. that the United States condemns in the like any that it had previously faced, international community. In today’s but . . . has been far more steadfast A Modified Means media environment, such inconsisten- in the past in keeping faith with its The reviews of cases that the ad- cies are highlighted, evaluated, and national commitment to the rule of ministration is conducting in the wake broadcast repeatedly to every corner law.”32 To do otherwise only adds to of the June 2004 Supreme Court ruling of the globe. This apparent double the growing worldwide anti-American- have now been ruled as insufficient standard denies Washington the moral ism that undermines U.S. credibility, and must be modified to determine high ground needed to censure other influence, and effectiveness. the POW status of the detainees. The nations for human rights abuses. It Undermining the coalition. The U.S. United States cannot proceed with its could also place the administration at strategy for winning the war on terror Military Commissions without first odds with the values of the American is predicated on creating an interna- modifying its Combatant Status Review people, creating a fault line that could tional environment inhospitable to Tribunals. Should a modified tribunal degrade domestic support for a genera- terrorists and all who support them. determine that POW status is war- tion-long war on terror. John Gordon, There is a realization that the Nation ranted, then, as already discussed, the a retired Air Force general and former does not have the option of going it Geneva Conventions demand higher Central Intelligence Agency deputy di- alone. President Bush has stated that levels of due process for POWs than rector who served as both the senior the United States will “constantly the Military Commissions allow. Given counterterrorism official and homeland strive to enlist the support of the in- the administration’s views on the POW security adviser on President Bush’s ternational community in this fight issue, the more likely outcome is that National Security Council, described against a common foe” because suc- a modified tribunal will determine for- the dilemma: “There was great concern cess “will not come by always acting mally that POW status should be de- that we were setting up a process that alone, but through a powerful coali- nied and Military Commissions should was contrary to our own ideals.”29 tion of nations maintaining a strong, follow. It appears, however, that the The worldwide promotion of united international front against ter- outcomes of any Military Commissions human rights is clearly in keeping rorism.”33 A senior official in U.S. Cen- will not be viewed as legitimate in the with America’s most deeply held val- tral Command, the regional combatant eyes of a world already skeptical of ues. Colin Powell has said, “Respect command responsible for prosecuting the detentions in Guantanamo. The for human rights is essential to lasting Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring United States can preserve the moral peace and sustained economic growth, Freedom, called coalition support the high ground by revisiting the initial in- goals which Americans share with peo- Achilles’ heel in these operations. The teragency group’s options and moving ple all over the world.” At the Human command sees the shaping of domes- the trials into the international arena. Rights Defenders of the Frontlines of tic opinion worldwide as essential to As stated previously, the inter- Freedom Conference at The Carter maintaining a strong coalition. agency group investigated four options: Center in November 2003, former Pres- Democratically elected leaders must Military Commissions, criminal trials, ident Jimmy Carter was disturbed to be responsive to their constituents. The military courts-martial, and tribunals find that many participants believed treatment of detainees at Guantanamo, with both civilian and military mem- the United States is contributing di- having fostered animosity toward the bers. Criminal courts would provide rectly to an erosion of human rights by United States, thus undermines U.S. ef- insufficient latitude without Congress its policies with respect to the Guan- toughening criminal laws and tanamo detainees. Moreover, Carter a politically viable option would be adapting the courts. This may deplored the indefinite detention of to seek a UN-authorized U.S. tribunal have been an option in early the suspects, adding, “This is a viola- 2002 when it was advocated tion of the basic character of my coun- by the Justice Department, but try.”31 The 9/11 attacks were horrific, forts to gather international support.34 it is now too late given that the detain- and it is in the interest of all civilized Even governments stalwartly behind ees have been in custody 3 years. A nations that the perpetrators be tried the war are under siege from their pop- court-martial offers advantages. Fore- and punished, but long-held American ulations. In Australia and the United most, it safeguards the administration values on human rights must outweigh Kingdom, for example, the govern- against domestic or international legal the desire for retribution. As General ments are under increasing pressure to challenges attacking the trial process John Shalikashvili, former Chairman withdraw from the coalition because of itself. A court-martial meets all current of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has stated, public belief that America’s treatment of standards of fundamental rights under

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Detainee being led into Camp Four, a medium security facility at Camp Delta U.S. Navy (John F. Williams) U.S. Navy (John F. the customary and written rules of law. The courts were international bodies increasingly skeptical domestic popula- It also protects sensitive and classified staffed principally from within the re- tions. The principal benefit for Wash- material during the proceedings. The spective countries. ington, however, lies in recapturing disadvantage, however, is that because The tribunal would be established legitimacy and thereby reducing wide- the administration has for the past 2 under special statute, agreed to by the spread anti-Americanism. International years created an atmosphere of legal United States and the United Nations. legitimacy will generate greater dip- ambiguity, the international commu- The statute could include, inter alia, the lomatic space for the administration, nity is conditioned to being skeptical requirement for a balanced member- providing opportunities to harness the and is likely to be suspicious of any out- ship of civilian and military, U.S. and broader international cooperation it comes from a U.S. military proceeding. international, and judicial and prosecu- needs to win the war on terror. This leaves tribunals as the final torial members. The advantage of this option. The United Nations (UN) has model, as opposed to the UN ad hoc In the prosecution of the war on established ad hoc tribunals to deal with tribunals, is that the United States has terror, the administration has sought individual responsibility for war crimes. greater control, and it brings the val- to redefine the borders between civil The tribunals have been empowered to ues of U.S. judges and prosecutors into liberties and public safety. The official deal with specific crimes during defined the proceedings. Such action would be position remains that the detainees are periods. Relinquishing control of the tri- viewed as a legitimate form of justice unlawful combatants and not POWs, als to the UN is not without risk, how- in the international community and but that they are being treated in ac- ever, and may prove politically unten- would therefore assist ongoing efforts cordance with the law. The unlawful able for an American administration. A in the war against terrorism. It would combatant status and the withhold- more politically viable option would be also send a message to the international ing of due process protections to the to seek a UN-authorized U.S. tribunal, community about U.S. beliefs on collec- approximately 500 foreign nationals similar to the courts established in 2000 tive legitimization versus unilateralism, detained at Guantanamo have attracted to try war criminals in Sierra Leone and most notably that the United States domestic and international criticism. East Timor. The respective governments believes that the United Nations and The international community and in- and the UN set up the courts jointly, the Security Council have not become dividual rights groups and academics giving them the mandate to try those irrelevant and still have a major role in within the United States believe the charged with war crimes, crimes against international relations. It would also administration is ignoring interna- humanity, and other serious violations do much to negate the pressure many tional law and in fact is breaking the of international humanitarian law. coalition governments face from their law. The U.S. Supreme Court, and most

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recently a Federal district court, have 3 U.S. Department of Defense, “Guan- 17 United Nations, “United Nations weighed into the debate with a ruling tanamo Detainees,” available at . Implementation of Military Order,” July 7, that curtails the Executive’s attempts 4 Ingrid Arnesen, “Detainees Not 2003, accessed at . to suspend selected human rights in its Covered by Geneva Conventions,” CNN 18 U.S. Department of State, “Egypt: response to 9/11. Online, June 9, 2004, available at . [For more information . policy at Guantanamo has been to fuel Process,” release of declassified documents at 19 Golden, 6. global anti-Americanism, which un- , June 22, 2004.—Ed.] 20 Ibid. dermines U.S. influence and effective- 5 Sean D. Murphy, ed., “U.S. Abuse 21 Ibid., 8. ness, degrades the domestic support of Iraqi Detainees at Abu Ghraib Prison,” 22 Tim Golden, “Administration Of- base, and denies the United States the American Journal of International Law 98 (July ficials Split Over Stalled Military Tribunals,” 2004), 592. [For more information see “DOD The New York Times, October 25, 2004, ac- moral high ground it needs to pro- Provides Details on Integration Process,” cessed at . appears that these costs have far out- defenselink.mil>, June 22, 2004.—Ed.] 23 Ibid. weighed the operational benefits that 6 Ibid., 593. 24 Kevin J. Barry, “Military Commis- the detainee operations have gener- 7 Jennifer K. Elsea, “Lawfulness of In- sions: Trying American Justice,” The Army terrogation Techniques under the Geneva Lawyer (November 2003), 1. ated. The administration must now Conventions” (Washington, DC: Congres- 25 Lewis, “Rules Bush Overstepped adjust its approach. The United States sional Research Service, September 8, 2004). Bounds,” A19. can preserve the moral high ground by 8 Neil Lewis, “Red Cross Finds Detainee 26 U.S. Department of Defense, 3. adjusting its Combatant Status Review Abuse in Guantanamo,” The New York Times, 27 Kevin J. Barry, “Guantanamo: Disor- Tribunals to adequately determine the November 30, 2004. der of the Day,” August 22, 2004, accessed 9 Charlie Savage, “4 Ex-Detainees Sue at . international arena. This adjustment 10 “Supreme Court Rules on Rasul v 28 Independent Task Force on Public would be viewed as a legitimate form Bush,” International Law Update, July 2004. Diplomacy, Council of Foreign Relations, of justice in the international commu- 11 Janik, 118. “Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for 12 Jeffrey Kaye, interview with Ruth Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy,” nity and would do much to reduce the Wedgewood and Geoffrey Miller, Online September 18, 2003. anti-Americanism that, among other News Hour, January 22, 2003, available at 29 Golden, 2–3. things, could undermine the coalition. . 31 The Carter Center, Conference Report, the Nation’s and world’s long-term in- 13 As of August 2004, 156 detainees “Human Rights Defenders on the Frontlines had departed Guantanamo either for re- of Freedom: Protecting Human Rights in the terests. In seeking to redefine the bor- lease or for transfer to another government. Context of the War on Terrorism,” November ders between civil liberties and public U.S. Department of Defense, “Guantanamo 11–12, 2003, available at . no further for guidance than Benjamin fenselink.mil>. 32 These comments were included in Franklin, who said, “They that can give 14 Neil Lewis, “Rules Bush Overstepped a letter sent to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Bounds—Doubt Cast Over Tribunals,” The Committee in January 2005 by a dozen up essential liberty to obtain a little New York Times, November 9, 2004, A19. high-ranking retired military officers ex- temporary safety deserve neither lib- 15 Tim Golden, “After Terror, a Secret pressing concern over the nomination of erty nor safety.”35 JFQ Rewriting of Military Law,” The New York White House counsel Alberto Gonzales as Times, October 24, 2004. Attorney General, given his role in shap- 16 Experts such as the UN Commission ing legal policies on detainee operations. NO TES on Human Rights, the International Fed- Dan Eggen, “Gonzales Nomination Draws eration for Human Rights, the International Military Criticism,” The Washington Post, 1 Anton L. Janik, Jr., “Prosecuting Al Committee of the Red Cross, the British January 4, 2005. Qaeda: America’s Human Rights Policy In- High Court, the Bosnia-Herzegovina High 33 George W. Bush, National Strategy for terests Are Best Served by Trying Terrorists Court, the Canadian High Court, the gov- Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC: The Under International Tribunals,” Denver Jour- ernments of Malaysia and Germany, Am- White House, February 2003), 11. nal of International Law and Policy 30, no. 4 nesty International, Human Rights Watch, 34 Eggen. (September 2002). American Civil Liberties Union, U.S. Lawyers 35 Qtd. in Barry, “Military Commis- 2 Alfred De Zayas, “The Status of Guan- Committee for Human Rights, the U.S. Anti- sions: Trying American Justice,” 9. tanamo Bay and the Status of the Detain- Defamation League, the Association of the ees,” The Douglas Brown Lecture, University Bar of the City of New York, the Law Society of British Columbia, Vancouver, Novem- of England and Wales, the U.S. National As- The Hamdan decision was overruled in ber 19, 2003, available at .

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 67 Tanker receiving its payload from Iraq’s Al Basrah Oil Terminal

America’s Strategic Imperative J. Brunson) U.S. Navy (Richard A “Manhattan Project” for Energy

By JOHN M. AMIDON he American presence in the strategic importance of the Middle the Middle East stretches East and elevated oil access to a core back to the closing days national interest. The end of the Cold of World War II, when War and the rise of Islamic fundamen- TPresident Franklin Roosevelt met King talism further shifted the security focus Saud aboard a U.S. warship in the Suez from keeping a mutual enemy, Russia, Canal. Through the ensuing 30 years, out of the region to fighting much of Washington sought to maintain oil the war on terror within the region. access and contain the Soviet Union by Dependence on imported oil, cultivating Persian Gulf allies. The mu- particularly from the Middle East, has tually beneficial relationship between become the elephant in the foreign the United States and the Middle East policy living room, an overriding stra- oil-producing countries was forever tegic consideration composed of a mul- altered by the Yom Kippur War and titude of issues. In the short term, U.S. the subsequent petroleum embargo. options are driven by the imperative The 1973–1974 embargo highlighted to achieve a favorable outcome in Iraq

Lieutenant Colonel John M. Amidon, USAF, wrote this article as a student at the Air War College.

68 JFQ / issue thirty-nine A m i d o n

and Afghanistan and on other battle- thy goal, achieving a meaningful effect leum extraction known as Hubbert’s fields of the war on terror, but we must will be difficult, given that domestic curve. It predicts that early in the life also find a way to extricate ourselves production is declining at a rate of 1.5 of an oilfield, production will increase from reliance on the Middle East and million barrels per day. rapidly due to infrastructure growth. other oil-producing countries. The report also urges improved The field will reach a point where pro- Current energy strategy assumes conservation: duction peaks and, barring new discov- that this country can meet its oil needs eries, no addition of technology will by managing the oil-producing coun- A recent analysis indicates that the fuel yield further gains. Thus, “Hubbert’s tries diplomatically and militarily. economy of a typical automobile could peak” marks the onset of decline, a However, this thinking overestimates be enhanced by 60 percent by increasing trend that accelerates as the cost of the available oil supply, ignores grow- engine and transmission efficiency and re- further extraction approaches the coming instability in the oil-producing ducing vehicle mass by about 15 percent. mercial value of each barrel pumped. countries, and understates the military Advanced lightweight materials offer up to In many “easy” oil instances, costs of preserving access. 6 percent improvement in mileage for each the oil is actually pressurized coming Today’s strategy must adopt a 10 percent reduction in body weight. out of the ground, reminiscent of the more realistic view of the limited avail- gushers seen in Hollywood movies. able oil and recognize the diplomatic The primary means of increasing In an oilfield with this so-called high and military costs of obtaining it. If automotive economy is through man- lift, the price of oil at the wellhead is the strategy were to correctly estimate dated corporate average fuel economy less than $5.00. Post-wellhead costs are the remaining supply and recognize (CAFE) standards. added through royalties, transporta- the cost to the Nation of accessing that Responsibly crafted CAFE stan- tion, refining, delivery, and profit. As oil, it would encourage users to con- dards should increase efficiency with- more oil is extracted, it becomes neces- sume less and accelerate development out negatively impacting the U.S. au- sary to pump the oil from the ground; of alternatives. The United States must tomotive industry. The determination thus the wellhead price rises through embark on a comprehensive plan to of future fuel economy standards must the life of an oilfield. Eventually, the achieve energy independence—a type therefore be addressed analytically and cost of extracting the next barrel of oil of Manhattan Project for energy—to based on sound science. exceeds the oil’s market value, and the deploy as many conservation and re- Taken in whole, the National En- well is capped. placement measures as possible. ergy Policy does not offer a compel- Hubbert based his model on oil ling solution to the growing danger production within the lower 48 states, Current Energy Policy of foreign oil dependence. The 2004 the region where oil was first com- In May 2001, the National Energy Department of Energy budget for all mercially exploited on a large scale. He Policy Development Group published types of renewable energy totaled $1.3 predicted that within a given oilfield, the Administration’s National Energy the peak in new discoveries Policy, which states: domestic production is declining at would be followed within a a rate of 1.5 million barrels per day few years by a peak in produc- Extraordinary advances in technology tion, and then decline. He also have transformed energy exploration and billion, increasing just 0.1 percent from postulated that peak production would production. Yet we produce 39 percent less 2002 to 2004, while lagging the entire occur when approximately half of the oil today than we did in 1970, leaving Department of Energy budget, which total reserves in a given area were de- us ever more reliant on foreign suppliers. increased 5.9 percent. Even if ANWR pleted. Hubbert forecast in 1956 that On our present course, America 20 years were fully exploited, proven reserves lower–48 oil production would reach from now will import nearly 2 of every 3 total about 7.7 billion barrels of recov- its maximum about 1970, which has barrels of oil—a condition of increased erable oil, enough to supply the Na- proved true. dependency on foreign powers that do not tion for just over a year. Although the The United Kingdom’s portion of always have America’s interests at heart.1 National Energy Policy sets forth a range the North Sea oilfields reveals a simi- of conservation and alternative tech- lar pattern. These fields reached their The policy calls for enhanced ef- nologies, no meaningful fiscal policy Hubbert’s peak in 1999 and are now in ficiency in existing domestic oilfields steps have been taken to bring them to decline, with production expected to and exploiting heretofore environmen- the fore. cease after 2020. tally denied areas such as the Alaska Hubbert’s concepts might be ap- National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). Al- Dwindling Global Supply plied to global oil production as well. though increasing the domestic frac- In 1956, geophysicist M. King Prior to 2000, the majority of studies tion of our oil consumption is a wor- Hubbert pioneered a model for petro- projected an ultimate recoverable sup-

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ply of 2 trillion barrels of oil. In 2000, pessimists) forecasts a peak in global though it is beset by political tension, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) fore- oil production in approximately 2007. internal dissent, and a looming demo- cast a 50 percent increase in estimated Since the USGS report of 2000, graphic crisis. world reserves to 3.003 trillion barrels. most studies have distanced them- Mexico is tied to the U.S. econ- As soon as it was published, the study selves from its numbers. A summer omy through the North American Free came under fire for what many con- 2004 report by BP–AMOCO estimated Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has sidered optimistic assumptions. Dis- the remaining oil supply at 1,147.8 been a mixed blessing for Mexicans. counting the USGS results, there has barrels,2 a figure in close agreement Although elimination of all trade bar- historically been broad agreement that with the estimate of the U.S. Energy riers led to a flood of foreign invest- the world’s ultimate oil supply equaled Information Agency, 1,266 billion bar- ment and industrialization during the approximately 2 trillion barrels. In one rels.3 These studies buttress the view 1990s, many of these jobs have since recent study, the average estimate of 76 that we are approaching worldwide moved to even lower wage countries. studies works out to be 1,930 billion peak oil production. NAFTA was championed as a solution barrels, of which 920 billion (48 per- Although the pessimists offer a for emigration problems, but Mexicans cent) have been consumed. convincing argument presaging a peak continue to migrate north in search Today, the oil supply prediction in global oil production, what if they of employment and higher wages. A camp is divided among the optimists, are wrong? What if technology and legacy of political corruption, high un- represented by organizations such discovery can delay it far into the 21st employment, and the corrosive effects as the USGS, and pessimists such as century? Assuming the oil is available of a burgeoning narcoeconomy repre- the Association for the Study of Peak somewhere on the globe, can we reli- sent great challenges. Oil and Gas. The optimists agree that ably deliver it here? During 2003, the Mexico has made no major oil dis- Hubbert’s peak is coming but will not United States averaged imports of 12.2 covery since 1980. The pessimists esti- occur until 2021 at the earliest and million barrels per day, representing 62 mate that Mexico has approximately 2112 at the latest, with 2037 as the percent of its total oil demand. Much 22 billion barrels (Gb) of oil remaining. median date. The pessimists believe of this imported oil comes from politi- Production will peak around 2015. Al- the USGS study was based on specula- cally volatile parts of the world. though Mexico is currently a net oil tive methodology and the peak is as Saudi Arabia has the world’s larg- exporter, growing domestic consump- close as 2007. The pessimists cite the est oil reserve, estimated at 250 billion tion will exceed production by 2010, growing gap between discovery and barrels (Gb).4 Peak Saudi production closing the Mexican spigot as a source production. They say that if the USGS will not occur until 2020; thus Saudi of oil for the United States. predictions are accurate, the annual Arabia will remain “the indispensable The Venezuelan oil industry was discovery rate between 1995 and 2025 nation of oil.” Saudi Arabia is ruled as born in 1866, only 7 years after pro- needs to average 21.6 billion new bar- a feudal monarchy, with absolute au- duction began in the United States. rels. New global oil discoveries over the thority held by the descendants of Abd Venezuela used this leadership in 1960 last 12 years have averaged 7.4 billion al-Aziz ibn Saud, who rose to power in to midwife the birth of the Organiza- barrels annually, far below both USGS 1932. Its vast oil wealth masks a nation of Petroleum Exporting Countries predictions and global consumption, tion with pressing demographic and (OPEC), going on to nationalize Ven- which averaged 28 billion barrels a political problems. More than half of ezuelan resources in 1976.5 The coun- year for the same period. Since 1980, all Saudis are under 18 years of age. try’s history has been characterized more oil has been extracted than has This group is plagued by limited edu- by revolution, counterrevolution, and been offset by new discoveries. cational opportunities and high un- dictatorship. The latest chapter began employment, factors that have made with the election of Hugo Chávez in America’s Fragile Oil Lifeline Saudi Arabia fertile ground for religious 1998. Although Chávez came to power Most of the world’s so-called easy extremism. The official state religion is as a populist reformer, an 18 percent oil has already been discovered or ex- Wahhabism, an inimical form of Islam contraction in the economy and his tracted, leaving the bulk of the un- that is the philosophical antecedent dictatorial practices triggered a na- discovered or unexploited oil in deep for Osama bin Laden and his follow- tional work stoppage in 2002, slowing water, or other isolated locales far from ers. The government has taken steps to oil production to a trickle. transportation infrastructure and mar- eliminate terrorist funding and curtail Venezuela possesses about 50 Gb of kets. The most promising possibilities al Qaeda recruitment within the king- conventional oil reserves, with exploita- for discovery are in the Caspian Basin dom; however, the long-term prog- tion having peaked around 2003. Ven- and Russia, areas torn by strife and nosis for success is not clear. In the ezuela also has a vast reserve of heavier instability. A prediction of future oil meantime, Saudi Arabia remains the oils, estimated as high as 1,200 Gb, production patterns (produced by the linchpin of U.S. energy security even which equals the entire conventional

