North Korean Leadership: Kim Jong Il's Balancing Act in the Ruling Circle
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Third WorldQuarterly, Vol21, No 5, pp 761 – 779, 2000 NorthKorean leadership: Kim Jong Il’s balancingact in the ruling circle JEI GUK JEON ABSTRACT Theunexpected durability of North Korea,the world’s last unre- formedStalinist polity, is attributable to Kim JongIl’ s prudentbalancing act betweenpolitical forces. His balancingact, which is embodiedin inclusive politics, honour – powersharing arrangements, and divide-and-rule tactics, has turnedout to beeffective in clearing awaypotential cleavagesbuilt into the ruling circle andthus in concludingthe prolongedsuccession plan.As longas the balancingact continuesto work,the dynasty,albeit defective, couldsurvive in adversity for alongerperiod than expected. However, once the delicate balancearti cially designedby Kim JongIl is brokendown for anyreason, Pyongyang’s powercircle will slip into acentrifugal spiral, followed by internecine powerstruggles andthe collapse of the regime. Thedeath of a totalitarian leader,as witnessed in Stalin’s Soviet Unionand Mao’s China,has oftentouched off a nakedpower struggle, followed by bloody purgesand a massive reshufe ofstate apparatus.North Korea’ s ‘Great Leader’, Kim Il Sung,was, indeed, a totalitarian ruler noless absolutist thanany other socialist leader.At the time ofKim Il Sung’s deathin July 1994,theref ore, outside observers,with fewexceptions, presupposed that Pyongyangwould soon slip into factionalisation andpower struggles. Surprisingly,the demise ofthe ‘Great Leader’in Stalinist NorthKorea has notyet broughtabout any signi cant change.In appearances, Pyongyang’ s powerelite remainedcalm andstable, withoutrevealing any particular signs off actional inghting— as if their political passions hadbeen totally emasculated. Hereinlies the mystery ofcontemporary NorthKorean politics. ArePyongyang’ s powerelites really like robotswho lack political ambitions andgive blind support and unconditional loyalty to their leader? Orhave factional cleavages beennonexistent from the outset? If not,why did the ruling elite appearquiet andcohesive in spite ofthe suddendisappearance of its centre ofgravity (Kim Il Sung)and the ensuingvacuum of the leadership post? Akeyto the puzzlelies in Kim JongIl’ s adroit ‘balancingact’ among political forces duringthe precarious‘ transition’period (199 4 – 97)involving power succession. Thepurpose of this study,therefore, is to exploreKim JongIl’ s strategic actions towardsthe rulingcircle in responseto the internal rumblings that formedan undercurrent after the deathof Kim Il Sung. Jei Guk Jeoncan be contactedat MokryonWorsung Apt 309-2001, Hogedong 1052-3, Dongangu, Anyang City, KyonggiProvince 431-080, South Korea. E-mail: [email protected]. ISSN0143-6597 print; 1360-2241 online/ 00/050761-19 Ó 2000 ThirdWorld Quarterly 761 JEI GUK JEON Initial conditions: multiple cleavages Thecritical challengeto the ‘edgling’new leadership in ahighlycentralised totalitarian polity,as in NorthKorea, is morelikely to come‘ fromwithin’ than fromoutside the rulingcircle. Lookinginto the thenpolitical landscape,some necessary conditionsf orpower struggles wereripening behind the scenes. After the deathof the absolutist ruler Kim Il Sung,for example, the topleadership titles wereleft vacantfor a prolongedperiod. Quite apart fromthe state presidency,the rulingWorkers’ Party ( KWP)hadremained leaderless formore thanthree years.Such abnormal phenomena might havecast afalse signal to the powerelite that the ‘leadership vacuum’should be lled byeither Kim JongIl oran alternative gure.A potential powercontender, if any,might havebeen tempted to substitute forKim JongIl. Factional cleavages,too, were not totally nonexistent,but were probably goingon, coupled with the thenpolitical uncertainties. Most ofall, Kim’s family itselfcouldhave been one of the most probablesources ofpower struggles. Fromits earliest days,the regime hadpractised nepotism,placing Kim’ s relatives andclose associates in keypositions in the rulingtroika— the party,the state andthe army,as part ofthe father-to-sondynastic succession plan.Kim JongIl’ s political base was thus exclusively foundedon a handfulof trusted cronies,relatives andclose associates. Onthe surface the Kim clan appearedcohesive after the deathof Kim Il Sung. However,nepotism couldbe the seedbedof internecine powerstruggles as well as the sourceof political support.Upon closer inspection the clan appearedfar frommonolithic. Allegedly it was dividedinto afewfactions whichhad long beenvying for in uence over Kim IlSungand for power after his death.Among the prominentfactions, the rst was Kim JongII’ s ownline, comprisingthe childrenand relatives ofhis motherKim JongSuk; the secondwas his step-mother Kim SongAe’ s clique,centring