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S-0681-0018-0001-00001 UC.Tif PLEASE RET.Al UN ARCHIVES ORIGINAL O ER SERIES s-u~ ~( cJ Qcv-l BOX i~ ,(rz /1 s FILE ACC. nAC- r~{~·O·b • DELEGASI REPUBLIEK INDONESIA Kaliurcrne;, 21 Ap:riJ 1948. No. : .... ~./.1.. ..... Ref. Encl.: ......................... ..... .......... S:ir , I herewith have the honour to i vite your attention t J to the followine;. On 24 February last, I had the honour to receive from tr e Com111:ttteP of Good Offices a era.ft parn_._>J- lPt , the cot tents of , hich aimed at incr-easine publicity concer-nine the Truce Agreement and tne other ae;reenel"ts concluded on bo&.rd the USS 11 RerviJ.Je 11 , by r ean s of 11-,j ch tbe ec:Y'-iine; a11 d rrnrport of U oc.e ae:ree1.,erts could be .:'ully irrpressed upon the rmbl ic. Seve 0 al days after rece · rJt I :r'P.turned t'w cl.ra"t, hich - :in thP, r" in - I ree: rd to hP P-xceed irely car)abJ e of servine: its in.tended purpose, to your Coruni ttee , to­ eet:her it' a nmr1,er of s11e;t:;Pf'ted ar11endrent::: for· the draft. Inas mch as I consider tl-·e public:at · on at an early n.e te of the pampblet very usefnl for tbe eeneral 1=1ty 1 os1Jhe:re, I would apprec:Late it very nu.ch if :rou co111<1 a,...,,e •ee the early publication of tl1 e pamrihlet. You~ obedient servPrt , ,01~-· ·~ i'oh . er airr1an -::lelega tio:n of the Republic of Indore~ia The Cha irrnan of the Security Councjl' s co~r;ttee of Good Offices on the Indonesian ':;uestj_on. ({ . r 0 A MESSAGE TO THE PF.OPLE OF INDONESIA FROM THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS On January 17th, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia signed an agreement in the US Naval transport Renville, a ship which had been sent to Java by the United Nations to provide a meeting place for representatives of the two governments. There are two parts to this agreement. The first part is a truce agreement. The second part is an polite... agreement on a basis for al\sattlement.,.Q,f ;poHiiioB:• d4file,.: efteas 'betweeB the J+e~tGl:tands !!ffltl ~e BepuhJ ic o~m. What does this agreement mean? It means, in the first place, that there is to be peace 1n Indonesia. When the agreement was signed, the Commanding General or the Netherlands roroea and the Commanding General of the Republican fore es ordered their troops to stop fighting immedia.teq. In order to make sure that there wo1..1ld be no more fighting be:ta,eoa tea :twe Ml!B!i:ee, the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia agreed that Java and Sumatra would for the time being be divided into areas under direct control of the Netherlands and areas under direct control or the Republic, and that neither army would be allowed to cross the dividing line into an area under the control of the other side. They also L1tLtt¼AMi agreed that the lines drawn in Java and Sumatra by theAGovernor-General on August 29th last year to show the extent of the areas over which the Nether­ lands claimed control would be accepted as the dividing lines. The troops on both sides of this line have bean ordered to stop all hostilities. They have also been ordered not to advance beyond their present forward positions except to carry out the duties of police, to keep order and to protect lives and property. The areas on both sides of the dividing lines bat1,reen the forward positions of the Netherlands forces and the forward positions or the Republican forces have been made into demilitarized zones. This means that -2- inside these zones there will be no military activity. For the time being, police iuties inside the demilitarized zones will be carried out by soldiers with special markings, but these soldiers will be under. the control of civil off'ioia.ls and will have on]¥ small weapons. h.A.vt.. b~ Arrangements &Pi l1ei ,cg ,nade to enable all soldiers of the Tentara (.11'(...r-t Nasional Indonesia who _.. in territory under the control of the Netherlands to cross the demilitarized zones to Republican controlled territory, taking . Th.,t;..ti with them all their arms and military equipment. ;iik:u'.l lhousand; ~ ~ .. tel.¼.t.s h.wt b~ Republican saldi.fl.H.-1~~!911:ml~~ 'fo:ilr'l~!tre!b-W.,c,:t~u~-aa11e-'eft..Ci,j1'9!1r~~ demilitarized zones, taking their flags and their weapons. Som- uai;te ft9."'l'e a.a,aadf eem,te:t;ed tee mcnmtent and~va, .ra;jn;i11N the BepubJ 1a The Netherlands and the ReJ111blio of Indonesia have agreed not on].Jr to stop all fighting but also to prohibit all other war-like actions, including the destruction of property and threats and reprisals against people. In the second part of the agreement signed on Januar,r 17th, the Nether­ lands and the Republic of Indonesia together have announced certain decisions which will be of the utmost importance for the future of Indonesia. They ,f e.r Tti.A.. p.r~ ~~vtr -~"'-' agree that .S.