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reserve remaining worldwide. The great- Nigeria today is ruled by a democrati- a 0.7 percent world production capacity est barrier to exploiting this resource has cally elected government, which has cushion. The continued viability of the been the low recovery rate of useable oil a well-deserved reputation for corrup- U.S. energy lifeline hangs on political (10–15 percent) and the high front-end tion. “For decades, powerful elites in and economic stability in nations such cost. In the early 1990s, the government the capital of Abuja have monopolized as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Nigeria. set the exploitation tax at 1 percent in the allocation of petroleum revenues, Interruption of oil production in any of an effort to draw the massive foreign providing relatively little to the ethnic the teetering countries described here investment required to bring heavy oils minorities of the Niger Delta region, would trigger immediate price rises and on-line. In October 2004, Chávez raised where most of the oil is buried. These economic dislocation. The simultane- these tax rates to 16 percent to correct minorities have grown increasingly ous loss of several oil-producing nations “foreign domination mechanisms.”6 dissatisfied and have launched armed due to boycott, sabotage, or war would Low internal consumption will place attacks on oil facilities, causing a sharp be an economic catastrophe. Venezuela at the forefront as a U.S. en- drop in exports.”7 Nigeria retains sub- ergy source for decades. But access will stantial oil resources, estimated by the The Military Challenge hinge on the policies of Hugo Chávez pessimists at 40 Gb, with a production Military operations to ensure en- and his successors. peak forecast for approximately 2009.8 ergy access and price stability have Nigeria was a British colony During 2003, the worldwide oil added an invisible subsidy to the true until it gained independence in 1960. industry produced an average of 68 cost of imported oil. From 1991 to Between 1966 and 1999, it was ruled million barrels per day, with every 2004, the average cost of a gallon of by a series of military governments producer but Saudi Arabia operating unleaded gas at a U.S. pump was as and torn by ethnic civil war and reli- at maximum capacity. Saudi excess oil high as $2.28. When the $2.2 trillion gious strife. Nearly 2 million perished production capacity currently stands cost of 9/11 and all Middle East/Cen- from violence, hunger, and disease. at less than 1 million barrels per day, tral Asia operations since Desert Shield are factored into the 1.71 trillion gallons American consumers have used Costs of Middle East Operations and 9/11, 1991–2004 since 1991, the cost at the pump rises to $3.56 per gallon (see table). The Total cost of Gulf War I $300B current energy strategy understates Annual peacetime force structure cost for units tasked $780B these costs of seeking energy security for the Middle East ($60B x 13 years) through military action. The invisible Annual cost of no-fly-zone enforcement and deployed Army forces $168.3B in Kuwait, 1991–2002 ($15.3B x 11 years) hand of market forces, which should Economic costs to the U.S. economy of the 9/11 attacks $585.2B trigger oil conservation at a price of Cost of operations in Iraq (based on substantial withdrawal in 2008) $308.9B $3.56 per gallon, has been disrupted by Cost of Operation Enduring Freedom and follow-on operations in Afghanistan the externalized military cost. $45.6B ($1.6B/month, 2002 + $1.1B/month, 2003–2004) Future military efforts to secure the Uzbekistan aid and airfield access payments, 2002 $.320B oil supply pose tremendous challenges Uzbekistan aid and airfield access payments, 2003–2004 $.357B due to the number of potential crisis Foreign aid to Pakistan, 2002 $.696B areas. Besides the nations already men- Foreign aid to Pakistan, 2003–2004 $1.2B tioned, the bulk of the world’s oil re- Kyrgyzstan foreign aid and airfield access $.500B serve is concentrated in the Middle East Foreign aid to Tajikistan $.563B and Central Asia. In order of proven Foreign aid to Turkmenistan $.274B resources, these countries are Iraq, Ku- Total U.S. gasoline consumption, 1991–2004 (gallons) 1,716.96B wait, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Rus- Hidden fuel price subsidy at the pump sia, and the nations surrounding the $1.276/gal (cost of Middle East operations/total consumption) Caspian Basin. This region, especially the Arab nations, has been referred to Sources: Grant T. Hammond, “Myths of the Gulf War,” Aerospace Power Journal 16 (November 2004), available at airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/fal98/hammondtxt.htm>; Amory B. Lovins, “U.S. Energy Security: Factsheet,” Alaska Building Science News 9, no. 1 (Fall 2003), available at ; U.S. House of Representatives Budget Committee, Democratic Caucus, “The Cost of War and Reconstruction The Middle East is faced with ex- in Iraq: An Update,” 108th Congress, 2003; Robert Looney, “Economic Costs to the United States Stemming from the 9/11 Attacks,” Strategic Insight (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, August 2002); Dennis Ryan, “Comptroller plosive population growth. By 2020 this Tallies Operation Iraqi Freedom Cost,” Pentagram, November 16, 2004, available at ; Lutz Kleveman, The New Great Game—Blood and Oil in Central Asia (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003), 173, 186, 245; U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Pakistan,” 800 million, a 30 percent increase. This “Background Note: Uzbekistan,” “U.S. Assistance to Tajikistan Fact Sheet,” “U.S. Assistance to Turkmenistan Fact surge will place huge strains on already Sheet,” available at ; U.S. Department of Transportation, “Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards,” available at . struggling governments and provide

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Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal Chinese domestic oil production could in the Arabian Gulf no longer satisfy demand, which had shot up because of the country’s extraordinary economic growth. Since then, China has imported more oil every year, from 6.4 percent of its consumption in 1993, to 31 percent in 2002, to a projected 60 percent by 2020.”10 The Asia- Pacific region’s dependence on Middle East oil may exceed 90 percent by 2010. Military and economic efforts to expand oil access in the Caspian Basin, like our actions over the past 60 years in the Persian Gulf, could bring the United States into conflict with energy- hungry regional powers such as China and India. Played out far from traditional U.S. supply lines, clashes would minimize our advantages in naval and air power and depend largely on ground forces and asymmetric warfare. The world energy delivery system is incredibly fragile. This vulnerability creates a vast universe of options for hostile nations, terrorists, and anti- globalists to create mischief by sabotage, destruction of key facilities, or interdicting transportation bottlenecks. The giant Ras Tanura loading facility in Saudi Arabia processes half of all Saudi production and thus a tenth of all global production each day. An attack on it could take half of Saudi oil off the market for at least 6 months, triggering a worldwide economic catastrophe. “Such an attack would be more economically damaging than a dirty nuclear bomb set off in midtown Man- hattan or across from the White House Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic (Aaron Ansarov) Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic (Aaron in Lafayette Square.”11 a ready source of recruits for grievance and are eager to free themselves of all organizations such as al Qaeda, for vestiges of Russian domination. Only Energy Consumption Patterns whom dissatisfied young males have two of the four, Azerbaijan and Ka- Petroleum provides nearly 40 per- been described as a center of gravity. zakhstan, have significant oil resources. cent of all energy used in the United The last oil frontier lies around Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan can States, a share that is forecast to rise the Caspian Sea. Although previous es- only hope to enjoy economic benefits over the next 20 years. Increasing reli- timates placed its oil resources as high through pipeline transit fees. All exist- ance on oil coupled with declining as 110 Gb, further exploration has lowing and proposed Caspian pipelines domestic production will trigger in- ered expectations to 17–33 Gb, well pass through some of the world’s most creasing demand for foreign oil. Today, below those of Iraq or Kuwait, but still war-torn real estate, including a pro- imports comprise 62 percent of total substantial. Over the long term, natu- posed pipeline across Afghanistan. petroleum consumption, predicted to ral gas may prove the most valuable The bulk of demand during the rise to 70 percent by 2025. resource there.9 Four of the six Caspian next decade will come from Asia. “In The main users of petroleum are Sea states are former Soviet republics 1993, after decades of self-sufficiency, the transportation and industrial sec-

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tors. Oil provides 95 percent of the en- that none of these replacement tech- per gallon (MPG) to 27 MPG. However, ergy for transportation and 20 percent nologies will happen overnight; rather, since 1985, these gains have remained for the industrial sector. Recognition they will be the result of deliberate pol- largely static as economy targets re- that world oil supplies have reached icy and investment decisions with lead mained unchanged. Improved fuel Hubbert’s peak will have major impli- times that may approach a decade. economy has been thwarted by the cations in the industrial world. World- Before discussing what will work, policy decision to set separate lower wide consumption is rising 3 percent let us remind ourselves of what will not economy standards for trucks. The annually, with the greatest growth in work. Developing additional resources growing percentage of lower-economy China. The oil energy industry gener- offshore or in the Arctic will not trucks has led to a decline in the over- ates annual revenues of $2.1 trillion. provide the long-term solution. Oil all economy of the automotive fleet. Most transportation technologies have economics have supplied great incen- Even at $2.25 per gallon, there useful lifetimes of 15 years or more. tives to discover more sources over the are few incentives for Americans to Transition to alternative technologies past decade. Despite these incentives conserve. At this price level, the an- could thus render part or all of this and ever more sophisticated technol- nual penalty of driving a gas-guzzling investment worthless and will not be ogy, new discoveries are not keep- sports utility vehicle (SUV) instead of a undertaken until the economic argu- more economical four- ments are unimpeachable. Although the continued viability of the U.S. energy door car is about $500 rising prices and sagging supplies will lifeline hangs on political and economic per year. The dearth of eventually produce clear incentives to economic incentives conserve and deploy alternative energy stability in nations such as Saudi Arabia, coupled with gas prices sources, in many cases these signals Venezuela, and Nigeria considerably lower than may not arrive until very late in the the highly taxed Euro- supply collapse, minimizing time for ing pace with consumption. Alaskan peans pay means that oil consumption classic economic incentives to act. production at Prudhoe Bay peaked per dollar of GDP is now more than The first barrier to solving this in 1988. The much-touted ANWR is 40 percent higher than in Germany problem lies in public and policy- estimated to contain about 7.7 billion and France. maker perceptions. Oil price shocks barrels of recoverable oil, enough to Hybrid automobiles. Hybrids are a and fluctuations have been common supply the United States just over a revolution in automotive design that since 1974, but each time the warnings year. Although tar sands and heavy combines a conventional gas engine proved false. For that reason alone, it oil hold promise, their economics and with an electric motor. There are three may prove difficult to convince the energy balance are daunting at best. hybrid cars and three hybrid trucks public and policymakers that an era of In sum, trying to drill our way out among the 2005 model year offerings. permanently limited oil supplies has of this crisis will not address the real The three cars, all from Japanese au- arrived. Predicting the shape of the problem, which is soaring demand and tomakers, average over 50 MPG and post-peak supply is also hard. Although the danger of military conflict over are mature designs of considerable Hubbert’s theory depicted a symmetri- shrinking resources. research and engineering. Replacing cal curve of growing and then shrink- every vehicle with a high mileage hy- ing production, the actual production Phase I: Conservation brid would cut consumption in half, pattern is highly dependent on the A national energy plan along the nearly eliminating the need for im- geology of individual oil fields and lines of the historic Manhattan Project ported oil. Improving the average fuel the level of investment in production is needed now. America faces a strate- efficiency of the entire car fleet by just technology. Further, some portion of gic imperative to decisively deploy a 5.3 miles per gallon could displace all the production shortfall may be off- range of solutions, both interim and Persian Gulf imports.12 set by conservation and increased use permanent, to address energy security. Ethanol-based fuels. Expanding of other fuels such as natural gas, oil Such an effort might consist of two production of ethanol alcohol offers a sands, coal gasification, and synthetic phases: conservation and the energy means of replacing imported oil with a oil. During World War II, German en- power shift. domestic agricultural product. All cur- gineers discovered that synthetic oils The U.S. fuel savings record is not rent automobiles can operate on fuels manufactured from coal become vi- impressive. The aftermath of the 1973– up to 15 percent ethanol. Flexible fuel able substitutes at a cost of around 1974 oil embargo saw the establish- vehicles (FFV) are designed to operate $60 per barrel. The shape of the peak ment of Government-mandated auto- on mixed fuels up to E85, a mixture and the impact of “swing” fuels such motive mileage standards. By 1985, of 15 percent gasoline and 85 percent as synthetic oil are difficult to predict. the average fuel economy of the U.S. ethanol. Over 4 million automobiles However, the key fact to remember is fleet had risen from 12.9 to 27 miles on the road are factory-equipped to

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use E85 fuels. Retrofit to FFV capability ies with existing power plants would tic petroleum demand and can be is a straightforward process that costs allow production for $1.05/gallon to priced more cheaply than gasoline.16 about $50 per vehicle. $1.60/gallon depending on the bio- According to testimony in the Senate, Ethanol-augmented fuels are avail- mass selected. Cellulosic ethanol offers sufficient cellulosic biomass is available mainly in the Midwest, where great promise for rural areas that have able in the United States right now to ethanol is made using a corn-based seen considerable depopulation due to displace up to 10 percent of today’s fermentation process. Today, 81 plants modern farming methods. oil imports.17 around the country are manufacturing The first step of implementation corn ethanol with a capacity of 3.4 bil- One cellulose ethanol plant would en- will be to emplace economic incentives lion gallons per year; 15 plants under hance energy security by replacing crude to conserve fuel. New hybrid vehicles construction will add a further 670 oil imports of 2.4 to 2.9 million barrels enjoy a tax credit of $1,500, which is million gallons per year. Corn etha- per year; increase farm income by $25 due to expire in 2006. This program nol critics observe that it takes more million per year by creating economic must be expanded, and although taxa- energy (in the form of fertilizers, farm value for residues that currently have little tion and incentives are anathema to machinery, processing into ethanol, to no value or are simply viewed as waste; many politicians, a cost-neutral regime and so forth) to grow the corn and create economic development by creating that taxes production and purchase distill the ethanol than is available in over 1,000 new jobs during peak construc- of low economy models and rebates the final product. The corn ethanol tion, and almost 200 new permanent jobs for purchase of hybrids and FFVs must production chain is dominated by cor- and about 450 spin-off jobs.15 be imposed. porate producers who have mobilized The second step is to resume in- substantial political support for a corn Biorefineries also hold great prom- creasing the CAFE fleet fuel economy ethanol tax subsidy regime of $1.4 bil- ise for urban areas. A typical large city requirement. The requirement has re- lion per year. has a substantial surplus of yard waste mained static at 27.5 MPG since 1985, Corn is a poor choice for ethanol and wood debris, products that can no while light trucks and SUVs have es- feedstock since it is the most irrigation- longer be deposited in landfills. New sentially received a free ticket. The and fertilizer-intensive crop grown in York and Philadelphia pay $150 per CAFE fuel economy requirement must the United States, and corn used for resume its move up- ethanol drives cattle feed prices higher, recognition that world oil supplies have ward in a fashion that creating hidden costs at the grocery reached Hubbert’s peak will have major produces sound public store. Although a nascent corn ethanol policy outcomes without industry has developed, future expan- implications in the industrial world exceeding the engineer- sion should be discouraged through ing capability of the au- a removal of the tax regime. Unsubsi- ton to dispose of municipal solid waste. tomotive industry. The SUV and light dized corn ethanol actually costs $2.24 Creating a simple urban wood recy- truck requirement, set at 20.7 MPG, per gallon to produce, making it un- cling routine of household recycling needs a realistic economic target that economical except in times of very bins would ensure a steady biomass balances the needs of the consumer high oil prices.13 supply and strengthen the economics with national energy security. The biorefinery and cellulosic etha- of urban biorefineries through prox- Step three institutes a crash pro- nol. Instead of valuable corn, the bio- imity to markets. Building an urban gram to build cellulosic ethanol fa- refinery produces ethanol using the biorefinery in the hundred largest met- cilities. Placement studies for ethanol starches and cellulose present in agri- ropolitan areas could produce 7 billion plants designed to consume a mixture cultural waste and byproducts such as gallons of ethanol a year, offsetting of agricultural wastes and grain have corn stalks, rice straw, paper mill waste, imported oil by 5 percent while help- estimated a construction cost of $27 recycled urban waste, and dedicated ing solve urban waste problems. million to build a facility capable of woody stemmed crops.14 Many of these The biorefinery is not a fanciful producing up to 15 million gallons of sources of cellulosic ethanol are consid- dream. In 1975, Brazil initiated a do- ethanol per year. At a proposed site ered negative-cost feed stocks, meaning mestic ethanol program based on sugar in North Dakota, suitable agricultural they have no food value and farmers cane waste. Over its 30-year life, the waste and inconsumable grain are al- must pay for their disposal. This gives ethanol industry has produced $50 bil- ready available to produce 12.5 million cellulosic ethanol a much higher net lion worth of ethanol while support- gallons of ethanol a year at no cost. energy balance than corn-based etha- ing 700,000 Brazilian jobs. Electricity Many potential sites could solve exist- nol. Studies at candidate biorefinery cogenerated at biorefineries provides ing waste disposal problems, exploiting sites in Indiana and Nebraska found 9 percent of national requirements. negative-cost biomass to turn waste that collocating ethanol biorefiner- Ethanol supports a fourth of domes- into treasure. National Renewable

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Director of Penn State’s Energy Institute displays Phase II: The Energy Power Shift a flow reactor that tests Although the “hydrogen econ- the thermal stability omy” is widely cited in political dis- of a coal-blended jet course, its practicality is doubtful. Pro- fuel that has been in ponents cite the vast renewable energy development over the past 15 years from wind, solar, and biomass sources. Massive wind farms, occupying merely a portion of the Dakotas, could theo- retically produce sufficient hydrogen through electrolysis to power all domestic transportation needs. Although it is possible to produce hydrogen in this fashion, storing, transporting, and distributing it to markets is problematic. Waiting to transition to the hydrogen economy ignores proven and inexpensive good technology in favor of unproven and costly perfect technology. Instead of hydrogen, phase II should focus on plug-in hybrid vehicles and optimizing the biorefinery concept. Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs). The next evolutionary step from the Toyota Prius, PHEVs use the same principle as today’s hybrid with the addition of a larger battery and a 120 volt electric wall plug. The PHEV charges its battery at night from the wall socket or even while parked at work. The enlarged battery is capable of driving the PHEV entirely electri- cally below 35 miles per hour (mph) for about 60 miles, well within the typical commuting range. When the PHEV is driven faster than 35 mph or beyond 60 miles, the conventional motor picks AP/Wide Photo (Pat Little) World up the load. Fully operational proto- Energy Lab studies show that an invest- age energy crop plantations are crucial types have already been built using ment of $31 billion would build 225 for creating a firm supply base for cel- modified Toyota Priuses. These exist- plants capable of producing enough lulosic ethanol. ing PHEVs average up to 180 MPG in ethanol to replace over 10 percent of Expanded use of hybrid cars and typical commuter profiles since most gasoline consumption. biorefineries provides an interim strat- driving is done in electric-only mode. Farmers need incentives to grow egy that enhances energy security while The energy-per-mile cost of electric- energy crops such as switchgrass, a na- ity is a third the cost tive plant that does not require fertil- unsubsidized corn ethanol costs $2.24 per of gasoline. PHEVs izer or irrigation. It is estimated that transfer a large por- 15 percent of the North American con- gallon to produce, making it uneconomical tion of the transpor- tinent consists of land that is unsuit- except in times of very high oil prices tation energy bill able for food farming but workable to the electric grid, for switchgrass cultivation. “If all that smoothing the transition to the next whose capacity is underused at night land was planted with switchgrass, we phase of an energy Manhattan Project, and can grow through the addition of could replace every single gallon of gas the “Energy Power Shift,”19 a move to existing and proven renewable energy consumed in the United States with emerging transportation technologies technologies such as wind, solar, and ethanol.”18 Farm policies that encour- that offer permanent energy security. distributed fuel cells.

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225 years. The economy, particularly Oil refinery plant in Basra, Iraq the transportation component, has become heavily dependent on foreign oil. Concurrent with rising demand are indications that world production may soon peak, followed by permanent decline and shortage. Moreover, most of the remaining oil is concentrated in distant, politically hostile locations, inviting interdiction by enemies. Over the last 60 years, policymakers have repeatedly applied diplomatic and military triage to the problem of national energy security while generally ignoring the economic prospects for a solution. Today, the Nation is engaged in a global war on terror throughout the same resource-rich area on which the safety of its economy hinges. Eco- nomic stagnation or catastrophe lurk Signal Company (Christopher J. Crawford) th

55 close at hand, to be triggered by another embargo, collapse of the Saudi Improved biorefinery. The center- biorefineries, or other as-yet-undefined monarchy, or civil disorder in any of a piece of the second pillar of phase II, technology would seem a policy deci- dozen nations. Barring these events, ris- improved biorefinery, is the thermal sion ranking with Thomas Jefferson’s ing world demand and falling produc- conversion process (TCP), by which Louisiana Purchase. tion could place the United States in di- the geological conditions that produce An ancillary bonus—clean air. Envi- rect military competition with equally oil are recreated. A technology demon- ronmentalists have championed many determined nations. It is doubtful that stration plant in Carthage, Missouri, is of the above ideas for years but have any military, even that of a global hege- producing 500 barrels of oil a day using been largely ignored or grudgingly pla- mon, could secure an oil lifeline indefi- turkey manure, bones, paper products, cated with half-measures. Until now, nitely. Failing to take urgent economic wood, municipal waste, and sewage. economic considerations have trumped steps now will necessitate more painful The TCP produces usable oil at a cost many of the environmentalists’ argu- economic steps later and likely require of 40 cents per gallon using landfill ments as cheap gas and lack of govern- protracted military action. waste as a feedstock. ment commitment knocked the props Meeting this dilemma with a tech- Although the steps outlined out from under the green platform. nical solution plays on America’s great- in phase I will offer breathing space The Manhattan Project for energy est strengths, those of the inventor and against the demise of the oil-based would provide an ideal convergence of the innovator. Rapid execution of a interests, bringing the two-phase Manhattan Project for energy the current world energy situation poses economist, diplomat, will provide near-term relief measures soldier, and environ- while laying the foundation for the a national threat unparalleled in 225 years mentalist under the long-term establishment of an “Energy same tent. In addition Power Shift” economy. Reduced depen- economy, rising demand and falling to girding energy security, PHEVs and dence on imported oil would also allow production suggest that a transition to TCP biorefineries offer dramatic im- the Nation to pursue a more pragmatic phase II must be defined, capitalized, provements in the pollution impact foreign policy, freed of the necessity to and executed with rigor. The 2005 De- of the transportation sector by either engage in all episodes of Middle East partment of Energy budget earmarks eliminating noxious byproducts en- or OPEC history. This strategy denies $2.5 billion for all categories of energy tirely or transferring to less polluting al Qaeda and its allies a key argument research. Given that the United States energy sources. in their war against the United States; has spent $2.2 trillion over the past 14 reducing the strategic importance of years seeking energy security through America’s Strategic Imperative the Middle East will obviate the need military action, $50 billion spent to The current world energy situation for “us” to be “there” and diminish the accelerate the arrival of PHEVs, TCP poses a national threat unparalleled in cultural friction between Muslims and

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the West. Absent the plausible charge 2 BP–AMOCO, BP Statistical Review of Security Affairs (December 2003), available at that the U.S. role in the Middle East is World Energy, June 2004, accessed at . 12 motivated solely by oil, U.S. efforts to bp.com>. Rocky Mountain Institute, Fuel Sup- 3 Guy Caruso, U.S. Oil Markets and the plies and Security (Snowmass, CO: Rocky nurture democracy, and local percep- Middle East (Washington, DC: U.S. Depart- Mountain Institute, 2004), available at tion of those efforts, could result in a ment of Energy, October 20, 2004). . new era of good will. Although this 4 “Country Assessment: Saudi Arabia,” 13 David Pimentel, “Ethanol Fuels: En- problem is daunting, it is not unsolv- Association for the Study of Peak Oil Newsletter ergy Balance, Economics, and Environmen- able; instead, it demands prompt and 21 (Cork, Ireland: 2002). tal Impacts Are Negative,” Natural Resources 5 “Country Assessment: Venezuela,” Research 2 (June 2003). certain action to ensure an energy-rich Association for the Study of Peak Oil Newsletter 14 BC International Corporation, Eth- and peaceful future. JFQ 22 (Cork, Ireland: 2002). anol From Biomass Process, November 13, 6 Iain Bruce, “Venezuela Raises Oil 2004, available at . 15 Niagara, it may easily happen that from tober 11, 2004. U.S. Senate, Proceedings and Debates 7 Michael T. Klare, “Growing Militari- of the 108th Congress, 2d Session, September time to time you run into a reach of quite zation of Our Oil Dependence,” The Boston 15, 2004. smooth water, or that a bend in the river Globe, October 12, 2004. 16 Amory B. Lovins et al., Winning the or a change in the wind may make the 8 “Country Assessment: Nigeria,” As- Oil Endgame (Aspen, CO: Rocky Mountain roar of the falls seem far more distant. But sociation for the Study of Peak Oil Newsletter Institute, 2005). 17 your hazard and your preoccupation are in (Cork, Ireland: 2003). U.S. Senate. 9 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy 18 Sam Jaffe, “Independence Way,” The 20 no way affected thereby. Information Agency, Country Analysis Briefs: Washington Monthly (July/August 2004),18. —Winston Churchill Caspian Sea Region (Washington, DC: De- 19 Barry J. Hanson, Energy Power Shift: partment of Energy, June 2004). Benefiting from Today’s New Technologies 10 Institute for the Analysis of Global (Maple, WI: Lakota Scientific Press, 2004). NOTES Security, Energy Security in East Asia, Au- 20 William Manchester, The Last Lion: gust 13, 2004, available at . (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1988), Group, National Energy Policy, May 2001, 11 Gal Luft and Anne Korin, “Terror’s 198. available at . Next Target,” The Journal of International

