.- ) INTERNATIOf\ BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AN OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Mro Robert Lo Garner DA TE: August 13, 1948 FROM: Raoul G.M. de Sercey ~ ­ SUBJECT: File

Mr. E. R. Black, Executive Director, UoS.A., requests that this report with attachments' be handed to Mr. Charles Reid Chief,

Southeast Asian Division, State Department, for perusalo When you return the file, please ,.

OFFICE SERVICCS 17 - 10 INTERNATIONAL BANK l • RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVE1...... ,PMENT INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCT , _. AND DEVELOPMENT UTING SLIP Dai•----- Roo• No

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'FOR• Action InitialinR AooroTal Preoarine Reply Co11111ent PreTious Papers Filin2 Notin,r and Returni11 Full Report Recommendation I- Information Siarnature 1--

1,r1c1 IIIWICII llot: INTERNATIONAL BANK FO R RECO NSTRUCT!, AND DEVELOPMENT ROUTI NG SLIP

Date 8-10-48 TO- Name Room No.

I Mr . de Sercey 420 2

3 q. FOR- Action Initialing Approval Preparing Repl y Comment Previous Papers Filin,z: Noti ng a nd Re t urnin1 - Full Repo rt Recommendation -..___/ Information Signature REMARKS

Attached is the original of the report you lent me. I have given Mr . Gould the copy. Many thanks.

L. Rist

orrlC[ SC RYIC[S 13- 12 \ Ji /

I ------July 20th, 1948 Mr. W. A. B. Iliff, Director Loan Department International Bank for Reoomtruotion and Development Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Iliff:

Sketch of the present siillation in t he Netherlands East Indieso

Io General

In reading these notes one should kee:r in mind the following .£a.C~a---whioh ----- appear to have had considerable bearing on the present situation in this region;

a) The instinctive .American sympa.tb.Y towa;rds any movement fof independence.

b) The failure of atter t~ war to secure the leadership and markets of Southeast Asia and her hopes that a fading in Dutch power { will open for her at least . his important market. /

o) The Ja:i:anese anti-white_propagama which has provided Southeast Asia with many of its slogans.

d) The Communist propaganda whioh thriVres on social and political trouble.

e) The large anti-foreign movement now in progress in Southeast Asia as a result of the m world wars which have greatly weakened the political and economic influence of tri hite race in this pa.rt of' the world.

II. Poli ti. oal Situation A. Sources of In.for tion • .. -. __, 1. A map attadhed hereto wUl s ow the areas visited which include not 1- only Dutch controlled te ritories, out ala a call to Jokiakarta. the seat of the 1 Republican Govemme~t.-~ I

2. In addition to ' conversations with Dutch oivil and military officials, I \ as well as with the President and memJers of the Republican cabinet, contacts •re established with Dutch and f ?reign b~siness circles, the .American delegation to the Good Offices Co ·ssion, militazy observers of the Consular Commission, members ~f the foreign di.plomati.o mi~sions, etc.

B. The Dutch s tantlpoin~.

1. Contacts with ~Dutch people either in Holland or in the Dutch East

Ind\es, reveal e oo no-:!L derab~e andety concerning the situation in Indonesia 0 To this feeling mwt be &dde inte:r:se strain and bitterness where the Dutch popula­ tion of Indon!Hia i s ounoente._d. f - 2 - 2. The Dutch fa.el they have their backs to the wall. Their country cannot maintain its independence and present standard of living without the . Most of the Dutch now operating here have gone through four years of internment followed by a wave of terrasm. Their li.ves are constantly at stake, their properties destroyed, their actions criticized abroad.

3. They have built up this country. They have constantly adapted its economy to suit the requirements of the world. When they first came to the East / Indies it was merely to trade in spices. Now the agricultural production at in­ dustrial level; rubber, quinine, tea, etc., even rice, is derived from specie im­ ported by them from foreign lands.

4. They have either singly, or with the help of foreign capital, dev­ eloped the minera]/4-esources of the islands; oil, tin, coal, etc.

s. They have equipped the country with roads, railways, harbors, p~ver stations, etc.

6. Yet they are criticized by most foreign nations and placed at U .N. level on the same basis as Indonesians whom they feel wil1[not be able to make proper use of the equipment they have built up.

7. They consider that bad the present movement not been fanned through foreign interference their 300 years of exper~eme in the Indies would have al­ lowed them to handle the Indonesian question without too much dif'.f'lculty.

c. The Republican viewpoint.

