central america

A Workshop Abandoned: WikiLeaks, U.S. Empire, and Central America By Kirsten Weld

entral America has long served as the work- 20th century, gunboat diplomacy in the circum-­Caribbean shop of U.S. empire.1 The tiny isthmus has gave way to dollar diplomacy and the Good Neighbor Cbeen made to function as a bustling laboratory Policy, when the United States realized that its aims could where the United States has experimented with regime be realized on the cheap. In the early 21st century, the change, economic restructuring, unsavory yet pragmatic­ United States may grumble about the electoral victories of alliances, electoral sleight-of-hand, and imperial sorties Mauricio Funes in El Salvador or Daniel Ortega in Nicara- designed as test runs for longer-term interventions in gua, but it will not send in the troops to depose them. Is the Middle East. But what happens to the workshop this the stench of a decadent, lordly rot or the high-octane when the work is done or when it moves overseas? fumes of a sleek, supercharged imperium? The U.S. diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks in November 2010 answer that question, painting a picture s late as 2003, when the leaked cables be- of diplomatic distraction, neglect, and half-heartedness. gin, U.S. priorities were crystal clear: to se- The cables, which range from late 2003 through 2010, A cure passage of the Central American Free reveal that the U.S. government maintained the same Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR); to obtain local approval hostile, Cold War–steeped attitudes toward Nicaragua’s for the extension of Central Skies, the joint regional Sandinistas (FSLN) and El Salvador’s Farabundo Martí counter-­drug military operation; and to finalize Article Liberation Front (FMLN) as in decades past. But what 98 agreements, the heavily Bush-promoted bilateral emerges from an examination of the cables is a sense of immunity accords aimed to protect U.S. citizens from the fading and erosion, not the forward-looking expan- prosecution in the International Criminal Court.4 These sion, of U.S. engagement in the region. were concrete, pre-9/11 objectives, and as 20th-century George W. Bush took office in 2001 having promised U.S.–Latin American history shows, defined objectives deep involvement with Latin America, articulating bold have met with defined results more often than not. plans for the continent—and in Spanish, no less.2 But the The United States was largely able to accomplish this events of 9/11 derailed the president’s journey down the narrow agenda, since it remained willing to exercise sig- Pan-American Highway, and in the ensuing years—which nificant diplomatic pressure in matters that directly af- were exceedingly busy for Central Americans, featuring a fected its own economy. CAFTA-DR was approved over coup, an escalating drug war, a new regional free trade the protests of local labor federations, which rightly agreement, and controversial presidential elections—U.S. doubted their governments’ ability and willingness to policy toward Central America sunk largely into decay. enforce the agreement’s labor provisions. And in what This is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, it might well has thus far proved largely a vain effort to curtail the be an opportunity for Central Americans to put a little activities of narcotraffickers, isthmian governments em- more distance between the sardines and the shark, to use braced the counter-drug funding and training pushed the metaphor of former Guatemalan president Juan José by the United States. Voices of dissent did emerge—for Arévalo.3 But on the other hand, it may mean that the in- example, in Guatemala, surrounding the renewal of its stitutionalization of a Pax Neoliberal has simply replaced branch of Central Skies. But when left-leaning parties the need for ugly, costly military intervention. In the early questioned the military appropriation in Guatemala’s Congress, “close, last-minute Embassy coordination” Kirsten Weld teaches Latin American history at Brandeis with key members of the Guatemalan Republican Front ­University. She is currently writing two books about Guatemala. (FRG) party, including the daughter of former ­dictator

SPRING 2012 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 73 Efraín Ríos Montt, “saved the day.” As the Embassy for a reform-minded,­ democratic candidate to win the crowed in its report back to the State Department, these elections.”6 The Embassy also created “rap sheets” on loyal deputies “fed our arguments directly onto the floor Ortega and the Sandinista party, “highlighting their sys- of the Congress.”5 That Guatemalan conservatives should tematic crimes and abuses,” for use with domestic and “feed” U.S. positions into the country’s legislature, at the international interlocutors.7 This was what “democracy U.S. Embassy’s behest, was certainly a mark of continu- promotion” looked like on the ground. ity or fealty to old friends, rather than of change. But while the United States threatened to reconsider But local embassies could not rely on such pliant aid programs in the event of a Sandinista victory, there local auxiliaries tipping the scales unless the scales al- was no risk of a