Tanker truck being loaded with ethanol at Golden Grain Energy plant, which generates renewable fuels AP/Wide Photo (Charlie Neibergall) World

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his essay addresses asymmetric conflict Soldier questions an Iraqi about insurgent activity in its current manifestation, which has come to be called jihadism. It accepts that the concept of center of gravity is Tapplicable to such conflict, as has been argued by many study projects at the U.S. Army War Col- lege.1 These studies, however, do not extend to the resistance struggle in Iraq. Even in their treatment of al Qaeda, they disagree as to what constitutes its center of gravity and reflect questionable assumptions about Islamist militancy. Departing from the conventional systemic approach, the present study focuses on contrast of culture to tie together loose strings and add clarity to the dynamic of jihadism. To begin with, center of gravity in the context of asymmetry has no correlation with the disposition, maneuverability, or sustainability of a field force or to the capacity of states to mobilize assets of manpower and materiel. Nonetheless, the term remains applicable, particularly as used by Antulio Echevarria. In his treatise on “Clause- witz’s Center of Gravity,” Echevarria reinterprets Clausewitz’s words as advice to look first for unity of effort and then “for connections among the various parts of an adversary, or adversaries, in order to determine what holds them together,” as if by centripetal force. “Centers of gravity are focal points that serve to hold a combatant’s entire system or structure together and that draw power from a variety of sources and provide it with purpose and direction.”2 The term asymmetric warfare similarly deserves clarification. The base concept of a weaker adversary using unconventional means, stratagems, or

Marine Forces, Pacific (JonDior Ferrell) Marine Forces, niche capabilities to overcome a stronger power remains pertinent. However, the original hypotheses of rogue states launching chemical, biological, Center of Gravity and and radiological attacks or millennialist terrorists wreaking havoc in the United States have been supplanted by the realities of the 9/11 attacks, Asymmetric Conflict the Taliban/al Qaeda aggression in Afghanistan, and the Sunni resistance in Iraq. The common denominator of these realities is the legitimizing Factoring of hostile action through the tenet of jihad—the Islamic imperative of fighting infidels to regain independence of action on the micro level or to In Culture bring social justice and ultimately salvation to mankind on the macro level. Thus, asymmetric conflict has become associated with jihadism. As By JOHN W. JANDORA any complex word-symbol, jihad lends itself to various interpretations, including who may right- John W. Jandora is the supervisory threat analyst at U.S. Army Special fully invoke it and how it may be conducted. Such Operations Command and the author of two books and numerous considerations notwithstanding, jihadism is the articles on warfare and Middle Eastern history. hallmark of America’s current opponents.

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Given this delimitation of asymmetric con- their resources contracted in times of drought or flict, jihadism manifests itself to the U.S. military seasonal change, [and] some of us were periodi- as an array of relatively small-scale, low-level at- cally becoming them.”4 This process is depicted in tacks by tribal militias, armed brotherhoods (Sufi the Bible, when the extended families of Isaac militias), factional/party militias, outlaw gangs, and Ishmael, the sons of Abraham, drew apart, and militant cells. This phenomenon is very dif- evolving into two distinct and now antagonistic ferent from the long-held image of companies or peoples, the Jews and Arabs. Then, too, there is battalions deployed “as two up and one back”— evidence that tribes intermingled for ecologic rea- doctrinal, spatially structured combat by state-or- sons, yet upheld a myth of common ancestry. ganized forces. It does not, however, defy analysis If we accept tribe as a valid term of analysis, of force generation and sustainment. Hence, this we can proceed to a meaningful definition of essay seeks to expose and explain the centrip- tribalism. It is not the antithesis of globalism, as etal (in-drawing) force that binds the disparate some scholars suggest, nor a primitive form of elements in their asymmetric approaches to jihad. nationalism. Rather, it is the self-legitimation of The process results in finding centers of gravity. the kin group and its intent and endeavor to op- timize its collective self-interest. Self-legitimation Tribes and Clients is conviction that the tribe is the beginning and Two countervailing social forces shape the ji- end of loyalty, identity, obligation, purpose, status, hadist community, tribalism and clientelism. Both honor, past, and future—exclusiveness relative to are outside the experience of most Americans. society at large. Thus, the tribe constitutes its own Both terms generally evoke disdain, albeit for armed force—a militia consisting of most or all quite different reasons.3 Tribalism, as a derivative fit adult males. The influence of tribalism may be of tribe, is problematic because many scholars strong or weak, depending on such circumstances contend that the base term lacks specificity and as affronts to honor, threats to security, challenges therefore analytic useful- to livelihood, or summons to jihad. Circumstances jihadism is the hallmark of ness. Clientelism, on the other may lead to voluntary or compulsory compro- hand, evokes images of the mises with kin group exclusiveness. (See figure 1 America’s current opponents old-time, party-linked patron- for a depiction of this phenomenon.) Individual age politics of America’s big tribesmen may be compelled to serve in the state’s cities, which the school of political correctness military establishment or voluntarily join the party sees as deserving avoidance if not censure. Dis- that rules the state. At a higher degree of drift, dain notwithstanding, anyone who has lived be- they may voluntarily leave their homeland at the yond the Western enclave in most of the Islamic behest of some militant preacher to join a muja- world knows such terms are indispensable. hideen group. However, the tribal bond remains The scholarly critique of the term tribe draws unbroken except in cases of full self-alienation. Up attention to its seemingly arbitrary use to denote to that extreme point, the individual expects, and groups as small as extended families and as large is expected, to serve tribal interests. He will give as nationalities. The head count of a tribe cor- the needs of his kinsmen priority and respond to respondingly ranges from a few score to hundreds the directives or entreaties of the tribal authority. of thousands. There is controversy whether the It is at the point of full self-alienation that term applies to urban as well as rural populations clientelism prevails: individuals stop acting as and where the distinction lies between clan and tribesmen and unquestioningly submit to the tribe. Moreover, genetic linkage may not correlate authority of preachers or operational leaders. This with tribal alliances and rivalries. However, none phenomenon, which involves a small minority, of these objections are critical because tribe and has parallels in Western societies, where youths tribalism can indeed be defined in practical terms. alienate themselves from their families to follow According to William R. Polk, a tribe is a kin- cult leaders. In both cases, the leader (patron) ship group that is optimally sized to its ecologic offers the followers (clients) religious salvation in setting—large enough to accomplish its mini- return for loyal service. The comparison has lim- mal economic chores and defend itself but small its because the personality factor—adulation of enough to keep members in contact and remain the leader—seems more significant in the West- proportional to the supply of food. Thus, his- ern case than in Islam. Osama bin Laden himself tory reveals that “clans were constantly splitting seems to be creating a cult of personality through apart as they grew beyond their resources or as his media releases, but this may be a hasty

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Figure 1: Compromise of Kin Group Exclusiveness Salafist (religious militant) and Ba’thist arenas as well as the military-security establishment, where they covertly facilitate resistance activity. The Politico-Economic- Salvation- Oriented Drift (Minimal) Oriented Drift (Maximal) tribal leaders have plausible denial insofar as the Self- Alienation tribal militias as such are not committed against State Employment Militant Religious Congregation multinational forces, while the tribe has ostensi- Kin Group “Circle” bly committed assets to the new regime. In figure 2, space B, at which these various Party/Faction Membership Combatant Group Mujahideen arenas (shown as circles) overlap, is tribal author- Primal Allegiance ity, which in this scenario abets the resistance. That space is both physical and moral; it consists of the tribal assemblies where decisions are made as well as the beliefs and rituals that legitimize interpretation. It is noteworthy that his harangues such decisionmaking. Space B, with its two di- are largely cast in nonegotistical terms, phrasing mensions, is thus the notional center of grav- in grammatical third person (it, that) rather than ity for tribally connected resistance. Reversing first person (I, me). Neither his deputies nor the the scenario perhaps better illustrates the point. leaders of allied militant groups seem to exploit Should the tribal authority opt to support the a personality factor. In their propaganda, the new government, the tribal members in the ranks more infamous actors pledge to cooperate with al of the military-security forces would cease their Qaeda and recognize bin Laden as head. However, subversive activity, and those acting out Ba’thist such allegiance is based on volition, not obliga- or radical Salafist agendas would cease hostilities. tion as is the case with tribalism. Hence, it seems From either perspective, the associated critical ca- that the militant group leaders attract followers pabilities of tribal authority are ensuring that the from both self-alienated individuals and genuine kin group has economic sustenance and security outcasts by justifying and facilitating jihad. from threats. Specifying a center of gravity, however, is Coopting Tribal Authority far from devising an effective strategy. The first There is certainly give and take, and even relevant consideration is that the two dimensions some overlap, between the competing influences of tribal leadership are not equally approach- of clientelism and tribalism. The Ba’thist resistance able. Addressing the moral dimension would be in Iraq ostensibly derives motive from old party a generational project and is, therefore, a non- ideology, yet it must heavily resort to the tribal starter. On the other hand, addressing the physi- environment for man- cal dimension is more feasible and suggests two it is at the point of self- power, subsistence, weap- approaches: removing tribal leadership, hope- ons caching, smuggling fully without provoking greater antagonism, or alienation that individuals stop assistance, and safe haven coopting tribal authorities and, through them, acting as tribesmen and submit since the party/state struc- their tribes. Still, determining the best course of to the authority of preachers ture has been destroyed. action requires many other considerations. There The real authority within are hundreds of tribes in Iraq, as there are in and operational leaders a tribe might be contested Afghanistan and many other Islamic countries. among its nominal chief, Within a country, some tribes are more powerful council of elders, or religious leaders. The outcome than others, some are bitter rivals, and some have might determine whether the males of the tribe regional dominance without ranking very high in mobilize together as an integral tribal militia or the national pecking order. component of a Sufi militia, or go off individually These power relations can of course be un- to a mujahideen camp. covered and then factored into a counterresis- Such variances should not be daunting, how- tance strategy. The operative questions are: ever, because graphing them affords the necessary ■ Which tribes are most significant in terms of perspective on the adversary. Figure 2 depicts manpower, control of strategic terrain or resources, ex- the resistance construct for Iraq, which includes ternal influence, and historic role? a small foreign component and a much larger ■ Which tribes will resist cooptation, either as native component. The graphing of the native a matter of principle or as a matter of irreconcilable component indicates tribes with members in the rivalry?

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■ Regarding those tribes open to cooptation, what al Qaeda and between it and those remote groups is the cost of coopting them, for example, in terms of who are said to respond to bin Laden’s direction. money, official positions, local development projects, or Yet one finds evidence of doctrinal discord and of public sector employment? Is the cost bearable? bin Laden’s indifference to it—of his willingness to ■ What are the tradeoffs between coopting at the make use of even those he considers beyond the regional or subregional versus the country level? pale of Islam.5 If it is not leadership, then perhaps ■ How does the stabilization force contain the al Qaeda’s center of gravity is its aggregated capac- tribes that cannot be coopted, for whatever reasons? ity to project terror. However, this recourse leads to These are not questions for the military consideration of critical capabilities or resources, alone. They require interagency and bilateral co- not center of gravity per se. Besides, al Qaeda’s re- ordination to answer and convert into a strategic sources are of very low density and of various tech- plan. However, the reality is that the military is nological levels and are therefore relatively easy engaged and often makes decisions about who is to move, conceal, replace, reschedule, or retool. worth training, who cannot be trusted, who gets There is perhaps a more subliminal dynamic at hired, which areas to cordon work—the possibility that and search, or where a project the military is sustaining the center of gravity of bin is initiated. The military also discussion on the potentiality Laden’s network equates to regularly gains information the word qâcida (corrupted and actuality of coopting on tribal power dynamics and into qaeda). The Arabic crafts its own ad hoc models tribal leaders word has numerous mean- to make sense of it. Lastly and ings—basic and extended, perhaps most significantly, the military is sustain- concrete and metaphoric. It can designate base in ing discussion on the potentiality and actuality of the concrete sense of foundational or operational coopting tribal leaders. Operational and tactical base; it can also designate fundamental principle. commanders and their troops must deal with the Thus, it connotes the same two dimensions, physi- dynamics of tribalism despite the lack of an inte- cal and moral, that were pertinent in the discus- grated strategic plan. sion of tribal authority. As a two-dimensional force, al Qaeda’s critical capabilities are to uphold Critiquing Extremist Doctrine radical interpretations of the jihad tenet, inspire What of the center of gravity in the clientele complementary actions (strikes), and covertly gain version of jihadism? From what has been discussed, new adherents to Islamist radicalism. it appears that it is neither the person nor the leg- Compared to the tribal case, however, the end of Osama bin Laden. If it were, one would ex- physical dimension of al Qaeda is diffuse—even pect to find doctrinal cohesion among the mujahi- more so than it had been—lacking geographic, deen in the camps supposedly run or supported by institutional, or temporal consistency. Prior to the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom, the al Figure 2: Sunni Resistance Construct Qaeda network was present in many countries in the form of mosques creating jihad-adepts and Iraqi Salaﬁsts training camps generating jihadist operatives. (non-religious militants) The command center and main concentration of manpower were in Afghanistan. Consequent to Foreign Fighters (non-native militants) Enduring Freedom and regional cooperation in the war on terror, mosque preaching was censured, Sunni Tribes and camps were abandoned. The militant leaders and their followers went into hiding and changed AB sites as needed to avoid detection. Nonetheless, capabilities in tradecraft, communications, financing, and arms procurement were conserved through better concealment techniques or modified procedures. Terrorist strikes have continued, Supporters with Military- and often it is such atrocities that first indicate Iraq Ba’thists Security Establishment presence in an area. So long as any cell can make gain for the A – Voluntary Cooperation B – Obligatory Cooperation whole movement, the effort to stop jihadist terror-

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ism demands a long-term, wide-ranging commit- conducting jihad against other Muslims) or Sayyid ment. Here again, formulation of strategy belongs Qutb’s construct of the “universal Islamic con- in the interagency arena. The military has already cept.” Even those who do would have virtually shown that it has suitable assets and techniques to no credibility with a Muslim audience, since they contribute to the cause and will likely remain en- would be immediately dismissed as Westerners and gaged as long as America’s will endures. However, infidels, regardless of their credentials. The task targets such as leadership, weapons caches, and must be shared with Muslim intellectuals who do smuggling rings are in the physical dimension of have the credibility to critique extremist ideology al Qaeda. What of the moral dimension? yet need the technical assistance in information Many observers in the governmental, mili- warfare America can offer. tary, and media arenas have already argued for an One last consideration: how does the Taliban information warfare campaign. However, the pre- movement fit into the above scheme? The Tal- ponderance of advice calls for an external, as op- iban are adversaries of the United States largely posed to internal, approach—promoting tolerance, because they have been, and remain, allies of al freedom, and democracy as countervalues rather Qaeda. They are not, however, agents of global than discrediting the tenets of Islamist extremism. terrorism. They are a regional, religious-based The former approach makes little sense when the faction that gained and lost control of most of adversary’s propaganda has already distorted Amer- Afghanistan. The Taliban have unity of doctrine ican values into (Deobandist) and a high degree of ethnic homoge- the Taliban continues to lose numbers licentiousness, neity (Pashtun). Their profile is a variation of the through members returning to their irresponsibility, competing allegiance dynamic graphed in figure and hypocrisy. 1. The organization, with its hard-core leadership tribal obligations and primal allegiance This rejection and henchmen, retains residual support among of Westernism the Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan and Pakistan. is buttressed by a full complement of extrem- However, it continues to lose numbers through ist treatises and jihad lore (salvation histories, members returning to their tribal obligations and myths, and folklore that portray hero-martyrs, primal allegiance. The progress of Kabul’s recently epic struggles, and the sense of Providence). Both initiated “Reconciliation Program” should offer sets can be targeted. However, the treatises are many examples of how wayward kinsmen are more vulnerable in that they lend themselves to coaxed back into the tribal fold. critique on points of doctrinal validity. The jihad Afghanistan seems to offer some prospects lore, like American frontier lore, is too embedded for Iraq. However, the analogy should not be Marine confirming in the popular culture to be easily subverted. The taken too far. In Afghanistan, the U.S. military destruction of hostile vehicle during doctrinal vulnerability, though, cannot be directly had an important advantage in the initial stage of Operation Spear in targeted. Few Americans have the knowledge to Enduring Freedom—the cooperation of a domestic Karabilah, Iraq critique the tenet of takfir (as it justifies Muslims ally, the Northern Alliance. This coalition not only had the necessary military and political organization to take charge of the country; it also had experience with accommodating tribalism. (During the civil war, some militias switched allegiance, according to tribal interest, just as occurred earlier in the Lebanese conflict.) The United States had no such advantage in Iraq—ex- cluding the Kurdish autonomous zone—and thus remains challenged with developing that capacity in a new Baghdad regime. The pacification and stabilization of Iraq may consequently take longer. The bottom line is that leveraging tribalism should be critical to that effort.

There will be ample opportunity to test the above thesis because militant jihadism is likely to challenge America and its allies for some years to Division Marine Combat Camera (Neill A. Sevelius) d

2 come. It may be an allied Muslim state, however,

82 JFQ / issue thirty-nine J a n d o r a U.S. Air Force (Jamie M. Shultz) U.S. Air Force

Security Force Airman that ultimately leads the way against the jihadists’ NOTES speaking to a tribe center of gravity. Regardless of which govern- leader’s son through ment leads and whether the requisite interagency 1 The relevant works, all products of the Strategy an interpreter approach ever becomes reality, the U.S. military Research Project at the U.S. Army War College, are James A. Bliss, “Al-Qaeda’s Center of Gravity” (Carlisle Barracks, must prepare to factor culture into mission plan- PA: Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, ning at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. May 3, 2004); Stephen W. Davis, “Center of Gravity and Many initiatives have been undertaken—partic- the War on Terrorism” (April 7, 2003); Joe E. Ethridge, ularly by the Army and Marine Corps, whose Jr., “Center of Gravity Determination in the Global War missions more directly engage foreign cultures. on Terrorism” (May 3, 2004); John L. Haberkern, “The Global War on Terrorism: Ideology as Its Strategy Center The increasing inclusion of cultural courses in of Gravity” (May 3, 2004); James Reilly, “A Strategic Level service school curricula as well as cultural factors Center of Gravity Analysis on the Global War on Ter- in training scenarios is a positive development. rorism” (April 9, 2002); Joseph P. Schweitzer, “Al-Qaeda: However, there are questions of proper focus and Center of Gravity and Decision Points” (April 7, 2003). 2 effectiveness of instructional time invested. It is Antulio J. Echevarria, “Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine—Again!” important, too, to preclude easy but meaningless (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Sep- fixes, such as casting an exercise opposing force as tember 2002), vi–vii, available at . is the source of authority to rule on such issues? 3 Some of that controversy is noted in Howard Perhaps the joint military community should es- Handleman, The Challenge of Third World Development, 3d ed. (Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 86. tablish a clearinghouse and staff it with specialists 4 William R. Polk, Neighbors and Strangers: The with genuine knowledge of indigenous customs Fundamentals of Foreign Affairs (Chicago: University of and social dynamics, Islamic theology and social Chicago Press, 1997), 30, 218. thought, and related subjects. JFQ 5 Various Internet sources allude to doctrinal dis- agreements among the jihadists. See, for example, the section on Isam al-Turabi’s testimonies in “Bin Laden’s Life in Sudan—Part One,” excerpt from FBIS translation of Arabic text of al-Quds al-Arabi (November 24, 2001), , 13.

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Army tanks pass through the “Arches of Victory” in Baghdad, Operation Iraqi Freedom Combat Camera Squadron (John L. Houghton) Combat Camera Squadron st

“Everybody Wanted Tanks” 1 Heavy Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom

By JOHN GORDON IV and BRUCE R. PIRNIE

his article reviews the performance ensuing counterinsurgency—for example, during of U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and combat in Fallujah. British armored forces during Opera- Depending on how the Marine regimental tion Iraqi Freedom. Although much combat teams (RCTs) are counted, heavy forces Tspeculation on the future of warfare tends to accounted for either 4 or 8 of the 16 ground downplay heavy forces, this operation shows that maneuver brigades/regiments committed to Iraq close combat remains inevitable and that tanks before the fall of Baghdad in mid-April. There and mechanized infantry still dominate close were four classic heavy brigades (three in the combat. Although the focus is on major combat U.S. Army’s 3d Infantry Division [Mechanized] operations in Iraq from March 19 to May 1, 2003, plus the British 7th Armored Brigade). The Marine the conclusions have remained valid during the RCTs could also be considered heavy forces since

Lieutenant Colonel John Gordon IV, USA (Ret.), is a senior military researcher at RAND. Bruce R. Pirnie is a senior analyst at RAND.

