ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol21, No 5, pp 761 – 779, 2000

NorthKorean leadership: Kim Jong Il’s balancingact in the ruling circle

JEI GUK JEON

ABSTRACT Theunexpected durability of North Korea,the world’s last unre- formedStalinist polity, is attributable to Kim JongIl’ s prudentbalancing act betweenpolitical forces. His balancingact, which is embodiedin inclusive politics, honour – powersharing arrangements, and divide-and-rule tactics, has turnedout to beeffective in clearing awaypotential cleavagesbuilt into the ruling circle andthus in concludingthe prolongedsuccession plan.As longas the balancingact continuesto work,the dynasty,albeit defective, couldsurvive in adversity for alongerperiod than expected. However, once the delicate balanceartiŽ cially designedby Kim JongIl is brokendown for anyreason, Pyongyang’s powercircle will slip into acentrifugal spiral, followed by internecine powerstruggles andthe collapse ofthe regime.

Thedeath of a totalitarian leader,as witnessed in Stalin’s Soviet Unionand Mao’s China,has oftentouched off a nakedpower struggle, followed by bloody purgesand a massive reshufe ofstate apparatus.North Korea’ s ‘Great Leader’, Kim Il Sung,was, indeed, a totalitarian ruler noless absolutist thanany other socialist leader.At the time ofKim Il Sung’s deathin July 1994,theref ore, outside observers,with fewexceptions, presupposed that Pyongyangwould soon slip intofactionalisation andpower struggles. Surprisingly,the demise ofthe ‘Great Leader’in Stalinist NorthKorea has notyet broughtabout any signiŽ cant change.In appearances, Pyongyang’ s powerelite remainedcalm andstable, withoutrevealing any particular signs off actional inŽghting— as if their political passions hadbeen totally emasculated. Hereinlies the mystery ofcontemporary NorthKorean politics. ArePyongyang’ s powerelites really like robotswho lack political ambitions andgive blind support and unconditional loyalty totheir leader? Orhave factional cleavages beennonexistent from the outset? If not,why did the ruling elite appearquiet andcohesive in spite ofthe suddendisappearance of its centre ofgravity (Kim Il Sung)and the ensuingvacuum of the leadership post? Akeyto the puzzlelies in Kim JongIl’ s adroit ‘balancingact’ among political forces duringthe precarious‘ transition’period (199 4 – 97)involving power succession. Thepurpose of this study,therefore, is to exploreKim JongIl’ s strategic actions towardsthe rulingcircle inresponse to the internal rumblings that formedan undercurrent after the deathof Kim Il Sung.

Jei Guk Jeoncan be contactedat MokryonWorsung Apt 309-2001, Hogedong 1052-3, Dongangu, Anyang City, KyonggiProvince 431-080, South Korea. E-mail: [email protected].

ISSN0143-6597 print; 1360-2241 online/ 00/050761-19 Ó 2000 ThirdWorld Quarterly 761 JEI GUK JEON

Initial conditions: multiple cleavages Thecritical challengeto the ‘edgling’new leadership in ahighlycentralised totalitarian polity,as in NorthKorea, is morelikely to come‘ fromwithin’ than fromoutside the rulingcircle. Lookinginto the thenpolitical landscape,some necessary conditionsf orpower struggles wereripening behind the scenes. After the deathof the absolutist ruler Kim Il Sung,for example, the topleadership titles wereleft vacantfor a prolongedperiod. Quite apart fromthe state presidency,the rulingWorkers’ Party ( KWP)hadremained leaderless formore thanthree years.Such abnormal phenomena might havecast afalse signal tothe powerelite that the ‘leadership vacuum’should be Ž lled byeither Kim JongIl oran alternative Žgure.A potential powercontender, if any,might have been tempted to substitute forKim JongIl. Factional cleavages,too, were not totally nonexistent,but were probably goingon, coupled with the thenpolitical uncertainties. Most ofall, Kim’s family itselfcouldhave been one of the most probablesources ofpower struggles. Fromits earliest days,the regime hadpractised nepotism,placing Kim’ s relatives andclose associates inkey positions inthe rulingtroika— the party,the state andthe army,as part ofthe father-to-sondynastic succession plan.Kim JongIl’ s political base was thus exclusively foundedon a handfulof trusted cronies,relatives andclose associates. Onthe surface the Kimclan appearedcohesive after the deathof Kim Il Sung. However,nepotism couldbe the seedbedof internecine powerstruggles as well as the sourceof political support.Upon closer inspection the clan appearedfar frommonolithic. Allegedly it was dividedinto a fewfactions whichhad long beenvying for in uence over Kim IlSungand for power after his death.Among the prominentfactions, the Žrst was Kim JongII’ sownline, comprisingthe childrenand relatives ofhis motherKim JongSuk; the secondwas his step-mother KimSong Ae’ s clique,centring on his half-brotherKim PyongIl; the third was his father KimIl Sung’s relatives in his grandparents’line, includinghis uncleKim YoungJu; andthe fourthwas his father’s comrades-in- arms whohad fought in the anti-Japanese struggles with Kim Il Sung. 1 Now, with the patriarch gone,the clan itselfmightturn into abattleŽeld amongthe immediate family members. Noless signiŽcant was afactional division within the military. Reportedly there werethree military factions: the older-generationhardliners whohad long servedKim Il Sung;the younger-generationofŽ cers, mainly composedof Kim JongIl supporters; andthe neutral faction indifferent tothe old – youngcon icts. 2 Amongthese, the older-generationrevolutionaries didnot respect Kim JongIl in the same waythey had respected Kim Il Sung.Nor would the military behappy with Kim JongIl’ s leadership succession, onthe groundsthat hehadno military experience. 3 Meanwhile,some signs ofmilitary rumblingswere occasionally reported.4 Awidercleavage that haddeveloped in the rulingcircle was the intergenera- tional split, whichhad been underway along the twodi fferent leadership lines of Kim Il Sungand Kim JongIl. As part ofthe father-to-sonsuccession plan,the twoKims madeevery effort to buildthe juniorKim’ s powerbase in the ruling 762 KIMJONG IL’SBALANCING ACT INTHE RULING CIRCLE troika.In the meantime, NorthKorea’ s powerstructure becamea kindof duopoly,with twosemi-independent hierarchies ofauthority and two sel f-sus- taining chains ofcommand— one leading to Kim Il Sungand another leading to Kim JongIl, withlittle interaction betweenthe two. 5 Theold Kim’ s power structure was foundedon the older-generationrevolutionaries, whereas the youngKim’ s commandline was built aroundthe youngerelites whowere largely fromthe Three-RevolutionMovement squads, the classmates ofManky- ongdaeRevolutionary Academy, and the graduatesof Namsan School and KimilsungUniversity. Duringthe twilight years ofKim Il Sung’s life, actual authoritybegan to move towardsthe Kim JongIl line, with the adventof a ‘co-leadership’, whereinthe senior Kim reignedwhile the juniorKim actually ruled. 6 Thusthe suddendeath ofthe senior Kim signalled adramatic shift ofpower towards the juniorKim’ s line. Aradical powershift fromthe oldto the youngergeneration, however, couldhave touched off power struggles betweenthe twogenerations. Apartfrom these cleavages built into the innercircle, there was adeeperrift betweenthis privilegedinner circle andthe alienated outercircle. Inparticular, the descendantsof the formerfactionalists, whohad been purged or put into political backyardsduring the earlier daysof communist revolution,still re- mainedas apotential reservoir ofdissidents. 7 Althoughthey occupied the lower positions in the rulinghierarchy and were not strong enough to challengethe Kim JongIl leadership,they would allegedly beconsideredto retain the right to take revenge.Therefore, if the political situation underwenta radical change, theywould turn against the regime incollaboration with anti-Kim forces. Tomakematters worse,the rulingmachine appeared to be inefŽcient, plagued with bureaucraticills andrampant corruption. Among the rulingtroika, both the partyand the cabinet nolonger seemed reliable to Kim JongIl. Inhis eyes,the partyand the administration wereseen as incapable,inefŽ cient, irresponsible, indisciplined, corrupt,and lifeless, lackingrevolutionary spirit. 8 Inparticular, the rulingparty, which should have played a leadingrole in the socialist revolution, deteriorated intoa hotbedof power abuse, inefŽ ciency and corruption. Its arroganceand irresponsibility hadreached extremes while it was wielding formidablepower under the Kim Il Sungleadership. Inshort, the post-Kim Il Sungpolitical landscapewas notconducive to the smoothadvent of the newregime. Given the multiple sources ofinternal rumblings,there was noguaranteethat KimJong Il wouldautomatically succeed to power.If anyof the potential cleavages wereto are up,the succession plan wouldevaporate at the Žnal stage. Inaddition, the rulingmachines werenot reliable butlikely to workagainst the inaugurationof the newleadership. If their arrogantbehaviour, corrupt practices andbureaucratic ills wereleft alone,the newregime wouldlose the hearts ofthe peoplein the longrun.