Contra-style invasion—no will to effect ready favored pro-U.S. leaders and parties. In the first regime change as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. As The years covered by the WikiLeaks cables, this was not a Christian Science Monitor noted, “some Nicaraguan ana- problem; presidents like El Salvador’s Tony Saca, of the lysts claim that the reporting in the leaked cables reads far-right ARENA party, and Guatemala’s Óscar Berger, a too much like a Facebook post to embarrass Ortega,­ pro-business technocrat, were willing partners in trade who’s heard it all before and developed a thick hide in liberalization and security cooperation. the process. If anything, pundits say, the US diplomatic The year 2006, however, saw Latin America’s electoral ­ mission could find itself in a tight spot for having its landscape shaken up, as viable, left-leaning presidential cards tipped and exposing the limits of their hand.”8 candidates emerged from Nicaragua to Argentina and Even in El Salvador, which Embassy officials considered Latin Americans throughout the hemisphere cast their “our closest friend in the Western Hemisphere,” the Unit- votes for new approaches to achieving social and eco- ed States did not move to prevent the democratic election nomic justice. In the U.S. diplomatic imagination, the of FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes.9 South America’s left- influence of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez—not the rejec- ward turn had heightened El Salvador’s strategic impor- tion of the Washington Consensus—loomed large in tance—Ecuadoran president Rafael Correa had pushed to this paradigm shift. In a previous era, the United States close the U.S. Southern Command base at Manta, thus might have sent military advisers to direct counter- increasing the role of Comalapa, SouthCom’s Cooperative campaigns or at least weapons to the defenders of the Security Location in El Salvador—but still, the Embassy friendly status quo. But, constrained by more modern more or less sat back while Salvadorans rejected the hard- expectations and their own congressional restrictions right ARENA status quo by a slim margin. on harder-nosed projections of U.S. influence, the of- This was all the more surprising because the Embassy, ficials consigned to the imperial backwaters of Central and the Bush administration in particular, had enjoyed America­ did little more than issue boilerplate threats an uncommonly close relationship with Saca. Saca was to cut off remittances and aid, fume about the “Com- so virulent in his anti-Communism that he boasted of munists,” and watch as both El Salvador and Nicara- smoking “only Padrón cigars, made by Miami Cubans, gua elected presidents deeply distasteful to the United and would never smoke a Cohiba.”10 It was Saca who States, knowing that those presidents still needed U.S. led his military into Bush’s Coalition of the Willing, dollars in order to manage their struggling economies. despite polls indicating that more than 80% of Salva- In Nicaragua, where FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega dorans opposed participating.11 And as municipal and competed successfully for the presidency, the Embas- legislative elections approached in 2006, the Embassy sy cables show that the United States continued to go very much hoped to prevent gains at the polls by the through the motions of the 1980s, remaining obsessed FMLN, which it characterized as “mired in disarray and with destroying the Sandinistas. As Ambassador Paul obsolete 1970s-era revolutionary rhetoric.”12 Trivelli wrote, “Mission personnel were very clear about Given all this, one would imagine that the United the dangers of an FSLN victory in the 2006 Presiden- States would do everything in its power to head off tial elections.” Imagining Nicaragua as another Cuba, an FMLN victory. And for a moment, it seemed that it Trivelli speculated that “a Sandinista win would like- would. Once Funes, perceived as an electable moderate, ly result in capital flight, a setback in open markets, was named presidential candidate for the FMLN, U.S. an anti-US foreign policy and an immigration crisis, officials began meeting with Salvadoran business lead- as many Nicaraguans would likely seek sanctuary in ers who, in 2008, sought to “develop a ‘Plan B’ in order the United States.” For these reasons, the ambassador to ‘save El Salvador’ should Funes win the election.” concluded, “timing is crucial for the receipt of elec- “The fact that they are taking a long view and attempt- tion and other financial assistance to bolster chances ing to fireproof El Salvador from feared FMLN mischief