84 JFQ / issue thirty-nine Gordon and Pirnie

they included roughly 130 tanks and over 450 High praise for heavy forces appears through- amphibious assault vehicles (AAV–7s) serving as out the written reports and interviews on Iraqi armored personnel carriers. Of the infantry the Freedom. The 3d Infantry Division After Action Marines initially deployed, all but three battalions Report states: rode in AAVs, with the remainder riding in trucks. Three of the Marine RCTs were organic to 1st Ma- This war was won in large measure because the rine Division, while the fourth formed the basis enemy could not achieve decisive effects against our of Task Force Tarawa, a brigade-sized force from 2d armored fighting vehicles. While many contributing Marine Division that was under direct control of factors helped shape the battlespace (air interdiction, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. close air support, artillery), ultimately war demands Total coalition tank strength was roughly closure with the enemy force within the minimum 450 vehicles at the start of the operation. The 3d safe distance of artillery. Our armored systems en- Infantry Division included over 200 M1A1s in its abled us to close with and destroy the heavily armed tank battalions and cavalry squadron. The 1st Ma- and fanatically determined enemy force often within rine Expeditionary Force had urban terrain with impunity. No other ground combat armored systems enabled us two tank battalions (virtually system currently in our arsenal could have delivered all the tanks in the active Ma- similar mission success without accepting enormous to destroy the heavily armed rine Corps), with some tanks casualties, particularly in urban terrain. . . . Decisive and fanatically determined being provided to each of the combat power is essential, and only heavily armored enemy force often within three RCTs of 1st Marine Divi- forces provide this capability.3 sion. Additionally, one com- urban terrain with impunity pany of Marine Corps Reserve Tanks tanks was activated to support The authors interviewed personnel from the Task Force Tarawa. The British Army deployed U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and British army two tank battalions in 7th Armored Brigade with a about main battle tanks in Iraq. Without exception total of 116 Challenger 2 tanks.1 or qualification, they praised the performance of The British had about 120 Warrior infantry tanks, describing them as vital to the quick victory. fighting vehicles in Iraq, comparable to the U.S. The United Kingdom Minister of Defence, Army’s Bradley. The Warrior has a 30 millimeter Procurement, stated, “Operation Telic [the British (mm) automatic cannon but does not mount an designation for Iraqi Freedom] underscored the anti-tank guided missile as the Bradley does. The value of heavy armor in a balanced force.” He also 3d Infantry Division had approximately 250 Brad- stated that Iraqi Freedom confirmed “protection is leys in Iraq including the M–2 infantry and M–3 still vital” and reemphasized “the effect of heavy cavalry versions of the vehicle. The AAV–7s of the armor in shattering the enemy’s will to fight.”4 Marine Corps carry more dismountable infantry Tanks were further esteemed during Iraqi than either the Warrior or Bradley (20 troops can Freedom for several reasons. be carried in the passenger compartment of the AAV), but the Marine vehicle’s armor is closer ■ Tanks were highly resistant to fire. The most common Iraqi antiarmor weapon was the rocket-propelled to that of an M–113. Most of the AAVs mount a grenade (RPG), especially the Soviet designed RPG–7. side-by-side 50-caliber machinegun and 40mm This weapon has both high explosive and shaped charge grenade launcher in the turret. Unlike the U.S. warheads. The antiarmor shaped charge can penetrate and British armies, where the infantry fighting up to 300 millimeters (nearly 12 inches) of solid, rolled vehicles are organic to the mechanized infantry homogenous armor plate under optimal conditions, but still failed to penetrate the advanced armor of battalions, the Marines have a large assault am- the Abrams and Challenger 2 in most locations. Brit- phibian battalion at division level that attaches ish army sources stated that one of their Challengers its vehicles to infantry regiments based on the operating near Basra absorbed 15 hits by RPGs with no mission. Most Marine infantry in Iraq rode in penetration. The only British Challenger knocked out AAVs and were essentially mechanized infantry. during the war was accidentally hit by another British tank.5 A tank battalion commander in the 3d Infantry The Marines often refer to infantry battalions Division stated that one of his Abrams took 45 hits with attached AAVs as being “mech-ed up,” while from various weapons, including heavy machineguns, the version of the AAV that includes the 50-cali- anti-aircraft guns, mortar rounds, and rocket-propelled ber and 40mm weapons is often called “up gun” grenades, with no penetration.6 A few Abrams were pen- because earlier versions of the vehicle had only a etrated by cannons and RPGs, usually in the rear flank or rear of the vehicle. In a few instances, enemy fire machinegun.2

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broke open the fuel cells of the external auxiliary power diately went to about a 20.”9 However, some irregular unit, allowing fuel to seep into the engine, causing a forces pressed their attacks in nearly suicidal fashion. fire.7 No Army or Marine crewman died in an Abrams ■ Fuel supply was less of a problem than originally tank due to enemy fire penetrating the vehicle during thought. The M1A1 has a well-deserved reputation as a major combat operations. “fuel hog.” Nevertheless, in Iraqi Freedom both the Army ■ Tanks led the advance. Almost always, Army, and Marines were able to keep their tanks fueled without Marine Corps, and British tanks led force movements undue difficulty. In the case of 3d Infantry Division, the to contact. Tanks were essential because situational maneuver brigades were provided with extra fuel trucks awareness regarding enemy forces was poor at the regi- prior to the offensive, thus making resupply relatively mental/brigade level and below. While operational-level easy. The Marines had a somewhat greater challenge, commanders often had enough situational awareness to but in discussions with all three RCTs in 1st Marine Divi- meet their needs, tactical commanders needed a degree sion, fuel was never critical despite the fact that over 450 of detail that was rarely available. As a result, there was miles was covered from Kuwait to Baghdad. constant danger of encountering the enemy without warning. Since the tanks could survive hits from a con- Tanks had a few relatively minor drawbacks. cealed enemy, they were the weapons of choice for the They were a greater maintenance challenge than “tip of the spear.”8 Indeed, this operation demonstrated the lighter armored and wheeled vehicles. By the the inverse relationship between force protection and time they reached Baghdad, most tanks were com- situational awareness. In circumstances where situational awareness was poor, as it normally was at the bri- bat capable but far from fully mission capable, gade/regimental level and below, there was a clear need largely due to an overall shortage of spare parts for strong armor protection. that plagued operations in Iraq. In addition, the ■ Tanks immediately took the enemy under fire. Tanks tanks needed a better antipersonnel round for the were immediately responsive when contact was made main gun. Most of the threat in Iraq came from with the enemy. Compared to artillery that could respond in 2 to 4 minutes, or fighters or bombers that light infantry and militia. The most effective tank could arrive on scene in 5 to 20 minutes, tanks could weapon was the multipurpose antitank (MPAT) open fire within seconds. The 3d Infantry Division and round, which was used against enemy infantry, 1st Marine Division noted that their infantry fired few bunkers, and buildings.10 Several Army and Marine antiarmor weapons because tanks were almost always in Corps tank units totally expended their MPAT load front and engaged the enemy in timely fashion. during the war. Army and Marine officers both ■ Tanks were highly effective in urban operations. According to conventional wisdom, tanks should be stated that tanks need a better weapon to engage extremely vulnerable in urban terrain, but in fact tanks dispersed infantry. Coalition tankers expended led most advances into Iraqi cities, most famously huge amounts of machinegun ammunition from during the Baghdad “thunder runs.” This was true in their co-axial and turret-mounted guns. the case of the Army, Marine, and British forces. The Army’s 3d Infantry Division developed an urban opera- In summary, the tank was the single most im- tions technique in which two Abrams would be closely portant ground combat weapon in the war. Tanks followed by two Bradleys with mounted infantrymen led the advance, compensated for poor situational and often an engineer vehicle behind the Bradleys. The awareness, survived hostile fire, and terrorized the tanks would flush the enemy when Iraqi forces fired on enemy. These attributes contributed much to the the tanks or ran from them, allowing the Bradleys to employ their 25mm cannons and machineguns. The rapid rate of advance from Kuwait to Baghdad. A British used similar techniques senior Marine Corps infantry officer offered an ap- the tanks would flush the in Basra where tanks would lead propriate summation of what the authors repeat- the advance, often smashing edly heard: “Everybody wanted tanks.” enemy, allowing the Bradleys holes in buildings that allowed the infantry to enter and oc- to employ their 25mm cupy the structure. The Marines Infantry Fighting Vehicles cannons and machineguns also used tanks as the leading Mechanized infantry worked closely with element going into urban areas. tanks in small combined arms teams. The Army The most important difference employed the Bradley (mostly the M–2, but also between Army and Marine Corps urban tactics was the cavalry M–3); the Marines used the AAV–7; that the Marines employed more dismounted infantry who operated close to the tanks. The British also made and the British used the Warrior. The Bradley and extensive use of their armored vehicles in urban opera- Warrior both have stabilized automatic cannons tions in the Basra area. and good protection against light cannon fire and ■ Tanks had shock effect. Some interviewees pointed rocket-propelled grenades. Both vehicles carry out that “tanks got respect” and that many Iraqi fight- roughly nine personnel, who may dismount or fire ers ran from them. For example, one senior Marine described an intense firefight at a bridge in An Nasiri- from the vehicle. Exploiting poor Iraqi marksman- yah on March 24. The decibel level of the firefight was ship, Soldiers often fired from atop the Bradleys. “about 90.” When two Marine Corps tanks rumbled The Marine AAV is primarily an amphibious onto the bridge, the volume of enemy firing “imme- tractor that is optimized for ship-to-shore move-

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Tanks defending the intersection was hit by rocket-propelled grenades during the of Highways 1 and 27 in Iraq campaign because of dismounted infantry support. In contrast, 2d Marine Tank Battalion’s tanks suffered numerous hits while operating with RCT 5. Compared to this dismounted technique that relied heavily on infantry, the Army tended to keep mechanized infantry mounted inside their Bradleys longer than the Marine infantry stayed in their AAVs.11 The weapons of the infantry fighting vehicles (25mm cannon in the Bradley, 30mm in the War- rior, plus machineguns, or the 50-caliber/40mm combination in the “up gun” AAVs) often proved more appropriate than the main guns of the tanks. Because the most frequent targets in Iraq were small groups of infantry dashing between covers, the fast-reacting, stabilized 25mm gun on the Bradley proved highly effective. Its high Marine Division (Paul L. Anstine)

st explosive round was excellent against personnel, 1 while the armor-piercing rounds could easily ment. It has light armor protection against small deal with light armored vehicles. At times, Iraqi arms fire and artillery or mortar fragments. The infantry approached too close for the Abrams AAV is a large vehicle that can carry some 20 in- tanks to depress their weapons sufficiently to fantrymen in the rear. Although Marine infantry engage them. In these cases, the following Brad- fought outside their vehicles far more often than leys would open fire. The automatic cannons the Army infantry, the large number of AAVs in and grenade launchers of the infantry fighting 1st Marine Division meant the Marine rifle battal- vehicles were also excellent against lightly con- ions were for the most part mechanized infantry. structed buildings. Against better-built, larger The Army, Marines, and British forces all structures, tank main guns, aircraft-delivered employed their armored infantry carriers in a weapons, or artillery were more useful. In addi- generally similar manner. During movements to tion, there were a few tank-on-tank engagements. contact—the most frequent tactical operation in In those cases coalition tank main guns were the Iraqi Freedom—tanks would almost always lead. preferred weapon. Close behind would be infantry fighting vehicles, The main disadvantage of infantry fighting or AAVs in the case of the Marines. The tanks vehicles was that they had less protection than would usually make contact with the enemy first. tanks. While RPG–7 rounds would only rarely When the Iraqis fired on the leading tanks, they penetrate tanks, infantry fighting vehicles were would give away their positions, creating targets far more vulnerable. That led to the technique of for the Bradleys, Warriors, and AAVs. placing tanks in the lead and, in the case of the The Marines dismounted their infantry from Marines, the use of considerable amounts of dis- their vehicles more often than the Army, es- mounted infantry around vehicles, especially in pecially in built-up areas, for several reasons. built-up areas. The high explosive version of the Marine tactics stress dismounted operations, and RPG–7 could not penetrate any of the infantry the AAV is not as well protected as the Bradley. fighting vehicles, but the shaped charge version Importantly, the Marines who rode in the AAVs normally would. Army and Marine personnel were essentially temporary passengers since the cited numerous cases in which external gear on Marine regiments do not normally have organic the Bradleys and AAVs (such as sea or duffle bags) infantry fighting vehicles as do the mechanized often caused RPGs to detonate prematurely, usu- units of the U.S. and British armies. The Marines ally negating the shaped charge effect against the believed there were advantages to dismounting hull. Additionally, the front-mounted engines their infantry in built-up areas since they could of the Bradley and AAV protected the crew and then provide close support for armored vehicles. passengers. If an RPG penetrated the front of Officers of 1st Marine Tank Battalion, supporting the vehicle, the engine would absorb the shaped RCT 7, thought that no tank in their battalion charge effect. Although the vehicle would then

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be a mobility kill, few personnel casualties would Insights for the Future result. Although the infantry fighting vehicles Every operation has distinct features. Iraqi were more vulnerable than tanks, there were few Freedom was unusual in that the enemy had catastrophic kills. Probably the worst vehicle loss large conventional forces, yet fought mostly as occurred when a Marine AAV near An Nasiriyah smaller unconventional elements that had little was struck in the rear by an RPG, exploding a antiarmor capability (probably due to the col- large load of mortar ammunition and causing lapse of most Iraqi conventional units). Even so, numerous casualties. the operation suggests the following insights Mechanized infantry and tanks formed an for the future. inseparable team, with infantry fighting vehi- Heavy forces were decisive. In Iraq, the United cles closely following tanks. For the Army, Ma- States used a full range of land forces—light, rine, and British mechanized infantry and armor medium, and heavy—but heavy forces were the played to each other’s strengths and compensated most important ground combat element. They for each other’s weaknesses. led the ground advance and destroyed the enemy The U.S. and British armies both augmented with direct fire. The heavy land forces received their light infantry with armor. The British stated excellent support from artillery and tactical air, that their light infantry in 3d Commando and including help from attack helicopters. Heavy 16th Air Assault Brigades always forces broke enemy resistance in the major cities, the main disadvantage of wanted support from Challenger leading to collapse of the regime. Light and me- tanks and Warrior infantry fight- dium ground units also played important roles, infantry fighting vehicles ing vehicles from 7th Armored Bri- but they generally supported the armored forma- was that they had less gade. Challenger 2 tank platoons tions. Light units occupied areas bypassed by the protection than tanks and companies were attached to fast-moving heavy units, while the British and light infantry battalions, especially Marine Corps medium elements performed a re- when required to enter urban areas connaissance role. where heavy resistance was expected. Similarly, V Until recently, the Army envisioned equip- Corps withdrew two armor/mechanized infantry ping all its forces with medium-weight combat task forces from 3d Infantry Division to provide systems. That concept now appears premature. Marine tanks st moving along armor support to 101 Airborne (Air Assault) and The Army still needs the full range of light, me- d Highway 8 82 Airborne Divisions as they cleared built-up dium, and heavy forces to accomplish its mis- in Baghdad areas behind 3d Infantry’s advance. sions. Trying to prevail with one force type would be difficult and unwise. Heavy forces, developed to fight similarly equipped Warsaw Pact forces, are still dominant in terrain that permits their use, which includes built-up areas. Indeed, most terrain in Iraq was ideal for heavy armor. Since the Army and Marine Corps must be prepared for operations anywhere in the world, retaining a mix of heavy, medium, and light forces will provide commanders with maximum flexibility. Judging by the Iraq experience, the Army should plan a heterogeneous force that includes light infantry, medium forces (today equipped with combat systems in the Stryker class and later the Future Combat System), and heavy forces, meaning for the foreseeable future the Abrams- Bradley team. The Future Combat System should replace today’s heavy forces only if it offers comparable combat power in close combat, including the sort of messy, unpredictable fighting encountered in Iraq. The British army was planning to retain a mixed heavy-medium-light structure before the recent war in Iraq. British army leaders believe

Marine Division (Paul L. Anstine) 12 st the Iraq experience vindicated that decision. 1

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The Marine Corps should also retain Abrams using an explosive device, take the convoys under main battle tanks to give its forces the needed fire for a few minutes, and then recede into the punch. Indeed, Marine infantry were probably populace. It was during this stability phase of op- more dependent on tank support than their Army erations that the Army introduced its first Stryker- mechanized counterparts. The Marines need a equipped units into northern Iraq. better infantry carrier than the AAV–7. During Against this tactic, U.S. forces required well- Iraqi Freedom, Marine infantry suffered from lack protected vehicles with considerable firepower, of a vehicle with the firepower and protection of especially general-purpose machineguns and gre- a Bradley. The introduction of the Expeditionary nade launchers. There was less use for the heavy Fighting Vehicle will give Marine infantry a more firepower of an Abrams tank and for fixed-wing heavily armed and better-protected vehicle. air support because of the need to minimize col- Armor compensated for poor situational aware- lateral damage. However, support units discov- ness. The experience in Iraq should deflate expec- ered that they needed at least some armor pro- tations for high levels of situational awareness at tection for vehicles due to the constant threat the lower tactical levels. Army and Marine Corps of ambushes and roadside mines. Today, heavy commanders in Iraq universally agreed that they forces continue to play central roles in protecting had poor information about enemy forces. That convoys and conducting combat patrols. resulted in U.S. forces usually making contact Situational awareness at the tactical level will with the enemy with little or no warning. Even- continue to improve as land forces acquire new tually, ground units may enjoy much better situ- systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, to re- ational awareness at the tactical level, but only connoiter before contact. But for the foreseeable when sensors can penetrate all kinds of cover and future, especially against irregular forces, land concealment, including buildings. forces will still need protection against enemies Heavy forces compensated for poor situ- who go unseen until they detonate a device or ational awareness by having a high degree of open fire. Armor will continue to play a key role passive protection and overwhelming firepower. not only for major combat operations, but also It mattered little when Fedayeen Saddam fired during stability operations. first because their weapons only rarely penetrated Some pundits predicted the demise of heavy an Abrams’ armor armored vehicles after the Yom Kippur War in heavy forces compensated for poor and the act of fir- 1973. Advances in shaped charge weapons, in- ing on U.S. armor cluding shoulder-fired rocket launchers and an- situational awareness by having a invited a devastat- titank guided missiles, were supposed to make high degree of passive protection ing response. The armor, including the main battle tank, obsolete. and overwhelming firepower Fedayeen should, of The prediction may come true someday, but 30 course, have allowed years later, heavy armored vehicles still dominate armored vehicles to the land battle in most terrain types. pass and opened fire on thin-skinned support ve- Against a better-armed enemy, armor would hicles. However, they would have needed enough be more vulnerable than it was against Iraqi forces popular support to keep civilians from warn- in 2003. The frontal arc of an Abrams currently ing U.S. forces of their positions, not a sound resists almost anything an enemy ground force assumption during Saddam Hussein’s regime. can throw at it, but other parts of the Abrams Particularly in the Shi’ite south, many Iraqis ini- and all of a Bradley are far more susceptible to tially regarded coalition forces as liberators and damage. For example, modern top-attack missiles willingly provided information about pockets of could present a severe challenge. However, armor Ba’thist resistance. has survived decades of proliferation of antiarmor After the fall of the Ba’thist regime, the in- systems, and remains irreplaceable. The high pro- surgents became more sophisticated. They learned tection and awesome firepower of heavy forces not to attack in ways that invited devastating re- was a chief reason for the rapid rate of advance sponses. They avoided contact by using mortars and low casualties during Iraqi Freedom. and improvised explosive devices rather than direct fire. When they did use direct fire, they Warfare is evolving rapidly in the computer soon broke contact, having learned that U.S. age, especially in sensing technology, precision forces welcomed and always won protracted fire- guidance, and control of forces. Heavy forces ben- fights. Their primary tactic was to halt convoys efit from these advances while continuing to offer

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Marines refueling

Abrams main battle tanks Marine Division (Paul L. Anstine) st 1

the advantage of survivability. They were devel- 3 “Operation Iraqi Freedom, 3d Infantry Division oped during World War I to solve the problem of (Mechanized) ‘Rock of the Marne’ After Action Report,” final draft, May 12, 2003. crossing terrain swept by enemy fire. Ninety years 4 “UK Forces’ Iraq Lessons Learned Reviewed,” In- later, they still solve this problem despite a wide ternational Defense Digest (September 2003), 14. range of efforts to make them obsolete. It should 5 Interviews with British army officers, British be no surprise that heavy forces are useful in con- Army Doctrine and Development Command, Upavon, ventional combat. In Iraq, heavy forces have also UK, July 2003. 6 Interviews with 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, proven just as useful in combat against irregular Fort Stewart, Georgia, October 28, 2003. forces employing swarming tactics, even in urban 7 “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 8–9. terrain. They were the key to a rapid victory over 8 David Talbot, “How Technology Failed in Iraq,” the Ba’thist regime that saved the lives of not MIT Technology Review (November 2004). only coalition soldiers but also Iraqi civilians. As 9 Interviews with 2d Marine Division, February 2004. transformation plans are refined, it is likely that 10 Interviews with 3d Infantry Division and 1st Ma- heavy forces will retain an important role. JFQ rine Division, October 2003. 11 Interviews with 1st Marine Division, Camp Pend- leton and 29 Palms Marine Base, California, October NOTES 2003. 12 Discussions with British Army Doctrine and De- 1 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, velopment Command, Upavon, UK, August 2003. Tactics, and Military Lessons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003), 37–39. 2 Insights on the Marines’ use of tanks and AAVs were obtained during interviews with 1st Marine Divi- sion, Camp Pendleton, California, October 1–3, 2003, and 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 2004.

90 JFQ / issue thirty-nine U.S. Soldiers from Task Force Konohiki with Iraqis they trained for patrols Combat Camera Squadron (Suzanne M. Day) Combat Camera Squadron st 1 Cross-Functional Working Groups Changing the Way Staffs Are Organized

By JOHN S. HURLEY

ver the past several years, the Army coalition environment, the Army must seize the has been drastically altering the way momentum and continue to transform. The next it organizes and fights. It is trans- area the service must address is how it organizes forming divisional organizations into and aligns staffs. Ounits of employment and brigade organizations This article proposes a new method for orga- into units of action while revolutionizing the way nizing staff sections. In addition to building staffs it thinks about and employs Reserve and National around functional areas of expertise, commands Guard forces. While these changes are critical to need staff sections that are mission-focused and the ability to fight in a joint, interagency, and whose members have expertise in a variety of

Lieutenant Colonel John S. Hurley, USA, is assigned to U.S. Army NATO, Allied Joint Forces Command Naples, as the civil engineer on the Joint Forces Command Naples relocation project.