JuniorKim’ s strategic options At that critical juncture,the thensuccessor-designate Kim JongIl employeda dualset ofbalancing tactics while quietlysidelining the potential rivals within his family. Thereare shownin Table 1. 763 JEI GUK JEON

TABLE 1 Components ofKim Jong Il’ s balancingstrategy

TacticsI: Intergenerationalbalancing · Inclusivepolitics for the older generation revolutionaries · Honour– powersharing arrangement forthe younger-generation elite TacticsII: Inter-and intra-agency balancing · Party–army equalisationto keep a check andbalance between thetwo powerful groups · Intra-armyself-balancing · Departmental compartmentalisation

Intergenerationalbalancing Inresponseto the broad-basedintergenerational cleavage,Kim JongIl optedfor anon-antagonisticappeasement policy, aiming toheal the generationalrift and embraceall agegroups into his ownpolitical territory. Forthe juniorKim, one oftwo strategic optionscould be taken towards the oldguard: inclusion versus exclusion.A newleadership in anormalpolity wouldprefer the ‘exclusionary’ option,in order to eliminate all potential rivals andunreliable elements onceand forall. However,Kim JongIl was notin apositionto doaway with the old guard.The aged revolutionaries, who had fought anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare togetherwith Kim Il Sung,still dominatedthe leadership posts in the ruling troika.During the transition period,therefore, retaining the loyalty ofthe old guardswould be ofgreater valuethan jettisoning them forthe smoothconclusion ofthe succession plan.Should he choose the antagonistic option,it wouldbe costly. KimJong It’ s attempt to purgethem wouldtrigger apolitical backlash whichmight befatal tothe rise ofthe newregime. Also, given their advanced agethe daysof the octogenarianswould soon be numbered. Hence, it was unnecessaryfor him to hurriedlyremove them at the risk ofpolitical repercus- sions. Based onsuch calculations, Kim JongIl chosethe ‘inclusionary’option towardsthe oldguard. However, he couldnot rely solely onthe older-generation revolutionaries.For the longer-termviability ofthe newregime hebadlyneeded to secure sustained supportfrom the younger-generationelite as well. Toappeasethe youngerhopefuls without displeasing the elders, heconducted adelicate balancingact betweenthe twogenerations. His intergenerational balancingact culminated in ‘honour – power’sharing practices: ‘honours’were givento the elders while real ‘power’went to the youngergeneration. This tactics provedto beeffective in pleasing all agegroups and healing the symptomsof intergenerational rupture.

Inter- andintra-agency balancing Against apotential power-concentrationon any political groupor power elite, Kim JongIl imposeda set ofself-balancing devices onthe rulingcircle, by whichpowerf ul agencies orindividuals couldbe checked and balanced among themselves. Shouldpolitical powerconverge on any group or Ž gureother than 764 KIMJONG IL’SBALANCING ACT INTHE RULING CIRCLE the Leader,it/ hemight betempted to take overpower. Herein lay astrategic imperative forKim JongIl to stie the potential seeds ofsuch hyper-growth. Forthat purpose,Kim JongIl has used‘ divide-and-rule’tactics. At Žrst, he tried to outweighthe overgrownparty with astrongarmy, elevating the armyto aposition equalto that ofthe party.However, as the armygrew to bea formidablepolitical force,he began to checkthe overgrowthof the armyby usingthe partymachine. Nonetheless,the armybecame so strongthat it might nothave been sufŽciently curbedby the downgradedparty. Therefore Kim JongIl, employed additional devices todampen potential initiatives bythe army.For instance, he institutionalised anoverlapping command structure, activated anintra-military surveillance networkand applied divide-and-rule tactics tothe military comman- ders. His divide-and-ruletactics wereextended to all the state apparatus.He has highlycompartmentalised the governmentalstructure andthen facilitated compe- tition amongvarious departments. His strategic objective was two-pronged:on the onehand, it was to preventthe concentrationof power in anyparticular agency;on the other,it was to inducecompetitive loyalty to the Leader. Kim JongIl’ s balancingstrategy appearedsystematic. Forthe balancingact to beeffective, however,it requiredample autonomyon the part ofthe balancer (Kim JongIl) in dealingwith the powerelite. Aimingat creating total freedom fromvested interests, therefore,he frozethe keypolitical institutions underthe pretext ofmourning for his deceasedfather. Key organs such as the Politburo, Party Central Committee, Central People’s Committee andSupreme People’ s Assembly (SPA)ceased tofunction throughout the three-yearmourning period (1994– 97). Havingsuspended all the keystate apparatus,Kim Jong Il was able to manage the powerelite as well as state affairs as hewished, f ree fromany procedures andformalities. His status as an‘ unofŽcial’ head of state duringthe transition periodalso providedhim with additional manoeuverability.He didnot take over the partysecretary-generalship foralmost three-and-a-halfyears after his father’s death.Nor had he assumed the state presidencyuntil it was abolishedin 1998. As aresult, there was noneed for him to convenemeetings ofthe partyor the cabinet.He could thus bevirtually free fromanything else andevade responsi- bility formismanagement.

Intergenerationalbalancing With ample autonomyat hand,Kim JongIl has skillfully mastered abalancing act betweenthe older-and younger-generation elites forthe purposeof assuring full supportf romall echelonsof Pyongyang’ s powerelite.