74 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS VOL. 45, NO. 1 is reassuring,” wrote then ambassador Charles Glazer in tion of those officials consigned to posts that were nei- a June 2008 cable.13 ther pleasant nor important. Not even the cables’ pe- But the Embassy’s direct efforts to forestall Funes’s riodic bluster about potential Iranian incursions into ascent fizzled, whether from apathy or fatigue. When Central America provided a sense of imperial purpose. Funes met with the ambassador during his candida- The rhetoric of the Cold War offered a sense of mission, cy, the presidential hopeful both spoke admiringly of an interpretive frame for the conflictive politics unfold- ­Fidel Castro and mentioned being an animal lover. The ing around the Embassy. But the United States’ commit- hardest-­hitting response that the deputy chief of mission ment, the resources, were simply not there. could muster was a canned denunciation of the Cuban This is what makes exceptions to the knee-jerk regime—and the fatuous allegation that Cuban state se- ­Nicaragua/El Salvador pattern so interesting. In Guate- curity had broken into his home and poisoned his pet mala, where the militant left was thoroughly decimated while he was stationed at the U.S. Interests Section in by U.S.-backed state terror during the 1970s and 1980s, Havana.14 Such man-bites-dog tales accomplished little; and where the survivors of that slaughter showed less Funes and the FMLN prevailed in the 2009 presidential affinity for Chávez and the Bolivarian Alternative for elections, despite the Embassy’s unease about Funes’s the Americas (ALBA) than their neighbors, Embassy candidacy and ideological foundations. officials reversed their 1980s tune, instead staking out In Honduras, the dated notion among U.S. function- progressive positions on transitional justice. aries that leftist politics is somehow inherently anti- This was due, in part, to the particularly enlightened democratic again proved its persistence in the absence tenure of Ambassador Stephen McFarland, whose ca- of an updated perspective. Although the United States bles read as sober, analytical assessments of Guatemalan condemned the 2009 coup, which the Embassy in Te- national affairs. When lawyer Rodrigo Rosenberg com- gucigalpa considered “illegal and unconstitutional,” it mitted suicide in 2009 after publicly blaming his death refused to push seriously for the reinstatement of ousted on a conspiracy directed by left-leaning president Ál- president Manuel Zelaya.15 Washington’s consternation varo Colom, the Embassy held back, waiting to hear the about the perceived “Chávez axis” was evident in many conclusions of the United Nations’ International Com- of the leaked cables on the subject. Yet the advocacy of mission Against Impunity. It did not seize the opportu- old-guard Cold Warrior hawks like Otto Reich, together nity to tar a progressive head of state, as the Guatemalan with the power of inertia, led U.S. officials to see Ro- upper classes desired. Instead, over the years McFarland berto Micheletti’s illegitimate presidency and the deeply brought the power of his office to bear in pressuring the compromised election yielding Porfirio Lobo’s victory as Guatemalan military to release war-era archives, sup- lesser evils than Zelaya’s return.16 porting the prosecutions of military and police officials Evincing the boredom of those U.S. officials con- for extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances, signed to post-9/11 Central America, Ambassador and accompanying the exhumations of mass graves.18 Hugo Llorens penned a cable titled “Who’s Who of the It remains to be seen how this concern will square with Honduran Coup” in which he broke down by color the the security collaboration being pushed as part of the key Honduran players in both the anti-Zelaya and pro- drug war, and how it will fare under the rule of General Zelaya camps. (It is not difficult to guess which faction Otto Pérez Molina, who is widely accused of complicity Llorens designated as the “White Team” and which he in the very crimes whose investigation the Embassy has tagged the “Red Team,” or “reds” for short.) He went on supported. ­(It is the Embassy’s position that Pérez ­Molina, to assign a shade of either white or red to individuals “no babe in the woods,” has intimate knowledge of more on the respective sides, according to their level of in- than a few unsolved mysteries, including the whereabouts fluence in Honduran affairs. Most of the powerbrokers of missing 1980s military plans and the final resting place in question were assigned subtle shades, such as lilac, of Efraín Bámaca, the slain guerrilla commander married ivory-blush, almond, or alabaster, but Rafael Alegria, a to U.S. citizen ­Jennifer Harbury—see “Guatemala’s Presi- well-known peasant activist and Vía Campesina Inter- dent Under the Lens,” page 41.)19 During one meeting nacional leader whom Llorens disparaged as “a Chávez with U.S. officials, Pérez Molina remarked that “human proxy,” was given a more prosaic hue: “blood red.”17 rights seemed to be the Obama administration’s dominant Did U.S. officials in Afghanistan have the spare time priority while for him, the commercial relationship be- in which to develop such elaborate color spectra? Prob- tween the two countries was the most important issue.”20 ably not. It was a terribly unimaginative approach to But the drug war, the economy, and human rights are 21st-century diplomacy, one that reflected the frustra- deeply intertwined. This is especially true in Guatemala,