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functions. These cross-functional working groups sections, all the benefits of task-organizing units (CFWGs) would be more responsive to both cus- become available to staffs. For example, rather tomers’ and commanders’ needs and produce than providing support to all missions a unit per- synchronized products more quickly than tra- forms, the tailored section would support only a ditional staff sections. This article cites three specific mission. Knowledge of the mission would examples from both peace and war where CFWGs thus be more thorough and refined, making the have been successful. task-organized staff more capable than the traditional staff structure. Organizing by Task Task-organized staffs are not new; they have By definition, staff sections are designed to been used under such names as “tiger teams.” support both the commander and the unit. They Nevertheless, their appearances have been surpris- help the commander understand the current situ- ingly rare despite their proven efficacy. For the ation, prepare for future actions, and command, purposes of this article, task-organized (or tai- control, and communicate with subordinate lored) staffs will be referred to as cross-functional units. They assist subordinate units by providing working groups, the name used at Joint Forces administrative and logistic support, as well as fa- Command, North Atlantic Treaty Organization cilitating coordination and synchronization with (NATO), in Naples (JFCNP). To illustrate the con- other units. cept, a description of the CFWG will be followed Staff organizations, from battalion to Army with three examples of successful working groups. level, are still rooted in the Prussian system. The fundamental principle behind the group Each unit has a fixed number of staff sections, is that, rather than being organized around a func- each with a unique function. tional area, it is crafted to solve a particular prob- the fundamental rubric A typical battalion has an S–1 lem or support a unique mission; it is mission- for staff organization has for personnel support, S–2 for centric rather than function-centric—for example, intelligence support, S–3 for the Balkans CFWG rather than the personnel hardly changed in a century operations, and S–4 for logistic staff section. support, along with mainte- The CFWG is composed of action officers nance and communications sections. Each sec- from multiple functional staff sections. (In this tion is composed of personnel with particular article, the terms action or staff officers refer to subject matter expertise. For example, S–1 Sol- officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted diers are trained personnel specialists, and the members who serve in staff sections.) Once ac- section provides general personnel support to the tion officers become members of the CFWG, they unit. As a result, each section is homogeneous by take all directions and orders from the chief of design and functionally organized. the working group, not their parent staff section. The fundamental rubric for staff organiza- The CFWG, in turn, falls directly under the com- tion has hardly changed in a century. The Army mander or his executive agent—the chief of staff has added engineer, civil-military, or financial or executive officer. This task organization makes sections, but the idea that commanders and units the CFWG fundamentally different from commit- are best served by homogeneous, functionally tees, in which staff officers often participate. In a aligned staff sections remains. committee, the staff officer belongs to his func- But given the increase in joint, interagency, tional staff section and only occasionally meets and coalition operations, are functionally orga- with the committee. In a CFWG, he belongs to nized sections the most effective way to fight and works for the CFWG. tomorrow’s wars? No longer can a unit expect to An example is germane. A battalion might perform only a few core competencies when it de- have ten Soldiers in S–1, five in S–2, ten in S–3, ploys to theater. The new environment demands and eight in S–4. They all support the battalion’s that units work with different organizations to per- many missions through their own areas of exper- form a wide variety of unique missions and tasks. tise; but while deployed to Iraq, the battalion may Perhaps instead of functional staff sections, be tasked to collect captured weapons and ord- it would be more effective to task-organize staffs nance. Although the battalion has never trained the same way units are task-organized—that is, to for this mission, it is a critical task that must be resource and create staff sections tailored to par- accomplished quickly. Accordingly, the battalion ticular assignments or missions rather than using could create a tailored CFWG comprised of six the existing headquarters staff. By tailoring staff Soldiers—two intelligence, two operations, one lo-

92 JFQ / issue thirty-nine H u r l e y

gistic, and one personnel. By focusing exclusively full of working groups. They are correct; one need on weapons collection, the group could provide look no farther than any division’s plans section timely support to both the units and the com- to realize that every division in the Army has a mander, while the units executing this mission task-organized, multifunctional staff structured would have a customized staff supporting them. to solve a problem (for example, producing plans This may sound simple, but a word of caution and orders for the division). is in order. The mission would often be best served The fundamental difference between exist- if a working group was formed that received guiding sections and the CFWG is that the com- ance directly from the commander and whose mander creates cross-functional working groups members answered only to the working group. as missions develop, and they exist for the dura- Those who have been primary staff officers are tion of that mission and are then disbanded. familiar with attending meeting after meeting, For example, to plan and coordinate military where they gather bits of information and taskers and political activities in the Balkans, the Com- to pass down to action officers. The action officers, mander of Allied Joint Forces Command Naples, in turn, pass their products up through their func- the NATO commander for that area of operations, tional staff section chiefs to be integrated into a could create a staff section specifically designed master plan. In this mode, the value added by the to work issues from that region. Once the mission primary staff officers is questionable. is complete, the group will be dissolved. Today’s multifunctional shops are generally permanent; Not Reinventing the Wheel we can hardly fathom a time when we will not Under the CFWG concept, the action of- need them. Further, Army doctrine dictates that ficers are removed from the staff sections and are they will exist and how they will be employed, directly integrated into the working group. As a and they are resourced with manning documents result, the commander’s guidance on the project to ensure that personnel are available to fill them. is directly passed to the CFWG chief and then to the action officers. There are three immedi- CFWGs at Work ate advantages of this task organization. First, Three examples will clarify the working of each action officer receives identical guidance, the CFWG: the Base Camp Development Group so there is no opportunity for (the G–8) in the 101st Airborne Division (Air As- each action officer receives a primary staff section leader sault) during Operation Iraqi Freedom; the Project identical guidance, so there to miscommunicate it. Second, Management Office in Allied Joint Forces Com- because the information does mand Naples; and the NATO Training Mission is no opportunity for a not filter down through the Iraq CFWG, again in Naples. primary staff section leader staff sections, the action offi- During Iraqi Freedom, the 101st Airborne Divi- to miscommunicate it cers, and later the CFWG, can sion (Air Assault) closed on Mosul in May 2003. It be more responsive and reduce became apparent that summer that the initial as- the turnaround time. Third, tra- sumption that the division would quickly depart ditional (functionally aligned) staff section lead- was no longer valid. Rather, it would remain in ers can focus on issues that apply to their func- Mosul for a year, then replacement units would tional areas rather than merely acting as conduits take over. As a result, the division began to re- for information. source and develop base camps to house over At this point, some may object that this 20,000 Soldiers. But first it had to decide who model would remove the traditional staff section would organize and lead this mammoth effort. leader and his expertise from the product. The Obvious choices included the divisional engi- concern is valid, but the action officer can and neers, an attached engineer group, the G–3 Plans should go back to the functional staff section Section, and the Division Support Command leader for guidance, mentoring, and quality assur- (since base camp development includes many ance and control. It is during these interactions service and support requirements in addition to that the traditional staff section leader can shape construction). Most units in theater employed the product. The input given for guidance and one of these courses of action. mentoring is fundamentally different from input There were advantages and disadvantages from the one responsible for the project. with each choice. The Assistant Division Com- Also, some may conclude that a CFWG is mander for Support, Brigadier General Jeffrey reinventing the wheel—that the Army is already Schloesser, the “base camp pasha” for the division,

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 93 ■ CROSS-FUNCTIONAL WORKING GROUPS Fleet Combat Camera Group Pacific (Edward G. Martens) Pacific (Edward Fleet Combat Camera Group

Army scout platoon concluded that to house the entire division by project, for example, J–4, J–6 (because of the com- investigating possible winter, the organization in charge had to focus plexity of establishing a new communications weapons cache, solely on that mission and be immediately respon- and information network), or the Support Group Operation Iraqi Freedom sive to subordinate unit housing needs, contractor (a colonel-level command responsible for current issues, and his own guidance. He believed the only base maintenance and life support issues). But way to achieve that level of responsiveness was to NATO decided to establish the Project Manage- create a CFWG for base camps. ment Office as an independent CFWG. The office To demonstrate that the CFWG was indepen- is comprised of members from the J–Engineer, dent of other staff sections and units, Schloesser J–6, and Support Group. Additionally, there is designated it the G–8 (the division does not have a civilian project coordinator whose duties re- a standing G–8 section). The chief was a major, semble those of a contracting officer. Finally, the and the G–8 contained permanent logistic, con- director answers to the Deputy Chief of Staff for tracting, and engineer personnel. When required, Support, a major general. the section received augmentation from G–1, The advantage is that since the group works G–4, G–6, and the Staff Judge Advocate. Because together as an independent organization, it is the CFWG was independent of other staffs and immediately responsive to issues that develop units, it was able to dedicate itself to base camp on the project or requests for information from development, received guidance straight from the command group. For example, as the com- General Schloesser, and reported directly to him. mand refines its guidance for equipping the new The benefits were soon apparent: although the facility, the Project Management Office can act division started base camp development later immediately. Further, since the action officers are than any major unit in theater, it was able to not members of other sections, they can focus full house over 20,000 Soldiers by the end of January time on the project. As a result, the office can be in containerized units or improved existing struc- proactive in managing and ensuring quality con- tures, an unlikely feat without an improved staff. trol. The importance of this posture can hardly be The second example of a successful CFWG understated since delays from inefficiencies or lax comes from Allied Joint Forces Command Naples standards will cost NATO $10 million per year in (AJFCN), a NATO command that is building a lease extensions on the current facility. headquarters costing over $180 million. As with An additional advantage of the Project Man- the previous example, AJFCN could have tasked agement Office is that, as a NATO organization, several standing organizations to execute the AJFCN is a joint and combined command, so its

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staff officers represent all services and NATO na- assists the Ministry of Defense in establishing an tions. Communications among staff officers are Iraqi-led Training, Education, and Doctrine Cen- thus doubly challenging. Beyond the normal joint ter near Baghdad. This mission has elements both difficulties, such as the Army trying to talk with in Iraq and throughout Europe. the Navy, there is often a language barrier. One has The support for NTM–I includes predeploy- only to witness a German officer trying to commu- ment training, personnel rotations, equipment nicate with an Italian civilian in English, the offi- contributions, and budget issues and is currently cial language of NATO, to appreciate the problem. handled by the JFCNP. To ensure that this support In such an environment, the value of ha- is responsive, the commander created a CFWG to bitual work relationships is immense. Over time, handle all issues related to the project. Building staff officers from different services, agencies, on experiences in the Balkans, the NTM–I CFWG and nations learn each other’s strengths and is composed of members from nearly every staff weaknesses and de- section in the command and meets twice daily to the CFWG was able to house over velop a common lan- handle all staff work and actions required to sup- 20,000 Soldiers by the end of guage applicable to port the mission. Further, group members have the specific working dedicated workspace in the Joint Operations Cen- January, an unlikely feat without group. It would be hard ter, which facilitates coordination and synchroni- an improved staff to fathom the difficul- zation. Finally, the chief of the NTM–I CFWG is a ties encountered in the lieutenant colonel whose singular responsibility is Project Management Office if staff officers rotated to run the CFWG and who answers directly to the in and out based on work schedules or the whims Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. of superiors. Trying to communicate rather than Because it is a standing staff that meets daily, working issues for the commander is a very real direction and guidance from the commander or problem that multinational and interagency staff from Iraq are acted on immediately without hav- sections face as they coordinate projects. ing to pass through the functional staff sections. Lest one conclude that CFWGs are useful Further, since the staff physically meets and works solely for niche engineer missions, the final ex- together in a dedicated office space, its products ample is more universal. In response to Opera- are consistently more synchronized than products tion Iraqi Freedom, NATO Training Mission–Iraq of functional staff sections in the command. Fi- (NTM–I) was formed to focus on training and ad- nally, products and solutions are quickly provided vice to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi to the commander or the field as they are already Marines receiving final Security Forces’ middle- to senior-level leaders, as synchronized across the staff and need only the instructions to start Operation Scimitar in well as on the coordination of equipment assis- approval of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Opera- Zaidon, Iraq tance for the security forces. Additionally, NTM–I tions before moving to the command group. As with the second example, the NTM–I CFWG dramatically improves communication within Naples. For other issues, the commander (a U.S. Navy admiral) issues guidance to the deputy and assistant chiefs of staff who, as expected in a joint and allied command, have a variety of national and service backgrounds. This guidance is then passed down to each staff section. However, because these deputy and assistant chiefs of staff have extremely varied backgrounds (to include languages spoken), the commander’s guidance can be subtly different between the staff sections. These differences can lead to difficulties when the staff sections try to synchronize their products. In the case of the NTM–I CFWG, the commander’s guidance is given to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and directly to the CFWG, ensuring that each member of the staff gets the same guidance. As a result, staff officers can more Marine Division Combat Camera (Matthew Hutchison) d

2 easily synchronize the product and, in turn, can

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an organization can overwhelm a commander with too many sections having direct access. How- ever, burying the CFWG in a staff section could negate the group’s inherent responsiveness. Third, CFWGs will never replace functional staff sections. There will always be a need to handle general personnel, intelligence, or logistic issues. Therefore, while the number of personnel may remain relatively constant, the number of staff sections will increase. In other words, adding a CFWG will flatten the staff hierarchy, testing the commander’s span of control of subordinate sections while giving him greater visibility on the issues. Although this will initially be a challenge for the organization, it will increase efficiency overall, which is why many competitive business leaders are flattening their staff hierarchies. Fourth, the commander must be ready to deal U.S. Navy (Mary Overstreet) with bruised egos. A CFWG is formed to deal with Mobile construction more effectively and quickly support both the only the most critical missions. As a result, many battalion providing commander and the mission in Iraq. functional staff sections and staff leaders might security for convoy Based on the success of the CFWG, JFCNP feel that their contributions or their organizations has published a command directive detailing the add minimal value. Such attitudes can have severe purpose, techniques, and procedures for work- consequences on the organization overall. ing groups. (The command does not formalize Finally, until the concept of CFWG is fully and publish staff proce- embraced by the organization, conflicts can arise the functional staff section dures on a whim; thus, as young staff officers are pulled between their must be prepared to handle an this publication is sym- old functional staff sections and the new CFWG. bolic of the importance In short, they will receive guidance and missions increased workload as members of working groups in the from both if responsibilities are not carefully depart for work in a CFWG command.) In the future, delineated. Also, some functional staff section among other changes, all leaders will still want to influence and control the working groups will be appointed with orders CFWG product. Since they might not be privy to from the Chief of Staff, and the chief of the work- all the commander’s guidance, their control can ing group will be an assistant chief of the staff unnecessarily delay the product. (for example, J–1, J–2, and so on). The noted shortcomings, as well as others Not Perfect Yet that will undoubtedly surface while implement- Despite the high marks bestowed on CFWGs, ing the groups, are not meant to dissuade orga- they are not without their shortcomings. First, nizations from using cross-functional working personnel management using the groups must groups. Rather they are offered as issues that be flexible. In order to execute this system, ac- should be resolved before implementation. These tion officers will move from their functional staff few obvious problems notwithstanding, the ben- sections to CFWG and back, creating turmoil not efits of CFWGs outweigh their costs. They will only with transferring work responsibilities but allow the command to respond quickly to un- also with counseling, mentorship, and efficiency expected missions or tasks while working with reporting. Additionally, the functional staff sec- unfamiliar units from other services, agencies, tion must be prepared to handle an increased and nations. Working groups do not replace exist- workload as members depart for work in a CFWG. ing functional staff sections; rather they augment Second, by definition, these CFWGs are new them and provide adaptability to the command. staff sections that must be integrated into the Army transformation is ultimately about giving organization. To improve responsiveness, they the command flexibility to prepare for and wage should have access to the commander or his rep- war most effectively. The cross-functional work- resentative, but that is a double-edged sword since ing group is another way to do that. JFQ

96 JFQ / issue thirty-nine recall

B–17s bombing Messina, Sicily U.S. Air Force

his study analyzes the operations of the Twelfth Air Air Support of the Force in the Mediterra- nean theater from 1943 to T1944, specifically in regard to the three Allied Landings Allied amphibious operations at Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio. These landings illustrate a wide range of tactical and in Sicily, Salerno, operational innovations, doctrine, and coalition air warfare. In the interwar years, the Army Air Corps had given and Anzio virtually no thought to supporting amphibious operations, yet it had to develop a doctrine for such operations. B y MATTHEW G. ST. CLAIR Amphibious assaults are the most complex of all military operations to Lieutenant Colonel Matthew G. St. Clair, USMC, serves with 4th Marine execute because they demand detailed Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism). coordination and planning among

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 97 ■ AIR SUPPORT OF ALLIED LANDINGS

the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Allied trated Airmen and ground commanders dustrial—targets for Airmen to attack. planners in the Mediterranean had few alike. As the war in the Mediterranean What it did have were vital transpor- historical models as examples in early theater progressed, the Airmen of the tation centers, especially ports. The 1943. The large amphibious landings Twelfth Air Force developed effective long-range American heavy bombers in North Africa in 1942 had experi- doctrine and tactical innovations that were ideal for striking the vulnerable enced only sporadic resistance from made significant contributions to the transportation network the Axis armies the Vichy French both on the ground Allied strategy and established prec- required for all their supplies. and in the air, and the defense never edents that are employed in the 21st What American and British airmen mounted a serious air or naval threat. century. In the end, the study shows lacked was a well-considered doctrine Many U.S. Army planners were the importance of sound doctrine, infor tactical support and amphibious reluctant to embrace the idea of am- novation, and leadership. operations. Allied planners had to ad- phibious operations and believed that just their doctrinal mindset and adopt landings against an opposed shore had Air Operations in North Africa command and control procedures to little chance of success. The British Operation Torch and the eventual allow for the integration of all aircraft. were not strong advocates of amphibi- Allied victory in Tunisia were executed Airmen were required to develop air ous operations because the failures at with considerable friction among the plans in support of winning air su- Gallipoli in 1915 and Dieppe in 1942 Americans, British, and forces of the periority, interdiction, close air sup- Free French. Initial proce- port, and strategic bombing not just in the doctrine and procedures developed dures regarding command North Africa, specifically Tunisia, but and control, doctrine, lo- also in the central Mediterranean.2 The by the end of the African campaign gistics, and employment British Desert Air Force had been op- served as the model for Sicily, Italy, of airpower were not erating in the Middle East since 1940 and northwest Europe universally agreed upon, and gained combat experience, but the which caused considerable American Twelfth Air Force arrived in debate between the plan- North Africa as an inexperienced and continued to haunt them. Yet am- ning staffs as well as between air and hastily organized unit. phibious landings would be critical to ground commanders. However, the Major General Carl Spaatz, com- the operational success of the Allies doctrine and procedures developed by mander of U.S. Eighth Air Force, was in the Mediterranean. General Dwight the end of the African campaign served directed to organize, train, and equip Eisenhower and his commanders had as the basic model for campaigns in a new air force, consisting primarily of limited experience in their planning Sicily, Italy, and northwest Europe. The Eighth Air Force units, to support Op- and coordination, and Airmen had not airpower doctrine advocated by Ameri- eration Torch. This force was designated developed a doctrine to support them. can Airmen laid the foundation for as Twelfth Air Force and given the code The learning curve would be steep and changes to the U.S. Army Air Forces name Junior. Brigadier General James innovation was essential. standing field regulations for air supe- Doolittle arrived in England on August The story of Twelfth Air Force sup- riority, interdiction, and close air sup- 6, 1942, to command the new force, port of the Allied landings contains port. Twelfth Air Force and the Royal which consisted of two heavy bomb valuable lessons for today’s coalition Air Force (RAF) Eastern Air Command groups, two P–38 groups, two Spitfire warfare environment as well as issues were initially unable to achieve air groups, three medium bomb groups, of air-ground coordination, close air superiority, and poor coordination of one transport group, and one light support, and the strategic effects of the overall air effort frustrated Allied bomb group.3 U.S heavy bombers in airpower. This study is not intended commanders. It became imperative for the Mediterranean theater gave Twelfth to be an operational history of Twelfth Eisenhower to resolve these issues and Air Force the capability to hit vital in- Air Force; rather, it follows the early adopt a doctrine providing for employ- terdiction targets deep in Italy as well evolution of the tactical and opera- ment of air assets to gain and maintain as Axis airfields in southern France. tional techniques and procedures used air superiority and provide close air On October 24, 1942, the head- and the development of doctrine that support to ground commanders.1 quarters deployed to North Africa influenced the organization of the U.S. Prewar airpower doctrine for the with a doctrine well versed in strate- Air Force. Army Air Force and RAF focused on gic bombing but lacking in tactical The conclusion addresses some strategic bombing and aerial interdic- support. The Army Air Force had no of the more important issues of inter- tion; thus, both air forces were orga- doctrine for supporting amphibious est today. Twelfth Air Force entered nized around a substantial fleet of operations. Issues of command, con- the war with no combat experience, bombers. However, the Mediterranean trol, tactics, doctrine, and coordination untested doctrine, and tactics that frus- theater had few strategic—that is, in- with the British had been overlooked,

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British LtGen. Bernard L. Montgomery and LTG George S. Patton, Jr., USA, study map of Sicily, July 1943

missions, but the procedures identified were not realistic in terms of effectiveness. FM 31–35 was a joint ground and air attempt at stipulating a doctrine for air support. The manual paid only slight attention to the techniques of close air support, ignoring procedures for battlefield operations and prioriti- zation of targets and missions. FM 31–35 essentially subordinated the role of the air force to the requirements of the ground force commander:

The ground force commander, in collaboration with the air support commander, de- cides the air support required. . . . The final decision as to priority of targets rests with the commander of the supported unit. The decision as to whether or not an air support mission will be ordered rests with the commander of the supported unit.

British and American airmen advocated centralized command of all air assets by the air commander, while most ground commanders believed they should control all ground support aircraft to prevent airmen from tasking these aircraft with other missions. The air forces supporting the Allied Courtesy Naval Historical Foundation (Collection of ADM H. Ke nt Hewit) invasion of North Africa had little time and Doolittle and his staff initially Techniques of Air Attack (1942); and FM to train and prepare for the unique embraced prewar tactical doctrine. The 31–35, Aviation in Support of Ground support that would be required during Twelfth entered the war with a doctrine Forces (1942). FM 1–5 addressed the Operation Torch. Airmen of Twelfth Air that gave the supported ground com- major principles of gaining and main- Force and Eastern Air Command would taining air superiority and have to develop many tactical and FM 31–35 essentially subordinated the of centralized command joint procedures, while simultaneously role of the air force to the requirements but, did not emphasize air convincing ground commanders of the as an offensive weapon, importance of adopting the principle of the ground force commander nor did it identify specific of a centralized air command. procedures and require- mander control of air assets assigned to ments for close air support, maritime Operation Torch support his maneuver while relegating operations, or air interdiction missions. General Eisenhower, following a the gaining and maintaining of air su- The manual did stipulate that “com- course that was consistent with Army periority to a lesser priority. bined operations of air and ground doctrine but frustrating to Airmen, did During operations in North Africa, forces must be closely coordinated by not designate a senior Airman to com- the Army Air Force used three primary the commander of the combined force mand the air forces supporting Op- doctrinal publications specifying em- and all operations conducted in ac- eration Torch. General Doolittle com- ployment of air forces: Field Manual cordance with a well defined plan.” FM manded the Twelfth, and Air Marshall (FM) 1–5, Employment of Aviation of 1–10 addressed close air support, mari- Sir William Welsh commanded Eastern the Army (1940); FM 1–10, Tactics and time interdiction, and bomber escort Air Command. The headquarters of

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 99 ■ AIR SUPPORT OF ALLIED LANDINGS

Waiting to load tanks in Tunisia 2 days before invasion of Sicily, July 1943 NARA/War & Conflict NARA/War the two air forces were not collocated, the air forces in their area to support reaped the benefits of air superiority contributing to command, control, and them exclusively. Ground commanders in the winter of 1942–1943, the Al- coordination problems for providing agreed that gaining and maintaining lied air forces remained subordinated air support. Neither commander was air superiority, as advocated by Airmen, to the ground commanders executing able to develop a clear understanding was essential, but none wanted to give an uncoordinated air campaign with of events taking place ashore. Eastern up tactical air support to achieve it. minimal effectiveness. Air Command provided air support to During the first weeks of fighting Eastern Task Force while XII Air Sys- ashore, ground commanders continu- Northwest African Air Force tems Command provided support to ally complained about being attacked By December 1942, Eisenhower Western Task Force and elements of XII by German Stuka dive-bombers and had grown increasingly frustrated with Fighter and Bomber Commands sup- demanded that the air force provide air coordinating the efforts of Twelfth Air ported Central Task Force. umbrellas to cover their front. Air com- Force and Eastern Air Command. The Subordination of the air assets manders argued that the most efficient time had come to embrace the theory under the ground task force command- way to eliminate the threat was to of American and British airmen. He in- ers and lack of unity of command of air concentrate on gaining air superiority formed General George Marshall, Chief assets prevented Eisenhower’s air plan- and attack the Stukas at their airfields. of Staff of the U.S. Army, that in order ners from developing a coordinated Many ground commanders were not to better coordinate his air assets, a sin- air plan to support the theater of op- familiar with the capabilities of indi- gle air commander was required, and erations. Individual ground command- vidual aircraft and assigned missions he recommended General Spaatz. On ers saw the enemy to their front and to planes that could not effectively ex- January 5, 1943, Spaatz was appointed associated air operations as the most ecute them, often suffering severe loss Air Commander in Chief of the Al- vital area of the campaign and wanted in the attempt. While the Germans lied Air Forces of Torch, commanding