Care ofthe oldguard: the inclusive politics Kim JongIl’ s intergenerational balancingact beganwith the appeasementof old-guardmembers whoseunchanged loyalty was believedto be an indispens- able building-blockof the newregime. To ensure that the elders continuedto 765 JEI GUK JEON serve him faithfully as theyhad served his father,he tookparticular care ofthese revolutionaries duringthe transition period. Forthe sake ofthe oldguard, Kim JongIl tried to curbthe political passions ofthe youngerelite whohad thus far devotedtheir loyalty to him.He exempliŽed sel f-controlof his ownpolitical ambition byref usingfurther honoursfor himself, therebysending a message to youngerhopef uls that patience andloyalty to him werethe surest routeto powerin duetime. 9 By doing so,he was able effectively tocalm downthe aspirations ofthe youngerhopefuls. Havingsilenced the youngerelite, KimJong Il declaredthat: ‘to respect the revolutionaryseniors is anoblemoral obligationof all revolutionaries’, and‘ the revolutionaryachievements ofold guards must beinherited andprotected’ . 10 Alongthis policyline, heretained all the elders employedby Kim Il Sungand keptintact the rulingmachinery and policies devisedby his father.Few old revolutionaries,unless incapacitated ordead, had ever been replaced by the youngerelite duringthe three-yearmourning period. Nor did he openly conduct political purgesto do away with unreliable elders. 11 Hedid not carry out a cabinet reshufenora formal reallocation ofstate/ partyposts formore than f our years after his father’s death.At best, changesin the rulinghierarchy, theref ore, tookplace withthe deathof the oldrevolutionaries— for natural reasons rather thanfor political ones. Kim JongIl’ s action towardsthe oldguard was prudentenough to recapture their loyalty to him.Even if the elders died,successors wereappointed only after adigniŽed period had lapsed. For example, when his father’s defenceminister, OhJin-U,died in spring 1995, Kim JongIl left the position vacantf ormore than sevenmonths before naming the newminister, ChoeGwang. Two years later, minister Choedied, but the post was leftvacantuntil September1998, when Kim Il Cholwas appointed.Many other ministerial posts, includingthose of electronics andautomation, natural resources development,shipping, prosecutor- general,and central auditing,were left vacantfor a longtime after the deaths of the incumbents. 12 Furthermore,successors todeceased old guards were not necessarily the younger-generationelite. Someof the newministerial posts wereawarded to those in the poolof aged revolutionaries. 13 Whatis more,in promotingarmy generals,Kim JongIl paidparticular attention to the agedmilitary leaders after 1994.In retrospect, beforehis father died,he had promoted mainly the younger military elite tosubstantiate his ownpower base inthe KoreanPeople’ s Army (KPA).But, after his father’s death,by andlarge hepromoted the Žrst-generation revolutionaries toforge a cordial relationship with the oldguard. 14 Many of the newlypromoted generals werealso sons ofthe oldrevolutionaries. 15 As a result, the steady rise ofthe youngerelite upPyongyang’ s powerladder did not result in resentment fromthe oldguard. Moreunusual was that some oldhigh-ranking ofŽ cials, whoserelatives had defected to Seoul,remained in their posts withoutbeing stigmatised bytreason. Forexample, although his son-in-lawhad defected to Seoulin 1994,Premier KangSong-San continued to remain inthe post until hewas droppedat the 10th SPA election heldin July 1998.Likewise, there was nosign ofa purgeon Hyon Chol-Gyu,who held top party and state posts in SouthHamgyung province, 766 KIMJONG IL’SBALANCING ACT INTHE RULING CIRCLE despite the fact that his sonand daughter-in-law had defected to Seoulin 1996. Giventhat the families ofdefectors hadbeen punished harshly in the past, such extraordinarytreatment was enoughto induce loyalty fromthe powerelite. Thanksto Kim JongIl’ s prudent‘ inclusive’politics, all the oldrevolutionaries wereable to stay in their posts fora prolongedperiod. In return, they remained loyal to Kim JongIl in the same waythat theyhad done to Kim Il Sung.Kim JongIl was thus able to smoothlyinherit fromhis father notonly the leadership titles butalso the loyalty ofthe oldguard.

Appeasingyounger hopefuls: honour – powersharing With nosigniŽ cant changesin the rulingelite andmachinery, the post-Kim Il SungNorth Korea looked like a‘landthat time forgot’, wherenothing had changedfor years after Kim Il Sung’s death.Many key posts inthe ruling troika werestill occupiedby the elders. If suchphenomena continued indeŽnitely, this might trigger discontent amongthe youngerhopefuls who had longbeen waiting forKim JongIl’ s day.Thus it was also important forKim JongIl to appeasethe younger-generationelite so that theywould continuously remain loyal tohim. Onceloyalty ofthe oldguard had been assured, therefore, Kim JongIl began quietly to realign political arrangementsto please boththe oldand young elites. Aboveall, it was abalanced‘ honour – power’arrangement that was effective in satisfying bothgenerations and also in embracingall agegroups within the new regime.Perhaps considering Korea’ s traditional valueorientations varyingacross generation—the olderpeople tend to seek honourswhile the youngerseek power—16Kim JongIl quietly movedthe elders intothe ‘honourable’positions while assigning the youngerelite tothe ‘powerful’posts in the rulingapparatus. Manyold revolutionaries thus remainedin the merely honourable,symbolic, prestigious positions, whereasthe youngerelite, mainly Kim JongIl’ s cronies andclose associates, wereplaced in the keyposts with real power. 17 This arrangementhas beenfacilitated with the increasing mortality ofthe old guard.For example, during the three-yearmourning period, about 50 of the older-generationpower elite died,including deputy premier KangHi-Won and the twodefence ministers OhJin-U andChoe Gwang. Taking advantage of this opportunity,Kim JongIl silently placedhis hand-pickedjunior elites in suchkey posts in the party,state andarmy. In the meantime, Pyongyang’s rulingcircle has undergonea ‘quiet’generational power shi ft, withoutarousing any friction betweenthe olderand younger generations. Kim JongIl’ s prudentintergenerational balancingact borerich fruits. First of all, apotential intergenerational conict that mighthave  aredup in the aftermath ofKim Il Sung’s deathhas beendi ffused.No sign ofpower struggles, therefore,has eversurfaced. Nor has there beenany particular symptomof internal cleavages overstate policies. Second,based on the intergenerational harmony,Kim JongIl’ s powerbase has beenconsistently consolidatedand substantially broadened,encompassing all agegroups, ranging f romthe elders in their 60s, 70soreven 80 s, to the younghopefuls in their 30sand4 0s. Third, 767 JEI GUK JEON steered byKim JongIl’ s balancingact, a‘silent revolution’has beenunderway in Pyongyang’s rulinghierarchy, opening a newwindow for a peacefultransition ofpower from one generation to another.

Inter- andintra-agency balancing: divide andrule At the institutional level Kim JongIl’ s balancingact was implemented by divide-and-ruletactics to keepa checkand balance between the partyand the army,among the keymilitary units/commanders,and among the variousdepart- ments.

Checkthe party bythe army:party – armyequilibrium NorthKorea was bornas aStalinist one-partystate in whichall the state apparatusare subordinateto the rulingKorean Workers’ Party ( KWP).Along with the cabinet andthe parliament, the KPA was underdirect controlof the partyas well. Meanwhile,the partybecame increasingly imbuedwith arroganceand irresponsibility. Kim JongIl thus hadserious doubtsabout the revolutionary spirit ofthe partycadres. To him, the partyappeared irresponsible, inefŽcient andli feless, whereasthe armywas perceivedas anexemplar of revolutionary spirit andloyalty to their leader. 18 All that remainedviable andreliable forhim was the army. After his father’s death,theref ore,Kim JongIl pickedthe KPA as amultipur- posepolitical instrument with whichto counterbalancethe party,to smoothhis powersuccession andto secure the long-termsurvival ofthe newregime. For the successor-designate Kim JongIl, the KPA wouldbe like a‘double-edged sword’, bywhich he couldgive a warningsignal to anypotential challengers at homeand abroad and eliminate potential barriers onthe roadto his power succession tohis father. Based onsuch calculations, Kim JongIl stronglypursued a military-Žrst politics, fully capitalising onthe quasi-emergencysituation causedby the sudden deathof Kim Il Sung.His military-Žrst politics was embodiedin exclusive favouritism to the army.A variety ofpolitical favours,privileges, honoursand economicbeneŽ ts weregiven to the armywhich no party cadres andstate ofŽcials haveever received since Kim JongIl assumed power. 19 Feedingon special favours,the military leaders, whohad stayed inthe political backyardin the past, beganto climb higherand higher on the power ladder,and eventually emerged as areal powerholder in North Korea. At the same time, the political centre ofgravity in the rulingtroika has quietly moved towardsthe armyand away from the party.From 1997 in particular, Kim Jong Ilbeganformally toraise the relative status ofthe army vis-a`-vis the partyunder asloganthat ‘the partyis the veryarmy and the armyis the veryparty’ . 20 Furthermore,it was announcedthat ‘the armyis the people,the state, andthe party’, andthat ‘withoutthe army,there will beno party, no state, andno people’.21 Morerecently, the regime reiterated the military-Žrst principle,with a rationale that ‘wecannotlive withoutbullets, butwe canlive withoutcandies’ . 22 Nowthe armyis ona parwith oreven ‘ appears’stronger than the party. 23 768 KIMJONG IL’SBALANCING ACT INTHE RULING CIRCLE