SPRING 2012 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 75 where the homicide rate in the capital city (to say nothing stance has emerged to replace that of the 1980s, and in of the porous border regions or the narco-controlled Pe- the cables, it shows. tén) averages 113 per 100,000 inhabitants and where, as There is some talk now of a U.S. turn back to the region, one cable reported, “the New York street value of the 300 of the possibility that the Central American workshop may metric tons of cocaine estimated to have transited Guate- swing back into operation stocked with new tools. With mala in 2009 is greater than the national budget.”21 These the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan winding down, top U.S. are problems for which neither the Embassy nor Pérez defense officials are promising a renewed engagement in Molina’s hard-line cabinet has any credible solutions. Latin America, making use of recently decommissioned The massive out-migration of Central Americans to Special Operations Forces and high-tech military innova- the United States is yet another difficult legacy of the tions to extend the reach of the United States southward. violence of the 1980s, and one that, the cables show, For the time being, as Defense Secretary Leon Panetta bedevils diplomatic relations. Again, the United States asserts, this will involve “low-cost and small-footprint engages in those Central American issues that have an approaches,” perhaps an expansion of the increasingly impact on U.S. domestic affairs, such as the war on drone-prosecuted drug war to match the United States’ drugs and immigration. From tense exchanges over the increasingly drone-prosecuted border enforcement.24 granting of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Central But the workshop, it seems, will not be stocked with American nationals to expressions of outrage by Cen- new ideas. Obama has largely continued the Bush agenda,­ tral American governments at the shocking treatment of or lack thereof, in Central America. And the Republican migrants in the United States, immigration has been a candidates vying to replace him view the region either consistent stumbling block. with Cold War eyes or through 9/11-tinted glasses. ­(Gin- Responding to H.R. 4437, the 2005 legislation to grich: Chávez is “a mortal enemy of the United States”; crack down on immigrants proposed by Jim Sensen- Romney: “Right now Hezbollah . . . is working through- brenner and passed by the U.S. House of Representatives, out Latin America, in Venezuela, in Mexico . . . which Eduardo Stein, the former vice president of Guatemala, poses a very significant and imminent threat to the Unit- told Embassy officials: “It seems like an affront to all of ed States of America”; Santorum: “What’s going on in Latin America that a government that calls itself friend Central and South America—I’m very concerned about and partner wants only our money and our markets, but the militant socialists and the radical Islamists joining to- views our people as a pest. . . . They are only interested gether, bonding together.”25) Fortunately, bluster on the in our resources and riches, not our people.”22 Punitive stump rarely transforms into substance. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids of As far as Central Americans are concerned, the wounds meatpacking plants employing undocumented Central of the Cold War cannot be healed; the best hope is that Americans directly affected the livelihoods of those rely- they be used to inspire a truly new regional agenda. That ing on remittances and the integrity of migrant families. has yet to occur, and in certain ways, notably in the levels And in 2005, when the Minuteman Project, a group of everyday violence, Central America feels as unsettled of vigilante extremists, took it upon themselves to hunt as ever. But U.S. distraction and disinterest can be and Latin American migrants along the U.S.-Mexico border, have been used to Central Americans’ advantage. What- U.S. officials despaired of the news story’s corrosive dip- ever the flaws of Funes and Ortega, both El Salvador and lomatic effects. “It is almost impossible to overstate the Nicaragua chose their presidents in spite of U.S. disap- damage [the Minutemen phenomenon] is doing,” wrote proval. With U.S. support, Guatemala is putting war then ambassador to Guatemala John R. Hamilton. “Gua- criminals on trial, or at least it was before the inaugura- temalans feel deeply humiliated by what they have been tion of hard-line president Pérez Molina. Migrants and seeing on TV and hearing on the radio. . . . Op-ed writ- their families are standing up for their rights both in the ers of left, right, and center are finding in our inability to United States and at home. Gunboats have yet to depose put a stop to the ‘hunting’ of their co-nationals echoes of Chávez, Ortega, Funes, Morales, or Correa, and even an US ‘imperial behavior’ of an era long past.”23 internal military coup against a leftist leader in ­Honduras was met with little more than stock disappointment by choes of U.S. imperial behavior—whether Central America’s pater americanus. Diminishing U.S. in the pushing of neoliberal trade deals, the ­interest translates into increasing Central American op- E attempts to sway Latin American elections portunity. It remains to be seen whether the region’s insti- rightward, or the selective concern for human rights— tutions, politicians, and social movements are equipped still ring throughout Central America. In fact, no new to make the most of it.