1. The Indonesians stand in an easy position. Ideal igtic and socialis­ tic theories so much in vogue in the world these days are their best allies.

2o They claim that the country, .. is theirs and they should be allowed to run it the way they wish to.

3. They claim that they have been exploited by the Dutoh and that they now want to run the country for the benefit of their people.

D. Short history of' the Indonesian question.

1. A brief review of the events in the Dutch East Indies since the end of World War II may help in explaining the existing situation.

2. v-J Day found the Dutch population of the archdpelago dispa~sed in civilian and military prison camps. The East Indies camps have been among the worst in tm Far East. Many Dutch have also gone through the horrors of the Siam• Burma railway.

3. The British army was entrusted with the disarmament of the Ja~nese in the Dutch East Indies and sent for the purpose two divisions; one of Indian and one of Gurka troops.

4. These troops maintained a strictly neutral attitude at the origin of the conflict which now opposes the Dutch and the Indonesians. They considered that their duty was to protect the lives of' the former and they kept them grouped within restricted areas. They left the rest of' the country to the Republicans, using Japanese troops to maintain order where and when necessary. - 3 - 5. The Dutch feel that had they been al lowed to bring their army over immediately, they could have stopped the rebellion which under these circumstances was given time to grow roots in the country and to assume the proportion of a na­ tionalist movement.

6. It is only one year later after tre de~rture of the British army that the Dutch were able to tackle the then much more extended Republican problem.

7. They attempted at first to settle the question through negotiations with the Republican leaders but the latter supported by their ?fohammedan corre­ ligionaries in the countr,.,surrounding the archipelago, as well as from other quarters, remained adamant. a. The countries which have recognized the Republican government are;

a) de jure: the meni>ers of the Arab league and Afghanistan. b) de facto: India and Australia. c) the case of the recognition by Soviet Russia is not clear yet. d) The u.s.A. and U.K. have recognized the Republic within the frame of the Linggajati agreement. As the latter he.s not beem implemented. this recognition is not yet now.ally effective.

9. Things worsened until the Dutch felt they could only restore not only order, but also the economic life of the country by what is known as "the police action." 10. The remaining sequence of events is better known and consists in the bringing up of the Indonesian case to the U.N. as if it were an international con­ flict instead of a Netherlands F..ast Indies domestic problem. This was followed by the appointment of a Consular Co:rmnission helped by military ~bservers and later by the sending of a Cormnis sion of Good Offices to bring about '5M truce and to act as an arbitrator between the two parties.

11. The police action was halted under foreign pressure when it was on the point of achieving 1 ts aim. The Dutch were only 60 kilometers from the Re­ publican capital. UN intervention brought the Indonesian situation back to where it stood before and turned it into an international problem.

12. Notonly have the negotiations carried through the Good Offices Com­ mission made no progress whatever, but they have now reached a complete deadlock.

13. Accusations of bad faith are hurled at each other by both sides, / whilst among the mediators and spectators, few can be considered neutral. Par­ tiality derived from national or private interests, sympathies built up on ide• lo• gies are everywhere in evidence.

14. Whilst the negotiations at international level are dragging out, the Dutch are proceeding through direct dealings with the natives in an attempt to or­ ganize the country according to their conception of the future federation of Indo­ nesia. A map showing the present political division of the Island is attached hereto. - 4 - 15. With their remarkable patience they have gone from conference to conference with Indonesian so-called leaders until they succeeded lately in creating an increased number of States. By doing so, they are more or less isolating the Republic and reducing its original territory which i:noluded the Islands of , and Madura to the area limited by the demarkation lines established by the truce commission.

16. Their most recent attempt was still in progress when this report was written and is known as the "Bandoeng Conference" at which gathered all the Indonesian non-Republican leaders and a few Dutch experts. The conference is supposedly to establish the basis of the future Indonesian-Dutch cooperation in the administration of the country.

Eo SUlll!Jllry of Foreign Opinions.

1. The General concensus of opinion seens to be that the Dutch are a hard-driving people. They got out of the oountry and its population as much as they could. The development of' the Netherlands East Indies has been conducted on a purelyl.tilitarian basis.

2. In the past the Dutch have been reluctant at letting other foreign- ers share in the development of the Islands.- Only a few .American, British, or Bel- / gian concerns have been allowed to operate in the Ea.st Indies. In short the futoh are charged with a monopolistic exploitation of the archipelago.

