Quantitative Analysis of Palestinian-Jordanian Identity and Opinions Toward Refugees
Angela Lin
MMSS Senior Thesis 2017, Northwestern University
Advisor: Jason Seawright
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Jason Seawright, for his guidance, time, and patience. He is the best example I know of someone who combines quantitative and qualitative methods into interesting questions and meaningful research. I would also like to thank Julian Caracotsios, Aniket Pajwani, and Benjamin Lim for saving me hours through their Stata advice and knowledge. In addition, I want to thank the Northwestern MENA department, especially Professors Fatima Khan, Ragy Mikhaeel, and Fadia Antabli for encouraging and guiding my passion for Arabic language and for expanding my personal interests beyond my local community. I would like to thank Office of Undergraduate Research,
The Buffett Institute, and the MMSS program for allowing me to pursue these interests by funding my research abroad in Amman.
Finally, thank you to the countless people in Jordan who advised my research design, helped me navigate a country I had absolutely no prior experience in, and for making Amman a truly special place for me. Thanks especially to Faisal Al-Hadeed (aka the Kim Kardashian of
Amman) for using his wasta power in connecting me with a multitude of sources for my interview research. Finally, the biggest thank you to Obada Belbesi for teaching me to overcome my fears of speaking Arabic. Without him I would still be stuttering in broken Arabic on the streets of Amman with zero surveys done.
1 Abstract
Most statistical and econometric research on attitudes toward refugees and immigrants focuses on host countries that vary greatly from the displaced population. Little quantitative research is done on host countries with similar language, religion, and geography as the incoming populations, as is the case with Jordan and its Syrian population. After Lebanon and
Turkey, Jordan has accepted the third highest number of Syrian refugees. However, Jordan exhibits a unique historical dynamic between its citizens and refugees: despite being the second most water-scarce country in the world and a non-signatory of the 1951 UNHCR convention, it is the only Arab country to naturalize Palestinian refugees. Today, Palestinians constitute over half of the Jordanian population, with a significant portion of the country sharing genealogical history with Palestine. While the integration of Palestinian refugees into Jordanian society is considered an economic and social success, the sudden influx of Syrian refugees presents an opportunity to understand how Jordanian-Palestinian identity may influence perceptions toward
Syrian refugees. I hypothesize that Palestinian identity has a positive correlation with opinions toward Syrian refugees. Using a stratified sample collection of surveys from Amman, Jordan,
Feeling Thermometers, Social Distance Scales, and List Experiments are used to gain a comprehensive understanding of the direction and magnitude of opinions. Overall, I conclude that that self-perceived Palestinian identity in Jordan does have a significant effect on positive feelings towards Syrian refugees. In addition, Palestinian-Jordanians do not exhibit any negative feelings toward Syrians in terms of taking resources, jobs, or bringing political instability. Non-
Palestinian Jordanians, however, tend to view Syrian as taking too many resources, but also think that Palestinians bring political instability and unwanted competition in the labor market.
2 Background and Literature Review
Like many territories in the Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the birth of the Jordanian nation state was quick and ad-hoc, prompted by Britain and France’s desires to govern and promote progress throughout the post-war region. Met with Arab revolt in their partitioned states, Transjordan was created and given to King Abdullah I in 1921 by the British in exchange for ceased attempts at unifying Arabs in the region and overturning the British mandate. Prior to European influences, the area of Transjordan had no experience with political community, comprised primarily of Bedouin tribes that were under little, if any, influence of the
Ottoman Empire (Cleveland 198).
Following the end of the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, Arab officials held the Jericho
Conference in December in response to the establishment of the State of Israel and the considerable number of displaced Palestinians fleeing the occupied land. Transjordanian and
Palestinian officials saw vital importance in preserving Arab control, thus seeking the unification of the West Bank and East Jerusalem with Transjordan. Shortly after, the annexation of the West
Bank reached de-facto recognition from the General Armistice Agreements of 1949, which King
Abdullah I followed by officially changed the name of the Kingdom to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The 1950s saw the political and social unification of Palestinians and Transjordanians, with the House of Deputies and House of Notables eventually declaring "complete unity between the two sides of the Jordan and their union in one state...[with] equality of the rights and duties of all citizens” (7 Rashid). At this time, The Kingdom now included nearly 1.5 million people, where over half a million were Palestinian refugees who automatically became citizens of
Jordan, thus making Jordan the first and only Arab country to naturalize Palestinian refugees.