~•➔~1!1'8!!--..-.ICll,m:ll!i911•.,- the Netherlands i"S la ln1wjj) re i11 • ii -,1.A..~ i...ls o o..1ru over all Indonesia.lat that upon a certain date~ which is to be announced, Indonesia will become an independent federated country as an equal partner in a Union with the Netherlands. The Republic will be one of the states which will make up the United States of Indonesia. In the meantime, the Netherlands and the Republic or Indonesia will continue discussions with the assistance -.3- sides hope that these discussions will soon produce a further and final ~ ,,_,,, ~-tJt"' ~l)q"" "1~+-.sn-t,~. ;1v. rJt~ . 1(\. d-i O-N-.! nu R~b/1·1.- NL,(. agreement,\ ~ ec:nlier tlu1n six mootha at~er th±s ag:taeme no:-n....►.. -t-,,~,,. a...lrtu. i; r , 1 .:than a ysa:P a:ftex thfi!ag!"-eeme:t, t;. plebescites will be held which will show whether the peoples of the different territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra wish their territory to be part of the Republic of Indonesia or to be pa.rt ~ wtlM.:.. l1cA. U'k~'f-l4 ~.f-t6f ~ lvt.dNJi~ , of,.... other state,._ Ever,r man will have a chance to express his desire, by casting a vote. Voting in the plebescite w1ll be secret. Ever,rone will be tree to vote exa.ct:q as he wishes, without the knowledge of anyone else. s~ -v., f {I /Jt tJ ~ orfl1A rz.r-, ~'I( S-> d prt, ~ p/{ I • ,.,,_,.; , t.ht.lcl «-.... I ~ Before the plebescite is held, you will receive full information about ~ ~ the question to be decided from leaders of both sides--that: is, those who will appeal to you to vote for your territor,y to join the Republic and those who will appeal to you to vote for your territory to be in another state. They will be free to address you, to distribute pamphlets among you, and to set forth their arguments in the newspapers and over the radio. You will . ~e-. ~ have ample opportunity t o hear · and make up your mind before you vote in the plebescite. Sometime after the results of the plebesoite are known, a convention will be chosen democr~fticallg to draw up a constitution for the United States of' Indonesia. ill parts of Indonesia will be represented in this convention. The number of representa.tives that eaoh state w1ll send will depend upon its population. The states with the largest populations will have the most representatives. Because the peoples of' Indonesia will have the opportunity to express their wishes through the plebescite and through the constitutional convention, it is tbe,r who will deoide how the,r wish to be governed in the future, when the United States or Indonesia becomes an independent country. -·J .. -4- That is the meaning of the truce signed on January 17th. Therefore, there is no longer ruJ¥ reason for hostilities between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia .. From now on there will be cooperation between them. They agree that Indonesia will become an indepen­ dent c01.D1try in a union with the Netherlands and that the peoples of Indonesia will be governed according to their own desires. The Netherlands and the Republic have decided that their disagreements can be settled by discussion because both Governments are working for the same thing--a. prosperous, united, self-governing Indonesia in which the Republic will have its rightful part. Therefore, all people must now work together for the same things-peace~ 7"1-,.J. d .t$ it-rv.c.h ~ the reconstruction or Indonesia after the yea.rs of war. K.uy: bn'lding tlaet hu d •; , ~ ~ , · 1 .- , • ,is M,,,d, N-'d roo. dJ., d that is g~ will mean fewer of the necessities or life for the peoples of this country, less food, .fewer clothes, greater hardships. Every disorder, every act of violence will postpone the time when the soldiers of both the Netherlands and the Republic can return to their peaceful occupations and to their families and will delay the day when the United States or Indonesia will take its place among the free nations or the world. If' you wish the people of your oountr,y to enjo/ peace and security, to have sufficient food, shelter, clothing;1 and other desirable things of life, and in the future to be represented in a free government of their own choosing, you must do everything in your power to see that the truce between the Nether­ lands and the Republic of Indonesia is carried out without violations and that there is friendship among all peoples throughout Indonesia.
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