3. Nevertheless the management of the .American concerns contacted in Swm.tra and Java; the Goodyear Rubber Plantation at Medan and their tire factory at Buitenzorg, the Standard Vacuum refinery of Palembang and the General Uiotors assembly plant in Batavia, expressed their wish to see the Dutch regain control over the Indies. They consider that they are certain to get under their leader­ ship law, order and proper administration.

4. In this connection, it is consi:lered suitable to mention that the only point on which everybody agrees (except the Republicans) is the high standard of honesty of the Dutch administration compared with the corruption existing in the neighboring countries of the Far East.

5. The only decidedly anti-Dutch body amongst the foreigners contacted is the American delegation to the Good Offices Commission. The nRtter is even more surprising if one remembers that the U.S.A. had been selected by both parties as an arbitrator in this conflict.

6. The opinion of the delegation as expressed by Mr. Charlton Ogburn with the support of his entire staff is that all the Indonesians hate the Dutch and that the best thing for the latter to do is therefore to hand the country over to the Republicans.

7. The members of the delegation claim that even should a new police action take place and be successful, the Dutch authorities will be unable t9tt1ain­ tain law and order in view of the wave of terrorism that will follow such a move.

8. They do not admit any discussion nor objection regarding this opin­ ion. The Dutch can do nothing right. - 5 - 9. The main argument of the delegation is that after three years of hostilities against the Dutch and in spite of the blockade~ the Republican gov­ ernment still maintains law and order in the territory under its control which contains two-fifths of the population of Indonesia. They consider this alone is a sufficient proof of their ability to lead the cotmtry. 10. Despite the fact that all other sources of information deny to the Republicans the technical ability to rule the country, they judge(; them ri['e'... to rundertake this task. 11. They do not seem to doubt that the Republicans could take charge overnight of a territory so vital to the welf~ of the world, although the economy of their zone is now reduced to mere farming ~ family level. Their opihion is that this is the result of the Dutch blockade and not the consequence of their in­ capacity. 12. Their last move known as "the Australian-American compromise propo­ sal" (see copy attached) Article One of which suggests the holdirJg of immediate election brought about the collapse of the negotiations. The Dutch considered that under the present circumstances such elections would not represent a free expression of the people and withdrew from the conference.

13. It appears that the partiality of the American delegation to the G.o.c. has greatly strengthened the Republicans' position and is prolonging the conflict •

._// F. Visit to Jokiaka.rta.

1. The impression gathered from meeting the members of the cabinet led by Dr. Hatta was poor.

2. This government appears to be composed of disgruntled former members of the Dutch administration and Dutch business firms. The only member who possesses more than a local education is Dr. Hatta who studied economics in Rotterdam.

3. An example of the intellectual value of the Jokia leaders is attached hereto in the form of the "Basic principles for the reconstruction of Indonesian Economy." 4. The Minister of Economic Affairs on being requested to supply the figures of the Republican area's production stated that this would ee useless since the documents are in Indonesian. The Governor of the State bank, in answer to a similar question, said that he could not supply his institution's balance sheet as it had not been printed. Finally~ the only document that was obtained from the Republican administration has been an obsolete, and therefore useless, budget estimate. 5. President Soekarno, in the course of his interview, confined himself to vague quotations from his sp~eohes delivered during a recent trip to Sumatra.

6. Incidentally, observers who were present at the reception of Presi• dent Soekarno in that part of the Republican territory, reported that it appeared that most of the antiusiasm displayed by the crowd lacked spontaneity. - 6 - c. The Communist Inf'lu.ence. 1. Al though the members of the Jokia oabinet burst into laughter when the word "Communism" was mentioned, there can be no doubt that a Communist party exists, has j_ts head office in Jokia and is, if not directing, at least strongly influencing the 'Republican Government policy.

2. It seems obvious, however, that great care is ta.ken at present to avoid soaring the foreign powers favorable to the Republican cause. Documents of undeniable Communist origin and of unquestionable authenticity bearing stamps showing the hammer and sickle and seized by the Dutch intelligence on prisoners lu!,ve been examined.

3. A:n independent observer stated th.at thoug,n Communistic activities in Indonesia are certain they consist at present in the organization of the usual net of cells. The Indonesian population is extremely primitive and as such oquld easily be aroused by a mere anti-white propaganda. A real Communist movement may use such slogans but needs a complete organization to achieve the aims required by the Comniform. This is what is now being developed.