Today, scholarship that examines modern Palestinian-Jordanian identity takes a relatively
3 macrocosmic approach, assuming that identity is dictated by a history of anti-colonial, pan-Arab nationalism and resistance to Israel (Massad 164). Other sources also suggest that tensions between the two ethnicities, however, arise from socioeconomic reasons (Brand 1995).
Regardless, relations are complicated with the genealogical mixing of Jordanians and
Palestinians, which most studies on identity attempting to sort out identity through a historical or anthropological lens that does not incorporate the context of the Syrian refugee crisis.
There is extensive quantitative research regarding attitudes toward both authorized and unauthorized immigrants (Murray 2013) and refugees. However, much of this research focuses on America (Fussell 2014) and Western European countries (Sniderman 2004), regions that resettle relatively small numbers of the world’s displaced. While Jordan is one of the largest hosts for refugees in the world, I have not found any studies that focus specifically on opinions toward refugees in Jordan. Lazarev and Sharma (2015) have studied Turkish opinions toward
Syrian refugees, but primarily focus on religion and religiosity as a predictor of prejudice toward refugees.
It is common for social scientists to focus on the relationship between attitudes toward refugees and specific factors, such as race (Oliver 2013), location (Hopkins 2010), and economic wellbeing (Malhotra 2013). However, these frameworks are not easily applicable to Jordanians and their Palestinian counterparts; the two share similar languages, religion, and culture, making integration easier and opinion toward the “other” less polarized. However, the recent influx of
Syrian refugees into Jordan presents an opportunity to compare attitudes toward refugees across the non-binary identities of Palestinian and Jordanian, giving insight to how in-group hierarchies across Jordanians, Palestinians, and Syrians are expressed, if at all.
4 Many of the above researchers acknowledge that the expression of identity is a complex interaction that cannot be reduced to clean-cut compartments and external factors (Sniderman
2004, Malhotra 2013, Lazarev and Sharma 2015) While it is generally understood that concerns over the economy, and not necessarily national identity in specific, have a significant effect on public opinion toward refugees, I plan to focus on the effect, whether conscious or unconscious, of Palestinian identity on the perception toward refugees, and how opinions toward “the other”
(if this is an applicable label) are formed. Some questions that I hope to answer: What demographic, social, and economic factors shape opinions toward refugees? Do Jordanians and
Jordanian-Palestinian descendants have different opinions toward Syrian refugees than
Jordanians do? For what reason? How do Jordanian opinions toward Syrian refugees and
Palestinian refugees differ?
I hypothesize that because those who identify as Palestinian in Jordan are aware of
Jordan’s continuation of resources, aid, and empathy to their ongoing displacement from Israel, they will be more sympathetic toward Syrian refugees within the current crisis. I find that while there is significant a positive correlation between magnitude of self-stated Palestinian identity and “favorability” toward Syrians, the net increase in favorability between Palestinian and
Jordanian groups is only about 20% in favor of Palestinians compared to Syrians. In addition, those who are exclusively Jordanian have greater concerns about the country’s resources and economy, while those who are Palestinian show no statistical significance of such concerns, emphasizing that national identity may greatly affect how one views a Syrian refugee within their country’s economy.
5 Data
The data were collected through face-to-face surveys over a period of 10 weeks in
Amman, Jordan during the summer. Participants were permanent residents or equal status that were the age of 18 or above. The surveys were written in Modern Standard Arabic and were given in public spaces, such as shopping centers, cafes, parks, and around mosques through a stratified sample across eight neighborhoods in West Amman. Questions were answered in
Levantine Arabic. Overall, 423 surveys were collected, and 54 were thrown out due to blank answers or failure to meet one of the above standards, making a total of 369 surveys.