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Twelfth Air Force, Eastern Air Com- dominated the employment of air as- gaining air supremacy, building up air mand, and various French air units.4 sets. This doctrine set the precedent for facilities to make Malta an “aircraft car- Also in January, President Franklin future air operations and would soon rier” for invasion support, and training Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston receive its initial test. troop carrier and glider pilots to trans- Churchill met at Casablanca to dis- port airborne forces. cuss the direction of Allied strategy An Airpower Victory NATAF assumed planning respon- after the Tunisian campaign. Among Operation Husky was the first op- sibility for employing tactical air forces issues decided was the reorganization eration in which air commanders ex- while Doolittle planned strategic op- of the air forces supporting Torch. The ercised centralized control of air assets erations. The Husky air planners had Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that under NAAF, employing them in a co- over 4,000 operational aircraft at their Eastern Air Command and Twelfth Air ordinated effort supporting all aspects disposal, divided among 146 American Force should be organized into one air of the invasion. Air assets were used squadrons and 113.5 British squadrons, force. On February 3, Spaatz ordered to provide cover for the naval armada, against up to 1,600 Axis aircraft.7 In the formation of a planning commit- interdiction to isolate the battlefield, order for Allied aircraft to operate freely tee to identify the exact composition and close air support for ground forces. over the Sicilian Straits and eastern required for a single air force. The com- Gaining and maintaining air superiority Tunisian plains, airmen would have to mittee recommended that a combined was the top priority and was achieved eliminate German radar direction-find- American and British headquarters be by the bombardment of enemy air- ing stations on Pantelleria and destroy formed and designated the Northwest dromes on Pantelleria and Sicily. The enemy air assets on the island. African Air Command, consisting of relentless pressure of Allied air forces Seizing Pantelleria would neutral- Twelfth Air Force (to include all Al- destroyed hundreds of enemy aircraft ize German long-range radar stations lied heavy and medium bombers and and compelled the Germans and Ital- and allow Allied fighters to use the air- long-range fighters), Tunisian Air Com- ians to evacuate their Sicilian airfields, field and help aircraft from Malta pro- mand, Coastal Defense Command, leaving behind some 1,100 aircraft. Em- tect the invasion convoys and beaches Moroccan Air Command, and a con- bracing lessons learned in Tunisia, the during the assault phase of Husky. It solidated Air Service Command. Allied air plan for Husky was designed would also eliminate the ship-watch- Roosevelt and Churchill decided around four primary missions: neu- ing stations that reported Allied ship- at Casablanca to designate General tralizing enemy air forces, disrupting ping movement. The Axis defense con- Eisenhower as Commander in Chief lines of communication, isolating the sisted of 15 batteries along the coast of the Mediterranean theater of op- battlefield, and providing close air sup- of the 42.5-square-mile island, with erations and adopt the organizational port. Other tasks included protecting guns ranging from 90mm to 120mm, command structure used by the Brit- the Allied naval armada, coordinating with the largest concentration in the ish Desert Air Force and Eighth Army. naval and air operations, reinforcing north where any amphibious assault British Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur convoys, performing airborne assaults, would have to occur. A contingent of Tedder was designated as Commander protecting rear areas from enemy air approximately 100 aircraft, predomi- in Chief, Mediterranean Air Command attacks, and conducting air-sea rescue. nantly Italian fighters, was stationed at (MAC), which commanded all aviation The air plan consisted of four phases the airfield.8 assets in the Mediterranean. covering preparatory operations, as- The NAAF objectives for Corkscrew The Northwest African Air Force sault phase, assault on Catania, and were to destroy any possibility of air (NAAF) was officially activated on the reduction of the remainder of Sic- interference from the island, blockade February 18, 1943, with six subordi- ily.6 Preparatory opera- nate units: Northwest African Strategic tions included conduct- Air Force (NASAF), Northwest African ing Operation Corkscrew Tactical Air Force (NATAF), Northwest (capturing the island of African Air Service Command; North- Pantelleria and its criti- west African Coastal Air Force, North- cal airfield), interdicting west African Training Command, enemy reinforcement and Northwest African Photographic and supply of Sicily Reconnaissance Wing.5 The creation and Sardinia, neutral- of NAAF allowed implementation of izing Axis airfields and a coordinated air campaign, providing increased operational and tacti- Royal Air Force crew services cal flexibility. Air superiority became British Spitfire on captured Sicilian airfield the priority, and an offensive mindset British Ministry of Defence

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 101 ■ AIR SUPPORT OF ALLIED LANDINGS

it against reinforcement by sea, reduce formation and follow the aircraft to tacking the target at a speed of 270 the coastal defenses to permit land- their home base. As the formation cir- mph. The elements of surprise, observa- ing operations, reduce morale of the cled over the airfield preparing to land, tion, and coordination were essential garrison by continuous bombing, and the lone wolf attacked from the rear, to these missions, and intense training provide air cover for naval vessels and destroyed as many aircraft as possible, was developed that made them highly landing craft. Strategic bombing began and disengaged.10 successful. on May 15, and 1,267 tons of bombs The ports of Messina, Palermo, Allied assault forces encountered were dropped by May 30, which almost and Catania were vital enemy lines minimal resistance on D–Day, and by neutralized the airdrome and prevented of communication and were bombed 0600 on July 10 all landings were com- the movement of Axis shipping. Air continuously. Other targets of inter- plete and the infantry began advanc- sorties by medium and fighter-bombers, est were rail marshalling yards and in- ing inland. Air planners were not able 50 to 60 per day, rendered the port un- dustrial and communication targets. to provide enough fighter aircraft for usable. Heavy bombers began bombing The pre-invasion bombardment by the continuous coverage over the assault on June 1, focusing on the coastal gun strategic air force caused the oppos- beaches due to the operational con- positions. The period from May 30 to ing air force to withdraw from Sicilian ditions of the Pantelleria and Malta June 11 saw over 4,770 sorties, which airfields and seek shelter on the Italian airfields, short time on station due to saturated the sky with so many aircraft mainland. That significantly reduced the distance of these airfields from that planes had to circle the target area enemy ability to provide air support to Sicily, and the large number of fight- until their turn to attack. Bomber runs ground forces defending the island. ers assigned to bomber escort. Air and were immediately followed by antiper- While the strategic air force neu- ground commanders agreed that fight- sonnel and strafing attacks. The Brit- tralized enemy airfields, fighters as- ers would provide continuous cover ish First Infantry Division embarked signed to the Coastal Air Force and oth- over two of the landing beaches dur- on amphibious shipping on June 10 ers based on Malta provided convoy ing daylight. All landing areas had and began sailing toward Pantelle- protection to the massive Allied naval continuous coverage from 0600–0800, ria for an assault at 1100 on June 11. armada approaching Sicily from North 1030–1230, and 1600–1730, the last As the first assault craft reached the Africa, which included 945 ships and hour and a half daylight; and a reserve shore, enemy resistance ceased except landing craft of the U.S. Navy and 1,645 wing was to be ready to provide sup- for sporadic small arms fire on one ships and landing craft of the Royal port as required. Enemy air attacks on landing beach. The island was declared Navy. On D–2 and D–1, some 570 sor- D–Day were limited to about a hun- secured on June 13, the first strategic ties covered the western convoys and dred sorties, compared to 1,092 Allied position the Allies captured through 540 provided local defense. The convoy sorties, and sank 12 ships by the eve- the use of airpower.9 protection the air forces provided pre- ning of July 10 at a price of 15 aircraft vented the enemy from attempting any destroyed and 11 damaged.12 Operation Husky significant attacks. Only one strike by Although the presence of enemy Immediately following operations six enemy aircraft attempted to disrupt aircraft over the beaches and shipping in Tunisia, the strategic air force began the convoys on D–1, and it was easily was minimal, the Navy argued that tac- modest operations against enemy air- defeated.11 NATAF aircraft were used tical air support for the amphibious as- dromes in Sicily, Sardinia, southern extensively for interdiction prior to sault was inadequate, saying that there Italy, and the eastern Mediterranean, as the main assault. XII Air Systems Com- were only 10 aircraft over the beaches well as submarine bases and communi- on average and often none. cation and industrial targets, until D–7. air superiority became the priority, It also complained about the Winning and maintaining air superior- and an offensive mindset dominated limited number of aircraft that ity was the objective of the bombing. prevented the air force from From D–7 until D–Day, the focus of the employment of air assets providing patrols at more than strategic bombing was to eliminate the one altitude. NAAF airmen enemy air force, with priority given to mand and British P–51s participated pointed out to the Navy that because German rather than Italian airdromes. in newly implemented daylight intru- many aircraft had been fired on by These operations were conducted day sion raids known as Rhubarbs. These naval and merchant vessels, combat air and night, keeping unrelenting pres- missions were carried out under low patrols were moved from 5,000/8,000 sure on the Luftwaffe. A tactic called overcast conditions, 500 to 1,000 feet, feet to 10,000/14,000 feet. Because Intruder operations was introduced, against aircraft on the ground, motor many ships were anchored up to 6 miles aimed at aircraft approaching their air- transport assets, locomotives, and ship- from the beaches, it was difficult for the dromes after dark. A single fighter, or ping. Two aircraft executed the mission, air force to cover the beaches, landing “lone wolf,” would locate an enemy one providing cover and the other at- craft, and ships simultaneously.13

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Air superiority was obtained Avalanche allowed the Allies to main- from reaching the assault area. In- through the unrelenting punishment tain the momentum gained in Sicily, creased night attacks were ordered to of airfields, causing the enemy to secure airfields that would be used to destroy enemy equipment and defense abandon most Sicilian airfields and support operations in southern France, installations, provide fighter cover withdraw to Italy while leaving behind Austria, and the Balkans, force Germany over the assault convoy and assault 125 fighters to operate from Sicily. Al- to move forces from the Eastern Front areas, and provide direct support to though aircraft from Italy participated to Italy, and provide a shorter sea sup- the ground forces. Night operations in the defense of the island, their time ply route to the Soviet Union. The soft by Allied airmen proved vital through- on station was significantly reduced underbelly of Germany was exposed. out Avalanche. House would exercise due to the distance from the southern The air plan for Avalanche con- control over a coalition air force of Italian airfields to Sicily. That mini- sisted of pre-invasion operations, D– 3 groups of U.S. P–38s, 2 groups of mized the threat to the invasion force Day operations, and operations sub- A–36s, 7 squadrons of P–51s, 1 group and strengthened the airmen’s argu- sequent to D–Day. Air Marshal Tedder of U.S. Spitfires, 4 squadrons of British ment for making the destruction of assigned Spaatz and NAAF to develop Beaufighters for night operations, and the air plan. The principal tasks 18 squadrons of RAF Spitfires. the Navy argued that tactical air were to neutralize the enemy During May, NASAF bombers in- support for the amphibious assault air forces, protect the landing tensified their efforts against targets beaches, assault convoys and in Italy, striking airfields, marshalling was inadequate subsequent operations ashore, yards, harbors, lines of communica- prevent/interdict movement tion, shipping, and other facilities to the enemy air force a top priority. The of enemy forces into the assault area, reduce the Axis ability to reinforce conduct of airborne operations was a provide close/direct air support, and troops in Sicily. Doolittle’s bombers fiasco during the insertion phase and furnish air protection to the Baytown maintained a concentrated effort until revealed that extensive training, coor- assault force. NAAF planners estimated D–Day of Avalanche. NASAF airmen dination with all units, and less com- that the Luftwaffe had approximately flew over 7,000 sorties and dropped in plex flight plans were required to en- 380 fighters and fighter-bombers and excess of 10,000 tons of bombs during sure future success and avoid fratricide. 270 bombers in the immediate vicinity the preparatory period.15 The NAAF Coordination between ground and air to defend against the invasion, with an preparatory air campaign significantly commanders improved, but tension re- additional 60 fighters and 120 bomb- reduced enemy air strength prior to mained. Ground commanders still de- ers from Sardinia. The Italian Air Force Avalanche and helped break the morale sired partial control of tactical aviation consisted of some 365 day fighters and of the Italians, contributing to Rome’s supporting their units, although few 275 bombers. NAAF had over 2,060 surrender on September 8, 1943. could deny the success of the Husky aircraft, to include 346 heavy bombers, air plan. A more efficient tactical air 388 medium day bombers, 122 me- The Invasion of Italy request system was needed to process dium night bombers, 140 light bomb- D–Day for Avalanche was Septem- requests for close air support in a more ers, 528 fighters, 160 fighter-bombers, ber 9, 1943. General House’s primary timely fashion and get planes over the and 32 night fighters. Aircraft sup- mission was to maintain continuous air target in minutes versus hours. Still, porting Avalanche came from British cover over the assault beaches, which Husky was a strategic success and con- units based at Malta and the Middle proved difficult due to the distance be- tributed to the resignation of Mussolini East, and the XII Air Support Com- tween Salerno and the Sicilian airfields. on July 25 and the armistice the Ital- mand (ASC).14 An additional 12 British The bulk of coverage came from the ians signed on September 3, 1943. Barracudas, 12 Albacores, and 56 P–38 squadrons, and House assigned Martlets operating from the 2 British two sorties per day per aircraft, provid- Operation Avalanche fleet carriers were available to support ing an hour of coverage each over the The success of Husky opened the the invasion. assault area. The British carrier-based door for the Allies to invade Italy and The commander for all tactical Seafires operating from HMS Unicorn, caused Germany to shift forces from aviation from NATAF for Avalanche, Battler, Attacker, Hunter, and Stalker were Western Europe and Russia to defend Major General Edwin House, was not used to augment the aircraft operating against the Allied offensive in the Med- tasked with supporting any operations from Sicily and conducted 713 sorties iterranean. With the collapse of the until D–Day. The mission of XII ASC during the first 4 days of Avalanche. Vichy French in North Africa and the was to destroy enemy air strength in D–Day operations were success- surrender of Italy, Germany was com- aerial combat, bomb Axis airfields, and ful, and the ground forces, encounter- pelled to fight alone on multiple fronts disrupt communications throughout ing heavier German resistance than with decreasing resources. Operation Italy to prevent enemy reinforcements expected, established a beachhead and

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began advancing inland to assigned manders had little information on tion is evident in the fact that only objectives. NAAF airmen flew 1,649 glide bombs and had not developed one vessel was sunk and one landing sorties on D–Day and dropped over 450 tactics to defend against them. ship damaged.16 tons of bombs, while carrier aviation To prevent enemy air penetration Forward air controllers were em- flew over 200 sorties. The Luftwaffe, fly- of the assault beaches and convoys, ployed during Avalanche. They were ing only 60 to 70 sorties, harassed the XII ASC provided three layers of cover- used in the Mediterranean by the Brit- invasion force throughout the day but age. House ordered high cover to be ish Desert Air Force in North Africa but did not have a significant impact. provided by Spitfires from 16,000 to not by the U.S. Army Air Force until The Luftwaffe used new radio-con- 20,000 feet, medium cover by P–38s Salerno. This command and control trolled glide bombs. The Fritz X (PC and Seafires from 10,000 to 14,000 feet, system was referred to as “Rover Joe” by 1400 FX) was a 3,000-pound armor- and low cover by P–51s from 5,000 to U.S. troops and “Rover David” or “Rover piercing, radio-controlled bomb for hit- 7,000 feet. With this plan, House was Paddy” by the British. The forward air ting warships. The Henschel 293 was a able to ensure continuous air coverage control team, usually consisting of a rocket-propelled, radio-controlled glide over the assault area with an average of combat-experienced pilot and one army bomb with a 660-pound warhead for 36 land-based aircraft. The additional officer, positioned itself overlooking the use against merchant ships and trans- 110 carrier-based Seafires increased the front line. Infantrymen encountering ports. Glide bombs were guided visu- number of aircraft over the beaches to resistance that required air support ra- ally by radio from an observer flying 58 during the daylight hours of D–Day. dioed the Rover unit, which passed the at 20,000 to 23,000 feet. Allied com- The effectiveness of the fighter protec- request to the fighter control center.

GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower, USA, and British LtGen. Bernard L. Montgomery viewing Italian mainland from Messina U.S. Army (Longini)

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If a request was approved, the Rover The Mediterranean Air Force in Italy, 95 in southern France, and 190 unit contacted designated aircraft on On December 10, 1943, the MAC in Greece and the Aegean. station and directed them to the target. was disbanded and the Mediterranean MAAF airpower overwhelmed As in Sicily, the focus on gaining Allied Air Force (MAAF) was estab- the Germans with over 2,600 aircraft. and maintaining air superiority, com- lished. Tedder was appointed Air Com- The XII ASC had 500 fighters and bined with convoy protection, meant mander in Chief Mediterranean with fighter-bombers plus 369 medium aircraft for close air support of the infan- Spaatz as his deputy. On January 12, bombers in the tactical bomber force. try were not always available. Indeed, it 1944, Lieutenant General Ira Eaker, pre- During Phase I, interdiction of German was not until D+4 that day close air viously commander of Eighth Air Force, bridges, rail lines, and marshalling support bombing was feasible.17 Fight- assumed command of MAAF, which yards was the primary mission of the ers and fighter-bombers provided the consisted of Mediterranean Allied Stra- bomber force. Aircraft of MASAF and most responsive close air support and tegic Air Force (MASAF), Mediterranean MATAF flew 12,974 sorties, dropped could usually be over the target within Allied Tactical Air Force (MATAF), and 5,777 tons of bombs, and destroyed 30 to 45 minutes of request. Coopera- Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force. over 90 enemy aircraft.20 tion between ground, air, and naval The primary missions of MAAF were During Phase II, Allied bombard- commanders improved, but the Navy to support the combined bomber of- ment of German airfields intensified, still complained about inadequate air fensive, support ongoing ground op- and MAAF aircraft flew 9,876 sorties, cover and the Army about the lack of erations in the Italian campaign, keep dropped 6,461 tons of bombs, and de- timeliness in processing air requests. the sea lines of communication open, stroyed over 50 enemy aircraft. The XII The Germans counterattacked on and protect supply points. Twelfth Air ASC, reinforced with 7 Desert Air Force September 12 with four Panzer divi- Force also reorganized during this pe- squadrons, flew 3,340 sorties during sions in an effort to cut the Allied line riod with Major General John Cannon the week prior to D–Day and more in half and push it back to the sea. assuming command on December 21, than 5,500 during Phase II. Airfields NAAF aircraft then began a massive 1943. On November 1, 1943, Fifteenth were made unserviceable by cratering carpet-bombing effort on Septem- Air Force was established, consisting the runways with 500-pound demo- ber 13, delivering over 1,300 tons of of the six heavy bombardment groups lition bombs, and aircraft were de- bombs on German forces. On Septem- and two long-range fighter groups pre- stroyed on the ground with 20-pound ber 14, the Germans penetrated the viously assigned to Twelfth Air Force. fragmentation bombs an hour later. Allied front and advanced to within Fifteenth Air Force would primarily be Another tactical innovation was 1,000 yards of the beach. Tedder, rec- part of the combined bomber offensive. bombing airfields. B–17s and B–24s ognizing the severity of the situation, The transfer of aircraft from Twelfth Air escorted by P–38s flew at normal alti- directed all NAAF efforts to the Salerno Force began the process of changing it tudes to be picked up by German radar. fight. The most intense combat took from an all-purpose to a strictly tactical P–47s then took off behind the bomb- place September 14–15. NAAF airmen air force. ers and flew below enemy radar, over- flew hundreds of missions with dev- took the bombers, and climbed to a astating results and severely damaged Air Plan for Operation Shingle higher altitude while approaching the the Panzer units and virtually destroyed Operation Shingle had three target area. The P–47s were to arrive the 1st Battalion, 3d German Paratroop phases. Phase I, from January 1 to 13, over the airfield 15 minutes early to Regiment. The German losses were so 1944, focused on attacking commu- catch the enemy fighters scrambling to heavy that they were forced to pull nication targets in northern Italy to intercept the bombers. After the P–47s back by September 16, allowing the Al- conceal the Allied intention to land destroyed the fighters, the bombers lies to go on the offensive.18 at Anzio and make the Germans be- arrived over the target to drop their The Allies established significant lieve an assault against Civitavecchia bombs unimpeded. combat forces on the Italian mainland was imminent. Phase II, when airmen with Avalanche and continued to attrit aimed to destroy airfields, aircraft, and D–Day Operation Shingle the German war machine. However, communications and isolate the beach- On January 22, the assault forces the initial success soon turned into a head, ended on D–Day, January 22. landed at Anzio and Nettuno and en- stalemate and the tenacity of the Ger- Phase III extended to the end of the countered minimal resistance, thanks man defenders further challenged the operation and included maintaining to complete surprise. An armada of 154 ability of air and ground commanders air cover over the beachhead, supply American vessels and 215 British and to coordinate operations optimizing convoys, and naval vessels and pro- Allied ships supported the invasion the combined effects of available com- viding close air support to the assault force. Allied airmen flew over 1,200 sor- bat power. forces.19 Planners estimated that the ties while the Luftwaffe managed only Germans had some 270 combat aircraft 140. General Cannon delegated control

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U.S. and British troops landing near Gela, Sicily, July 10, 1943 U.S. Army (Osborne) of all tactical aircraft of the MATAF to Rover units developed “Cabrank” pro- The German Counterattack XII ASC, assigning it responsibility for cedures to enhance their proficiency. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring support to the assault force and Fifth Fighters on Cabrank missions were as- launched a vigorous counterattack Army, while the Desert Air Force sup- signed alternate targets prior to takeoff. on February 4 that lasted until early ported the British Eighth Army. Cabrank aircraft arrived over the bat- March. The most intensive fighting To enhance cooperation between tlespace at 30-minute intervals. Once took place February 16–22. German the ground and air commanders, Fifth on station, they waited 20 minutes for forces struck with tenacity and at one Army and XII ASC personnel met Rover tasking. If they did not get it, point penetrated the American lines nightly to discuss that day and plan for they attacked previously assigned alter- and advanced to within a few miles the next. They built a plan identifying nate targets. Rover units often had dif- of the Allied beachhead. Due to the targets for destruction and establishing ficulty locating observation positions desperate situation on February 16, the order of attack. That improved co- to direct aircraft onto targets threaten- XII ASC, augmented by the strategic ordination between the air and ground ing the infantry. The solution was the and tactical air force, committed 813 teams and fostered understanding of “horsefly” technique, which consisted bombers and fighter-bombers, which objectives, air support, and potential of an L–5 flying at 6,000 feet either over dropped over 970 tons of bombs to problems. Another new method to en- or 5 miles behind the front lines with repulse the counterattack. hance air support was the “call targets” an Army observer aboard. Although On February 29, the Germans at- system, which consisted of a telephone the horsefly maintained contact with tacked with three divisions and pen- call from Fifth Army to XII ASC when the Rover unit, it could direct aircraft etrated 1,000 yards into the line of 3d emergency air support was needed. forward to designated targets. Aircraft Infantry Division. The MAAF airmen The XII ASC then directly called a unit of MATAF also flew “pineapple” mis- flew 796 sorties on March 2, dropped standing by for “call targets” and as- sions against moving targets. Recon- over 600 tons of bombs, and helped Al- signed it to the attack. naissance aircraft identifying these tar- lied ground forces stop the offensive.22 Using lessons learned from Ava- gets reported to the Army Air Control Although Kesselring failed to break lanche, and recognizing the difference Center and passed the information to through, nearly 3 months would pass in spotting procedures practiced by the pineapple-designated aircraft on alert. before the Allies could finally breach Army and Navy, U.S. P–51s were used This proved extremely efficient, and the Gustav Line and advance on Rome. to spot for the ground forces while Brit- often the aircraft were over the target The XII ASC and MAAF airmen ish Spitfires spotted for the Navy. The within 15 minutes of the request.21 dominated the skies over Anzio and