4. It is reporlBd that Communist orders and propaganda are reaching the Republican tenitories through the following channels; San Franoisoo via Sydney on the one hand, North China via Bangkok and Singapore on the other. The Chinese are the usual link between the Communists abroad and their organizations in Indonesia.

5. Three reports oonoerning Communist activities in Indonesia are at­ tached hereto. It is regretted that their style should make their reading almost impossible. They contain a number of facts, however, and have been obtained from a reliable source.

6. The American members of the G.o.c. deny any importance to the Com­ munist movement in Indonesia. They appear convinced that it has been overplayed by the Dutch for propaganda reasons.

III. The Military Situation

A. The Dutch Army.

1. The strength of' the Dutch army is difficult to ascertain, but may be estimated at 125/150,000 men including the services. They have also a very limited number of native soldiers.

2. Their equipment obtained mostly from British sources is in ppor condition. Replacements and spare parts are now unobta~nable.

3. The air force comprises about two groups.--One of bombers - B-25, and one of fighters. To these must be added service planes such as transports. etc.

4. These troops are scattered all over the archipelago and keep watch behind the demarkation line.

I I I I ~ - I - 1 - 5. From charts examined it seems that the losses incur red during the police action have been very limited. A period of almost complete calm followed but in.f'iltration of terrorist bands from Republican territory seem to be on the increase and incidents involving exchange of fire are now getting more frequent.

6. It'is the opinion of the foreign military observers and particularly of their head, Colonel William Mayer of the United Jta.tes Army, that the frequency of the incidents may reach such a rhythm that they will degenerate into open war­ fare. Colonel Mayer does not seem to doubt that in such case the Dutch will easily reach Jokia but fears a general outbreak of murder, arson and sabotage throughout Indonesia. He does not know whether in such an eventuality the Dutch forces would be strong enough to deal Yi.th the situation.

B. The Republican Army.

1. The Republican army obtained its weapons .from the Japanese. Its equipment is extremely poor. It has no transport whatsoever. The air force is practically inexistent.

2. It counted until lately 400,000 men but only 251 000 rifles. The government decided recently to bring it down to 40,000 men. This step was played up as a measure of good will and the Republicans suggested that the Dutch do the same as a nark of good faith.

3. The Tendara National Indonesia (Indonesian National Army) generally referred here as the TNI, was originally organized and trained by the Japanese. It is now one of the stumbling blocks of the Dutch-Republican negotiations.

4. Whilst the Dutch show willingness to incorporate at least part of its elements in the future Federal army, the RepublicaDB insist that it should form the nucleus of this body. s. In the meantime, the Repubjiican Anny takes advantage of the timidity and passivity of the population to live on the country.

6. It is doubtful whether the Republican gover:cment has real control over the Army whose commanding officer, General Soedir.man, seelll3 to enjoy a large degree of independence and whose rank and file appear deeply permeated by Communist tendencies.

IV. The Economic Situation

1. Herewith attached is a very complete report on the present economic and .f'inancial con:iitions in Indonesia which had been prepared as the basis for the loan application from the Export-Import Bank. Checks effected at this end oncer­ tain of the .f'igures contained therein indicate that this survey gives a reliable picture of the present situation.

2. The following paragraphs are therefore mere commentaries resulting from observations ma. de on the spot. - 8 - 3. The situation Wl.ich faced the Dutch authorities after the police ac­ tion when it became possible for the management of the various industries and es­ tates to reach their bases of operation appeared desperate.

4. Factories and plantations spared by the war had been destroyed by the Republicans in the course of their retreat. Nobody seems to have j!>ointed out to the Jokia government that if a scorched earth policy may be justified when it consists in laying bare vast expAnS es of land behind which an army can re form when it is ap­ plied on islands 300 kilometers wide, it amounts to nothing but wanton destruction and terror ism.

5. With insufficient foreign capital to obtain replactiments abroad, and with labor conditions disrupted by the political si~ation, the Dutch nevertheless undertook with remarkable ingenuity and energy to salvage whatever they could.

6. Their efforts have been directed at producing as fast, as much, and as soon as possible, so as to resum their place on the world markets and earn the for­ eign exchange required by the rehabilitation of the industry.

7. Factories that had been spared from destruction because they had been abandoned for more modern ones have been recormnissioned. Buildings and equipment burned to the ground are being rebuilt from salvaged materialso Steel beams and frames twisted by the fire are straightened out with the help of hand forges and local blacksmi;ths, and re-erected. Plantations abandoned f'or years are cleaned and set into production again.