To form the identity measure, participants were asked to list all the ethnicities they identified with, and if multiple choices were chosen, they were then asked to note which ethnicity they identified with the most. The data was then coded into those who were exclusively
Jordanian (J), those who were Jordanian-Palestinian but identified more as Jordanian ((P
Palestinian. Out of the 369 surveys used, 225 participants identified as Jordanian, 40 as (P 63 as (P>J), and 41 as Other. Three opinion measures were used to understand opinion in a comprehensive manner: A feeling thermometer, a Bogardus Social Distance Scale, and finally a list experiment. The three measures were asked toward both Syrians and Palestinians. The feeling thermometer asked participants to indicate on a scale of 0-30 degrees Celsius the extent in which they feel “warmly” or “coldly” toward the inquired demographic, with 0 being the coldest, 15 being neutral (described as no particular leaning) and 30 being the warmest. 6 The feeling thermometer is typically given on a scale of 0-100 because its historically been used to survey American populations who use Fahrenheit. However, the scale was changed from 0-30 to conform to reasonable Celsius temperatures. The Bogardus Social Distance (Bogardus 1930) scale asked participants indicate their level of a comfort (a scale of 1-4) regarding a series of statements about social relations with the inquired demographics, for example having a Syrian/Palestinian as a neighbor or married within their family (a sample of a survey can be found in Appendix A). Overall the scale was comprised of five statements that were assumed to be cumulative: any agreement with any item implies agreement with all preceding items, and each item is equidistant from each other. Because of this assumption, the five questions could be comprised into one metric that added all scores (which were coded numerically from 0-3) across all questions together, giving a singular measure for both Palestinians and Syrians that ranged on a scale of 0-15, with 0 being the least socially comfortable, and 15 being the most. Finally, in addition to the above direct measures of opinion, a list experiment was used to understand specific opinions toward Syrians and Palestinians. List Experiments are typically used in opinion research that asks about sensitive questions such as drug use, sexual activity, or racial prejudice (Imai, Park, Greene 2015). The survey is given to two groups, the treatment and control. In both groups, participants were to provide the total number of statements on a list to which they answer affirmatively. Respondents were not asked which statements they answer affirmatively, only how many. In the control survey, the list included only four items of non- sensitive statements, such as “I have an older brother.” For the treatment group, the list contained a sensitive treatment statement in addition to the same non-sensitive items as the control survey, such as “I think Syrians bring political instability.” It is important to note that in 7 general, questions about other Arab ethnicities, regardless of their nature, are considered inappropriate to ask, especially by a foreigner. Such questions may presume that certain demographics do not belong to each other, or maybe even differ from one another in a way beyond surface-level ethnicity. The list experiment is meant to combat these potential feelings of discomfort that potentially lead to a social desirability bias by allowing participants to protect their specific opinions (List-Experiment Technique) The survey considered multiple demographic variables, such as participants’ gender, age, salary, education, religion, and employment. Aside from the list experiment question, the survey was given in a multiple-choice format, which resulted in categorical rather than discrete data for all demographic variables. However, only age, salary, and education were considered in the final regression model due to the small variance in religion and employment. In addition, age, salary, and education were treated as continuous variables rather than binary variables for simplicity and to maximize the degrees of freedom within the model. A quadratic of each continuous demographic control was also included. Table 1a and 1b show results for continuous and binary variables, respectively. Table 1a shows the mean and standard deviation in parenthesis, while Table 1b exhibits the number of participants and the percentage of their respective identity groups. Table 1b also shows the speculative biases that are associated with the nonrandom sample selection, particularly those associated with gender, age and socioeconomic status. For example, its less common for Jordanian women to be out in public spaces such as the ones listed above, as they usually spend time in private areas such as houses, smaller coffee shops, and occasionally in malls. This is apparent in the data, with roughly 66% of the total sample being male. In addition, the average age category was 1.858, where