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Italy. Although the Luftwaffe made spo- men quickly established air superiority NOTES radic harassing raids over Allied ship- and denied the enemy the ability to ping and the battle area, MAAF won air use their rapidly declining air assets 1 David Syrett, “Northwest Africa, 1942–43,” in Case Studies in the Achieve- superiority and did not relinquish it. effectively. As in the Pacific and South- ment of Air Superiority, ed. Benjamin Frank- From D–Day until February 15, 1944, west Pacific theaters, the skies over lin Cooling (Washington DC: Office of Air its airmen flew 27,204 sorties, dropped Italy and the Mediterranean were by Force History, 1994), 224. 13,035 tons of bombs, and destroyed no means devoid of enemy aircraft; 2 Ibid., 225. 326 enemy planes at a cost of 96 Allied however, the sorties the Germans could 3 History of the 12th Air Force, vol. 1, chap. I, 2, in USAF HRA Doc. 650.057–3, bombers and 133 fighters, lost mostly fly inflicted only moderate damage and 1942–1945. 23 to German antiaircraft artillery. failed to keep the Allies from achieving 4 Ibid., chap. X, 5. The Mediterranean theater of oper- their strategic objectives. 5 Daniel R. Mortensen, A Pattern for ations proved to be a testing ground for The intensity of the Allied air Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Sup- American Airmen in the development campaign compelled the Germans port North Africa (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History and U.S. Army Center of of tactics, techniques, and procedures to withdraw most of their aircraft Military History, 1987), chart 2. for the employment of airpower in a first from Sicily, then from south- 6 Wesley Craven and James Cate, The combat environment. The air-ground ern Italy. That reduced their ability Army Air Forces in World War II. Europe: operations yielded some of the same to mass their air effort to oppose the Torch to Pointblank August 1942 to December lessons gathered earlier by Allied forces landings due to the distance from the 1943 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), 445. in New Guinea in the Southwest Pacific airfields to the beaches. The Allied 7 Twelfth Air Force in the Sicilian Cam- beginning July 1942. Additional les- air effort in the Mediterranean, along paign, 1, in USAF HRA Doc. 650.01–2, 1942– sons gained over the Mediterranean in with ground operations, drained Ger- 1944. coordination with ground commanders man combat power that could have 8 Ibid., 430. benefited airmen and soldiers landing been used on the Eastern front or to 9 Ibid., 8. 10 C.J.C. Molony, History of the Second in Normandy and southern France. reinforce France. Berlin was forced World War: The Mediterranean and the Middle Twelfth Air Force, within 3 months to fight a three-front war with inad- East (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Of- of activation, deployed to North Africa equate resources. fice, 1973), vol. V, 34. in October 1942 to participate in Op- 11 Ibid., 100. eration Torch. Its Airmen arrived with- The Italian capitulation forced the 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., 451. out experience in combat or in joint, Germans to defend Italy alone with 14 Fifth Army History, 52, in USAF HRA coalition, or amphibious operations. their overstretched forces. Twelfth Air Doc. 680.01, vol. I, 1 October–15 November Dogged determination, innovative Force and their British counterparts 1943. thinking, and sound leadership helped helped secure the Mediterranean lines 15 Operational Plan Avalanche, Head- them overcome the friction and fog of communication, and with most of quarters, XII Air Support Command, 81, in USAF AHRA Doc. 651.430–3, August 1943. of war. The Luftwaffe fought cleverly Italy under Allied control, U.S. and 16 Molony, 283. and tenaciously while introducing new Free French forces were able to in- 17 Alan Wilt, “Allied Cooperation in weapons such as the radio-controlled vade southern France in August 1944. Sicily and Italy 1943–1945,” in Case Studies This invasion secured the port in the Development of Close Air Support, ed. the Mediterranean theater proved of Marseilles, which played a Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1990), 116. major role in relieving the Al- to be a testing ground for American 18 Colonel Rudolf Boehmler, Com- lied logistic crisis of late 1944. manding Officer, 4th German Paratroop Reg- tactics, techniques, and procedures The aerial interdiction cam- iment, 21, in USAF HRA Doc. K113.310.8, paign in the Mediterranean 1943–1945. glide bombs. Twelfth Air Force adapted disrupted the flow of supplies for the 19 Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Op- erations in Support of Shingle, 6, in USAF quickly and became an efficient and ef- German army. Reopening the Mediter- HRA Doc. 622.430–1, 1 January–15 February fective combat force that helped bring ranean greatly economized on shipping 1944. the collapse of Italy and of Wehrmacht around Africa with major benefits for 20 Ibid., 7. forces in the Mediterranean theater. the antisubmarine war. Allied airmen 21 Wilt, 219. The coordinated air campaigns helped achieve major strategic goals. 22 “Brief of Report by Fifth Army to HQS. Allied Central Mediterranean Forces” that supported the amphibious land- More important, the lessons learned in in USAF HRA Doc. 680–619–2, March 4, ings of Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio al- Italy helped refine Air Force doctrine 1944. lowed the Soldiers of Fifth and Eighth and enhanced the effectiveness of the 23 Operations in Support of Shingle, 17. Armies to secure beachheads and ad- air-ground team. JFQ vance inland with minimal interference from enemy aircraft. Allied air-

issue thirty-nine / JFQ 107 ■

Interagency Dialogue Premiere JFQ is pleased to announce an important new series — Interagency Dialogue. With each issue of JFQ will supply articles on topics of interest to those who conduct integrated interagency operations and coordinate among Federal and local government agencies and organizations. The goal of this section is to stimulate thought and debate on a wide range of security issues that cut across agency stovepipes within the Federal Government and between the Department of Defense, local government agencies, first responders, and a multitude of agencies in allied governments. This essay is on a controversial topic, strategic communications. It was written by Jeffrey Jones, recently a Bush administration National Security Council member and retired U.S. Army colonel. JFQ encourages your feedback or essays on security matters that involve interagency and all the instruments of national power for this featured section. Please see the NDU Press Web site for feedback or information on submissions: ndupress.ndu.edu.

Strategic Communication A Mandate for the United States

By JEFFREY B. JONES

n an era when the power of information and transnational issues. A mechanism to coordi- affects every human being in matters mun- nate all interagency informational efforts at the dane and transcendent, individual and so- national level is essential to its success. The forum cial, national and international—when im- should meet routinely, not just in times of crisis. Iages are transmitted instantaneously worldwide, This call for a national communications strat- radio programs are translated into hundreds of egy is not an argument for a propaganda minister, languages and broadcast to every corner of the but for better coordination of information efforts earth, and periodicals and the Internet are univer- among agencies. The information war must be sal communications media—there is no alterna- waged during peacetime, crisis, operations other tive but to harness information to protect and than war, war itself, and in the post-conflict pe- promote national interests.1 riod. It should shape the informational and intellectual environment long before hostilities. The The Mandate effort is not restricted to the White House Office As a subset of the national security strategy, of Global Communications or to interagency there is a need for a national communications spokesmen, press officers, information warriors, strategy coequal with the political strategy over- or technological innovations that are shaping the seen by the Department of State, the economic digitized battlefield; it must include the public strategy led by the National Security Council diplomacy activities of the Department of State Office of International Economic Affairs, and the as well as the full spectrum of global activities of national military strategy implemented by the the U.S. Agency for International Development Secretary of Defense and the uniformed military. (USAID) and other agencies. The national communications strategy should In reality, we are talking about strategic com- provide objectives and guidance for both regional munication—the synchronized coordination of

Jeffrey B. Jones is a senior associate with Booz Allen Hamilton, and was the Director for Strategic Communications and Information on the National Security Council.

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tration, choreography, and synergy. This article deals with the use of information to affect attitu- dinal and behavioral change (the nonlinear and intellectual fourth dimension) and the mandate for successful communications with first wave (agrarian), second wave (industrialized), and what Alvin and Heidi Toffler call the post-industrial third wave of societies.3 The following factors impact today’s informational environment:

■ Traditional dividing lines between public affairs, public diplomacy, and military information operations are blurred because of immediate access to information. Domestic press announcements are broadcast and monitored globally, and they influence as well as inform. Reports and examples of focused, tactical U.S. psychological operations (PSYOP)—all truthful but designed expressly to influence foreign attitudes and behavior—are also available in this country on the Internet. Each is important and designed for specific audiences. None is preeminent. Synergy is impossible without coordination. The information activities of other government agencies are distinct, although some of the means may be the same. ■ Resources dedicated to the information realm, which some would argue is the most critical element of national power, have been estimated to be insufficient Assistant Secretary of Defense for by a factor of ten. Public Affairs with Joint Staff Director of ■ There is extensive proliferation of animosity, Operations briefing reporters at Pentagon alienation of allies, disappointment of friends, and disil-

DOD (Helene C. Stikkel) lusionment of those who have traditionally looked to a trusted America for hope. statecraft, public affairs, public diplomacy, mili- ■ Technological innovations exist but are insuf- tary information operations, and other activities, ficiently funded, tapped, or fused. The Joint Staff’s reinforced by political, economic, military, and other information management portal, conceived during operations in Afghanistan, is only now coming to frui- actions, to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives. tion. Integration with unclassified systems at the State To date, the predominant concern has been for Department remains an unfulfilled requirement. reaching domestic audiences through public af- ■ Bureaucratic turf battles, misperceptions, and the fairs and dealing with U.S. and Western media absence of visible, sustained interagency commitment and the 24-hour news cycle, with our public are detriments to progress. diplomacy efforts severely constrained by the ■ Al Qaeda and other parties constitute an active adversary in the propaganda domain. What previously disestablishment of the U.S. Information Agency existed in the training camps of Afghanistan is now on some years ago, and the the Internet. Months ago, Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s terror- using information requires reality that we have had ist group released a CD–ROM urging Muslims to battle coordination with the chronic resource insuffi- against Coalition “crusaders” in Iraq, and others have ciency across the strategic followed. That is not an argument to engage in propa- information efforts of allies, ganda; for the United States, truthful information is the communication domain. best antidote and is exactly what its public affairs, public friends, and former adversaries As Joseph Nye points out, diplomacy, and information operators seek to provide. to get America’s message ■ Policy issues that dominate the “hierarchy of across, we need assurance, positive actions and hatred” against the United States, such as the Middle examples, persuasion, moral suasion, and other East peace process, remain unresolved. With increased and balanced U.S. pressure on both sides, and sustained inducements as much as we need deterrence, dis- engagement, some progress is being made. But as the 2 suasion, and coercion. United Nations Arab Human Development Report recently Using information also requires coordination underscored, we are not the only guilty party, despite with the information efforts of allies, friends, and accusations to the contrary. former adversaries. Further, it demands constant ■ From the highest levels of government, there multi-agency, multiservice, multidisciplinary, and is growing overreliance on non–face-to-face communications that do not convey national seriousness of multidimensional integration as well as orches-

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Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice This is a requirement in peacetime, as well as dur- arriving at Darfur, ing crises, conflicts, and post-conflict operations. Sudan, during African Members of such an interagency structure would Union Mission also work together to implement strategic information plans proposed by the affected geographic Combatant Commanders to both the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who would provide these requests for interagency support such as was executed so successfully during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. At the theater level, each combatant commander has a theater security cooperation plan, which should include senior leader engagement, international military education and training, security assistance, pervasive use of DOD-sponsored regional security studies centers, peacetime PSYOP programs, and, ideally, a theater information strategy derived from the national communication strategy. All elements of the plan

U.S. Air Force (Bradley C. Church) U.S. Air Force should be designed to help achieve political, economic, and military objectives for the region. purpose or even interest in allied opinion. Perceptions Coordination mechanisms include elements of become reality in the mind. the combatant command staff (operations, intel- ■ Our national ability to use television and the In- ternet in sophisticated ways to reach the full spectrum ligence, strategy and plans, public affairs, strategic of audiences remains woefully inadequate if we are to communications, information operations, PSYOP, influence the future. and Civil Affairs and the Staff Judge Advocate), ■ There is a mandate to apply the lessons of the U.S. Embassies (foreign policy, intelligence, State past, positive and negative: organizational, technological, Department public diplomacy affairs, Defense planning; education and training; phasing; interagency, joint, and coalition; strategic, operational, and tactical. Attaches, and regionally oriented USAID advisers) and, to the extent possible, allied representatives. The Requirements Each combatant command should draft a theater At this point, as the Tofflers point out in War information strategy concentrating on proactive, and Anti-War, there is no overarching knowledge influential, and shaping (rather than reactive) or information strategy at the national level, nor efforts to reduce sources of conflict; assistance to is there a focused and effective mechanism for nations in their transition to democratic systems; coordinating dissemination to all prospective increasing dialogue by building political, eco- audiences around the world—allied, friendly, nomic, military, medical, commercial, social, and neutral, potentially hostile, and hostile. While educational bridges; development of collaborative the U.S. Information Agency had the predomi- approaches to regional problems; reduction of nant responsibility for public diplomacy until it the motivation and perceived legitimacy of those was disestablished, national assets for communi- who possess nuclear weapons and other weapons cation, information, and education around the of mass destruction; and emphasis on the correct globe have degraded, and other actors and key role of the military in a democracy, including communicators are now involved. There is little constructive domestic uses. evidence of cooperation, coordination, or even These same advisers would meet regularly appreciation for the impact of strategic commu- to coordinate their respective efforts with those nication. Thus, there is a need for a permanent at the interagency level, channeled through the mechanism to coordinate as well as implement DOD-led/J–39 Battle Update Brief apparatus to and monitor all interagency information efforts. maximize the informational impact throughout Several attempts have been made over the last 4 the region and implement the agreed strategy. years, but none have been effectively institution- As a matter of course, strategic communication alized in a national security Presidential directive, plans would be integrated into operation, con- which is needed to add discipline, guidance, and cept, and contingency plans in much the same direction as well as to monitor implementation. way as we have incorporated flexible deterrent

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options. Finally, when problems arise and con- enduring commitment for potential adversaries; tingency planning commences, a theater-wide persuasion of friends, allies, adversaries, and neu- strategic communication supporting plan must be trals; enhanced perceptions in terms of military developed and implemented. Every effort must be and other presence; and two-way education and made to “informationally” prepare the battlespace capacity enhancement programs at all levels. In (Phase 0) to defuse, deter, or contain the conflict. addition, we need more effective human rights as- Combatant commanders should submit their sistance, informational efforts to speed newly free requests for interagency consideration in terms of countries on the road to democracy, humanitarian encouraging multinational organizations such as and disaster assistance, refugee and counterdrug the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organiza- operations, and full-spectrum information efforts tion of American States, and Association of South- in support of President George W. Bush’s Prolifera- east Asian Nations to participate in developing tion Security Initiative. and implementing such an information strategy An unfulfilled task from the administration’s and to accept an increasing role. The George C. first term is the aforementioned need for a na- Marshall European Center for Security Studies and tional communication strategy to drive the cre- regional centers of National Defense University ation of cascading theater information strategies (Africa Center, Near East for each region, more com- and South Asia Center, and conveying information can prehensive theater security Center for Hemispheric encourage dissension, defection, cooperation plans, better Defense Studies), which in- and surrender, thus ending the coordination with U.S. Em- stitutionalize the self-help bassy Mission Performance process through sharing battle quickly Plans, robust information the ideas and experiences plans implementing each of Western democracies and their free market of the regional combating terrorism strategies, economies, could play an invaluable role as well. better allied capacity-building, and increased New centers of this type should be proposed to means of measuring strategic, operational, and meet theater needs. tactical effectiveness. The Department of Defense At the tactical level, there are myriad applica- needs to establish a comprehensive strategy for its tions for peacetime information use. Conveying role of supporting the State Department in public information by all means available can enhance diplomacy, as well as more rational and respon- one’s ability to see, hear, know, disrupt, deny, sive product and action approval authority. “out-communicate,” and “out-think” the adver- In crises, there are again both regional and sary. In addition, it can encourage dissension, transnational requirements: tailored, non–order- defection, and surrender, thus ending the battle of-battle intelligence requirements as well as a quickly and saving lives. Also at the tactical level, mandate for enhanced dissuasion, deterrence, de- information must be used to help in the all-im- ployment enhancement, perceptions of presence, portant multifaceted, multi-agency, and probably prepositioning, interagency cross-fertilization, and multinational efforts after the battle. Allies can be accessing broader coalition assistance and coop- invaluable contributors to common goals and ob- eration. As requested but denied in Rwanda, there jectives as well as provide key conduits to enhance may be opportunities for information intervention the effectiveness of our informational efforts. (U.S./allies/UN) to counter the genocidal encour- agement from such entities as hostile radio broad- Planning Across the Spectrum casts. Strategic communication and information In peacetime, strategic communication issues planning accelerators are needed as well as en- are both regional and transnational. The construct hanced capacity for technological reachback, tem- is more encompassing than yesterday’s deterrence pered with the enduring requirement for physical and dissuasion, although those remain central to presence to assess ground truth and the resonance national survival and our global interests. Given of our messages. We need to develop or take bet- the U.S. reputation for unilateral action, with little ter advantage of other conduits for our messages, (or at least perceived as insufficient) coordination especially those with proven or likely resonance. and inclusion of allies, we need the following to Just as in peacetime, as crises escalate, we ensure that we have enduring bridges of under- must better understand that our actions—politi- standing: an effective and active strategy of reas- cal, economic, or military—convey messages more surance for friends; assurance of our capacity and loudly than rhetoric, but that both are important

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and neither in isolation is a panacea. While there phases, there must be simultaneous informational are indeed strategic, operational, and tactical mea- and operational planning for the post-conflict sures of effectiveness, there must be organizational period, which can clearly prove more complex, elements dedicated to tracking them and provid- challenging, and of longer duration than force-on- ing feedback to information planners at all levels. force operations. Feedback loops are essential to A more rational and responsive product/action ensure resonance and modification of approaches, approval process is needed that prescribes authori- conduits of influence, products, and actions when ties down to the lowest appropriate. As during crises, dedicated person- regarding media monitoring, level. Earlier information as nel and systems must be in place to measure the we must keep a pulse not only well as intelligence prepa- effectiveness of messages and actions, monitor ration of the battlespace adversarial media, accelerate response times at all on what is watched but also is required. There must be levels, and preempt or counteract enemy misinfor- on its public credibility better analytic, human fac- mation and disinformation. We must ensure the tor, perceptional, and en- capacity for both individual and collective target- vironmental guidance in terms of what to expect ing—from sophisticated elites to the illiterate. for planners, commanders, and deploying service- Databases drawn from all available sources must be members. Some sources exist, but simply posting assembled months in advance. Targeting guidance information on the Defense Intelligence Agency must be issued, and tactical as well as theater-wide Web site is insufficient. Both push and pull are plans for radio, television, Internet, print, and face- necessary. There must be attention to identify- to-face communications must be in place. ing full-spectrum intelligence and open-source Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have un- requirements that are essential to effective under- derscored that we must create a greater capacity standing as well as communication at all levels. to capture still and video images and develop As crises become more volatile, there must improved means to transmit, package, and use be better pulsing and synchronization of infor- them imaginatively. Every effort must be made to mation. There is need for face-to-face engage- more effectively reach out to allies, friends, and ment instead of the increasing tendency to rely neutrals and to prioritize our organizational, joint, on demarches delivered by others, telephone interagency, and coalition efforts. Based on experi- calls, cables, and interlocutors that do not convey ence, there are requirements for rapid adjustment, the same national purpose. Moreover—and this dissemination of good news, and phasing away is especially key for forward-deployed combat- U.S. voices and faces to fade into the background ant commanders—we must more pervasively while those of the nation in which the operation engage multilateral and international organiza- is being conducted take the lead. We must un- tions (including nongovernmental organizations derstand that we may no longer be the critical or that understand who the true influencers are most credible deliverers of the message. In fact, we in an affected population and have conduits to must do everything we can to assist the nation in them), expand our flexible deterrent options, re- articulating what must become its, not our, priori- fine interagency requirements in plans, integrate ties. Coordinating messages with combat power on strategic communication planning elements into every level, we must accelerate the defeat of enemy standing joint force headquarters, develop docu- forces and be prepared for such factors as the de- ments that identify interagency requirements, sertion, defection, and surrender of enemy forces and establish standing information coordinating as well as demonstrations by civilians. committees to better fuse strategic communica- Servicemembers must understand that in to- tion both in theater as well as with Washington. day’s information environment, as underscored by As combat operations appear imminent, we the actions of a few at the Abu Ghraib prison, their must finalize information planning with both the individual deeds can have strategic consequence interagency community and with allies. Coun- for either good or ill, affecting not just their im- try-specific, regional, and transnational strategic mediate surroundings, but things as far reaching communication requirements should have already as alliance trust, confidence, and even continued been identified and expertise deployed to key coalition participation. Improvement is needed information nodes in the region so that plan- in capturing the positive acts of our own Soldiers, ning and relationship-building are completed in Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, the activities of the advance and refined implementation can occur. U.S. Agency for International Development, the Moreover, while planning is indeed done in citizens themselves, and other parties across the

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country. It is essential that the world, as well as re- Measures of Effectiveness gional and U.S. domestic audiences, sees these im- At issue is how to establish and institution- ages of security, collaborative progress, and hope. alize measures of effectiveness—standards of In post-conflict operations, interagency co- comparison used to evaluate the progress of an ordination on the ground becomes even more operation—at the strategic, operational, and tacti- critical regionally as well as internationally. In- cal levels. Lack of established and agreed criteria, formation coordinating committees become vital failure to fuse intelligence efforts, and shortfalls for interagency, coalition, and potentially inter- in dedicated personnel, linguistic oversight, and national coordination, cooperation, and synergy. technological monitoring continue to inhibit Again, the importance of good news cannot be data compilation, fusion, and dissemination. overemphasized. Nor can constantly assessing For instance, there is a need to measure the resonance and target audiences, disseminating to sentiments and actions of: multiple audiences, dealing with insurgents and former regime elements, not giving untoward ■ the populace (not monolithic in Iraq or Afghani- stan—demographics must be understood) legitimacy to low-level “thorns” in the process, ■ elites, whose actions and messages impact audi- and “incentivizing” the populace toward coopera- ences and decisionmakers tion and providing information. Better care must ■ decisionmakers (de facto and official). be taken in preparing the Armed Forces for the always difficult transition from warfare to posi- Regarding media monitoring, we must keep tive engagement with a defeated populace. Joint a pulse not only on what is watched but also on interagency coordination groups, such as those its public credibility. In addition, those involved established in Iraq, are key to engagement at the in such efforts must do more than simply docu- personal level as well as to coordination, provid- menting what was broadcast. They must also tell ing cogent explanations for coalition activities, commanders the range of implications as well responding to questions from key communicators as propose what might be done about it—and and “influentials,” managing funding for projects by whom! identified as critical to the quality of life for the Strategically, leading indicators include alli- common citizen, and transitioning from occupier ance participation, statements by heads of state to partner. The message must be communicated and government leaders, policy endorsement, mo- to locals that it is their country and their future, bilization, votes in the United Nations and other and thus their responsibility—with international multinational organizations, resource commit- assistance—to achieve post-conflict stability. ments (forces, equipment, funds, civilian police or other trainers, and facilities), regional Friday sermons, intercepts and intelligence cooperation, Terrorism Structure and Approach international and national media coverage, ac- Defend—Always, Everywhere tions and messages from multinational organizations (such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, Or- ganization of Islamic Council, and Arab League), Law Enforcement local alliances, cross-border cooperation, polling, Defeat Diplomatic Leadership fatwas, resonance in academic publications, recall Information Military of ambassadors for consultations, and the closing Terrorist Economic of foreign missions. Organizations Intelligence Operationally, primary indicators are statements by senior officials and military commanders, statements from religious organizations such States Deny as the hawza, regional Friday sermons, troop movements and exercises, combat power demonstrations, border and maritime operations, demonstrations or other civil disobedience, na- International tional media reporting, enhanced intelligence- Diminish gathering, key leader defections and large-scale desertions, self-generated grounding of combat Underlying Causes aircraft, self-generated return to garrisons, fatwas, national polls, and large unit surrenders.