Inline with the ascendantposition ofthe army,its visibility in the North Koreanpolitical economyhas beenincreasingly evident.As moreand more armyelites encroachon the keyparty/ state apparatus,such as the Politburo,the Party Central Committee andthe SPC,major publicpolicies are signiŽcantly affected bymilitary interests. Pyongyang’s diplomacyis nolonger immune to military interference,as seen inthe DPRK– USnucleardeal during1993 – 94 and its foodaid diplomacyafter 1995.Some of the publicsecurity affairs havebeen takenover by the KPA fromthe Ministry ofPublic Security.Even the economy is increasingly undermilitary inuence as the armygets involvedin a wide variety ofeconomic activities suchas construction,coal mining,manufacturing, tree planting,river embankmentsand even manure collection. 24 While the KPA has enjoyedmore and more clout in NorthKorean sociopolit- ical life,the partyhas beenincreasingly marginalised overtime. Sidelined bythe rising army,the partyappeared to retreat to the political backseat. At best, the partynowadays ensues acampaignof ‘ Learningfrom the People’s Army’, calling forparty members tobe armedwith the revolutionaryspirit ofthe army.

Checkthe armyby the party Stronglybacked by the newleader Kim JongIl, indeed,the armyhas emerged as the most powerfulgroup in North Korea today. By any standards— its size, coercivepower, organisational strength andbudget expenditures— the KPA has a clear superiority overother political groups.However, the military is like a dangerous‘ tiger’which has its ownphysical powerand means toeliminate its master wheneverit decides to doso. If the KPA wereleft to its owndevices, it mightdare to challengethe Kim JongIl leadership. Awareof such potential dangers,Kim JongIl has assiduously managedto curbthe hyper-growthof the military. Tobegin with, he has fully utilised the partymachine to dampen the political muscle ofthe army.By the verynature ofthe ‘partystate’ , the ruling KWP has its owncommand channel in the army. Everylevel ofthe military command,ranging from the ArmedForces Ministry to the companylevel, has beenpenetrated by party committees andpolitical departments,as indicated in Figure1. These party organs are responsible for monitoringthe activities ofrespective military units andreporting back directly tothe Party Central Committee. Theyalso interfere extensively inthe military operations,requiring the respective units to reportall military activities. A military commander,therefore, cannot perf ormany kind of military exercises and/ormilitary operationswithout prior approval from the political ofŽcer. Aside fromthe regularparty channel, there are certain less visible channelsof commandin the KPA.Forinstance, the KimilsungSocialist YouthLeague has its ownŽ eld ofŽces at everylevel ofthe military units andcarries outpolitical worksin the army.In addition, until veryrecently the Three-Revolution Movementsquads allegedly keptan independent line ofcommunication with Kim JongIl. Trappedin these multiple channelsof command, the regular military commandershave little roomfor independent military action. Also,Kim JongIl has fully capitalised onthe party’s extensive secret-police networkin order to place the military commandersunder his direct control. 769 JEI GUK JEON

Party Central Committee National Defense Commission

Ministry of People’s Armed Forces

People’s Army General Political General Staff of Security Guard Party Committee Bureau People’s Army Command

Corps Corps Political Corps, Navy/Air Corps Security Party Committee Commissars Force Commands Guard Department Primary Committee

Division Division Political Division Division Security Party Committee Commissars Guard Department

Regiment Regiment Political Regiment Division Security Party Committee Commissars Guard Department

Battalion Party Battalion Political Battalion Battalion Security Officers Guard Officers

Company Company Company Party Cell Political Officers

FIGURE 1 North Korea’s militarycommand structure.

Amongothers, the Organisationand Guidance Department ( OGD)ofthe Party Central Committee is anotoriousdevice that conductsround-the-clock surveil- lance ofthe behaviourof the military elite as well asofall partycadres andstate ofŽ cials.25

Intra-armysel f-balancing Nevertheless, it wouldnot be enoughto checkthe overgrownmilitary onlyin the downgradedparty. Therefore the regime has institutionalised aset ofintra-mili- tary self-balancing mechanisms. Forone thing, the Ministry ofthe People’s ArmedForces andthe GeneralStaff ofthe Armyhave been devised to keep a balanceof power. 26 Foranother, as seen inFigure 1, within the ArmedForces Ministry the three keyorgans— the GeneralStaff ofthe Army,the General Political Bureauand the Security GuardCommand— constitute anintra-ministry ‘troika’based on a checks-and-balancesrelationship. 27 770 KIMJONG IL’SBALANCING ACT INTHE RULING CIRCLE

Kim JongIl has also activated a‘cross-checking’mechanism to ensurehis clear reignover all the military elites. Alongwith the party’s OGD,forexample, the GeneralPolitical Bureauand the Security GuardCommand within the ArmedForces Ministry conductround-the-clock surveillance ofthe political behaviourand attitudes ofall military personnelon a regularbasis. Inaddition, the OperationsBureau in the GeneralStaff ofthe Armyseparately undertakes strict surveillance ofall military ofŽcers, generals in particular. 28 Kim JongIl has also created a‘special mission group’within the State Security Agencyto watch high-rankingof Žcials in the partyand the army.No individual, nor even the smallest unit inthe army,theref ore,can evade political surveillance conducted byintra- andextra-military police networks. All intelligence andinformation on military activities are directly reportedto Kim JongIl. Based onsuch conŽ dential reports,Kim JongIl has the chanceto take preventivemeasures against anypotential dangersfrom the army.Some- times hehas purgedpotential opponents.At other times hehas replacedthem with his cronies. Inaddition to suchextensive use ofinstitutional devices,Kim JongIl has exercised ‘divide-and-rule’tactics overtop military leaders. Byhaving contact with the powerfulmilitary leaders onanindividual basis, hecanpretend to give aparticular favourto aparticular military leader in orderto secure loyalty from that commander.By doing so, he can induce military leaders to compete´with eachother, for example the DefenceMinister versus the Chief ofGeneral Staff versus CorpsCommanders, to get morefavours from the Leader. 29 Thanksto Kim JongIl’ s multiple devices,a delicate checks-and-balances mechanism has comeinto being between the partyand the army,among the key organsin the DefenceMinistry, andamong the topmilitary commanders. Therefore,despite its growingin uences on overall state affairs, the armyis not able to evadeKim JongIl’ s direct controlnor to overshadowhis leadership.