category 1 represents 18-24, and 8 category 2 represents ages 25- 34. Overall, this places the average age of participants around 32 years old, assuming that sampled participants are distributed equally across all years. Following the same logic, the average salary is around 633 JD a month, and the average education implies that most participants have had some college coursework or vocational training. While gender and does not have immediately obvious biases in identity or opinions toward Syrians, it is likely that age does. For example, younger generations may have less connection with the Palestinian homeland, as they are significantly less likely to have been to Palestine or have immediate family in Palestine. In addition, the sample was done in West Amman, which is considered wealthier and more educated than East half of the city. Most important, East Amman holds many refugee camps and neighborhoods (Habersky). Leaving out a significant sample of refugees or descendants of refugees (Palestinian, Syrian, and Iraqi) not only skews the identity breakdown of the sample, but also their opinions and feelings toward refugees. 9 Table 1a Summary Statistics for Demographic Variables treated as Continuous J (P Table 1b Summary Statistics for Binary Demographic Variables J (P 10 Methodology A simple linear regression was used for the three opinion measures, with the list experiment regression being the most complicated because of its inclusion of a treatment dummy. All opinion measures were asked about both Syrians and Palestinians. Equation 1 shows the most saturated regression model used for both the feeling thermometer and the social distance scales, where Opinioni is the respective measure that increases as “favorability” or “comfort” towards the inquired demographic increases (between 0- 30 for the feeling thermometer and 0-15 for the social distance scale). The coefficients on each identity group represent the degree of variance from the baseline group (residents of Amman, Jordan who do not fall within any of the three identity categories). Equation 1: 2 2 Opinioni = β0 + β1Ji + β2(P In addition to the regression, I also test if the opinion measures of either Palestinian group differ from the Jordanian group, which can be exhibited in the following two-sided hypothesis tests. Hypothesis 1a: Jordanians (Ji) differ in opinion from Palestinians who identify more as Jordanian ((P H0: β1 = β2 à H0: β1 – β2= 0 H1: β1 ≠ β2 H1: β1 – β2 ≠ 0 Hypothesis 1b: Jordanians (Ji) differ in opinion Palestinians who identify more as Palestinian ((P>J)i) H0: β1 = β3 à H0: β1 – β3= 0 H1: β1 ≠ β3 H1: β1 – β3 ≠ 0 11 Equation 2 shows the regression used for the list experiment, where Yi is the number of questions answered affirmatively (between 0-5), but includes Ti as a dummy variable where Ti = 1 if the participant received the treatment survey and Ti = 0 if the participant received the control survey. Equation 2 Yi = α0 + α1Ji + α2(P I first test if the treatment effects (the difference between the control and treatment values) for each identity group are significant. The treatment effect is the coefficient of the Treatment (Ti) coefficient added to the coefficient on the interaction term between identity variable and Treatment dummy. The treatment effect can be interpreted as the percentage of identity group that agrees with the treatment question. These tests are given below in Hypothesis 2a, 2b, 2c. Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c: The Treatment Effects of each identity group differs from 0 For Ji For (P H0: α4 + α5 = 0 H0: α4 + α6 = 0 H0: α4 + α6 = 0 H1: α4 + α5 ≠ 0 H1: α4 + α6 ≠ 0 H1: α4 + α6 ≠ 0 12 Similar to Equation 1, I will test the difference of treatment effects between the Jordanian group and the two Palestinian groups, which can be given in the following two-sided hypothesis tests. These tests will indicate whether Jordanians and Palestinians feel significantly different about the inquired demographic, as given in percentages measured by the list experiment. Hypothesis 2d: Opinions of Jordanians and Jordanian-Palestinians who identify more as Jordanian do not differ H0: α4 + α5 = α4 + α6 à H0: α5 – α6 = 0 H1: α4 + α5 ≠ α4 + α6 H1: α5 – α6 ≠ 0 Hypothesis 2e Opinions of Jordanians and Jordanian-Palestinians who identify more as Palestinian do not differ H0: α4 + α5 = α4 + α7 à H0: α5 – α7 = 0 H1: α4 + α5 ≠ α4 + α7 H1: α5 – α7 ≠ 0 13 Results of the Feeling Thermometer and Social Distance Scale Table 2a shows the regression results for the feeling thermometer and the social distance scale. The three identity groups show significant positive differences (significant at 1%) from the baseline group in the feeling thermometer score towards Palestinians. If the three identity variables are seen as gradations of Palestinian identity, then are there is a positive relationship between level of Palestinian identity and feelings toward Palestinians. Jordanians on average give feel 3.65 degrees warmer toward Palestinians, while (P However, in contrast to the feeling thermometer