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as its military capacity and reliability. The way friends, allies, former adversaries, future enemies, and neutrals view our capabilities, as well as our intentions, remains fundamental to strategic and conventional deterrence and to our ability to resolve disputes and prevail in conflict. Today’s international security environment requires not only the effective application of emerging technologies to enhance the command and control of the tactical commander, but also the imaginative implementation of information strategies and campaigns at the national and theater levels. Enhanced cooperation, coordination, and cohesion of information efforts, from the national level to the tactical, bringing to bear all the resources and conduits of influence needed, are essential to meet today’s challenges and tomorrow’s unknowns. By encouraging long-term change, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (B.J. Weiner) attacking the sources of conflict, and encouraging Iraqi general speaking Tactically, important indicators are individ- openness and dialogue, strategic communicators to media at opening ual or unit desertions, defections, surrenders, can contribute significantly to keeping the peace, of border patrol fort abandonment of equipment, civilian compliance reinforcing stability, and inhibiting terrorism, the in Al Zaid or noncompliance, local open-source print, radio, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and and television coverage, Friday prayers, influen- the flow of drugs. In addition, they can enhance tial imams’ statements, fatwas, meetings, atten- U.S. power projection, accelerate war termina- dance at established local, regional, or provincial tion, and help in complex postconflict stability coordination committees, polling, recruitment and reconstruction operations. and retention figures in military/security forces (such as the National Guard, police, Facilities Pro- Maintaining the peace is better than resolv- tection Service, border police, and army), attacks ing crises. Containing conflict is better than com- on coalition forces and civilians, level of intel- mitting forces. If combat is necessary, shortened ligence reported to coalition forces or hotlines, conflict with minimum loss of life on both sides intercepts, paramilitary cooperation, reestablish- and postconflict stability are the preferred out- ment of a secure environment, school attendance comes. Winning the information war is impera- or closings, civilian compliance with interim gov- tive to all these efforts. Thus, strategic commu- ernment directives, Internet traffic, willingness of nication—the effective integration of statecraft, students and others to engage in discussions and public affairs, public diplomacy, and military participate in focus groups, telephone call-in data, information operations, reinforced by political, reports from USAID and its British equivalent, the economic, and military actions—is required to Department for International Development, as advance these foreign policy objectives. No single well as other nongovernmental organizations, contributor is preeminent. All are required in a willingness to be hired for coalition-led infrastruc- synchronized and coherent manner. JFQ ture enhancement projects, focus groups, surveys of elites, open-source photography, and graffiti. NOTES In a time of defense budgets predominantly focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, but with other 1 Jeffrey B. Jones, “The Third Wave and the Fourth global concerns, evolving overseas basing, sus- Dimension,” in Special Operations Forces: Roles and Mis- tained forward deployments, and increased in- sions in the Aftermath of the Cold War, ed. Richard H. Schultz, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, and W. Bradley Stock stability, it is critical to reinforce perceptions (Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing, 1996). of American commitment through diplomatic 2 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power (New York: Public Af- engagement and outreach, particularly toward fairs, 2004). the Muslim world and against Islamic and other 3 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (Bos- extremists. It is vital to underscore the Nation’s ton, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1993). economic and developmental assistance as well

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A Book Review well-bred man should be able to do. The By JAMES JAY CARAFANO Commonwealth armed forces seemed to have inherited this attitude, albeit in a more egalitarian form, and their attempts The Last Word? Essays on Official at official military history appear to have History in the United States and followed suit. History projects were ad British Commonwealth hoc affairs, championed by those who Edited by Jeffrey Grey Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003 had a particular interest, and produced 177 pp. $69.95 for a variety of idiosyncratic reasons [ISBN: 0–313–31083–1] that may have had little to do with professional military education or the he aim of The Last Word? Essays pursuit of academic excellence. on Official History in the United In contrast, the U.S. Army’s green book T States and British Commonwealth series, its official histories of World War frequently complained to Washington is to illustrate how a variety of Western II, also reflected the Nation’s approach that General Douglas MacArthur was militaries addressed the challenge of to war, but it reads altogether unlike the suppressing the publication of the green writing official histories of battles and Commonwealth writings. In one of the book on the Buna campaign to diminish campaigns. But the book delivers more best essays in the book, Edward Drea, Eichelberger’s place in history. Indeed, than it promises, offering a glimpse into a former branch head at the U.S. Army Drea reveals that one of MacArthur’s the subtle cultural factors that influence Center of Military History, describes the generals tried to derail work on the official how nations address the art of war and genesis of one of the most substantial and history of the Southwest Pacific Theater illuminating the shortfalls of institutions comprehensive military history projects while he peddled his own commercial, that rely too heavily on themselves ever attempted, a work on an industrial hagiographic version of MacArthur’s war. for understanding their own nature. scale, with volumes dedicated to every Curiously, official historians shared With contributions from a solid team of major campaign in the global war as their academic brethrens’ frustration in international historians, the first of the well as additional treatises on various obtaining access to records. Historians book’s two parts consists of four essays on functional areas such as medical care and working on the European campaigns official history writing in Canada, South ordnance operations. Authorized in 1946, during World War II, for example, were Africa, New Zealand, and Australia. Five the project was so massive that the last barred from looking at War Department essays on various aspects of World War II volume, The Medical Department: Medical holdings. As a result, many of their historiography comprise the second half. Service in The War Against Japan, by Mary judgments on how theater operations Since all the militaries under Ellen Condon-Rall and Albert E. Cowdrey, fit into the overall strategic intent of the consideration grew out of the traditions was not published until 1998. Pentagon are suspect. and language of the British way of war, Also, unlike the Commonwealth While The Last Word? provides a an expected common theme in how each histories, U.S. military history had worthwhile collection of readable and engaged in preparing its official histories a clearly utilitarian purpose. Official informative essays on the state of official is notably and surprisingly absent. Most accounts were primarily intended as historical writing over the course of striking are the distinctions between professional military education tools, the 20th century, missing is an overall the Commonwealth and American both to pass on the honors and traditions assessment of the current state of the approaches to the art of writing about of the service and to act as platforms craft or projections for the future. war. Truly, these were military historians for critical thinking about the conduct Jeffrey Grey’s conclusion that “official divided by a common language. of war. histories are best understood as the The Commonwealth militaries have Where American and Commonwealth first word, not the final one” (p. xi), always maintained an air of the amateur’s efforts share common ground is that, like is simply no longer correct. The age superiority. Deeply rooted in the British all histories, they must be understood when we relied on combat historians civil-military tradition that remained within the context of when they were for history’s first draft and a solid and skeptical of standing armies, British written. Even official historians do not dependable backbone of chronology, military professionals were expected, like have perfect knowledge, nor are they names, and places for others to build Cincinnatus, to return to the plow after free of bias, either their own or someone on, is over. Today, journalists and winning the war. Professionalism was else’s. Politics often played a role. academics can crank out reasonably akin to fox hunting, something every General Robert Eichelberger, for example, well-written histories long before official historians can have their efforts blessed Lieutenant Colonel James Jay Carfano, USA (Ret.), is a senior fellow at the Kathryn and for publication. The recent war in Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Afghanistan is a case in point. There are

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half a dozen volumes on the subject but civilizations exist and are fairly clearly not yet an official history. demarcated not only by their history Finally, official historians have but also by unique cultural traits. It is much to explain regarding their role even more déclassé to suggest that those as educators of future military leaders. distinctive characteristics might give one Many of the essays presented in The civilization an advantage of one sort or Last Word? detail efforts to reach for another over others. While few observers objectivity and scholarly excellence. deny that the West has seemed to have Still, it is worth asking if institutional the upper hand in military struggles histories can provide the critical over the past few hundred years or introspection and analysis needed to more, it is far more acceptable in saloon move the profession forward. Militaries society to chalk up the phenomenon to tend to call for the histories they want environmental caprice, as Jared Diamond he is a vivid writer and historian—he rather than the histories they deserve. did in his popular Guns, Germs, and Steel, chooses one West versus non-West battle There is no need to look further than the or to the mercantile and militaristic (to include a few Western defeats) to current occupation operations in Iraq. ambitions of a civilization gone greedy. highlight advantages derived from each Planners and leaders have little history Classical historian Victor Davis cultural trait. to turn to for guidance. While the U.S. Hanson does not buy the prevailing The Athenian naval victory over the military churned out dozens of combat thinking. In Carnage and Culture, he Persians at Salamis in 480 BC shows histories on the battles of World War II, offers fundamental and systematic the moral advantage that free men the official histories on the occupation reasons why history has unfolded as it have over slaves. Alexander the Great’s period are few and far between. has, particularly military history. His breaking of Darius III’s large Persian There are examples of official history thesis is that the undeniable Western and Greek force at Gaugamela in 331 being used to transform a military rather advantage in warfare itself, particularly BC evinces the advantages of a Western than simply document the past. The on the battlefield, stems directly from tradition of decisiveness rather than post–World War I studies commissioned the cultural traits of Western societies. ritual maneuvering. The annihilation by German General Hans von Seeckt, Conversely, the cultural traits of non- of the Romans by Hannibal’s army which helped launch a revolution in Western societies gave way to ritualistic at Cannae in 216 BC and Rome’s combined arms warfare, are probably and tribal forms of warfare that were subsequent recovery to drive him from the best example of this type. Such regularly bested by Western militaries. Italy and win the war with Carthage moments are the exception and are rarely Victory has causes, Hanson tells demonstrate the ability of a civic republic seen today. Official military history has us, and they are not always the ones to rally its citizenry to strategic victory much to do to recapture its stature as the that crop up in after-action reviews, even after a calamitous defeat. authoritative word on the past. JFQ such as terrain, command, planning, The Frankish victory over the Moors local tactics, and weaponry. Instead, at Poitiers in 732 AD exemplifies the such factors as political freedom, the power of the yeoman tradition in quest for decisiveness, a sense of civic Western warfare—lower class landed A Book Review duty, rationalism and science, capitalist infantry soldiers and their shock economics, technological enthusiasm, formations whose operations were based By JOHN HILLEN discipline combined with individual not on brave individual warriors, a proud initiative, and a tradition of critique non-Western tradition, but on a team of and self-correction have not only made exchangeable cogs in a machine. Cortez’s Carnage and Culture: Western societies into what they are campaign in Mexico in 1520–1521 and Landmark Battles in the today, both good and bad, but they also culminating victory over the mighty Rise of Western Power provide the foundation of understanding Aztecs at Tenochtitlan point up the by Victor Davis Hanson the enduring Western military advantage advantages of Western rationalism and New York: Anchor Books, 2001 544 pp. $29.95 in battle. technology when put together. The [ISBN: 0–3857–2038–6] While allowing for anomalies, Hanson Venetian crushing of the Turkish fleet at maintains that the whole of military Lepanto in 1571 highlights the military lthough for many observers 9/11 history basically supports his thesis. To benefits capitalist societies have over brought the return of history illustrate his points most vividly—and command-directed economic traditions. A to a globalizing world, it is still unfashionable in polite society to John Hillen, the author of several books and numerous articles on strategic affairs, is a mili- admit—à la Samuel Huntington—that tary consultant to ABC News and a contributing editor at National Review.

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The 1879 British defense of Rourke’s Drift imagined “butchering thousands of rifle- Hanson’s broad and provocative against the Zulus after the annihilation carrying redcoats.” thesis is largely supported by his analysis of the British force at Isandhlwana shows Moreover, where many non-Western of selected engagements (themselves the advantage of the soldier over the forces were successful, Hanson contends subject to endless reinterpretation), but warrior. Nimitz’s tide-turning triumph at that it was because they borrowed the more interesting issue is whether his Midway in 1942 illustrates the value of a Western tactics and weapons. “In all choices are indicative of a more universal society that prizes individual initiative. such debate [scholars] must keep in mind theme that provides the single best Finally, and perhaps most controversially, that non-European forces did not with explanation for Western dominance. This the U.S. operational victory/political any frequency and for long duration is a complex question. First, there is the defeat in the Tet Offensive of 1968 navigate the globe, borrowed rather matter of what the West is and what it is is an example of the self-correcting than imparted military technology, did not. Hanson is squarely in the Adlerian mechanisms of societies not afraid to not colonize three new continents, and intellectual tradition in assuming that criticize themselves and improve. usually fought Europeans at home rather the West is defined by a relatively linear Hanson’s battle chapters are rich and than in Europe.” For those keeping cultural tradition evolving from Greece to entertaining. Even so, the problem with score and bent on citing notable non- Rome to Europe and at last to the United this battle-per-cultural-trait method Western victories, Hanson maintains States. David Gress, author of From Plato is that military history is so rich and that his essential points still stand on the to NATO: The Idea of the West and Its diverse that it offers a series of actions record: the dynamism of the West has Critics, has challenged this traditional or battles to prove almost any thesis on generally made for superior forces and interpretation effectively, or at least warfare. Hanson is primed to take on that dynamism sprang from political and expanded on the idea of a pure cultural this argument and spends considerable cultural values unique to the Western link from Socrates through to Milton time in a preemptive defense to convince tradition. Moreover, there has been no Friedman. But questions remain. For the reader that such engagements as attempt by Western forces to incorporate instance, what traditions do the Russians/ Thermopylae, Kabul, the Little Big Horn, non-Western traditions or cultural values Soviets represent? This is not addressed. Isandhlwana, Khartoum, and Dien Bien to improve battlefield effectiveness, while In fact, much could be learned from Phu do not disprove his thesis. His the reverse has often been true. After all, West-on-West conflicts, but Hanson’s general tactic is a debater’s best friend— as Hanson tells us, “Alexander did not only point there is that such clashes positing the impossible to imagine hire the [Persian] Immortals, the British have always been a bloodbath due to the the opposite case. After all, “England did not outfit regiments with assegais, military effectiveness of both sides. was in India, India not in England,” and the American Navy did not institute Second, who represents “everyone and a handful of Zulus could never be samurai sword training.” else,” and why can’t these societies reach

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a point where they can challenge the of behavior, and values. Instead, dominant characteristics of Western intellectuals swarmed to cultural societies? This brings to the strategist’s relativists (Aren’t we all really the same? mind the question of whether these It’s just our greedy leaders who are cultural traits represent truly sustainable, different) and geographic determinists competitive advantages on the such as Jared Diamond, who offered battlefield—advantages that are valuable, explanations about Western military unique, hard to copy, and decisive. superiority that had the comforting feel Hanson leaves no doubt that these of an apology. qualities are valuable. He also makes a Ironically, Hanson’s controversial persuasive case that they are unique. It thesis is fairer to the non-Westerner than is less certain whether they are difficult to Diamond or others. Unlike them, he is or costly to imitate—and the Chinese, by no means an implicit racist. He makes Koreans, and Japanese in particular have much of the fact that intelligence and realize the dramatic increase in military effectively demonstrated that on occasion. bravery are shared the world over and effectiveness the Gulf War suggested. Finally, we know that these traits, while by every culture in equal measure. But Advances in information technology giving great advantage to Western some cultural groups evolved different (IT) are having revolutionary impacts on militaries, are not always decisive. societal traits concerning the way they a wide range of human activities. Perhaps Most important, there are the would order their economic and political the closest recent historical analog questions of whether these advantages affairs. The traits of the West allowed it was the upheaval that ensued from even matter. The invasion of Iraq would to develop a matchless military power widespread diffusion of small engines certainly prove Hanson’s point about that accounts for the advantages it and motors in the first decades of the last Western military superiority when the has enjoyed on the battlefield and in century. Societies, cultures, militaries, enemy stands and fights, but the non- campaigns. JFQ economies, and the structure of Western way of war has been employed international relations changed in ways since the initial victory and with some that could not have been foreseen. The tactical success for America’s adversaries. impact of today’s information advances If these cultural traits manifest A Book Review is similar in scale for the same reason: IT themselves as advantages only on the has become ubiquitous in virtually every battlefield, then a Westerner hopes By JAN M. VAN TOL facet of life. For defense strategists, the that he doesn’t run short of fights and key question is how to think about the adversaries willing to accommodate him. The Diffusion of Military possible military consequences. Finally, there is the question of where Technology and Ideas The diffusion of U.S. military political and cultural qualities actually Edited by Emily O. Goldman technology is a multifaceted problem. make the West more vulnerable. For and Leslie C. Eliason Most of the current debate on the Stanford, California: Stanford University instance, do the standards of individual Press, 2003 ostensible IT-driven revolution in freedom, openness, and transparency 415 pp. $75.00 military affairs (RMA) is focused on what make homeland defense harder? Do [ISBN: 0–8047–4535–8] the United States can or should do to the traditions of civic society and clear transform its forces. The debate, however, separation between combatants and his book comprises historical is taking place without reference to noncombatants hamper the West’s case studies on the diffusion of what other actors will do in response to effectiveness in counterinsurgency T military technologies and ideas, U.S. transformation. Yet it is virtually campaigns? framed by a concise introductory section inevitable that new technologies and The questions remain to be answered. laying out the key issues and how to ideas with military applications will But Hanson’s provocative thesis is more think about them and a cogent final diffuse to other state and nonstate actors. right than wrong and marks a valuable chapter drawing thoughtful hypotheses As the Director of OSD Net Assessment contribution to a hotly debated subject. from the cases. The case studies were notes in his preface, this diffusion “raises Whether one buys his entire premise, prepared for workshops sponsored by issues that U.S. policymakers will have to Hanson’s enduring contribution is to the Office of the Secretary of Defense address in developing a strategy to guide reintroduce the power of culture to the (OSD) addressing the international our actions in the RMA that is currently debate about military effectiveness. consequences should the United States unfolding.” The editors note that: For too long it has been out of fashion to speak of cultural influences and Captain Jan M. van Tol, USN, is the Navy fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was differences—systems of belief, patterns commander, USS Essex, through February 2005.

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our study takes up the question of how contributors to this volume distinguish hardware [since] military innovation others are likely to respond to U.S. between two facets of technologies and and diffusion are shaped by societal, innovations and how this will affect innovations: hardware (the physical cultural, institutional, organizational, America’s position. The answer depends manifestations of the technologies) and bureaucratic, individual, doctrinal, on whether and how others assimilate software (ideas, organization, doctrine, and historical forces.” The case studies and exploit innovations. Anticipating the or social change). Many observers focus illustrate these points. diffusion trajectories likely to accompany wrongly on the more obvious hardware The first set of cases addresses the military innovation and transformation, facet. Merely acquiring the hardware in way “local culture shapes and redirects and developing strategic responses, are core an effort to emulate other militaries is even the most assiduous attempts at aspects of the RMA challenge. rarely sufficient to improve capability. emulation.” These include the highly Indeed, “a key finding of this analysis is successful 18th-century introduction of As various Third World nations have that for military diffusion, the spread of the British regimental system into South found, diffusion of technology and ideas ideas, or software, has throughout time Asia, the less than effective adoption is not merely a matter of purchasing been the crucial dimension that accounts of Soviet doctrine and organizational new technologies, thereby achieving for military effectiveness.” Yet, “software forms by Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, and the instant improved performance. The generally does not travel as well as successes due to cultural affinity between New from NDU Press

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Toward an Equitable and Durable Solution Aaron David Miller, President of Seeds of Peace, argues that there is an equitable and durable solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. But such a solution can only be achieved through the long and imperfect process of negotiation. Sadly, Israelis, Palestinians, and Arabs in general still see the struggle as an existential conflict over physical security and political identity. U.S. diplomacy must recognize that ending the conflict is a generational proposition.

U.S.-Australia Alliance Relations: An Australian View Paul Dibb, professor emeritus at The Australian National University, discusses how Australia will remain a committed U.S. ally for the foreseeable future. Though Canberra and Washington have common views on many issues, Australia faces considerable challenges in its own neighborhood, which have first priority. Maintaining a strong relationship will be contingent upon Washington’s success in convincing the Australian public that U.S. policies are both necessary and legitimate and that Australia’s contributions to mutual security are not taken for granted.

Sustaining U.S.–European Global Security Cooperation Stephen J. Flanagan, director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, explains how sustaining effective transatlantic security cooperation over the next decade will require narrowing remaining European- American differences over threat perceptions, strategy, and military priorities. In fact, Washington will remain reluctant to treat Europe as a full partner until it demonstrates a willingness to enhance lagging defense capabilities.

Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on occasional papers and other publications at: ndupress.ndu.edu.

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the United States and its Anglo allies addresses differences between diffusion entry to acquisition of lethal capabilities; that underpins their sharing of military from “core” (major or technologically as a result, smaller powers and nonstate expertise. advanced) states to the “periphery” and actors may have access to destructive The next cases examine “whether vice versa. capacity formerly the province of only and to what extent it is possible to A third set of cases examines how major powers. On the other end of shape, direct, and manage the diffusion diffusion of ideas and technology the scale, diffusion of IT systems and process.” Tracing cause and effect turns has resulted in large-scale military ideas to growing powers such as China out to be difficult. One case explores transformations. Cases include the could affect military balances globally, how the Soviets consciously tried to Napoleonic and Prussian revolutions, perhaps much more rapidly than has restructure the military organizations which “consisted of military innovations happened historically. It thus is not clear of the Warsaw Pact states by controlling embedded within broader social and that aggressive U.S. exploitation of an the diffusion of technology. Strikingly, economic transformations”; the varying information RMA, reacted to by a host of the Soviet motivation for the type and Allied responses to combined arms actors, will leave the Nation in a better quantity of technology to supply to each armored warfare in World War II; and the position over the long term. Accordingly, ally was driven less by the international differing paths to carrier aviation taken these diffusion issues are among the most security of the alliance than by the by the British, U.S., and Japanese navies, complex and vital that policymakers face need to safeguard and legitimize the as well as those considered by Germany in planning forces and capabilities. communist regimes in those states, and Italy. Editors Goldman and Eliason are something not understood in the The final set of cases addresses professors at the University of California West until well after 1989. Another diffusion in the information age. at Davis and the Monterey Institute of case examines the diffusion of nuclear Information technology is not merely the International Studies, respectively. The weapons. This is a less satisfying case means by which military effectiveness case study contributors come from a wide in that, given that the imperatives may be greatly increased in coming range of military and civilian academic for acquiring nuclear weapons or years; it simultaneously facilitates the institutions. Mixed groups of academics constraining their proliferation are so rapid diffusion of ideas about warfare and military professionals attended the unique, it is difficult to generalize from generally, which may be as important. various OSD workshops for which these such special weapons to technological The easy access to inexpensive advanced cases were prepared. JFQ diffusion more generally. A third case IT may in itself lower the barriers to

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