Departmentalcompartmentalisation Kim JongIl’ s balancingact has beenextended to the overall state apparatusas well. Oncethe party – armybalance was institutionalised, Kim JongIl upgraded the relative status ofthe cabinet andthe people’s committees ofprovincial governments vis-a`-vis the Workers’Party inparticular. Inthe past, the cabinet was always in the lowest position amongthe tripartite rulingapparatus, and the people’s committee in aprovinceremained subordinate to the KWP. However, througha constitutional amendmentin September1998, Kim JongIl has given afreer handto the cabinet andthe provincialpeople’ s committees. Accordingly, the tripartite relationship ofthe rulingtroika has becomemore balanced than ever,with relative autonomyof the cabinet fromthe twopredominant power groups,the partyand the army. At the departmental level, Kim JongIl’ s divide-and-ruletactics havebeen pursuedin the formof compartmentalisation, aiming to facilitate the division and mutual competition ofthe rulingapparatus. Inretrospect, underthe Kim Il Sungleadership, it was interdepartmental co-ordinationrather thancompetition that hadbeen strongly emphasised. Hence, 771 JEI GUK JEON inuential Žguresmight bepostedto toppositions in twoor moreorganisations in orderto f acilitate horizontalco-ordination among different agencies.How- ever,as Kim JongIl tookpower, the priority shifted towardsinter-agency competition andaway from co-ordination. 30 Different departments andcells, therefore,are playedoff against eachother. Mutual exclusiveness andcompe- tition thus beganto permeate the governmentalstructure. Seized bya sense of competition,state ofŽcials havebecome obsessed with their owninstitutional interests. Meanwhile,Kim JongIl has monopolisedthe wholedecision-making process alone.Co-operation, bargaining and co-ordination among the variousdepart- ments is possible onlythrough Kim JongIl. Therefore,if departments (or individuals) wantto winfavours and enjoy more power, they have to forgea close relationship with Kim JongIl, competingamong themselves to demon- strate their loyalty tothe Leader.

Strategyeffectiveness Kim JongIl’ s balancingstrategy has provedto bethe keyinstrument inpropping upthe world’s last unreformedStalinist regime.Yet, just as there is nopanacea inthe drugworld, his balancingact itself contains inherentweaknesses that mightundermine the veryviability ofthe regime inthe longrun.

TangiblebeneŽ ts Kim JongIl’ s balancingact has led notonly to the clearance ofpotential cleavages built intothe rulingcircle butalso toa ‘loyalty competition’among the powerelite. At the time whenthe three-yearmourning period ended in July1997, theref ore,the political base ofthe newregime hadeven been strengthened. Aboveall, the intergenerational balancingact turnedout to bea ‘win – win’ formulafor Kim JongIl himselfaswell as forboth the oldand younger elites. While the older-generationrevolutionaries remainedcomf ortable with the junior Kim’s inclusive politics, the younger-generationelites werepleased withhis honour– powersharing arrangement. Kim JongIl, too,succeeded in incorporat- ingall agegroups into his ownpolitical orbit.His prudentbalancing act between the twoincompatible generationswas, indeed, eff ective in suturingthe potential cleavages lyingunder the surface atKim Il Sung’s death.As aresult, intergen- erational harmonycame intobeing in the rulingcircle, andthe political scene has beenstabilised. AnothersigniŽ cant consequencewas to pavea soundway for a generational powertransfer. Steered bythe juniorKim’ s balancingact, Pyongyang’s power circle has undergonea silent powershift fromone generation to another, without triggeringintergenerational friction orsubstantial changesin the existing power structure. Apositive dimensionhidden behind the intergenerational changeis that it might plant aseed oflong-term change in the NorthKorean political economy,thus preparing for a newera. 772 KIMJONG IL’SBALANCING ACT INTHE RULING CIRCLE

Kim JongIl’ s balancingact at the institutional level contributedto the maximisation ofhis manoeuverabilitywithin the rulingcircle. His inter-agency balancingact culminated in aparty – armyequilibrium. At Žrst hecurbed the arroganceof the partywith the army,then he dampened the hyper-growthof the armyusing the partymachine. Check and balances betweenthe two powerfulgroupshave thus created anewpolitical orderin the post-Kim Il Sung era. Kim JongIl’ s imposition ofintra-military balancingand divide-and-rule tactics onthe coremilitary commandershas furtherreduced the possibility ofa military revolt against the regime.After all, the strongPeople’ s Armyhas been convertedinto a ‘private army’, whichf unctionsas aprime lifeguardfor the new Leaderand the last bulwarkof the regime,thereby contributing to the durability ofthe anachronistic Stalinist regime.All the KPA cando nowis to pledgeits total loyalty to the LeaderKim JongIl, holdinga ‘rally ofloyalty’ at every opportunity. 31 Fromthis perspective,even though Kim JongIl has thus far appearedto rely heavilyon the army,it is KimJong Il, notthe army,that has beenin clear charge.For this reason,the military-based Kim JongIl regime has notdeteriorated into apureform of ‘ military regime’or ‘ praetorianstate’ dominatedby the military elite. Kim’s tactics ofdepartmental compartmentalisation haveheightened his own political autonomyfrom within. With compartmentalisation, powerhas been dispersed amongvarying agencies andinter-departmental competition has been intensiŽed. At the apexof national authority,therefore, Kim Jong Il alonehas Žnal andabsolute say onmajor policyissues. Appeasedand/ orchecked by such a multi-dimensional balancingact, Pyongyang’s powerelite thus far remains loyal to Kim JongIl, competingwith eachother to gain the Leader’s trust andfavours.

KimJong Il’ s political initiatives Havingensured such a solid leadership position,Kim JongIl has initiated changesin the rulinghierarchy, economic policies andinternational relations. As forinstitutional realignments, to beginwith hehas normalised the state apparatusfrozen during the mourningperiod. Above all, the SupremePeople’ s Assembly,which had been defunct af ter its ninthterm expiredin April 1995, was elected in July 1998and has since functionedon a normalbasis. 32 Second, hehas reshufedthe rulingmachine in sucha wayas to concentrateall the real powerin himselfbymandating a constitutional amendmentin September1998. Amongother things, he has elevated the National DefenceCommission, which hehas chairedsince 1993,intovirtually the highest organof the state, instead ofabolishing the state presidency. 33 Third,he has carried outa generationalshift in the rulingcircle. Inthe election ofthe tenth-term SPA,therefore,about two-thirds ofthe 687representatives werereplaced by younger-generationelites. Likewise,at the Žrst session ofthe tenth-term SPA (September1998), 24 younger elites outof a total of3 1ministers wereappointed as cabinet ministers, whereas manyolder-generation elites weredemoted to ‘ honorary’deputy chairmen of the newlyestablished SPA Presidium. 773 JEI GUK JEON

At the same time Kim JongIl beganpaying particular attention tothe economy,recently introducinga newruling philosophy of Kangsongdaeguk —a militarily strongand economically prosperous nation. 34 Notonly did he resume on-the-spotguidance visits tovarious economic sectors byJanuary 1998, 35 the regime has also carefully managedto changeeconomic polices withoutendan- geringthe existing juche system. First, to alleviate the foodcrisis, it allowed private farmingon a limited scale, tolerated farmers’markets andintroduced contract farming.Second, to spurforeign investments, it deregulatedthe rules overforeign investments andforeign exchange rates, andalso created twomore free trade zonesoutside the Rajin-Sonbongarea. Third, to promote f oreigntrade it has begunactively toseek overseas markets inrecent years,with a renewed emphasis onthe trade-Žrst policy. 36 Fourth,with aconstitutional amendmentin September1998 it has eased the principle ofstate ownership,allowed some private businesses andintroduced the capitalist conceptsof prices, costs and proŽ ts. However,Kim JongIl has beencautious enoughto stop economicconcessions fromgoing too far. Along with these ‘reform-like’measures, the regime has takencounter-measures. For example, it launcheda new‘ self-reliance’cam- paign,based on the so-called ‘mosquito-nettheory’ , to preventthe harmful capitalist culture andalien ideologyfrom coming into its territory. 37 Onthe external front,Kim’ s self-conŽdence in rulingthe countryhas been evidentin his managementof international relations as well. Oncedomestic politics hadbeen stabilised, Kim JongIl beganactively toengage in the international communityto create abreak-throughin the diplomatic impasse. Notonly has Pyongyangtried to warmup its ties with its oldallies, it has also madeattempts toimprove its relations withits oldfoes. As reported,North Koreahas recently signeda new‘ treaty off riendship,good-neighbourliness, and co-operation’with Russia, madereciprocal visits ofhigh-level ofŽ cials toChina, established diplomatic relations with Italy andthe Philippines, andrestored its ties withAustralia. Also,North Korea is tryingto normalise its relations with Germanyand the Philippines, while renewingits efforts to approachthe non-alignedThird World countries. Amongother things, the Kim regime has employedall its diplomatic arsenal in improvingrelations with Washington,fully exploitingits developmentof nuclearweapons and the long-rangeballistic missile card.It has also madeevery effort to normalise diplomatic relations with Tokyosince the early 1990s, aiming at gainingthe latter’s compensationfor colonial rule overKorea. As aresult, after anine-yearrecess (1991 – 99),Pyongyang – Tokyonormalisation talks were resumedin April 2000. NorthKorea’ s diplomatic offensiveculminated inthe Žrst-ever inter-Korean summit heldin Pyongyangduring 13 – 15June, 2 000.Thesummit was success- ful,thus openinga newwindow for active co-operationand exchanges between the twoKoreas. Also the summit has offereda goldenopportunity for Kim Jong Il tochange his image fromthat ofa reclusive, erratic, quirkyand dangerous dictator tothat ofa rational andpragmatic leader.Based onthe Leader’s new image,Pyongyang is steppingup its diplomatic contacts with the outside world to putan end to its economiccrisis andinternational isolation. 774 KIMJONG IL’SBALANCING ACT INTHE RULING CIRCLE