toward Palestinians, the coefficient on (P>J)s in the feeling thermometer toward Syrians is near 0 (-0.73) and also statistically insignificant, supporting the hypothesis that Palestinians are more likely to feel sympathy toward Syrians compared to those identify primarily as Jordanian. Rows 4 and 5 show the differences in coefficients between Jordanians and both Palestinian groups, allowing us to understand the magnitude of differences in opinion between the identity groups. The difference between Jordanian and (P>J)s (Row 5) coefficients is significant toward both Palestinians and Jordanians. Jordanians feel 3.14 degrees colder than (P>J)s toward Palestinians, and 4.91 degrees colder toward Syrians. The differences in opinion between Jordanians and (P Palestinians who identify as Jordanian exhibit around the same magnitude of “warmness” toward Syrians. Like the Feeling Thermometer, the Social Distance Scale exhibits a positive relationship between Palestinian identity and opinions toward Palestinians and Syrians: as the magnitude of 14 Palestinian identity increases, so does comfort toward both Syrians and Palestinians. Also similar to the feeling thermometer, the coefficients on all identity groups toward Palestinians are positive, but negative toward Syrians. However, while the coefficients of (P Understandably, both (P Unlike the feeling thermometer, the differences in levels of social comfort between Jordanians and both Palestinian identity groups are similar in magnitude and direction toward both Palestinians and Syrians. However, these differences say nothing about the original “score” of the identity groups, which is potentially misleading. For example, its possible that all groups feel more negatively about Syrian refugees, which would exhibit similar differences, but ignore the important normative value of the original numbers. 15 Table 2a Regression results for the Feeling Thermometer and Social Distance Scale Feeling Thermometer Social Distance Scale FT toward FT toward FT SDS toward SDS toward SDS Palestinians Syrians Difference Palestinians Syrians Difference (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) J 3.650 -5.651 9.301 0.452 -2.912 3.364 (1.071)*** (1.747)*** (1.697)*** (0.486) (0.840)*** (0.802)*** (2) (P 16 To address this problem, I define a new variable that is the difference between Palestinian opinion measure and the Syrian opinion measure (the difference of the dependent variable from the two regressions), which can be interpreted as the amount that the identity group differs in opinion toward Palestinians compared to Syrians. For example, if the output is 3.5, then on average, there is a difference of 3.5 in a score between opinions toward Palestinians and opinions toward Syrians for this group. The results are given in Table 2b, where FT is the column for the Feeling Thermometer and SDS is the column for the Social Distance Scale. Jordanians and (P Palestinians than Syrians (9.30 and 9.61 degrees, respectively). (P>J)s feel slightly warmer, with difference of 7.52 degrees warmer, about a 20% increase from the other two identity groups. The social distance scale exhibits similar differences for all groups, with Jordanians and (P (3.364 and 3.282, respectively). (P>Js) exhibit a slightly warmer net change in opinions toward Syrians, about a 10% increase in social comfort compared to Jordanians and (P 17 Table 2b Difference between Palestinian and Syrian Feeling Thermometers and Social Distance Scales FT Difference SDS Difference (1) J 9.301 3.364 (0.697)*** (0.802)*** (2) (P 18 Results of the List Experiment Table 3 lists the coefficients in Equation 2, the regression for the list experiments. While the coefficients do not give insight to the individual treatment effects, each List Experiment does show that, statistically speaking, those with the treatment survey (the coefficients on variable T), regardless of their ethnicity, do not actually answer more questions than that of the control survey. This changes as we look at individual identity groups, however. Table 3 List Experiment Regression Results List Experiment 1 List Experiment 2 List Experiment 3 “The governments spends too “______are taking our jobs” “______bring political much money helping ______” instability Palestinians Syrians Palestinians Syrians Palestinians Syrians J 0.285 -0.123 -0.059 -0.060 -0.075 -0.017 (0.251) (0.246) (0.244) (0.225) (0.242) (0.234) (P 19 Tables 4a, 4b, 4c exhibit the coefficients and respective standard errors for the three list experiments that asked about both Syrians and Palestinians, giving a total of six questions asked. The Treatment coefficients (Columns 1 and 4) give the predicted number of affirmative questions answered for the treatment group, while the Control coefficients (Columns 2 and 5) give the predicted number of affirmative questions answered for the control group. The Treatment Effect (Columns 3 and 6) exhibit the differences between Treatment and Control to find the overall treatment effect, or the predicted percentage of identity group that agrees with respective statement. 