on his half-brotherKim PyongIl; the third was his father Kim Il Sung’s relatives in his grandparents’line, includinghis uncleKim YoungJu; andthe fourthwas his father’s comrades-in- arms whohad fought in the anti-Japanese struggles with Kim Il Sung. 1 Now, with the patriarch gone,the clan itselfmight turninto abattleeld amongthe immediate family members. Noless signicant was afactional division within the military. Reportedly there werethree military factions: the older-generationhardliners whohad long servedKim Il Sung;the younger-generationof cers, mainly composedof Kim JongIl supporters; andthe neutral faction indifferent to the old – youngcon icts. 2 Amongthese, the older-generationrevolutionaries didnot respect Kim JongIl in the same waythey had respected Kim Il Sung.Nor would the military behappy with Kim JongIl’ s leadership succession, onthe groundsthat hehadno military experience. 3 Meanwhile,some signs ofmilitary rumblingswere occasionally reported.4 Awidercleavage that haddeveloped in the rulingcircle was the intergenera- tional split, whichhad been underway along the twodi fferent leadership lines of Kim Il Sungand Kim JongIl. As part ofthe father-to-sonsuccession plan,the twoKims madeevery effort to buildthe juniorKim’ s powerbase in the ruling 762 KIMJONG IL’S BALANCING ACT INTHE RULING CIRCLE troika.In the meantime, NorthKorea’ s powerstructure becamea kindof duopoly,with twosemi-independent hierarchies ofauthority and two sel f-sus- taining chains ofcommand— one leading to Kim Il Sungand another leading to Kim JongIl, with little interaction betweenthe two. 5 Theold Kim’ s power structure was foundedon the older-generationrevolutionaries, whereas the youngKim’ s commandline was built aroundthe youngerelites whowere largely fromthe Three-RevolutionMovement squads, the classmates ofManky- ongdaeRevolutionary Academy, and the graduatesof Namsan School and Kimilsung University. Duringthe twilight years ofKim Il Sung’s life, actual authoritybegan to move towardsthe Kim JongIl line, with the adventof a ‘co-leadership’, whereinthe senior Kim reignedwhile the juniorKim actually ruled. 6 Thusthe suddendeath ofthe senior Kim signalled adramatic shift ofpower towards the juniorKim’ s line. Aradical powershift fromthe oldto the youngergeneration, however, couldhave touched off power struggles betweenthe twogenerations. Apartfrom these cleavages built into the innercircle, there was adeeperrift betweenthis privilegedinner circle andthe alienated outercircle. Inparticular, the descendantsof the formerfactionalists, whohad been purged or put into political backyardsduring the earlier daysof communist revolution,still re- mainedas apotential reservoir ofdissidents. 7 Althoughthey occupied the lower positions in the rulinghierarchy and were not strong enough to challengethe Kim JongIl leadership,they would allegedly beconsideredto retain the right to take revenge.Therefore, if the political situation underwenta radical change, theywould turn against the regime in collaborationwith anti-Kim forces. Tomakematters worse,the rulingmachine appeared to beinefcient, plagued with bureaucraticills andrampant corruption. Among the rulingtroika, both the partyand the cabinet nolonger seemed reliable to Kim JongIl. Inhis eyes,the partyand the administration wereseen as incapable,inef cient, irresponsible, indisciplined, corrupt,and lifeless, lackingrevolutionary spirit. 8 Inparticular, the rulingparty, which should have played a leadingrole in the socialist revolution, deteriorated into ahotbedof power abuse, inef ciency and corruption. Its arroganceand irresponsibility hadreached extremes while it was wielding formidablepower under the Kim Il Sungleadership. Inshort, the post-Kim Il Sungpolitical landscapewas notconducive to the smoothadvent of the newregime. Given the multiple sources ofinternal rumblings,there was noguaranteethat Kim JongIl wouldautomatically succeed to power.If anyof the potential cleavages wereto are up,the succession plan wouldevaporate at the nal stage. Inaddition, the rulingmachines werenot reliable butlikely to workagainst the inaugurationof the newleadership. If their arrogantbehaviour, corrupt practices andbureaucratic ills wereleft alone,the newregime wouldlose the hearts ofthe peoplein the longrun. JuniorKim’ s strategic options At that critical juncture,the thensuccessor-designate Kim JongIl employeda dualset ofbalancing tactics while quietly sidelining the potential rivals within his family. Thereare shownin Table1. 763 JEI GUK JEON TABLE 1 Components ofKim Jong Il’ s balancingstrategy TacticsI: Intergenerationalbalancing · Inclusivepolitics for the older generation revolutionaries · Honour– powersharing arrangement forthe younger-generation elite TacticsII: Inter-and intra-agency balancing · Party–army equalisationto keep a check andbalance between