Nodoubt Pyongyang’ s pragmatic diplomacyin recent years is seen as a reection ofKim JongIl’ s conŽdence in dealingwith external forces,based on his unassailable positionat home.Without total supportfrom the rulingcircle, hecould not take diplomatic initiatives onhis own.Fortunately, steered byhis proactivebalancing act, all the rulingelites in Pyongyangunanimously support the regime’s diplomatic actions, withoutany political debates overor outright oppositionto the newdiplomacy.

Potential risks As longas the balancer(Kim JongIl) remains well, andas longas the checks-and-balancesmechanism continuesin effect, the currentruling machine andpublic policies will continueto work,thus buttressing. the post-Kim Il Sung regime.However, a delicate intergenerational balanceand an uneasy truce amongthe powerelite andthe groupswhich were artiŽ cially crafted byKim JongIl will notlast indeŽnitely. Oncloser examination,the potential seeds ofinternal cleavages are still alive behindthe scenes. Forone thing, thanks to Kim JongII’ sinclusive politics, some unreliable elements continueto survivein the rulingcircle. Foranother, boostedby Kim JongII’ s deliberate ‘divide-and-rule’tactics, the political rivalry betweenthe partyand the armyis tendingto become intense, the governingapparatus has beenhighly compartmentalised andthe keymilitary leaders are dividedagainst oneanother. Thus, inter-elite, inter-agencyand inter-departmental competition has becomea newreality in post-Kim IISung political life.A newpattern of‘ miniaturised’cleavages is likely toemerge in the powercircle. Shouldthe balancer(Kim JongII) disappearfrom the political scene—perhaps becauseof an accident,illness orf orany other reason— the delicate balancewill sooneror later hebroken down. Once that happens,Pyongyang’ s powercircle mayslide intoa centrifugalspiral. Notonly would all the latent cleavages come tothe surface,new factions might arise as well, feedingon the renewedpolitical uncertainties. Factionalisation wouldeventually lead tointense powerstruggles amongthe variousrivalries, followedby anarchy and even the collapse ofthe regime.In particular, aclash betweenthe partyand the armyor amongmilitary commanderscould result inbloody consequences fatal tothe regime. Eventhough Kim Jong II continuesto maintain his political health,the divide-and-ruletactics mightbe self-defeating in the longrun. Among other things,his leadership capacity couldbe come overloaded as hetries tomanage all the powerelites/ groupsfor himsel f.His father KimII Sungwas able efŽciently to controlthe rulingcircle througha ‘vertical’division of labour— the Leader ruledthe party,and the partycontrolled the state andthe army.Yet Kim JongII dismantled this practice andhas beentrying to ‘directly’control all the ruling troika andthe individualpower elites. Sofar hehas beeneffective at tightening his gripon the powercircle. But,given the increasing numberof miniaturised cleavages,it will bemore and more di fŽcult forhim to manageall the power groups/elites inefŽ ciently. His leadership capacity will eventuallybe exhausted, whichmight inturn lead tointernal fragmentationand power struggles. 775 JEI GUK JEON

Also,the built-in tendencyof mutual exclusiveness amongthe rulingappar- atus might steadily erodethe legitimacy ofthe regime,sti ing policy co- ordinationand thus effacingstrategy effectiveness. Inter-agencyco-operation andco-ordination have been choked by Kim JongII’ sdivide-and-ruletactics. Instead,mutual competition has becomea newnorm of the decision-making process.Lacking close co-ordinationamong the concernedparties, however, publicpolicies wouldbe deprivedof coherence, continuity and directionality. At best, this might producesel f-contradictorypolicies. 38 Shouldsuch practices accumulate,the overall effectiveness ofstate policies will besubstantially eroded,thus eventually undermining the legitimacy ofthe regime. Theailing economy,too, could make it increasingly difŽcult forKim JongII to keepa delicate balanceby depriving him ofpolitical leverages that are indispensable tohis balancingact. Thanksto the availability ofa hugeamount ofpolitical funds,he has thus far beenable to managethe powerelites as he wishes. However,without substantial reformand opening, the ailing economy will notbe revived, and his private slush fundswill bedepletedover time. If he canno longer provide sustained favoursf orall the rulingelites/ groups,his political leverageand manoeuverability over the powercircle will cometo an end.His leadership position will subsequentlybe weakened,and the seams ofhis balancingact will beloosened. Althoughsome signs ofreform and opening have appeared in recent years, uponcloser inspection there are nottrue reforms toremedy structural ills, but ‘controlledref orms’, orexpedient measures, at best tinkeringto temporarily alleviate the currenteconomic di fŽculties. Kim JongII’ sbalancingact has rather erected anunexpected barrier togenuine reform, keeping intact the older- generationrevolutionaries whoprefer the status quoto substantial changes. Amongothers, the KPA,whichhas longenjoyed a privilegedposition and vested interests thanksto Kim Jong II’ s military-Žrst politics, is morelikely thanothers to opposea substantial restructuring ofthe existing system. As longas these conservativeelements haveleverage in politics, meaningful reformis unlikelyto beput into practice in the nearfuture. Meanwhile, the economicpain will becomedeeper and deeper, which might eventuallybe translated intosociopolit- ical unrest. 39