20 In List Experiment 1, only the exclusively Jordanian (J) group is statistically significant, and only toward Syrians, implying that neither Palestinian group believes that the Government spends too much money helping Syrians. In contrast, roughly 91% of Jordanians sampled believe that the government is giving too much money to Syrians, significant at a 1% level. Similar to the results of the Feeling Thermometer and Social Distance Scale, negative opinions toward Syrians decrease as Palestinian identity gets stronger. No groups significantly believe that the Government spends too much money helping Palestinians. Table 4a List Experiment 1: “The Government spends too much money helping ______” Palestinians Syrians Treatment Control Treatment Treatment Control Treatment (1) (2) Effect (3) (4) (5) Effect (6) J 2.222 2.170 0.052 3.029 2.021 0.909 (0.389)*** (0.396)*** (0.142) (0.382)** (0.389)*** (0.140)*** (P 21 Similar to List Experiment 1, List Experiment 2 is only statistically significant for the exclusively Jordanian group. A large majority of Jordanians, about 87%, believe that Palestinians are taking jobs from them, significant at a 1% level. Neither Palestinian group believes that Palestinians are taking jobs, and none of the three identity groups likely believe that Syrians are taking jobs, which is understandable, given that refugees do not have the right to work in Jordan, and often resort to taking labor jobs that few others want. Table 4b List Experiment 2: “______are taking our jobs” Palestinians Syrians Treatment Control Treatment Treatment Control Treatment (1) (2) Effect (3) (4) (5) Effect (6) J 2.863 1.894 0.870 1.634 1.550 0.084 (0.379)*** (0.387)*** (0.139)*** (0.350)*** (0.357)*** (0.128) (P 22 Finally, List Experiment 3 again shows only statistically significant treatment effects for Jordanians, with roughly 64% of Jordanians believing that Palestinians bring political instability and 38% believing that Syrians bring political instability. The Treatment effects toward Syrians are insignificant for all groups, implying that none of the groups believe that Syrians bring political instability. Table 4c List Experiment 3: “______bring political instability” Palestinians Syrians Treatment Control Treatment Treatment Control Treatment (1) (2) Effect (3) (4) (5) Effect (6) J 2.902 2.264 0.638 2.142 1.762 0.380 (0.376)*** (0.383)*** (0.138)*** (0.363)*** (0.370)*** (0.133)** (P 23 However, similar to the Feeling Thermometers and Social Distance Scales, it is helpful to look at differences between groups. Jordanians are 63% more likely than (P In addition, Jordanians are 83% more likely than (P Jordanians are 60% more likely than (P Table 4d Difference in Treatment Effects between Jordanians and both Palestinian groups List Experiment 1 List Experiment 2 List Experiment 3 “The governments spends too “______are taking our jobs” “______bring political much money helping ______” instability” Palestinians Syrians Palestinians Syrians Palestinians Syrians J – (P 24 Conclusion The feeling thermometer and the social distance scale both show a positive relationship between level of Palestinian identity and favorability toward Syrian refugees. However, despite this relationship, Jordanians and both Jordanian-Palestinian identity groups show roughly only 10-20 percent differences in favorability between Palestinians and Syrians. Overall, this means that roughly 10-20 percent of self-identified Palestinians in Jordan are more likely to feel favorable toward Syrians (compared to Palestinians) than Jordanians and Jordanian-Palestinians who are more Jordanian. However, it is important to mention that both the feeling thermometer and social distance scale are direct measures that are vulnerable to participants lying about their answers. In addition, tendencies to lie about opinions may vary across both identity groups as well as inquired participants. For example, it is possible that Palestinians are more likely that Jordanians to be truthful about their opinions toward Palestinians. In addition, it is also possible that all identity groups are more likely to be truthful when asked about Palestinians rather than Syrians, because the latter group may elicit more negative opinions that are socially inappropriate to state. However, while 10-20 percent is not an intuitively substantial change between identity groups, in List Experiment 1, we saw that a large majority of Jordanians (91%) believe that the Jordanian government spends too much money helping Syrians, while neither Palestinian identity group believes there is an overexertion of government resources. This is also interesting in contrast to the Feeling Thermometers and Social Distance scales, which have less drastic results, emphasizing that Palestinians may be more socioeconomically sympathetic to Syrians. While its important not to read too far into these results, this is in line with Palestinian socioeconomic integration into Jordan. While many Palestinians comprise the