Myanmar in Transition: China, Conflict, and Ceasefire Economies in Kachin State Jenny Hedström
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4/2019 Myanmar in transition: China, conflict, and ceasefire economies in Kachin State Jenny Hedström PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | UI.SE Abstract In Myanmar, the notion that local conflicts can be halted by addressing economic rather than political grievances guides ceasefire agreements with non-state armed actors and informs regional efforts on economic development in troubled conflict areas. However, these economic development efforts are evolving alongside deeply held communal concerns about the intentions and effects of investments in areas previously controlled by ethnic minority armed actors. In this context, the Chinese government’s flagship development project in Myanmar, the Myitsone Dam in Kachin State, became a rallying point for communal protest. This led the Myanmar government to halt work on the project in 2011. Currently, Myanmar is coming under immense pressure from the Chinese government to resume work on the Myitsone dam. At the same time, however, a strong social movement is actively opposing the dam project. This has resulted in increased military tension along the two countries’ shared border. This illustrates that investments in economic infrastructure projects, while ostensibly aimed at increasing stability through economic concessions and regional development, may instead increase tension and insecurity. Keywords: Myitsone Dam; Kachin; Myanmar; development; conflict; China Author Jenny Hedström Research Fellow Umeå University © 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs Language editing: Andrew Mash Cover photo: TT Content Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. 4 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 5 Background ................................................................................................................................. 7 Competing ethno-nationalisms, 1961-1994 .................................................................................. 7 Contested politico-economic structures, 1961-1994 ................................................................... 8 Ceasefire economies and Competing Ethno-Nationalism ....................................................... 10 China, the ‘Great Game’ and Ceasefire Economies in Kachin State, 1994-2011 ........................ 10 Ceasefire & Activism, 1994-2011 ................................................................................................ 11 Ceasefire & Activism in Kachin State, 1994-2011 ....................................................................... 12 China, the new ‘Great Game’ and Renewed Conflict in Kachin State ......................................... 13 Looking Ahead .......................................................................................................................... 16 Timeline ..................................................................................................................................... 18 References ................................................................................................................................ 20 © 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 3 Abbreviations BRI Belt and Road Initiative CPB Communist Party of Burma EEDY Education and Economic Development for Youth FDI Foreign Direct Investment KIA Kachin Independence Army KIO Kachin Independence Organization Jinghpaw: The language spoken in Kachin State Tatmadaw: Myanmar’s national armed forces © 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs Introductioni Myanmar has seen numerous violent In late 2018, an apparently uprising in recent decades (Smith, 2007; counterproductive attempt by Chinese Sadan, 2016). Ceasefire agreements have diplomats to pressure Kachin leaders into been struck with a number of armed actors supporting the hydropower project resulted but these have been focused on economic in an declaration of independence by development, rather than on resolving overseas Kachin organisations with close political grievances. The underlying notion links to the Kachin Independence Army guiding this strategy has been that weak (KIA)—a Kachin armed group and one of the economic development rather than poor country’s largest insurgency groups active in governance or lack of political inclusion lies the Sino-Myanmar border areas (Lawi at the heart of local opposition (Brenner, Weng, 2019). This was followed by large- 2017). Incentivised by the plentiful natural scale protests in Myitkyina, the capital of resources present in conflict-affected, Kachin State, and a flurry of statements minority-ethnic dominated states, Chinese released by Kachin community leaders ventures have dominated investments in denouncing plans to resume work on the these areas. One of the more spectacular project. Although a temporary suspension infrastructure projects funded by a Chinese of the fighting between the Kachin company is the Myitsone Dam in Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and the State, on which work was suspended in 2011 central government was in place at the following public protest (Kiik, 2016b; time, these incidents—the pressure Kirchherr, Charles and Walton, 2017). leveraged by China and the response this generated among Kachin communities— This paper shows how the government’s contributed to increased tension along the attempts to root out discontent by two countries’ shared border which quickly economic means paradoxically provided a saw a proliferation of military activity. breeding ground for the emergence of a vocal civil society able to disrupt and These events raise questions about the contest not only the state, but also its relationship between social movements, powerful neighbour, China. The cessation of armed actors and development projects in hostilities and the granting of limited Myanmar, and suggest that regional territorial autonomy resulted in the aspirations for economic development are expansion of activist networks that could be occurring alongside deeply held communal mobilised for political ends. As discontent concerns about such investments. The about the negative impacts of the ceasefire Myanmar government has embarked on an deals grew, disparate groups and individual ambitious reform project, which involves a activists united in protest against the move from a military regime to a semi- Myitsone Dam. The dam had for many in democratic government and a nationwide Kachin State become symptomatic of the ceasefire process. This has resulted in an mistreatment endured by local influx of foreign investment, much of which communities. This demonstrates that is focused on development projects in the development interventions in conflict- country’s resource-rich but conflict-ridden affected areas must be attentive to local ethnic minority states. However, as the case grievances, or risk increasing tensions and of the Myitsone dam illustrates, possibly provoking a return to fighting. Yet, investments in economic infrastructure there is nothing to suggest that either projects, while ostensibly aimed at Myanmar or China have learned from its increasing stability through economic past failures in this regard. concessions and regional development, © 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs may in fact increase tension and insecurity. resume work on the Myitsone Dam. As such they challenge the notion that a de- However, the Chinese and Myanmar escalation of conflict automatically governments have vastly underestimated accompanies development. Instead, as has the extent to which communities living happened in Kachin State, the opposite can along the countries’ shared border happen. understand and contest Chinese-sponsored development projects. In fact, social The 1994 ceasefire between the Myanmar movements in Kachin State, enabled by the armed forces (Tatmadaw) and the KIO, as absence of active fighting and aided by a well as its armed wing the KIA, provides a new generation of Kachin military leaders cautionary tale. The ceasefire, which ended dedicated to rejuvenating public support for almost 20 years of conflict, was promoted the Kachin cause, have been incentivised by by a series of economic incentives but economic and political grievances—in ignored the underlying grievances that particular the Myitsone Dam backed by informed the outbreak of conflict in the first China. place. In fact, the assumption that rebels can be co-opted using economic incentives Thus, the case of the Myitsone Dam alone, supported in particular by Chinese illustrates the way in which regional investment, guided many, if not all, of the geopolitical relations affect the everyday Myanmar government’s negotiations with lives of people living on the periphery of minority ethnic armed groups in the late states, and inform both violent and non- 1980s and early 1990s. By reallocating violent forms of dissent. Exposing these access to economic resources, these deals relationships allows examination of how facilitated new forms of regional socio-economic structures shape action, partnerships, often to the detriment of local and demonstrates the interplay between minority ethnic communities. The increased regional dynamics, deeply held communal state or state-sanctioned military presence anxieties and conflict. Unless these in previously ‘liberated’ territories, dynamics are fully understood, and the ostensibly to clear the way