Conclusion:strategic implications Atleast onesecret to the longevityof the post-Kim IISungNorth Korea lies in Kim JongII’ s adroit balancingact amongpolitical forces.Manipulated by his balancingtactics, Pyongyang’s powerelite remains cohesiveand loyal tohim. TheKim JongII regime thus enjoysa highdegree of stability evenin astate of economiccrisis. However,upon closer inspection,the regime’s stability is basedat best, on a‘fragile balance’or an ‘ uneasytruce’ among political forces that couldeasily bebroken down. No matter howtactful andprudent, the balancingact is not acure-all. Theseemingly shrewdtactics, too,have their owninherent limits andself-contradictions, whichmight underminethe veryfoundation of the regime inthe longrun. Already, because of the country’s innate problems,the 776 KIMJONG IL’SBALANCING ACT INTHE RULING CIRCLE effectiveness ofthe balancingact might havepassed the pointof increasing returnand entered the phaseof diminishing return. Amongthe variouscomponents of the balancingstrategy, the ‘divide-and- rule’tactics are seen as amoreproblematic ploythat is likely to bringabout long-terminstability in returnfor short-term stability. Encouragedby Kim Jong II’stactis, the internal divisiveness has becomea built-in tendencyin the ruling circle. NowPyongyang’ s powerelites are preoccupiedwith ‘ unproductive’ competition forloyalty to the Leader.As longas the juniorKim tries tomanage the rulingcircle with those tactics, theywill just reproducebitter competition andmutual exclusiveness, thus eventuallyundermining internal solidarity and regime security. Fromnow on, therefore the utmost critical task ofthe KimJong II regime will behow to harmonise‘ competition’with ‘co-operation’among power elites/ groups.As elsewhere,both sound competition andclose co-operationare indispensable forpolicy effectiveness andthe long-termviability ofthe regime. Toattain this, Kim JongII must beable tocommand a higherlevel of ‘statecraft’, orientated towardsthe long-termsurvival anddevelopment of the state andaway from his short-sighted ‘divide-and-rule’tactics obsessed with regime survival.He should also liberate the powerelites fromtheir obsession with ‘loyalty competition’and thus redirect their political concernsand energies towardsthe developmentof state policies throughproductive competition and creative co-ordination.

Notes Allviews expressedin this paper are solelythe author’ s anddo not necessarily represent theviews ofany institutionwith which he is afŽliated. 1 AZhebin,‘ NorthKorea after Kim IISung:hard choices’ , KoreanJournal of Defense Analysis ,7(1),1995, pp 211– 232.For the intra-clan split particularly between Kim JongII andKim YongJu, and between Kim JongII andKim PyongII, see KEGause, ‘Kim Chong-il’s Žrst year inpower’, Jane’s IntelligenceReview , 7 (9–10),1995, pp 420 – 423(Part I), 464 – 467(Part II). 2 EIU, CountryReport: South Korea North Korea 3rd Quarter 1994 ,London:Economist Intelligence Unit, 1994, p 47. 3 See BBridges,‘ NorthKorea after Kim II-Sung’, TheWorld Today ,51,June 1995, pp 103 – 107; Pan Suk Kim, ‘WillNorth Korea blink?Matters ofgrave danger’ , AsianSurvey ,34(3),1994, pp 258 – 272; C K Armstrong,‘ Thepolitics of transition in North and South Korea’ , inD McCann(ed), KoreaBrieŽ ng: TowardReuniŽ cation ,New York:ME Sharpe,1997, p 20. 4 There has beena series ofunconŽ rmed reportson military revolts against the regime. Forexample, there were twomilitary disturbances in 1986: one was toboost Kim PyongIl’ s standingin the military; another was tooppose Kim JongII’ s successionto Kim IISung.Likewise, in autumn 1991 a groupof regimental commanders movedto unseat Kim JongII fromhis successor-designate. In 1993 two coup attempts were reported.In 1994 some 100army ofŽcers inthe 6th Corps were reportedlyarrested oncharges of anti-regimeactivities. Another military revolt occurred in August 1996, triggered by dissatisfaction with fooddistribution. 5 AYMansourov,‘ DPRK after Kim IISung:is a secondrepublic possible?’ , paperprepared for an internationalconference on‘ NorthKorea after Kim IISung’held in Melbourne, Australia, 26 – 27September 1994. 6 BCKoh,‘ Recent politicaldevelopments in North Korea’ , inT HHenriksen& JMo(eds), North Korea After Kim IISung:Continuity or Change ?Stanford,CT: HooverInstitution Press, 1997,pp 1 –12. 7 Alarge numberof the former factionalists,including the Soviet faction, China’ s Yananfaction, South Korea’s Workers’Party faction and the domestic faction, were purgedby Kim IISungin the process of powerstruggles during his early days.Like his father, Kim JongII has nevertrusted the children of these factionalistsand has notplaced them inhigh positions. 777 JEI GUK JEON

8 Kim JongII onceharshly rebuked the party and the administration, pinpointing the lack ofrevolutionary spiritand responsibility on theparty cadres andgovernment ofŽ cials. ForKim JongII’ s perceptionsof the partyand the state, see hisaddress at the50th anniversary of Kimilsung University on 7 December 1996, whichwas reportedin ‘ Remarks made December 7,1996 by Great General Kim JongII’ , VantagePoint , 20(4), 1997, pp 1 – 4,http:/ /www.cowin.kois.go.kr/nkorea/monca/vpoint/9704/2.html. 9 SWLinton,‘ NorthKorea underthe son’ , WashingtonQuarterly ,19,1996, pp 3 – 17. 10 Quotedin Chung Kyu-Sup, ‘ Areshufe inthe power hierarchy under Kim Jong-II’s leadership,and an analyticstudy on its stability’ , VantagePoint ,20(7),July 1997, p 3. 11 After thethree-year mourningperiod ended, however, he reportedly conducted a publicexecution of nine high-rankingofŽ cials inSeptember 1997 on charges oftreason and espionage. They included the Party secretary SoGwan-Hi, a four-stargeneral Li Bong-Won, and seven leaders ofthe Kimilsung Socialist Youth League.See Agence France Presse news reports20 January 1998. 12 EIU, CountryReport: South Korea North Korea 4th Quarter 1997 , p 44. 13 Forinstance, the new defence minister,Choe Gwang, who had succeeded OhJin-U, was nota younger generalbut rather a77-yearold revolutionary who had served Kim IISungfrom the beginning. 14 The763 military leaders promotedin 1992 – 93included 140 second-generation general ofŽ cers. Advance- ment alsoreached outto third-generation military leaders withthe promotion of 524 colonels to major-generals.Nevertheless, 63.6%(7/ 11)of vice-marshals, 62.5%(10/ 16)of generals and3 2.4%(11/ 34) ofcolonel generals were promotedafter Kim JongIl’ s father’s death.For more details,see Kim PanSuk, ‘WillNorth Korea blink?’, p261;H Takesada, ‘TheNorth Korean military threat under Kim JongII’ , in Henriksen& Mo, NorthKorea After Kim IISung , pp 72– 73;and ‘ Solvingeconomic woes andeasing militarypressure, key to survival of Kim JongII regime’, VantagePoint ,20(11), 1997. 15 AAJordan& JHKu,‘ Copingwith North Korea’ , WashingtonQuarterly ,21(1), 1998, pp 33 – 46. 16 Traditionallyit is ‘honour’that has reallybeen respected amongKoreans far more thanmoney or power. Thusthe North Korean older generation, which is still imbused with traditional values, is more likelyto respect honoursthan power, compared with the younger generation. 17 Interviewwith North Korean army coloneldefector Choe Ju-Whal, 25 March 1997. See alsoChung Kyu-Sup,‘ Areshufe inthe power hierarchy under Kim Jong-II’s leadership’; andChon Hyon-Joon, ‘Structureof the power elite ofnorth Korea’ , KoreanJournal of National UniŽ cation ,SpecialEdition 1994, pp 5– 52. 18 See ‘Remarks made December 7,1996 by Great General Kim JongII’ . 19 Kim JongII has greatlyelevated therelative statusof military Ž gures vis-a`-vis theparty cadres. For example,vice-marshals, whoused to be ranked outside the top 30 oreventhe top 50, are nowplaced above PartyCentral Committee secretaries andvice premiers butjust below Politburo members at major ceremonies. Kim gavehonours to the army byconducting a series ofmassive promotionsof military generals—19 generals inOctober 1995, six generals inFebruary 1997, 123 generals inApril 1997, 22 generals inApril1998, 79 generals inApril 1999. He alsoprovided the KPA withvarious economic beneŽ ts andadvantages, and military personnel get the highest material rewards—salaries, foodrations, apartments, cars, etc. 20 ‘Freshpolicies unlikely from Kim JongIl as PartyGeneral Secretary’, VantagePoint ,20(10), 1997; EIU, CountryReport: South Korea North Korea 4th Quarter 1997 , p 43. 21 ‘Ceremonyheld to mark Kim’s becoming NDC Chairman4 years ago’, VantagePoint ,20(4), 1997; North KoreaThis Week ,75,2000, p 2,at http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/services. 22 NorthKorea This Week ,79,2000, p 4. 23 However,this does not necessarily mean atotalreversal ofthe party – army relationshipand a downgrading ofthe party below the army. 24 Formore details,see EIU, CountryReport: South Korea North Korea 3rd Quarter 1997 , p 43; and ‘Military’s increased rolein the economy’ , VantagePoint ,21(2), 1998. 25 Amongthe 27 specialised departmentsand the secretariat ofŽces inthe Party Secretariat Bureau,the Organisationand Guidance Department isthe de facto highestorgan and a core ofŽce forthe maintenance ofpower. Not only is the OGD responsiblefor the guidance of party activities and control of the private lives ofcadres, italso gets involved in a widevariety of state activitiesand military affairs. See Korea Herald, AHandbookon North Korea ,Seoul:Naewoe Press, 1996;Chung Kyu-sup, ‘ Areshufe inthe power hierarchyunder Kim JongIl’ s leadership’; andChon Hyun-Joon, ‘ Structureof the power elite ofNorth Korea’, pp16 – 17. 26 Organisationallythe General Staffis undercontrol of the Armed Forces Ministry,but functionally it is separated fromthe latter. In peacetime theministry takes charge ofmilitary administration, while the General Stafftakes themilitary operational command. In wartime theSupreme Commander takes overboth militaryadministration and operational command directly through the General Staff,bypassing the Armed Forces Ministry.Thanks to such an idiosyncratic dual chain of command, the two maintain a delicate balance.See Jei GukJeon, ‘ Kim JongIl’ s rideon the tiger KPA:atwopronged strategy towards the military’, KoreanJournal of Defense Analysis ,11(1), 1999, pp 127 – 146. 778 KIMJONG IL’SBALANCING ACT INTHE RULING CIRCLE