wealthy elite in 25 Jordan, a significant portion of Palestinians live in slums and refugee “camps” (now more like neighborhoods) in the poorer parts of Amman. Such camps have relied on government benefits and subsidies since their sudden creation in the 1950s (“Jabal El-Hussein Camp”). A small number (15,000) of Palestinians have also fled Syria to Jordan since the crisis (“UN Says Palestinian Refugees from Syria Face 'increasingly Grave' Situation Region Wide."), which may also contribute to Jordanian-Palestinian favorability toward government spending on refugee aid. List Experiment 2 shows that a large majority of Jordanians, about 87%, believe that Palestinians are taking jobs. There are a couple of possible explanations for this result. In general, Palestinians in Jordan are wealthier and better educated, stemming from the economic success of their first generation refugees who came primarily in 1948. Brand notes that first- generation Palestinians can be divided into four groups: those residing in refugee camps, middle class merchants, notable businessmen, and those who left for the Gulf to work (49). Jordanians in this sample may feel resentment toward Palestinians who comprise the business elite. In addition, although neither Palestinian group believes that Palestinians are taking jobs, it is also important to understand that the sample is geared toward wealthy Palestinians. Palestinians who live in run-down camps or low-income refugee neighborhoods may feel differently, and may possibly feel resentment toward their better-off counterparts. More research should be done to examine how the polarization of socioeconomic status in the Palestinian-Jordanian population affects perceptions of the self and others. List Experiment 3 showed that 64% of Jordanians believe that Palestinians bring political instability, yet fewer believe that Syrians bring political instability. It is unintuitive that a relatively high percentage of Jordanians believe that Palestinians bring political instability, especially because only 38% believe the same with Syrians. One possible explanation for the 26 number is the vicinity of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, which Jordanians may be weary towards due to their long-winded history of absorbing both political and social consequences of the conflict. The Israel-Palestinian conflict has been ongoing since the ’48 war, with new developments and news of Palestinian revolts and Israeli violence released every day. Jordan’s absorption of the Syrian crisis is relatively short in comparison, beginning roughly 10 years ago. Most important, most Jordanians also understand that Syrians who come into the country are fleeing from the government of Bashar al-Assad, and obviously do not support his policies and ideology. In contrast, many Palestinians may support Hamas, the Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas, although not an official political representative of Palestine, is banned by the Jordanian government and is considered a terrorist group by many countries. Some Jordanians may feel weary of Palestinians who come into the country due to a perceived support of Hamas (Profile: Hamas Palestinian movement). 27 Limitations of the Identity Measure and Future Research Ultimately, the survey and experiment design was based on methodology and past studies that were undertaken in primarily Western countries where the host population and the immigrant population differ significantly. Future research that focuses on relations between Jordanians, Palestinians, and Syrians should proof conceptions cultural and linguistic nuances in survey questions. For example, Modern Standard Arabic does not have an exact word that translates into the English verb “to identify with.” Instead, “identity” is typically understood in a literal way, such as with an identity card or identity documentation. To communicate similar meanings and connotations as the Western understanding of “identity,” the Arabic words of “feelings of identity,” “hometown,” and “homeland” were used. However, such words immediately revealed complications with local and global identity. For example, interviews done in the winter of 2016 revealed that many Jordanians with Palestinian ancestry did not understand why it was necessary to differentiate between the two: even though there were clear distinctions between surface-level features like bloodline, complexion, accents, and even some cultural practices, presuming that the two identities were different immediately assumed that one did not belong with the other, a racist and offensive opinion that greatly contrasts with the norm of Arab solidarity and brotherhood in the region. To many I spoke with in interviews (as well as in handing out surveys), the label of “Jordanian” applied to anyone who lived in Jordan permanently, regardless of ancestry or ethnicity. This potentially presents an issue because it may lead to an ambiguous number of those who identify as “Jordanian” and may actually see no differences between Jordanian and Palestinians. This hypothesis is supported in the breakdown of the of the sample: its estimated that roughly 30% of Jordan does not share genealogical roots with Palestine, yet over 60% of the survey sample identified themselves as exclusively 28 Jordanian, a 50% overestimation if identity was based solely on ethnic roots. While some of this discrepancy could be attributed measurement error, its likely that a portion of it is attributed to participants who identify as Jordanian because they believe there is no difference between “Jordanian” and “Palestinian.” Overall, while identity is a self-conceived perception, this does not necessarily present an issue for the mathematical analysis or even intuition. 