76 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS VOL. 45, NO. 1 1. Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, Salvador cable, 06SANSALVADOR2953, Decem- WikiLeaks; Stephen McFarland, “Guatemalan the United States, and the Rise of the New Impe- ber 15, 2006, released by WikiLeaks. Court Sets Precedent With Forced Disappearance rialism (Henry Holt, 2007). 12. Michael Butler, “El Salvador: Six Months From Elec- Conviction,” Embassy Guatemala cable, 09GUA- 2. George W. Bush, Spanish-language campaign tions, ARENA Climbs/FMLN Self-Destructs,” Em- TEMALA890, September 16, 2009, released by speech delivered August 25, 2000, available at bassy San Salvador cable, 05SANSALVADOR2507, WikiLeaks; Stephen McFarland, “Exhumations archive.newsmax.com. September 9, 2005, released by WikiLeaks. Help Guatemalan Families Find Closure,” Em- 3. Juan José Arévalo, The Shark and the Sardines 13. Charles Glazer, “Emerging Plan B Should the bassy Guatemala cable, 08GUATEMALA1458, (L. Stewart, 1961). FMLN Win the Presidential Elections,” Embassy November 21, 2008, released by WikiLeaks. 4. John Hamilton, “Embassy Guatemala’s 90-Day San Salvador cable, 08SANSALVADOR843, June 19. Stephen McFarland, “Opposition Leader Com- Plan: First Quarter 2004,” Embassy Guatemala 14, 2008, released by WikiLeaks. plains of Smear Campaign,” Embassy Guatemala cable, 04GUATEMALA25, January 8, 2004. 14. Robert Blau, “FMLN Candidate Funes on Wire- cable, 10GUATEMALA49, February 22, 2010, re- 5. Bruce Wharton, “Guatemala Extends Authoriza- taps, Partisanship, Debates, and More,” Embassy leased by WikiLeaks. tion for US Military CD Operations,” Embassy San Salvador cable, 08SANSALVADOR1037, Au- 20. Stephen McFarland, “WHA DAS Reynoso’s Visit Guatemala cable, 04GUATEMALA360, February gust 29, 2008, released by WikiLeaks. Reaffirms Partnership with Guatemala,” Embassy 13, 2004, released by WikiLeaks. 15. Hugo Llorens, “Open and Shut: The Case of the Guatemala cable, 09GUATEMALA1035, Decem- 6. Paul Trivelli, “State and USAID Policy Planning Di- Honduran Coup,” Embassy Tegucigalpa cable, ber 24, 2009, released by WikiLeaks. rectors Visit Nicaragua to Assess US Assistance 09TEGUCIGALPA645, June 24, 2009, released by 21. Stephen McFarland, “Guatemala: Recent Crime Programs,” Embassy Managua cable, 06MANA- WikiLeaks. Events and Trends,” Embassy Guatemala cable, GUA20, January 5, 2006, released by WikiLeaks. 16. Paul Trivelli, “Ortega’s First 100 Days—Autocratic 10GUATEMALA41, February 11, 2010, released 7. Paul Trivelli, “Nicaragua’s Most Wanted Part I: Trends Draw Concern,” Embassy Managua cable, by WikiLeaks. The Crimes of Daniel Ortega and his Family,” Em- 07MANAGUA1067, April 25, 2007, released by 22. James Derham, “Guatemala Vice-President bassy Managua cable, 06MANAGUA1002, May WikiLeaks. Slams Immigration Bill,” Embassy Guatemala ca- 5, 2006, released by WikiLeaks. 17. Hugo Llorens, “Who’s Who of the Honduran Coup,” ble, 06GUATEMALA9, January 3, 2006, released 8. Tim Rogers, “How WikiLeaks May Give Nicara- Embassy Tegucigalpa cable, 09TEGUCIGALPA617, by WikiLeaks. gua’s Daniel Ortega an Upper Hand With US,” The June 17, 2009, released by WikiLeaks. 23. John Hamilton, “Immigration in US-Guatemalan Christian Science Monitor, December 8, 2010. 18. See, for example, Stephen McFarland, “Minister Relations: Minutemen are Poisoning the Well,” 9. Charles Glazer, “El Salvador: The Case For Major of Defense Under Pressure to Turn Over Two Miss- US Embassy cable, 05GUATEMALA888, April 8, Non-NATO Ally Status,” Embassy San Salvador ing Military Plans,” Embassy Guatemala cable, 2005, released by WikiLeaks. cable, 07SANSALVADOR2229, November 5, 09GUATEMALA222, March 11, 2009, released by 24. Jennifer Rizzo, “US ‘Budget Dust’ and Latin 2007, released by WikiLeaks. WikiLeaks; Stephen McFarland, “Retired Colonel America,” January 9, 2012, CNN.com. 10. Ibid. Sentenced to 53 Years in Ground-Breaking War 25. Ibid. and Andrew O’Reilly, “Newt Takes Obama to 11. Douglas Barclay, “El Salvador: Assembly Votes Crimes Trial,” Embassy Guatemala cable, 09GUA- Task over Chávez and Castro,” January 25, 2012, for One-Year Extension in Iraq,” Embassy San TEMALA1023, December 11, 2009, released by latino.foxnews.com.

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