27 TheGeneral Staffis incharge of‘ pure’military affairs suchas militarystrategy, operations, training and exercises. Onthe other hand, the General PoliticalBureau is apartyagent implanted into the army. Followingdirectives from the Party Central Committee, itsupervises military activities, collects information onthe behaviour of ofŽ cers andreports directly to the Party Central Committee andKim JongIl. However, itis nota totallyfree agent.There isa thirdparty, the Security Guard Command, which allegedly exercises indirectcontrol over the General PoliticalBureau. The Security Guard Command is acore military intelligenceand surveillance agency under the direct control of Kim JongIl and connected with the State SecurityAgency. Like the General PoliticalBureau, the Security Command has itsown agencies at every levelof the military units down to battalion level in the Armed Forces Ministryand the General Staff Department.Through these agencies itdetects andarrests anti-Kim,anti-revolutionary and anti-system elements withinthe KPA,investigatesall kindsof crimes amongmilitary personnel, and conducts extensive politicalsurveillance over high-ranking ofŽ cers. Hence, evenpolitical ofŽ cers inthe General Political Bureaumay notbe immunefrom its activities. For more details,see Jei GukJeon, ‘ Kim JongIl’ s rideon the Tiger KPA’, pp 140–141;and Choe Ju-Hwal, ‘ The KPA’sSecurityGuard Command: its organizations and activities’, mimeo, 1999. 28 ChungKyu-Sup, ‘ Areshufe inthe power hierarchy under Kim Jong-Il’s Leadership’. 29 Interviewwith North Korean defectors ChoeYoung-Ho and Cha Sung-Keun, 29 April 1997. 30 RyooKihl-jae, ‘ NorthKorean regime underKim Jong-illeadership: changes in systems andpolitics’ , VantagePoint ,20(5), 1997. 31 Forexample, celebrating Kim’ s 58thbirthday in February 2000, the KPA helda ‘rallyof loyalty’ , where vice-marshal ChoMyong Rok, chief ofthe General PoliticalBureau in the Armed Forces Ministry, emphasised:‘ Allservicemen are requiredto become heroesand self-sacriŽ cial warriors tosafeguard the commandpost of revolution [Kim JongIl] even at thecost of their lives, faithfully following the Supreme Commander[Kim JongIl] at anycircumstances’ . Also,on 26 February, 2000, the KPA helda meetingof politicalofŽ cers fromall companiesto make them unconditionallyloyal to thetop military commander Kim Jong Il. See NorthKorea This Week ,73/75,17 February/ 2March2000. 32 After theelection the SPA has heldits session every year. At theŽ rst sessionof the tenth-term SPA held in September1998, it amended the constitution, reshuf ed the state apparatusand appointed key political Žgures.At thesecond session in April 1999 it approved the governmental budget for FY 1999and enacted thePeople’ s EconomicPlanning Act. At thethird session in April2000 it approved the governmental budget forFY 2000,enacted theEducation Act, ExternalEconomy Arbitration Act andCivil Aviation Law, and ratiŽed the new treatywith Russia. 33 Formore detailson the institutional restructuring, see Ministryof UniŽ cation, ‘ TheResults of the First Sessionof the Tenth-Term SPA’,internaldocument, 6 September1998. 34 Accordingto Pyongyang’ s rhetoric,the three pillarsof Kangsungdaeguk are the juche (self-reliance) ideology,the gun and science andtechnology. Among the three, ‘ thegun’ has beenstrongly emphasised. Inthis respect, NorthKorea’ s approachto Kangsungdaeguk is basedon the ‘ militaryŽ rst,economy later’ formula,obsessed with its own style of socialism. Theregime called fora struggleto revive the ‘ economic structureof our own style’ based on the ‘ self-reliant heavyindustry’ . 35 Kim JongIl never visited North Korea’ s economiczones during the three-year mourningperiod. Yet he made anon-the-spot guidance tour to Jagang Province in January 1998 for the Ž rst time since hisfather’ s death.Thereafter, hehas oftenmade visitsfor economic guidance, for example, eight trips in 1998 and 18 tripsin 1999. See ‘NorthKorea in1998’ , VantagePoint ,21,1998; and ‘ Assessment onprospect of the NorthKorean economy’ , KoreanUniŽ cation Bulletin ,12,1999, p 6. 36 NorthKorea This Week ,71;3 February2000, p 3.As partof this, the External Economy Arbitration Law was enacted at thethird session of the tenth-term Supreme People’ s Assembly inApril 2000. 37 Inorigin, its mosquito-net theory emerged at asummitbetween Kim IlSung and Deng Xiao Ping, where Dengurged Kim to‘ openthe windows to get some fresh air’, notingthat the Chinese economy was booming because ofa ‘small windowopening to the West’ , butKim IlSung reportedly replied that ‘ ies come in whenyou open the window to the West’ . Based onthis analogy, North Korea has pursueda two-pronged strategyof ‘ controlledreform’ : onthe one hand, it has triedto open a windowto the West inorder to get some ‘fresh air’— foreigncapital andtechnology; on the other hand, it has assiduouslyinstalled mosquito netsto prevent ‘ harmfulinsets’ — capitalistideology and culture— from coming in with the fresh air. 38 Forexample, in September 1996 a NorthKorean heavily-armed submarine penetrated the South at thevery time whena businessforum was beingheld in the Rajin-Sonbong free-trade zoneto attract foreign investments.The net result was notmerely todiscourage foreign investment into the North but also to sharplyreduce foodaid from the international community. 39 Althoughthe economic hardship alone might not be automatically translated into political unrest, it could bea catalyst leadingto internal disputes and political instability.

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