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Web 31 Appendix A – Sample of the Treatment Survey in English What is your age? • 18-24 • 25-34 • 35-44 • 45-54 • 55-64 • 65-74 • 75+ What is your gender? • Male • Female • Other What is your monthly income? • No income • Less than 500 JD • 500-999 JD • 1000-1499 JD • 1500-1999 JD • 2000-2499 JD • 2500-2999 JD • 3000-3499 JD • 3500-3999 JD • 4000-4449 JD • 4500-4999 JD • 5000 JD or more What is the highest level of education you have completed? • No school completed • Less than high school diploma • High school diploma or equivalent • Some college coursework • Two-year degree or vocational degree • Four-year college degree • Masters degree • PhD • Other______ Are you currently…? • Employed for wages • Self-employed • Not working 32 • Out of work but not currently looking for work • A homemaker • A student • Retired • Unable to work • Other______ What is your religion? • Sunni Islam • Shi’a Islam • Christian • Bahai • Druze • Other______ Please indicate all of the identity groups that you identify with: • Jordanian • Palestinian • Iraqi • Armenian • Circassian • Other______ Of the choices you’ve circled above, please list the identity that you identify with the most______ To what extent do you identify with this ethnicity? • I don’t identify with any particular ethnicity • I identify with this ethnicity a little • I identify with this ethnicity somewhat • I identify with this ethnicity a great deal • I only identify with this ethnicity What is your status of citizenship? • Jordanian citizen by birth • Jordanian citizen by naturalization • Palestinian citizen • Iraqi citizen • Syrian citizen • Other______ 33 Please indicate to what extent you feel comfortable if you had a Palestinian as a close relative 1. Close relative by marriage • Very uncomfortable • Uncomfortable • Neither comfortable or uncomfortable • Comfortable 2. Close personal friend • Very uncomfortable • Uncomfortable • Neither comfortable or uncomfortable • Comfortable 3. Neighbor on the same street • Very uncomfortable • Uncomfortable • Neither comfortable or uncomfortable • Comfortable 4. Co-worker in the same occupation • Very uncomfortable • Uncomfortable • Neither comfortable or uncomfortable • Comfortable 5. Citizen in my country • Very uncomfortable • Uncomfortable • Neither comfortable or uncomfortable • Comfortable Please rate how you feel about the following person on a feeling thermometer using a scale of 0 to 30. The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel toward that person, the lower the number, the colder or less favorable you feel. You can pick any number between 0 and 30. You would rate the group at the 15-degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group. Syrian 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Palestinian 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 34 Below are four things listed that may or may not apply to you. I do not want to know which ones apply to you. Only list how many apply to you. • I go to the same mosque every Friday • I live in the same area as most of my family • I own a pet other than a dog or a cat • I live with four or more people • I think the government spends too much money helping Syrians Number of statements you agree with______ • I have a brother • I have more than one sister • Soccer is my least favorite sport • I read the newspaper every day. • I think Syrians are taking our jobs Number of statements you agree with______ • I have lived outside of Jordan • I have more than two children • I watch television often • I have more than one pet • I think Syrians bring political instability Number of statements you agree with______ • My favorite subject in school was math • I own an iPhone • I have been to Spain • I have read a book in the past week • I think the government spends too much money helping Palestinians Number of statements you agree with______ • I prefer spring over fall • I have seen a movie in the last week • I often shop online • My family lives outside of Amman • I think Palestinians are taking our jobs Number of statements you agree with______ • I like listening to American music • I have been to China • I like to exercise • I have a younger brother • I think Palestinians bring political instability Number of statements you agree with______ 35