8. The task accomplished until now is pathetic and touching. Its results are remarkable. Tables showing increases in output

a) on the East Coast of Sumatra b) in West Java o) in the Palembang area are attached hereto for perusal.

9. The two major problems facing the N.E.I. Economic Affairs Department are equipment and labor. They can only be solved with the help of u.s. dollars.

10. The labor force composed mos ~i.Y of Javanese since they form 58% of the total population of the archipelago i;:f ~ ganized by years of war and terrorism, has to be regrouped and rebuilt.

11. To persuade the Javanese to work the Dutch authotities md to adopt an inducement policy consisting at providing than at reasonable prices with their staple food; rice, and with other consumer goods of which these people m.ve been completely deprived since the war, partioularly textiles. Charts showing the re­ sults of this policy are attached hereto.

12. The inducement policy, as well as the urgent requirements of the in­ dustries, have depleted the gold and foreign currency reserves of the Dutch East Indies, whilst their production, and therefore, U.S. dollar earning c~pacity has under the present conditions reached their peak. - 9 - 13. Not only will it be difficult to develop production with factories built up from scrap metal, but l~_.i.s to be feared that the latter will not be able to stand their present pace and7r'equent breakdowns will soon occur.

14. Consequently, the N.E.I. government is seeking U.S. dollars and ex­ pects to obtain them at first from two sources

a) the Marshall plan; U.S.$128,000,000 •• b) the Export-Import Bank; US$100,000,000.

15. Political consi2ir ~~ions intervene4in the course of the negotiations concerning the~ badly needed eJ;:!iNe~~ The matter now stands as follows:

a) Marshall Plan; whether the total amount mentioned above will be made available to the Dutch East Indies in unknown. However, according to the latest news, US$35 1 000,000 will be provided for the period July/December 1948 through the Netherlands Indies Bank at Paramaribo, West Indies. This bank was formed during, the war when b"'otlt Holland and the East Indies were occupied. The Dutch East Indies have been allowed to use these funds in part settlement of their purchases of textiles from Japan. It must be noted, however, that contrary to what happens elsewhere, the sums made available to the Dutch East In­ dies under the Marshall Plan are not in the form of a grant, but in the form of a loan. The conditions of' the loan were still unknown in Batavia.

b) lCDlport-Import Bank - After protracted negotiations up to $100,000,000 may be made available as per conditions given in the translation of a cable received in Batavia and attached hereto.

16. The political consequences of' these loans should not be underrated. They may have a decisive effect on the Indonesian situation.

V. Conclusion

1. The Netherlands East Indies .are potentially one of the wealthiest territories in the world. The Dutch have been and are still doing there an enor­ mous amount of work. They are the constructive element in that country.

2. Capital wanting to seek profitable inves1ment in Indonesia by shar­ ing in the rehabilitation and development of the country will want under one form or another the guarantee of a stable government. Nobody but the Dutch can have at present th(~ stablising influence.

3. It does not seem that the native population has reached yet a degree of maturity that wi.11 allow them to talce over the administration of the country.

4. The interest of the world which obtains from th~s archdpelago such an important share of the materials it requires should try its utmost to keep the Dutch there pending the time whe~der a new regime and a new consti"bltion the Indonesians will be able to take over gradually the leadership of the country. - 10 - VI. Notes

1. Foreign Exchange a:greements between the oil companies and the N.E.I. government.

a) The Standard Vacuum Oil Company and the B.P.M. have reached an agreement with the N.E.I. government whereby they are al­ lowed full use of the foreign e xohange derived from the ex­ port of their production.

b) Against this privilege the oil companies have undertaken to pro­ vide the foreign oapital required for the rehabilitation of their equipment.

c) Under this agreement the sums al ready expended and remairu.ng to be spent for the complete rehabilitation of the Palembang refineries alone are as follows;

Already e:2ended Total project

Standard Oil US$ 40 11 00011 000 US$ 6411 00911 000 B.P.M. 20.000_000 , so_ooo 000 11 r 2. Purchase of textiles in Japan by the N.E.I.

a) The pre-war total yearly requirements- ef textiles by the N.E.I. amounted to about aoo_ooo,ooo yards of which only about 1 11 300,000 yards were manufactured in Java. b) Since the war the N.E.I. have resumed their purbhases of tex­ tiles in Japan under an agreement which provides that part of it is settled by barter (mostly sugar) and the rest in u. s. dollars.

c) The N.E.I. purchase program for 1948 is $37 11 000,000 of which us$12 11 000,ooo is to be settled by barter and US$2511 000 11 000 paid in cash.

d) In view or the fact that the NoE.I. are allowed to use the funds derived from the Marshall plan f'or the purchase of textiles and that the paym3nt facilities granted by 8CAP to the Dutch Fast Indies am:>unt to approxinately one-year

credit11 the N.E.I. authorities will be able to adopt a more aggressive inducement policy which should have an important bearing on the future production of' this country.

3. N.E.I. balance of trade.

The excess of exports over imports for the first h~~ since the war were:

In April 3 million guilders In May 10 " " - 11 - 4. Summary of an interview with Dr. Hubertus Van Mook

a) Dr. Van Mook pointed out the nefarious ef.:f'ects of gestures such as the Australian-American proposal on the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations.

b) He stated that he had succeeded several times in ooming to agree• ments with Republican delegates. As such understandings were the results of concessions on his part, the settlements were refused by the extremists of Jokia who, on the one hand, do not want to lose the position they now hold, and on the other, hope to increase t~ir popularity by always asking for furth.,er concessions.

o) Proposal such as the one mentioned above means only an entice­ ment for the Republicans to carry this policy om step further.

d) Consequently, Dr. Van Mook has prepared a set of final proposals for the organization of the Federation of Indonesia which will be made public as woon as he has received their approval from the new Dutch cabinet.

e) Besides being offered to the leaders of the Dutch controlled territory, these proposals will also be ooI!Dllunicated to the Republicans. If the latter should refuse th3m, Dr. Van Mook intends to proceed with the organization of the Federation, leaving out the territory under Republican control.

5. Summary of an interview with General Spoor, Commanding the Dutch Jrmy in Indonesia.

a) General Spoor first explained his plans for the organization of the future Federal army which will include a majority of native soldiers. He considers that the period required for this~ rganization and for the training of the troops will l'EHf'UFG from ten to fif'teen years.

b) The General then stated that for the time being, ho1,vever strong a pressure might be brought to bear, and from whichever quar­ ter the Dutch army will not at present quit Indonesia.

o) Finally. he pointed out the importance of Indonesia as a supply and operational base in a future conflict tbl.t would inevi• tably involve, as in the last one, Southeast Aaia.

d) He did not doubt that the Army would take the lead in such a oase and strongly suggested that preparations be started w.ii.thout delay and include joint st,a:t'f cooperation comprising; representatives of the u.s., British, French and Dutch forces as already takes place in London and Brussels.

I ...

- 12 - VII. ~

1/ o - .. 1. List of ::·:~::~:::::·:~ Ne:::/ / ~-10 2.

3. Australian-American Compromise Proposal • ..J \ '?O J I i5o 4. Basic Principles for the Reoonstruotion of Indonesian Eeonomy. , t~I - 5. Reports on communist activities in Indonesia (10~ t~ 4~u~ )/ ~;);.D - 6. Some Particulars concerning the Estates on the East?Coast of / Suim.tra, M. E.Io /

~;l_D- 7. Production figures of West Java. V

(o~ -- a. Political and Economic Development in Palembang during the month May# 1948.

< 9o Some graphs of' production# Export and Prices. /J-vf{,:c 1~::l / 4-~'l. -- 10. Cable regarding the Export-Import Bank loan to the N.E.I. / 11. The Indonesian Problem: Faot and Factors 1£ l _ 12. The and Additional Clauses. I ~o - 13. Production possibilities of the Estat~within the demarcation lines in Java and Sumatra. v

1 S-0 - 14. The State's Participation in the Economic Reconstruction of Indonesia in 1947. / /

:i4-:)_ 15. Public Utilities: Electric Power and Distribution.

~ ~ t 16. Map of the Tin Placers in Bangka v;'

,,,)j1,; - 17. Set of pictures showing types of industries visited. / /

31 '3 18. Samples of notes issued by Republican Military ColllIIRnders in Sunatra.V 1 (0:1. ,..,_ 1· ~ '-•~'\M,.l·C.,. ~ r-.·~~C4·~ ~,.;. t~ol,~-•8' (1t> ~ ~ ~IU.t..'\U.a..

Yours sincerely# lszr1 R. DE SERCEY